

Palacký University in Olomouc

Faculty of Law

Saurovh Mazumdar

Economic sanctions as a response to the violation of the prohibition of  
the use of force: Case of 2022 Russian invasion.

Master's Thesis

Olomouc 2023

## Declaration

I declare that this research is my own work, and any other sources adapted have been fully and specifically acknowledged. Thus, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis mentioned all the references and correct citations. I have provided all the literal sources and met all principles and ethics.

Author: Saurovh Mazumdar

Supervisor (Professor): JUDr. Pavel Bureš, Ph.D., D.E.A

In Olomouc: 31<sup>st</sup> May 2023

Signature:

*Saurovh Mazumdar*

## Acknowledgements

I want to address my special thanks to my Teacher/Professor, JUDr. Pavel Bureš, PhD, D.E.A, for his precious guidance throughout this work's drafting process and my whole experience as a master's student at the University Palacky of Olomouc. I would also like to express my gratitude to my family for their moral support, which gave me belief in myself and allowed me to write this thesis.

## Abstract:

A considerable outcry has been generated worldwide because Russia invaded Ukraine. To stop the war, many countries have instituted punitive sanctions against Russia. The general aim of this thesis will be based on the current situation, and the main objective is to examine the type of economic sanction levied against Russia and the classification of economic sanctions or different economic sanctions in various sectors, individuals, and companies. The primary research will be based on sanctions adopted against Russia; this master's thesis will only examine the economic sanctions imposed by the E.U., U.S., UK, Canada, and Japan against Russia for using force in Ukraine. It also sheds light on the sanction on exports and local companies. Lastly, some focus will be put on countermeasures taken by the Russian Federation as a cross-retaliation to those sanctions.

Keywords: Economic sanction, ARSIWA, classification of economic sanctions, individuals, oligarch, E.U., U.S., UK, Canada, Japan, countermeasures.

## Abbreviations

ARSIWA: Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts

ARSIWAC: Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries

EU: European Union

US: United States of America.

UK: United Kingdom

## Table of content:

DECLARATION ----- (pg. 2)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ----- (pg. 3)

ABSTRACT --- (pg. 4)

ABBREVIATIONS ---- (pg. 5)

- CHAPTER 1: ----- (pg.: 7 to 9)
- CHAPTER 2: ----- (pg.: 10 to 11)
- CHAPTER 3: ---- (pg.: 12 to 22)
- CHAPTER 4: ----- (pg.: 23 to 29)
- CHAPTER 5: ----- (pg.: 30 to 34)
- CHAPTER 6: ---(pg.: 35 to 39)
- CHAPTER 7: ----(pg.: 40 to 45)
- CHAPTER 8: ----- (pg.: 46 to 50)
- CHAPTER 9: ---- (pg.: 51 to 54)
- CHAPTER 10: -----(pg.:55 to 56)
- CHAPTER-11: ----- (pg.: 57 to 62)
- CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION. ---- (pg.: 63)

BIBLIOGRAPHY. ----- (pg.: 64 to 70)

## CHAPTER 1

### 1. Introduction

This master's thesis is based on the observation that recent events of Russia's invasion of Ukraine have highlighted an increasing desire for economic sanctions to justify the wrongful acts committed by Russia. Many around the world tend to rely on economic sanctions as a means of justifying Russia's actions in Ukraine.

Economic sanctions have become a standard tool of economic warfare and foreign policy, with their use becoming increasingly widespread. In fact, over the past two decades, we have witnessed a trend toward imposing economic sanctions. These economic sanctions can take the form of both corporate entities and individuals. They serve two purposes: influencing the state's behaviour and discouraging non-state actor's conduct.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has presented a unique and challenging problem for many nations looking for an efficient solution to stop the aggression. Economic sanctions have been identified as one of the potential approaches that may bring about the settlement of the situation and always consider necessary measures a government may impose on another government or a population to compel a behaviour change. In the case of Russia and Ukraine war, the economic sanctions have significantly impacted Russia's economy. The U.S., E.U., UK, Canada, and Japan have implemented strict and coordinated economic sanctions targeting Russia's banking, aviation, and shipping industries and critical economic sectors like defence, aerospace, and energy. As a result, Russia's economy has been directly impacted.

Therefore, economic sanctions can be a potent weapon in the fight against regional and global challenges.

### 2. Purpose and Research Questions:

The purpose of this master's thesis is to examine the type of economic sanction levied against Russia and the countermeasures within the framework of the law of State responsibility.

The main research question that will be examined is, therefore:

What are the types of economic sanctions taken by the E.U., U.S., U.K., Canada, and Japan as a response in 2022 against Russia for violating the prohibition of using force in Ukraine and the type of countermeasure taken by Russia in response to that sanction?

To answer the main research question, other essential points must also be examined:

- Sanction in international law – general representation of countermeasure to ARSIWA 2001.
- Types of economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., U.K., E.U., Canada and Japan against Russia.
- Countermeasure by Russia.

### 3. Methodology:

The objective of this master's thesis is to evaluate only the type of economic sanctions imposed by the E.U., U.S., UK, Canada, and Japan on Russia for violating the prohibition of using force in Ukraine. Many types of economic sanctions have been researched by using official websites. In February 2022, work was begun on the thesis and finalized within and by October 2022.

However, this master's thesis does not analyze the effects of targeted restrictions that later transformed into embargoes on investments and other economic activities, nor does it examine the consequences of such actions. Due to time and space constraints, this master's thesis will not investigate the effects of economic sanction in detail. The objective of this master's thesis is not to quantify the impacts of economic sanctions or to differentiate the effects of these economic sanctions on the Russian economy.

This master's thesis has two aims. Firstly, to give a general view on countermeasures, as outlined in the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).<sup>1</sup> Secondly, this master's thesis only focuses on the type of economic sanctions implemented by the E.U., U.S., UK, Canada, and Japan against Russia for violating international law and doing conduct of use of force in Ukraine.

Moreover, through this master thesis, we can gain insight into the various type of economic sanctions imposed on Russia. This master's thesis also evaluates the type of Russian countermeasures against those economic sanctions.

### 4. Outline of the master's thesis:

This master's thesis contains 12 chapters.

Chapter 1: This chapter provides an overview of the master thesis, including the background and context of the study.

Chapter 2: This chapter defines economic sanctions and explores the different forms.

Chapter 3: This chapter provides an overview of the general principles of countermeasures in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).

---

<sup>1</sup> REMY, Jan. The Application of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in the WTO Regime – EJIL,2021. Accessible at: Talk!. <https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/janyvesremy/>



Chapter 4: This chapter discusses the classifications of economic sanctions.

Chapter 5: This chapter provides an overview of the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union.

Chapter 6: In this chapter, we delve into the type of economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia.

Chapter 7: In this chapter, we delve into the type of economic sanctions imposed by the UK on Russia.

Chapter 8: In this chapter, we delve into the type of economic sanctions imposed by Canada on Russia.

Chapter 9: In this chapter, we delve into the type of economic sanctions imposed by Japan on Russia.

Chapter 10: This chapter focuses the sanctions imposed against Russian oligarchs.

Chapter 11: This chapter explores the Russian government's countermeasures.

Chapter 12: Conclusion.

## CHAPTER 2:

### 1. Economic Sanctions – meaning:

Economic sanctions, or restrictive measures, are penalties that one or more countries impose on another country, its officials, a group, or individuals.<sup>2</sup> Economic sanctions aim to exert economic pressure, change regimes, or discourage specific policies, behaviours, or activities.<sup>3</sup> Economic sanctions can effectively achieve their intended goals, and they can also have unintended consequences.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it is essential for countries to carefully consider the potential impact of economic sanctions before implementing them.<sup>5</sup> They should also work to ensure that these measures are targeted and proportionate and do not violate international law or human rights.<sup>6</sup> When diplomatic talks fail to resolve foreign challenges, governments often turn to economic sanctions as a powerful tool short of military force.<sup>7</sup>

On February 24th, 2022, the United States government and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made a significant announcement.<sup>8</sup> <sup>9</sup> In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, sanctions were imposed on the Russian government, financial institutions, and individuals.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the economic sanctions imposed on Russia were a necessary and decisive response to their invasion of Ukraine.<sup>11</sup> The consequences of Russia's actions were severe, and the message was clear that aggression would not be tolerated.<sup>12</sup>

### 2. Different Forms of Economic Sanctions:

Economic sanctions can be imposed unilaterally, by a single country or multilaterally, by a group of countries or<sup>13</sup> by an international organisation.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> *CORPORATE, Finance, Institute*. Economic Sanctions Penalties imposed by one or more countries against another country, 2023. Accessible at: [corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions](https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions).

<sup>3</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>4</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>5</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>6</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>7</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>8</sup> LOGUE, Ann. "What Are Economic Sanctions?" 2022. Accessible at: [www.thebalancemoney.com/economic-sanctions-5224103](https://www.thebalancemoney.com/economic-sanctions-5224103).

<sup>9</sup> LANGE, Jason. "EXCLUSIVE Americans Broadly Support Ukraine No-fly Zone, Russia Oil Ban -poll." *Reuters*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-americans-broadly-support-ukraine-no-fly-zone-russia-oil-ban-poll-2022-03-04](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-americans-broadly-support-ukraine-no-fly-zone-russia-oil-ban-poll-2022-03-04).

<sup>10</sup> LOGUE, Ann. "What Are Economic Sanctions?" 2022. Accessible at: [www.thebalancemoney.com/economic-sanctions-5224103](https://www.thebalancemoney.com/economic-sanctions-5224103).

<sup>11</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>12</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>13</sup> RADCLIFFE, Brent. "How Economic Sanctions Work." *Investopedia*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/economic-sanctions.asp](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/economic-sanctions.asp).

Travel sanctions can result in being denied access to the airspace of sanctioning countries or unable to travel to those countries altogether.<sup>15</sup> Capital flow sanctions can prevent the flow of capital through sanctioning countries or restrict investments from those countries.<sup>16</sup> Trade sanctions can include export and countermeasures and tariffs.<sup>17</sup> Diplomatic sanctions that result in the cancellation of diplomat's and political leader's visas.<sup>18</sup> Cultural sanctions block participants from international sporting events and artists from participating in international competitions.<sup>19</sup> Finally, arms embargoes can prevent weapons and military equipment from leaving or reaching a country.<sup>20</sup>

It is important to note that Economic Sanctions are a powerful tool and often used to pressure a country to change its behaviour or policies.<sup>21</sup>

### 3. Conclusion:

Economic sanctions are a powerful tool in the arsenal of foreign policy, and it is a sophisticated and multidimensional weapon that can influence the actions and policies of targeted nations. Economic sanctions can effectively achieve desired outcomes and lead to greater poverty and restricted access to necessities for the affected communities.

---

<sup>14</sup> *CORPORATE, Finance, Institute*. Economic Sanctions Penalties imposed by one or more countries against another country, 2023. Accessible at: [corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions](https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions).

<sup>15</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>16</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>17</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>18</sup> TEAM, Wallstreetmojo. "Economic Sanctions." *WallStreetMojo*, 2023, Accessible at: [www.wallstreetmojo.com/economic-sanctions](https://www.wallstreetmojo.com/economic-sanctions).

<sup>19</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>20</sup> *CORPORATE, Finance, Institute*. Economic Sanctions Penalties imposed by one or more countries against another country, 2023. Accessible at: [corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions](https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions).

<sup>21</sup> *ibidem*

## CHAPTER 3:

### I. Sanction in International Law – General presentation of Countermeasure in respect of ARSIWA,2001:

1. Article 49: Article 49. Object and limits of countermeasures: 1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State<sup>22</sup> responsible for an internationally wrongful act to induce that State to comply with its obligations under Part Two.<sup>23</sup> 2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State.<sup>24</sup> 3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question.<sup>25 26</sup>

2. Article 50: "Article 50. Obligations not affected by countermeasures: 1. Countermeasures shall not affect: (a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; (c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals; (d) other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.<sup>27</sup> 2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations: (a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible State; (b) to respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives, and documents."<sup>28</sup>

3. Article 51: Article 51. Proportionality Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered,<sup>29</sup> considering the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.<sup>30</sup>

4. Article 52: Article 52.: Conditions relating to resort to countermeasures 1. Before taking countermeasures, an injured State shall: (a) call upon the responsible State, in accordance with Article 43, to fulfil its obligations under Part Two; (b) notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with that State.<sup>31</sup> 2. Notwithstanding

---

<sup>22</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations, 2008, pp. 129- 131.

<sup>23</sup> ibidem

<sup>24</sup> ibidem

<sup>25</sup> "ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Public International Law." *Public International Law, Public International Law Resources*,2010, p. 15.

<sup>26</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, pp. 129- 131.

<sup>27</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, pp. 131-134.

<sup>28</sup> ibidem

<sup>29</sup> ibidem

<sup>30</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, pp. 134-135.

<sup>31</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, pp. 135-137.

paragraph 1 (b), the injured State may take<sup>32</sup> urgent countermeasures necessary to preserve its rights.<sup>33</sup> 3. Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already taken, must be suspended without undue delay if: (a) the internationally wrongful act has ceased, and (b) the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties.<sup>34</sup> 4. Paragraph 3 does not apply if the responsible State fails to implement the dispute settlement procedures in good faith.<sup>35</sup>

5. Article 53: "Article 53. Termination of countermeasures: Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible State has complied with its obligations under Part Two in relation to the internationally wrongful act."<sup>36</sup>

6. Article 54: "Article 54. Measures taken by States other than an injured State: This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under Article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take<sup>37</sup> legal measures against that State to ensure the cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached."<sup>38</sup>

## 1. Countermeasures:

The International Law Commission (ILC) has drafted the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts<sup>39</sup> (ARSIWA) to establish a set of international norms that govern the legal responsibility of states for breaches of international law.<sup>40</sup> One of the critical components of ARSIWA is the concept of countermeasures.<sup>41 42</sup> This master's thesis will explore the idea of countermeasures and their role within ARSIWA.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, pp. 135-137.

<sup>33</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>34</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>35</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>36</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, p. 137.

<sup>37</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>38</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, pp. 137-139.

<sup>39</sup> Roscini, Marco. Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for Cyber Operations. *Texas International Law Journal*, 50(2/3), 2015, p. 233.

<sup>40</sup> ALLINSON, Dr. Kathryn. "Can Russia Be Held Responsible for Their Invasion of Ukraine? – University of Bristol Law School Blog." 2022. Accessible at: [legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine](http://legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine).

<sup>41</sup> Roscini, Marco. Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for Cyber Operations. *Texas International Law Journal*, 50(2/3), 2015, p. 233.

<sup>42</sup> ALLINSON, Dr. Kathryn. "Can Russia Be Held Responsible for Their Invasion of Ukraine? – University of Bristol Law School Blog." 2022. Accessible at: [legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine](http://legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine).

<sup>43</sup> *ibidem*

Countermeasures refer to a range of responses that a state may take in response to another state's international law violation.<sup>44</sup> It is defined in ARSIWA that countermeasures are intended to "induce the responsible State to comply with its obligations towards the injured State".<sup>45</sup> This means that the primary aim of countermeasures is to encourage the offending State to comply with its legal obligations rather than to punish it for its actions.<sup>46</sup>

The ARSIWA states that if a State takes action deemed a lawful measure of self-defence under the United Nations Charter, then the act cannot be considered wrongful.<sup>47</sup> This principle serves as a safeguard against unjust accusations.<sup>48</sup> It ensures that States have the right to protect themselves within the framework of international law, and this means that if Ukraine and its allies are subjected to military aggression from Russia, it is imperative to acknowledge that Ukraine and its allies possess the right to engage in both individual and collective acts of self-defence.<sup>49</sup> This provision is crucial in ensuring that Ukraine and its allies can protect themselves from potential threats and maintain their sovereignty.<sup>50</sup> This right must be recognised and upheld in the face of any hostile actions from Russia.<sup>51</sup>

Moreover, according to Article 49 of the ARSIWA, Ukraine can implement countermeasures against Russia for their continuous international wrongful acts.<sup>52</sup> These countermeasures are designed to encourage compliance with international obligations and may involve the non-fulfilment of such obligations.<sup>53</sup> However, the use of force should not be included in these countermeasures.<sup>54</sup> In simpler terms, Ukraine has the legal right to take action against Russia for its wrongful acts, but it must do so in a way that does not involve using force.<sup>55</sup> This is an essential aspect of international law that helps to maintain peace and stability between nations.<sup>56</sup>

According to Article 54 of the ARSIWA, any State has the right to take legal measures against another State if the obligation breached is owed to the international community, as explained in Article 48 of the ARSIWA.<sup>57</sup> This means that if a State violates an obligation that affects the

---

<sup>44</sup> ALLINSON, Dr. Kathryn. "Can Russia Be Held Responsible for Their Invasion of Ukraine? – University of Bristol Law School Blog." 2022. Accessible at: [legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine](https://legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine).

<sup>45</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>46</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>47</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>48</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>49</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>50</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>51</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>52</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>53</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>54</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>55</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>56</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>57</sup> *ibidem*

global community, other States have the right to take action against them.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, it is essential to note that this provision emphasises the importance of upholding international obligations and the responsibility that States have to the global community.<sup>59</sup> It serves as a reminder that actions have consequences and that States must be held accountable for their actions.<sup>60</sup>

Article 54 of the ARSIWA grants the States, the right to take legal measures against wrongful States if the obligation breached affects the international community.<sup>61</sup> This provision highlights the importance of upholding international commitments and the responsibility that States have to the global community.<sup>62</sup>

The case of Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain) in the International Court of Justice is a clear example that the prohibition of aggression is an erga omnes obligation.<sup>63</sup> This means all states have the right to countermeasures against any offending party, including Russia.<sup>64</sup> It is important to note that the erga omnes principle is fundamental to international law, establishing that certain obligations are owed to the international community.<sup>65</sup> In the case of aggression, all states must prevent and respond to acts of aggression committed by any state.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, all nations must uphold their responsibility to maintain international peace and security by taking appropriate measures against any state that violates this fundamental principle.<sup>67</sup>

The international community is responsible for working together to end Russia's numerous breaches, many violating fundamental norms.<sup>68</sup> In addition, the community can implement countermeasures under the general rules of state responsibility or the specific rules outlined in Article 55 of the ARSIWA. Russia is accountable for its actions and prevents further violations.<sup>69</sup>

According to ARSIWA, countermeasures must comply with specific procedures and restrictions.<sup>70</sup> For example, they must be proportionate to the initial wrong committed, not target civilians or other non-combatants, and not harm the environment beyond what is necessary to

---

<sup>58</sup> ALLINSON, Dr. Kathryn. "Can Russia Be Held Responsible for Their Invasion of Ukraine? – University of Bristol Law School Blog." 2022. Accessible at: [legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine](https://legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine).

<sup>59</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>60</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>61</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>62</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>63</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>64</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>65</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>66</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>67</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>68</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>69</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>70</sup> *ibidem*

achieve their intended purpose (Article 50).<sup>71</sup> These restrictions ensure that countermeasures do not escalate conflicts or cause undue harm to innocent parties.<sup>72</sup> Another essential aspect of ARSIWA's treatment of countermeasures is the requirement that states exhaust all other options before resorting to them.<sup>73</sup> A state must first attempt to resolve the issue through diplomatic channels or other non-violent means before taking military or economic action.<sup>74</sup> A state can resort to countermeasures only when these measures have proven unsuccessful (Article 49).<sup>75</sup> While the concept of countermeasures is meant to be a tool for deterring or encouraging compliance rather than punishment, in some cases, it may be seen as punishment.<sup>76</sup> In such a case, the punishments imposed by a state as countermeasures must not violate the principles of international law.<sup>77</sup> If the punishments are seen as a violation of international law, the State that imposes such punishments would be held liable for any damages or injuries that may result (Article 54).<sup>78</sup>

Thus, ARSIWA's use of countermeasures provides a legal framework for states to respond to breaches of international law in a way that is not only consistent with international norms but also reasonable and controlled.<sup>79</sup> The countermeasures serve the primary objective of inducing compliance, and there are strict legal limitations to their use to maintain a peaceful and ethical international order.<sup>80</sup> States should consider compliance measures such as diplomatic or non-violent means before using countermeasures.<sup>81</sup>

The regulations regarding State responsibility are classified as secondary rules.<sup>82</sup> Primary rules of international law outline the specific obligations that States must adhere to, while secondary rules outline the repercussions of breaching the primary rules.<sup>83</sup> In simpler terms, primary rules set the standards for State behaviour, while secondary rules determine what happens when those standards are not met.<sup>84</sup> It is important to note that secondary rules are not meant to replace primary rules but rather to complement them by providing a framework for accountability.<sup>85</sup> The

---

<sup>71</sup> ALLINSON, Dr. Kathryn. "Can Russia Be Held Responsible for Their Invasion of Ukraine? – University of Bristol Law School Blog." 2022. Accessible at: [legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine](https://legal.research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine).

<sup>72</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>73</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>74</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>75</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>76</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>77</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>78</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>79</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>80</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>81</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>82</sup> HENRIKSEN, Anders. *International Law*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2019, pp. 120-121.

<sup>83</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>84</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>85</sup> *ibidem*



distinction between primary and secondary rules is<sup>86</sup> crucial in international law.<sup>87</sup> Therefore, by adhering to primary rules, States can avoid the consequences outlined in secondary rules and maintain their reputation as responsible global community members.<sup>88</sup>

Article 49 of ARSIWA outlines that a bilateral countermeasure pertains to the legal relationship between the injured and responsible states.<sup>89</sup> The injured State takes this non-forcible measure when the responsible State fails to comply with its international obligations.<sup>90</sup> Essentially, it is a means for the injured State to seek redress for the harm caused by the responsible State.<sup>91</sup>

The occurrence of an act that is considered unlawful on the international stage is the first essential need for a proper countermeasure.<sup>92</sup> A State wounded may only take countermeasures against a State that has committed internationally illegal conduct, as defined in Articles 1-2, following Article 49(1) of ARSIWA.<sup>93</sup> This criterion is a fundamental precept that assumes the existence of an "objective standard".<sup>94</sup> However, the State implementing the countermeasures has the authority to decide whether the requirements for countermeasures are satisfied since there is no mandatory jurisdiction of courts and tribunals with the ability to issue binding judgments under international law.<sup>95</sup> Thus, the evaluation is also made at the risk of that State, and if the assessment is flawed, the State may be held accountable and subject to retaliation.<sup>96</sup> The State can serve as a judge in its suit under this decentralized system.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, countermeasures are subject to both procedural and substantive requirements.<sup>98</sup>

---

<sup>86</sup> HLA, Hart's. Concept of Law Summarized - Libertatem Magazine. Accessible at: <https://libertatem.in/law-notes/hla-harts-concept-of-law-summarized/>

<sup>87</sup>HENRIKSEN, Anders. *International Law*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.,2019, pp. 120-121.

<sup>88</sup> *ibidem*.

<sup>89</sup> HAPPOLD, Matthew. 'Economic Sanctions and International Law: An Introduction', in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 8.

<sup>90</sup> DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2017,p. 19.

<sup>91</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>92</sup>ORAKHELASHVILI, Alexander. 'Sanctions and Fundamental Rights of States: The Case of EU Sanctions Against Iran and Syria', in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing., 2016, p. 34.

<sup>93</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations, 2008, p. 130, para. 3.

<sup>94</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>95</sup> TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonios. 'State Reactions to Illegal Sanctions', in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016,p. 70.

<sup>96</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>97</sup> DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2017,p. 4.

<sup>98</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. 'Unilateral European Sanctions as Countermeasures: The Case of the EU Measures Against Iran', in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing,2015,p. 53.

## 2. Procedural Conditions:

The implementation of countermeasures necessitates the fulfilment of specific procedural prerequisites.<sup>99</sup> This holds significant, significance as countermeasures are deemed inherently wrongful unless the targeted State has committed an internationally illegal act.<sup>100</sup> However, determining the existence and wrongfulness of said action must be objectively established when countermeasures are implemented.<sup>101</sup> The initial prerequisite entails that before implementing countermeasures, a State that has suffered harm must request the responsible State to fulfil its obligations.<sup>102</sup>

The requirement stated in ARSIWA indicates a well-established rule in customary international law.<sup>103</sup> The arbitral tribunal in the *Naulilaa* case has affirmed this rule.<sup>104</sup> The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also<sup>105</sup> upheld this requirement in the case *Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project*.<sup>106</sup> The ICJ ruled that this requirement applies to non-armed countermeasures under contemporary international law.<sup>107</sup> The second provision stipulates that in the event of a State or international organization's intention to implement countermeasures, it is required to provide prior notification to the responsible State and extend an offer to engage in negotiations with said State.<sup>108</sup>

The lawfulness of countermeasures is subject to an additional procedural requirement that has been controversial for a considerable period.<sup>109</sup> This requirement pertains to the prior exhaustion of means of dispute settlement.<sup>110</sup> When the target state is negotiating in good faith, there should be no need for defences.<sup>111</sup> So, defences would not be allowed under the "necessity" rule.<sup>112</sup> Countermeasures are only needed when the target state does not want to help settle a disagreement in good faith.<sup>113</sup> This principle has several challenges associated with it, including the challenge of determining in practice the level of non-cooperation (of the target State) that renders countermeasures necessary and justifiable, as well as the challenge of determining the sincerity of the State contemplating countermeasures while engaged in negotiations.<sup>114</sup> These

---

<sup>99</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, p. 324.

<sup>100</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>101</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>102</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>103</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>104</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>105</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>106</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>107</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>108</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>109</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, p. 325.

<sup>110</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>111</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>112</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>113</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>114</sup> *ibidem*

challenges are only a few reasons it would be preferable to have the issue heard by an international court or tribunal.<sup>115</sup>

### 3. Substantial Conditions:

Article 49 ARSIWA provides inter alia that "an injured State may only take countermeasures against a State responsible for an internationally wrongful act to induce that State to comply with its obligations...."<sup>116</sup> In this particular context, it has been observed that when it comes to implementing enforcement measures, whether they are considered sanctions or countermeasures, the legality of the action on the international level primarily depends on the actual occurrence of the wrongful act committed by the targeted State.<sup>117</sup> The determination of whether Russia has committed an internationally wrongful act is depending upon the integrity of the alleged violations attributed to Russia by the E.U., USA, UK, Canada, and Japan, which serve as the basis for the lawfulness of the measures taken by these entities against Russia.

Articles 54 of ARSIWA, give the E.U., USA, UK, Canada, and Japan the right to call on Russia to be responsible.<sup>118</sup> The issue of countermeasures in response to violations of obligations that represent a general interest still needs to be addressed.<sup>119</sup>

Article 54, also known as "Countermeasures," pertains to the actions taken by states other than the injured party.<sup>120</sup> It explicitly states that it does not impede the right of a non-injured state to take legal measures against the responsible State to ensure the cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State.<sup>121</sup> Article 54 allows states not directly affected by a breach of international law to take legal action against the responsible State to ensure that the breach is stopped and the injured State is compensated.<sup>122</sup>

The ILC's use, lawful measures instead of "countermeasures" was a strategic move to avoid potential controversy.<sup>123</sup> The ILC was compelled to seek a compromise solution and leave the question open for future development.<sup>124</sup> This decision ensured that all perspectives were

---

<sup>115</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, p. 325.

<sup>116</sup> Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, pp. 129- 131.

<sup>117</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, p. 326.

<sup>118</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, p. 330.

<sup>119</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>120</sup> DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 34.

<sup>121</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>122</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>123</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>124</sup> *ibidem*

considered and that a fair and equitable solution could be reached.<sup>125</sup> Moving forward, the ILC will continue to monitor the situation and work towards a resolution in the best interests of all parties involved.<sup>126</sup>

In the case of Russia, Ukraine is the State that has been hurt the most, but the ban on violence and the use of force are responsibilities erga omnes, which means that all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.<sup>127</sup> <sup>128</sup> The ICJ recognized this in the Barcelona Traction case.<sup>129</sup>

Article 51 of ARSIWA, pertains to ensuring proportionality in implementing countermeasures.<sup>130</sup> Article 51 says that remedies must be proportional to the harm done, considering the seriousness of the internationally illegal act and the rights at stake. In customary international law, sanctions must follow the concept of balance.<sup>131</sup> The principle could prevent or limit actions that, for instance, violate the rights of individual citizens and foreign investors, are punitive or have serious, long-lasting effects, or are on the verge of violating the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention.<sup>132</sup>

Article 49 of ARSIWA states that a state that has been hurt can only act against a state that is guilty of getting that State to meet its responsibilities to stop and make up for the damage.

Article 53 says that remedies must also end when the responsible State has met its duties to stop and compensate for the damage. Generally, the actions should only be taken against the guilty State.<sup>133</sup> It is imperative that the goal of these actions is to induce the wrongdoing State to comply with its international obligations and that the measure must, as a result, be reversible.<sup>134</sup>

Article 50 is an effort to enumerate specific commitments not impacted by countermeasures. Certain of these obligations include the responsibility to abstain from the threat or use of force,<sup>135</sup>

---

<sup>125</sup> DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 34.

<sup>126</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>127</sup> HENRIKSEN, Anders. *International Law*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 137.

<sup>128</sup> International Law Commission, *Articles on State Responsibility*. Accessible at: <http://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/international-law-commission-articles-state-responsibility>

<sup>129</sup> BARCELONA Traction, *Light and Power Company, Limited*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, paras. 33-34.

<sup>130</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. *Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran*, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, p. 331.

<sup>131</sup> DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. 'Unilateral European Sanctions as Countermeasures: The Case of the EU Measures Against Iran', in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 60.

<sup>132</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>133</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>134</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>135</sup> Requête introductive d'instance | COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE. Accessible at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/fr/node/104043>

obligations for the preservation of fundamental human rights, and requirements of a humanitarian nature that prevent reprisals.<sup>136</sup>

According to Article 50(2)(b), states must respect the inviolability of diplomatic and consular relations. Even though they aren't specifically named in ARSIWA's list of non-negotiable principles, "non-intervention" and "respect for territorial integrity" cannot be violated under any circumstances.<sup>137</sup>

The concepts of necessity and non-aggravation of conflicts are the main guiding principles for the procedural requirements.<sup>138</sup> According to Article 52(1)(a), the injured State shall, before taking countermeasures, call on the responsible State to fulfil its obligations under Article 43.<sup>139</sup>

In accordance with Article 52(1)(b), the State must also inform the responsible State of its decision and before using countermeasures, the State must, at the very least, provide a warning or explanation in advance.<sup>140</sup> However, it does not appear that the so-called "urgent countermeasures" mentioned in Article 52(2), which are not preceded by notification, have a clear foundation in customary international law.<sup>141</sup> Article 52(3) states that countermeasures are prohibited if the wrongdoing has stopped and a court or other panel having the power to issue a binding ruling is currently hearing the case.<sup>142</sup> According to Article 52(4), this does not apply when the responsible State fails to execute dispute resolution processes fairly and impartially.<sup>143</sup> However, countermeasures have yet to be adopted concurrently with dispute resolution in an international court or tribunal; therefore, the situation described in Articles 52(3) and (4) is not applicable in practice.<sup>144</sup> Additionally, practice indicates that parallel diplomatic contacts are most frequently used to fulfil the notification requirement and offer to negotiate.<sup>145</sup> In conclusion, experience seems to indicate that the concept in Article 52 is adhered to as an "adequate safeguard", even if there are no procedural requirements for evidence or judicial procedures.<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>136</sup> DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 308-314.

<sup>137</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>138</sup> DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 365-379.

<sup>139</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>140</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>141</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>142</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>143</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>144</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>145</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>146</sup> *ibidem*

## II. Conclusion:

The economic sanctions against Russia cannot be categorised as legal acts of retorsion because they violate the E.U. Member States' obligations under international law. They can only be understood and justified as countermeasures to enforce severe breaches of the responsibilities of non-use of force and non-intervention on behalf of Ukraine.

In conclusion, sanctions are a powerful tool in international law to achieve various objectives. States or international organisations can impose them, and their implementation are guided by the ARSIWA,2001 framework.

Moreover, the ARSIWA 2001 framework recognises the crucial role of international organisations in coordinating and regulating the use of sanctions and countermeasures, particularly in maintaining international peace and security. While sanctions can effectively achieve their intended objectives, their implementation and impact on innocent individuals and populations must be carefully considered to avoid unintended consequences.

## CHAPTER 4

### 1. Classifications of economic sanctions:

#### I. Introduction:

Economic sanctions have become the preferred tool for policymakers seeking to address significant geopolitical challenges.<sup>147</sup> As a result, extensive research has been dedicated to economic sanctions, substantially changing the scope and characteristics.<sup>148</sup>

Economic sanctions are a complex and multifaceted instrument of foreign policy that can take many forms, including financial, diplomatic, and military measures.<sup>149</sup> They often pressure governments or individuals to change their behaviour or policies.<sup>150</sup>

However, considering the current Russia economic sanctions episode, more research is necessary to examine the complex theoretical and practical challenges connected to economic sanction design and implementation questions, but this thesis will not examine the complex theoretical and practical challenges related to economic sanction; this thesis will only determine on the type of economic sanction imposed on Russia for its aggression behaviour on the sovereignty of Ukraine.<sup>151</sup>

#### II. Economic sanctions framework:

The research on economic sanctions is expanding in both breadth and depth, and with it comes a diverse range of angles, perspectives, and approaches to their classification.<sup>152</sup> However, the existing types vary significantly regarding the dimensions, criteria, and terminology used in economic sanctions.<sup>153</sup> As economic sanctions continue to be a prevalent tool in international relations, it is crucial to have a clear and consistent understanding of their classification.<sup>154</sup> The study differentiates between international economic sanctions which includes purposeful, palliative, punitive, and partisan measures.<sup>155</sup>

Firstly, purposeful economic sanctions are designed to inflict economic losses on the target country to pressure them into changing their policies.<sup>156</sup> These economic sanctions are often used

---

<sup>147</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>148</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>149</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>150</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>151</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>152</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>153</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>154</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>155</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>156</sup> *ibidem*

as a last resort when diplomatic efforts have failed.<sup>157</sup> Secondly, palliative economic sanctions, conversely, are intended to signal disapproval of the target country's behaviour.<sup>158</sup> These economic sanctions are not meant to cause economic harm but to express the sender's displeasure.<sup>159</sup> Thirdly, punitive economic sanctions are meant to cause demonstrable economic losses for the target nation.<sup>160</sup> The goal of changing the target's behaviour or policy is secondary, and the primary objective is to punish the target for their actions.<sup>161</sup> Finally, partisan economic sanctions can lead to either a gain or a loss for a specific group within the country imposing them.<sup>162</sup>

Economic sanctions come in two primary forms, and they are first trade-economic sanctions, which restrict the flow of goods and services, and it also target the assets and transactions of individuals or entities.<sup>163</sup> Secondly, there are more economic sanction which are difficult to evade or avoid with the assistance of third-party countries.<sup>164</sup> It can be expensive and complex to counteract, the impact of financial and economic sanctions on the sectors.<sup>165</sup>

Moreover, Asset freezing is a type of sanction that has recently gained popularity.<sup>166</sup> Now, an asset freeze targets the country and the sanctioned individuals or organizations.<sup>167</sup> The impact of asset freezes is not limited to financial flows, as it also impedes trade.<sup>168</sup> This measure is often combined with complete trade controls to maximize its effectiveness.<sup>169</sup> Assets that can be targeted with this measure include merchandise in stock, tangible property assets, and bank accounts.<sup>170</sup> Once an asset freeze is announced, everything owned by the sanctioned country, its legal entities, and physical persons can be targeted.<sup>171</sup> Asset freeze is a powerful tool that can significantly impact the target country's economy<sup>172</sup>.

Economic sanctions can be classified in various ways, including the degree of openness about their objectives, the tools used, the scope, and the number of participants.<sup>173</sup> Explicit economic

---

<sup>157</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>158</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>159</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>160</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>161</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>162</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>163</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>164</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>165</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>166</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>167</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>168</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>169</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>170</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>171</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>172</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>173</sup> *ibidem*



sanctions are those where the sender clearly states their objectives, while implicit economic sanctions are more subtle.<sup>174</sup>

Economic sanctions often used to pressure a country to change its behaviour, can be divided into different types.<sup>175</sup> Trade economic sanctions involve restrictions on imports and exports, while financial, economic sanctions limit financial transactions, precious metal transactions, and investments.<sup>176</sup> Economic sanctions on services include insurance, banking, brokerage, payment systems, and transport restrictions.<sup>177</sup> Finally, sectoral economic sanctions target specific industries such as energy, finance, defence, and agriculture.<sup>178</sup>

Economic sanctions are a powerful tool used by governments to influence the behaviour of other countries.<sup>179</sup> They can be divided into two groups based on their desired objective: deterrence and coercion.<sup>180</sup> Deterrence economic sanctions aim to deprive the target of necessary funds and support, while coercion economic sanctions compel the target to change their policy or behaviour.<sup>181</sup>

The developed economic sanctions typology comprises trade, targeted (smart), and sectoral economic sanctions.<sup>182</sup> Trade economic sanctions are primarily aimed at reducing foreign investment and international marketing.<sup>183</sup> Targeted trade economic sanctions may include financial measures, such as restrictions on legal and physical persons' access to the global financial system, and non-financial measures, which disrupt travel and visa rules for physical persons.<sup>184</sup> Sectoral economic sanctions restrict transactions with specific industries rather than the whole economic system.<sup>185</sup>

---

<sup>174</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>175</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>176</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>177</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>178</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>179</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>180</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>181</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>182</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>183</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>184</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>185</sup> *ibidem*

Economic sanctions come in three types: trade, financial, and targeted.<sup>186</sup> Trade economic sanctions are designed to affect a target's foreign trade.<sup>187</sup> On the other hand, financial and economic sanctions can either stimulate or restrict a target's economic and investment flows.<sup>188</sup> Targeted or "economic sanctions" include travel bans, transferring technology, and intellectual property restrictions.<sup>189</sup> These economic sanctions are often implemented in critical areas such as culture and sports, diplomacy, transportation, communications, cooperation for development, military cooperation, finance, trade, and criminal justice.<sup>190</sup>

Moreover, economic sanctions can be categorised into three levels of impact: National, corporate, and personal.<sup>191</sup>

National economic sanctions target specific government agencies, officials, business people, politicians, legal entities, regions, and sectors of the economy.<sup>192</sup> The effectiveness of these economic sanctions depends on the target country's economic potential.<sup>193</sup>

Corporate economic sanctions are imposed on companies operating inside and outside the target country.<sup>194</sup> The effectiveness of these economic sanctions depends on the degree of diversification of these companies and their embeddedness in the global production organisation.<sup>195</sup>

Finally, personal economic sanctions are imposed against specific state leaders or groups and particular citizens.<sup>196</sup> These economic sanctions can take many forms, including diplomatic, industrial, commercial, and economic, financial, scientific, sports and cultural, and travel restrictions.<sup>197</sup>

There is a clear distinction between direct and indirect economic sanctions.<sup>198</sup> Immediate economic sanctions are implemented to alter the undesirable behaviour of a target government by restricting its access to resources.<sup>199</sup> In that case, direct economic sanctions may prohibit the supply of weapons and military technology, oil supply, loans, and other resources that the

---

<sup>186</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>187</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>188</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>189</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>190</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>191</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>192</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>193</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>194</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>195</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>196</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>197</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>198</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>199</sup> *ibidem*

government can utilise to pursue militarization further.<sup>200</sup> On the other hand, indirect economic sanctions are not intended to change the target's behaviour but rather to trigger protests and encourage collective action to pressure the target's government into changing its policy to avoid losing power.<sup>201</sup> Indirect economic sanctions can be used to complement direct economic sanctions.<sup>202</sup>

Economic sanctions can further categorise under various factors.<sup>203</sup> National economic sanctions are introduced by a group of states or one state from a group of developed countries, while international organisations impose administrative economic sanctions.<sup>204</sup>

Unilateral economic sanctions are taken by one state, while a group of states assesses collective economic sanctions.<sup>205</sup>

Multilateral economic sanctions can be divided into counter-economic and derivative economic sanctions, which are secondary and extraterritorial.<sup>206</sup>

Comprehensive economic sanctions are broad and affect all aspects of the targeted country's economy.<sup>207</sup>

Personal economic sanctions are imposed on physical persons, while economic sanctions on legal persons target companies and organisations.<sup>208</sup>

Categorical economic sanctions are related to specific commodities, while sectoral economic sanctions target particular sectors such as energy, defence, and agriculture.<sup>209</sup>

Diplomatic economic sanctions affect diplomatic relations, while cultural and economic sanctions target art, culture, and sport.<sup>210</sup>

In economic sanctions, trade-economic sanctions are a crucial tool in foreign economic policy and are widely used by countries such as the USA, Japan, and EU nations.<sup>211</sup> These economic sanctions are particularly effective because the countries imposing them typically have

---

<sup>200</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>201</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>202</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>203</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>204</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>205</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>206</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>207</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>208</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>209</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>210</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>211</sup> *ibidem*

significant economic power, while those targeted heavily rely on trade with these leading nations.<sup>212</sup>

Sectoral economic sanctions are imposed on specific sectors of a country's economy, such as energy or defence.<sup>213</sup>

Soft economic sanctions, on the other hand, are less severe and may include measures such as travel restrictions or diplomatic isolation.<sup>214</sup>

Monetary economic sanctions can significantly impact the operations of banks and companies.<sup>215</sup> They can force organisations to change their financial strategies and increase their reliance on internal financing.<sup>216</sup>

One such example is the economic sanctions package imposed during the War in Yugoslavia in 1990.<sup>217</sup> The effectiveness of economic sanctions may be debated, but the economic sanctions package's success in Yugoslavia is a compelling example of its potential impact.<sup>218 219</sup>

In the case of Myanmar, economic sanctions were imposed in response to the military junta's human rights abuses, but they did little to change the regime's behaviour.<sup>220</sup> Similarly, North Korea has been subject to various economic sanctions over the years, but it has continued developing its nuclear weapons program and engaging in other provocative behaviour.<sup>221</sup> Moreover, economic sanctions can have unintended consequences, harming innocent civilians by limiting access to essential goods and services and creating corruption and black market activity opportunities.<sup>222</sup>

---

<sup>212</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>213</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>214</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>215</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>216</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>217</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>218</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>219</sup> CORTRIGHT, David et al. *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, p. 256.

<sup>220</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>221</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>222</sup> *ibidem*

## 2. Conclusions:

The economic sanctions imposed against Russia have significantly impacted the global economy and increased tensions between Russia and the West.<sup>223</sup> The use of economic sanctions made it clear that it will continue the foreign policy for many countries in the years to come, and therefore, the effectiveness of economic sanctions and developing new approaches to using them to minimize unintended consequences and maximise their potential for achieving political objectives.<sup>224</sup>

---

<sup>223</sup> POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, pp. 196–207.

<sup>224</sup> *ibidem*

## CHAPTER 5: E.U. Economic Sanction on Russia.

### 1. Introduction:

The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia has dramatically concerned the international community.<sup>225</sup> Recently, in 2022, the European Union (E.U.) took a major step towards exerting significant pressure on Russia through sanctions.<sup>226</sup> The sanctions involve asset freezes and travel bans for individuals and entities that have played a role in supporting Russian aggression towards Ukraine.<sup>227</sup>

The E.U.'s decision to impose sanctions will likely send a message to other countries that aggression towards other nations will not be tolerated.<sup>228</sup>

This thesis will discuss the types of sanctions issued by the E.U. on Russia in 2022. The reasons for their imposition, the consequences for Russia, and their impact on the EU-Russia relationship will not be discussed.

### 2. Timeline and type of sanction issued by E.U. against Russia:

In 2022, the E.U.'s restrictive measures against Russia were due to Russia's unjustified military aggression against Ukraine, have significantly responded to Russia's actions by E.U. to promote peace and stability in the region.<sup>229</sup>

February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2022:

The Council has taken a firm stance against Russia's decision to recognize the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine as independent entities and to send troops into these areas.<sup>230</sup> The package includes targeted sanctions against 351 members of the Russian State Duma and an additional 27 individuals.<sup>231</sup>

---

<sup>225</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 50-62.

<sup>226</sup> ibidem

<sup>227</sup> ibidem

<sup>228</sup> ibidem

<sup>229</sup> Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>.

<sup>230</sup> ibidem

<sup>231</sup> ibidem

### February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

At a special summit in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, E.U. leaders have agreed to impose additional sanctions against Russia.<sup>232</sup> These sanctions will target the financial, energy, and transport sectors, dual-use goods, export control and financing, and visa policies.<sup>233</sup>

### February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The European Union has taken a strong stance against Russia's invasion of Ukraine by implementing a second package of sanctions.<sup>234</sup> These measures include freezing the assets of Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, and Sergey Lavrov, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.<sup>235</sup>

### February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The E.U. has approved a third package of sanctions to curb Russia's aggressive behavior.<sup>236</sup> These measures include a ban on transactions with the Russian Central Bank, a €500 million support package to provide equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces, and a ban on Russian carriers accessing E.U. airports and airspace.<sup>237</sup>

### March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2022:

The E.U. has implemented a third round of sanctions against Russia, which includes a SWIFT ban for seven Russian banks.<sup>238</sup> This move will effectively disconnect these banks from the global financial system, severely limiting their ability to operate globally.<sup>239</sup> This ban affects the seven banks: Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Rossiya Bank, Sovcombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB), and VTB Bank.<sup>240</sup>

### March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022:

The European Union has extended its restrictive measures against individuals identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds or the abuse of office, resulting in a loss of Ukrainian public funds.<sup>241</sup>

---

<sup>232</sup> Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>

<sup>233</sup> ibidem

<sup>234</sup> ibidem

<sup>235</sup> ibidem

<sup>236</sup> ibidem

<sup>237</sup> ibidem

<sup>238</sup> ibidem

<sup>239</sup> ibidem

<sup>240</sup> ibidem

<sup>241</sup> ibidem

March 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The European Union has taken a strong stance and measures which include restricting the provision of specialized financial messaging services to three Belarusian banks, prohibiting transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus, and banning the listing and provision of assistance concerning shares of Belarusian state-owned entities on E.U. trading venues.<sup>242</sup>

March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The European Union sanctions travel restrictions, asset freezes, and a ban on providing funds or other economic resources to the individuals and entities listed.<sup>243</sup> Eight hundred sixty-two individuals and 53 entities will continue to be subject to the sanctions.<sup>244</sup>

March 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The E.U. new measures encompass several prohibitions, such as suspending all transactions involving specific state-owned enterprises, discontinuing credit rating services for any Russian individual or organisation, and a halt to new investments in the Russian energy sector.<sup>245</sup>

April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The E.U. another sanction package includes a range of measures, such as a ban on imports of coal and other solid fossil fuels from Russia and a prohibition on all Russian vessels accessing E.U. ports.<sup>246</sup>

April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The Council has introduced humanitarian exceptions in two sanctions regimes dealing with Ukraine's situation.<sup>247</sup> The latter deals with recognising non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and deploying Russian armed forces.<sup>248</sup>

April 21<sup>st</sup>, 2022:

The European Union has taken a strong stance and the Council has adopted measures against Serhiy Vitaliyovich Kurchenko and Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin.<sup>249</sup>

---

<sup>242</sup> Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine,  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>.

<sup>243</sup> ibidem

<sup>244</sup> ibidem

<sup>245</sup> ibidem

<sup>246</sup> ibidem

<sup>247</sup> ibidem

<sup>248</sup> ibidem

<sup>249</sup> ibidem



May 30<sup>th</sup> – May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2022:

This E.U. sanction package will cover crude oil and petroleum products from Russia to member states, with a temporary exception for crude oil produced by pipeline.<sup>250</sup>

June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022:

The EU sanction measures have been put in place due to the reported atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces.<sup>251</sup> The package includes a ban on crude oil imports and refined petroleum products from Russia, with limited exceptions.<sup>252</sup> A SWIFT ban has been imposed on three Russian banks and one Belarusian bank.<sup>253</sup>

June 20<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The Council has decided to extend the sanctions, and the measures include a ban on importing products from the illegally annexed regions into the E.U. and restrictions on infrastructural or financial investments and tourism services.<sup>254</sup>

July 21<sup>st</sup>, 2022:

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Council has adopted a new package of measures to tighten existing economic sanctions against Russia.<sup>255</sup> Firstly, a new prohibition has been introduced that prevents purchasing, importing, or transferring Russian-origin gold, including jewellery.<sup>256</sup> Secondly, export controls for dual-use goods have been reinforced.<sup>257</sup>

July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The European Union has extended its economic sanctions against Russia, including limitations on various sectors, such as finance, energy, technology, dual-use goods, industry, transport, and luxury goods.<sup>258</sup>

August 4<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

---

<sup>250</sup> Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>.

<sup>251</sup> ibidem

<sup>252</sup> ibidem

<sup>253</sup> ibidem

<sup>254</sup> ibidem

<sup>255</sup> ibidem

<sup>256</sup> ibidem

<sup>257</sup> ibidem

<sup>258</sup> ibidem

The European Union has taken a strong stance, and the Council has added Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, a pro-Russian former President of Ukraine, and his son Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych to the list of persons, entities, and bodies subject to these measures.<sup>259</sup>

September 14<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The EU sanction extension are currently a set of restrictive measures includes limitations on travel for specific individuals, freezing of their assets, and a prohibition on providing funds or any other economic resources to the individuals and entities listed under the sanctions.<sup>260</sup>

October 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The European Union has implemented a fresh set of sanctions, marking the eighth package, as a response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.<sup>261</sup>

October 20<sup>th</sup>, 2022:

The European Union has taken a strong stance against three Iranian individuals and one entity to its list of those subject to restrictive measures for their role in developing and delivering Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) used by Russia in its war against Ukraine.<sup>262</sup>

### 3. Conclusion:

Thus, in conclusion, these measures (till October 2022) include asset freezes, travel bans, and economic sanctions, significantly impacting Russia's economy. Despite these measures, Russia has continued to violate international law and disregard the sovereignty of Ukraine. The E.U. remains committed to supporting Ukraine and upholding the principles of international law and will continue to monitor the situation closely.

---

<sup>259</sup> Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>.

<sup>260</sup> ibidem

<sup>261</sup> ibidem

<sup>262</sup> ibidem

## CHAPTER 6: U.S. imposition of sanctions against Russia.

### 1. Introduction:

On February 22, 2022, the U.S. administration announced a package of initial sanctions measures.<sup>263</sup> <sup>264</sup> These measures include full-blocking sanctions on two Russian financial institutions, Vnesheconombank and Promsvyazbank, and their subsidiaries.<sup>265</sup> The sanctions will be imposed on five individuals and their families, including Aleksandr Bortnikov, Denis Bortnikov, Sergei Kiriyenko, Vladimir Kiriyenko, and Promsvyazbank C.E.O. Petr Fradkov.<sup>266</sup>

The U.S. Treasury has firmly decided to target any institution within the Russian financial services sector for future sanctions.<sup>267</sup><sup>268</sup> These measures demonstrate the U.S.'s commitment to protecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.<sup>269</sup>

### 2. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. against Russia (from February 21<sup>st</sup> to July 29<sup>th</sup> 2022) :

On February 21, 2022, President Biden took a firm stance against the DNR and LNR by signing Executive Order (E.O.) that imposes sanctions on these regions.<sup>270</sup>

On February 22, 2022, US President Joe Biden delivered a speech to the nation, outlining the sanctions the US will impose on Russia.<sup>271</sup> The sanctions include full blocking sanctions on VEB bank and the Promsvyazbank (PSB), 42 of their subsidiaries, and five vessels owned by the PSB subsidiary.<sup>272</sup>

On February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, in response to Russia's military actions, the U.S. administration announced further sanctions and these measures include sanctions against Russia's two most prominent financial institutions, Sberbank and V.T.B. Bank, which comprise more than half of Russia's banking system by asset value.<sup>273</sup>

---

<sup>263</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 39-50.

<sup>264</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>265</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>266</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>267</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>268</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>269</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>270</sup> OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments - 02/24/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments).

<sup>271</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>272</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>273</sup> *ibidem*

Moreover, on February 24th, 2022, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of Commerce announced an expansion of export controls.<sup>274</sup>

Further, on February 24th and 25th, 2022, President Joe Biden of the United States announced a new set of sanctions aimed at Russia in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 14024.<sup>275</sup>

On February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the United States announced sanctions on several high-ranking Russian officials, including President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.<sup>276</sup> Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov were also sanctioned.<sup>277</sup>

On February 26<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the U.S. Treasury confirmed that it was not only sanctioning the Russian Central Bank but also introducing sanctions on the Russian Direct Investment Fund, which is known to be a slush fund for President Putin and his inner circle.<sup>278</sup>

Further, on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024.<sup>279</sup> This directive prohibits any transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.<sup>280</sup>

On March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022, the US sanction targeted individuals such as Alisher Usmanov, Nikolai Tokarev (C.E.O. of Transneft), and Dmitry Peskov (President Putin's Press Secretary).<sup>281</sup> Further, a travel ban was imposed on 19 oligarchs, 47 family members, and associates.<sup>282</sup>

On March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2022, President Biden issued an Executive Order that imposed restrictions on specific imports, exports, and new investments.<sup>283</sup>

---

<sup>274</sup> OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments - 02/24/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments).

<sup>275</sup> OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments (February 28th Updates) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022, Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-february-28th-updates](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-february-28th-updates).

<sup>276</sup> MILLS, Claire. *Sanctions against Russia*, 2022, pp. 39-50.

<sup>277</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>278</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>279</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>280</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>281</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>282</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>283</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Sanctions Against Russia, Recent Developments (Updated 22 March) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars).

On March 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the U.S. State Department announced they were targeting 11 members of Russia's defence ministry, including all of Russia's Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Commander in Chief of Russia's National Guard Troops, Viktor Zolotov, and the Director General of Rosoboronexport, Alexander Mikheev.<sup>284</sup>

The U.S. Treasury, on March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, sanctioned, the key enablers of the invasion, including dozens of Russian defence companies, 328 members of the Russian Duma, the Board members of Sovcombank, and the Head of Sberbank, Herman Gref.<sup>285</sup>

On May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the U.S. Treasury unveiled a new set of sanctions aimed at individuals and entities deemed crucial to Russia's ability to wage war against Ukraine.<sup>286</sup>

On June 2, 2022, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the Department of the Treasury announced an update to the sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>287</sup>

On June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented a new regulation that revises, corrects, and clarifies specific provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) related to export controls on the Russian Federation.<sup>288</sup>

On July 29<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the United States Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the expansion of its Specially Sanctioned Nationals List (SDN List) to include several entities and individuals.<sup>289</sup>

These measures demonstrate the U.S. administration's commitment to holding Russia accountable for its aggressive actions.

Further, here are some more sanctions on specific areas implemented by the US towards Russia for its aggressive action in Ukraine territory:

### 3. U.S. ban on Russian oil:

On March 8, President Biden took a bold step by signing an Executive Order prohibiting the import of Russian crude oil, certain petroleum products, natural gas, and coal to the United States.<sup>290</sup>

---

<sup>284</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Sanctions Against Russia, Recent Developments (Updated 22 March) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars).

<sup>285</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>286</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>287</sup> MAISONNEUVE, Maël. "Sanctions Against Russia. Recent Developments. - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/06/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/06/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents).

<sup>288</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>289</sup> THOMAS, Florent. "Sanctions Against Russia. Recent Developments (9 August Update) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-9-august-update](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-9-august-update).

<sup>290</sup> MILLS, Claire. *Sanctions against Russia, 2022*, pp. 39-50.

Furthermore, the U.S. has restricted investment in Russia's energy sector, whether directly or indirectly, through foreign companies.<sup>291</sup> This is a significant step towards ensuring that the U.S. and its allies are not held hostage by the whims of the global oil market.<sup>292</sup>

#### 4. U.S. revoking Russia's M.F.N. Status:

On March 11, President Biden made confirmed that the U.S. would be revoking Russia's Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status, also known as Most Favoured Nation (M.F.N.).<sup>293</sup>

#### 5. U.S. ongoing response to alleged Russian atrocities in Ukraine<sup>294</sup>:

On April 6, 2022, the United States made a significant announcement regarding its response to Russia's ongoing brutal war against Ukraine and atrocities against Ukrainian citizens.<sup>295</sup> Among the measures announced were:

- Full blocking sanctions on Sberbank, Russia's largest state-owned bank, and 42 subsidiaries. Alfa Bank, Russia's largest private bank, and six of its subsidiaries.<sup>296</sup>
- Sanctions against President Putin's daughters, Sergey Lavrov's daughter, and Sergey Lavrov's wife, Maria Lavrova.<sup>297</sup>
- Sanctions against the remaining Russian National Security Council members, including former President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, who were not previously sanctioned in February 2022.<sup>298</sup>
- The designation of state-owned enterprises, including the diamond company Alrosa and the United Shipbuilding Corporation (U.S.C.). Eight board members of the U.S.C. were also sanctioned.<sup>299</sup>

These measures indicate the U.S.'s commitment to holding Russia accountable for its actions and convey that such behaviour will not be tolerated.<sup>300</sup>

---

<sup>291</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 39-50.

<sup>292</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>293</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>294</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>295</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>296</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>297</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>298</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>299</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>300</sup> *ibidem*

## 6. Conclusion:

The U.S. government has implemented sanctions to pressure the Russian government to change its action against Ukraine. However, the impact of these sanctions on the conflict remains uncertain, and they are likely to strain already fraught relations between the two countries. Therefore, the situation between the United States and Russia is complex and requires careful consideration. The United States and Russia must prioritize diplomatic efforts and work towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Ukraine.

## CHAPTER 7: U.K. imposition of sanctions against Russia.

### 1. Introduction:

In 2022, the United Kingdom prompted economic sanctions on Russia in response to its aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine.<sup>301</sup> The sanctions were aimed towards Russia's oil and gas industry and were meant to pressure the Russian Government to change its actions.<sup>302</sup>

The U.K. was prepared for these consequences and had taken steps to diversify its energy supplies before implementing the sanctions.<sup>303</sup>

### 2. Sanctions list imposed by the U.K. against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine:

On January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2022, the Foreign Secretary confirmed that the Government plans to introduce legislation enabling an unparalleled package of coordinated sanctions in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.<sup>304</sup>

On February 10, Russia (Sanctions) (E.U. exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 were published, amending the designation criteria set out in the Russia (Sanctions) (E.U. exit) Regulations 2019.<sup>305</sup>

On 24 February 2022, The United Kingdom has recently imposed blocking sanctions following Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/855).<sup>306</sup> These sanctions are aimed at Russian financial entities and individuals.<sup>307</sup> These sanctions have targeted the following banks: Bank Rossiya, Industrialny Sbergatelny (IS) Bank, Genbank, Promsvyazbank, and Black Sea Bank for Reconstruction and Development.<sup>308</sup>

On March 1st, 2022, the UK Treasury released financial sanctions notice establishing sanctions aimed at Sberbank.<sup>309</sup>

---

<sup>301</sup> MILLS, Claire. *Sanctions against Russia, 2022*, pp. 7-35.

<sup>302</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>303</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>304</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>305</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>306</sup> OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments - 02/24/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022.

Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments).

<sup>307</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>308</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>309</sup> OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Development (March 2nd Updates) - Jeantet."

*Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-against-russia-recent-development-march-2nd-updates](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-against-russia-recent-development-march-2nd-updates).



On March 2, 2022, the Prime Minister committed to publishing a complete list of all those associated with the Putin regime, although he did not provide a timeframe.<sup>310</sup>

On March 15th, the United Kingdom announced its fourth package of sanctions aimed at Russia.<sup>311</sup> These new sanctions specifically target Russian individuals and entities.<sup>312</sup>

Moreover, the UK has implemented a sanction on Sberbank and it was subsequently subject to a complete asset freeze on April 6, 2022.<sup>313</sup>

In May 2022, the Queen's Speech confirmed the Government's plan to introduce new legislation to reduce Russian influence in the U.K.<sup>314</sup> This includes a National Security Bill that will revamp existing state legislation and an Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill to combat illicit finance and economic crime.<sup>315</sup>

In July 2022, the Government expanded the criteria for designating individuals subject to sanctions.<sup>316</sup>

These measures demonstrate the U.K. administration's commitment to holding Russia accountable for its aggressive actions.

Further, here are some more sanctions on specific areas implemented by the U.K. towards Russia for its aggressive action in Ukraine territory:

### 3. Russia Financial and trade sanctions by the U.K.:

In February 2022, the U.K. announced new sanctions under the Russia sanctions regime.<sup>317</sup> These sanctions include asset freezes, travel bans for individuals and entities, and measures to prevent Russian-owned financial institutions from accessing capital markets.<sup>318</sup> Additionally, there is an arms embargo and restrictions on other trade, such as exporting technology needed for oil exploration to Russia.<sup>319</sup>

### 4. Putin, Lavrov and family members were sanctioned.

---

<sup>310</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 7-35.

<sup>311</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Sanctions Against Russia, Recent Developments (Updated 22 March) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars).

<sup>312</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>313</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>314</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 7-35.

<sup>315</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>316</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>317</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>318</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>319</sup> *ibidem*

On February 25, 2022, the U.K. Government took a strong stance against Russian aggression by imposing sanctions on President Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.<sup>320</sup>

On April 13, Maria Lavrova, Sergey Lavrov's wife, was also sanctioned and is now subject to a U.K. asset freeze and travel ban.

Finally, on June 29, the U.K. Government imposed sanctions on Anna Tsivileva, Putin's first cousin and President of the Russian coal mining company JSC Kolmar Group, along with her husband Sergey Tsivilev, who is Governor of the coal-rich Kemerovo region.<sup>321</sup>

#### 5. UK sanctions Putin's inner circle:

On March 15, the U.K. Government announced that it would impose sanctions on several individuals from President Putin's inner circle.<sup>322</sup> The sanctions include an asset freeze and travel ban on Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, and former President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council.<sup>323</sup>

In addition to these sanctions, on June 16, the U.K. sanctioned Patriarch Kirill, Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for his support to Russian military aggression in Ukraine.<sup>324</sup>

In the end of July 2022, Russian Minister of Justice Konstantin Chuychenko, and Deputy Minister of Justice, Oleg Sviridenko were also sanctioned for suppressing Russian society by introducing legal measures targeting those who spoke out against the war.<sup>325</sup>

#### 6. The UK sanctions Russian military leaders.

On March 31, the U.K. Government made a significant announcement regarding the imposition of sanctions on Russian General Mikhail Mizintsev.<sup>326</sup> In addition to Mizintsev, four other Russian military leaders were sanctioned on April 21 for committing atrocities on the front line.<sup>327</sup>

On June 16, the U.K. Government announced that Colonel Ramil Ibatullin, the Commander of Russia's 90th tank division, which has been on the Ukrainian frontline since the invasion began, was also sanctioned at the beginning of December 2022.<sup>328</sup>

---

<sup>320</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 7-35.

<sup>321</sup> ibidem

<sup>322</sup> ibidem

<sup>323</sup> ibidem

<sup>324</sup> ibidem

<sup>325</sup> ibidem

<sup>326</sup> ibidem

<sup>327</sup> ibidem

<sup>328</sup> ibidem

## 7. Financial sanctions by the UK:

### i. Exclusion from SWIFT:

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a vital service that facilitates secure messaging between banks and financial institutions.<sup>329</sup> Each bank has its unique SWIFT code, allowing seamless communication and transactions between institutions.<sup>330</sup>

These sanctions on SWIFT, demonstrate the U.K.'s commitment to holding those responsible for atrocities accountable for their actions.<sup>331</sup>

### ii. Restrictions on the Russian Central Bank:

On February 26<sup>th</sup>,2022, the U.K. took measures include removing selected Russian banks from SWIFT and restricting the Russian Central Bank's activities to prevent it from accessing its foreign reserves, thereby negating the impact of Western sanctions.<sup>332</sup>

### iii. U.K. outward investment in Russia:

In a further move, on April 6<sup>th</sup>,2022, the U.K. government announced a complete ban on all new investments in Russia.<sup>333</sup>

## 8. Transport sanctions:

### i- Shipping:

On February 28, 2022, the Department of Transport issued a letter to all U.K. ports requesting they deny access to Russian-flagged, registered, owned, controlled, chartered, or operated vessels.<sup>334</sup>

The U.K. Chamber of Shipping is committed to supporting the Government in this effort and ensuring that the ban is as effective as possible.<sup>335</sup>

### ii- Airline sector:

On May 19, the Government announced further sanctions on Russia's leading airlines to prevent them from landing slots at U.K. airports.<sup>336</sup>

---

<sup>329</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 7-35.

<sup>330</sup> ibidem

<sup>331</sup> ibidem

<sup>332</sup> ibidem

<sup>333</sup> ibidem

<sup>334</sup> ibidem

<sup>335</sup> ibidem

## 9. Luxury goods sanction:

On March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the G7 nations intended to expand trade sanctions to include high-end luxury goods exported to Russia.<sup>337</sup>

On March 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the UK announced that luxury vehicles, fashion, and works of art would likely be sanctioned.<sup>338</sup>

On March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the U.K. government confirmed that Alrosa, Russia's largest diamond producer, had also been sanctioned.<sup>339</sup>

On April 21, 2022, a new list of goods subject to additional tariffs was announced.<sup>340</sup> This list included diamonds, leather, rubber, textiles, tobacco, and food products.

On May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the U.K. announced a third package sanction for goods subject to import, including chemicals, platinum, and palladium, majorly produced in Russia..<sup>341</sup>

## 10. The U.K. designates Russian banks and individuals:

The U.K. Government has acted by designating five Russian banks and three individuals.<sup>342</sup>

The sanctioned banks are the following<sup>343</sup>:

1. Bank Rossiya.<sup>344</sup>
2. Black Sea Bank for Development and Reconstruction.<sup>345</sup>
3. JSC Genbank.<sup>346</sup>
4. I.S. Bank.<sup>347</sup>
5. PJSC Promsvyazbank.<sup>348</sup>

The individuals sanctioned are<sup>349</sup>:

---

<sup>336</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 7-35.

<sup>337</sup> ibidem

<sup>338</sup> ibidem

<sup>339</sup> ibidem

<sup>340</sup> ibidem

<sup>341</sup> ibidem

<sup>342</sup> ROSEUK, Andrew. UK designates 5 Russian banks and 3 individuals in response to the situation in Ukraine, 2022.

Accessible at: <https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/uk-designates-5-russian-banks-and-3-individuals-in-response-to-the-situation-in-ukraine/>

<sup>343</sup> ibidem

<sup>344</sup> ibidem

<sup>345</sup> ibidem

<sup>346</sup> ibidem

<sup>347</sup> ibidem

<sup>348</sup> ibidem

<sup>349</sup> ibidem

1. Gennady Timchenko.<sup>350</sup>
2. Boris Rotenberg.<sup>351</sup>
3. Igor Rotenberg.<sup>352</sup>

Furthermore, any transactions involving entities owned or controlled by the newly sanctioned parties will be subject to restrictions imposed by the sanctions.<sup>353</sup>

## 11. Conclusion:

The U.K.'s decision to impose economic sanctions on Russia due to the 2022 war was a significant measure to advocate for peace and stability in the international community. The U.K. government's decision to impose economic sanctions on Russia is a necessary step and this move aligns with the principles upheld by the United Nations and promotes peaceful resolution of conflicts. Therefore, this move has sent a clear message that aggression towards other countries will not be tolerated, and the U.K. is actively working towards ending the conflict.

---

<sup>350</sup> ROSEUK, Andrew. UK designates 5 Russian banks and 3 individuals in response to the situation in Ukraine,2022. Accessible at: <https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/uk-designates-5-russian-banks-and-3-individuals-in-response-to-the-situation-in-ukraine/>

<sup>351</sup> ibidem

<sup>352</sup> ibidem

<sup>353</sup> ibidem

## CHAPTER 8: Canada's imposition of economic sanctions against Russia.

### 1. Introduction:

The increasing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine have made Canada impose economic sanctions on Russia.<sup>354</sup> The economic sanctions aim to pressure Russia into abandoning its aggressive stance towards Ukraine.<sup>355</sup>

### 2. Economic sanctions imposed by Canada on Russia:

On February 22, 2022, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made a significant announcement regarding Economic sanctions against Russia.<sup>356</sup> These measures aim to hold further Russia accountable for its actions and include<sup>357</sup>, the following sanction are as follows:

1. On February 21<sup>st</sup>, 2022, Canada took a firm stance against Russia's recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR).<sup>358</sup> The outlined as follows: - i-Restrictions will be imposed on members of the Russian State Duma who voted in favour of the decision to recognize the independence of the two regions within Ukraine.<sup>359</sup> ii- All financial dealings with the so-called independent states of DPR and LPR will be prohibited.<sup>360</sup> iii- New prohibitions on purchasing Russian sovereign debt will be introduced. iv- Economic sanctions will be imposed on two state-backed Russian banks.<sup>361</sup>
2. On February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Canadian Government released amendments to the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations and Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Regulations, known as the "Amended Regulations."<sup>362</sup>

---

<sup>354</sup> MILLS, Claire. *Sanctions against Russia, 2022*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>355</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>356</sup> OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments - 02/24/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments).

<sup>357</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>358</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Announces New Sanctions in Response to Russia's Recognition of the So-Called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-new-sanctions-in-response-to-russias-recognition-of-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic](http://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-new-sanctions-in-response-to-russias-recognition-of-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic).

<sup>359</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>360</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>361</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>362</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on Russia..." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-ends-issuance-of-permits-for-export-and-brokering-of-controlled-goods-and-technology](http://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-ends-issuance-of-permits-for-export-and-brokering-of-controlled-goods-and-technology).

3. On February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada significantly changed its economic sanctions against the Russian Federation.<sup>363</sup>
4. On March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2022, the Canadian government moved significantly by revoking the Most Favoured Nation status from Russia and Belarus.<sup>364</sup>
5. On March 4<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada introduced additional sanctions, which included senior Russian officials, their close associates, and agents."<sup>365</sup>
6. On March 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada sanctioned 19 individuals and 25 entities in response to Belarus' support of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<sup>366</sup>
7. On March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada sanctioned five individuals and 32 entities.<sup>367</sup> These new sanctions include current and former Russian officials and associates of the Russian government.<sup>368</sup>
8. On March 14, 2022, the country amended its Economic sanctions by adding 15 more individuals.<sup>369</sup> These individuals are all Russian government officials sanctioned as part of Canada's ongoing efforts to hold Russia accountable for its actions.<sup>370</sup>
9. On March 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada updated its Economic sanctions against Belarus by adding 22 more individuals.<sup>371</sup> This decision was made in response to Belarus' support of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<sup>372</sup>
10. On April 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada announced the implementation of additional sanctions on nine Russian individuals.<sup>373</sup>

---

<sup>363</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations Including Russian President and Officials..." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-russian-president-and-officials-prohibits-dealings-with-russian-central-bank-ministry-of-finance-and-national-wealth-fund](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-russian-president-and-officials-prohibits-dealings-with-russian-central-bank-ministry-of-finance-and-national-wealth-fund).

<sup>364</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Withdraws Most Favoured Nation Status From Russia and Belarus." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 4 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-withdraws-most-favoured-nation-status-from-russia-and-belarus](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-withdraws-most-favoured-nation-status-from-russia-and-belarus).

<sup>365</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations Including Senior Russian Officials, Their Close Associates and 'Agents of Disinformation.'" *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 9 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-senior-russian-officials-their-close-associates-and-agents-of-disinformation](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-senior-russian-officials-their-close-associates-and-agents-of-disinformation).

<sup>366</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on Belarus, Designates 19 Individuals and 25 Entities." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 15 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-19-individuals-and-25-entities](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-19-individuals-and-25-entities).

<sup>367</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>368</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>369</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations on 15 Senior Russian Officials." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 16 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-15-senior-russian-officials](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-15-senior-russian-officials).

<sup>370</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>371</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on Belarus, Designates 22 Senior Ministry of Defence Officials." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 18 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-22-senior-ministry-of-defence-officials](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-22-senior-ministry-of-defence-officials).

<sup>372</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>373</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations on Nine Russian Individuals, Prohibits the Provision of Insurance, Reinsurance and Underwriting Services Relating to Russian Aircraft, Aviation and Aerospace Products." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 8 Apr. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-nine-russian-individuals-prohibits-the-provision-of-insurance-reinsurance-and-underwriting-services-relating-to-russian-aircraft-aviation-and-aerospace-products](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-nine-russian-individuals-prohibits-the-provision-of-insurance-reinsurance-and-underwriting-services-relating-to-russian-aircraft-aviation-and-aerospace-products).

11. On April 19th, 2022, Canada introduced additional sanctions for 14 Russian oligarchs, their family members, and close associates.<sup>374</sup>
12. On April 26<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada sanctioned an additional 203 individuals under the schedule of sanctioned persons.<sup>375</sup>
13. On May 27<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada introduced additional sanctions for 22 senior officials of Russian financial institutions and their family members, as well as 4 Russian financial institutions and banks.<sup>376</sup>

Furthermore, Canada has imposed Economic sanctions on 351 members of the Russian Duma,<sup>377</sup> and these measures have been taken in response to their involvement in activities that violate international law and human rights.<sup>378</sup>

Now, further sanction implemented by the Canadian government are as follows:

1. On June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Canadian government banned essential services necessary to function in Russia's oil, gas, and chemical industries.<sup>379</sup>
2. On July 14<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada banned two additional services provided to the Russian oil, gas, chemical, and manufacturing industries.<sup>380</sup>
3. On June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada imposed economic sanctions on those believed to be involved in these activities.<sup>381</sup>

---

introduces-additional-designations-on-nine-russian-individuals-prohibits-the-provision-of-insurance-reinsurance-and-underwriting-services-relating-to-russian-aircraft-aviation-and-aerospace.

<sup>374</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations on 14 Russian Oligarchs, Their Family Members and Close Associates." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 20 Apr. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-14-russian-oligarchs-their-family-members-and-close-associates](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-14-russian-oligarchs-their-family-members-and-close-associates).

<sup>375</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on 203 Officials of the Governments of the So-called DPR and LPR." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 28 Apr. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-203-officials-of-the-governments-of-the-so-called-dpr-and-lpr](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-203-officials-of-the-governments-of-the-so-called-dpr-and-lpr).

<sup>376</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations on 22 Senior Officials of Russian Financial Institutions and Their Family Members, and 4 Russian Financial Institutions and Banks." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 1 June 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-22-senior-officials-of-russian-financial-institutions-and-their-family-members-and-4-russian-financial-institutions-and-banks](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-22-senior-officials-of-russian-financial-institutions-and-their-family-members-and-4-russian-financial-institutions-and-banks).

<sup>377</sup> MILLS, Claire. *Sanctions against Russia, 2022*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>378</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>379</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>380</sup> Burns, Brian Cacic, Matthew Oppenheim, Paul D., et al. "Canada Bans the Provision of Two Additional Services to the Russian Oil, Gas, Chemical and Manufacturing Industries, Designates Eight New Sanctioned Manufacturing Industries." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 20 July 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-bans-the-provision-of-two-additional-services-to-the-russian-oil-gas-chemical-and-manufacturing-industries-designates-eight-new-sanctioned-manufacturing-industries](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-bans-the-provision-of-two-additional-services-to-the-russian-oil-gas-chemical-and-manufacturing-industries-designates-eight-new-sanctioned-manufacturing-industries).

<sup>381</sup> Burns, Brian Cacic, Matthew Oppenheim, Paul D., et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Sanctions With Respect to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 4 July 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-sanctions-with-respect-to-russia-ukraine-and-belarus](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-sanctions-with-respect-to-russia-ukraine-and-belarus).



4. On July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada imposed sanctions on Russian TV channels Channel One and Rossiya 24, news agency TASS, and Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova.<sup>382</sup>
5. On August 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2022, Canada announced the implementation of additional sanctions on 43 military officials and 17 defence sector entities.<sup>383</sup>
6. On August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2022, Canada announced the implementation of additional sanctions on 62 Russian government officials, their family members, and one defence sector entity.<sup>384</sup>
7. On September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada recently announced additional amendments to its sanction measures concerning Russia and Ukraine.<sup>385</sup>
8. On September 29<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Canada sanctioned 43 oligarchs and close associates of the Putin regime were sanctioned.<sup>386</sup>
9. On October 17, 2022, the Canadian government sanctioned 34 individuals and one entity as an agent of Russian propaganda and their family members, along with the influential individuals spreading disinformation".<sup>387</sup>
10. On October 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Canadian government announced additional Economic sanctions targeting thirty-five senior officials of already sanctioned energy entities, including those of Gazprom (Gazprom is a contraction of the Russian words means gas industry)) and its subsidiaries, as well as six entities in the energy sector.<sup>388</sup>

Thus, Canada's economic sanctions against Russia in 2022 can be regarded as a crucial and imperative measure to respond to Russia's persistent aggression and destabilising actions in the global sphere.<sup>389</sup>

---

<sup>382</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>383</sup> Burns, Brian Cacic, Matthew Oppenheim, Paul D., et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations on 43 Military Officials and 17 Defense Sector Entities." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 4 Aug. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-43-military-officials-and-17-defense-sector-entities](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-43-military-officials-and-17-defense-sector-entities).

<sup>384</sup> Burns, Brian Cacic, Milinda Yimesghen, Paul D., et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Designations on 62 Russian Government Officials and Their Family Members, and 1 Defence Sector Entity." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 24 Aug. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-62-russian-government-officials-and-their-family-members-and-1-defence-sector-entity](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-62-russian-government-officials-and-their-family-members-and-1-defence-sector-entity).

<sup>385</sup> Burns, Brian Cacic, Milinda Yimesghen, Paul D., et al. "Canada Introduces Additional Sanctions With Respect to Russia and Ukraine." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 4 Oct. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-sanctions-with-respect-to-russia-and-ukraine](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-sanctions-with-respect-to-russia-and-ukraine).

<sup>386</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>387</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Announces Additional Sanctions Against Russia: 34 Individuals and 1 Entity Sanctioned." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 19 Oct. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-additional-sanctions-against-russia-34-individuals-and-1-entity-sanctioned](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-additional-sanctions-against-russia-34-individuals-and-1-entity-sanctioned).

<sup>388</sup> BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. "Canada Imposes More Sanctions Against Russia: 35 Individuals and 6 Entities in the Energy Sector Targeted." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 31 Oct. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-more-sanctions-against-russia-35-individuals-and-6-entities-in-the-energy-sector-targeted](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-more-sanctions-against-russia-35-individuals-and-6-entities-in-the-energy-sector-targeted).

<sup>389</sup> MILLS, Claire. *Sanctions against Russia, 2022*, pp. 63-64.

### 3. Conclusion:

Thus, Canada has levied Economic sanctions on Russia, which is a necessary reaction to Russia's belligerent conduct in Ukraine, which manifests Canada's dedication to maintaining global standards and principles.<sup>390</sup> Nevertheless, Canada's position showcases its resolute dedication to maintaining global norms and principles and advancing a system of international governance founded on rules.<sup>391</sup>

---

<sup>390</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 63-64.

<sup>391</sup> *ibidem*

## CHAPTER 9: Japan's imposition of sanctions against Russia.

### 1. Introduction:

The increasing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine have made Japan impose economic sanctions on Russia.<sup>392</sup> The Japanese government has accused Russia of providing military aggression in Ukraine.<sup>393</sup> The economic sanctions pressure Russia into abandoning its aggressive stance towards Ukraine.<sup>394</sup>

Japan is a major player in global business, and its sanctions on Russia have caused significant trade disruptions.<sup>395</sup> In Japan, economic sanctions based on security considerations are enforced within the framework of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No. 228 of 1 December 1949).<sup>396</sup>

### 2. Sanctions imposed by Japan on Russia:

#### i- Japan announces sanctions against Russia and the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic:<sup>397</sup>

On February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2022, the Prime Minister of Japan, Fumio Kishida, made a significant announcement regarding Japan's stance on the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine.<sup>398</sup> In response to Russia's recent recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) as independent states, Japan has decided to implement economic sanctions against Russia and the two breakaway regions.<sup>399</sup>

---

<sup>392</sup> MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, pp. 65- 66.

<sup>393</sup> ibidem

<sup>394</sup> ibidem

<sup>395</sup> ibidem

<sup>396</sup> "Executive Summary of Japanese Sanctions and Export Control Restrictions on Russia Announced.", *Executive Summary of Japanese Sanctions and Export Control Restrictio - Hogan Lovells Engage*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/executive-summary-of-japanese-sanctions-and-export-control-restrictions-on-russia-announced](http://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/executive-summary-of-japanese-sanctions-and-export-control-restrictions-on-russia-announced).

<sup>397</sup> Suetomi, Junko. "Japan Announces Sanctions Against Russia and the So-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 24 Feb. 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic](http://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic).

<sup>398</sup> ibidem

<sup>399</sup> Suetomi, Junko. "Japan Announces Sanctions Against Russia and the So-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 24 Feb. 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic](http://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic).

ii- Japan announces additional sanctions on Russia and designation of Belarusian President.<sup>400</sup>

On February 25<sup>th</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup>, and 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Prime Minister of Japan, Fumio Kishida, made three separate statements announcing that Japan would impose additional sanctions on Russia.<sup>401</sup> The new sanctions include asset freezes and visa suspensions for crucial Russian individuals, including President Putin.<sup>402</sup> Additionally, selected Russian banks and other entities will have their assets frozen, and Japan will work with its allies to cut off selected Russian banks from SWIFT.<sup>403</sup>

iii- Japan imposes additional sanctions on Russia, Belarus and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.<sup>404</sup>

On March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022, the Japanese government announced additional sanctions against the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.<sup>405</sup> These new restrictions include sanctions of 18 individuals from the Russian Federation, four Russian banks (VTB Bank, Sovcombank, Novikombank, and Otkritie), seven individuals and two entities from the Republic of Belarus, and 30 individuals from the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.<sup>406</sup>

iv- Japan announces which items will be subject to the ban on exports of luxury goods to Russia.<sup>407</sup>:

On March 29<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Japanese government made an official announcement regarding the items that will be affected by the ban on luxury goods exports to Russia.<sup>408</sup>

---

<sup>400</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Announces Additional Sanctions on Russia and Designation of Belarusian President." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-additional-sanctions-on-russia-and-designation-of-belarusian-president](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-additional-sanctions-on-russia-and-designation-of-belarusian-president).

<sup>401</sup> ibidem

<sup>402</sup> ibidem

<sup>403</sup> ibidem

<sup>404</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Imposes Additional Sanctions on Russia, Belarus and the So-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-belarus-and-the-so-called-donetsk-and-luhansk-peoples-republics](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-belarus-and-the-so-called-donetsk-and-luhansk-peoples-republics).

<sup>405</sup> ibidem

<sup>406</sup> ibidem

<sup>407</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Announces Which Items Will Be Subject to the Ban on Exports of Luxury Goods to Russia." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-which-items-will-be-subject-to-the-ban-on-exports-of-luxury-goods-to-russia](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-which-items-will-be-subject-to-the-ban-on-exports-of-luxury-goods-to-russia).

<sup>408</sup> ibidem

v- Japan introduces further sanctions on Russia and Belarus<sup>409</sup>:

On March 8th, 2022, the Japanese government sanctioned twenty individuals and two entities related to the Russian Federation and 12 individuals and ten entities related to the Republic of Belarus.<sup>410</sup>

On March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Japanese government further sanctioned the designation of three banks from the Republic of Belarus, namely Belagroprombank, Bank Debrabyt, and the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus.<sup>411</sup>

On March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Japanese government announced amendments to the Export Trade Control Order, which went into effect on March 18th, 2022.<sup>412</sup>

On March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2022, they sanctioned 15 individuals and nine entities related to the Russian Federation.<sup>413</sup>

On March 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022, exports to two specially sanctioned entities in Belarus, namely the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus and JSC Integral (also known as OAO Integral and Joint Stock Company Integral-Holding Managing Company), will be prohibited.<sup>414</sup>

On March 25<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Japanese government took a firm stance against the Russian Federation by imposing sanctions on 25 individuals who are closely associated with the Russian Federation.<sup>415</sup>

On April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Japan made a significant announcement regarding its stance on coal imports from Russia.<sup>416</sup>

On April 20, 2022, Japan officially passed a law that revoked Russia's most favoured nation status.<sup>417</sup>

---

<sup>409</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions on Russia and Belarus." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-on-russia-and-belarus](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-on-russia-and-belarus).

<sup>410</sup> ibidem

<sup>411</sup> ibidem

<sup>412</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus).

<sup>413</sup> ibidem

<sup>414</sup> ibidem

<sup>415</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia).

<sup>416</sup> Practitioner, Trade. "Japan Actions on Russia and Russia-related Sanctions." *Japan Actions on Russia and Russia-related Sanctions | The Trade Practitioner*, 29 Apr. 2022. Accessible at: [www.tradepractitioner.com/2022/04/japan-actions-on-russia-and-russia-related-sanctions](https://www.tradepractitioner.com/2022/04/japan-actions-on-russia-and-russia-related-sanctions).

<sup>417</sup> ibidem

On June 7th, 2022, the Japanese government implemented additional sanctions against Russia and Belarus.<sup>418</sup>

On July 5th, 2022, the Japanese government implemented additional sanctions against Russia and Belarus.<sup>419</sup>

On September 26th, 2022, the Japanese government implemented additional sanctions against Russia.<sup>420</sup>

On October 7th, 2022, the Japanese government implemented additional sanctions against Russia and Belarus.<sup>421</sup>

Thus, these economic sanctions aim to pressure Russian governments and promote peace and stability in global world.<sup>422</sup>

### 3. Conclusion:

The Japanese government has accused Russia of military aggression in Ukraine. It has implemented sanctions to pressure the Russian government to change its action. Ultimately, a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Ukraine will require the cooperation and engagement of all parties involved. Thus, Japan and Russia must priorities diplomatic efforts and work towards a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine conflict.

---

<sup>418</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-2](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-2).

<sup>419</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-4](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-4).

<sup>420</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-5](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-5).

<sup>421</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-3](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-3).

<sup>422</sup> SUETOMI, Junko. "Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus." *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-3](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-3).

## CHAPTER – 10: Sanctions against Russian oligarchs.

### 1. Sanctions against Russian oligarchs<sup>423</sup>:

The term "oligarch" refers to an individual or group of individuals who have acquired a significant amount of wealth and power by controlling specific industries, sectors, or businesses.<sup>424</sup>

Sanctions against Russian oligarchs have been controversial in international politics and these sanctions are imposed as a punishment for the Kremlin's involvement in various geopolitical events.<sup>425</sup>

Moreover, the sanctions may harm international trade and relationships with Russia, leading to political and economic impacts.<sup>426</sup> However, the impact of these sanctions may also be felt by businesses and individuals who rely on the oligarchs' wealth.<sup>427</sup>

### 2. Sanctions affect the Russian oligarch's company<sup>428</sup>.

The sanctions have profoundly impacted the Russian oligarchs and their companies, changing the global balance of power.<sup>429</sup> One effect of sanctions on Russian oligarchs and their companies is limiting their ability to operate in the global market.<sup>430</sup>

Despite these challenges, Russian oligarchs and their companies have adapted to the sanctions through several measures.<sup>431</sup>

However, these sanctions have also led to the adaptation of the oligarchs to moved their assets to foreign countries, which are more favourable towards them, while others have sought investments from friendly nations that are not subject to international sanctions.<sup>432</sup>

---

<sup>423</sup> BREMUS, Franziska, HÜTTL, Pia. Sanctions against Russian oligarchs also affect their companies, DIW Weekly Report, 2022, pp. 142-146.

<sup>424</sup> ibidem

<sup>425</sup> ibidem

<sup>426</sup> ibidem

<sup>427</sup> ibidem

<sup>428</sup> ibidem

<sup>429</sup> ibidem

<sup>430</sup> ibidem

<sup>431</sup> ibidem

<sup>432</sup> ibidem

### 3. Oligarchs Experience Greater Stock Market Losses Due to Sanction<sup>433</sup>:

However, in the stock market, oligarchs experience more significant losses due to the sanction as they have concentration of their wealth in specific companies or sectors.<sup>434</sup> Oligarchs have long been a powerful driving force behind many of the world's stock markets.<sup>435</sup>

Yet despite the losses suffered by these oligarchs, many of them have managed to weather the storm and while some may be able to bounce back from their losses relatively quickly, and may find that the sanctions have permanently altered their fortunes and will be forced to adjust to a new economic landscape in which their influence is diminished.<sup>436</sup>

### 4. Conclusion:

Thus, imposing sanctions against oligarchs has resulted in a significant impact on the economy over time.<sup>437</sup> First, the oligarchs' vast wealth has often shielded them from legal or political repercussions, making them powerful and influential in decision-making.<sup>438</sup> Secondly, with sanctions, oligarchs' access to capital is limited, which puts them at a disadvantage when investing in and expanding their businesses.<sup>439</sup>

---

<sup>433</sup> BREMUS, Franziska, HÜTTL, Pia. Sanctions against Russian oligarchs also affect their companies, DIW Weekly Report, 2022, pp. 142-146.

<sup>434</sup> ibidem

<sup>435</sup> ibidem

<sup>436</sup> ibidem

<sup>437</sup> ibidem

<sup>438</sup> ibidem

<sup>439</sup> ibidem



## CHAPTER-11: Russian countermeasures.

### 1. Introduction:

In response to economic sanctions, Russia has implemented countermeasures on goods originating from the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and other Western countries supporting Russia's opposition.<sup>440</sup> These restrictions have been implemented as a retaliatory measure to the sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>441</sup>

President Putin's decree was a significant step in response to the sanctions imposed against Russia.<sup>442</sup> It was a clear message to the international community that Russia would not be intimidated and would take all necessary measures to protect its interests.<sup>443</sup>

### 2. Russia's countermeasures against the sanction.:

1. On March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022, a Russian court rejected Hasbro Inc.'s trademark claim for misusing its 'Peppa Pig trademark'.<sup>444</sup>
2. On March 4<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian government passed Federal Law to criminalise the actions of Russian citizens who call for the imposition or extension of restrictive political or economic measures by foreign states or unions of foreign states against Russia, Russian citizens, or Russian legal entities.<sup>445</sup>
3. On March 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Russian President Putin signed Decree, which was about a quick way to pay off debts to some foreign creditors.<sup>446</sup>
4. On March 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Russia issued a decree stating that Russian patents from forty-seven "unfriendly states" would not be entitled to any compensation for infringement.<sup>447</sup>
5. On March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian government passed order No. 295, which set the rules for how the government committee would give permissions in line with the president's order.<sup>448</sup>

---

<sup>440</sup> BHALA, Raj. Waves of Russian Sanctions: American and Allied Measures, Indian and Chinese Responses, and Russian Countermeasures, 14(2) TRADE L. & DEV. 352, 2022, pp. 426 – 436.

<sup>441</sup> ibidem

<sup>442</sup> ibidem

<sup>443</sup> ibidem

<sup>444</sup> ibidem

<sup>445</sup> ibidem

<sup>446</sup> ibidem

<sup>447</sup> BHALA, Raj. Waves of Russian Sanctions: American and Allied Measures, Indian and Chinese Responses, and Russian Countermeasures, 14(2) TRADE L. & DEV. 352, 2022, pp. 426 – 436.

<sup>448</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments - 03/10/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments).

6. On March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian political party, United Russia (Yedinnaya Rossiya), announced a draft law aimed at the external administration of foreign companies suspended in Russia.<sup>449</sup>
7. On March 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Russian President Vladimir President Putin signed Decree, which outlines Special Economic Measures in international economic transactions.<sup>450</sup>
8. On March 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Government released a list of goods and materials imported to Russia and temporarily prohibited them from being exported outside the country.<sup>451</sup>
9. On March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Governmental Commission for Control of Foreign Investment subcommittee decided to authorise certain transactions involving individuals.<sup>452</sup>
10. On March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian government implemented regulations to offer preferential interest rates on loans for systemic companies.<sup>453</sup>
11. On March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian government implemented regulations to offer preferential interest rates on loans to systemic companies.<sup>454</sup>
12. On March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2022, President signed Decree No. 126, which outlines additional temporary economic measures to secure financial stability in currency regulation.<sup>455</sup>
13. On March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2022, the Russian Chamber of Industry and Commerce released a letter advising the suspension of force-majeure statements in specific cases related to agreements between Russian partners.<sup>456</sup>
14. On March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2022, a draft law was introduced to the State Duma to amend certain legislative acts.<sup>457</sup>

---

<sup>449</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments - 03/10/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments).

<sup>450</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>451</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>452</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (7 April Updates) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-07-avril-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-07-avril-2022).

<sup>453</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>454</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>455</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>456</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>457</sup> *ibidem*

15. On March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, President Putin of Russia announced yet another countermeasure.<sup>458</sup> The country would begin selling natural gas to nations deemed "unfriendly" in roubles.<sup>459</sup>
16. On March 29<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian Government issued a resolution authorising the importation of original foreign goods that are marketed abroad without the approval of the title holder.<sup>460</sup>
17. On April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) released clarifications regarding the application of decrees issued by the President.<sup>461</sup>
18. On April 7<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Russian senators and deputies presented draft law to the Russian State Duma,<sup>462</sup> which proposed legislation seeking to criminalise enforcing foreign sanctions within Russia.<sup>463</sup>
19. On April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2022, legislation aims to establish a legal framework for expropriating assets located within Russian territory owned by individuals associated with unfriendly foreign states.<sup>464</sup>
20. On April 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Government issued a Resolution authorizing the lease of state and municipal land plots without bidding.<sup>465</sup>
21. On April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2022 until the end of 2022, Russian citizens and entities could lease these land plots to manufacture import-substituting products.<sup>466</sup>
22. On April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Izvestia reported that the proposed legislation regarding the external administration of foreign companies, commonly referred to as the "nationalization draft law," has been suspended.<sup>467</sup>

---

<sup>458</sup> BHALA, Raj. Waves of Russian Sanctions: American and Allied Measures, Indian and Chinese Responses, and Russian Countermeasures, 14(2) TRADE L. & DEV. 352, 2022, pp. 426 – 436.

<sup>459</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>460</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (7 April Updates) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-07-avril-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-07-avril-2022).

<sup>461</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>462</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>463</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>464</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>465</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (13 April Updates) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-13-april-updates](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-13-april-updates).

<sup>466</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>467</sup> *ibidem*

23. On April 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) passed a resolution to expand the list of contracts exempted from the 30% advance payment threshold.<sup>468</sup>
24. On April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian Central Bank (CBR) released clarifications regarding the obligation for residents to sell 80% of their foreign currency profits, as established on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022.<sup>469</sup>
25. On April 27<sup>th</sup>, 2022, President Putin threatened to cut off natural gas shipments to European buyers who refused to pay in roubles.<sup>470</sup>
26. On May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022, President Putting signed Order, which outlines special economic measures to counteract unfriendly acts from foreign states and international organisations.<sup>471</sup>
27. On May 27<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian Central Bank granted authorisation for the payment of shares in the charter capital of foreign entities, provided that certain conditions are met.<sup>472</sup>
28. On July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the President issued Decree which pertains to the repatriation of foreign and Russian currency by residents participating in international economic activity.<sup>473</sup>
29. On June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Special Governmental Commission eliminated the mandate of selling 50% of foreign currency earnings under foreign trade agreements with non-residents.<sup>474</sup>
30. On June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian President signed a new federal law that amends certain legislative acts on using intellectual property.<sup>475</sup>
31. On June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the President signed a law authorizing the implementation of specific measures in case foreign states impose sanctions.<sup>476</sup>

---

<sup>468</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures : Recent Developments (Update May 3, 2022) - Jeantet." Jeantet, 2022. [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/05/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-may-3-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/05/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-may-3-2022).

<sup>469</sup> ibidem

<sup>470</sup> BHALA, Raj. Waves of Russian Sanctions: American and Allied Measures, Indian and Chinese Responses, and Russian Countermeasures, 14(2) TRADE L. & DEV. 352, 2022, pp. 426 – 436.

<sup>471</sup> VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures : Recent Developments (Update May 3, 2022) - Jeantet." Jeantet, 2022. [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/05/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-may-3-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/05/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-may-3-2022).

<sup>472</sup> MAISONNEUVE, Maël. "Russian Counter Measures : Recent Developments, 2022, - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/07/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-july-12-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/07/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-july-12-2022).

<sup>473</sup> ibidem

<sup>474</sup> ibidem

<sup>475</sup> ibidem

32. On July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the President issued Decree No. 430, which pertains to the repatriation of foreign and Russian currency by residents participating in international economic activity.<sup>477</sup>
33. On July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Special Governmental Commission allowed Russian residents to repay their debts early under loans provided by foreign banks in foreign currency.<sup>478</sup>
34. On July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) temporarily suspended its general rule, which previously stated that advance payments for non-residents could not exceed 30% of the total sum of obligations under the contract.<sup>479</sup>
35. On July 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation issued Decision, which expands the list of foreign states deemed to be committing unfriendly acts towards Russia.<sup>480</sup>
36. On August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2022, the Russian Central Bank (CBR) released a statement announcing the extension of cash withdrawal restrictions until March 9th, 2023.<sup>481</sup>
37. On August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian President issued special economic measures in the Financial and Oil Fields due to unfriendly Acts of Certain Foreign States and International Organizations."<sup>482</sup>
38. On August 8th, 2022, the Russian President issued Decree No. 529, which outlines a temporary procedure for executing currency obligations.<sup>483</sup>
39. On September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian government introduced amendments that established a new procedure for approving transactions involving shares in Russian limited liability companies.<sup>484</sup>

---

<sup>476</sup> MAISONNEUVE, Maël. "Russian Counter Measures : Recent Developments, 2022, - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/07/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-july-12-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/07/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-july-12-2022).

<sup>477</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>478</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>479</sup> Verilhac, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (19 August 2022 Update) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/russie-contre-mesures-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-19-aout-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/russie-contre-mesures-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-19-aout-2022).

<sup>480</sup> Verilhac, Charlotte. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (19 August 2022 Update) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/russie-contre-mesures-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-19-aout-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/russie-contre-mesures-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-19-aout-2022).

<sup>481</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>482</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>483</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>484</sup> *ibidem*

40. On October 13<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Ministry of Finance released a set of clarifications, including a detailed explanation of the types of transactions that will require approval from the Governmental Commission.<sup>485</sup>

41. On October 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Russian President issued Decree, establishing new regulations for specific transaction types.<sup>486</sup>

### 3. Conclusion:

Thus, Russia's imposition of countermeasures on imports of agricultural products, raw materials, and food products had far-reaching consequences for the global economy and political landscape.<sup>487</sup> The Russian Government's move aims to protect the Russian people's interests and ensure the country's economy remains stable.<sup>488</sup> Overall, the countermeasure by the Russian Government is significant, and it is expected to have a major impact on the agricultural industry in Russia.<sup>489</sup>

---

<sup>485</sup> DEDEYSTERE, Christelle. "Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (29 September 2022 Update) - Jeantet." Jeantet,2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/09/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-29-september-2022-update](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/09/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-29-september-2022-update).

<sup>486</sup> ibidem

<sup>487</sup> ibidem

<sup>488</sup> ibidem

<sup>489</sup> ibidem

## CHAPTER 12

### Conclusion:

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine made the EU, USA, UK, Canada, and Japan have implemented sanctions against Russia. These sanctions encompass diplomatic, individual, and sectorial economic measures. The sectorial economic sanctions prohibit technical assistance in the energy and military sectors. It includes selling, supplying, transferring, and exporting specialised equipment for deep-sea exploration and oil production and developing shale gas and oil projects in Russia.

The economic sanctions imposed in response to the Russian invasion served multiple purposes. Firstly, they aimed to inflict economic pain on the Russian government and its supporters, limiting their ability to finance and sustain their military operations. Secondly, economic sanctions played a crucial role in isolating Russia diplomatically.

However, it is important to acknowledge that economic sanctions alone may not be sufficient to bring about a complete resolution to such conflicts. Therefore, it is crucial to recognize that economic sanctions should be employed alongside other diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting and peaceful resolution to conflicts.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

### I. References:

1. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations, 2008, 129- 131 pp.
2. “ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Public International Law.” *Public International Law, Public International Law Resources*, 2010, 15 p.
3. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, 131-134 pp.
4. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, 134-135 pp.
5. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, 135-137 p.
6. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, 137 p.
7. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, 137-139 pp.
8. Roscini, Marco. Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for Cyber Operations. *Texas International Law Journal*, 50(2/3), 2015, 233 p.
9. HENRIKSEN, Anders. *International Law*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2019, 120-121 pp.
10. DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 20-28 pp.
11. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations, 2008, 130, para. 3 p.
12. HAPPOLD, Matthew. ‘Economic Sanctions and International Law: An Introduction’, in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, 8 p.
13. ORAKHELASHVILI, Alexander. ‘Sanctions and Fundamental Rights of States: The Case of EU Sanctions Against Iran and Syria’, in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing., 2016, 34 p.
14. TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonio’s. ‘State Reactions to Illegal Sanctions’, in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, 70 p.
15. DUPONT, Emmanuel Pierre. ‘Unilateral European Sanctions as Countermeasures: The Case of the EU Measures Against Iran’, in Eden, P., Happold, M. (ed.), *Economic Sanctions and International Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015.



16. Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, United Nations 2008, 129- 131 p.
17. BARCELONA Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, paras. 33-34 p.
18. DAWIDOWICZ, Martin. *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 365-379 pp.
19. POBEDIN, Alexander. Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime, *R-economy*, 8(3), 2022, 196–207 pp.
20. CORTRIGHT, David et al. *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, 256 p.
21. MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, 50-62 pp.
22. MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, 39-50 pp.
23. MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, 7-35 pp.
24. MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, 63-64 pp.
25. MILLS, Claire. Sanctions against Russia, 2022, 65- 66 pp.
26. BREMUS, Franziska, HÜTTL, Pia. Sanctions against Russian oligarchs also affect their companies, *DIW Weekly Report*, 2022, 142-146 pp.
27. BHALA, Raj. Waves of Russian Sanctions: American and Allied Measures, Indian and Chinese Responses, and Russian Countermeasures, 14(2) *TRADE L. & DEV.* 352, 2022, 426 – 436 pp.

### Websites:

1. *CORPORATE, Finance, Institute*. Economic Sanctions Penalties imposed by one or more countries against another country, 2023. Accessible at: [corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions](https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/economic-sanctions).
2. REMY, Jan. The Application of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in the WTO Regime – *EJIL*, 2021. Accessible at: Talk!. <https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/janyvesremy/>
3. LOGUE, Ann. “What Are Economic Sanctions?” 2022. Accessible at: [www.thebalancemoney.com/economic-sanctions-5224103](https://www.thebalancemoney.com/economic-sanctions-5224103).
4. LANGE, Jason. “EXCLUSIVE Americans Broadly Support Ukraine No-fly Zone, Russia Oil Ban -poll.” *Reuters*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-americans-broadly-support-ukraine-no-fly-zone-russia-oil-ban-poll-2022-03-04](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-americans-broadly-support-ukraine-no-fly-zone-russia-oil-ban-poll-2022-03-04).
5. RADCLIFFE, Brent. “How Economic Sanctions Work.” *Investopedia*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/economic-sanctions.asp](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/economic-sanctions.asp).
6. TEAM, Wallstreetmojo. “Economic Sanctions.” *WallStreetMojo*, 2023, Accessible at: [www.wallstreetmojo.com/economic-sanctions](https://www.wallstreetmojo.com/economic-sanctions).
7. ALLINSON, Dr. Kathryn. “Can Russia Be Held Responsible for Their Invasion of Ukraine? – University of Bristol Law School Blog.” 2022. Accessible at: [legal](https://www.bristol.ac.uk/law-school/blog/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine/)

- research.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2022/04/can-russia-be-held-responsible-for-their-invasion-of-ukraine.
8. HLA, Hart's. Concept of Law Summarized - Libertatem Magazine. Accessible at: <https://libertatem.in/law-notes/hla-harts-concept-of-law-summarized/>
  9. International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility. Accessible at: <http://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/international-law-commission-articles-state-responsibility>
  10. Requête introductive d'instance | COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE. Accessible at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/fr/node/104043>
  11. Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>.
  12. OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments - 02/24/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments).
  13. OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments (February 28th Updates) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-february-28th-updates](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-february-28th-updates).
  14. VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Sanctions Against Russia, Recent Developments (Updated 22 March) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars).
  15. MAISONNEUVE, Maël. "Sanctions Against Russia. Recent Developments. - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/06/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/06/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents).
  16. THOMAS, Florent. "Sanctions Against Russia. Recent Developments (9 August Update) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-9-august-update](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments-9-august-update).
  17. OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Developments - 02/24/2022 - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/02/sanctions-against-russia-recent-developments).
  18. OUSSAIDEN, Julie. "Sanctions Against Russia: Recent Development (March 2nd Updates) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-against-russia-recent-development-march-2nd-updates](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-against-russia-recent-development-march-2nd-updates).
  19. VERILHAC, Charlotte. "Sanctions Against Russia, Recent Developments (Updated 22 March) - Jeantet." *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at:

- [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-22-mars).
20. ROSEUK, Andrew. UK designates 5 Russian banks and 3 individuals in response to the situation in Ukraine,2022. Accessible at: <https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/uk-designates-5-russian-banks-and-3-individuals-in-response-to-the-situation-in-ukraine/>
  21. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Announces New Sanctions in Response to Russia’s Recognition of the So-Called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-new-sanctions-in-response-to-russias-recognition-of-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-new-sanctions-in-response-to-russias-recognition-of-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic).
  22. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on Russia, Ends Issuance of Permits for Export and Brokering of Controlled Goods and Technology.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*,2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-ends-issuance-of-permits-for-export-and-brokering-of-controlled-goods-and-technology](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-ends-issuance-of-permits-for-export-and-brokering-of-controlled-goods-and-technology).
  23. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Introduces Additional Designations Including Russian President and Officials...” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-russian-president-and-officials-prohibits-dealings-with-russian-central-bank-ministry-of-finance-and-national-wealth-fund](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-russian-president-and-officials-prohibits-dealings-with-russian-central-bank-ministry-of-finance-and-national-wealth-fund).
  24. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Withdraws Most Favoured Nation Status From Russia and Belarus.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 4 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-withdraws-most-favoured-nation-status-from-russia-and-belarus](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-withdraws-most-favoured-nation-status-from-russia-and-belarus).
  25. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Introduces Additional Designations Including Senior Russian Officials, Their Close Associates and ‘Agents of Disinformation.’” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 9 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-senior-russian-officials-their-close-associates-and-agents-of-disinformation](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-including-senior-russian-officials-their-close-associates-and-agents-of-disinformation).
  26. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on Belarus, Designates 19 Individuals and 25 Entities.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 15 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-19-individuals-and-25-entities](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-19-individuals-and-25-entities).
  27. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on Belarus, Designates 22 Senior Ministry of Defence Officials.” *Sanctions & Export Controls*

- Update*, 18 Mar. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-22-senior-ministry-of-defence-officials](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-belarus-designates-22-senior-ministry-of-defence-officials).
28. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Introduces Additional Designations on 14 Russian Oligarchs, Their Family Members and Close Associates.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 20 Apr. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-14-russian-oligarchs-their-family-members-and-close-associates](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-14-russian-oligarchs-their-family-members-and-close-associates).
  29. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Imposes Additional Sanctions on 203 Officials of the Governments of the So-called DPR and LPR.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 28 Apr. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-203-officials-of-the-governments-of-the-so-called-dpr-and-lpr](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-203-officials-of-the-governments-of-the-so-called-dpr-and-lpr).
  30. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Introduces Additional Designations on 22 Senior Officials of Russian Financial Institutions and Their Family Members, and 4 Russian Financial Institutions and Banks.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 1 June 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-22-senior-officials-of-russian-financial-institutions-and-their-family-members-and-4-russian-financial-institutions-and-banks](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-additional-designations-on-22-senior-officials-of-russian-financial-institutions-and-their-family-members-and-4-russian-financial-institutions-and-banks).
  31. Burns, Brian Cacic, Matthew Oppenheim, Paul D., et al. “Canada Introduces an Import Ban on the Trade of Certain Gold Goods With Russia and Designates 29 New Individuals and 15 Entities Involved in Disinformation Activities.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 11 July 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-an-import-ban-on-the-trade-of-certain-gold-goods-with-russia-and-designates-29-new-individuals-and-15-entities-involved-in-disinformation-activities](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-introduces-an-import-ban-on-the-trade-of-certain-gold-goods-with-russia-and-designates-29-new-individuals-and-15-entities-involved-in-disinformation-activities).
  32. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Announces Additional Sanctions Against Russia: 34 Individuals and 1 Entity Designated.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 19 Oct. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-additional-sanctions-against-russia-34-individuals-and-1-entity-designated](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-announces-additional-sanctions-against-russia-34-individuals-and-1-entity-designated).
  33. BURNS, Brian Cacic et al. “Canada Imposes More Sanctions Against Russia: 35 Individuals and 6 Entities in the Energy Sector Targeted.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 31 Oct. 2022, [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-more-sanctions-against-russia-35-individuals-and-6-entities-in-the-energy-sector-targeted](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/canada-imposes-more-sanctions-against-russia-35-individuals-and-6-entities-in-the-energy-sector-targeted).
  34. “Executive Summary of Japanese Sanctions and Export Control Restrictions on Russia Announced.”, *Executive Summary of Japanese Sanctions and Export Control Restrictio - Hogan Lovells Engage*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/executive-summary-of-japanese-sanctions-and-export-control-restrictions-on-russia-announced](https://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/executive-summary-of-japanese-sanctions-and-export-control-restrictions-on-russia-announced).
  35. Suetomi, Junko. “Japan Announces Sanctions Against Russia and the So-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic.” *Sanctions & Export*

- Controls Update*, 24 Feb. 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic).
36. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Announces Sanctions Against Russia and the So-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 24 Feb. 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-sanctions-against-russia-the-so-called-donetsk-peoples-republic-and-luhansk-peoples-republic).
37. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Announces Additional Sanctions on Russia and Designation of Belarusian President.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-additional-sanctions-on-russia-and-designation-of-belarusian-president](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-additional-sanctions-on-russia-and-designation-of-belarusian-president).
38. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Imposes Additional Sanctions on Russia, Belarus and the So-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-belarus-and-the-so-called-donetsk-and-luhansk-peoples-republics](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia-belarus-and-the-so-called-donetsk-and-luhansk-peoples-republics).
39. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Announces Which Items Will Be Subject to the Ban on Exports of Luxury Goods to Russia.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-which-items-will-be-subject-to-the-ban-on-exports-of-luxury-goods-to-russia](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-announces-which-items-will-be-subject-to-the-ban-on-exports-of-luxury-goods-to-russia).
40. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Introduces Further Sanctions on Russia and Belarus.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-on-russia-and-belarus](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-on-russia-and-belarus).
41. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia).
42. Practitioner, Trade. “Japan Actions on Russia and Russia-related Sanctions.” *Japan Actions on Russia and Russia-related Sanctions | The Trade Practitioner*, 29 Apr. 2022. Accessible at: [www.tradepractitioner.com/2022/04/japan-actions-on-russia-and-russia-related-sanctions](https://www.tradepractitioner.com/2022/04/japan-actions-on-russia-and-russia-related-sanctions).
43. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-2](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-2).
44. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-5](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-5).

45. SUETOMI, Junko. “Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus.” *Sanctions & Export Controls Update*, 2022. Accessible at: [sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-3](https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-3).
  46. VERILHAC, Charlotte. “Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments - 03/10/2022 - Jeantet.” *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/03/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments).
  47. VERILHAC, Charlotte. “Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (7 April Updates) - Jeantet.” *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-07-avril-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/sanctions-contre-la-russie-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-07-avril-2022).
  48. VERILHAC, Charlotte. “Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (13 April Updates) - Jeantet.” *Jeantet*, 2022. [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-13-april-updates](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/04/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-13-april-updates).
  49. VERILHAC, Charlotte. “Russian Counter Measures : Recent Developments (Update May 3, 2022) - Jeantet.” *Jeantet*, 2022. [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/05/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-may-3-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/05/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-may-3-2022).
  50. MAISONNEUVE, Maël. “Russian Counter Measures : Recent Developments, 2022, - Jeantet.” *Jeantet*, [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/07/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-july-12-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/07/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-update-july-12-2022).
  51. Verilhac, Charlotte. “Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (19 August 2022 Update) - Jeantet.” *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/russie-contre-mesures-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-19-aout-2022](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/08/russie-contre-mesures-developpements-recents-mise-a-jour-du-19-aout-2022).
  52. DEDEYSTERE, Christelle. “Russian Counter Measures. Recent Developments (29 September 2022 Update) - Jeantet.” *Jeantet*, 2022. Accessible at: [www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/09/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-29-september-2022-update](http://www.jeantet.fr/en/2022/09/russian-counter-measures-recent-developments-29-september-2022-update).
-