Diplomatické vztahy mezi Habsburky a Ruskem v letech 1654-1656

Mgr. Libor Svoboda, Ph.D.

Disertační práce

Russo - Habsburg Diplomatic Ralations between 1654-1656

Anotace:

V říjnu roku 1654 došlo k obnovení diplomatických vztahů mezi habsburskými císaři a Ruskem. Předložená práce řeší: a)jaké okolnosti doprovázely obnovení vzájemných habsbursko-ruských vztahů, b) jaké byly důvody obou stran k navázání diplomatických styků, c) co obě strany od znovuobnovení kontaktů očekávaly, d) jaký byl průběh jednotlivých diplomatických poselstev v Moskvě a ve Vídni, e) jaké byly výsledky diplomatických habsbursko-ruských jednání v padesátých letech 17. století a jaký byl jejich dopad na budoucí vývoj vzájemných vztahů.

Abstract:

This study is concerned with the development of Russo-Habsburg relations from 1654 to 1656. From the long-time perspective, it is undoubtedly a key era, because it created the bedrock for all the future development in the relations of those two powers in following decades and centuries. The main purpose of this work is to show all the motivations that led both sides to make diplomatic contacts, to describe all of the circumstances, the expectations of both sides, as well as the course of negotiations itself in Moscow and Vienna. Results of the 1650s negotiation will also be discussed, along with their impact on the future relationship of Russia and the Habsburg monarchy. It was definitely Russia who started the process of creating diplomatic connection with the Imperial Court in 1654. This primarily resulted from the 1650s events, which had deeply shaken the only Habsburg ally in eastern Europe – Rzeczpospolita. Russian intervention on the side of Zaporozhian Cossacks started a political shakedown throughout the most of the Europe and the originally Polish-Cossack conflict amounted into an international crisis, with many European governments getting involved. The Tsars court wanted to avoid an international isolation, trying to obtain alliance or at least a promise of neutrality of the powers for the upcoming war in Poland. Thus, in the spring of 1655, a delegation of Baklanovskij and Michajlov left Moscow for Vienna with an errand of obtaining Emperors neutrality. He temporarily accepted Tsars terms, promising to send no military, financial or any other help to the Polish king. However, it was not politically possible for the Emperor to stay out of the conflict completely. As one of the most powerful princes of Europe he could not allow to ignore events just across the Empires and Habsburg hereditary lands frontier. Especially in the area considered to some degree to be an area of Habsburg influence. The initiative could not be left to the enemies, Sweden and France. Thus, the Emperor made an offer to the Tsar – he would be a mediator in the conflict. The Emperor sent his delegation, led by Allegretti and Lorbach, to Moscow, in the summer of 1655. Their main task was to convince Tsar to start a peace talk with Poland, with the Emperor as a mediator. However, the situation in eastern Europe went more dramatic during the Allegrettis and Lohrbachs trip to Russia. Poland was invaded by Sweden in July 1655, and Swedes occupied most of the country including both capitals, Warsaw and Krakow. The Russo-Habsburg negotiations of 1655/1656 were successful for both sides. Russia stopped the fighting in Lithuania and agreed to peace talks with Rzeczpospolita along with the Imperial mediation. Meanwhile, Russia started with war preparations directed against Sweden. The Russo-Polish negotiations took place – with participation of Imperial mediators, Allegretti and Lohrbach – in the capital of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilnius. However, Russian suggestion that some member of the house of Romanov should be elected a king of Poland ran into a stormy opposition of Habsburg mediators. Nevertheless and notwithstanding this opposition, the question of Tsars succession to Polish throne remained a part of the negotiations and was included in the peace treaty at the end. However, this peace treaty was an armistice in real. All important, the question of Tsars succession to the throne included, was superseded for the future times. All the Habsburg involvement in the Russo-Polish War of 1655-1657 has to be considered from two different perspectives. First are the efforts of the Imperial diplomats Allegretti and Lorbach in Moscow and later in Vilnius. Their task was practically impossible to complete successfully, because it became clear after a short time that there is no need for mediator between the Polish king and the Tsar. Moreover, the Emperors instruction was more than vague and unclear, leaving both men basically to their own fortunes. T

Abstract:

hey have little or no information on the latest events and their knowledge of Russo-Polish relations were evidently not sufficient. Second, there is the perspective of the Imperial “eastern” policy itself. That means what the Vienna court expected from its efforts in Rzeczpospolita and Russia and what importance they saw in these activities. If only both sides had stuck to the agreement from Vilnius and Tsars candidature to the Polish throne was passed by the Polish senate, it would be a real disaster of Imperial mediating policy. However, it seems that this probability was not feared too much in Vienna. They looked on the whole affair with an pragmatic eye. The armistice under these circumstances did not suit the Imperial court well, but the fact that it actually came true was more important for them. This way it helped Rzeczpospolita at least in some way. In fact, the Tsars election to the Polish throne was a great improbability. For the standing and prestige of the Vienna court in Poland and in European politics it was important, that it actively participated in the peace talks. Their presence was more in the symbolic level, proving that both sides respected the Imperial authority and understood the Emperors role as an arbiter helping to solve their problems. This, in other way, helped to strengthen the position of the Imperial court in Central Europe and the Empire itself, especially against France. As for Russia, signing of the Vilnius agreements came out as a bad decision, losing more than it gained. The grandiose political gamble played by Tsars court in 1650s showed to be beyond its potential and powers. In this phase, Russia was not powerful enough to fight a war in such a vast area and on two or more fronts, against two mighty adversaries, Poland and Sweden, at once. Fighting Sweden, the Moscow government suffered many defeats and Tsars hopes for the Polish throne diminished in time. A few years later, a common interest as well as problem reappeared again in Russo-Habsburg relations – it was the Ottoman Empire, which in 1660s became once again a real threat to Vienna as well as for Moscow, making their interests more common than ever before, and for a long time. Thus, the delegations of 1654-1656 laid foundations of the new relations between two partners – the Moscovite Russia and the Austrian Habsburgs. They were the first of many diplomatic missions, which led to Russia entering the Holy League in 1686 and later to creation of standard diplomatic relations between the two of European powers, Austria and Russia.

Klíčová slova

Česky, Rakouští Habsburkové, Rusko, Polsko, východní Evropy, kozáci, 17. století, dějiny mezinárodních vztahů, dějiny diplomacie English, Austrian Habsburg, Russia, Poland, Eastern Europe, Cossakh, 17th Century, History international Relations, History Diplomacy

Jazyk práce: čeština

Datum vytvoření / odevzdání či podání práce: 31. 10. 2006

Obhajoba závěrečné práce

• Obhajoba proběhla 8. 11. 2006
• Vedoucí: doc. PhDr. Pavel Boček, CSc.

Masarykova univerzita

Filozofická fakulta

Doktorský studijní program / obor:
Historické vědy / Historie - obecné dějiny