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MASTER THESIS

**National identity in the discourse of nationalist and populist parties in
Europe: the dismantlement of multiple belonging and its social and
political implications in terms of exclusion and development**

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“If you can feel that staying human is worthwhile, even when it can't have any result whatever you've beaten them”

George Orwell, 1984

Dedicated to my sister, whose kindness has taught me more than any university course.

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of my original research work and that it has not been submitted, entirely or partially, to any previous application for a degree. The work contained in this document is entirely my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text by reference or acknowledgment.

The present thesis was completed under the guidance and supervision of Lenka Dušková, lecturer at the Palacký University in Olomouc.

A handwritten signature in brown ink, reading "Regina Palacios". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large loop at the end of the last name.

Signature

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Zásady pro vypracování

The aim of the present research is to analyze and compare the discourse of different nationalist and populist leaders in Europe in order to determine if the construction of national identity in their political movements and parties undergoes through a process of dismantlement of multiple belonging as well as to examine the main social and political implications of this process in terms of exclusion and development. The method of research chosen is qualitative. A discourse analysis will be carried out to approach the different views on identity of the selected political figures. Primary and secondary data will be collected through various methods such as questionnaires and observations.

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Abstract

The popularity of right-wing populist parties has significantly increased in Europe in the last two decades. As a consequence, the impact of their discourse on national identity has also grown as these parties have progressively acquired stronger platforms for the dissemination of their ideas. In this context, the aim of the present research is to analyze and compare how national identity is constructed in the discourse of two European right-wing populist leaders, Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Matteo Salvini in Italy, and identify the mechanisms used by these figures for the dismantlement of multiple belonging in identity as well as the main social and political implications of this process in terms of exclusion and development. The present work uses Critical Discourse Analysis methods and theories to identify the discursive elements through which national identity and belonging are constructed by the right-wing populist parties. When contrasting the main messages conveyed by these parties regarding identity and belonging with globally agreed principles for human development, the evidence shows that the non-recognition of intersectional identities contributes to the exclusion of minorities and the legitimization of violence towards them, undermining their right to development.

Key words: national identity, belonging, right-wing populism, politics of fear, development, exclusion.

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1. Introduction

In the last two decades, Europe's political landscape has experienced significant transformations as a result of various events which have disturbed the economic and political stability of the region. The current shift in the political views of European citizens can be attributed to several factors, among which three have played a substantial role: the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, the large increase in the migratory flows to Europe between 2013 and 2015 (UNHCR, 2019) and the difficulties experienced by the European Union in the containment of the 2008 financial crisis which led to critical levels of unemployment in various countries of the block (OECD, 2008). These events have led to a rising dissatisfaction of the European population with the proposals of traditional political parties, which has manifested itself as a transformation of the voting patterns of the region.

The popularity of nationalist and right-wing populist parties has increased all over Europe and, in many cases, these parties have placed their candidates in relevant government positions. For instance, according to the BBC, in seven countries of the European Union¹, nationalist parties have won more than 15% of the votes in the most recent national elections (BBC, 2018). Germany is currently dealing with its first right-wing populist party in parliament since the 1960s (Halikiopoulou, 2018) and in Italy the government is shared between two populist parties: the Five Star Movement and the League. These are just some examples of a phenomenon which is taking place all over Europe: the spread of populism, mainly in the form of right-wing populist parties.

While political shifts are customary processes for democratic governments, the upsurge of right-wing populism raises concerns in the international community. Considering that populist ideologies in the XXth century were at the heart of one of the most devastating conflicts in the world, the Second World War, the current escalation of right-wing populism in Europe is, for many, a potential threat to the institutions that guarantee peace and cooperation in Europe. During the World Economic Forum Meeting of 2018, Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her concern regarding the rise of populism saying that it is a threat to "*the spirit of multilateralism that rebuilt Europe*" (WEF, 2018).

¹ Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, Hungary, and Austria.

Independently of the views regarding the legitimacy of the proposals presented by populist parties, the impact of their discourse has significantly increased in Europe in the last two decades, which is why it is necessary to analyze its implications in terms of development. Within the framework of nationalist and populist parties, the present research focuses on right-wing populist parties, as understood by the professor Ruth Wodak, due to the relevance of the concept of identity in their discourse. Her approach recognizes the existing differences between these parties and movements in terms of agendas, political imaginaries, identity narratives and perceived threats but also emphasizes their similarities in terms of the means through which they reproduce their ideologies and they generate an exclusionary agenda (Wodak, 2015).

In a context of growing human mobility, the defense of national identity has become one of the main arguments of right-wing political parties. Their discursive construction of imagined communities with clearly defined boundaries is relevant in terms of development as these conceptions have an impact on the selection of the beneficiaries of their actions and policies. By defining who belongs and who does not belong to a nation, populist parties can foster the systematic exclusion of particular population groups.

The present research intends to analyze and compare how national identity is constructed in the discourse of right-wing populist leaders from different regions of Europe and identify the mechanisms used by these figures for the dismantlement of multiple belonging in identity as well as the main social implications of this process in terms of exclusion and development. For this purpose, the discourse of two right wing populist leaders will be analyzed: Matteo Salvini in Italy and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. These two leaders have been selected among others because of their high levels of popularity in their respective countries and the fact that they currently hold a position of power in which they have policy making power.

The concept of multiple belonging will be explained further on in this research, as it is crucial for the discourse analysis that will be carried out. The present work is distributed in two main parts. The first one corresponds to the discourse analysis of right wing populist leaders with special focus on the dismantlement of multiple belonging in the context of identity and the second one consists of a detailed examination of the implications of this process regarding global commitments and principles undertaken by the international community for the promotion of development at a global and local scale.

2. Literature review

In an increasingly globalized world, the concept of national identity has acquired a higher complexity as the enhancement of human mobility has led to the existence of collectivities with diverse characteristics within a state. In this sense, the delimitation of who belongs and who does not belong into a country or a national community has become a controversial issue since it is subject to different understandings of identity. The notion of belonging can be built around different aspects of identity such as aspirations, lifestyle, among others. However, the present research will focus on the concept of belonging from the perspective of national identity and citizenship.

According to the sociologist Yuval-Davis, belonging is an “*act of self-identification or identification by others, in a stable, contested or transient way*” (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 199). The author points out that, although this process tends to be naturalized, it should not be perceived as fixed condition but as a dynamic process stemming from power relations. She argues that individuals and collectivities can belong in multiple ways to different attachments and objects. In this sense, she identifies three analytical levels at which belonging is constructed: (1) social locations, (2) identifications and emotional attachments, and (3) ethical and political values. The first level refers to the place in which individuals are located along an axis of power with respect to the multiple categories of identity to which they can simultaneously belong, such as ethnicity or gender. The second one corresponds to the identity narratives people share about who they are and who they are not, recognizing themselves as part of a collectivity. Finally, the third one refers to the ways in which identity constructions are valued and their connection to ideologies defining categorical boundaries (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

Yuval-Davis builds the notion of belonging around the idea of intersectionality, which she adopts predominantly from feminist research. The intersectional approach affirms that there is an intersection between different categories of identity, such as ethnicity, gender and class, and, therefore, these categories cannot be analyzed in isolation. Consequently, no social division has an individual concrete meaning. This entails that belonging to a category, for instance, being a woman, is different if the person lives in an urban or rural area or if she is young or old (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

This author also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing the notion of belonging from the one of politics of belonging. While belonging refers to emotional attachment, the politics of belonging constitute political projects directed at constructing belonging in specific ways to specific collectivities which are, simultaneously, being constructed by these projects. Therefore, the politics of belonging are an instrument for defining the boundaries of the political community of belonging, determining who is included and excluded. These boundaries separate the population into ‘us’ and ‘them’. The politics of belonging ensure, in one hand, the maintenance and reproduction of the community boundaries and, on the other hand, their contestation by other political agents (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

Building upon the work of Yuval-Davis, Christensen adds another dimension for the analysis of the notion of belonging. Besides the distinction between belonging and the politics of belonging, she adds “*the interplay between constructions of belonging/unbelonging*” (Christensen, 2009, p. 27). This perspective highlights the deep interrelation between the two facets of belonging. The construction of who belongs to the nation state simultaneously generates a construction of who does not. In this context, the understanding of identities requires the exploration of non-identification, which is “*who is being marginalized; who we do not want to resemble; against whom we draw borders*” (Christensen, 2009, p. 27). The delimitation of the borders between who belongs and who does not, leads to the existence of imagined communities.

From the perspective of Anderson, a nation is an imagined political community since “*the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion*” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Building on this argument, he affirms that the nation is a community because, regardless of the inequality between its members, it is always conceived as a “*deep, horizontal comradeship*” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). This means that the individuals who are part of an imagined community feel tied to each other and would sacrifice for what they perceive as the well-being of their community although they don’t know every member (Anderson, 2006).

However, drawing the line between the people included and excluded from this imagined community is not a simple task, considering the concept of intersectionality previously presented. Individuals and collectivities can belong to various identity categories; this situation is known as multiple belonging. On this point, Gaither emphasizes the idea that every individual has multiple

social identities which can coexist and adjust depending on the person, the context and the identities in question. In her work, the author enumerates several reasons why the multiplicity of belonging is essential for accurately analyzing identity, among which she includes rising migration and interracial marriage, as well as language shifts surrounding multi-ethnic populations. In her view, these elements lead to the existence of more complex identities which should not be disregarded (Gaither, 2018).

Despite the extensive literature existing on belonging and the politics of belonging, there are no previous works² relating these concepts to the notion of development³. Considering that the discourse on belonging can determine the beneficiaries of public policies and that these policies can constitute a strong tool for development, it is necessary to take into account their interrelation. The present work intends to address the existing gap in the literature by identifying the contradictions existing between the internationally agreed principles and commitments for development and the discourse on identity and belonging of right-wing populist parties.

3. Theoretical framework and operationalization

National identity is a recurrent element in the discourse of political actors. The strategies adopted for the construction of this identity usually reveal the aims and objectives of the political body which conceives them as they define who is considered a beneficiary of the proposals presented. In the present study we will approach nationalism and the construction of national identity based on the constructivist theory of the nation of Ernest Gellner. This author claims that nations “*are not inscribed in the very nature of things*” (Gellner, 1983, p. 49). Under this approach, they are not real entities that can be objectively defined but, instead, they are artificial constructs intentionally created by elites. In this sense, nations are the products of nationalism and not the other way around (Walicki, 1998). Therefore, the delimitation of nation boundaries and of the collectivity perceived as belonging to them is a process that responds to individual interests.

The identification of the people included and excluded from a nation is a common process in the construction of national identity. However, the way in which “the other” is depicted varies considerably depending on the motivations of the political actors involved and it has a significant

² There are no previous works in the author’s knowledge.

³ In this research, the concept of development is understood as the one provided by the Human Development approach of the UN, which refers to the enlargement of individuals’ freedom and opportunities, as well as the promotion of well-being.

impact on the ways in which the collectivities inside and outside the established boundaries interact. The individuals defined as outsiders, do not necessarily have to be presented as antagonists. Nevertheless, it is often the case in the discourse of right-wing populist parties. Despite the differences existing among them, there are various common features in the way in which they tend to build the image of outsiders to pursue their political goals.

In this regard, the theory of the ‘Politics of Fear’ by Professor Ruth Wodak is a useful instrument to understand how the image of ‘the other’ is produced by these parties. Wodak states that:

“all right-wing populist parties instrumentalize some kind of ethnic/religious/linguistic/ political minority as a scapegoat for most if not all current woes and subsequently construe the respective group as dangerous and a threat ‘to us’, to ‘our’ nation” (Wodak, 2015, p. 2).

Considering that outsiders are described as a threat to the people belonging to the nation or nation-state, this approach incites and legitimizes exclusion. Right-wing populist parties present the citizens of a country as a homogeneous group, usually resorting to the idea that the physical limits of the state coincide with the physical limits of the nation. However, by failing to recognize multiple belonging or intersectionality, the discourse of right-wing populist parties may generate the systematic discrimination of groups in multiple identity categories. According to professor Wodak, right-wing populist parties constantly reproduce their exclusionary agenda through speeches, campaigns, slogans, posters and using the media (Wodak, 2015).

But how is this exclusion problematic in terms of development? Isn’t it normal that citizens of a country have certain exclusive rights that non-citizens do not benefit from?

Right-wing populists tend to present the national collectivity defined by them as an equivalent of the body of citizens. However, there are citizens who do not entirely fit in the national identity profile promoted by these parties and who may be subject to fewer opportunities as the political projects of these parties institutionalize. For instance, if a populist discourse targets a particular ethnical group as a scapegoat, the members of this group could face higher discrimination levels as a result of the ‘politics of fear’. Hence, less opportunities would be open to them in various spheres, such as the labor market. Additionally, if someone is a citizen but also belongs to an identity category that opposes the traditional image of the national citizen (disseminated by nationalist parties), this individual could face more difficulties to exercise his or her rights and to achieve his or her goals.

In this sense, it is relevant to mention that development, based on Amartya Sen's capability approach, "*consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms*" which reduce people's opportunities and agency capacity (Sen, 2000, p. xii). Consequently, depriving certain groups from opportunities, understood by Sen as 'capabilities' to live the lives they value, could affect their development processes. Sen's approach has been widely used by the international community, especially by the United Nations, to promote inclusion, which is reflected by one of the main principles of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of "leaving no one behind" (UN, 2016). Therefore, in a context of increasing participation of nationalist and populist parties in Europe, it is pertinent to analyze the coherence of their discourse with international development principles in order to avoid the normalization of exclusion which can affect international development by weakening human rights, peace and security.

In this research, Wodak's "Politics of Fear" will be used as a guiding theory to identify the strategies used by right-wing populist parties to build national identity while dismantling multiple belonging whereas Sen's capability approach will be used for analyzing the implications of this process for human development. Although there are other prominent authors who have studied the strategies used by right-wing populist parties to disseminate their ideology and exclusionary agenda through discourse, such as Teun A. van Dijk and Norman Fairclough, the approach of Ruth Wodak was selected as this author has the largest experience in terms of political discourse analysis, which is reflected by her more than four hundred publications.

4. Objectives and methodology

The main objective of the present research is to analyze and compare how national identity is constructed in the discourse of two right-wing populist leaders from different regions of Europe and identify the mechanisms used by these individuals for the dismantlement of multiple belonging in identity as well as the main social and political implications of this process in terms of exclusion and development. This goal encompasses three specific objectives, presented below:

1. Identify in the discourse of right-wing populist parties in Europe the elements through which national identity is constructed.
2. Analyze the process of dismantlement of multiple belonging in the discourse of right-wing populist parties in Europe and its political uses.

3. Analyze the coherence of the discourse on identity of right-wing populist parties with respect to international development principles and commitments and determine if the divergence between them contributes to exclusion.

In this context, the following research questions surge:

- How is national identity constructed in the discourse of right-wing populist parties in Europe?
- Regarding national identity how is multiple belonging dismantled by the discourse of European right-wing populist parties and what political purpose is it used for?
- How does the discourse of right-wing populist parties regarding identity contrast with international development commitments and principles and how does this divergence contribute to exclusion?

In order to answer these questions, it is important to start by defining the concept of discourse. Discourse is the use of language in speech and writing. There are multiple ways of carrying out a discourse analysis. However, the methodology selected for the following research is the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) due to the fact that this approach goes beyond the simple quantification of words in text and oral sources, performed during Content Analysis, and it allows for a deeper understanding of the relation between language and power (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). This type of analysis is fundamental for identifying the underlying purposes of the speakers and their impact in social structures, especially in the sphere of political power which is the one we will address

CDA is an analytical practice “*that primarily studies the way social-power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context*” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). This framework recognizes discourse as a social practice and affirms that there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and the social structures, institutions and situations that shape them. Hence, discourse is constituted by the society but it also constitutes it (Wodak, 2002) and, therefore, it is closely related to power. Among the basic assumptions of critical discourse analysis, the following stand out: power relations and ideology are channeled through discourse, society and culture are also constituted by discourse, CDA identifies social problems, it is historical and interpretative and, finally, it is a form of social action (Van Dijk, 2001).

Within CDA, there are various focal approaches. The one selected for this work is Wodak's Discourse-historical Approach. This method consists in the analysis of interrelationship between discursive practices and fields of action (institutions, social structures and situations). On one hand, this approach studies interdiscursive relationships, which are the connections existing between various discourses and texts. On the other hand, it approaches the intertextual relationships, which corresponds to the connection between discourses. This approach encompasses three aspects: (1) 'discourse immanent critique' which aims at identifying contradictions, inconsistencies and dilemmas in discourse-internal structures, (2) 'socio-diagnostic critique' which intends to expose the 'persuasive or manipulative character' of certain discursive practices and (3) 'prognostic critique' which promotes the improvement of communication, for instance generating guidelines for avoiding sexist language (Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

When analyzing national identity, Reisigl and Wodak suggest the identification of five strategies, synthesized hereafter: (1) *referential strategies*, by which social actors are represented and constructed (for instance, establishing ingroups and outgroups), (2) *predicational strategies* which aim at labelling social actors positively or negatively through the use of predicates, (3) argumentation strategies, which are the means through which positive and negative attributions are justified, (4) *perspectivation*, which is the mechanism through which speakers express their position and involvement in the reporting of discriminatory events and finally, there are (5) *intensifying and mitigation strategies* used to sharpen or tone down the illocutionary force of racist, nationalist or discriminatory utterances (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). The present research will detect these strategies in the discourse of the far-right populist leaders selected.

Considering that both of these leaders are public figures, their statements may be altered by the communication means that transmit their messages. For this reason, the present work intends to collect public statements, recorded in written form, directly emitted by Mr. Matteo Salvini and Mr. Viktor Orbán. The speeches, interviews or statements selected should originate from sources that are owned, controlled or approved by them. In this line, the information prioritized will be the one published in the websites of the public offices and institutions in which they work. Another relevant source will be the official Twitter accounts of these leaders, as they are a direct channel between these figures and the public. This selection intends to include exclusively the statements

formulated intentionally as they are more representative of deliberate political strategies and choices.

The time frame for the data collection will be from the 1st June of 2018 to the 20th of April 2019. The starting date corresponds to the moment in which Mr. Salvini took office as Deputy Prime Minister of Italy. This event constituted a momentum for right-wing populist parties in Europe as Mr. Salvini's election not only reinforced the diffusion the right-wing populist discourse at the international level but it also strengthened the regional cooperation between parties with similar political views. One example of this is the anti-migration coalition proposed by Mr. Salvini to the Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán and the leader of the Law and Justice Party in Poland, Kaczynski to be implemented at the European Parliament (Bloomberg, 2019). The closing date for the data collection corresponds to the closest point in time in which data analysis can be carried out before the delivery of this research. This period is relevant for the present analysis because it corresponds to the electoral campaign preceding the European Parliament elections which will take place from the 23rd to the 26th of May. Considering that both Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán have expressed their interest in increasing the representation of their parties in this institution, it is an optimal moment to analyze their discourse as their presence in the media is expected to intensify during this period.

In order to rely on a sample that is specific to the topic analyzed, only the statements related to national identity will be collected. Based on the Conceptual Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity of Jones and McEwen, five externally defined identity dimensions will be considered: race, culture, religion, social class and sexual orientation (Jones & McEwen, 2000). A nationality and regional citizenship dimension will be added as it is relevant for this analysis. Whenever one of these dimensions is directly mentioned or is subject of an official public statement or Twitter post, the statement will be included in the sample. Also if the word "identity" is stated openly. Table 1 indicates the elements that will be considered within each dimension.

Table 1. Elements considered for sample selection

Identity dimension	Elements included
Race	Innate physical characteristics (ie. skin and hair color).
Culture	Language, ancestry, customs and traditions, values, minorities.
Religion	Types of religion, religious practices, religious groups, rituals, religious values, behavior towards religion.
Social class	Wealth, income, material possessions, material deprivation
Sexual orientation	Categories associated with sexual orientation (i.e. homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, etc.), family types (ie. traditional family).
Nationality and regional citizenship ⁴	Explicitly mentioned nationalities, collectivities of a region, groups described as outsiders to the national group (ie. foreigners, immigrants), expressions referring to geographical origins and actions describing belonging to a national collectivity (ie. integration, expulsion).

Source: Own elaboration

Once the main conceptions regarding national identity and belonging have been identified, these will be contrasted with internationally agreed principles and commitments for development. For this purpose, three main documents will be used: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015), the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). These texts, composed under the framework of the United Nations Organization (UN), were selected on the basis that they contain globally recognized guidelines for development. In the case of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the analysis will focus on the preamble and declaration sections and not on the sustainable development goals and targets as the former include the general principles and motivations which apply to all the goals and are intended to guide development actions all over the world.

Considering that there are multiple views regarding the conditions necessary for development and the concept of development itself, the documents selected stem from the multilateral organization which has the highest number of adherents in the world, the UN. For this reason, it is considered that the principles and commitments for development chosen are legitimate and have a global reach. The content of the documents abovementioned will be compared to the discourse of right-wing populist parties on identity in order to pinpoint the contradictions existing between them. Although it was initially envisaged to also analyze development principles of organizations

⁴ As it is common for political leaders to address the people of their country, this dimension will be considered for sample selection only if there is at least another nationality than the one from the speaker mentioned in the text or if characteristics are attributed to the nationality described (for instance, by the use of adjectives).

specialized in economic development, such as the World Bank, these were removed from the present work due to time constraints and thesis length restrictions.

The main limitations of this work are its limited time-frame and language barriers. Due to time constraints, the sample used will be based on online written sources, which implies a more limited quantity of information available with respect to an analysis including also printed documents. Nevertheless, the use of official and direct public statements certifies that the perspectives collected are reliable. Regarding the language of the discourses analyzed, considering that Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán speak Italian and Hungarian respectively, the discourse analysis in original language statements can only be performed in the Italian texts as Hungarian is not spoken by the author. For the discourse of Mr. Orbán, the official⁵ translations of his speeches to English will be used, which may allow for certain contents to be less accurate in translation.

5. The construction of national identity in the discourse of right-wing populist leaders: a case study of Victor Orbán and Matteo Salvini.

5.1. A brief overview of concepts and characteristics of the right-wing populist discourse in Europe

Before proceeding to the discourse analysis of the statements of Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán, it is important to take into consideration several concepts which are essential for understanding the nature and the structure of their discourse. As the present research focuses on the construction of national identity, the first concept to define is nationalism.

Nationalism, in its broader sense, is the “*identification with one's own nation and support for its interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations*” (Oxford, 2019, p. 1). This concept can be complemented by the approach of Professor Ernest Gellner, who analyzes it as a theory of political legitimacy, under which ethnic boundaries should not cross political ones nor separate the power-holders from the rest (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). This theory frequently appears in discourses regarding national identity, as it will be presented in the following sections.

Additionally, in order to discuss about right-wing populism, it is also necessary to elucidate the concept of populism. The political scientist Cas Mudde has defined it as an ideology which

⁵ These translations are authorized by Mr. Orbán and published in the website of the Hungarian Prime Minister office.

contemplates society as “*separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’*” and which asserts that politics should be an expression of the ‘*general will of the people*’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). This ideology argues that the interests of ‘the people’, integrated by common individuals, are opposed to those of ‘the elite’, integrated by the powerful. Therefore, ‘the people’ are encouraged to recover the power from ‘the elite’. The former are presented as the ‘good’ and the latter as the ‘bad’, in a simple dichotomist approach.

Nationalism and populism are often associated with right-wing populism. Although the characteristics of the political parties adhering to this line of thought vary significantly depending on their geographic and historical background, various authors have recognized common features through which they can be identified. One of these authors is Professor Ruth Wodak, who has defined right-wing populism as:

“a hybrid political ideology that rejects the hegemonic post-war political consensus and usually, though not always, combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism or other, often profoundly different and contradictory ideologies” (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2017, p. 5).

This ideology can be qualified as populism in the sense that it appeals to the common individual and to a collectivity defined as quasi-homogeneous in an ethno-nationalist way (ibid.). In this context, it is relevant to mention that while populism can be present in both left-wing and right-wing parties, this research focuses on right-wing populist parties as their views on national identity are a frequent component of their discourse. According to Wodak, the main difference between them is that right-wing populist parties are “inwards looking” and, hence, primarily nationalist, while left-wing populist parties are frequently oriented towards “internationalism or post-nationalism” (Wodak, 2015). Consequently, nativism, understood as the ideology that promotes the rights and privileges of the “native born” population over those of “foreign” status (Payne, 2017), is a common feature of right-wing populist parties, which is relevant for the present analysis as it leads to a clear delimitation of who belongs to the nation and who does not.

Another recurring element of the right-wing populist discourse is the glorification of the ‘heartland’. This notion is presented as the place where an ‘imagined community’ of virtuous and unified people lives (Mudde, 2004, p. 546). The community living in this territory, often presumed to be a nation-state, is described as homogeneous and united by history, values and traditions. The outsiders to this community are also defined as a homogeneous group, the negative ‘other’

(Wodak, 2011). Although different labels are assigned to specific groups of outsiders, the negative connotations attributed to them recurrently manifest their unbelonging to the community (ibid.).

Thus, there are four concepts that are constantly present in the discourse of the right-wing populist parties: ‘the elite’, ‘the people’, ‘the heartland’ and ‘the others’. Multiple other features characterize the discourse of these parties, however, only two additional ones will be discussed since they contribute to the subsequent analysis of views on national identity. As it was previously mentioned, right-wing populist parties appeal to the ‘politics of fear’ to attract voters. According to professor Wodak, under this approach, the right-wing populist parties instrumentalize minorities as scapegoats for most of the society problems and present them as dangerous and a threat to ‘the people’, “to ‘us’, to ‘our’ nation” (Wodak, 2015, p. 2). Therefore, the abovementioned parties create an atmosphere of fear to reach their political goals through emotional bias. The minorities can be selected due to ethnic, political and linguistic reasons, among others.

Finally, right-wing populist parties support anti-intellectualism, materialized as hostility towards intellectuals and a general disdain for education. This behavior has been described as the ‘arrogance of ignorance’. In this context, there is an appeal to ‘common sense’ and conservative values, which prevail over education (Wodak, 2015, p. 22).

Although the content of the discourse of any right-wing populist party invariably depends on the geographical and historical contexts in which it was conceived, the recurrent presence of the abovementioned elements in the discourses of right-wing populist parties makes them relevant components to take into consideration when analyzing the views of these political actors regarding national identity and belonging.

5.2. Identity and dismantlement of multiple belonging in Victor Orbán’s discourse

Viktor Orbán is the current Prime Minister of Hungary. He has occupied this position since 2010 and also between 1998 and 2002. He has filled other political positions as well, such as Member of the National Assembly. Mr. Orbán leads the right-wing populist party Fidesz, of which he is president (Hungarian Government, 2019). At the moment, Fidesz has a strong policy-making power in Hungary as it holds two-thirds of the seats in Parliament (Santora, 2018). In 2019, the main topics at the center of the agenda of this party were anti-immigration actions and the defense of Christian values, among others (DW, 2019).

To analyze the discourse on identity of the Prime Minister of Hungary, a sample⁶ of 45 official speeches and interviews was used. These texts, taken from the section of the Prime Minister in the website of the Hungarian Government⁷, sum up 143 588 words in total. To classify the ingroups and outgroups in the context of national identity, the main social actors present in the discourse of Mr. Orbán have been identified in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 includes actors associated with a geographic origin and table 3 includes those who are not localized. This distinction has been made in order to pinpoint the collectivities which are more relevant for the speaker in terms of defining territorial borders to national belonging (in table 2).

Table 2. Social actors associated with a geographical origin in the discourse of Viktor Orbán

Actors	Number of appearances ⁸	Total
Hungarians	247	330
• Hungarian people	64	
• The Hungarian nation	19	
Germans	30	30
Czechs	14	14
Slovaks	12	12
Polish	10	10
Austrians	10	10
Italians	10	10
Croatians	7	7
Serbs	5	5
Europeans	32	32
Central Europeans	16	16
Western Europeans ('Westerners')	14	14
Migrants	123	753
• Immigrants	24	
• Refugees	11	
• Migration ⁹	424	
• Immigration	171	

Source: Own elaboration based on the discourse sample for Viktor Orbán, detailed in Annex 1.

⁶ The interventions included in this sample are detailed in Annex 1. They have been assigned a code, which is used for referencing them in the text.

⁷ Website of the Hungarian Government, (2019), *The Prime Minister's speeches*, retrieved from: <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches>

⁸ Number of times the actor/collectivity has been mentioned in the sample. An actor is included if it has been mentioned at least 5 times in the sample.

⁹ The expressions 'migration' and 'immigration' have been included as they are often used by Mr. Orbán to refer to migrants without directly mentioning them.

Table 3. Social actors nonassociated with a geographical origin in the discourse of Viktor Orbán

Actors	Number of appearances	Total
The Left	30	45
• Socialists	10	
• Communists	5	
Liberals	19	19
NGOs	19	19
European elite	12	12
Muslims	11	11
Christians	8	8

Source: Own elaboration based on the discourse sample for Viktor Orbán, detailed in Annex 1.

For the definition of ingroups and outgroups, Mr. Orbán uses various predicational strategies to qualify social actors, assigning them positive or negative characteristics. The most recurrent of them are summarized in table 4.

Table 4. Characterization of social actors in the discourse of Viktor Orbán

Actor	Characteristics	Elements characterizing the way of life of the collectivity
Hungarians	'good neighbor,' 'Christians,' 'people with self-respect and pride', 'romantic people', 'adventurous people', 'a loyal breed', 'a unique breed', 'a rare member of the human species', 'endangered', 'outstanding abilities', 'hard-working by nature', 'death-defying courage', 'complete unity and purity of heart', 'heroism', 'greatness', 'mistrustful people', 'talented', 'sentimental', 'a clever breed' 'ingenious people, 'excellent and competitive'	'the traditions of a Christian Europe', 'European attitude to life', 'Christian virtues', 'Freedom', 'civilisational and cultural homogeneity', 'the concept of the nation; the basic principles of family policy; the regulation of marriage; and social integration', 'European way of life', 'Christian heritage', 'a community with a strong national identity, community awareness, and strong family feelings' 'exceptionally rich cultural heritage', 'cultural peace', 'working hard', 'Christian democratic ideological foundations', 'jobs, homes and security'
Germans	'Friends'	- Not described -
Czechs	'Friendly'	'European values'
Slovaks	'very successful', 'pragmatic', 'clear', 'patriotic people'	- Not described -
Polish	'Friends'	'freedom', 'independence'
Austrians	- Not described -	- Not described -
Italians	'brave', 'a big country'	- Not described -
Croatians	'friends and neighbors', 'the Croatians are close to Hungarian hearts', 'allies'	'footballing culture'
Serbs	'reliable and friendly'	- Not described -
Europeans	'indigenous Europeans', 'successful', 'self-sacrifice', 'selflessness'	'Christian culture', 'traditional family model', 'great civilization', 'Christian foundations', 'the most thriving culture, the most advanced technologies, the world's best schools and the highest living standards humanity has ever seen' 'scientific breakthroughs and magnificent works of art', 'strong families', 'equality between men and women and freedom of religion', 'single civilisation'
Central Europeans	'Christian European', 'responsible', 'successful', 'excellent abilities and qualifications'	'this region has the world's best workers', 'Central Europe is a region which also has a special culture. It is different from Western Europe', 'culture of cooperation'

Western Europeans	'naïve'	"welcoming culture", 'multiculturalism', 'absence of democracy', 'censorship and restrictions on freedom of speech', 'censorship and political correctness', 'Christian culture', 'large unintegrated communities', 'don't defend Christian culture, want mixed societies, and don't see terrorism and the deterioration of public security as a particular danger'
Migrants	Coming from 'somewhere in Africa', 'people living in Africa', 'Terrorists', 'dangerous', 'perpetrators', 'bad', 'African', 'Asian', 'terrorists and criminals', 'unable to organise their lives, and they're unable to provide for this many people', 'countries of the Arab world', 'almost 400,000 people – mostly men of military age, unarmed but in military style', 'Muslims'	'armed conflicts', 'war', 'disappearance of the conditions for peaceful life', 'terrorism', 'terrorist attacks', 'will never vote for a Christian party', 'excess population', 'crime', 'crimes against women' 'vast masses of people – masses numbering in the tens of millions'

Source: Own elaboration based on the discourse sample for Viktor Orbán, detailed in Annex 1.

The delimitation of the ingroups and outgroups in the framework of national identity can be identified through the characteristics associated to each actor in the discourse. The relationships between these actors are clearly defined by the speaker, contributing to the establishment of bounds between them. Hungarians are at the center of the analysis with solely positive connotations attributed to them. They are described as a “unique breed” which is “talented” and “hardworking”. In the discourse they are assigned a double identity: Hungarian and European. Mr. Orbán emphasizes that the link between these two are “Christian culture” and a “civilizational and cultural homogeneity”.

In the same line, European nationalities are also described with positive connotations as “friends” and “neighbors” who are “reliable”. However, when speaking about regional collectivities, the discourse is more polarizing. The populations of Europe are described at three levels: at a general level, as ‘Europeans’, and at a sub-regional level as two collectivities: ‘Central Europeans’ and ‘Westerners’ (from Western Europe). While Europeans are presented as a single collectivity with a homogeneous culture related to Christianity, there is a distinction between the latter two groups with respect to their relation to outsiders. While ‘Westerners’ are portrayed as more open to the arrival of individuals coming from outside European countries, Central Europeans are depicted as more skeptical. Therefore, ‘Westerners’ are presented as ‘naïve’, although they are not addressed directly by their nationality as so. On the contrary, Central Europeans, in which Mr. Orbán includes Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria, are presented as more ‘responsible’ for restricting the arrival of outsiders.

In the discourse of Mr. Orbán, the outsiders in terms of national and regional identity are foreigners or migrants from outside of Europe. These are depicted negatively as “terrorists and criminals”,

coming from overpopulated countries in “Africa” and “Asia”. They are associated with “armed conflicts” and hence portrayed as violent. Moreover, they are presented as culturally different from Europeans because of their religion: “Muslims”. Despite the fact that migrants from regions like Africa and Asia can have a lot of differences among themselves, including religious differences, they are presented as a single collectivity, which constitutes ‘the other’.

Therefore, for Mr. Orbán, national identity is deeply connected with regional identity. Although migrants are generally presented negatively, it is important to note that only migration coming from outside of Europe is considered a problem. The migration between Hungary and other countries of Europe is not only not restricted but also approved through the constant promotion of the rights of Hungarian minorities living in other European countries and of European minorities living in Hungary. One example of this is the request of Mr. Orbán to the Prime Minister of Slovakia to “*to look after the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia*” (VO8, 2018). However, the migration coming from the ‘South’ is regarded differently.

Besides the negative connotations associated to migrants from outside of Europe, Mr. Orbán uses referential strategies to impersonalize them. While European nationals are described by their nationality or as a human collectivity with words such as “community”, migrants from outside of Europe are not frequently described with words that associate them to people but to an abstract concept, a phenomenon or a natural disaster. While the words “migrants” and “immigrants” are used 158 times in the sample, the words “migration” and “immigration” are used 595 times. The process of impersonalization of migrants is also demonstrated when they are described as a “problem” (27 times) and an “issue” (82 times). Metaphors are frequently used to compare migrants to disasters such as a “flood” or as a “crack in a dam wall”. Other expressions are used to attribute a violent nature to the arrival of migrants such as “invasion” (6 times). All these rhetorical strategies lead to the argumentation strategies which are used to justify the need for the exclusion of those not sharing the national and regional identity.

Since migrants from outside of Europe are presented as a threat to this region and to Hungary in particular, Mr. Orbán claims that their exclusion would respond to a need of “protection of identity” and “security” (VO1, 2018). Going back to the analysis of intersectionality in the framework of national identity, the perspective of migrants being a human group that is completely

incompatible with Hungarians or Europeans is at the heart of the dismantlement of multiple belonging.

Through perspectivation strategies, Mr. Orbán expresses his point of view regarding the existence of mixed cultures, on behalf of the Hungarian population. These strategies are crucial for understanding his discourse on national identity, as they clearly outline the limits of national belonging. One of the main concepts that appears in his discourse regarding migration is that it is a process of “replacement of populations” (VO1, 2018). This expression leads to the assumptions that Hungarian people would not have family ties with outsiders, which would make them be outnumbered and hence replaced, and also that, if new generations were issued from Hungarian and foreigners, they would not be Hungarian.

Furthermore, Mr. Orbán directly expresses his perspective on intercultural bonds, stating:

“they don’t like Christian Europe; they don’t like the traditions of a Christian Europe; and they definitely don’t like Christians. They believe that if they mix us with some other kind of people we’ll be more beautiful, we’ll look better, and Europe will be a better place in which to live. We, however, do not want to mix with others. We are aware of our faults, and we don’t think we’re perfect, but we’re fine the way we are: we want to remain Christian.” (VO1, 2018).

In this statement, the pronoun “they” refers to the supporters of migration. According to Mr. Orbán, migrants would be the cause of the loss of ‘traditions of a Christian Europe’. This idea is used to illustrate what he sees as an incompatibility between Europeans, described as Christians, and foreigners usually associated by him to the Muslim religion. Under this logic, the possibility of a foreigner who is a Christian or a Muslim who is European are not conceived. Moreover, there is an allusion to physical appearance, which is an indirect way to reference race. As he lets the audience understand that he does not agree with the supporters of migration (‘they’), he mentions that ‘They believe that if they mix us with some other kind of people we’ll be more beautiful’. In this sense, he transmits the message that he believes ethnical mixes would lead to individuals that are the opposite of beautiful. This comment reveals that national identity, in his view, depends on an ethnical or racial origin, having an intrinsic value. This is confirmed by other affirmations of situations that are unacceptable in his perspective, such as *“the appearance of increasing numbers of men of fighting age arriving from other continents and other cultures, within our lifetime shaping European cities in their own image”* (VO22, 2018). In this context, ‘their own image’ refers to the physical appearance of mixed populations, which is rejected.

We previously mentioned that the migration of Europeans to Hungary was not considered an issue, only the one coming from Africa and Asia. Therefore, there is a categorization of the world ethnicities, in which the population of Europe, described as a single ethnicity, would be better than others. This is confirmed by the idea of mixed populations being an “experiment” (VO31, 2018) that would lead to a “new race” having “some new kind of quality” (VO28, 2018). Consequently, Mr. Orbán’s discourse on national identity does not recognize Hungarians belonging to different ethnical backgrounds as ‘true’ Hungarians.

However, this is not the only way in which multiple belonging is dismantled. The Hungarian Prime Minister directly expresses his disapproval of belonging to more than one nationality, cultural background or ethnicity by making the following statements: “We do not want to become a mixed country” (VO39, 2019), “We do not want mixed populations living in our countries”, “we don’t want to live in a society with a mixed culture” (VO39, 2019). These affirmations highlight the lack of recognition of the possible intersectionality of various types of cultural, religious and ethnical identities within the Hungarian national identity. The idea of populations that cannot mix is reinforced by the word “co-existence” (VO42, 2019) used to describe the situation in which different cultures would live in the same territorial space. This word suggests that there would be no direct interaction between them.

In the discourse of Mr. Orbán, national identity does not extend to individuals with mixed cultural and ethnical origins as their non-European roots categorize them at the same level as immigrants, who are described as violent, intolerant and disrespectful of the social institutions established in the country. Therefore, these individuals do not belong to the Hungarian nation in Mr. Orbán’s discourse, which generates their systematic exclusion, despite their possible citizen status. This situation makes them second category citizens. Other citizens who may enter this category are the ones listed in table 3, except for Christians. Despite the fact that their national identity is not questioned, they are attributed negative characteristics, which depict them as contrarian to the interests and values of Hungarian people.

The discourse of Mr. Orbán does not include intensifying and mitigation strategies that are relevant for the present analysis.

5.3. Identity and multiple belonging in Salvini's discourse

Matteo Salvini is the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior of Italy since the 1st of June, 2018. He has occupied various political positions, such as City Councilor in Milan and Member of the European Parliament. Mr. Salvini has been a member of the Lega since 1990 and was elected as its Federal Secretary in 2013 (Italian Government, 2019). The Lega is an Italian right-wing populist party born from a coalition of parties of northern Italy, whose proposals are currently centered in anti-immigration actions and the promotion of Euroscepticism, among others (Lega, 2019).

To analyze the discourse of Mr. Matteo Salvini, a sample¹⁰ of 7 interventions and 531 Twitter posts was used. The interventions were taken from the section of interventions and interviews of the Minister at the website of the Ministry of the Interior¹¹ and the tweets¹² were retrieved with Twitter Analytics from a set of 3200 tweets¹³ starting on November 25, 2018 and ending on April 20, 2019. The sample contains 25 903 words in total. Considering that Mr. Salvini uses Twitter as his primary communication mean, it was considered necessary to include his interventions in this social network to have a better understanding of his discourse. To classify the ingroups and outgroups in the context of national identity, the main social actors present in the discourse of Mr. Salvini have been identified in tables 5 and 6. Table 5 includes actors associated to a geographic origin and table 6 includes those who are not localized; this division follows the same purpose stated in the previous section.

¹⁰ The interventions and Twitter posts included in this sample are detailed in Annex 2. They have been assigned a code which is used for quoting them in this text.

¹¹ Website of the Ministry of the Interior, (2019), *Interventions and Interviews*, retrieved from: <http://www.interno.gov.it/it/ministero/matteo-salvini> .

¹² Twitter Page of Matteo Salvini, (2019), retrieved from: <https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi>.

¹³ This amount corresponds to the maximum amount of Tweets retrievable through Twitter analytics.

Table 5. Social actors associated with a geographical origin in the discourse of Matteo Salvini

Actors	Number of appearances ¹⁴	Total
Italians (<i>gli Italiani</i>)	57	60
• Italian people (<i>popolo italiano</i>)	3	
Europeans / [People from] Europe (<i>Europei/Europa</i>)	54	
Moroccan (<i>marocchino/a/i</i>)	6	6
Nigerian (<i>nigeriano/a/i</i>)	15	22
• Nigerian mafia (<i>Mafia nigeriana</i>)	7	
Immigrants (<i>immigrati</i>)	78	239
• Migrants (<i>migranti</i>)	25	
• Clandestine(s) (<i>clandestino/i</i>)	49	
• Refugees (<i>rifugiati</i>)	6	
• Fugitive (<i>profugo/hi</i>)	22	
• Foreigners (<i>Stranieri</i>)	5	
• Immigration (<i>Immigrazione</i>)	54	
African(s) (<i>africano/a/i</i>)	7	
Roma camp(s) (<i>campo/i [Rom]</i>)	13	13

Source: Own elaboration based on the discourse sample for Matteo Salvini, detailed in Annex 2.

Table 6. Social actors nonassociated with a geographical origin in the discourse of Matteo Salvini

Actors	Number of appearances	Total
Law enforcement officers (<i>le Forze dell'Ordine</i>)	22	23
• State police (<i>Polizia di Stato</i>)	1	
Firefighters (<i>Vigili del Fuoco</i>)	5	5
The mafia (<i>La mafia</i>)	16	16
NGO(s) (<i>ONG/s</i>)	24	24
Islamic terrorist(s) (<i>terrorista/i islamico/i</i>)	9	9
The Left (<i>la sinistra</i>)	28	28

Source: Own elaboration based on the discourse sample for Matteo Salvini, detailed in Annex 2.

The predicational strategies used by Mr. Salvini for the definition of ingroups and outgroups, achieved by the assignment of positive or negative characteristics to social actors, are summarized in table 7.

¹⁴ Number of times the actor/collectivity has been mentioned in the sample. An actor is included if it has been mentioned at least 5 times in the sample.

Table 7. Characterization of social actors in the discourse of Matteo Salvini

Actor	Characteristics	Elements characterizing the way of life of the collectivity
Italians	‘the most generous, welcoming and supportive people of the world’(<i>i popoli più generosi, accoglienti e solidali del mondo</i>), ‘fantastic People’(<i>un popolo fantastico</i>), ‘Poor’ (<i>poveri</i>), ‘the most welcoming people in the world, doing the most volunteering in the world’(<i>il popolo più accogliente del mondo, che fa più volontariato al mondo</i>), ‘proud’ (<i>orgogliosi</i>).	‘Crucifix and nativity scene are symbols of our values, culture and traditions, expression of our identity’ (<i>Crocifisso e presepe sono simboli dei nostri valori, cultura e tradizioni, espressione della nostra identità</i>), ‘Italy is the cradle of beauty, respect, culture and work’ (<i>L’Italia è la culla del bello, del rispetto, della cultura e del lavoro</i>), ‘popular values, family, work, safety, wellbeing, children’.
Europeans	-Not described-	‘European values — from Judeo-Christian roots to the right to work, the right to security, the right to life’, ‘civilization’(<i>civiltà</i>), ‘the richest continent in the world’(<i>il continente più ricco al mondo</i>), ‘Europeans ask us for safety, the defense of borders and our history and culture as a priority’(<i>gli europei ci chiedono come priorità la sicurezza, la difesa dei confini e della nostra storia e cultura</i>)
Nigerians	‘offenders’ (<i>delinquenti</i>), ‘gangsters’ (<i>mafiosi</i>), ‘drug dealers’ (<i>spacciatori</i>), ‘delinquent’ (<i>delinquente</i>), ‘thugs’ (<i>balordi</i>),	‘drug trafficking’(<i>traffico di stupefacenti</i>), ‘Rites of black magic, heroin trafficking and girls forced into prostitution’ (<i>Riti di magia nera, traffico di eroina e ragazze costrette a prostituirsi</i>), ‘blood crimes’ (<i>crimini di sangue</i>), ‘Nigerian mafia’ (<i>mafia nigeriana</i>), ‘The Nigerian Mafia is the most dangerous: it controls prostitution, drugs and organ trafficking’ (<i>Mafia nigeriana è la più pericolosa: controlla giro prostituzione, droga, traffico di organi</i>), ‘Nigerian gangsters are violent and unscrupulous. They control drug trafficking and prostitution.’(<i>Mafiosi nigeriani sono violenti e senza scrupoli. Controllano giri di droga e prostituzione.</i>), ‘human trafficking’(<i>tratta di esseri umani</i>), ‘voodoo rituals’(<i>riti voodoo</i>)
Moroccans	‘drug dealers’ (<i>spacciatori</i>), ‘Drugged, drunk’(<i>Drogato, ubriaco</i>),	‘stabblings, threats’ (<i>accoltellamenti, minacce</i>), ‘robbery’ (<i>rapina</i>), ‘drug dealing’ (<i>spacciando droga</i>), ‘ISIS’.
Immigrants	‘foreign fighters’ ‘departing from Africa’, ‘economic or climatic migrants’(<i>immigrati economici o climatici</i>), ‘hundreds’(<i>le centinaia</i>), ‘tens of thousands of immigrants’(<i>decine di migliaia di immigrati</i>), ‘thugs’ (<i>balordi</i>), ‘scoundrels, delinquent and former terrorists’(<i>furbetti, delinquenti ed ex terroristi</i>), ‘thieves’(<i>ladri</i>), ‘traffickers’ (<i>trafficienti</i>), ‘hundreds of thousands of people from the rest of the world’(<i>centinaia di migliaia di persone che vengono dal resto del mondo</i>),	‘Islamic terrorism’, ‘the explosion of cohabitation problems’(<i>l’esplosione di problemi di convivenze</i>), ‘criminality’ (<i>criminalità</i>), ‘theft, robbery and drug dealing’ (<i>furti, rapine e spaccio di droga</i>),
• Illegal immigrants	‘Clandestine migrants’ (<i>immigrati clandestine</i>), ‘thugs criminals or clandestines’ (<i>balordi, delinquenti o clandestini</i>), irregular immigrants (<i>immigrati irregolari</i>), ‘from Africa’ (<i>dall’Africa</i>),	‘crime and social conflict’, ‘illegal immigrants who come here, without rules, to commit crimes, to steal, to deal, to rape’(<i>clandestini che vengono qui, senza regole, a delinquere, rubare, spacciare, stuprare</i>), ‘invasion’ (<i>invasione</i>), ‘drugs and weapons’(<i>armi e droga</i>), ‘terrorism’ (<i>terrorismo</i>), ‘Islamic terrorism’ (<i>terrorismo islamico</i>)

• Legal immigrants	'welcome', 'regular and decent immigrants, who pay taxes and send their children to school' (<i>immigrati regolari e perbene, che pagano le tasse e mandano i figli a scuola</i>)	'they came with their hats in their hands, they integrated, they pay taxes and they send their children to school' (<i>sono venuti col cappello in mano, che si sono integrati, pagano le tasse e mandano i figli a scuola.</i>), 'who respect the history and culture of this country, who pay taxes, who send their children to school, who do an honest job and who are Italian as I am' (<i>che rispettano la storia e la cultura di questo Paese, che pagano le tasse, che mandano i figli a scuola, che fanno un lavoro onesto e che sono italiani quanto me</i>), 'finding a stable job' (trovando un lavoro stabile), 'regular and proper' (<i>regolari e perbene</i>).
• Refugees and fugitive (from war)	'True fugitive' (<i>profughi veri</i>)	'war' (<i>guerra</i>), 'truly escape from war' (<i>scappano davvero dalla guerra</i>)
Africans	-Not described-	'Violent, organized, unscrupulous: the African bosses represent a growing danger' (<i>Violenti, organizzati, senza scrupoli: i boss africani rappresentano un pericolo crescente</i>)
Roma people	'five or six thousand people in total' (<i>cinque o seimila persone in tutto</i>), 'pickpocket' (<i>borseggiatrice</i>)	'They live in total lawlessness', 'They steal and burn everything.', 'crime, illegality, exploitation of minors' (<i>criminalità, illegalità, sfruttamento di minori</i>), 'people who educate their children in theft and who live at the expense of others' (<i>gente che educa i figli al furto e che campa a scrocco</i>), 'violence' (<i>violenza</i>), 'caos' (<i>caos</i>), 'outside the law' (<i>fuori della Legge</i>)

Source: Own elaboration based on the discourse sample for Matteo Salvini, detailed in Annex 2.

In this case, the predicational strategies used for labeling actors positively or negatively are not centered in the ingroup, as in the case of Mr. Orbán, but they are focused on the outsiders, which means that identity is built more through differentiation than through the praise of the characteristics of nationals. Although Italians are positively described as 'welcoming', 'generous', 'supportive' and 'fantastic', they are also qualified with negative characteristics such as 'poor'. These general adjectives do not attribute specific features to the ingroup, which could present them as culturally homogeneous. However, Mr. Salvini mentions a few unifying elements such as Catholicism, implied by the use of 'crucifix and nativity scene', and also other values such as 'respect', 'family', 'work'. In this case, 'family' refers to the Catholic traditional family, as it is explained repeatedly in the sample. Although the association between the European identity and the Italian national identity is not emphasized, there is an idea of common values shared between the different European countries, which are presented as 'European values' from 'Judeo-Christian roots' such as the right to work and to security.

In contrast, there is a very detailed description of outgroups in the context of national identity, mainly constituted by immigrants and Roma population. The connotations associated to immigrants are overall negative; however, they vary depending on the type of migration they

address. On one hand, immigrants and illegal immigrants are commonly presented negatively, and rarely any distinction between them is made. They are both described as a large group of ‘tens of thousands of immigrants’ having a violent behavior. They are presented as ‘foreign fighters’, ‘thugs’, ‘terrorists’, ‘traffickers’ and ‘thieves’. It is frequent to find references to their origin, mentioned as ‘Africa’. Within the aggregate of African populations, there is a frequent mention of Nigerians and Moroccans, who are mainly associated to ‘drug trafficking’, ‘rites of black magic’, ‘prostitution’ and ‘robbery’. There is also a frequent use of the term ‘Nigerian mafia’, which designates a group of violent people. However, although these two African nationalities are the most recurrent in Mr. Salvini’s discourse, they are not the only ones. Various other nationalities, mainly in Africa, are also associated to crime and violence, such as Egyptians, Gambians, Senegalese, among others. This is a clear example of the ‘Politics of Fear’.

Another characteristic that is associated to illegal immigrants is their religion. In the discourse, they are presented as ‘Islamic terrorists’. In this sense, Islam is presented as an extremist religion that would be incompatible with Catholicism, as Mr. Salvini states that the arrival of Muslim migrants generates ‘the explosion of cohabitation problems’. By the use of the term ‘cohabitation’, there is also a process of dismantlement of multiple belonging since there is the assumption that Italian people and people from different origin would not integrate.

Nevertheless, there are two groups of outsiders which are qualified more positively than other immigrants: legal immigrants and refugees. Mr. Salvini states that these immigrants distinguish themselves from others in the sense that they demonstrate a desire to integrate themselves because they ‘respect the history and culture’ of Italy, ‘pay taxes’, ‘send their children to school’, and ‘do an honest job,’ hence they are ‘welcome’. In the same line, it is explained that ‘true fugitives’ escaping ‘war’, also known as refugees, can be received in Italy as well due to humanitarian reasons. This positive description is often used as a response to accusations of racism. Mr. Salvini insists on the fact that he only attacks illegal immigrants and not legal ones, stating that the discrimination performed is not based on ethnicity but on legality. However, the repeated process of attributing negative qualifiers to African nationalities undermines the positive ones assigned to legal immigrants and refugees, considering there is no distinction between both sources of migration. Additionally, the term ‘fugitives’ is used instead of refugees to underline the fact that

not every person who receives refugee status is fleeing war, so this term also entails discrimination for a segment of the refugee population.

The Roma population is also defined as an outsider in terms of national identity. Despite the fact that part of this minority has the Italian nationality, they are depicted negatively as living ‘outside the law’ and as generators of ‘crime, illegality, exploitation of minors’. They are characterized as a very small group within Italy, of ‘five or six thousand people in total’. Usually their nationality is not mentioned, which reinforces the idea that they are outsiders to the Italian national identity.

Regarding referential strategies, Mr. Salvini impersonalizes the outsiders of his discourse by describing them indirectly with terms that refer to objects or actions. For instance, in the case of migrants, he uses the term ‘the landings’ (*gli sbarchi*) or when referring to the Roma population, he uses the term ‘camps’ (*campi*) (MS3, 2018). It is also common to find expressions that refer to violent groups to refer to migrants such as ‘pirates’ (Salvini, 2019c). Through this means, Mr. Salvini builds the image of outsiders as unanimated elements or people who are incompatible with the imagined community. Hence, since a nation is constituted by homogeneous people in the nationalist discourse, outsiders could not be included.

Various argumentation strategies are displayed to justify the exclusion of outsiders. Considering that immigrants are presented as violent, one of the main justifications is ‘security’ (MS7, 2018). Therefore, to guarantee safety, Mr. Salvini argues that they should face ‘expulsion’ (Salvini, 2018a). Another justification is the existence of limited resources. The Deputy Prime Minister of Italy states that there are ‘5 millions of Italians living in poverty’ (Salvini, 2019a), meaning that the Italian state should address the poverty from nationals before considering the needs of foreigners. Therefore, to guarantee a higher level of income, foreigners should not be received. Additionally, there is the argument that immigration is a ‘business’ for ‘smugglers’ (Salvini, 2018c), so it should be stopped to reduce human trafficking.

Furthermore, Mr. Salvini expresses his views on multiple belonging through perspectivation. Despite the fact there is no direct reference to the process of population mixing, as in the case of Mr. Orbán, there are affirmations which suggest a negative position. For instance, when asked about the need of migration to face the European decline in fertility, he states that he does not agree. Instead, he proposes to promote growth because ‘If the economy grows, families will decide to have more children’ (MS2, 2018). Therefore, if the growth of immigrant population is not

counted as an increase in national fertility, it entails that these people are not expected to become nationals neither to form alliances with nationals. Mr. Salvini also encourages Italian nationals to have babies as he would like his government to be remembered as the one increasing the number of ‘full cradles, with babies born’ (Salvini, 2018b). This action reveals that population growth is only considered valuable when it is generated by nationals and, hence, young generations issued from migration are still considered outsiders.

Unlike the case of Mr. Orbán, Mr. Salvini does not completely restrict migration in his discourse. As it was previously mentioned, there is an acceptance of legal migration and refugees escaping war. However, it is stated that this migration should be limited. According to Mr. Salvini ‘integration is possible if numbers allow for it’ (Salvini, 2018d). However, this integration requires the newcomers to entirely adopt the Italian culture. The Prime Minister explains that:

“to integrate someone who comes from far away, I must explain to him/her who I am, my culture, my religion, my traditions [...]. Otherwise, how is it possible for anyone to integrate?” (Salvini, 2018e)

In this case, multiple belonging is dismantled in the sense that the integration of people with a different culture or religion is not presented as a possibility. This idea is reinforced by the negative attributes assigned to foreigners, which suggests their way of life is incompatible with Italian national identity.

Regarding intensifying strategies, Mr. Salvini uses caps letters in his Twitter posts to direct the attention of the reader to certain social actors or to actions described. This strategy reinforces the roles assigned to each of them.

Other actors, unassociated to a territory, are presented in table 6. These are polarized based on their affinity to the government. While actors under the control of the government, such as law enforcement officers, the police and the firefighters, are glorified, other actors are presented as enemies of the interests of the Italian nation, for instance the Left, NGOs, the Mafia, and Islamic terrorists. Whereas the last two are associated with crime and directly exposed as outsiders, the former two are sometimes included in the national collectivity, but as second class citizens. This is also the case for Roma population. The glorification of the police forces is also used as a mechanism for the justification of the use of violence against minorities. Considering this process is simultaneous to the defense of weapon use by civilians, there is a legitimization of the use of violence against minorities at two levels: at the state level and at the individual level.

5.4. Main messages transmitted by Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán regarding national identity and belonging

Despite the fact that Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán are issued from different geographical and cultural contexts, their discourses on national identity have various common messages. The first one is that the members of their nation constitute a homogeneous collectivity, sharing the same culture, values, religion and ethnicity. In the discourse of Mr. Orbán, Hungarians are characterized by Christianity, civilizational and cultural homogeneity, and community awareness. He frequently uses the term 'breed', implying that Hungarians are not only bound by a shared culture but by race. According to his statements, Hungarian identity derives from a broader European identity, based on the Christian culture and on the production of knowledge (ie. 'scientific breakthroughs'). In the same line, Mr. Salvini presents the Christian traditions as characteristic from the Italian population, as well as the existence of a common culture and values. Although he does not make any reference to a European identity, he underlines the fact that European countries have a common history and common values, 'European values', which have an influence in local cultures. He does not directly refer to race or ethnicity, however he states that the fertility decline of Italians cannot be compensated with increasing migrant population, meaning that he considers these two populations as physically different.

This point leads to the second message which is that the arrival of populations issued from other countries puts at risk the national identity. Considering that countries are approached as nation-states, foreigners are considered a threat to the national collectivity, as they are said to have different values, cultures and behaviors, which can deteriorate the identity of this collectivity. However, not all foreigners are considered a threat; immigrants from European countries are not perceived as a problem, since they are expected to have common values. However, migrants from developing countries, particularly from African countries are constantly presented as a form of invasion. They are depicted as criminals, stemming from violent backgrounds, coming in large numbers to modify the local culture and to take over the resources of nationals. Mr. Orbán uses the term 'population replacement' to describe a process in which immigrants would outnumber locals and institutionalize their way of life. Immigrants are generally associated with the religion of Islam, which is linked in the discourse to terrorism and extremism. Consequently, the culture of immigrants is presented as incompatible with the local culture.

Hence, the third message is that national populations should not incorporate or mix with populations issued from migration as they would undermine the cultural and ethnical homogeneity of the national group. While Mr. Orbán directly affirms that he doesn't approve the mixture of populations and cultures in Hungary, Mr. Salvini implies it by frequently assigning negative characteristics to foreigners, which contrast with the positive characteristics of nationals, and by expressing that the only way to increase labor force is to raise the birth rate of nationals instead of integrating outsiders to this group. He also considers certain local minorities, historically known for their foreign origins, as outsiders. One of these minorities is the Roma population. The negative connotation assigned to this group is justified by referring to their alleged illegal behavior; nevertheless, it may be considered an ethnical form of discrimination as this collectivity is also partially integrated by Italian citizens, who could be included in the group of the nationals, but are not.

Based on the discourse on national identity of the leaders selected for this study, diverse conclusions can be reached in terms of the ways in which multiple belonging is dismantled in right-wing populist parties. First of all, intersectional approaches to identity are denied. Nationals are depicted as a group having homogeneous characteristics, which are clearly defined, and individuals who do not share these features are immediately categorized either as outsiders, either as second category citizens. Therefore, the discourse of these parties generates the systematic exclusion of certain groups that do not strictly adapt to their definition of national identity. Hence, their political projects promote development only for a restricted community which differs from the entire collectivity living within the borders of the states they target. The politics of belonging of right-wing populist parties can materialize into public policy when these parties integrate governmental bodies. For this reason, it is relevant to identify the implications of the dismantlement of multiple belonging in the identity discourse in terms of exclusion and development.

Considering that these parties promote the idea that countries are nation-states, in which people share the same ethnicity, their discourse normalizes the exclusion of people who do not belong to the largest ethnical group in their country, regardless of their nationality. In this sense, immigrants have low possibilities of being integrated to the group of nationals and if they manage to become citizens, they are likely to be discriminated by ethnical and racial reasons. This situation is also

likely to affect the collectivity described by Mr. Orbán as the ‘mixed populations’. These individuals, issued from alliances between national citizens and foreigners are entitled by law to be considered national citizens. However, according to Mr. Orbán, they should be sent back to the country of origin of the parent who is not Hungarian. This not only undermines their rights but also encourages racism.

In the case of Mr. Salvini, ethnical discrimination also affects minorities whose national citizenship can be Italian. The Roma population, for instance, is presented as an outsider, supposedly for behavioral reasons. However, individuals of this community committing illegal acts are not exposed individually, but as a whole, implying that the whole community is integrated by people who violate the law, when this cannot be proven. Therefore, discrimination is executed towards members of this community as a whole, which constitutes a form of ethnical discrimination.

Additionally, there is the assumption that Christianity is at the base of the Italian and Hungarian identity. Yet, this perception does not acknowledge the existence of other religious communities, which are also present in these territories. Therefore, it may contribute to the exclusion of national citizens having other religions than Christian ones. Furthermore, the association of Islam to extremism promotes fear and rejection of the Muslim population, regardless of their country of citizenship. Moreover, both Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán defend the concept of the Christian family, which is based on the idea of marriage between a man and a woman. This definition of family promotes the exclusion of population groups who advocate for the recognition of other types of families, such as the LGBTI population.

There are other groups whose belonging to the national collectivity is not questioned but who are also attacked by the right-wing populist parties. These groups vary depending on the country. In Hungary, they are mainly actors considered as political opponents, such as individuals from the Left side of the political spectrum, liberals, civil society organizations supporting migration such as NGOs, and representatives of the European Union, called the ‘European Elite’. In Italy, these groups are mainly political opponents, such as the Left and NGOs contrary to the migration policies of Mr. Salvini, but also multilateral organizations perceived as a threat to sovereignty, such as the European Union and the United Nations Organization. Although the exclusion of these actors does not respond to their national identity, it is relevant to point out that they are frequently presented as outgroups due to their diverging views on national identity and migration.

Additionally, one of the main differences between the discourse on national identity of Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán is the central argument used to justify the exclusion of certain population groups from the 'heartland'. While Mr. Orbán affirms that this process responds to a difference in ethnicity, as he suggests Hungarians are a race or 'breed', Mr. Salvini justifies the exclusion by affirming it is a question of legality. In this sense, the Prime Minister of Hungary argues that the necessary expulsion of outsiders from the 'heartland' corresponds to a needed protection of the interests of a race which would be incompatible with others. On the contrary, Mr. Salvini affirms that it is not a matter of race but of legal status, so people without permits of stay could be expelled from the 'heartland' for security reasons. Therefore, the discourse of Mr. Salvini allows for the integration of small groups of minorities (the ones having legal status) while Mr. Orbán's discourse does not. Nevertheless, the recurrent negative depiction of minorities by Mr. Salvini suggests that despite the fact that some of their members may have or acquire legal status, they are not considered full members of the national collectivity, which again contributes to the dismantlement of multiple belonging in the context of national identity.

Although Mr. Orbán and Mr. Salvini are issued from different European regions, Central Europe and Western Europe respectively, this situation does not make their discourses differ significantly. In fact, they share common topics of interest such as migration, security, the promotion of natality, among many others. Additionally, they collaborate together in political activities at the European level, which makes them exert a mutual influence on each other, which is reflected in the content of their statements.

Taking into account the normalization of violence towards groups defined as outsiders vis-à-vis the national collectivity, the dismantlement of multiple belonging in the discourse of right-wing populist parties can contribute to exclusion when their definition of national identity is institutionalized through policy-making. If the criteria used to categorize individuals as belonging to a national collectivity is transformed into the criteria for granting national citizenship, a large group of individuals would be systematically deprived from rights. As governments generate policies for the development of their citizens, if there are collectivities which are consistently excluded from the benefits of these policies, these groups would be isolated from development initiatives. The exclusion promoted by the discourse on national identity of right-wing populist

parties contradicts internationally agreed principles and commitments for human development. These inconsistencies will be addressed in the next section.

6. Implications of the dismantlement of multiple belonging for development.

6.1. Contrast between the right-wing populist discourse on identity and the 2030 Agenda for Development.

As we have seen in the previous section, the discourse of right-wing populist parties on national identity contributes to the exclusion of certain population groups living in states which are presented as nation-states but which encompass populations whose characteristics do not coincide with the given definition of an individual belonging to the national collectivity. The leaders of these parties are recognized worldwide for stating that their governments will prioritize the needs of the individuals belonging to their nation over the ones of other individuals. In Italy, Mr. Salvini is recognized for his slogan ‘Italians first’ (*Prima gli Italiani*), which he uses as a hashtag in his social media posts (Salvini, 2019b), while Mr. Orbán uses the expression ‘Hungary before everything, God above us all’ (VO35, 2019). Considering that both of these leaders are currently heads of government with policy-making power, they have the capability to decide over the beneficiaries of state actions for development, which means they have the power to prioritize the rights of the group that they consider the national collectivity over other groups. The definition of this collectivity, as we analyzed in previous sections, excludes various social actors.

In this sense, their discourse contradicts multiple globally agreed principles and commitments stated in the 2030 Agenda for Development. First of all, the preamble of the agenda and the point 4 of the declaration assert that the initiatives adopted towards sustainable development should ensure “no one will be left behind” (UN, 2015). This statement indicates that every individual should be included in governmental and multilateral actions directed towards development, which contradicts the discourse of right-wing populist parties in which the needs of nationals should be addressed before those of individuals categorized as outsiders. Moreover, in the section addressed to peace, one of the five areas considered of critical importance for development, it is mentioned that “inclusive societies” (UN, 2015) should be fostered, which once again emphasizes the importance of the inclusion of all sectors of the population. Later on, it is mentioned that the implementation on the development agenda is “based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity” which should focus on “the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable” (UN, 2015). Taking into account the

negative connotations attributed by Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán to populations from developing countries in Italy and Hungary, it can be stated that global solidarity is not a priority for their governments as they share the idea that local resources are limited and they should be distributed exclusively among nationals. Additionally, groups that are vulnerable to poverty, such as the Roma population, are criminalized in the discourse, which reinforces their exclusion.

Furthermore, the point 8 of the declaration of the agenda, which describes the common vision for global development, specifies that:

“We envisage a world of universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and non-discrimination; of respect for race, ethnicity and cultural diversity; and of equal opportunity permitting the full realization of human potential and contributing to shared prosperity.” (UN, 2015)

The discourse on national identity of the politicians studied violates several of the elements considered necessary for global development. The discriminatory discourse against collectivities belonging to a certain ethnicity or religious community contradicts the principle of equality and non-discrimination, as well as the respect for race and cultural diversity. This practice also contributes to disparities in terms of opportunities as there is a categorization of the collectivities living in states, in which particular categories are less entitled than others to benefit from prosperity.

Likewise, point 23 highlights that, in the process of development, empowerment should reach “people who are vulnerable”, such as “refugees and internally displaced persons and migrants” (UN, 2015), among others. In this regard, the perpetual negative depiction of immigrants carried out by Mr. Orbán and Mr. Salvini demonstrates that these politicians do not recognize the need of integrating these individuals to the national collectivity or guaranteeing their rights within their respective countries. In point 29 of the declaration, there is an acknowledgement of the “positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development” (UN, 2015), which is also opposed to the discourse of right-wing populist parties which affirm that the national collectivity should increase its birth rate in order to generate growth instead of receiving immigrants as they are expected to have differentiated contributions to growth.

Point 35 of the declaration affirms that peace and security are essential for the sustainable development and that these elements depend on “the respect of human rights (including the right to development)”, among other conditions. The contradictions between this conception and the

right-wing populist discourse will be addressed in detail in the following two sections. Nevertheless, it can be briefly stated that the discourses of Mr. Orbán and Mr. Salvini do not recognize equal rights to development for people living within the borders of their states, which is manifested by the constant incitement to the expulsion of minorities from the territories they govern.

Finally, the negative connotations attributed to minorities, foreigners and people having a different faith than Christianity, particularly African minorities and Muslims, oppose the global commitment to development stated in point 36 of the declaration, which states that development is based on “intercultural understanding, tolerance mutual respect” (UN, 2015), among other principles.

6.2. Contrast between the right-wing populist discourse on identity and the Declaration on the Right to Development

The processes of exclusion fostered by the dismantlement of multiple belonging in the discourse on identity of right-wing populist parties is also inconsistent with various principles stated in the Declaration on the Right to Development. The first article of this declaration states that development is a “human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in” (OHCHR, 1986). As we previously mentioned, the political discourse of the leaders studied does not recognize the right of certain collectivities to live in the states they govern, as these collectivities do not fulfill the characteristics used to describe an individual belonging to their nation. According to this discourse, they are deprived of the right to participate in the development processes of the states they live in as they do not belong to them.

Moreover, the second article asserts that “the human person is the central subject of development” (OHCHR, 1986). This statement presents development as a process that should focus on people, in general, due to their human condition, without exceptions. This principle is complemented by the affirmation that states have the duty to formulate national development policies which “aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals” (OHCHR, 1986). This affirmation specifies once again that one of the basic conditions for the promotion of development at the state level is to take into account the entire population living within the territory of the country in question, as this would guarantee equal access to development initiatives. Nevertheless, the dismantlement of multiple belonging regarding national identity

carried out by right-wing populist parties generates the exclusion of certain population groups from the governmental actions carried out for development under the rule of these parties.

Additionally, as the segregated population groups are pinpointed for reasons related to their country of origin, their ethnicity and their religious practices, there is also a contradiction between the right-wing populist discourse and the article 6 of the declaration which affirms that all states should cooperate for promoting the universal respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights “without any distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (OHCHR, 1986). Therefore, according to this article, governments and their representatives should promote the respect of human rights as it is considered a basic condition for development. Following this premise, the contradictions between the right-wing populist discourse on identity and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will be analyzed in the next section.

6.3. Contrast between the right-wing populist discourse on identity and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The respect of human rights is considered a basic condition for development not only in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, but also in the Declaration on the Right to Development. In this sense, it is relevant to analyze the coherence between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the views on identity expressed by the Prime Ministers of Italy and Hungary in order to highlight that their discriminatory discourse also contradicts rights that are considered essential for development.

The first article of the declaration of Human Rights stipulates that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UN, 1948). This entails that they should have an equal right to development, which is an assumption that is contradicted by the declarations of Mr. Salvini of Mr. Orbán, who express that their governments direct their development policies towards natives and considers legitimate the expulsion of individuals who do not have certain characteristics defined as essential to be considered part of the national collectivity, such as Christianity or a long ancestry of nationals.

Moreover, article 2 states that everyone is entitled to the rights included in the Declaration, “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. This principle contrasts once again with the discourse of right-wing populist parties who depict negatively the individuals issued

from migration or belonging to minorities, whether it is because of their origin or because of their mixed ancestry. This discourse is characterized by the normalization of discriminatory processes, which can be considered as violations of Human Rights, such as the displacement of populations from their places of residence against their will and the legitimization of the use of violence against them.

Furthermore, in article 5, it is explained that no one shall be subjected to “degrading treatment” (UN, 1948), which is a principle again violated by the use of negative connotations to describe individuals considered as outsiders from the national collectivity. For instance, individuals having an African origin are commonly associated with criminals and terrorists, which constitutes a degrading treatment which is often spread through the official statements of Mr. Orbán and Mr. Salvini.

Article 7 of the declaration affirms that everyone is entitled to equal protection of the law and equal protection against “any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination” (UN, 1948). This article is particularly relevant for the present analysis since the way in which minorities are addressed by right-wing populist parties is not only a form of violation of Human Rights, in the sense that it generates discrimination due to ethnic and religious causes, but it is also an incitement to discriminatory practices among the population. This is supported by the fact that national citizens are encouraged to ‘defend’ themselves from minorities, who are portrayed as a threat to security.

Additionally, article 14 states that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (UN, 1948). In the case of Mr. Orbán, this right is not recognized as he affirms that he is reluctant to any kind of immigration and that he has promoted regulations which block the arrival of any foreigner. In the case of Mr. Salvini, this right is recognized but he affirms that he intends to modify regulations in order to guarantee that a smaller amount of people are granted this right. Therefore, the discourse of Mr. Orbán contradicts this global principle for development.

Furthermore, article 15 explains that no one shall be denied “the right to change his nationality” (UN, 1948). This principle is entirely opposed to the discourse on identity of both Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán who defend the existence of nation-states in which exclusively native people should

be considered nationals. This argument is exposed by the discrimination of minorities who are presented as an invasion, which cannot be integrated to the national collectivity.

Finally, article 18 states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” (UN, 1948). The discourse of right-wing populist parties on identity contradicts this article by building a negative image of individuals who practice Islam, associating them to terrorism and extremism. Also, the message that the Hungarian and Italian identity are based on Christianity does not recognize the legitimacy of the practice of other faiths among Hungarian and Italian nationals.

Consequently, there is a notorious contradiction between the principles and commitments globally agreed as guidelines for human development, characterized by the promotion of social inclusion, and the discourse on identity of right-wing populist parties, which dismantles multiple belonging in terms of ethnicity, religion, and culture, among others, contributing to discriminatory practices.

7. Conclusions

The subject of national identity has acquired a higher complexity as the development of communication means has allowed for a higher mobility of individuals from all over the world, increasing the diversity of the population present within the borders of a state. Nevertheless, the concept of the nation-state is still defended by various political actors who sustain the idea that a nation should be integrated by a homogeneous group of individuals. As we have seen in previous sections, the representatives of two large right-wing populist parties, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán, agree with this view. Through the use of the politics of belonging, they have defined and constructed the limits of the national community analyzing individuals based on their geographical origin, ethnicity, religion, among other personal characteristics.

Their discourse dismantles multiple belonging with respect to identity in the sense that it does not allow for an intersectional approach in which inhabitants from their respective countries could simultaneously have characteristics associated to the ‘traditional’ concept of a national and from other cultures and ethnicities. In this sense, the main messages transmitted by these leaders regarding national identity are that:

1. Members of their nation constitute a homogeneous collectivity, sharing the same culture, values, religion and ethnicity.

2. The arrival of populations issued from other countries or cultures puts at risk the national identity.
3. National populations should not incorporate or mix with populations issued from migration as they would undermine the cultural and ethnical homogeneity of the national group.

These assumptions pose a problem when the actors who promote them acquire policy-making power in the sense that there are various population groups living inside their territories who do not match the restrictive definition of national identity posed by these leaders, which fosters a perception that these individuals are less entitled to rights than the individuals said to belong to the national collectivity. With slogans such as ‘Italians first’ or ‘Hungary before everything’, right-wing populist parties contribute to the exclusion and the promotion of exclusion of those who are not considered nationals. However, if this exclusion is materialized into public policy, several categories of population groups become vulnerable with respect to their rights as citizens. The main groups who are discriminated in the right-wing populist discourse are: immigrants, populations with African and Asian origins, Roma population, individuals with mixed ethnicity, Muslims and individuals identified as LGBTI. Although several of these actors have a national citizenship, they also belong to identity groups which are excluded from the traditional conception of national citizen, which makes them less likely to be protected by their states, governed by ruled by right-wing populist parties. For instance, when appointed Minister of the Interior, Mr. Salvini ordered the removal of multiple settlements of Roma population in Rome (Reuters, 2018), stating that his intention was to ‘give back this space to the citizens’ (MS3, 2018).

States are crucial actors in terms of human development as they define policies and actions for the well-being of their citizens. States, however, are not autonomous entities; they are integrated by political actors, who have their own views on development processes. Considering the diversity of perspectives existing regarding the paths towards development, states have developed common principles and commitments to guarantee that this process will lead to the best possible outcomes for the global community. However, the right-wing populist discourse on identity contradicts several of the pre-conditions considered essential for human development and peace.

One of the main principles for development, stated simultaneously in the 2030 Development Agenda, the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the need for this process to be encompassing and to include every individual, without any

type of discrimination linked to race, ethnicity or religion. However, this principle is repeatedly violated by the right-wing populist discourse which promotes societies in which the needs of inhabitants can be prioritized based on factors different than their citizenship. The dismantlement of multiple belonging in the discourse of right-wing populist parties on identity contributes to the systematic exclusion of minorities and other groups who do not fit with precision the given definition of national collectivity, which undermines the correct implementation of development initiatives both at the local and at the international level.

Although every government has political opponents, when these are not pinpointed for their actions but for their personal and intrinsic human characteristics such as appearance, origin, or gender, there is an immediate process of legitimization of discrimination and racism, which generally opposes international principles for development. Through the ‘politics of fear’ and the glorification of the police forces, political actors like Mr. Salvini and Mr. Orbán promote the use of violence against minorities in the name of security, which can take the form of physical violence, especially considering they also carry out a simultaneous lobby for the liberalization of the individual use of weapons.

In the current context of rising nationalism, it is important to question ourselves with respect to the development initiatives proposed by states and consider who the effective beneficiaries of these initiatives are in order to avoid the naturalization of discrimination. Regarding the formulation of policies for human development, three main recommendations can be drawn from the present research. The first one is to guarantee that the policies generated at the state level benefit all the members of the population living within the geographical limits of the country concerned and, in the case that they cannot encompass the whole population (due to financial limitations, for instance), they should incorporate processes of positive discrimination to guarantee that minorities can also benefit from these policies. The second one is that every policy issued with the purpose of enhancing security should be respectful of the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so as to prevent the legitimization of the use of violence against minorities. Finally, governments should formulate development policies which incorporate an intersectional approach to national identity so as to guarantee that national citizens are granted equal access to their rights, without being categorized into first class and second class citizens.

8. References

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Annex 1. Interventions included in the discourse sample of Viktor Orbán

The sample used to analyze the discourse of Mr. Orbán comprises 45 interventions published in the Website of the Hungarian Government, in the section of the Prime Minister, under the subsection '*The Prime Minister's speeches*'. In order to identify these interventions in the framework of the present investigation, a code has been assigned to each of them. The following

table presents, for each intervention, the code granted, the publication date, the title of the intervention and the exact hyperlink of the online source.

Code	Date	Title	Online source
VO1	10-06-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “180 Minutes”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes-20180610
VO2	16-06-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at a conference held in memory of Helmut Kohl	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-at-a-conference-held-in-memory-of-helmut-kohl
VO3	24-06-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “180 Minutes”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes20180624
VO 4	06-07-18	Press statement by Viktor Orbán after his talks with Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/press-statement-by-viktor-Orbán-after-his-talks-with-chancellor-of-germany-angela-merkel
VO5	21-07-18	Orbán before his talks with Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/press-statement-by-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-before-his-talks-with-benjamin-netanyahu-prime-minister-of-israel
VO6	26-07-18	Press statement by Viktor Orbán after the NATO summit in Brussels	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/press-statement-by-viktor-Orbán-after-the-nato-summit-in-brussels
VO7	25-07-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s press statement following his talks with Prime Minister of Montenegro Duško Marković	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-press-statement-following-his-talks-with-prime-minister-of-montenegro-du-ko-markovi
VO8	27-06-18	Slovak commercial television channel TA3’s interview with Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán and Prime Minister of Slovakia Peter Pellegrini	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/slovak-commercial-television-channel-ta3-s-interview-with-prime-minister-of-hungary-viktor-Orbán-and-prime-minister-of-slovakia-peter-pellegrini
VO9	28-07-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “180 Minutes”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes20180727
VO10	29-07-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-at-the-29th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp
VO11	29-08-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s press statement after his meeting with the Interior Minister of Italy Matteo Salvini	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-press-statement-after-his-meeting-with-the-interior-minister-of-italy-matteo-salvini
VO12	02-09-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s eulogy at the funeral of Kossuth and Jászai Prize-winning director and theatre manager Imre Kerényi	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-eulogy-at-the-funeral-of-kossuth-and-jaszai-prize-winning-director-and-theatre-manager-imre-kerenyi
VO13	06-09-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 6th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-at-the-6th-summit-of-the-cooperation-council-of-turkic-speaking-states
VO14	11-09-18	Address by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the debate on the so-called “Sargentini Report”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/address-by-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-in-the-debate-on-the-so-called-sargentini-report
VO15	12-09-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s response to the debate in the plenary session of the European Parliament	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-response-to-the-debate-in-the-plenary-session-of-the-european-parliament
VO16	15-09-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “180 Minutes”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes-20180915
VO17	18-09-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech in Parliament before the start of daily business	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-in-parliament-before-the-start-of-daily-business

Code	Date	Title	Online source
VO18	18-09-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement in Parliament, responding to reactions to his address before the start of daily business	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-statement-in-parliament-responding-to-reactions-to-his-address-before-the-start-of-daily-business
VO19	01-10-18	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme "Good Morning Hungary"	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary
VO20	05-10-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the inauguration of the renovated House of Traditions	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-renovated-house-of-traditions
VO21	16-10-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the opening ceremony for the Puskás Academy Sports and Conference Centre	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-at-the-opening-ceremony-for-the-puskas-academy-sports-and-conference-centre
VO22	24-10-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech on the 62nd anniversary of the 1956 Revolution and Freedom Fight	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-on-the-62nd-anniversary-of-the-1956-revolution-and-freedom-fight
VO23	31-10-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address at an event marking the reopening of the Museum of Fine Arts in Budapest	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-address-at-an-event-marking-the-reopening-of-the-museum-of-fine-arts-in-budapest
VO24	07-11-18	Speech of Viktor Orbán at the first China International Import Expo (CIIE)	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-Orbán-at-the-first-china-international-import-expo-ciie
VO25	12-11-18	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme "Good Morning, Hungary"	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-20181112
VO26	13-11-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address at the meeting of the central bank governors of China and Central and Eastern European countries	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-address-at-the-meeting-of-the-central-bank-governors-of-china-and-central-and-eastern-european-countries
VO27	26-11-18	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme "Good Morning, Hungary"	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-20181126
VO28	14-12-18	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on "Duel", broadcast by the Czech channel TV Barrandov	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-duel-broadcast-by-the-czech-channel-tv-barrandov
VO29	04-12-18	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement following his meeting with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-statement-following-his-meeting-with-prime-minister-of-croatia-andrej-plenkovi
VO30	10-12-18	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme "Good Morning, Hungary"	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-20181210
VO31	25-12-18	Hungary has set out on an upward path	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/hungary-has-set-out-on-an-upward-path
VO32	28-12-18	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme "Good morning, Hungary"	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-20181221
VO33	10-01-19	Viktor Orbán's press conference at the 127th Government Info	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-Orbán-s-press-conference-at-the-127th-government-info
VO34	18-01-19	Viktor Orbán's answers to journalists' questions at his international press conference	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-Orbán-s-answers-to-journalists-questions-at-his-international-press-conference
VO35	11-02-19	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's "State of the Nation" address	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-state-of-the-nation-address-2019

Code	Date	Title	Online source
VO36	24-02-19	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “Good morning, Hungary”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary1
VO37	03-03-19	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s address at the Business Year Opening Event of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-address-at-the-business-year-opening-event-of-the-hungarian-chamber-of-commerce-and-industry
VO38	08-03-19	Viktor Orbán’s interview with Welt am Sonntag	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-Orbán-s-interview-with-welt-am-sonntag
VO39	10-03-19	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “Good morning, Hungary”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-20190308
VO40	12-03-19	Viktor Orbán’s speech at the opening ceremony of the 12th Star of the Profession Festival	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-Orbán-s-speech-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-12th-star-of-the-profession-festival
VO41	15-03-19	Orbán Viktor’s ceremonial speech on the 171st anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and Freedom Fight of 1848/49	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/Orbán-viktor-s-ceremonial-speech-on-the-171st-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-freedom-fight-of-1848-49
VO42	25-03-19	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s address at Mathias Corvinus Collegium’s international conference, “Budapest Summit on Migration”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-address-at-mathias-corvinus-collegium-s-international-conference-budapest-summit-on-migration
VO43	27-03-19	Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “Sunday News”	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-the-kossuth-radio-programme-sunday-news20190324
VO44	08-04-19	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the inauguration of the Calvinist Church in Klapka tér	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-calvinist-church-in-klapka-ter
VO45	10-04-19	Speech by Viktor Orbán at the inauguration of the main building of the Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies	https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-by-viktor-Orbán-at-the-inauguration-of-the-main-building-of-the-avicenna-institute-of-middle-eastern-studies

Annex 2. Interventions and Twitter posts included in the discourse sample of Matteo Salvini.

The sample used to analyze the discourse of Mr. Salvini comprises 7 interventions published in the section of the Ministry of the Interior in the Website of the Italian Government, in the segment “Press Room” (*Sala Stampa*), under the subsection “Interventions and Interviews” (*Interventi e interviste*) and 531 Twitter posts of the official Twitter page of Mr. Salvini, @matteosalvinimi. In order to identify these interventions in the framework of the present investigation, a code has been assigned to the discourses in the governmental website. In the case of the Twitter posts, they can be traced by their automatic Tweet ID.

For each intervention, the first table presents the code granted, the publication date, the title of the intervention and the exact hyperlink of its online source. The second table contains a list of the

Tweets included in the sample of Mr. Salvini, with a specification of their Tweet ID and publication date and time.

Interventions

Code	Date	Title	Link
MS1	13-06-18	Salvini: «Sta nascendo un asse con i tedeschi»	http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/salvini-sta-nascendo-asse-i-tedeschi
MS2	22-07-18	Italy has done a lot - maybe too much	http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/italy-has-done-lot-maybe-too-much
MS3	25-07-18	«Ai poliziotti i soldi tagliati ai profughi» - «Così taglio i soldi a rom e profughi»	http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/poliziotti-i-soldi-tagliati-profughi-cosi-taglio-i-soldi-rom-e-profughi
MS4	08-08-18	«Spiagge sicure? Sta funzionando ma serve tempo»	http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/spiagge-sicure-sta-funzionando-ma-serve-tempo
MS5	13-09-18	«We Want to Change Things from Within». Italy's Matteo Salvini on His Goal to Reshape Europe	http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/we-want-change-things-within-italys-matteo-salvini-his-goal-reshape-europe
MS6	01-10-18	«Più agenti e fondi anti-stese»	http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/piu-agenti-e-fondi-anti-stese
MS7	14-12-18	Dal decreto su sicurezza e immigrazione alle leggi approvate, il bilancio	http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/dal-decreto-sicurezza-e-immigrazione-leggi-approvate-bilancio

Tweets

Tweet Id	Date	Time
1066981901796294656	26-11-18	09:08:03
1067146276465254400	26-11-18	20:01:13
1067345639300833281	27-11-18	09:13:25
1067387156233183233	27-11-18	11:58:23
1067387153246760960	27-11-18	11:58:23
1067539696866287616	27-11-18	22:04:32
1067540860236111872	27-11-18	22:09:09
1067541265103888384	27-11-18	22:10:46
1067686420628811776	28-11-18	07:47:33
1067753118350434305	28-11-18	12:12:35
1067818449974497280	28-11-18	16:32:12
1067881497221365763	28-11-18	20:42:43
1068104209843798017	29-11-18	11:27:42
1068115780322172928	29-11-18	12:13:41
1068278966212009986	29-11-18	23:02:07
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