


**BRNO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY**

**Faculty of Electrical Engineering  
and Communication**

**BACHELOR'S THESIS**

**Brno, 2022**

**Gabriela Gajdošová**



# **BRNO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY**

VYSOKÉ UČENÍ TECHNICKÉ V BRNĚ

## **FACULTY OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND COMMUNICATION**

FAKULTA ELEKTROTECHNIKY  
A KOMUNIKAČNÍCH TECHNOLOGIÍ

## **DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES**

ÚSTAV JAZYKŮ

## **SPEECH ACTS PERFORMED BY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STUDENTS IN ONLINE DEBATES**

ŘEČOVÉ AKTY REALIZOVANÉ STUDENTY INFORMAČNÍCH TECHNOLOGIÍ  
V ONLINE DEBATÁCH

### **BACHELOR'S THESIS**

BAKALÁŘSKÁ PRÁCE

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# Bakalářská práce

bakalářský studijní obor **Angličtina v elektrotechnice a informatice**

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### POKYNY PRO VYPRACOVÁNÍ:

Vymezte koncepci komunikačních aspektů řečových aktů v argumentativních diskuzích a analyzujte, jak studenti informačních technologií realizují řečové akty v online debatách.

### DOPORUČENÁ LITERATURA:

- 1) Bach, K., & Harnish, R. M. (1979). Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- 2) Searle, J. (1979). Expression and meaning. Studies in the theory of speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 3) Van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (1983). Speech acts in argumentative discussions. Dordrecht: Foris Publications Holland.

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## **Abstract**

This bachelor's thesis aims to frame the concept of speech acts and discuss issues related to their interactional aspects in argumentative discussions. The theoretical part of the thesis is written in the style of a literature review, beginning with an explanation of basic terminology of speech acts and defining the illocutionary force and its indicators. It also provides a detailed comparison of three different approaches to the analysis of speech acts and describes their roles using the model of a critical discussion. The analytical part of the thesis focuses on the practical application of the theoretical concepts. It defines the rules of online debates, describes their phases and provides an analysis of boosters and hedges and speech acts based on transcripts of the debates. The results of the analysis are displayed in tables, supplemented with illustrative examples and then discussed.

## **Key words**

Speech act, illocutionary act, illocutionary force, hedge, booster, analysis, online debates, IT students, comparison, frequency, direct speech act, indirect speech act

## **Abstrakt**

Cílem této bakalářské práce je vymezit koncept řečových aktů a diskutovat problematiku související s jejich interakčními aspekty v argumentativních diskuzích. Teoretická část práce je psána formou literární rešerše, počínaje vysvětlením základní terminologie řečových aktů a definováním ilokuční síly a jejich ukazatelů. Dále srovnává tři různé přístupy k analýze řečových aktů a popisuje jejich roli v rámci modelu kritické diskuze. Analytická část práce se zaměřuje na praktickou aplikaci teoretických konceptů. Představuje pravidla online debat, popisuje jejich fáze a poskytuje analýzu intenzifikátorů a modalizátorů a řečových aktů na základě transkriptů debat. Výsledky analýzy jsou zobrazeny v tabulkách, doplněny ilustrativními příklady a následně diskutovány.

## **Klíčová slova**

Řečový akt, ilokuční akt, ilokuční síla, modalizátor, intenzifikátor, analýza, online debaty, studenti IT, porovnání, četnost, přímý řečový akt, nepřímý řečový akt



## Rozšířený abstrakt

Tato bakalářská práce se zabývá koncepcí řečových aktů, která je součástí každodenní komunikace. Podle Austina (1962), každý výrok, který předneseme, zahrnuje lokuční, ilokuční nebo perlokuční akty. S těmito akty se spojují i pojmy jako ilokuční síla, intenzifikátory a modalizátory apod. V komunikaci se vyskytují s touto koncepcí související témata, která jsou v této práci vysvětlena a následně zkoumána. Prvním dílčím cílem této bakalářské práce je popsat teorii řečových aktů, srovnat tři různé klasifikace ilokučních řečových aktů, vymežit role intenzifikátorů a modalizátorů a charakterizovat přímé a nepřímé řečové akty, prvky argumentace a pravidla kritických diskuzí. Druhým dílčím cílem práce je analyzovat výskyt řečových aktů, intenzifikátorů a modalizátorů a přímé a nepřímé řečové akty v online debatách studentů informačních technologií.

Teoretická část práce je rozdělena do čtyř hlavních kapitol. V první kapitole je podrobně vysvětlena teorie řečových aktů, kterou v roce 1962 představil John L. Austin. V rámci této teorie uvedl tři základní řečové akty – lokuční, ilokuční a perlokuční akt. Dále se zde dozvíme o pojmech spojených s řečovými akty, jakými jsou například performativní slovesa, která explicitně popisují realizované řečové akty. S řečovými akty jsou spojeny i prostředky vyjádření ilokuční síly (IFIDs), které pomocí performativních sloves a jiných prostředků ovlivňují ilokuční sílu. Problematika ilokuční síly je diskutována v další části této kapitoly. Může být zvýrazněna nebo naopak zeslabena za pomoci intenzifikátorů a modalizátorů, které jsou prostředky používané k vyhnutí se konfliktu v komunikaci nebo k dosažení vzájemné dohody. Poslední důležitou částí této kapitoly jsou přímé a nepřímé řečové akty, prostřednictvím kterých můžeme ilokuční sílu vyjadřovat přímo nebo nepřímo na základě vztahů mezi formou a komunikační funkcí výroků. Druhá kapitola se zabývá třemi klasifikacemi ilokučních řečových aktů podle Austina (1962), Searla (1975) a Bacha a Harnishe (1979), jejich charakterizací, rozdělením na jednotlivé kategorie a rozdíly mezi nimi. Třetí kapitola této práce je věnována funkcím řečových aktů v argumentativních diskuzích. Je zde popsán vztah ilokučních a perlokučních aktů, princip kritických diskuzí, jejich fáze a druhy řečových aktů, které se v těchto fázích vyskytují, spolu s jejich funkcemi. Čtvrtá a poslední kapitola teoretické části charakterizuje způsoby, kterými lidé argumentují, a jejich použití. Dále jsou zde za pomoci diagramů popsány hlavní prvky a struktura argumentace, a tvrzení a návrhy, které účastníci debat používají k podpoře svých argumentů.

Analytická část práce sestává z jedné kapitoly a několika podkapitol. Analýza začíná

popisem metodologie výzkumu, který jsem provedla na základě tří nahrávek online debat studentů informačních technologií v předmětu Angličtina pro IT, které mi poskytla vyučující Mgr. Ing. Eva Ellederová, Ph.D. Tyto debaty byly nahrávány prostřednictvím Microsoft Teams během online vyučování v době pandemie COVID-19, a následně byly převedeny do formy transkriptů. Studentům, kteří byli po dvojicích rozděleni do dvou týmů – afirmativního a negativního, byla přidělena různá témata debat včetně přesně zadané struktury každé debaty s časovým rozdělením do jednotlivých fází. V první části výzkumu se zabývám počtem tokenů, slov a vět těchto tří debat. Následně tyto tři debaty analyzuji pomocí programu Sketch Engine, kde zkoumám výskyt intenzifikátorů a modalizátorů, uvádím jejich příklady a také příklady jejich kategorií. Další důležitou částí je analýza řečových aktů podle Searla v první debatě. V této části se věnuji identifikaci jednotlivých kategorií a podkategorií řečových aktů, jejich výskytu a shodě mezi fázemi debaty z teoretické části práce a fázemi, které byly studentům zadány vyučující. Rovněž jsou zde uvedeny příklady podkategorií řečových aktů. Dále analyzuji řečové akty v jedné konkrétní fázi debaty. Popisuji zde jejich komunikační funkce, důvody jejich použití účastníky debaty a cíle, kterých jejich použitím účastníci chtěli dosáhnout. V poslední podkapitole analytické části analyzuji přímé a nepřímé řečové akty ve druhé debatě. V jejím transkriptu tyto akty identifikuji, a následně uvádím jejich příklady, kde popisuji jejich funkce a důvody pro jejich klasifikaci jako přímé nebo nepřímé řečové akty.

Na konci tohoto výzkumu jsem dospěla k závěru, že studenti používají zejména jednoduchou slovní zásobu, protože komplikovanější intenzifikátory a modalizátory ze seznamu od Hylanda (2005) vůbec nepoužili. Studenti také častěji používali modalizátory. Důvodem těchto zjištění je snaha studentů vyhnout se kritice a neshodám se svými oponenty. Co se týče řečových aktů, výsledky ukazují největší výskyt reprezentativních řečových aktů, které jsou následovány direktivními, expresivními a komisivními řečovými akty. Deklarativní řečové akty v debatě nebyly použity. Kromě toho, fáze debaty uvedené v modelu kritické diskuze se s fázemi v praktické části práce shodují jen do určité míry, protože teorie popisuje spontánní argumentaci, zatímco fáze v praktické části mají zadaná přesná pravidla a trvání. Jelikož shoda jednotlivých fází není úplná, není úplná ani shoda v použití řečových aktů. Některé druhy se v jednotlivých fázích shodují, jiné ne. Další výsledky ukazují, že přímé řečové akty byly použity častěji než nepřímé řečové akty, protože argumentace je většinou uváděna přímo. Nepřímé řečové akty byly použity jako znak zdvořilosti, nejistoty, zmatení nebo jako řečnické otázky k uvedení argumentů.

Gajdošová, G. (2022). *Řečové akty realizované studenty informačních technologií v online debatách*. Brno: Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta elektrotechniky a komunikačních technologií. 64 s.

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## **Prohlášení**

Prohlašuji, že bakalářskou práci na téma *Řečové akty realizované studenty informačních technologií v online debatách* jsem vypracovala samostatně pod vedením vedoucí bakalářské práce a s použitím odborné literatury a dalších informačních zdrojů, které jsou všechny citovány v práci a uvedeny v seznamu literatury na konci práce.

Jako autorka uvedené bakalářské práce dále prohlašuji, že v souvislosti s vytvořením této práce jsem neporušila autorská práva třetích osob, zejména jsem nezasáhla nedovoleným způsobem do cizích autorských práv osobnostních a/nebo majetkových a jsem si plně vědoma následků porušení ustanovení § 11 a následujících zákona č. 121/2000 Sb., o právu autorském, o právech souvisejících s právem autorským a o změně některých zákonů (autorský zákon), ve znění pozdějších předpisů, včetně možných trestněprávních důsledků vyplývajících z ustanovení části druhé, hlavy VI. díl 4 Trestního zákoníku č. 40/2009 Sb.

V Brně dne 31.5.2022

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Gabriela Gajdošová

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## **Introduction**

The concept of speech acts is a long-discussed problem. It all started with the introduction of the theory of speech acts by Austin (1962) who defined three main types of speech acts and described five categories of illocutionary acts. His theory, however, was later questioned by Searle (1975), and Bach and Harnish (1979) who introduced their own concepts using various categories. The whole thesis revolves around these categories and their role in argumentative discussions.

I chose this topic mainly because of the frequent discussions related to the three concepts. I wanted to have each author's opinion in one place to be able to make a better comparison, and finally, choose one of them to carry out an analysis. Another reason is that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, lessons were in the form of online teaching and learning, the online debates being no exception. These debates are a perfect opportunity to put theory into practice and analyse and evaluate one of the approaches in greater detail.

This thesis is divided into two parts, a theoretical part and an analytical part. The theoretical part starts with the above-mentioned concepts of speech acts. Austin's theory is the main starting point of this thesis. For instance, speech act theory involves the concept of the modification of the illocutionary force, which is a way the speech acts can be interpreted. An important fact is that the illocutionary force can be either highlighted or reduced through attenuation and accentuation markers. These markers help the speakers achieve agreement, make controversial and difficult topics easier to talk about, or indicate uncertainty and doubt about certain issues. Boosters and hedges, as they are also referred to, are used frequently both consciously and subconsciously.

Direct and indirect speech acts are special kinds of speech acts where the meaning of the utterance produced can be understood either directly or has to be deduced by knowing the situation or context. For instance, asking a question to get an answer is a direct speech act, whereas asking a question and expecting an action is an example of an indirect speech act.

The theoretical part then continues with van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (2004) explanation of the roles of speech acts in argumentative discussions, including the description of a critical discussion and its individual stages where the interlocutors usually use a certain combination of speech acts.

The last chapter of the theoretical part frames the concept of a debate and its fundamental



elements. In general, all debates start with a piece of evidence and finish with a claim as the final element. Arguments have three types of structure in which different combinations of debate elements are used. Debaters also use different types of propositions to support their arguments during a debate. IDEA (2003) defines four categories of propositions to understand how arguments work and what propositions debaters usually put forward.

In the analytical part of this thesis, transcripts of three students' online debates are used to analyse the basic features of the three debates as well as the frequency of hedges and boosters with the help of the online corpus manager Sketch Engine. Illustrative examples of their categories, based on Urbanová's (2003) concept of the modification of the illocutionary force, are selected from the transcripts of the debates.

Moreover, the first debate is used to analyse the speech acts according to Searle's classification (1975), their occurrence in the debate along with their subcategories, their use in argumentation stages and their communicative functions. The second debate is used for the analysis of direct and indirect speech acts, i.e. which are used most frequently. In addition, examples are given with a commentary about their function and purpose.

# 1 Speech act theory

According to Nordquist (2019, July 03), the speech act theory is a subfield of pragmatics. It describes how words can be used to present information and execute actions. The speech act theory was first introduced by J. L. Austin in *How to Do Things with Words* in 1962. This theory was later developed by J. R. Searle (1969, 1971, 1975). A speech act can be divided into three types, which are listed and explained in Chapter 1.1.

## 1.1 Speech act schema

A locutionary act, an illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary act are terms given by John L. Austin (1962) to three aspects of what he called the “total speech act” in the total speech situation (p. 52).

In any situation, the action we perform by producing an utterance includes the three related acts. The first act, the *locutionary act*, is a basic act of utterance or producing a meaningful linguistic expression. You may fail to produce a locutionary act if you are not able to produce a meaningful utterance in a language. This means saying non-existent words. On the contrary, saying a sentence, such as “I’ve just made some coffee” (Yule, 1996, p. 48), counts as a locutionary act.

According to Austin (1962), the *illocutionary act* expresses the speaker’s intent, which is either informing, ordering, warning, or undertaking, for example: “The black cat is stupid” (Nordquist 2019, July 18). As Yule (1996) says, the illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance. One might utter to make a statement, an offer, an explanation, or for some other communicative purpose. This is known as the *illocutionary force* of the utterance. Searle (1971) argues that there is actually no difference between locutionary and illocutionary acts because, as he says, “I might utter the sentence to someone who does not hear me, and so I would not succeed in performing the illocutionary act of ordering him, even though I did perform a locutionary act” (p. 409). He further states that “the only distinction left for such sentences will be the distinction between that part of trying to perform an illocutionary act, and actually succeeding in performing an illocutionary act” (p. 409). Austin suggests that “I said to you that there’s a spider on your lap”, is an example of a locutionary act. Searle (1969), on the other hand, claims that producing that utterance is a prime example of an illocutionary act.

To sum up, Austin (1962) emphasized the conventional interpretation of speech acts referring the “total situation in which the utterance is issued” (p. 52), whereas Searle (1969, 1971) emphasized a psychological interpretation based on the speaker’s psychological states.

The *perlocutionary act* is such an act which has an effect on feelings, thoughts, or actions. Austin (1962) finds that the objective is to change the hearer’s mind by convincing, persuading, or deterring. Furthermore, Nordquist (2019, July 18) supports this claim with an example: “Please find the black cat”. This example shows the speaker’s aim to change the hearer’s behaviour – the speaker wants them to stop what they are doing and go find their cat (Nordquist 2019, July 18). Mostly, the speaker utters on the assumption that the hearer will recognize the action they wanted them to execute. This is known as the *perlocutionary effect* (Yule, 1996).

Of all mentioned above, the most discussed is the *illocutionary force*. This is due to the fact that the same locutionary act can be interpreted in several ways, such as a prediction, a promise, or a warning. The following sentence represents all three illocutionary forces mentioned: “I’ll see you later” (Yule, 1996).

The problem is that by producing an utterance with numerous meanings, the hearer might not recognize the intended illocutionary force. The solution, which is the term *felicity conditions* and *illocutionary force indicating device* will be addressed in Chapters 1.3 and 1.5.

## 1.2 Performative verb

In the speech act theory, as explained by Nordquist (2020, January 21), the *performative verb* can be understood as a verb that specifically defines the type of speech act being performed. While a speech act is an expression of intent, a performative verb is an action that bears intent. He also adds that a speech act can be in the form of a promise, invitation, apology, request, warning, forbiddance, and others. Verbs accomplishing any of these examples are performative verbs.

Here are a few examples (Nordquist 2020, January 21):

- *As your lawyer, your brother, and your friend, I highly **recommend** that you get a better lawyer.*
- *We **forbid** any course that says we restrict free speech.*

- *'I declare,' he said, 'with the mamma I got, it's a wonder I turned out to be such a nice boy!'*

A similar point of view is presented by Austin (1962). He explains that, as he calls it, the performative sentence, or just a *performative*, is a type of sentence, which contains “humdrum verbs in the first person singular present indicative active” (p. 5). He further claims that these sentences do not describe or report anything, are not true or false, and that the uttering of these sentences is a part of the performing of an action, for example:

- *I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife.* (as uttered during a marriage ceremony)
- *I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.* (as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem)
- *I give and bequeath my watch to my brother.* (as uttered in a will)

Finally, Austin comments on the above-listed examples as follows, “to utter the sentence is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it” (p. 6).

### 1.3 Illocutionary force indicating device

As suggested in Chapter 1.1, *the illocutionary force indicating device* (IFID) is an effective way to indicate or highlight the illocutionary force. Referring to Yule (1996), one way to indicate the illocutionary force in a sentence is by explicitly naming the illocutionary act being performed using a performative verb, see the example below:

- *I (performative verb) you that...*

Vendler (1980) supports this claim: “The function of a performative verb is to mark the illocutionary force of a speech act” (p. 274). According to Yule (1996), if a performative verb such as “promise” or “warn” is inserted in the sentence shown above, the IFID is very clear. He states that, however, the speakers do not always perform the speech acts so explicitly. Sometimes, for instance, they may only describe the speech act being performed:

- *Him: Can I talk to Mary?*
- *Her: No, she's not here.*
- *Him: I'm asking you – can I talk to her?*

- *Her: And I'm telling you – SHE'S NOT HERE!*

As Yule (1996) notes, “in this scenario, each speaker has described, and drawn attention to, the illocutionary force (‘ask’ and ‘tell’) of their utterances”, and he further explains that “most of the time, however, there is no performative verb mentioned” (p. 50). According to him, other IFIDs besides performative verbs are word order, stress, and intonation, as shown below (p. 50):

- *You're going! (I tell you you are going)*
- *You're going? (I request confirmation)*
- *Are you going? (I ask you if you are going)*

While intonation and other IFIDs might be used to indicate the illocutionary force, the utterance also must be produced under certain conditions in order to have the intended illocutionary force (see Chapter 1.5).

Bierwisch (1980) supports the previous claims of both Yule and Vendler. He says that IFIDs are “elements which more or less directly determine the illocutionary force of the speech act in which they are used” (p. 1), and he lists two main types of IFIDs that are fairly identical with those listed by Yule (1996). The first type includes performative formulas like “I promise you to” or “I request that”, and the second type is represented by sentence types like imperatives or interrogatives.

Bierwisch (1980), as well as Yule (1996), lists examples of both IFID types:

- *I promise you to be there before you. (performative)*
- *I request that you come in the evening. (performative)*
- *Could you come in the evening? (interrogative)*
- *Come in the evening! (imperative)*

#### **1.4 Attenuation and accentuation of illocutionary force**

Urbanová (2003) observes that the illocutionary force is under constant modification due to the two factors, “counteracting notions” or “discourse tactics” influencing the weight of the message – *attenuation* and *accentuation*, “coexist, thus creating a tension, which can contribute substantially to the dynamic flow of communication” (p. 67). Hyland (1998) refers to these notions as *hedges* and *boosters* and finds that they are “communicative

strategies for increasing or reducing the force of statements” (p. 350). Urbanová (2003) further explains that attenuation, otherwise known as hedging, is an approach that weakens the illocutionary force, which could lead to a loss of face in certain situations and make the communication between a listener and a hearer unsustainable. In other words, the main point of attenuation is the elimination of conflict in communication in accordance with the concept of negative politeness. On the other hand, accentuation is “a common discourse tactic applied very frequently to achieve positive politeness and solidarity, less frequently to reinforce negative attitudes in a frank, straightforward, casual face-to-face exchange of views” (Urbanová, 2003, p. 71). In plain English, accentuation is a notion primarily directed towards the formation of solidarity and mutual agreement. Moreover, Urbanová explains the attenuation and accentuation dichotomy and lists examples (see Table 1).

Table 1. *Attenuation and accentuation dichotomy*

	<b>Explanation</b>	<b>Example 1</b>	<b>Example 2</b>
<b>Attenuation</b>	The meaning becomes subdued, indirect, and implicit.	I suppose <i>in a sense</i> it is.	Particularly <i>I think</i> you probably like the sort of clothes I like anyway.
<b>Accentuation</b>	The meaning becomes reinforced, underlined, exaggerated, explicit.	<i>I am absolutely convinced</i> that the schools are wrong.	I say <i>I think</i> they made up their minds before they started.

Note: Adapted from Urbanová (2003).

Specifically, the relationship between attenuation and accentuation is not a dichotomy in the strict sense of the word. Fuzziness, which is typical in spoken language, is also demonstrated in the opacity inherent in the illocutionary force. This is due to the fact that sometimes, the same pragmatic marker can be used for both attenuation and accentuation, as seen in example 2 in Table 1. These two examples can be distinguished by the presence or absence of stress, speed of utterance, and beyond all that, context. In the case of attenuation, *I think* conveys hesitation and uncertainty, while in the case of accentuation, the marker is expressed by emphasis, which is the heavy stress put on the pronoun *I*. The stress contributes to the reinforcement of the speaker’s individual judgment (Urbanová, 2003).

Hyland (1998) simply states that hedges include words such as *possible, might, or perhaps*, while boosters include *clearly, obviously, or of course*. He gives a detailed example of both hedges and boosters in a text as follows:

Our results *suggested* that Moffitt’s developmental theory specifying two higher-order latent factors *may* explain the underlying structure of antisocial behavior across the early life course, from age 5 to age of 18. In a test of a general theory against a

developmental theory using parent reports, the two-factor model was *clearly* supported over the single-factor model. Additionally, two conceptual replications using self reports and teacher reports *demonstrated* the utility of the two-factor model (pp. 352–353).

Urbanová (2003) then states that both attenuation and accentuation have their own markers which she classifies into several types as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. *Types of attenuation and accentuation markers*

<b>Attenuation</b>	<b>Accentuation</b>
Negative politeness	Empathizers/emphasizers
Assumption, consideration	Assurances
Unspecified reference	Agreement/understanding
Detachment, reservation	Degree of quality
Depersonalization	Subjectivity
Self-evaluation	Topicalization
Non-commitment	Blends
Conversational gambit	
Afterthought	
Positive politeness	
Sarcasm	
Contradiction	

Note: Adapted from Urbanová (2003, p. 60, p. 72).

Urbanová (2003, pp. 60–64) classifies the attenuation markers into the following categories:

- *Negative politeness* is a marker used to avoid refusal, disagreement, objection, or criticism. It is also often connected with sensitive topics. An example of refusal is: “I mean it would be a bit out of place somehow.”
- *Assumption, consideration* is used by speakers who assume, or make judgements about the possibility of something being or not being the case, for example: “so I presume it is for anybody in the faculty of arts.”
- *Unspecified reference* refers to vague, implicit utterances, such as: “You know the sort of thing...”
- *Detachment, reservation* is an attenuated expression of negative attitudes like objection, criticism, or disapproval, for example: “I don’t think it’s sensible.”
- *Depersonalization* is an impersonal way to express detachment: “or one wonders whether it’s that way round or whether it’s the other way round.”
- *Self-evaluation* is a way to express an apology or make an excuse in embarrassing and difficult situations: “Having had this glass of sherry I was a bit woozy.”
- *Non-commitment* is used by speakers to signal a lack of information about a certain

topic, for example: “They’re probably people who’ve left pictures here.”

- *Conversational gambit* is often represented by *I mean* as a transition element, and used for opening a new topic, or suggesting a different viewpoint: “I mean I’ve got a thing anyway about academic women.”
- *Afterthought* is a remark that amplifies a previously expressed meaning and specifies the circumstances of a speech event: “The interview was it was all right I mean I handled it like a competent undergraduate.”
- *Positive politeness* is a marker used to show interest and curiosity, frequently carried out by the expression *sort of*: “There were questions that I couldn’t cope with and I said so.” “What sort of questions?”
- *Contradiction*: “She is not a bit the way she is at college.” (Urbanová, 2003).

Classification and examples of accentuation markers are as follows (Urbanová, 2003, pp. 69–73):

- *Empathizers/emphasizers* (you see, you know, you remember, as far as you could gather);
- *Assurances* (certainly, of course, indeed, really, I’m sure, obviously, definitely);
- *Agreement/understanding* (exactly, right, quite, yes, absolutely, that’s true, I agree);
- *Degree of quality* (very, a lot, very largely, perfectly, frantically, ghastly, kindly, thoroughly, absolutely, bloody);
- *Subjectivity* (I think, I thought, I mean, I see, I hope, personally, I’d rather);
- *Topicalization* (actually, anyway, in fact, the point is, what it does mean, the trouble is, solely, nevertheless, after all).

#### 1.4.1 Context-sensitive hedges and boosters

As observed by Holmes (1990), even though the phrase *I think* is automatically categorised as a hedge by most researchers, its function, in fact, varies significantly with the intonation the speaker uses. When *I think* is pronounced a fall-rise intonation, the speaker expresses their uncertainty and tentativeness. In the following example, where the phrase is used as a hedge, a child is examining an unclear photograph and expressing an opinion about what it represents:

- *It’s got some writing on it I think.*



In the next example, on the other hand, the speaker expresses their certainty about the topic they are talking about. What indicates the confidence is the position of the booster, which is in the beginning of the sentence, combined with the level stress on the verb *think*, see below:

- ***I think** that's absolutely right.*

Holmes (1990) further explains that analyses which ignore such formal variation provide inaccurate information. In other words, the lexical shape without intonation or context does not provide enough information to identify its function.

In the next two examples, the phrase is used both times at the end of the sentence, but the examples have different functions. The first example shows a softener, also referred to as a negative politeness marker, which belongs to boosters. A teacher shows they have no doubt the student's answer is wrong. In contrast, the second example shows the speaker's uncertainty about the exact time; they indicate their memory may not be perfect, see below:

- *You've got that wrong **I think**.* (booster)
- *It'd be about two o'clock **I think**.* (hedge)

Holmes (1990) finds that another frequently miscategorised marker is *you know*. This marker is as well as *I think* often labelled as a hedge only. *You know* can be again identified both as a hedge and a booster. In the following examples, this phrase expresses the speaker's confidence and has an emphatic function to reassure the hearer of the validity of the proposition:

- *... and that way we'd get rid of exploitation of man by man all that stuff, **you know**, you've heard it before.* (Radio interviewee describing past experience)
- *I'm the boss around here **you know**.* (Woman joking to neighbour in presence of flatmates)

In contrast, there are instances of *you know* that express uncertainty, which are categorised as hedges:

- *... and it was quite, well it was it was all very embarrassing **you know**.* (uncertainty about the hearer's response)
- *... better entertainment product or better, **you know**, music musicians.* (uncertainty regarding the linguistic encoding of the message)

Another context-sensitive marker is *of course*. Holmes (1990, pp. 190–191) points out that

confidential *of course* (booster) refers to the assumed knowledge or beliefs that are personal and specific to a particular social network (or a discourse community) and signals the status of the proposition as mutual pre-existing knowledge. It generally precedes the proposition and expresses positive politeness. Impersonal *of course* (hedge) is a marker of meta-knowledge about accepted ‘consensual truths’ or undisputed ‘generally shared knowledge’, attitudes or beliefs. It tends to occur medially or finally in the sentence and expresses negative politeness.

## 1.5 Felicity conditions

According to Yule (1996), if the speech act is to be performed as intended, there must be appropriate circumstances, known as felicity conditions. The performance can be either felicitous (appropriate) or infelicitous (inappropriate). In other words, the words must be well-suited for the purpose.

English Language and Linguistics Online (n.d.) give the example of a marriage scene in a movie: “Have you ever asked yourself why the words ‘I now pronounce you husband and wife’ do not create a legal marriage between two people when uttered in the context of a film set?” As explained by Nordquist (2019, May 30), it is obvious that the two actors are not legally married, even if they both said “I do” in front of the camera. Both of them were acting, and the actor playing the priest has no legal right to pronounce the two a husband and a wife. As said above, the words must be suited for the purpose, and therefore, in this case, the speech act in the movie is infelicitous.

In order to analyse a speech act properly, the felicity conditions were divided by Yule (1996, pp. 50–51) into five following types:

- *General conditions* mean that the participants can understand the language used and that they are not play-acting or being nonsensical.
- *Content conditions* according to which the content of the utterance must be about a future event. This applies to a promise or a warning. Another content condition for a promise requires that the future event will be a future act of the speaker.
- *Preparatory conditions* for a promise: the event will not happen by itself, and the event will have a beneficial effect. On the other hand, when a warning is uttered, there are the following conditions: it is not clear that the hearer knows the event will

- occur, the speaker does think the event will occur, and the event will not have a beneficial effect.
- *Sincerity condition* says that in the case of a promise, the speaker genuinely intends to carry out the future action, while in the case of a warning, the speaker genuinely believes that the future event will not have a beneficial effect.
  - *Essential condition* says that by uttering a promise, the speaker intends to create an obligation to carry out the action as promised. The state changes from non-obligation to obligation. This condition, therefore, states what must be in the utterance content, the context, and the intentions of a speaker, for a specific speech act to be felicitously performed.

In addition, Hogan (2000) describes felicity conditions giving this example:

Suppose I am in a play and deliver the line 'I promise to kill the evil Don Fernando.' I have not, in fact, promised to kill anyone. The speech act fails because the words are uttered in a context where they are not used by the speaker, but in effect quoted from a text. And it is a general felicity condition that the speaker use the words of the locution and not merely quote them (p. 283).

According to Nordquist (2019, May 30), Hogan's example of the utterance is infelicitous due to the preparatory condition not being met since he certainly does not have the authority to kill anyone. The speech also does not meet the sincerity condition, which is, obviously, because he does not actually want to kill anyone – he is only acting. And he also does not meet the essential condition because he does not expect anyone to kill Fernando for him.

## 1.6 Direct and indirect speech acts

Another important categorization of speech acts is into direct and indirect speech acts based on a relationship between the form and the communicative function of an utterance (see Searle, 1979; Yule, 1996). In order to introduce these types of speech acts, Yule (1996) gives examples and lists the three basic structural forms, which are: declarative, interrogative, and imperative. For example:

- Declarative: *You wear a seat belt.*
- Interrogative: *Do you wear a seat belt?*
- Imperative: *Wear a seat belt!*

The three general communicative functions need to be mentioned as well, since there is a relationship between them and the above-listed structural forms. According to Yule (1996), these functions are: statement, question, and a command or a request. He suggests that the relationships can be listed as follows:

- declarative – statement,
- interrogative – question,
- imperative – command/request.

From the examples above, it can be inferred that whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function, it is a direct speech act. On the other hand, when there is an indirect relationship between a structure and a function, it is an indirect speech act. Therefore, a declarative used to make a statement is a direct speech act, and a declarative used to make a request is an indirect speech act (Searle, 1979; Yule, 1996). For example:

- *It's cold outside.*

The above-mentioned utterance is a declarative.

- *I hereby tell you about the weather.*

This is a direct speech act – a declarative used to make a statement.

- *I hereby request of you that you close the door.*

Finally, this is an indirect speech act, as it is a declarative used to make a command or a request.

As Yule (1996) further suggests, another interesting approach is that different structures can be used to achieve the same function. All three structures can be used in the form of a request. In the following example, the speaker does not want the hearer to stand in front of the television. In case of the imperative structure being used for a request, it will be the only structure representing a direct speech act, which is due to the direct relationship between a structure and a function mentioned above. With this knowledge, it can be concluded that in the case of both interrogative and declarative structures, there is an indirect relationship, and therefore also an indirect speech act, as shown below (Yule, 1996).

- *Move out of the way!* (imperative)
- *Do you have to stand in front of the TV?* (interrogative)

- *You're standing in front of the TV.* (declarative)

One of the most common indirect speech acts in English has the form of an interrogative but is not used just to ask a question. Yule (1996) explains that this means that the person asking not only expects an answer but also expects action – they are making a request, e.g. *Could you pass the salt?*

In the English language, asking a question about the hearer's assumed ability (*Can you?*) or future likelihood of doing something (*Will you?*) is usually interpreted as a request to do something. Besides, indirect speech acts in English are considered more polite than direct speech acts (Yule, 1996).

On the other hand, Kiefer (1980) does not characterize indirect speech acts with relationships between a structure and a function, but simply gives examples of questions used as indirect speech acts. He explains that “yes-no” questions are often interpretable as indirect speech acts and that even though such questions may kind of look like they need the “yes-no” answer, it is actually inappropriate to answer them in such a manner. These questions may be used as indirect requests for action or for information. Kiefer gives an example of both:

- *Have you got a change for a dollar?* (action)
- *Can you describe him to us?* (information)

Kiefer's (1990) explanation of indirect speech acts is, in fact, quite similar to Searle's and Yule's.

*This chapter focused on the basic concepts of the speech act theory which were introduced by J. L. Austin and elaborated on by J. R. Searle. Then, performative verbs were listed and explained. The illocutionary force indicating devices were specified and three congruent views by Bierwisch (1980), Vendler (1980) and Yule (1996) were presented. Moreover, the use of boosters and hedges for attenuation and accentuation of the illocutionary force as well as the issue of the context-sensitive markers were discussed. In the two final subchapters, the other important terms were defined, such as felicity conditions and direct and indirect speech acts, and several opinions and definitions by different authors were compared. Each of these concepts and terms needed to be defined because together they represent the fundamental knowledge necessary for the speech acts analysis described in the analytical part of this thesis.*

## 2 Illocutionary speech acts classification

This chapter focuses on comparison of three different concepts of the illocutionary speech acts classification, in particular the concepts framed by J. L. Austin, J. R. Searle, and K. Bach and R. M. Harnish. Austin (1962), who introduced speech acts to linguistics, was also the first to divide illocutionary acts into five basic categories, which are *verdictives*, *expositives*, *exercitives*, *behabitives*, and *commissives*. On the other hand, Searle (1975), decided to define illocutionary speech acts in his own terms. These include *representatives*, *directives*, *commissives*, *expressives*, and *declarations*. Finally, Bach and Harnish (1979) listed six categories, which are *effectives*, *verdictives*, *constatives*, *directives*, *commissives*, and *acknowledgments*. Each approach is displayed in Table 3.

Table 3. *Approaches to speech acts classification*

Austin (1962)	Searle (1975)	Bach and Harnish (1979)
Verdictives	Representatives	Effectives
Exercitives	Directives	Verdictives
Commissives	Commissives	Constatives
Behabitives	Expressives	Directives
Expositives	Declarations	Commissives
		Acknowledgments

The details about each of these approaches and their categories are discussed in the following subchapters.

### 2.1 Austin's concept

As previously mentioned, according to Austin (1962), illocutionary acts are divided into five categories. To explain, he gives examples of verbs characteristic of each category:

- Verdictives – acquit, hold, describe, estimate, rank, assess
- Expositives – affirm, deny, emphasize, illustrate, answer, report
- Exercitives – order, command, direct, beg, recommend, advise
- Behabitives – apologize, thank, congratulate, felicitate, criticize
- Commissives – promise, vow, pledge, guarantee, embrace, swear

Next, Austin (1962) defines verdictives as “typified by the giving of a verdict” (p. 150). He adds that they may be uttered by a jury or an umpire but need not be final; on the other hand, they may be an estimate or appraisal. Exercitives are the exercising of either powers, rights, or one's influence. These include appointing, voting, ordering, or warning. He describes

commissives as utterances that are characteristic for promising or undertaking, they commit one to do something, but also include declarations and espousals. Behabitives are linked with attitudes and social behaviour, for example, apologizing, congratulating, condoling, or cursing. Finally, he defines expositives as follows: “They make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, how we are using words, or, in general, are expository” (p. 151).

## 2.2 Searle’s concept

Searle (1975) took Austin’s classification into account and divided speech acts as follows:

- Representatives – they can be literally characterized as true or false
- Directives – they are attempts of varying degrees to get the hearer to do something
- Commissives – they are acts, whose point is to commit the speaker to some future course of action
- Expressives – they express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a situation specified in the propositional content (*thank, congratulate*)
- Declarations – a successful performance ensures that the propositional content corresponds to the world: *If I successfully perform the act of nominating you a chairman, then you are chairman.* (pp. 354–361).

According to Searle, Austin’s classification has many weaknesses; there is no clear principle of classification, there is confusion between illocutionary acts and illocutionary verbs, and the categories tend to overlap a great deal. For instance, the verb *describe* is listed as both a verdictive and an expositive in Austin’s theory and is not the only one – *affirm, deny*, and many more fall into both categories. As a result, Searle introduced his alternative taxonomy of illocutionary acts as shown above (Searle, 1975). Moreover, even Austin (1962) himself doubts his classification: “The last two classes are those which I find most troublesome, and it could well be that they are not clear or are cross-classified, or even that some fresh classification altogether is needed” (p. 151). Here is another example: “[Behabitives and expositives] seem both to be included in the other classes and at the same time to be unique in a way that I have not succeeded in making clear even to myself.” (Austin, 1962, p. 151).

## 2.3 Bach and Harnish's concept

Referring to Bach and Harnish (1979), illocutionary acts can be divided into six classes. They, however, further divide these classes into two types. The first two are called *conventional illocutionary acts* which are judgements and changes that by conventions have official, binding import in the context of the particular institution. The remaining four classes are called *communicative illocutionary acts*, which are further classified in Table 4.

Table 4. *Communicative illocutionary acts*

Constatives	Directives	Commissives	Acknowledgments
Assertives	Requestives	Promises	Apologize
Predictives	Questions	Offers	Condole
Retrodictives	Requirements		Congratulate
Descriptives	Prohibitives		Greet
Ascriptives	Permissives		Thank
Informatives	Advisories		Bid
Confirmatives			Accept
Concessives			Reject
Retractivess			
Assentives			
Dissentives			
Disputatives			
Responsives			
Suggestives			
Suppositives			

Note: Adapted from Bach and Harnish (1979).

A constative expresses a belief or an intention. The kinds of constatives are listed as follows (Bach and Harnish, 1979):

- Assertives – affirm, allege, assert, aver, claim, declare, say, state, submit
- Predictives – forecast, predict, prophesy
- Retrodictives – recount, report
- Descriptives – appraise, assess, call, categorize, characterize, classify, describe, rank
- Ascriptives – ascribe, attribute, predicate
- Informatives – advise, announce, disclose, inform, notify, point out, tell, testify
- Confirmatives – assess, certify, conclude, confirm, diagnose, find, verify, vouch for
- Concessives – acknowledge, admit, agree, allow, confess, grant, own
- Retractivess – abjure, correct, deny, disavow, disown, renounce, take back,



withdraw

- Assentives – accept, agree, assent, concur
- Dissentives – differ, disagree, dissent, reject
- Disputatives – demur, dispute, object, protest, question
- Responsives – answer, reply, respond, retort
- Suggestives – conjecture, guess, hypothesize, speculate, suggest
- Suppositives – assume, hypothesize, postulate, stipulate, suppose, theorize

As Bach and Harnish (1979) suggest, directives express attitude towards a possible action of the hearer but also express the speaker's intention that the utterance is taken by the hearer as a reason to act. Directives include:

- Requestives – ask, beg, beseech, implore, insist, invite, petition, plead, request, urge
- Questions – ask, inquire, interrogate, query, question, quiz
- Requirements – bid, charge, command, demand, dictate, direct, order, require
- Prohibitives – enjoin, forbid, prohibit, proscribe, restrict
- Permissives – agree to, allow, authorize, bless, consent to, grant, pardon, release
- Advisories – admonish, advise, caution, counsel, propose, recommend, warn

The authors further explain that commissives are “acts of obligating oneself or of proposing to obligate oneself to do something specified in the propositional content” (pp. 49–50), such as:

- Promises – promise, swear, vow
- Offers – offer, propose

Finally, Bach and Harnish (1979) find that acknowledgments express feelings towards the hearer. According to them, these feelings are appropriate to particular occasions (greeting – pleasure, thanking – gratitude). Acknowledgments include:

- Apologize
- Condole – commiserate, condole
- Congratulate – compliment, congratulate, felicitate
- Greet
- Thank
- Bid – bid, wish

- Accept – acknowledge an acknowledgment
- Reject – refuse, reject, spurn

As previously stated, the second type of illocutionary act class is called conventional illocutionary acts, to which belong effectives and verdictives (Bach and Harnish, 1979).

Effectives are utterances that, when produced under the right circumstances by the right person, make it the case that such and such. According to Bach and Harnish (1979), “this is a matter not of causality but of mutual belief” (p. 113), which means that for an utterance to be an act of a certain type, it must be mutually believed to be of that kind. For instance, only in that case does it count as an act of resigning, vetoing, or bequeathing. Verdictives, on the other hand, do not produce facts as effectives do, they are nothing but determinations of fact. They do not make it the case that such and such, as effectives do, “they make it *as if* it were the case in the sense that it is a fact for the institution in question” (Bach and Harnish, 1979, p. 115). In other words, as far as institutional processes are concerned, something that has been determined to be so is acted upon as if it were so (Bach and Harnish, 1979).

*This chapter dealt with three different approaches to categorizing and distinguishing illocutionary speech acts. The first approach by Austin (1962) was rather undeveloped; therefore, it was later elaborated on by Searle (1975) whose classification, based on the notion of the speaker’s aim to get the hearer to recognize their intention, is widely used to this day. The last detailed and relatively complex approach by Bach and Harnish (1979) emphasizes the speaker’s intention and the hearer’s uptake without considering a situation that can suddenly emerge in communication and influence illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. These three concepts of speech acts classification were explained in detail in order to understand the differences between them, and consequently to choose the most suitable one for the analysis of speech acts in this bachelor’s thesis. Due to Austin’s classification being somewhat inaccurate with overlapping categories, and Bach and Harnish’s approach being rather complex, the approach of Searle was chosen for the analytical part of this thesis.*

### **3 Interactional aspects of speech acts and their roles in argumentative discussions**

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983), even though the speech act theory provides a sufficient theoretical framework for the analysis of language, the matter of argumentation has not yet been studied as a speech act. This chapter covers the above-mentioned issue. As explained above, Austin (1962) invented his own theory of speech acts, which was subsequently modified by Searle (1975), who distinguishes three types of speech acts that are performed whenever a speaker utters a sentence:

- utterance act (certain speech sounds, words, and sentences),
- propositional act (referring to something or someone, predicting their properties),
- illocutionary act (utterance with a force of a promise, or statement of fact).

Apart from these acts, the speaker can also perform a perlocutionary act, which produces certain effects, such as boredom or shock.

#### **3.1 Communicative and interactional aspects of language**

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) find that speakers do not perform speech acts with the sole intention of making the hearer understand what speech act they are performing, but they rather hope to induce a particular response, which can be verbal or else. This means their language serves both *communicative* and *interactional* purposes. Furthermore, van Eemeren and Grootendorst explain that “translated into terms of the speech act theory, the communicative aspects of language are expressed in attempts to bring about illocutionary effects and the interactional aspects in attempts to bring about perlocutionary effects” (p. 23). According to them, Searle’s theory only applies to illocutionary acts, while perlocutionary acts are being disregarded. They also suggest that “the performance of speech acts cannot be treated as one-way traffic between a speaker and a listener” (p. 23), and therefore they believe that the speaker performing a speech act not only wants their words to be understood, but they also want them to be accepted.

In ordinary conversations, the speech acts performed by speakers are meant to make the listener respond in a way, in which they sign understanding and particularly, acceptance. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983), this applies, above all, to argumentation during a discussion or a debate, or in other words, “to a certain extent arguments in debates

are designed to achieve precisely defined verbally externalized illocutionary and perlocutionary effects” (p. 24), also being referred to as perlocutionary effects.

For the purpose of distinguishing the perlocutionary effect of acceptance and further consequences, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) distinguish between *inherent perlocutionary effects* and *consecutive perlocutionary consequences*. Inherent perlocutionary effects consist of the acceptance of the speech act by the listener, and consecutive perlocutionary consequences include all other consequences of performing the speech act. Since the speaker consciously tries to achieve these effects or consequences, inherent perlocutionary effects can be termed as *minimal*, and consecutive perlocutionary consequences as *optimal*. To put it another way, the speaker minimally tries to achieve the perlocutionary act of acceptance, but the satisfactory, or optimal result is achieved if they also manage to bring about other consequences descending from acceptance (see Table 5).

Table 5. *Illustration of communicative and interactional aspects of language*

Speech act	Communicative aspects		Interactional aspects		
	Illocution	Illocutionary effect	Perlocution	Inherent perlocutionary effect	Consecutive perlocutionary consequence
Example 1	Advising	Understanding the advice	Cheering up	Accepting the advice	Enrolling for a new course
Example 2	Arguing	Understanding the argumentation	Convincing	Accepting the argumentation	Desisting from opposition to a point of view
Example 3	Requesting	Understanding the request	Persuading	Accepting the request	Abandoning the intention to leave
Example 4	Informing	Understanding the information	Instructing	Accepting the information	Henceforth using contraceptives
Example 5	Warning	Understanding the warning	Alarming	Accepting the warning	Keeping mouth shut

Note: Adapted from van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983).

### 3.2 Speech acts in argumentation

The hypothesis of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) is that argumentation in the communicative sense is a form of language that corresponds to the language use defined in the speech act theory as illocutionary acts, and the interactional aspects of argumentation correspond with the perlocutionary act of convincing. They discuss the term *argumentation*, because they believe the word *argue* already has a commonly accepted meaning in the

colloquial speech, and therefore they list numerous definitions of these words from a dictionary to establish that they have the correct meaning in their context:

- To argue – to present objections, to debate and discuss, to persuade by giving reasons
- Argumentation – reasoning, the act of forming reasons
- Argument – a reason or reasons offered for or against a proposition, opinion, or measure, a debate or discussion in which there is disagreement

In conclusion to this matter, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) state that:

The meaning we attach to the term argumentation certainly does not conflict with the meaning that such words as *argue*, *argument*, and *argumentation* have in colloquial language and, indeed, that if one digs down a little deeper one finds that our meaning is even confirmed by ordinary idiom, but that we nevertheless give the word argumentation a more explicit and more ‘worked out’ or ‘developed’ meaning than it has in everyday language. This means that we can use the term argumentation to denote the speech act *argue*, in the meaning that we wish to give that speech act, without the fear of ‘wrong’ connotations due to its meaning in colloquial speech (p. 30).

Moreover, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) argue that many authors including Searle (1970) or Cohen (1973) simply treat argumentation as an illocutionary act and convincing as a perlocutionary act but do not explain why. Although they agree with these authors on treating argumentation as an illocutionary act, they suggest that such characterization creates various problems, the most essential ones arising from Searle’s characterization of the relation between illocutionary acts and (grammatical) sentences. He claims that if the conditions for the correct performance of the speech act are fulfilled, the utterance of one sentence is a question, and the utterance of another sentence amounts to an assertion, and so on. However, as already mentioned, this correlation presents problems being as follows (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983):

- The speech act of arguing can consist of more than one sentence. Even simple argumentations consist of at least two statements, for example: “I hear William comes from the north. Those northerners have always been dark horses.”
- The second problem stems from the previous example. The statements that constitute argumentation may be performed by uttering illocutionary acts that are different from the illocutionary act of argumentation, therefore may have two illocutionary forces.

For example, a statement in an argumentation may at the same time be an assertion or a supposition from Searle's category of *assertives*, also called *representatives* (see Chapter 2.2). These assertives are part of a constellation, which forms the illocution of argumentation.

- A constellation of statements can be regarded as argumentation only if the sentences have a relationship between each other in a special manner. In no case can the statements be considered as argumentation when isolated from a sentence with a function of expressed opinion.

### **3.3 Argumentation and the perlocutionary act of convincing**

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983), by performing argumentation, the aim is not only to make the listener understand what the speaker is trying to justify, the aim is also “to convince the listener of the acceptability or unacceptability of that opinion” (p. 47). In other words, the analysis of argumentation should cover both the communicative and the interactional aspects of language. This chapter, therefore, deals with interactional aspects and the relation between the speech act of argumentation and the perlocutionary effect where the listener either accepts or does not accept a conveyed opinion.

In this matter, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) point out that even though neither Austin nor Searle deal with argumentation, they both connect argumentation with convincing. They also mention that similarly, Cohen acknowledges the relationship between the illocution *argumentation* and the perlocution *convincing*. It is also pointed out that perlocution is brought about through illocution.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) have their own justification for the connection between illocutions and perlocutions in case of argumentation. They suggest that arguing and convincing have different happiness conditions. For instance, argumentation is happy if the speaker performs the illocution correctly and makes the listener understand that the speaker suggested a pro- or contra-argumentation (speaker convinced him of the acceptability or unacceptability of their opinion). On the other hand, convincing is happy if the speaker makes the listener accept the expressed opinion (in case of pro-argumentation) or reject it (in case of contra-argumentation).

### 3.4 Speech acts in critical discussions

To begin, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) describe critical discussion as “an exchange of views in which the parties involved in a difference of opinion systematically try to determine whether the standpoint or standpoints at issue are defensible in the light of critical doubt or objections” (p. 52). They continue by explaining that their approach towards discussions is dialectical, but also pragmatic. In other words, to resolve a difference of opinion, verbal activities, or speech acts can be used. They have therefore named their approach to argumentation *pragma dialectics*.

The model of a critical discussion specifies the different stages in the process of the resolution of a difference of opinion. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), a difference of opinion can only be resolved when the involved reach an agreement on whether the “standpoints at issue are acceptable or not” (p. 57). In order to conduct a critical discussion, one does not concern themselves only with the relations between the premises and the conclusions of the arguments, but also with every speech act that helps determine the acceptability of standpoints.

As van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) explain, there are four stages in the process of resolving a difference of opinion:

- *The confrontation stage* – there is a standpoint that is not accepted, the speakers establish a difference of opinion.
- *The opening stage* – the participants try to find how much common ground they share.
- *The argumentation stage* – the participants share their arguments to overcome the antagonist’s doubts. If the arguments are not convincing, the antagonists react, which makes the protagonists present further arguments, and so on.
- *The concluding stage* – the participants establish the result of their resolution of the difference of opinion.

Moreover, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) find, the theory of speech acts is an ideal means of dealing with resolutions of difference of opinion. In the stages mentioned above, the moves that help reach a resolution “can be pragmatically characterized as speech acts” (p. 62). They follow the typology of speech acts by Searle (1979), where some of his speech acts are directly related to a critical discussion, and some are not.

The first type is *assertives*, also referred to as *representatives*. Assertives are speech acts that speakers use to assert a proposition. All assertives can appear in a critical discussion, where they can be used to express a standpoint under discussion, to form argumentation to defend that standpoint, or to establish the result of the discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004).

The second type is *directives*, which are speech acts that speakers use to make the listener do something. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), only certain directives are useful in resolving a difference of opinion. Directives may, for example, challenge the antagonists to defend their standpoint, request them to provide an explanation or a provision of argumentation to support their standpoint may be requested. In no case, however, are directives such as prohibitions and orders allowed in a critical discussion.

The third type is *commissives*, where the speaker commits themselves to an action. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) suggest that commissives can have different roles in a critical discussion, such as

accepting or not accepting a standpoint, accepting the challenge to defend a standpoint, deciding to start a discussion, agreeing to assume the role of protagonist or antagonist, agreeing to the discussion rules, accepting or not accepting argumentation, and – when relevant – deciding to start a new discussion (p. 65).

The fourth type is *expressives* which are used by speakers to express their feelings by thanking, congratulating, or apologising. Even though expressives can appear during critical discussions in the sense that one of the participants may sigh as a sign of being unhappy with the discussion, these speech acts do not play a direct role in discussions.

The last type is *declaratives*, also referred to as *declarations*. By performing a declarative, the speaker creates a certain reality, such as “I open the meeting”. In critical discussions, however, declaratives do not play any role, with the exception of usage declaratives, which may occur at any stage of the discussion. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) give examples of declaratives in the four stages as follows:

- *Confrontation stage* – declaratives unmask spurious differences of opinion.
- *Opening stage* – they may explain a discussion rule.
- *Argumentation stage* – they may prevent a premature acceptance or non-acceptance of an argument or a standpoint.



- *Concluding stage* – they may prevent arriving at a specious resolution.

In conclusion, the use of speech acts in discussions can be distributed as demonstrated in Table 6.

Table 6. *Distribution of speech acts in a critical discussion*

	<b>Confrontation</b>
<b>Assertive</b>	Expressing a standpoint
<b>Commissive</b>	Acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint
<b>Directive</b>	Requesting a usage declarative
<b>Usage declarative</b>	Definition, specification, amplification, etc.
	<b>Opening</b>
<b>Directive</b>	Challenging to defend a standpoint
<b>Commissive</b>	Acceptance of the challenge to defend a standpoint
	Agreement on premises and discussion rules
	Decision to start a discussion
<b>Directive</b>	Requesting a usage declarative
<b>Usage declarative</b>	Definition, specification, amplification, etc.
	<b>Argumentation</b>
<b>Directive</b>	Requesting argumentation
<b>Assertive</b>	Advancing argumentation
<b>Commissive</b>	Acceptance or non-acceptance of argumentation
<b>Directive</b>	Requesting a usage declarative
<b>Usage directive</b>	Definition, specification, amplification, etc.
	<b>Concluding</b>
<b>Commissive</b>	Acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint
<b>Assertive</b>	Upholding or retracting a standpoint
	Establishing the result of the discussion
<b>Directive</b>	Requesting a usage declarative
<b>Usage declarative</b>	Definition, specification, amplification, etc.

Note: Adapted from van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004).

*This chapter dealt with the roles of speech acts in argumentative discussions, as this is a matter that is not commonly studied regarding argumentation. Speech acts are not performed only to make the listeners understand, but also to accept them. Therefore, inherent perlocutionary effects and consecutive perlocutionary consequences were defined and demonstrated in Table 5. It was also established that argumentation is closely related to the speech act theory. At the end of the chapter, the stages of critical discussions were listed, and the roles and applications of the speech acts by Searle (1975) in discussions were defined and then summarized in Table 6. The concept of speech acts in argumentation was important to frame because the analytical part of the thesis focuses on an analysis of speech acts performed by IT students in online debates.*

## 4 Argumentation and debating

According to IDEA (2003), the concepts of communication, rhetoric, argumentation and debate are interrelated. Communication is a process that uses signs to convey information, and although all humans use rhetorical communication, all communication is not rhetorical. The symbol is the clearest distinction between rhetoric and other forms of communication. Even though all humans are able to use symbols, the symbols differ geographically. The fact that people speak different languages is a clear sign that they have developed different symbols. IDEA (2003) suggests that language is a prime example of symbolic language and further explains that “the concept of a symbol differentiates rhetoric from other forms of communication”, and that “symbols, hence rhetoric, are abstract methods of communication” (p. 8).

Rhetorical communication, as explained by IDEA (2003), can be divided into three categories, which are *narrative*, *metaphor*, and *argumentation*. The narrative focuses on sequential time, while the metaphor compares one thing to another, and the argumentation focuses on giving reasons. Although all of these categories are useful in debates, argumentation is the most important of the three.

People carry out argumentation using reason to communicate claims to each other, as found by IDEA (2003). According to them, the focus on reason is what distinguishes argumentation from other forms of rhetoric. During an argument, people not only make claims but also give reasons for their claims to be plausible. Most importantly, argumentation is not only significant in negotiation, conflict resolution, or persuasion, but also in debating, which is an activity that would barely exist without it.

As IDEA (2003) further explains, a debate can be defined as a process, where the participants argue about their claims, and the outcome must be decided by an adjudicator.

### 4.1 The elements and the structure of an argument

To illustrate the main elements of an argument, IDEA (2003) uses the Toulmin model which identifies four basic elements: claim, data (or evidence), warrant, and reservation. A clear explanation for these terms and their roles in an argument is as follows: “The evidence is the argument’s starting point. The claim is the arguer’s destination. The warrant is the means of

travel, and the reservation involves questions or concerns the arguer may have about arrival at the destination” (IDEA, 2003, p. 9).

According to IDEA (2003), there are three argument structures, which include simple argument, convergent argument, and independent argument. A simple argument contains one claim that is supported by one claim, a piece of evidence, a single warrant, and sometimes a single reservation. This structure is illustrated by a simple diagram in Figure 1 (IDEA, 2003).




Figure 1. Structure of a simple argument. Reprinted from IDEA (2003).

Due to the fact that real arguments are rarely as simple, IDEA (2003) introduces a convergent argument, where there are two or more pieces of evidence to support a claim (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Structure of a convergent argument. Reprinted from IDEA (2003).

What is unique about this structure is that the arguer produces a collection of evidence that together supports the claim. In convergent arguments, all participants must believe each piece of evidence. If they refuse to accept only one piece of evidence, the structure falls. For this reason, IDEA (2003) introduces the independent argument structure. This structure contains several pieces of evidence, where each piece supports the argument. For instance, one of the debaters may present two pieces of evidence and demand the audience to accept the claim even if they are convinced by only one of them (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Structure of an independent argument. Reprinted from IDEA (2003).

## 4.2 Claims and propositions

According to IDEA (2003), claims and propositions are conceptually the same argumentative elements as they both are statements that need reason for support. Debaters frequently use these statements to support another statement; every initial statement is a claim, and the concluding statement is a proposition. IDEA (2003) finds four categories of propositions: definition, description, relationship, and evaluation.

*Definitions* imply “values by including terms that are value laden” (IDEA, 2003, p. 12). An example of a definition in an argument is when antiabortion advocates managed to define abortion process physicians called “intact dilation and extraction” as “partial-birth abortion” or “partial-birth infanticide”. Their definition caused the values associated with birth and infanticide to be transferred to the medical procedure, therefore they managed to shortcut

the argumentation by avoiding the value controversy, which is inherent in their definition.

*Descriptions* are utterances that characterize features of an object, event, or a concept, or the object and the event itself, for instance, “the rifle purported to have killed President Kennedy requires a minimum of 2.3 seconds between shots”. Such a statement is controversial and requires reasons for support. On the other hand, utterances such as “violets are blue” are not in any sense controversial and therefore are not descriptive arguments.

*Relationship statements* are such statements that assert a connection between two or more objects, events, or phenomena. They may be used as evidence for making evaluative claims, such as: “second-hand smoke contributes significantly to health problems” or “advertising has changed the role of women in the U.S.”. These statements are claims of relationship because they show a connection between two objects – second-hand smoke and health, advertising, and women.

And lastly, IDEA (2003) presents the last category, *claims of evaluation*, which are complex claims that require a combination of definitions, descriptions, and relationship statements. Due to being so complex, they can be divided into three categories, which are *claims that evaluate a single object* (Capitalism is good), *claims that compare two objects* (Reagan was a better president than Clinton), and *claims of action* (Capital punishment should be abolished).

*In this chapter, the main elements of arguments were introduced and described to understand the three possible structures of debates. Figures with detailed diagrams were provided to make it easier for the reader to understand the argument structures. Then, four types of propositions that participants of a debate may put forward were divided into categories and described using illustrative examples. These concepts and characterizations were critical to define due to the aim of this thesis, which is an analysis of argumentative debates, hence the definition of a debate, its structure, claims and propositions.*

## 5 Analytical part

This chapter deals with the analysis and identification of speech acts, boosters, and hedges in three online debates. The analysed material consists of transcripts of three online debates (see Appendix) about a closed platform and an open platform, human labour and artificial intelligence, and the Dark Net in which students from the Faculty of Information Technology of Brno University of Technology participated.

The debates were recorded in the course English for Information Technology in Microsoft Teams during the COVID-19 pandemic in the summer semester 2021 when all lessons were taught online. The audio recordings used for transcripts were provided by my supervisor Eva Ellederová, and the students gave their consent for using the audio recordings for this analysis.

### 5.1 Rules and stages of the online debates

At the beginning of the semester, the students of the course English for Information Technology were assigned the topic of the debate and they were separated into groups of four. Each group was then divided into an affirmative team and a negative team. The students had several days to prepare for the debate whose phases and duration were as follows:

- 1) Affirmative team starts the debate: speech – 2 minutes
- 2) Cross-questioning: 3 minutes
- 3) Negative team delivers its speech: 2 minutes
- 4) Cross-questioning: 3 minutes
- 5) Affirmative team's conclusion: 1 minute
- 6) Negative team's conclusion: 1 minute.

In the online lesson, the assigned groups took turns according to the given instructions and proceeded with their prepared debates. The teacher used a stopwatch for tracking the duration of the individual phases of debates and signalled the end of each phase by playing a bell sound. The students had to finish the phase and continue with the next one.

### 5.2 Corpus description

To analyse the debates, I decided to use the online corpus manager *Sketch Engine*. It is an

online program that allows its users to create their own corpus and analyse it using multiple functions the program offers. It contains functions such as a thesaurus, a keywords function, or a concordance function used to determine the frequency of certain words in the user's own corpus.

First, I created my own corpus by importing the text of all three debates using the function *New Corpus*. Then I simply chose *Corpus Info* in the main function menu, and the basic statistics of the debates automatically displayed in the *Counts* tab. The corpus contains a certain number of tokens, words, and sentences, see Table 7.

Table 7. *Basic corpus statistics of all three debates*

<b>Tokens</b>	6227
<b>Words</b>	5450
<b>Sentences</b>	361

### 5.3 Analysis of accentuation and attenuation of the illocutionary force

Accentuation and attenuation markers, also referred to as boosters and hedges, are listed in Table 8. In this table, I used a list of common boosters and hedges by Hyland (2005, pp. 221–224). To find these words and their frequency in all three debates, I again used *Sketch Engine*.

Table 8. *Boosters and hedges and their frequency of use*

<b>Boosters</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Relative frequency</b>	<b>Hedges</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Relative frequency</b>
Actually	2	0.036%	Almost	1	0.018%
Always	3	0.055%	In my opinion	1	0.018%
Believe	13	0.238%	I think	15	0.275%
Definitely	1	0.018%	Likely	1	0.018%
I think	9	0.165%	May	8	0.146%
Must	1	0.018%	Maybe	6	0.110%
Obviously	1	0.018%	Might	3	0.055%
Of course	4	0.073%	Of course	4	0.073%
Really	10	0.183%	Often	2	0.036%
Sure	1	0.018%	Perhaps	1	0.018%
True	1	0.018%	Possible	1	0.018%
You know	1	0.018%	Probably	9	0.165%
			Quite	3	0.055%
			Seems	1	0.018%
			Should	1	0.018%
			Somewhat	2	0.036%
			Usually	1	0.018%
			Would	8	0.146%
			You know	8	0.146%
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>0.858%</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>1.387%</b>

Using *Sketch Engine*, I found that many words from the list by Hyland (2005) were not used in the debates at all. Due to the fact that the number of unused words prevailed over the ones used, I decided not to include them in Table 8. A few examples of the excluded boosters and hedges are *conclusively*, *decidedly*, *doubtless*, *mainly*, *on the whole*, or *suppose*.

On the other hand, the words included in Table 8 were used relatively frequently, but since this program cannot distinguish between some context-sensitive attenuation or accentuation markers and basic sentence elements, I selected the markers manually from the list the program provided. The frequency then significantly decreased. For instance, the frequency of the phrase *you know* in my corpus is 12. After the manual selection (see the illustrative example in Figure 4), the frequency of the phrase used as a booster was 1 and the frequency of the hedge was 8. Three instances of the phrase were excluded from the analysis because they were used only as a verb, hence not increasing or decreasing the force of the statements. Examples of boosters and hedges used in sentences are as follows:

- *You know* monetary barriers for entry to the App Store are not only for the developers to make more profit which is why both applications are available on iOS first by the way. (booster)
- ... you get more privacy more higher quality higher precision more polish but all of this of course comes at a cost and the cost is **you know** limiting... (hedge)
- That limits freedom for everyone **you know**. (hedge)
- And I think that corporations millions and millions I mean they would probably want to dodge this... er... to paying this tax but **you know**. (hedge)
- Like imagine like you have a city where there is like a thousand trash cans and you released... er... like... er... nine... er...trash trucks that can... er... pick them... pick **you know** automatically by themselves and then one with actual human that does the rest that they cannot so you... you still have nine less people. (hedge)






Figure 4. Frequency and GDEX of a hedge *you know* in Sketch Engine.

The same applied especially to the hedge *would*, whose frequency dropped from 43 to 8 instances of hedging (see examples below):

- *I've read and heard a lot of developers that are just frustrated with Apple and their policies because it is quite hard to meet those standards that **would** almost seem unnecessary.*
- *Of course it depends on preparations or... er... openness or security and like... things like this I **would** say and this is it.*
- *And the next step from there **would** be probably just an... self-driving truck that would actually do that.*

- *And if you count in the tax and other resources that have to go for the robots I **would** say it would cost more than the people.*

The phrase *of course* was used as a booster in four cases and as a hedge in four cases in the corpus.

The confidential *of course* (booster) was used in the following examples:

- ***Of course** due to its nature and reputation the Dark Net seems like a nest of crime and nothing more.*
- ***Of course** if someone is good, he can make malware but it's...*
- ***Of course** it depends on preparations or... er... openness or security and like...*

Examples of the impersonal *of course* (hedge) are as follows:

- *Whereas if there was and there are probably states where you have zero to none freedom, and **of course**... er... it's quote unquote safe...*
- *... you get more privacy more higher quality higher precision more polish but all of this **of course** comes at a cost...*

Moreover, due to the high frequency of the booster *believe*, several examples should be included (see below). Students used this assurance booster to promote truthfulness of their proposition and they tried to sound confident and persuasive (see also Urbanová, 2003, p. 69).

- *But a true magic of an open platform we **believe** lies in the experience.*
- *So in short we **believe** that open platforms excel at availability and customization.*
- *I **believe** that the freedom is a double-edged sword...*
- *... the limitation of your choices and your freedom I **believe** is more devastating than having choices and just having to be more careful.*
- *We **believe** that we have shown that there is no clear winner as both platforms have their pros and cons.*
- *All things considered me and my colleague **believe** that regulating Dark Web is not a good idea.*
- *I **believe** people didn't actually choose to be in China when they were born there and they may not agree with this they may want to be well free and they would like to express their... er... opinions... er... anywhere freely.*

In the case of the word *may*, it was originally used 15 times in the debates. After the manual

selection, I found out that there were only 8 hedges, for example:

- *They have to like adapt the software and they **may** charge them for that.*
- *I believe people didn't actually choose to be in China when they were born there and they **may not** agree with this they **may** want to be well free and they would like to express their... er... opinions... er... anywhere freely.*
- *It **may** be about the people in the government.*

And finally, the debates included 9 instances of the booster *I think*, and because it is listed as a hedge too, there were also 15 instances of hedging, see examples below:

- *But if murder was legal, the people would alter the... their behaviour to such an extent that they would actually lose freedom like **I think** this is the same example, like... (hedge)*
- *Well **I think** it is bad but... er... (hedge)*
- ***I think** it's... (hedge)*
- ***I think** our three minutes are once again over. (hedge)*
- *If you tell people that they... they will not get their garbage taken out if they don't place... place their garbage can on a... on a large X on the ground then **I think** they will place it on the large X on the ground. (booster)*
- *Well **I think** you did mention it but I don't really think the criminality can be stopped in either way and I really think it will just find a different way. (booster)*
- ***I think** some jobs for sure will be replaced and I don't think it's necessarily a bad thing but a lot of jobs can create some problems that are hard to solve and I don't think are good. (booster)*

As Table 2 demonstrates, there are numerous categories of attenuation markers. I found several examples of these markers in the transcripts of the debates:

- Conversational gambit: *Oh yes. But he has a lot of choice but it's like still restricted. He **I mean** can't really choose from as much as on Android... (He has a lot of choice, but my view is he can't choose from as much as on Android)*
- Contradiction: *So first of all, we would like to point out that **even though you have... you had some interesting points** it... it still doesn't change the fact that open platforms enable more flexibility more creativity easier integration and honestly have a greater growth potential. (You had some interesting points, but we still think open platforms are better.)*

- Detachment, reservation: *So **I'm not sure** that this is such an extreme advantage.* (I politely disagree)
- Assumption, consideration: *You can **probably** find as many contentious views on this topic as there are smartphones.* (I assume there are as many views as there are smartphones.)
- Detachment, reservation: ***I wouldn't** be so sure.* (polite disapproval)
- Detachment, reservation: *So... **I don't see how** that's a solution.* (that is not a solution)
- Non-commitment: *Of course that **may** be my lack of imagination.* (I may be wrong)
- Non-commitment: *...they will... er... **probably** get some support from government and then there will be a divide.* (maybe they will and maybe they will not)
- Unspecified reference: *...nowadays people are doing **all that DIY stuff** back home.*
- Afterthought: *Well I think that.. er... there were some arguments for regulation and not regulation and of course... er... things like oppressive regimes are... er... it's a... it's a... it can help people who are under oppressive regimes but also there are some really unspeakable crimes happening on the... on the Dark Web and I think it... **it may just make sense to regulate it yeah.***

In addition, I found examples of accentuation markers as follows:

- Assurances: *Well I think it is bad but... er... Apple has a **really** big competition, all the Android-using phones.*
- Agreement/understanding: ***Yes** it really depends on user... user-to-user expectations and... er... needs.*
- Degree of quality: *When you take for example Linux if the user is skilled enough he can tailor every pixel of the OS to his own needs and desires resulting in two or even a hundred Linux computers looking **absolutely** nothing alike.*
- Subjectivity: ***I mean** with time you can you can... er... perfect the AI just like any other tool.*
- Degree of quality: *So I think this is one of the examples that's **really** easily replaceable.*

- Empathizers/emphasizers: *And I think that [unclear expression] corporations millions and millions I mean they would probably want to dodge this... er... to paying this tax but **you know**.*
- Subjectivity: *Well **personally** I don't think I have any other questions.*
- Degree of quality: *...and I **really** think it will just find a different way.*
- Agreement/understanding: *Oh yes.*
- Topicalization: ***It is a fact** that the Dark Net is a place full of criminals.*
- Assurances: ***Of course** due to its nature and reputation the Dark Net seems like a nest of crime and nothing more.*
- Agreement/understanding: *Oh yes **absolutely** I... **I agree**.*

As seen in the examples above, students applied both negative politeness with hedges and positive politeness with boosters in their speeches. Referring to Table 8, due to the prevailing number of hedges used (e.g. *may, maybe, probably, would*), negative politeness was used more frequently, which “reflects the need to avoid face-threatening acts, such as refusal, disagreement, objection, dislike, disapproval, criticism, disregard, etc.” (Urbanová, 2003, p. 60) while discussing controversial topics. Moreover, students tended to minimize the assertiveness of some speech acts in accordance with the maxim of modesty of Leech’s politeness principle (Leech, 1983).

On the other hand, the frequent use of boosters (e.g. *I believe, really, I think*) allowed students to build solidarity and reach an agreement with their opponents by means of intensification of meaning (see Hyland, 1998; Urbanová, 2003). Students used boosters (e.g. *really, sure, always, actually, obviously*) “to suppress alternatives, presenting the proposition with conviction while making involvement, solidarity and engagement” (Hyland, 2005, p. 145) among the members of the discourse community of IT students.

Finally, the co-existence of accentuation and attenuation can be seen in the debate, for instance, *He **I mean** (hedge) can't **really** (booster) choose from as much as on Android*, reflects “the constant need for balance with regard to the validity of the interpretation of the meaning conveyed by particular speech acts” (Urbanová, 2003, p. 68).

## 5.4 Analysis of speech acts

In this chapter, I will analyse the speech acts according to Searle's classification only in the first debate (see Debate 1 in Appendix). The reason for this is the length of the debates – they are rather long, the speech acts can be found in every sentence, and therefore I consider one debate as a reasonable sample with sufficient informative value.

Table 9. *Searle's speech acts in Debate 1*

Speech act	Frequency	Relative frequency
Representative	106	84.13%
Directive	13	10.32%
Commissive	3	2.38%
Expressive	4	3.17%
Declarative	0	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>126</b>	

The results clearly show that representatives and directives were the most commonly used speech acts. Numerous examples of expressives were found as well. There were only a few commissives, and as expected, there were no instances of declaratives (see Table 9). Declaratives are not the speech acts that students normally use. Moreover, students have no authority to perform such acts, as neither of them is superior to the others. Declaratives are a sign of superiority, and the debate was conducted in a friendly manner (see the transcript of Debate 1 in Appendix). Besides, students participating in the debates do not have a special institutional role that changes the world via their utterances (see Searle, 1975).

Neither the speech acts used in Debate 1 nor the debate stages completely correspond to the distribution of speech acts and the stages in Eemeren and Grootendorst's (2004) model of a critical discussion, as indicated in Table 6. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) note (see Chapter 3.4), the stages are *confrontation*, *opening*, *argumentation*, and *concluding*. The stages listed are usually used in debates with more spontaneous argumentation, whereas Debate 1 is an in-class structured debate based on predetermined rules given by the teacher. Therefore, not all stages correspond to the above-mentioned model. For instance, the confrontation stage does not fully correspond with the first debate, because the first stage (see Appendix) is a monologue by one of the participants about their opinion on the discussed topic. Even though the point of the confrontation stage is to present a standpoint, which corresponds with Debate 1, a difference of opinion does not take place, because it is a monologue. The monologue is instantly followed by questions by the opposing (negative) team who try to undermine the affirmative team's arguments presented in the monologue.

Since the participants do not try to find how much common ground they have, it is obvious that van Eemeren and Grootendorst's opening stage does not take place in the debate. In contrast, the stage that does take place is the argumentation stage, which is described as the *cross-questioning* stage in Chapter 5.1. The teams exchange their arguments and ask questions, while trying to persuade their opponents to their viewpoints. Similarly, the concluding stage is also present in the debate.

Regarding the speech acts used in Debate 1 when compared to Table 6, only assertives (representatives) are used in the confrontation stage because in the debate, there is no dialogue in the stage where the main speeches are delivered by the affirmative and negative teams. In the argumentation stage, all speech acts except usage directives are used. Expressives are also used, but as explained in Chapter 3.4, they do not play any important role in debates, so they are not included in Table 6. Finally, in the concluding stage, commissives and assertives are used. The two separate conclusions in Debate 1 are monologues, and therefore no directives or usage declaratives are used.

In order to carry out a detailed analysis of speech acts, I specified their subcategories and listed their frequency in Table 10. As Table 9 demonstrates, representatives belong to the most frequent group of speech acts performed, and the number of subcategories corresponds to this fact.

The most frequently used representative speech acts in Debate 1 (see Appendix) are assertions, examples of which are as follows:

- *So if you're a person who has high standards who values efficiency and privacy you should have an easy time picking a side on this topic.*
- *That's my point like that you can download pretty much anything.*
- *Well I think it is bad but... er... Apple has a really big competition all the Android-using phones.*

From directives, one of the most commonly used speech acts are suggestions, the frequency of which is 3:

- *Let us look on a few examples shall we?*
- *Yeah we can continue this afternoon.*

The only subcategory of commissives that has been found in Debate 1 are promises, for example:

- *I... I shall start with one with first question.*
- *I'll conclude our discussion.*

And finally, two instances of expressive speech acts have been found in Debate 1, with one of their subcategories being apology, for example:

- *Oh sorry Marek (go on).*
- *Er... I'm... I'm sorry...*

Table 10. *Subcategories of speech acts in Debate 1*

<b>Representative</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>Directive</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Commissive</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Expressive</b>	<b>4</b>
Confirmation	13	Question	2	Promise	3	Greeting	1
Statement	2	Suggestion	3			Pleasure	1
Assumption	2	Request	3			Apology	2
Assertion – rhetorical question	7	Asking for confirmation	1				
Explanation	9	Command	2				
Assertion	45	Reminder	1				
Exemplification	4	Asking for permission	1				
Reporting	3						
Informing	2						
Reasoning	3						
Agreement	6						
Hypothesis	2						
Acceptance	1						
Reminder	2						
Admitting	2						
Criticism	1						
Conclusion	2						

## 5.5 Speech acts in the cross-questioning phase of the debate

To analyse the function of speech acts in the debates in more detail, I decided to focus on one particular stage of Debate 1 (see Appendix), which is the first cross-questioning stage. The interlocutors use different types of speech acts along with their subcategories to communicate different standpoints, opinions and arguments in this stage, which is the most suitable for the analysis of communicative functions of speech acts.

As Appendix shows, all types of speech acts are used in the cross-questioning stage, except for declaratives which are not used in the debate at all. The very first line of Negative Speaker 1 is very diverse, as it uses representatives, a commissive and a directive all in the first line. This speaker first reacts to the end of the previous stage by a representative speech act of agreement to signify understanding of the beginning of the next stage. Then they use a commissive in the form of a promise to commit themselves to an action, which is asking



the first question. By making the utterance *I just like to ask*, they use a directive in the form of a request, which means they are hinting that they expect an answer for their question, hence requesting a future action from the listener. This speaker then uses four representatives, with the first one *You mentioned that...* having reporting function, which means that they refer to what the previous speaker has said to support their next argument. Right after reporting, they use reasoning to support their disagreement with logic. The speaker then finishes their line with two representatives (*...and I believe that the majority of people...; So I'm not sure that this is such an extreme advantage.*) that have an assertive function of presenting their opinions.

The next line is of Affirmative Speaker 1 who delivered their speech in the previous stage. They use a directive in the form of a question, to ask for confirmation of a standpoint the previous speaker has just expressed. Negative Speaker 1 confirms it by using a representative. Affirmative Speaker 1 then confirms they have understood and continues by presenting two assertions as their opinion to refute the argument that was presented. Negative Speaker 1 confirms they understand what has been said and continues to explain their argument *But my point is that...* hoping to persuade the opponent.

Affirmative Speaker 1 tries to reply using a representative in the form of a hypothesis *So basically if the...* but is interrupted by further assertions *The risk isn't so high like...* and acceptance *I admit that Apple... er... has a better quality control...* of one of the arguments of Negative Speaker 1. After they finish, Affirmative Speaker 1 continues by reporting the other speaker's opinion *So basically your point is that...* to try to undermine it. Afterwards, there are more assertions followed by explanations.

When the speakers finish presenting their arguments related to one of the points, Negative Speaker 2 joins the debate by using a directive *Er... now I would like to ask...* to ask a question. Affirmative Speaker 2 joins the debate by making an assertion *Well I think it is bad but...* to try to defend their standpoint. Both negative speakers then try to oppose this standpoint with their assertions but interrupt each other by starting to speak simultaneously. Negative Speaker 1 then uses an expressive *Oh sorry Marek* to apologise, then finishes with a directive *Go on* as a command to their colleague to continue their utterance.

Negative Speaker 2 continues by using exemplification *The point is if some company for example uses... er... Apple software...* followed by explanation *They have to like adapt the software and they may charge them for that...* to make a standpoint. This standpoint remains

unchallenged because Negative Speaker 1 interferes by apologising, reminding all the interlocutors that the time for this stage is over, and making a command *...so maybe move on and get back to this*. to continue the discussion later, which was followed by a suggestion from a member of the opposing team.

## 5.6 Analysis of direct and indirect speech acts

In this chapter, Debate 2 will be analysed for direct and indirect speech acts. Even without counting the frequency of these speech acts, it is obvious (see Appendix, Debate 2) that direct speech acts prevail over indirect speech acts. The higher occurrence of direct speech acts was expected, as the text analysed is a debate, where arguments are presented. Arguments are usually presented in a direct manner, which is a structure *declarative – statement* (see Chapter 1.6). From indirect speech acts, an act with the highest occurrence in the debate was rhetorical question, which the speakers used in their speeches to put forward their arguments. Rhetorical questions belong to indirect speech acts because the speakers do not expect an answer afterwards, which defeats the purpose of a question.

As previously mentioned, the most occurring indirect speech acts are rhetorical questions. The following examples show the rhetorical questions speakers used during their speeches:

- *Alright so... Should human labour be replaced with an a... with a AI?*
- *Er does a human being deserve to be slaving all their entire life doing good job that can be easily replaced by a machine?*
- *Why shouldn't they work unless of a monotone environment where they can fulfil their creative needs and... er... be productive at the same time?*
- *Do you hear somebody still complaining about them being replaced?*

The next example shows a question one of the speakers used to signify confusion. They did not expect any answer, they rather tried to get themselves time to think, to reformulate their next utterance:

- *Uh I think that's the incenzi... how do I put it? You incentivize them to actually not switch to AI then.*

Furthermore, in the three following examples there is an indirect relationship between the structure and the function of the utterances (see Chapter 1.6):

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: *Yeah may I?*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: *Go on.*

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: *If... I can touch into that...*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: *Yeah?*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: *Negative question should have their speech now.*

In the first example, Affirmative Speaker 2 used an indirect speech act, which is an interrogative used to make a request. They asked for permission to continue indirectly in order to be more polite, which is, according to Yule (1996), “considered more polite than direct speech acts” (see Chapter 1.6). Affirmative Speaker 1 answered with a direct speech act using an imperative to make a command, which is less polite.

The second example shows two speakers interrupting each other, where Negative speaker 2 tried to make a request by using a declarative, which is again an indirect speech act. The speaker tried to present an argument related to a standpoint presented before by requesting the affirmative speaker’s attention. His request was answered indirectly, because Affirmative Speaker 1 should have answered with a declarative, such as *Yes, you can* but they decided to use an interrogative instead. The utterance *Yeah?* essentially means that they are listening.

The third example is a declarative used to make a command. Affirmative Speaker 1 apparently noticed they have run out of time, so they interrupted the argumentation by indirectly commanding the participants to stop what they were doing and start delivering their speech.

In the example below, a direct speech act is responded to with an indirect speech act. Negative Speaker 2 asked for explanation, such as how garbage collectors would work with AI, but instead of a direct answer, Affirmative Speaker 1 avoided it by saying that the AI could be perfected with time:

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: *Oof... er... What about repetitive jobs that are hard to fulfil with AI such as I don't know garbage collectors? I think there's a lot to do there.*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: *I mean with time you can you can... er... perfect the AI just like any other tool.*

The example below illustrates how direct and indirect speech acts can take turns in a conversation. In the first two lines, the speakers interrupted each other by speaking simultaneously, and both used direct speech acts. Affirmative Speaker 2 then commanded Affirmative Speaker 1 to continue their speech by using an imperative to make a command, which is a direct speech act. Affirmative Speaker 1 continued with a direct speech act giving reasons for their opinion on a topic under discussion. Negative Speaker 2 responded with an indirect speech act, which is a declarative, but its intention is not just to make a statement but also to signify their doubt and provoke a reaction from the opponent. It almost sounds like a question, such as *Are you sure?*. The speaker recognised the opponent's intention and presented an argument in the form of a declarative, which is again a direct speech act.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: *Yeah I guess that might be true.*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: *It's just...*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: *Yeah go ahead.*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: *It's just a matter of creating a system. If you tell people that they... they will not get their garbage taken out if they don't place... place their garbage can on a... on a large X on the ground then I think they will place it on the large X on the ground.*

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: *I wouldn't be so sure.*

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: *Well then they won't get their garbage collected.*

## Conclusion

In conclusion, this bachelor's thesis aimed to define the speech acts and other important aspects of the theory related to them, and most importantly, to successfully carry out research into the occurrence of hedges and boosters as well as the speech acts performed by information technology students in online debates. In the process, I found that the speech act theory covered a wide range of concepts and approaches. Therefore, I tried to discuss it in detail and provide definitions of different terms and topics. Besides speech acts, I framed the concept of the modification of the illocutionary force of utterances and presented the way to analyse it systematically. In addition, I listed the categories of boosters and hedges, which were significantly important for the analytical part of this thesis, and compared three different taxonomies of speech acts, namely by Austin, Searle and Bach and Harnish. The description of direct and indirect speech acts and the definition of speech acts in argumentation, along with the stages of argumentation were also important for the analytical part of this thesis.

In the analytical part, I dealt with the analysis of attenuation and accentuation markers which are also referred to as boosters and hedges. First, I explained the rules of online debates and their stages and duration. Then, with the help of *Sketch Engine*, I created a corpus for the three debates, counted the boosters and hedges using Hyland's (1998, 2005) lists of metadiscourse markers, selected some of them manually, and displayed their frequency in a table. I also included and commented on several examples, and finally, carried out an analysis of the attenuation and accentuation markers, drawing on Urbanová's (2003) concept, and giving one or more examples for each category I found in the debate.

I found out that students primarily used basic vocabulary, or in other words, did not use very complicated variations of boosters and hedges. Due to the students' use of basic vocabulary, I removed the boosters and hedges with zero occurrence from the table. I found out that what they used more frequently were hedges, which reached the frequency of 1.387% in the debates, whereas boosters only reached 0.858%. The results may seem surprising since the point of the debate was to try to convince the opponents to share their team's point of view, which can be done no other way than to increase the illocutionary force of their statements. However, the fact that the students had never before taken part in a debate and the resulting stress and nervousness are possible reasons for the higher frequency of hedges as a sign of uncertainty in their speeches. What is more, students used more hedges to avoid refusal,

criticism, or disagreement, as mentioned by Urbanová (2003).

After choosing Debate 1 for the analysis of speech acts according to Searle (1975), I identified the types of speech acts and their subcategories and displayed them in two separate tables along with their occurrence in the debate. As a result, I found out that representatives were the most frequently used speech acts, followed by directives, then expressives and commissives. No declaratives were found in the debate, which is because students do not have the authority to use them, as they require a special institutional role that changes the world via their utterance (Searle, 1975). Further results show that the speech acts used during the debate stages the students should follow do not completely correspond to the stages described by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004). The reason is that the stages described in their model of a critical discussion are used in spontaneous argumentation, while the stages in the analysed debate have fixed structure, so the speech acts used in the debate correspond to the model only to a certain degree. Regarding the subcategories of speech acts used in the debate, I found out that assertions, suggestions and requests, promises and apologies were used most frequently.

In the next part of the speech act analysis, I chose the cross-questioning part of Debate 1 to determine what speech acts the interlocutors use for different communicative functions and purposes.

In the last part of the analysis, I decided to analyse Debate 2 for direct and indirect speech acts. After identifying these two types of speech acts in the transcript included in Appendix, I found out that direct speech acts were of significantly higher occurrence than indirect speech acts. Arguments are usually presented directly, which is the reason for the above-mentioned results. The indirect speech acts that were identified in the debate were most frequently uttered as rhetorical questions, which were used to present the following arguments. Apart from rhetorical questions, the interlocutors used indirect speech acts either as a sign of politeness, uncertainty, or even confusion.

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# Appendix

## Transcript of Debate 1

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Okay can you hear me?** (directive – question) **Hello.** (expressive – greeting)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Yes.** (representative – confirmation)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: **Yes.** (representative – confirmation)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: **Uh-huh.** (representative – confirmation)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Okay.** (representative – confirmation) **Great.** (expressive – pleasure) **So iOS versus Android.** (representative – statement) **You can probably find as many contentious views on this topic as there are smartphones.** (representative – assumption) **Why are so many people so passionately arguing for their side defending their favourite phone and its operating system?** (representative – assertion, asking a question) **To answer this question properly we firstly have to establish that speaking about iOS without a firm that is behind its development is like speaking about your salary without ever mentioning your job.** (representative – explanation) **Well it is possible it's impractical at its best and flat-out misleading at its worst.** (representative – assertion) **But why on Earth would people buy an Apple smartphone when there are admittedly cheaper options that seemingly offer the same capabilities?** (representative – assertion, asking a question) **What would justify this price bump on Apple products?** (representative – assertion, asking a question) **Let us look on a few examples shall we?** (directive – suggestion) **The App Store.** (representative – exemplification) **Now I hear you say: "How is this better than the Play Store? The Play Store has more apps and you can upload your apps almost for free".** (representative – assumption) **And while that is true, Play Store has more apps.** (representative – assertion) **But tell me how often did you download it like a weather app or game or something like that and it asks you to allow access to your contacts to your calls to pretty much everything?** (representative – assertion, asking a question) **How many of these applications can be malicious?** (representative – assertion, asking a question) **Well in 2017 the lookout security intelligence team has discovered that over 500 apps used plugin that spied on its users.** (representative – reporting) **You know monetary barriers for entry to the App Store are not only for the developers to make more profit which is why both applications are available on iOS first by the way.** (representative – informing) **But also for users for you while you don't have more apps to choose from you have the peace of mind that those applications are much more**

rigorously tested for quality and security. (representative – assertion) And speaking about security Apple even has a long-standing fight over your privacy with the FBI because the FBI was unable to break into iPhones. (representative – reasoning) So if you're a person who has high standards who values efficiency and privacy you should have an easy time picking a side on this topic. (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Er... very well. (representative – agreement) I... I shall start with one with first question. (commissive – promise) I just like to ask (directive – request) you mentioned that... er... on iOS... er... you get more privacy more higher quality higher precision more polish (representative – reporting) but all of this of course comes at a cost and the cost is you know limiting... er... both the users and the developers while... er... on Android and on open platforms you still can get all the polish and all the... er... all the quality only if you... if you know where to look (representative – reasoning) and I believe that the majority of people... er... like people don't need to be like technical magicians to be able to tell the difference between... er... let's say malware or some... er... bad software and some legit software. (representative – assertion) So I'm not sure that this is such an extreme advantage. (representative – assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well you just said that people shouldn't be magicians to like distinguish between malicious apps or... er... legitimate apps right? (directive – asking for confirmation)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Yeah. (representative – confirmation)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Yeah. (representative – confirmation) On Apple... yeah... like on App Store you wouldn't find malicious apps. (representative – assertion) That's my point like that you can download pretty much anything. (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Yes I understand. (representative – confirmation) But my point is that... er... that's these are like not necessarily rare cases but... er... er... it's not a high percentage... er... it's not a high chance that you're going... doing... going to find these bad apps if you know what you're looking for. (representative – explanation)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: So basically if the... (representative – hypothesis)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: The risk isn't so high like... (representative – assertion) I admit that Apple... er... has a better quality control but... er... the... it's not as extreme on Android. (representative – acceptance, assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: So basically your point is that sacrificing like your benefits of Android that like you have more freedom to choose and like everything like that is... well... basically that it's still worth it even though... (representative – reporting)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **It doesn't outweigh the negatives.** (representative – assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Well do you know the difference between positive and negative freedom?** (representative – assertion, asking a question) **Like for example murder is illegal.** (representative – explanation) **That limits freedom for everyone you know. You can't people... you can't kill people anymore.** (representative – assertion) **But if murder was legal the people would alter the... their behaviour to such an extent that they would actually lose freedom** (representative – explanation) **like I think this is the same example like... er... even though to a lesser extent you can still apply the same logic to this that even though you have more like limited choices the choices in the end outweigh like the cost.** (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: **Er... now I would like to ask: Wouldn't you agree that companies taking advantage of no competition if they manage to lock the user in their ecosystem and squeezing them is a predatory behaviour and that definitely that shouldn't be as... as... common as it is today?** (directive – asking a question)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: **Well I think it is bad but... er... Apple has a really big competition all the Android-using phones.** (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Er... yeah... I think it's...** (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: **Yes the point is that...** (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Oh sorry Marek** (expressive – apology) **go on.** (directive – command)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: **The point is if some company for example uses... er... Apple software and they need change they can't just customize their systems.** (representative exemplification) **They have to like adapt the software and they may charge them for that.** (representative explanation)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Er... I'm... I'm sorry** (expressive – apology) **we're over three minutes already** (representative – reminder) **so maybe move on and get back to this.** (directive – command)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Yeah we can continue this afternoon.** (directive – suggestion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Okay.** (representative – confirmation) **So... er... my... my speech.** (directive – request) **So first of all we would like to point out that even though you have... you had some interesting points it... it still doesn't change the fact that open platforms enable more flexibility more creativity easier integration and honestly have a greater growth potential.** (representative – assertion) **And all that by just giving the users more freedom.**

(representative – assertion) **Er... for example let's look at Android.** (directive – suggestion) **Although Android was released over a year later than iOS it didn't hesitate and thanks to being an open platform it aggressively took over the smartphone market.** (representative – assertion) **Since the beginning it prided itself with symbolizing the exact opposite of what iOS stood for.** (representative – assertion) **Amongst the core values of open platforms and therefore Android is their accessibility allowing it to reach exponentially more people.** (representative – reasoning) **It is very easy to find phones with Android at every price which sadly can't be said for iPhones which have historically kept a premium price and didn't allow the users to enter at a lower price point.** (representative – assertion) **Nowadays Apple has diversified its phone selection offering phones from lower to high-end but it still isn't even comparable to the number of phones with Android on the market.** (representative – assertion) **But a true magic of an open platform we believe lies in the experience.** (representative – assertion) **When you take for example Linux if the user is skilled enough he can tailor every pixel of the OS to his own needs and desires resulting in two or even a hundred Linux computers looking absolutely nothing alike.** (representative – exemplification) **So in short we believe that open platforms excel at availability and customization.** (representative assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: **So would you like to go back where we left off or do we start over?** (directive – request)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **I... I don't really have a preference.** (representative – informing) **That's up to you you're questioning us.** (directive – reminder)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Okay.** (representative – confirmation) **So...** (representative – assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: **Er... er... May I?** (directive – asking for permission)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Yep of course.** (representative – confirmation)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: **If the person is really good let's say with Linux than he can make... er... very powerful applications.** (representative – assertion) **So why wouldn't he make some virus or some malware?** (representative – assertion) **It's... er... Also open platform allows this to propagate to a lot more... ahem... systems and... ahem... devices.** (representative – assertion) **In Apple it's... er... a lot harder because... er... the platform...** (representative – explanation) **Of course if someone is good he can make malware but it's... er... harder to... er... distribute it amongst the users.** (representative – admitting)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: **Er... well... yeah...** (representative – agreement) **I believe that the freedom is a double-edged sword... sword.** (representative – assertion) **But... er... I**

believe that this applies to almost everything in life where the more freedom you have the more responsibility you have. (representative – assertion) And... er... you just have to be careful. (representative – assertion) Er... but that's nothing new and it's nothing special. (representative – assertion) Whereas if there was and there are probably states (representative – hypothesis) where you have zero to none freedom and of course... er... it's quote unquote safe... safe fear but also well like the... the limitation of your choices and your freedom I believe is more devastating than having choices and just having to be more careful. (representative – assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Ahem... I believe... (representative – assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yes it really depends on user... user-to-user expectations and... er... needs. (representative – agreement)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Yeah my point is user shouldn't have to be wary of what applications he chooses to install. (representative – explanation) That's my point. (representative – explanation) Like you if you really want you can upload whatever you want on all App Stores. (representative – exemplification) But like user can download pretty much anything like he still has a lot of choice yet he doesn't have to worry about malware. (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Oh yes. (representative – agreement) But he has a lot of choice but it's like still restricted. (representative – assertion) He I mean can't really choose from... (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Another point... (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: ... as much as on Android. (representative – assertion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Yeah. (representative – agreement) That brings me to another point that is... er... that on Android you are able to offload the apps from... er... third party services like from third party sides whereas on iPhone and iOS you have you have to go through the App Store which means that for the users and the developers you have to obey and adhere to the quite strict Apple policies which again brings me to my point well... er... I've read and heard a lot of developers that are just frustrated with Apple and their policies because it is quite hard to meet those standards that would almost seem unnecessary. (representative – assertion)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well I mean you can like... I can have an anecdote for every one of us. (representative – assertion) But I mean a lot like... lots of applications are first on iOS because it's more lucrative like if you can get an app on App Store like for you as a developer it's more beneficial than on Play Store. (representative – explanation) So... and...



(representative – statement)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: I... I can't... I can't argue with that. (representative – admitting)

You're... you're right about that. (representative – agreement) But... er... I think our three minutes are once again over. (representative – reminder)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Yeah. (representative – confirmation)

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yes all right. (representative confirmation) I'll start with our closing statement. (commissive – promise) So throughout this debate... er... we have tried our best to show iOS and Apple smartphone as better than either Android operating system and... er... Android device and we hope we succeeded in at least persuading some people to agree with us. (representative – assertion) In the end the decision lies on the customer and their personal priorities and needs. (representative – assertion) We can only shows what iOS operating system can offer and in which ways it's better than Android. (representative – assertion) Of course it depends on preparations or... er... openness or security and like... things like this I would say and this is it. (representative – conclusion)

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Okay. (representative – confirmation) I'll conclude our discussion. (commissive – promise) We believe that we have shown that there is no clear winner as both platforms have their pros and cons. (representative – assertion) A closed platform aims to deliver a polished and reliable experience at the cost of restricting the users' customization options and is controlled by a single entity which believes itself to know what's best and also sets the price of its product. (representative – criticism) In contrast an open platform provides the user with huge amount of options for customization encourages the users to unleash their creativity and doesn't lock itself behind an arbitrary paywall. (representative – assertion) So in conclusion each represents a different idea has its own way of forming the user experience and is also made for our different markets. (representative – conclusion)

### Explanatory notes:

Representatives

Commissives

Directives

Declaratives

Expressives

## Transcript of Debate 2

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Alright so... Should human labour be replaced with an a... with a AI? Er does a human being deserve to be slaving all their entire life doing good job that can be easily replaced by a machine? Why shouldn't they work unless of a monotone environment where they can fulfil their creative needs and... er... be productive at the same time? And AI should replace a human labour that is most likely just dreading the next shift filled with repetitive tasks instead of finding a fulfilment and joy in their job. Just like engine replaced the horse. An AI computer replaced well a computer! That's right that that was an actual job and human processing information just like a computer. Input and output. Er that job really existed. Do you hear somebody still complaining about them being replaced? They got replaced by uh they got replaced before much more efficient machine the one you are using right now coincidentally. Human labour has been replaced by te... technological advancements since the beginning of time. AI is just another iteration of such phenomenon. Another tool that humanity could use. And now you're probably worried that your job will be taken over by some AI. Er did you ever just go to like a fast food restaurant and have seen like those kiosks that you can order there by yourself? Did they replace cashiers? I don't think so. There will always be need for human touch in almost all industries. Some of them are ev... er... some of them are even quite not possible to be replaced by an AI. Such as a writer or an artist. Doctors and other delicate fields are up to AI (unclear word) for a while... er... [unclear expression] for a while too. Repla... er... replacing human labour is just another step forward in our technical advancement as is PC and should be embraced and not hindered. That's it. Now for the questions... Negative team do you have any questions?

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Oof... er... What about repetitive jobs that are hard to fulfil with AI such as I don't know garbage collectors? I think there's a lot to do there.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: I mean with time you can you can... er... perfect the AI just like any other tool.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yeah actually the...

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: And [unclear expression]...

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yeah may I?

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Go on.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yeah yeah just like because I've already seen like uuh... the uuh... garbage collector trucks they actually were picking up the... the garbage cans by themselves and like dumping the garbage to the... to the space in the back just by like a



robotic arm. And the next step from there would be probably just an... self-driving truck that would actually do that. So I think this is one of the examples that's really easily replaceable.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Well I think it depends on... er... I don't know if you live in a city or in a village but where the garbage cans are located is kind of a problem I think.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yeah I guess that might be true.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: It's just...

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yeah go ahead.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: It's just a matter of creating a system. If you tell people that they... they will not get their garbage taken out if they don't place... place their garbage can on a... on a large X on the ground then I think they will place it on the large X on the ground.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: I wouldn't be so sure.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well then they won't get their garbage collected.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: (unclear expression) the second thing. I... I don't think I have any other questions.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Umm maybe if the roads are bad and the truck can't get in... some houses that are near the road?

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well that's... that's... er... what... what was in my first speech that... er... the jobs will always require still some human touch to... do the unexpected things and... and such. Plus you know having like maybe... I don't know. Like imagine like you have a city where there is like a thousand trash cans and you released... er... like... er... nine... er... trash trucks that can... er... pick them... pick you know automatically by themselves and then one with actual human that does the rest that they cannot (unclear word) so you... you still have nine less people.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yeah and also like ev... ev... even if there was like problem with the roads that still I think that can be fixed with... er... you know like a strict system like... er... we're talking about some stuff in the future so you know. Maybe... maybe then everything will be fine.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Negative question should have their speech now.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: So um...

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Negative team.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Mhm... I would... I would say that... er... If... if you replaced some jobs at some level then too many... let's say too many simple levels of jobs would be replaced and so the people working in them sh... would will be... will be unemp... unemployed. And let's say you have a people who are unable to do... er... some... er... more

advanced work. They can only do the the work that will be replaced then they will be a burden for the government and they... there will be... there... there will be a system needed to count for them and I think that when you count in the maintenance of the robots the experts who have to care for them all the risks that the robots will create in the workplace because they will be programmed from for only... one... predeter... predetermined task of... er... Sorry. Uh they will have one predet... prede... predefined programming and they will not... n... not be able to go beyond that. Er I think the... the negatives outweigh the pros.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: I also believe that if you replace a human with a machine obviously the person gets angry and the more of this you have I think it can create some social problems on a larger scale that might be difficult to deal with. Since a lot of angry people because they lost their jobs I think is usually a good thing. And I don't really know how you solve that issue because people don't want to learn new things and change jobs even if their jobs are boring and repetitive. Maybe there if it...

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: I will also say it would.. it would create... er... social divide because let's say the people who got their jobs replaced and can't do anything else will be... will... will not have to work and they will... er... probably get some support from government and then there will be a divide.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: I guess it's time for our question now. Um alright so... there could be like an... easy... er... system how to... er... get like... er... money... er... with the government. Because imagine like a company... er... makes a new line they hire or buy like AI... er... you know machines or robots to do a job for the... for the people and... they fire them. And... now let's say for every like... er... machine that will replace a human there would be like a taxation and from that taxation they would pay the people that got unemployed until they find a new job. And I think that [unclear expression] corporations millions and millions I mean they would probably want to dodge this... er... to paying this tax but you know. What can you do? [unclear expression]

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: If... I can touch into that...

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Yeah?

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Uh I think that's the incenzi... how do I put it? You incentivize them to actually not switch to AI then. If you taxate it. Because it costs them money instead of saving them money then. So... I don't see how that's a solution.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Um let's say... er... you have a human labour that can... that usually works in eight hour shift sometimes in 12 hour shift. And if they can stretch it to 16 hours but then they... er... have to give them some vacation at least here. Er but the AI...

er... robot or whatever can... can work 24 hours a day it's gonna be more productive... er... by like an hour than the human anyway and probably more precise so it's gonna... er... not waste as much material. That's just creating like a much more like two times as much profit to the company. So if they switch to like... er... AI they can and will pay the tax at least like partially... er... to replace the money for the person they fired... er... and maybe it's not gonna be like for... forever maybe it's till they find a new job or something. And or like for like a year or something. So they still will have either the same amount of money or more amount of money from that AI even if they pay the tax.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well you... you count in the unexpected situa... situations and you count in that even someone who cares for them some human input. Then I would say the human input will be more highly valued than the previous jobs so you would have to pay I would say a lot because you will have fewer people working in a robotic environment and that I don't think that would be really... comfortable for... for the people so I think that... hi... hi... higher pay... payment for them would be plausible. And if you count in the tax and other resources that have to go for the robots I would say it would cost more than the people.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Then there would be no incentive to really pursue the AI in the industry and they still pursued it so there must be a profit in there somewhere. And we should probably move on to the conclusion.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Yeah yeah so I can... I can sum it up I guess. Um and yeah I mean you guys had pretty good points... er... 'cause... er... I guess not all jobs can be replaced but most of them definitely can and even now there's like nowadays people are doing all that DIY stuff back home. Especially now with the situation that we have. So there will always be some way for people to do some jobs and earn some money without the robotic help but... er... I still as well as... Pepe I believe we still both stand behind our opinion that... er... the human labour should be replaced... er... or should be probably will be replaced with the AI but I guess time will tell.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: I guess I can deliver our speech. I think some jobs for sure will be replaced and I don't think it's necessarily a bad thing but a lot of jobs can create some problems that are hard to solve and I don't think are good. As well as some jobs that... that will never be replaced as doctors and others as you have said yourself. And I don't know I think we've had a nice discussion about the points of... pluses and minuses of each side.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Alright that's it.

## **Explanatory notes:**

Direct speech act

Indirect speech act

### **Transcript of Debate 3**

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: The matter is if the Dark Net should be regulated like the rest of the Internet or not? The quote unquote regular Internet is a public space where people exchange information and use a wide range of services offered by other people or business subjects. The cyberspace is being perceived as a means of inter human interaction which from the historical point of view replaced the regular physical interactions in some instances. It's not an exception to buy goods of various kinds online and have them delivered to your doorstep without ever leaving your premises. As all these exchanges still have the basic characteristics of regular face to face interactions and happen on a given states territory laws still apply even when breaking them. Arranging a delivery of illegal narcotics online is still unlawful just like conducting these quote unquote business practices the old fashioned way. Communications on the Dark Net add practises and technologies to disguise and anonymize exchanges of information. Just like perhaps using masks and meeting in back alleys of cities where law enforcement agencies don't always look. Even if that presents technical challenges and you still cannot eradicate crime completely not even in the real world I and Vojtěch here believe that the Dark Net should be regulated like it's just another means of communication. At least by establishing a proper legal framework. As was given you the other team don't agree and the objective is to discuss this matter and explore each other's views and arguments. So let's proceed to the... to the questions. Feel free to ask.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Do you think the Dark Net can be regulated in the first place? Do you think it is possible at all?

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: From the technical point of view?

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Can be.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Okay. Er well the Five Eyes alliance consisting of various intelligence agencies such as the NSA CIA Scotland yards MI6 and others has a lot of tools available for this purpose. Er one of these tools is the prism system which is able to analyse all forms of commonly used communication paths and detect certain key points in real time. Er although for example Torch is a very good scheme that makes the endpoints very hard to discover and trace. Er methods based... based on burial analysis and correlations are in the

research to extend... extend this prism system.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Uh-huh.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Er what would make me... er... believe that these... this systems wouldn't be misused once... er... given groups of law enforcement... er... people or I should... I should call them law enforcement groups. Er when they would get into this – er let's call it dark area – what... what will make me believe that they wouldn't misuse their... er... their powers?

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Excellent question. Er well... er... these agencies have a lot of anticorruption teams... er... in them that make sure that the... this... accesses to this... er... these systems are legitimate and every access triggers an audit that is... er... very thoroughly processed. Although I cannot deny it has... er... these agencies have misused their powers in the past.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well personally I don't think I have any other questions.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Okay. Er well... er... I haven't heard your point of view but still I have a preliminary question if I can ask. Er as you don't agree with our view how do you want to hinder or even prevent criminal conduct in which otherwise untraceable exchanges may (unclear word)?

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well I think you did mention it but I don't really think the criminality can be stopped in either way and I really think it will just find a different way. Say if you're buying drugs on the Dark Net you'll just find a local dealer instead of finding one on the Dark Net.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: And is that a reason why not regulate it? That doesn't like... that it can't... that you still can't prevent the... crimes. That doesn't seem...

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well I will just say... er... Can I say my speech instead?

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Oh yes. Er I think here... 3 minutes have passed anyway so go on.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well the reason people come to the Dark Net is privacy. The ability to do what you want on the Internet without anybody knowing it. Now this already sounds [unclear expression]. Very often when people hide something it's not something good. It is a fact that the Dark Net is a place full of criminals. Of course due to its nature and reputation the Dark Net seems like a nest of crime and nothing more. However this is simply one side of the coin. The Dark Net is a very important tool for people in countries with oppressive regimes to access the world outside. For them it is not a tool of crime but one of freedom. I dare say there is no information that the government should hide from its people.

Of course that may be my lack of imagination. But people can safely come to the Dark Net to release this information that the government may be hiding from the public whether your country's oppressed or not. The Dark Net may also be a place for people who don't want the rest of the Internet to see them. Not because they're exactly hiding but simply because they don't feel comfortable having just anyone to see. Now this may just be our general peeling person not feeling good about cookies but where I'm going is forums with people with trauma or other troubles. There are forums on the Internet for people such as survivors of rape or child abuse. What makes the Dark Net a tool of... for a crime is not itself but the criminals that come there. Whether it is possible or not to regulate it... the Dark Net. And it might decrease crime somewhat but it will not stop it. People looking for drugs will just find a more... like a dealer instead as I said. Regulating the Dark Net however will disrupt the privacy it has and it would remove the tool people have to cover and communicate without government watching. That's our speech.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Excellent arguments I have to say. Er I have a question though. Er if... er... if you consider... er the let's say regimes in... er... in er... countries that are member of the... of the Five Eyes Alliance such as the USA UK and Australia. If you would consider the (unclear word)... the regimes of these countries somehow... somewhat oppressive.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: Well what I would consider oppressive is as I kind of said is when the government is not telling you everything for any reason really.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Uh-huh.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 1: I don't... I can't imagine a situation where the government is holding uh... information away from you without... er... I don't want to say exactly evil intention. And it may not just be about the government or what the government has and does. It may be about the people in the government. Say you're... say the government is protecting one of theirs despite them being a bad person who has done crimes.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Oh well if I may [unclear expression] government for example Chinese which implemented thing... thing so called the Great Firewall and they are holding out information from their people... er... because they want to help their power as their government. Er they believe that the information from around the world could... er... could harm their power in the state. And I... I believe people didn't actually choose to be in China when they were born there and they may not agree with this they may want to be well free and they would like to express their... er... opinions... er... anywhere freely.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Oh yes absolutely I... I agree. China and North Korea

(unclear word) have very oppressive regimes but I was asking about... about the Anglophonic countries specifically. If you view them as oppressive.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Not necessarily as oppressive but... er... I have to admit all the countries these Anglo countries as you call them have movements that are pro free speech and they... er... I don't think they would... er... they... they didn't strike me as oppressive.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Okay. I'm afraid I'm out of questions. If my... er... colleague here Vojtěch doesn't have any...

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: No sadly I have no question... no questions.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: I think that would conclude the questioning if... if you have... er... the... er ending prepared. You may deliver that.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 2: Well I think that.. er... there were some arguments for regulation and not regulation and of course... er... things like oppressive regimes are... er... it's a... it's a... it can help people who are under oppressive regimes but also there are some really unspeakable crimes happening on the... on the Dark Web and I think it... it may just make sense to regulate it yeah.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: All things considered me and my colleague believe that regulating Dark Web is not a good idea. The risk of people losing their desire to anonymity is too high for it to be tampered with. In my opinion regulations pose a threat because of any form Internet... of Internet should be decentralised and not regulated by any government. Since... since it would be an infringement of people's free speech rights and democracy. Dark Net is vast unexplored and very fluid space of wide range of sites and services. Admittedly not all of... all of them are legal or moral per say but I think that outweighs... er... it all. And acceptan... acceptable form of regulation is yet to be found since it poses a great challenge. Dark Net is not a place where ideas can be tested quote unquote tested. As of now either wrong people get hurt with which was the case many times up until now or people that are guilty often do not get... get caught at all. Dark Net should not be blamed for its criminal activity. It happens on to... so call... so called surface Internet too. The problem are people using it. Thank you all for a contribution to this debate.

AFFIRMATIVE SPEAKER 1: Thank you for (unclear word) the excellent arguments that you presented.

NEGATIVE SPEAKER 2: Likewise.