



Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture

Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic (Home)
University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain (Host)

May, 2011

The Common Foreign Policy of the European Union towards Cuba with Focus on the Czech – Cuban Relations

Submitted by:

Mgr. Ondřej Polišenský
S20027984
ondrapolisensky@gmail.com

Supervised by:

Doc. PhDr. Karel Konečný, CSc.
(Palacký University in Olomouc)

Dr. Cristina Churruca Muguruza
(University of Deusto, Bilbao)

Olomouc, 15th May 2011

Signature



**MA Program Euroculture
Declaration**

I, Mgr. Ondřej Polišenský, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “The Common Foreign Policy of the European Union towards Cuba with Focus on the Czech – Cuban Relations” submitted as partial requirement for the Euroculture MA Program, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e. g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the list of references.

I hereby and also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the Euroculture MA thesis and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Program Euroculture.

Signed: Mgr. Ondřej Polišenský

Date:

Preface

I would like to genuinely thank to the following individuals who have contributed to the creation of this thesis.

Most of all, I would like to thank to my parents Věra and Zdeněk for their absolute support throughout all the years of my studies at Palacký University in Olomouc, University of Deusto in Bilbao, and elsewhere. Also, my thanks belong to my supervisors PhDr. Karel Konečný, CSc. and Dr. Cristina Churruca Muguruza who helped me with shaping of this project, and the thesis writing seminar tutor Mgr. Jitka Mašátová for her excellent job and ideas. Furthermore, I thank Ms. Béatrice Minh, MA. for her insights in terms of Spanish translation and Mr. Reuben Liew, MA. and Ms. Salena Lee, MA. for their peer reviewing.

Lastly, an expression of great thanks belongs to Euroculture Erasmus Mundus Consortium for the opportunity which enabled me to study this program.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	5
Key Words.....	6
Introduction	7
Aims of the Thesis.....	7
Structure of the Thesis.....	7
Hypotheses	9
Methodology.....	10
1. General Information	11
1.1. European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy - Overview of Objectives and Interests.....	11
2. The EU Foreign Policy towards Cuba.....	12
2.1. Historical Development of the Euro-Cuban Relations.....	12
2.1.1. Colonial and Post-colonial context of Euro-Cuban ties	12
2.1.2. Communist Historical ties of Europe and Cuba	14
2.1.3. Specific Development of European Union - Cuban Relations.....	16
2.2. Contemporary Situation.....	20
2.2.1. Europe’s Internal Influences.....	22
2.2.1.1. Economic Interests	23
2.2.1.2. European Post-Communism.....	25
2.2.1.3. Importance of Human Rights and Liberty	26
2.2.2. EU’s Global Reasons.....	28
2.2.2.1. The Global Players: USA, China, and New Global Players.....	30
2.2.2.2. EU’s Global Influence Aspirations and Development	35
2.2.2.3. Role of the Holy See.....	37
2.2.3 EU’s Developmental Aid.....	40
3. Czech Foreign Relations with Cuba	41
3.1. Information on Historical Development.....	42
3.1.1. Communist Cooperation.....	42
3.1.2. Post-Communist Freeze.....	46
3.1.3. Contemporary Situation.....	53
3.2. Czech Interests and Approach Reasons	55
3.3.1. Czech Post-communism and Liberalism	56
3.3.2. Absence of Colonialism	58
4. Influence of the Czech Policy on EU’s Policy, Reasons of Unsuccessful Relations .	59
5. Future Development	61
Discussion.....	64
Conclusion.....	66
Bibliography	68
Appendices Contents	68
Appendix 1: Tables.....	79
Appendix 2: Preliminary Interview Questions	80
Appendix 3: Interview Contacting Letters	81
Appendix 4: Interview Transcripts	82
Appendix 5: The “Dangerousness” Law, Excerpt from the Cuban Criminal Code .	103
Appendix 6: List of Used Abbreviations.....	107

Abstract

Due to globalization, international politics have recently become an important topic for many countries of the world, most notably, the world powers. As the European Union continues in its development forward, it sees its position among leading political and economic entities of the world and creates its own external policy service. However, as the European Union is quite complex political entity in terms of governance, certain problems within the international politics emerge. This thesis, therefore, intends to uncover such problems by providing a study of relations of the European Union and the Czech Republic towards the Republic of Cuba.

The thesis itself is intended to be a theoretical study of recent and contemporary political development between the European Union and the Republic of Cuba, its influences, and actors. It aspires to provide explanations of the problematic communication and cooperation of the EU and the Czech Republic with Cuba since the beginning of 1990s, analyze the contemporary situation, and foreshadow a possible future development of Cuba in relation to the EU.

As, mentioned above, the thesis is intended to be theoretical and therefore does not include any practical research in a form of a questionnaire or any scientific measuring research. The planned research consists of a study of various primary, secondary, and independent sources. The study is also analyzes information based on interviews conducted with various individuals representing NGOs or governmental bodies of mentioned political entities.

More concretely, this part includes information from interviews with Mgr. Pavla Holcová – head of Cuban section of People in Need – a Czech non-profit, non-governmental organization which defends human rights and democratic freedom carrying out development and aid projects in troubled regions around the world¹, Mgr. Jaroslav Kurfürst – Director of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) dept. of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Ms. Isabel Martinho –Deputy Head of Cuban Unit at European External Action Service (EEAS), Cuban ex-prisoner and journalists exiled in Spain: Mr. José Gabriel Ramón Castillo, and Mr. Javier Martínez-Corbalán – Secretary General of Fundación Hispano Cubana. This foundation is a private nonprofit organization for Spaniards and Cubans living in Cuba or elsewhere

¹ Člověk v tísni, “O Člověku v tísni”, <http://www.clovekvtsni.cz/index2.php?id=176> (accessed 18 April 2011).

with objective of promotion of the development, human rights adherence, and the support of Cuban exile in Spain².

Lastly, the whole study is intended to provide a point of view on European Union and its cooperation development with a communist country written by a person whose life and views have not been substantially influenced by communism in 20th century Europe and who believes in future in freedom for the people of his age in Cuba.

Key Words

International relations, European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Czech Republic, Republic of Cuba, Coherence, Human rights, member-state interests.

² Fundación Hispano Cubana, “Quienes Somos”, <http://www.hispanocubana.org/> (accessed 18 April 2011).

Introduction

Aims of the Thesis

In this Master thesis, it is intended to uncover and provide a study of problems of the Common European Foreign Policy towards the Republic of Cuba in connection to the relations between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Cuba. The project intends to contribute to the general understanding of the European external relations as well as the reasons of problematic relations of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Cuba. In the thesis, examples of clashes between the Common European Foreign Policy practices and those on national level are given and analyzed. Specifically, relationship of Cuba the Czech Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) is given substantial attention. Additionally, throughout the study, Spain's approach towards Cuba is given attention. The reasons for this are Spanish colonial and historical proximity of Cuba and Spain, and Spanish contemporary political and economic interests which, within the EU, oppose those of the Czech Republic.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter covers general information and settings of the topic. Also, the EU's Common European Foreign Policy towards Cuba is introduced and studied in-depth.

To specify the introduced topic, the second chapter introduces the EU's Common Foreign Policy towards Cuba. Then, a study of various developmental influences of the relations of Europe and Cuba is provided through an overview of historical development of Cuba as a Spanish colony, USA-dependent republic, and a socialist republic. Furthermore, specific development of the relations of the modern European Union and Cuba is studied. The second chapter also provides the contemporary situation of relations of the European Union and Cuba together with explanations of reasons for such state, including the information on influential actors from inside and outside the union. In this part, contemporary topics such the importance of human rights and Liberty within the cooperation of Europe and Cuba and disagreements to this connected are studied. Also, the European Union's global influence development and a comparison of the relations of EU and other world powers

such as, USA and China, or other important world players like the Holy See, are provided.

In the third chapter, Czech foreign relations with the Republic of Cuba are studied. The study summarizes historical development of the Czech-Cuban relations, specifically the cooperation of communist Czechoslovakia and Cuba, and the Czech post-communist withdrawal from this economic and political cooperation. Concerning the contemporary situation, the interests of Czech Republic are analyzed; mentioning the importance of Czech Post-communism, commitment to human rights adherence, and absence of post-colonial connections.

The fourth chapter deals with reasons of problems of the Common Foreign Security Policy. Specifically, it studies differences between policies favored by the Czech representation, and policies of The European External Action Service and other European Union member states. In this topic, an example of the Kingdom of Spain is used. The reason for this choice is that Spain traditionally practices more positive and opened approach towards Cuba compared to the Czech Republic and the Union as a whole.

The fifth chapter provides a short debate of the future development of Euro-Cuban relations based on the previous analyses of European and Czech policies. The following chapter provides a discussion on the whole topic and a resolution to the hypotheses, and last, the thesis consists of the conclusion in which outcomes of the study are summarized.

Hypotheses

With this thesis, it is intended to validate or disprove the hypotheses which concern the relations of the Republic of Cuba, The European Union and the Czech Republic in relation to Common Foreign Security Policy of the European Union carried out by the External Action Service as well as individual national interests of mentioned political entities.

Hypothesis # 1

The European Union's system of Common Foreign Policy is, in terms of Cuba, not functioning well.

Hypothesis # 2

Czech relations with Cuba differ substantially from the Union's Common Foreign Security Policy program intentions and thus ambiguity is created.

Hypothesis # 3

Accession of post-communist countries to the union has positively influenced the Common Foreign Security Policy towards and Common Position towards Cuba.

Hypothesis # 4

The European Union is capable of influencing the Cuban Government in order to approximate the country towards democratization.

Methodology

Sources of information for the thesis are mainly secondary. Nevertheless, the primary sources, such as information from involved institutions, NGOs and civic associations, independent news, as well as interviews with involved individual professionals giving contemporary views, are provided. The thesis is not divided into theoretical and practical parts as the information from interviews is integrated within the thesis sources in the text and their transcripts are provided in the appendices. The main idea of the interviews is to provide information from institutions and individuals from varied backgrounds and interests as they all influence directions of European foreign relations development either directly or indirectly.

The interviews were conducted orally in person or via Skype. The conversations were, with the agreement of the interviewees, recorded using free “Audacity Beta 1.3” software available to download on the internet. The recordings were later translated, and rewritten into interview transcripts. Prior the interviews, the interviewees were provided a set of preliminary questions for the interview which outlined the topics intended to cover. Therefore the interviews can be considered as structured interviews. The time span of the interviews ranged between 28 minutes up to 47 minutes. A total of five interviews, during the period of one month, were conducted. The interviewer was the author of the thesis and the interviewees were Ms. Isabel Martinho, Ms. Pavla Holcová, Mr. Javier Martinez-Corbalán, Mr. Jaroslav Kurfürst, and Mr. José Gabriel Ramón Castillo.

1. General Information

Since 1993, the European Union has implemented the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) introduced by Maastricht Treaty. The recent successful ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of The European External Action Service further aspire to ease the problems connected to general external relations by greater coordination and consistency of the CFSP of the European Union. However, there are still problems causing misunderstanding and poor relations within and outside Europe as well³.

A very notable example of these problems can be the European Union's relationship with Cuba. Having the policy of external representation, the European Union, in this case, has to deal with many difficulties often blocking the cooperation. These are, for example, diametrically different point of views on governmental policy and regime, global international politics, or human rights. These problems are, in the case of Euro-Cuban relations, not divided but rather interconnected. The EU's Foreign Policy "package" seeks to solve these difficulties and find the concord with the Cuban positions. However, it is not always that easy. In order to give a clearer image of the European Union's Policy towards Cuba, the general information on the CFSP will be provided.

1.1. European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy - Overview of Objectives and Interests

Based on the information provided at the information portal of the European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a system of policies recognized by all member states in order to create an organized conjoint action in terms of relations towards non-member countries. Since the implementation of the Lisbon treaty, the CFSP has been managed by the External Action Service with its head – The High Representative⁴, nowadays Mrs. Catherine Ashton⁵. Through the establishment of the CFSP, the EU pledges to promote its values in the world.

The European Union, in the position of "the world's strongest commercial power and the biggest aid donor to the developing world", pledges to promote the

³Council of the European Union, "The Common Foreign Security Policy", CONSILIUM– Foreign Policy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=248&lang=en> (accessed 17 January, 2011).

⁴European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon, Final Act", *Official Journal of the European Union*, 17. 12. 2007, C 306/27, vol. 50, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0231:0271:EN:PDF> (accessed 25 January, 2011).

⁵European Union, "The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy", *Europa*, EEAS, http://eeas.europa.eu/ashton/index_en.htm (accessed 25 January 2011).

values of the EU in the world and aspires to contribute to: “peace and security, sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty protection of human rights, respect for and enhancement of international law as defined, in particular, in the United Nations Charter”⁶.

The interests of EU’s Common Foreign Policy can be generally understood as promotion of the European Union and supporting the European influence around the world, especially in developing countries, as well as the consolidation of member-state foreign policies in order to achieve a consensus on unified international acting of the Union as one body – one global political entity.

2. The EU Foreign Policy towards Cuba

As the topic of this project deals specifically with foreign policy of the EU and foreign affairs of the Cuban Republic, in the second part it is intended to summarize the historical connection of Europe and Cuba in order to provide the reader with the background information on the reasons of contemporary cooperation, its reasons and problems. Furthermore, contemporary ties of the two studied political entities cooperation will be dealt with. The objective of this is to provide the reader with a general background for the further reading of this paper. In order to provide a comprehensive study of the suggested problem, background information on development of European and Cuban approaches towards each other will be carried out.

2.1. Historical Development of the Euro-Cuban Relations

Cuba has been influenced by Europe, predominantly Spain, since the age of first explorations and colonialism. This fact has created a close connection of Cuba through the cultural proximity as well as trade activities. Even despite the Cuban spirited fight for their own freedom since the times of José Martí, the era of American dependence, and the era of Soviet Union-dependent socialism, the connections have not been broken. This is what the contemporary European Union, lead by Spain, seems to build up on.

2.1.1. Colonial and Post-colonial context of Euro-Cuban ties

It was on October 12th, 1492 when Cuba was pronounced a Spanish colony by Christopher Columbus. During this period, the dependency of Cuba on the Spanish

⁶ European Commission, “Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty”, <http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/others/84/en.pdf> (accessed 25 January 2011).

kingdom was created and maintained through eradication of the indigenous peoples, rule of Spanish colonizers, migration from Spain, superiority of the white men, and slavery⁷. It is indisputable that the Euro-Cuban connection was firmly established and developed during the whole period of colonization until the break of 19th and 20th century when Cuba became the last colony which Spain lost.

As Gott mentions, the Republic of Cuba was declared independent on May 20th, 1902, after numerous revolts against the rule of Spanish kingdom, occupation, and the Spanish-American war. Since 1902, the Republic of Cuba has, therefore, been a sovereign state. It is, however, important to mention that Cuba was then under a very strong influence of the United States of America. According to Gott, the era of Americanization after 1902 Cuban is in contemporary Castrist Cuba understood as a “pseudo-republic” and the first President Tomás Estrada Palma, who was an American citizen and who was the first to support the close cooperation with USA, is perceived as a capital traitor to his homeland⁸.

The influence of the USA anchored by the Platt Amendment⁹ lasted because of the often high rate of corruption and election frauds favoring the pro-American governmental garniture. As Staten says, “The Platt Amendment and the growing political and economic power of the United States made a mockery of Cuban independence. Cuba was strategically important because it allowed the United States to control access to Panama Canal. United states also believed that the maintenance of political stability, although not necessarily democracy, was the best way to protect its growing economic investments and its dominance of the Cuban sugar industry”¹⁰.

In spite of dependence on the United States of America and withdrawal from the colonial rule of Spain, the connection between Cuba and Europe even deepened. As Gott mentions, the number of immigrants from Europe, predominantly from Spain, grew substantially during the first decades of the 20th century¹¹. The connection between the two countries, as Montaner mentions, can actually be proved by migration facts. Similarly to Gott, Montaner mentions Spanish citizens, especially from the provinces of Asturias and Galicia, who emigrated in “hundreds of thousands” to Cuba in search of a

⁷ Ted Henken, *Cuba : a global studies handbook*, (Santa Barbara Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2008) : 54.

⁸ Richard Gott, *Kuba: nové dějiny*, 1st ed. (Praha: BB/art, 2005): 150.

⁹ C. I Bevans, “The Platt Amendment,” *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776 – 1949*, no. 8, (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971): 1116 – 17.

¹⁰ Clifford L. Staten, *The History of Cuba*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005):45.

¹¹ Richard Gott, *Kuba: nové dějiny*, 1st ed. (Praha: BB/art, 2005): 150.

better future before revolution in 1950s¹². Consequently, the presence of an extensive trade connection with Spain has never weakened either. As the official compendious study of the Cuban territory by The Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana says, Spain has been the key trade partner for Cuba, and even nowadays ranks as 3rd main trade partner after China and Venezuela¹³. According to this, it is possible to presume that until the beginning of Cuban revolution the connection in form of immigration, consequent cultural exchange, extensive trade and political cooperation between Cuba and Europe has not been importantly limited. The connection has not been cut off even during the change of the regime in Cuba. Nevertheless, it has changed accordingly to the development of the regime changes throughout Europe, mainly the communism in Central and Eastern Europe.

2.1.2. Communist Historical ties of Europe and Cuba

The regime troubled with corruption and American dependency was overthrown in a quite long process. It is officially accepted that the Cuban revolution started on July 26th, 1953 with the attack of groups of revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro against the Moncada Barracks. As Staten describes, this attack was fended off by the army and the guerilla fighters had to seek exile in Mexico. The next attempt to overthrow Fulgencio Batista's government started on December 2nd, 1956 when members of the "Movimiento 26 de Julio" or "M-26-7" – landed in Cuba with the yacht "Granma". The M-26-7 was a revolutionary organization of guerrilla fighters organized from the exiled revolutionaries in 1955 in Mexico. The movement led by Castro Brothers and Ernesto "Che" Guevara based itself in Sierra Maestra Mountains in the south-east of the island and later spread to the whole country. This putsch made Fulgencio Batista flee the country on January 1st 1959¹⁴ and the regime of Fidel Castro was established¹⁵.

Studying the Cuban "switch" of political system and the change of orientation from USA to USSR in 1950s, it is evident that the cooperation with European countries has undergone various changes. As claimed above, during the first half of the 20th century, out of all contemporary EU countries, Cuba had the closest relationship with Spain. Concerning other European countries, in the first half of the 20th century, the

¹² Carlos Montaner, in Manuel Márquez-Sterling, *CUBA 1952 – 1959: The True Story of Castro's Rise of Power*, (Wintersgreen: Kleiopatra Press, 2009): 13 – 15.

¹³ Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana, "Souhrnná Teritoriální Informace Kuba", <http://services.czechtrade.cz/pdf/sti/kuba-2010-04-01.pdf> (accessed 22 February 2011): 41.

¹⁴ *Encyclopedia Britannica – Academic Edition*, S.V. "Fulgencio Batista", <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/56027/Fulgencio-Batista> (accessed 15 February 2011).

¹⁵ Clifford Staten, *The history of Cuba*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 175.

cooperation with the Republic of Cuba was mainly based on the sugar trade. This branch of trade, as Himes claims, importantly helped in Cuba's development due to the shortages of sugar in Europe during the World War 2. With the beginning of the Cuban Revolution and the newly introduced bi-polar system of world politics after the war, strong ties within the eastern bloc and Cuba emerged¹⁶.

Thus the continuation of European-Cuban relations in economy, politics, and diplomacy were preserved. Soon after the revolution, Cuban politics became closely linked to the politics of the USSR and its satellite countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

The cooperation of the eastern bloc country with Cuba can be given on the example of Czechoslovakia. As Opatrný mentions, similarly to other European countries, Czechoslovakia and Cuba based their contact on the trade with sugar. He further describes the relationship of the two countries strongly dependent on the world politics development, especially the Cold War. The cooperation of Cuba with the eastern bloc was revived with the Cuban revolution. After somewhat limited diplomatic or economic connections of 1940s and 1950s, the Czechoslovakia quickly recognized the M-26-7's new government of 1959 and re-established a new consulate in Havana only in 1960. This meant a substantial growth of trade. Specifically, export of Czech machinery, arms, automobiles, and chemical products to Cuba, and on the other hand, export of fruit and sugar to Czechoslovakia¹⁷. The cooperation of the communist countries was deepened in 1972 when Cuba entered Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). With the membership in the group, Cuba benefited from better accessibility to cheap goods from the Eastern bloc. As The Library of Congress' study says, among the Comecon countries, Cuba was among the least developed and on the contrary the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe were the most developed. As the system of Comecon was based on an extensive support given to underdeveloped countries from the developed ones, diplomatic connections were strongly supported and the goods from countries like East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were imported. In return Cuba exported to Comecon countries its natural resources such as sugar or nickel but also served the Soviet-led Comecon to advance Soviet foreign policy

¹⁶ Joshua Himes, "Cuban Development and the Sugar Economy: The Effects on Cuban Development of Changing International Economic Relations", <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/ca/cuba/asce/cuba3/himes.html> (accessed 15 February 2011).

¹⁷ Josef Opatrný, "Československo-kubánské vztahy v období 1945-1989", *Zahraničná Politika*, 30 June 2007, www.zahranicnapolitika.sk/index.php?id=231 (accessed 15 February 2011).

interests with the placement of naval or rocket bases and military support of Soviet allies in Africa¹⁸.

The close cooperation can be proved by the mentioned quick emergence of embassies or cultural centers of Cuba in the countries of Comecon. Also, as Gott mentions, a prove of the convergence could be an establishment of a new academy of Latin American studies in Moscow and a support of Spanish education in Russia in order to bring up new journalists, industry advisors, diplomats, interpreters, or even spies skilled in the field of Latin America¹⁹.

Mutual aid of the Comecon member states was based on bilateral cooperation. This form of cooperation of Cuba with mainly Eastern European Countries lasted until the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 and later collapse of the Soviet Union.

2.1.3. Specific Development of European Union - Cuban Relations

The beginning of the European Union-Cuban relations concretely dates to 1993, when the European Commission introduced a humanitarian aid program through the Humanitarian Aid Office of the European Union (ECHO). This initiative was aimed at reduction of the effects of the economic hardship of the Cuban society caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1990s. Furthermore, another important reason for the aid was the support of a step-by-step process of the political reform in form of influence through humanitarian aid, co-financing of NGOs and economic cooperation²⁰.

As is evident, the European Union has chosen the best time to aim its interest in this strategic island. In 1993, Cuba was devastated by the collapse of its main partner in economy, trade, and strategic politics and ideology – the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the commercial and diplomatic embargo applied to Cuba by the United States of America in 1962 during the presidency of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, had influenced EU's policy as well. In the framework of the embargo, the USA basically excludes itself from trade with Cuba. Thus, the European Union could start cooperating with a partner where, unlike in the rest of the world, does not face the competition of American influence through politics, trade, or any support.

¹⁸ Malinda Goodrich, "A Country Study: Soviet Union (Former) – Appendix B: The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance – Soviet Union", *The Library of Congress*, 2010, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/soviet_union/su_appnb.html (accessed 23 February 2011).

¹⁹ Richard Gott, *Kuba: nové dějiny*, 1st ed. (Praha: BB/art, 2005): 232.

²⁰ European Commission, "Republic of Cuba – European Union Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period of 2011-2013", http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cu_csp10_en.pdf (accessed 14 March 2011): 26.

The interest in Cuba later deepened. On December 2nd 1996, the European Union, through the Council of European Union emitted the “Common Position on Cuba”. Common position is a document by which European Union commits itself to promote the positive communication with the Cuban Republic, support Cuba’s development, and promote the democratic changes and adherence to human rights.²¹ Concretely, European Union suggested a set of reforms and intended to “...encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as sustained recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people”²².

As the Common Position was understood as a connection of European policy with the strict policy of the United States, which openly seeks the de-establishment of the Cuban government, the Cuban government refused this concept²³, and has been severely criticizing it since then.

Nevertheless, a limited cooperation has continued to develop. The reasons for the continuation of cooperation are important historical ties of Cuba with certain members of the EU, especially Spain who is an important supporter of cooperation with Cuba, but also thanks to economic factors. More concretely, after the Cuban rejection of common foreign policy concept, the Republic of Cuba aspired for the membership in the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. The ACP countries, established in 1975, signed the Agreement of Cotonou in Benin in 2000 by which cooperation with the European Union was appointed. As it is said at European Commission website²⁴, the Cotonou Agreement basically created a framework of EU’s relations with 79 countries in Africa, Pacific, and Caribbean Region. The cooperation within this project is based on European developmental support in fields of humanitarian aid, healthcare, security, sustainability, fight against climate change, support of authorities, and reinforcement of trade. The membership in ACP group which closely cooperates with EU would then finally save Cuba from the isolation, and the needed development supported by the EU would have been achieved.

²¹European Union, “96/697/CFSP: Common Position of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba”, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996E0697:EN:NOT> (accessed 29 April 2010).

²² Ibid.

²³Tzivelis Vassiliki, “The European Union’s Foreign Policy Towards Cuba: It Is Time to Tie the Knot,” in *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 6 No. 7, March 2006: 11.

²⁴ European Commission “The Cotonou Agreement”, Development, Cotonou Agreement, http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm (accessed 29 April 2010).

In regards to the reasons for the inclusion of Cuba into ACP group and thus to the sphere of European influence, Cuba has very good relations with ACP countries, as well as it has many bilateral agreements with individual EU member states. Since the establishment of the ACP, Cuba has done many attempts to enter. However, there has always been present a problem of the cooperation with Europe in terms of its criticism of Cuba's human rights adherence. As the situation further developed, the ACP members renewed the 1975 Georgetown agreement of group establishment²⁵ and thus allowed Cuba to enter. This means participation in the Strategic Partnership of the European Union and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) on one hand. On the other hand, a closer cooperation with EU such as participation on various funding is limited as a formal agreement between Cuba and the Union is lacking²⁶. This actually meant that in 2000, Cuba became an ACP group member but could not "play the game"; e.g. participate on receiving aid from European Development Fund (EDF)²⁷.

The membership which Cuba holds is rather an observer's position. At the beginning, Cuban membership in ACP was seen as the beginning of a "new age" in the Euro-Cuban relations. However, the European Union kept being reluctant and differentiated in opinions of its leaders. This caused ACP membership application withdrawal in 2001, as Cuba understood EU's representation hypocritical for the very positive speeches of EU representatives but no action²⁸. Such problems were caused by the 6-month rotating presidency of EU-member countries. In this case, as presidency was changing, the opinion of the EU on the outside was changing as well. Furthermore, by the time when the final agreement was close by, the EU condemned Cuba in the United Nations Resolution on human rights, which made Brussels decisions look quite incompatible.

The situation between the European Union and Cuba, however, worsened. In March 2003 a harsh persecution of Cuban dissidents stirred the European Commission

²⁵Tzivelis Vassiliki, "The European Union's Foreign Policy Towards Cuba: It Is Time to Tie the Knot," in *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 6 No. 7, March 2006: 13-16, <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Tzivelisfinal.pdf>. (accessed 20 April 2010).

²⁶ European Commission, "Republic of Cuba – European Union Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period of 2011-2013", *Europa*, 24 March 2010: 5, http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cu_csp10_en.pdf (accessed 14 March 2011).

²⁷ Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana, "Souhrnná Teritoriální Informace Kuba", <http://services.czechtrade.cz/pdf/sti/kuba-2010-04-01.pdf> (accessed 22 February 2011): 25.

²⁸Tzivelis Vassiliki, "The European Union's Foreign Policy Towards Cuba: It Is Time to Tie the Knot," in *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 6 No. 7, March 2006: 16, <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Tzivelisfinal.pdf>. (accessed 20 April 2010).

who then decided to re-check the Cuba's application to ACP and an introduction of tightening of diplomatic sanctions against the Castro regime.²⁹

This move led to another withdrawal of the accession from the Cuban side and a strong irritation of Cuban government. The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) conducted an analysis of the ACP membership with the result that membership costs are higher than actual benefits and called the EU's Common Position as an "interventionist text" attempting to "establish discriminatory requirements for Cuba" – an EU inspection foregoing the accession³⁰. During his speech, commenting on the failure of the agreement, Castro pointed out the ambiguity of EU's foreign policy as well as the disquietude over the fact that European Union, in terms of Cuba, stresses certain additional political conditions. Later on, Castro accused the European Union of propagating the interests of the United States and called the European Union "the superpower's Trojan horse"³¹.

Thanks to these, so called, "Cuban Cocktail-party Wars"³² when EU limited high-level visits and cultural exchanges, and Mr. Castro prevented Cuban officials to attend EU receptions, the Euro-Cuban relations froze. It was, basically, a setback to the relations of 1996. Despite the political disagreements, a certain form of cooperation of the Republic of Cuba with the European Union was preserved. Led by Spain, France, Netherlands, and Italy, trade between EU and Cuba kept on growing. Even though this may be understood as a positive influence, the fact of vivid trade on one hand and strictly limited cultural and diplomatic cooperation meant in a way "schizophrenic" behavior of the Union.

The next move of the Euro-Cuban relations was supposed to come in 2004 with the Spanish parliamentary elections. Cuba's critic José Maria Aznar was defeated by the Socialist Worker's party's José Luis Zapatero, which has been traditionally more open to collaboration with Cuba³³. A shift of Spanish and European approach towards Cuba

²⁹Simone Radačičová, "Oswaldo Paya: Nerušte Sankce," *Britské Listy*, 18 November 2004, <http://www.blisty.cz/art/20674.html> (accessed 6 May 2010).

³⁰Ministerio de Relaciones Externas de Cuba, "Cuba desires ever-widening relations with the European Union, but they must be based on mutual respect", *Trabajadores Digital*, http://edicionesanteriores.trabajadores.cu/2003/mayo/20_ingles/textos_y_fotos/statement.htm (accessed 10 March 2011).

³¹David Adams, "Castro Labels EU the 'Superpower's Trojan Horse'", *The Times*, 28 July 2003, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article850973.ece> (accessed 20 April 2010).

³²The Economist, "Cuba's cocktail-party war: No eating my canapés any more", *The Economist*, Vol. 367 No. 8329, 21 – 27 June 2003: 49.

³³Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE, "Historia del Partido Socialista Obrero Español", *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*,

from the very cold one to more opened and collaborative was expected but, actually, it did not happen. Even though Zapatero is rather pro-cooperation oriented, other obstacles appeared. Most notably, as Roy mentions, it was the opposition of Sweden, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom³⁴.

Furthermore, in 2000, then hot candidates for the EU-membership, Poland and the Czech Republic sponsored a resolution on Cuba condemning the state of human rights and presented it in the Commission for Human Rights in Geneva³⁵. This, among other examples, pictures the strong concern of the Czech Republic in this problem. It is therefore understood that the accession of the new post-communist expectedly joined the opposing countries and showed how Union's decision-making was influenced. Together they have criticized the state of human rights, and non-democratic government in Cuba, which builds a strong limitation to the communication with Cuban representatives and further cooperation until nowadays.

2.2. Contemporary Situation

Talking about the contemporary state of the EU's foreign policy, in fall 2008, diplomatic talks have slightly moved the cooperation forward. Concretely as Erikson claims, in 2008, the EU managed to launch cooperation agreements over the academic exchange and the humanitarian aid for the Cubans affected by 2008's hurricanes Gustav, Ike and Paloma.³⁶ As Phillips says, the declaration of the restoration of bilateral cooperation of EU and Cuba has been signed in Havana on October 23rd 2008. By this agreement EU declared to provide Cuba with needed financial aid. Concretely, EU promised to provide €2 million for hurricane reconstruction and in further two years €25 million - €30 million.³⁷ Lately, the approximation of Cuba and the European Union has been positively influenced by the accession of Cuba to OAS (Organization of American

<http://www.psoe.es//ambito/historiapsoe/docs/index.do?action=View&id=460110> (accessed 25 April 2010).

³⁴ Joaquín Roy, "The European Union Perception of Cuba: From Frustration to Irritation," *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 3 No. 2, August 2003, http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/roy_EUCuba.pdf (accessed 27 April 2010).

³⁵ Tomas Pstross, "The Concept of Human Rights in Foreign Policy – An analytical and methodological study", The ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Department of Human Rights, http://www.cubasource.org/pdf/Human_Rights.pdf (accessed 27 February 2011): 30-40.

³⁶ Daniel P. Erikson, "Europe's Cuba Problem: The Limit of Constructive Engagement", *IDEA – Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance*, http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Erikson_low_1.pdf (accessed 8 May 2010).

³⁷ Leigh Phillips, "EU and Cuba formally restore tie", *EUobserver*, 24 October 2008, <http://euobserver.com/9/26991> (accessed 8 May 2010).

States).³⁸ As Lockhart mentions, Cuba joined the Rio Group and OAS on June 3rd, 2009; as the group decided not to use the resolution from 1962, which excluded the Cuban government from its participation³⁹. This, according to Lockhart, is at least a minor step towards further cooperation that has been done by the EU during 2008 and 2009. In 2009, the Council of European Union elaborated an evaluation on the common position towards Cuba. The document re-assures Europe's adherence to 1996 common position in terms of human rights, fundamental freedoms, development of the Cuban society improvement of the living standards and the democratization. Even though mentioning the hot issue of human rights and democratization, as Lockhart points out, by this, the council stands for the refusal of USA-like methods such as economical duress and embargo policy regulated by 1996 Helms-Burton Act.⁴⁰

Since the "Black Spring" – a period of the Cuban governmental crackdown on country's dissidents when imprisonment of 75 individuals in 2003, a thawing of the relations between the European Union and the Republic of Cuba has been gradually developing. Lately, in 2010 and 2011 the biggest number of independent journalist, writers, and opponents of the regime imprisoned for "damaging Cuba's territorial integrity and economy" were released and in most cases allowed to leave the country for Spain⁴¹. This happened after Raul Castro's pledge in July 2010 to release 52 political prisoners and allow them to leave the country for Spain. This act of the Cuban government has been importantly influenced by pressure of the Roman Catholic Church led by Cuban archbishop Jaime Ortega⁴², and was strongly supported by a Vatican diplomat Miguel Ángel Moratinos, and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁴³.

³⁸ Melissa Lockhart, "EU revising 'Common Position' on Cuba", *Foreign Policy Association*, Cuba, Continuity in Havana, Miami and Washington, 18 March 2009, <http://cuba.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/03/18/eu-revising-common-position-on-cuba/> (accessed 30 April 2010).

³⁹ Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on Evaluation of the EU Common Position on Cuba 2951st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting Luxembourg, 15 Jun 2009", Council of the European Union, 15 June 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108471.pdf (accessed 30 April 2010): 2.

⁴⁰ Joaquín Roy, "The European Union Perception of Cuba: From Frustration to Irritation," *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 3 No. 2, August 2003, http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/roy_EUCuba.pdf (accessed 27 April 2010): 9.

⁴¹ Claire Voeux, "Cuba – no surrender by independent journalists, five years on from 'Black Spring'", *Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom*, March 2008, http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Cuba_report.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011):1.

⁴² BBC News, "Castro meets Catholic Church leaders", *BBC*, 20 May 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10134050> (accessed 22 March 2011).

⁴³ The Guardian, "Seven freed Cuban political prisoners arrive in Spain", *The Guardian*, 13 July 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/13/cuba-frees-political-prisoners-spanish-exile> (accessed 22 March 2011).

On the contrary, one of the imprisoned and later freed journalists, José Gabriel Ramón Castillo, agreed during the interview with the presumption, that even though this may seem as a conciliatory move from the side of the Cuban government, it seems as it is now rather less complicated state for Cuba. To have the dissidents extradited to Spain rather than have them in Cuba either in prisons or out of them influencing the society is welcomed by the regime (see appendix 4, p. 99). This is also assumed knowing the occurrences of February 2011, when, as it has been reported, two jailed prisoners, Hector Maseda and Ángel Moya, refused to be released unless they would be able to stay on Cuban soil and the rest of their fellow prisoners would be released immediately with them⁴⁴.

As the study shows, it is understood that the relationship of the European Union concerning Cuba keep on improving but the process is somewhat slow. The general idea that is common to all of the EU member states as well as engaged NGOs and the Catholic Church is, as Pavla Holcová mentions, the improvement of well-being of the people of Cuba (see appendix 4, p. 86)

2.2.1. Europe's Internal Influences

Since its establishment, the European Union has worked on its internal coherence. After numerous impediments in historical development of a united Europe, a collective European identity and a coherent view on international affairs is nowadays getting a real form through the External Action Service (see 1.1). This coherent approach is to be identified within the external policy and the foreign policy towards Cuba as well.

However, when mentioning the particular European approach, it is very hard to identify it because the individual member states perceive cooperation with Cuba very differently. One example is the Czech approach. The Czech Republic has, apart from minor trade, no connections with Cuba.⁴⁵ Also, as Jaroslav Kurfürst mentioned, the Czech Republic actively engages itself in improvement of the state of Cuban civil society and gradual liberalization. During the Czech presidency of the European Union in 2009, the Czech Republic organized the 1st political dialog between the European

⁴⁴ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, "Cuba Releases Two Dissidents Against Their Will", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 13 February 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/cuba_dissidents_freed/2307684.html (accessed 22 March 2011).

⁴⁵ MZV ČR, "Vztahy ČR k zemím Severní a Jižní Ameriky," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2010, http://www.mzv.cz/public/2e/fd/c/72942_14945_VztahyCRseZememiSeverniAJizniAmeriky.pdf, (accessed 2 March 2010):19-20.

Union and Cuba (see appendix 4, p. 90). Furthermore, apparent general aversion towards communist Cuba is very strong due to Czech communist experience. Many other EU countries where the stress on freedom, democracy and human rights is very strong also support this negative approach towards the Cuban Government. Such rather negative approach of majority of members is then, quite logically, reflected in the European Union Council's decisions.

On the other hand, as evidenced by research, for example, Spain has profound interests in Euro-Cuban cooperation due to historical, cultural, and, very importantly, economic ties. Thus, the problem appears when the European representations in Cuba act. The European Union, apart from the Council's office in Havana, does not have any joined external representation. Therefore, the embassies in non-EU countries still seem to act according to their national interests and thus ambiguity may appear; as Cuban officials, specifically Fidel Castro, have pointed out⁴⁶.

Such problems are thought to be caused by very strong interest differences of individual European Union member states. Detailed information about the Czech-Cuban relations is provided in the further parts of the thesis (see 3. p. 41).

2.2.1.1. Economic Interests

Despite Cuba's limited position in ACP and troubled relations with EU since 2003, the value of European trade cooperation with Cuba ranks among the highest. According to the European Commission, the value of European Union's import in 2008 ranked 2nd place after Venezuela, with €1.6 million. Similarly, the export figures show EU to be 3rd most important export partner after China and Canada, with the value of €552 million⁴⁷. With the figures combined, the European Union ranks to be the most important trade partner of the island nation (see table 1, p. 79).

Regarding the economic decisions and interests of various parties in the European Union, Cuban relations indeed play a key role. As mentioned above, it is mainly Spain which supports the appeasement of the relations and, as Erikson mentions, so far, it has been the only member state which has put the recalibration of EU's

⁴⁶Tzivelis Vassiliki, "The European Union's Foreign Policy Towards Cuba: It Is Time to Tie the Knot," in *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 6 No. 7, March 2006: 21, <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Tzivelisfinal.pdf>. (accessed 20 April 2010).

⁴⁷ European Commission, "Republic of Cuba – European Union Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period of 2011-2013", *Europa*, http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cu_csp10_en.pdf (accessed 14 March 2011): 90.

Foreign Policy Towards Cuba as its high priority to solve during the country's presidency of the Council of the European Union, which took place in first six months of 2010⁴⁸.

As Erikson mentions, 25% of European investments in Cuba belong to Spanish investors alone. As an example of influential interests of Spain, post-cold war flourishing tourist industry in Cuba may serve. Spanish-established hotel chain Sol Meliá, which is the world's largest resort operator⁴⁹, runs up to a dozen of hotels in Cuba⁵⁰ and this fact has quite clear effects on Spain's polity in terms of approach toward the island and consequently influences Union's policies as well. Similarly to Sol Meliá, another Spanish company, Repsol YPF, may be understood to have certain influence on Spain's interests in easing the trade with Cuba. Repsol YPF is a Spanish giant oil and gas company. It ranked 3rd largest company in Spain in 2010⁵¹ and 16th largest petroleum company in the world in 2009⁵². In 2010, Repsol YPF has agreed with Cuban officials on developing the exploration of Cuban reserves of oil and natural gas in the Gulf of Mexico.

Apart from Spanish corporations, Cuba serves as an export destination to the whole EU-27. According to Eurostat, the value of the European Union's export to Cuba was €1,296 millions in 2010 with the main export commodities of machineries and transport equipment, manufactured goods, and chemicals⁵³. Also, some member states, such as the Netherlands, have taken some measures to further develop trade cooperation. As Van Reenen mentioned in her article, in March 2008 the Dutch Centre

⁴⁸ Daniel P. Erikson, "Puede Resolver España el problema de Cuba?" in *Política Exterior*, No. 133 Enero/Febrero 2010, <http://www.politicaexterior.com/2010/01/%C2%BFpuede-resolver-espana-el-problema-de-cuba/> (accessed 17 March 2011).

⁴⁹ Nadja Brandt, "Deutsche Telekom, Ryanair, Sol Melia: European Equity Preview", *Bloomberg*, 4 June 2007, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3mAN8YCYLUY&refer=europe> (accessed 17 March 2011).

⁵⁰ Daniel P. Erikson, "Puede Resolver España el problema de Cuba?" in *Política Exterior*, No. 133 Enero/Febrero 2010, <http://www.politicaexterior.com/2010/01/%C2%BFpuede-resolver-espana-el-problema-de-cuba/> (accessed 17 March 2011).

⁵¹ CNN Money, "Global 500: 2010 – Spain – Fortune", *CNN*, 2010, <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/countries/Spain.html> (accessed 7 April 2011).

⁵² CNN Money, "Global 500: 2009 – Industry – Fortune", *CNN*, 2010, <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/industries/20/index.html> (accessed 7 April 2011).

⁵³ Eurostat, "Cuba EU bilateral trade and trade with the World", *Europa*, September 2006, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122460.pdf (accessed 13 April 2011).

for Trade Promotion organized an exploratory trade mission to Cuba⁵⁴. This clearly shows gradual development of growing trade connections.

Undoubtedly, the presence of European companies has been importantly influencing individual EU-member governments as they tend to promote the development of national companies. This, may be, one of the reasons dividing EU member-states to two groups of approach towards Cuba – the one with trade interests and the one without substantial trade interests.

2.2.1.2. European Post-Communism

As it is claimed above (see 2.1.3.), the change towards better relationship of the European Union and Cuba appeared only in 2004 with the victory of Spanish Socialist Worker's party⁵⁵. The new Spanish government led by José Luis Zapatero influenced other European countries, and already in fall 2004, Spain together with Austria, Belgium, Greece, and Sweden, started to demand a new common policy for the cooperation and change of the Cuban regime. This initiative was later supported by the French, and at the beginning of 2005 the 2003 sanction tightening (see 2.1.3.) was proposed to stop.⁵⁶

This, however, was strongly opposed by the group of post-communist European Union-member states, especially the Czech Republic. On January 31st 2005, during the meeting of foreign ministers of EU, the Czech foreign minister Cyril Svoboda asserted that EU countries can continue to host the local Cuban dissidents at their embassies in Havana.⁵⁷ Concerning the EU's move closer to Cuba, Václav Havel commented on this development as well. In his essay "Zvát či nezvat" (To Invite or Not To) – meaning the Cuban dissidents to our embassies, he remembered the position of Czech dissidents before 1989, pointed out that no world power even during the Cold War dared to dictate whom to invite to their embassies. Furthermore, he warned against the close

⁵⁴ Saskia Van Reenen, "Dutch consider re-establishing ties to Cuba after secret trade mission", *Havana Journal*, Cuba Business, 16 April 2008, <http://havanajournal.com/business/print/8191/> (accessed 13 April 2011).

⁵⁵ Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE, "Historia del Partido Socialista Obrero Español". Partido Socialista Obrero Español, <http://www.psoe.es/ambito/historiapsoe/docs/index.do?action=View&id=460110> (accessed 24 April 2010).

⁵⁶ Simone Radačičová, "Oswaldo Paya: Nerušte Sankce," *Britské Listy*, 18 November 2004, <http://www.blisty.cz/art/20674.html> (accessed 6 May 2010).

⁵⁷ iDnes.cz, "Praha protestovala kvůli zakázané oslavě v Havaně", *iDnes*, 2 November 2005, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/domaci.asp?r=domaci&c=A051102_173957_domaci_nelr. (accessed 5 May 2010).

relationship of the EU with any dictatorship and appealed to keep the commitment to the European values of freedom and democracy and not accepting totalitarianism.⁵⁸ Through such suggestions and demands from the new EU members, warmer EU-Cuban relations and cooperation has once again been opposed and obstructed.

The reasons for such adherence of Czech officials are very clear. What is more important in this case, is actually the fact that by the accession of the post-communist countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland, the European Union has gained a new face and balance which, in this case, has proved to be beneficial for having secured preference in European values rather than in the profit from business with a dictatorial regime.

2.2.1.3. Importance of Human Rights and Liberty

When mentioning the possibility of the Cuban-European cooperation throughout past twenty years, the question of the respecting the human rights have always been the hot topic. Most notably, it was evident from 1996 “Common Position” of European Union elaborated by the Council of European Union (see 2.1.3), that the importance of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and liberty has a strong tradition, is highly valued and is anchored in constitutions throughout the continent.

Such European tradition obviously clashes with the totalitarian system in Cuba. The European Union, as well as many Non-Governmental organizations develop pressure on Cuban officials and openly support the dissidents and opposition in the island. As an example, the International Committee for Democracy in Cuba (ICDC), established in Prague in 2003⁵⁹, or the 1996 EU’s Common Position which was described above can be given. Apart from that, the fact that the Sakharov prize for Freedom of Thought awarded by the European Parliament was in 2010 given to Mr. Guillermo Fariñas – a Cuban persecuted independent journalist and dissident, can be given as an example as well⁶⁰.

⁵⁸Václav Havel, “Zvát či nezvat”, in *Project Syndicate*, January 2005, <http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/havel24/Czech> (accessed 5 May 2010).

⁵⁹ICDC: International Committee for Democracy in Cuba, “About ICDC”, ICDC, <http://icdcprague.org/index.php?id=10> (accessed 5 May 2010).

⁶⁰ European Parliament, “Guillermo Fariñas - winner of the 2010 Sakharov Prize – Press release”, *Europa*, 21 October 2010, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20101020IPR89528/html/Guillermo-Fari%C3%B1as-winner-of-the-2010-Sakharov-Prize>, (accessed 20 March 2011).

Reviewing the European criticism of the Human rights adherence in Cuba, a question of business interests of the European Union and particular member states comes to the light. The criticism on one hand, together with a vivid cooperation on the other hand may look, somewhat hypocritical. Based on the interviews conducted with professionals engaged in Cuban affairs, the hypocritical picture of Europe's behavior is, however, weakened. Pavla Holcová, the head of Cuban Unit of Czech non-profit NGO "People in Need", mentions that the European focuses on either human rights or the economic approximation and trade development in fact "seek the same goal" which is "the development of the Cuban society", (see appendix 4, p. 86) and that is what matters. On the contrary, as Ms. Isabel Martinho – Deputy Head of Cuban Unit at European External Action Service in Brussels stated "Every member state has its own interests and these need to be respected" (see appendix 4, p. 82).

It is evident that the EU member-states that have experienced communist regime and/or do not have strong affiliation with Cuba in terms of trade rather incline to the support of the human rights and liberty transformation policy. As Pavla Holcová pointed out, "The fact that the Czech Republic can imagine the real situation on Cuba more easily and empathize to the situation of the opposition and human rights activists and therefore has chosen a construction of civil society as a goal is understandable" (see appendix 4, p.86).

The Czech Republic, even though criticizing the contemporary state and trying to develop Cuban civil society and liberal thinking, acts positively in terms of Spanish-led trade approximation policy. As Jaroslav Kurfürst mentioned "The Czech Republic does not criticize wider opening of the EU-Cuba trade as the establishment of the market economy in Cuba is among Czech interests as well, despite the lower volume of Czech trade compared to Spain or some other EU members". Even though the Czech Republic criticizes the state of human rights situation in Cuba, it is not against the development of business cooperation which is understood as contribution to approximation to liberal system.

On the other hand, the actual situation of the persecution and the state of civil society still seems critical. According to the 2009 report on Cuba and the situation of its political prisoners elaborated by the Human Rights Watch, the state of human rights in the Republic of Cuba is considerably appalling. As the Human Rights Watch states, the Cuban population is massively oppressed with a system of laws disregarding people's

fundamental freedoms anchored in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁶¹. Fear and repressions are present in every-day life of the society. A tool for such oppression is, as HRW states, the Cuban legal system in which, among others, a law constituting a state of possible “dangerousness”. According to this law, a person who is likely to commit a crime can be jailed⁶².

Such a situation proves that even though the common position of 1996, European Parliament’s support of Cuban dissidents, work of European NGOs, or certain member-states, a clear pressure on development towards liberalization exists, and the Union also respects the development of business and humanitarian material support. Nevertheless, these activities are not coordinated and sometimes may seem contradictory.

2.2.2. EU’s Global Reasons

Studying the reasons of the European Union’s interests in Cuba, it is essential to answer the following core questions. What is the motivation of EU in having influence on the outside world and, specifically, why is there a need of deeper influence to, and relation with, other global powers and relatively small and non-influential nations such as Cuba in the Caribbean?

Since the beginnings of European integration, a need for a consensus in terms of inter-European relations has been present. This, as the European Community and later European Union grew in size as well as importance, has been boosted up by the interests of Europe beyond its borders. This move of philosophy and therefore politics of the continent can be described as “conceptualization of the global actor identity”.

As mentioned above, since 1993, the European Union has created the structure of Common Foreign Policy (CFSP) but the idea, according to Bretherton and Vogler, has been here since 1970s already. As Bretherton and Vogler claim, the original idea of the CFSP is a creation of one secure Europe with coherent representation on the outside.

Nonetheless, as they further mention, the internal historical reasons such as the experience with the Second World War and the Cold War were also important

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, *New Castro, Same Cuba – Political Prisoners in the Post-Fidel Era*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009): 1.

⁶² *Ibid.*

influential factors⁶³. The former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, said in a speech that “the question is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role”⁶⁴ and thus automatically placed the European Union among the world leaders that need to cooperate internationally as for their interests and global cooperation and development.

However, it is not the European Union and its officials placing themselves in such position. With the member states acting consistently and in unity, the EU has been gaining a strong international position mainly through international organizations where votes of European countries became, in most cases, unanimous. As Laatikainen mentions, the EU is recognized as a “formidable” force within the UN, OSCE, or WTO and that “nothing gets accomplished” without its support⁶⁵. Consequently, Edwards in Hill and Smith says, the European Union’s historical, geographical, as well as political and economic connections place Europe to the position of an influential global power.

To explain this, he mentions the colonial history of western European countries and a successive project of ACP, cooperation with Latin American cooperative groups such as Mercosur or the Rio Group, historical and cultural proximity of Europe and North America, or the new proximity of Russia and its role of a new partner in international trade and security matters⁶⁶. Similarly, Bretherton and Vogler state that the core of the European Common Foreign Policy is commitment to multilateralism, distinctiveness from unilateralism of USA, promotion of multilateral dialogue with ACP, EUR-Med, Mercosur or ASEM, and proactive participation in WTO and UN.

As Solana mentions, the interest of EU’s global action is not only the need of the influence on others but the aim of promotion of global cooperation, development, safety, democracy and human rights worldwide.

Based on the studied sources, it is evident that the European Union has gradually gained a position of an important world player. Understanding this from a contemporary point of view, however, it appears that European Union nowadays has to work on

⁶³ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, “*The European Union as a Global Actor*”, (New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁶⁴ Javier Solana, “Europe’s Place in the World”, Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Copenhagen 2002, *Europa*, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/70719.pdf (accessed 17 February 2011).

⁶⁵ Katie Verlin Laatikainen, “Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN”, *CFSP Forum*, Vol. 2 No. 1, January, 2004.

⁶⁶ Geoffrey Edwards, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, “The Pattern of the EU’s Global Activity”, in *International Relations and the European Union*, (New York, OUP: 2005).

strengthening its positions in global arena as well as develop its goodwill – the “European brand”. It is understood that the “European way” of international and global influence is the influence of “soft power” and “civilian power”. That is why the European Union maintains relations with various cooperation groups as well as individual countries of the world. The question, however, is whether this policy works in favor of European internal unity and common foreign relations.

In case of Cuba, the positivity of such policy is evident. Unlike the United States of America, the European Union has never taken such strict measures similar to Helms Burton act setting economic blockade. The interests of Europe in Cuba are then understood to be too strong to break the connections and the European Union, therefore, gains position of an alternative cooperating world power to Cuba substituting or “competing” with others.

2.2.2.1. The Global Players: USA, China, and New Global Players

As the European Union has been gradually gaining its importance outside its borders, other influential countries of the world, of course, did not stay behind, and have worked on their connections throughout the world as well. When mentioning “world powers” it is important that during the last twenty years, the meaning of this term has been significantly changed. Also, as Erikson and Minson say, Cuba’s international relations have changed remarkably with new partnerships emerging as well as old alliances unraveling⁶⁷.

To explain the shift of the existence of world powers at the break of the century, a very important milestone of the whole transformation to Globalization was the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Organization of Economic Interdependence, also known as “Comecon” (see 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). With the collapse, the Cold War and bipolar world of two world leaders, USA and USSR, ended and the world politics became suddenly unipolar with the hegemony of the United States. Lately, as Kegley and Wittkopf mention, the hegemony of this world leader is being gradually transformed to a more multifaceted world with the United States, the European Union, Russia, China,

⁶⁷ Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson, “Cuba and China: the new face of an old relationship”, *Hemisphere*, 22 September 2006, <http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/national-security-international/3975916-1.html> (accessed 7 March 2011).

and Japan as key players⁶⁸. Responsibility of managing the world security has therefore moved from one nation to a shared duty.

Consequently, the interests and engagement in Cuban problems have spread as well. Nowadays, it is not only The United States of America and Spain who are counted as having influence on Cuba. Together with Spain, the rest of the European Union must also be counted and furthermore, there are existing important interests of China and Venezuela.

As for the current state of United States' influence on, interests in, and relations with the Republic of Cuba, the most striking factor has been the embargo imposed already in 1960. Reasons for immediate imposition soon after the revolution were the economic struggles over oil and sugar refineries in Cuba and Cuban nationalization of the possessions of US companies in Cuba⁶⁹. After the imposition the US-Cuban relations froze with the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba and triggering off the Cuban Missile Crisis⁷⁰, probably the worst crisis of the Cold War. The embargo has been gradually edited onwards to the latest version anchored within the judicial system of the USA as The Helms-Burton Act of 1996. This Act has been lately further expanded. For example, in 2009, travel restrictions for US citizens and residents were lifted and the volume of allowed money exchange between the countries increased⁷¹. In 2010, however, President Barack Obama extended the act through September 14th, 2011⁷².

Through this late development, the government of the United States has shown Cuba a clear gesture a proactive approach in terms of lifting the economic limitations as well as adherence to promotion of the development of the Cuban society towards democratic changes and liberty. As President Obama pointed out during a pre-election televised discussion "It is important to the United States not just to talk to its friends but

⁶⁸ Charles Kegley and E. R Wittkopf, *World Politics Trends and Transformation*, (London: Thomson Learning, 2006): 123.

⁶⁹ Richard Gott, *Kuba: nové dějiny*, 1st ed. (Praha: BB/art, 2005): 230-1, 237.

⁷⁰ Library of Congress, "Cuban missile crisis", *The Library of Congress, Cold War*, 2010, <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html> (accessed 6 April 2011).

⁷¹ The Huffington Post, "Obama lifting Cuba travel restrictions", *The Huffington Post*, 14 April 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/13/some-cuba-travel-restrict_n_186197.html, (accessed 6 April 2011).

⁷² The White House, "Presidential Memorandum – Continuation of Authorities Under the Trading with the Enemy Act" The White House, 2 September 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/02/presidential-memorandum-continuation-authorities-under-trading-with-enem> (accessed 4 April 2011).

also to its enemies”⁷³. Unlike his precursor, he claimed that he would meet with the Cuban officials without any pre-conditions as the meeting of the President of the United States must not serve as an “earned privilege”⁷⁴ which reinforces the sense that the United States stand above the rest of the world.

It is clear that the United States of America have recently improved their work towards normalizing their relations with Cuba. Similarly to the European Union practice, President Obama said that he sees the liberty of the Cuban people as “the starting point for policy in Cuba”⁷⁵ Also, even despite the existence of the embargo, the United States has very strong interests in Cuba. Supporting this, regardless of the embargo imposed for more than fifty years, the value of American trade exchange is very high. USA ranks as the 5th most important importer as well as overall trade partner. Therefore, it is possible to presume that they will keep their position of a key influential country to Cuba for now as well as in future. The reasons are clearly set. It is the promotion of democracy and liberty to the island nation, interests in development and trade, and the restoration of connections of Cubans living in the USA with the ones in Cuba. However, as it is evident, USA, even though easing the communication will not lift up the restrictions imposed due to incompatibility of the ideas and practices of the Cuban regime with basic and founding ideas of USA, which they promote and stand for.

Reviewing the state of foreign affairs and cooperation between the Republic of Cuba and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), one can understand certain reasons of the position of Cuba in global arena. Providing that PRC is a communist country⁷⁶ of a booming development, existence of certain mutual sympathies and cooperation is expected. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, relations of China with Cuba are “friendly and cooperative” with China supporting Cuba in rejection of US embargo policy and Cuba backing China in the issues of Taiwan and Tibet⁷⁷.

On the other hand, Chinese socialism works on a new basis of socialist market economy and importantly differs from the one of 20th century Soviet Union. Therefore,

⁷³ CNN, “Obama, Clinton agree to disagree”, *CNN*, 21 February 2008, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/21/debate.main/index.html#cnnSTCVideo> (accessed 6 April 2011).

⁷⁴ YouTube, “Clinton, Obama on Cuba” *YouTube*, 22 February 2008, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJtp-PPNc&feature=related> (accessed 6 April 2011).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Juan Carlos Espinoza, “Civil Society in Cuba: The Logic Emergence in Comparative Perspective”, 1999, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.124.5754> (accessed 11 April 2011).

⁷⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Cuba – bilateral relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/lmzs/gjlb/3488/> (accessed 11 April 2011).

Cuba, plunged into recession in 1990s, did not find in China its “next big brother” but only an important business partner and a country willing to invest money but without any risk of undermining the influence of the United States in the region. As Magnier quotes Guo Shuyong, an international relations professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China “respects U.S. influence in the region” and does not intend to “push too much in that direction”⁷⁸.

Furthermore, as Mr. Corbalán mentioned in the interview, trade connections between PRC and Cuba frequently suffer from unwillingness of the Chinese to make business with Cuba due to Cuban haphazard behavior in negotiating and instability in keeping up with commitments such as on time payments (see appendix 4, p. 95). Similarly to this, Frank mentions that Chinese authorities expressed “concern” about inefficiency of Cuban debt payment postponement and ineffectiveness of Havana’s outdated investment strategies. Chinese corporations, as well, according to Frank, “are often hesitant” to do business with Cuba without “government guarantees”. Chinese companies, despite the mentioned problems, continue to strengthen their positions in Cuban market as well as deepen cooperation with Cuban authorities. As Martinho said, traditional Chinese products which are present all over the world, such as clothing or cheap vehicles are possible to see in Cuba as well (see appendix 4, p 82). China continues to buy Cuban nickel as well as develops activities in petroleum industry. As Horta mentions, China’s PetroChina leads active talks with Cuban authorities in 2008. Also SINOPEC, another Chinese petroleum corporation is reported to be drilling oil off the Cuban shore⁷⁹. Even despite China’s very high ranking between Cuba’s trade partners (see appendix 1, p...), presence of Chinese petroleum companies, high Cuban debt to China estimated in 2010 to \$4,9 billion⁸⁰, and two presidential visits^{81,82} of Hu Jintao in Cuba in last seven years, China is not even by Cubans perceived as a key partner. As Ms. Holcová stated,

⁷⁸ Mark Magnier, “US is Watching China’s Latin American Moves”, *The Los Angeles Times*, 15 April 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/15/world/fg-china15/2> (accessed 11 April 2011).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Reuters, “China restructures Cuba’s debt, backs reform“, *Reuters*, 23 December 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/23/cuba-china-debt-idUSN2313446920101223> (accessed 11 April 2011).

⁸¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “President Hu Jintao Arrives at Havana and Starts State Visit to Cuba”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbj/zjg/lmzsg/gjlb/3488/3490/t171661.htm> N2313446920101223 (accessed 11 April 2011).

⁸² Loro Horta, “A Brave New World: China Embraces the Caribbean”, *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 2009: 426.

“USA and China are world powers but they are too distant from the Cuban ideals, traditions and ideas. USA are controversial from the fundamentals of their foreign policy towards Cuba, and China, in terms of Cuban view, is looked down on as and functions only as a major trade partner“. She overall pointed out that Cuba’s government’s interests do not align with Chinese style and that “Cuba will never become China” in terms of politics and society (see appendix 4, p. 88-89).

Similarly, Mr. Kurfürst remarked that Cuba might in the future follow the Chinese model of restructuring its economy, but Cuban cultural and social models constitute a strong limitation and that China is not a “role model” for Cuba (see appendix 4, p.90). Overall, PRC is nowadays simply playing politics of opening-up to the world through trade. As the Ministry of foreign affairs of PRC states, concerning the Caribbean, what they do is a “win – win strategy”⁸³, meaning a good business without any interest of profound political or ideological influences.

Additionally, even though not being a world power, Venezuela, ranks among the most influential countries for Cuba as well. Concerning the political closeness of the Castro government with the president Hugo Chávez as well as vivid trade and bilateral projects, is the influence obvious⁸⁴. Supporting this, the creation of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) has to be taken into account as well. ALBA was established by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 and later joined by Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines⁸⁵.

The alliance was based on the ideas of an alternative to the hegemony of the USA in the Americas, the celebration of withdrawal from Spanish hence European colonial system and therefore Latin self-sufficiency. The cooperation of the member-states is further based on bartering of services, products and natural resources (Venezuela’s oil subsidies for Cuba’s healthcare workers) and working on establishing a common currency for the member states of the bloc called “Sucre”⁸⁶. Also, with promotion of general development through Bolivarian politics, nationalization of key

⁸³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean“, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm> (accessed 11 April 2011).

⁸⁴ BBC News, “Wikileaks reveal US concern on Cuba-Venezuela ties”, *BBC*, 1 December 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11883465> (accessed 4 April 2011).

⁸⁵ ALBA – Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, “Qué es el ALBA”, ALBA, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2080> (accessed 4 April 2011).

⁸⁶ Aljazeera, “Bolivia Summit Adopts New Currency”, *Aljazeera - Americas*, 17 October 2009, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/10/2009101712255748516.html> (accessed 5 April 2011).

industry and emphasis on social equality and Latin American traditions⁸⁷ has Venezuela approximates itself to Cuba's state-planned economy system.

Concerning all mentioned World powers, the European Union is an equal partner. In terms of Cuba and a way of influence on it, the European Union led by Spain however holds a unique position. The connection of European and Cuban culture, trading companies and step-by-step approximation opens for Europe certain possibilities of improving the level of life quality of Cubans as well as profiting from possible opening of Cuban market or perhaps transformation of Cuban planned economy to a market one. Importantly, as Martinho mentioned, the European Union's activities connected with the island should not be understood as competitive to the activities of neither of mentioned world powers which actively engage in Cuban political and business matters (see appendix 4, p. 84).

To sum up this, all mentioned world powers and Venezuela have different approaches towards trade and political cooperation with Cuba. Also, their attitudes towards future development of the island nations differ and thus range from a total blockade of USA to close cooperation and barter strategies of Venezuela. Even though it is not given as a key reason by any of the mentioned political entities, oil reserves in the Cuban territory of the Caribbean seems to play quite an important role. European as well as Chinese and Venezuela's companies have already engaged with Cuba in terms of oil business. Even though it may seem as a competition over hegemony in the island, it is not the case. All interviewed respondents have pointed out that neither EU, nor PRC, nor does USA have such tendencies. Only Venezuela asserts polity of opposition towards USA and US key position on the American continent. In terms of the European Union's position of a key influential power, there is therefore a space for cooperation with other world powers engaging in Cuba.

2.2.2.2. EU's Global Influence Aspirations and Development

Developing the idea of possible cooperation of world powers on Cuba's development opens the topic of aspirations of the European Union in global arena. The case of the Republic of Cuba and the development of the European approach of civilian

⁸⁷ BBC News, "Profile: Bolivia's President Evo Morales", *BBC*, 12 January 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12166905> (accessed 5 April 2011).

power strategy towards the nation may show the reasons of Europe having strong global influence.

Since the end of Cold War, the European continent has undergone a long journey of internal transformation. However, having gradually formed the European Community and later the Union predestined European nations to act conjointly and internationally. Nowadays, Europe is facing the challenge of transformation on the outside. This, however, more than 20 years after the fall of Berlin Wall and after the end of bilateral world, seem to be still only developing and Europe's aspirations of a single player of the "game" of global powers seems to be not evolved fully yet.

Supporting this, Shapiro and Witney describe still unsettled European approach towards United States as stuck in the "junior" role in the partnership and claim that the EU member-states have not managed to "shake off" their learned behaviors and strategies from the era of American domination⁸⁸. Europe has been for decades divided between two hegemonies. Nowadays, its integration serves to implement its aspirations of a global leader into practice and this takes time.

Also, as it has been mentioned in this thesis, individual member states keep on maintaining their individual interests. As Mr. Kurfürst mentioned, European way of creating its own global position is very different and more difficult from those of United States and China as the Union is not a single-nation political entity (see appendix 4, p. 92).

Even though holding a position of a substantial political entity in the global relations, the European Union, compared to other world leaders, is currently facing a problem which limits its position of a global leader. It is the slow pace of development into an internally coherent global player with externally comprehensible goals and strategies.

However, it is important to realize that the system of the European Union and the structure of functioning of EU's foreign policies are unexampled and therefore this unique system has to be understood as "developing". Furthermore, goals of the union, so far, have not been profoundly set either and the fact that the decisions are not taken that "briskly" actually means that the system works as it was planned. Contemporary functioning of CFSP towards Cuba can serve as an example. As Jaroslav Kurfürst pointed out about the member-states work:

⁸⁸ Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, *Towards a post-American Europe: A power audit of EU-US relations*, (London: European Council on Foreign Relations ECFR, November 2009): 7.

“The fact that they are not reaching the consensus means that it actually works. The ‘commonness’ of the European Union’s view is not imposed by one single member-state” (see appendix 4, p. 90).

The aspirations of the EU as one of the global leaders of the multipolar world of the 21st century are therefore understood as a still developing. On the other hand, Europe is bringing a new way of handling the international affairs. Its approach which is multilateral as well as unilateral may seem confusing but it is believed that it is functioning and democratic way of decision-making and cooperating with others as voices of all the member-states must be taken into account and the eventual policy approved unanimously.

2.2.2.3. Role of the Holy See

The Catholic Church is a very influential element in the world politics. The presence of the archbishops and bishops in Cuba which are subordinated to the Holy See seated in the Vatican City is, therefore, a crucial power in terms of diplomacy on the island. The Republic of Cuba is known to be a country of a high percentage of religious people practicing predominantly Roman Catholicism⁸⁹. This fact works well as a tool for influencing the Cuban regime in order to bring the development of society and promoting freedom and human rights adherence in the country.

Going back to the 1990s, a very important step of the Holy See was the visit of the Pope in Cuba. The Polish Pope John Paul II made a historic visit to Cuba in January 1998⁹⁰, paying the first papal visit to the island ever. Therefore this was for the Castro regime a very important event and a sign of a positive approach of the Catholic Church towards possible development of communication with the Cuban government. However, the visit of John Paul II who played an important role in the disintegration of the communism in Europe, carried a meaning of the Church supporting the Christian tradition as well as development towards opening of the island to the world and promotion of freedom and social justice⁹¹.

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report 2009 - Cuba”, U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127386.htm> (accessed April 19 2011).

⁹⁰ CNN World, “The Papal Visit to Cuba”, *CNN*, 24 January 1998, http://articles.cnn.com/1998-01-24/world/9801_24_pope.cuba_1_lina-ruz-havana-castros?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 20 April 2011).

⁹¹ The Vatican: The Holy See, “Welcome ceremony in Cuba: Address of John Paul II. 21. January 1998”, The Vatican: The Holy See, January 1998,

Nonetheless, apart from the crucial visit of the Pope, the communication between the Cuban government and the Catholic Church has been mainly implemented by His Eminence Cardinal Jaime Lucas Ortega y Alamino the Archbishop of Archdiocese of Havana. His Eminence, being a former prisoner of the Cuban regime in 1960s was dubbed the Bishop of Diocese of Pinar del Rio in 1978 and in 1981 the Archbishop of Havana and proclaimed a cardinal by John Paul II in 1994. During his career, he has importantly promoted the development of Cuban society and freedom and strengthening the role of the Catholic Church in Cuba. The role of Church, thanks to him, has gained importance with the establishment of Cuban Caritas Internationalis branch in 1991⁹². With the work of Caritas, the Catholic Church takes part in providing emergency, humanitarian assistance to the poor and all the Cuban people in need. Also, the existence of Caritas in Cuba, in fact, gives evidence for the real situation of the society. As Caritas states on their website, the poverty in Cuba is officially non-existent⁹³, however the very existence of Caritas itself logically challenges that assertion.

Apart from national activities of the Roman Catholic Church such as those of Caritas or individual projects of establishing parishes or Churches around the country, the Church engages itself in the field of diplomatic relations and talks with the Cuban government. Most importantly, recent extradition of political prisoners was advocated by the Roman Catholic Church. Specifically, H.E. Jaime Ortega led the talks with President Raúl Castro Ruz and Spanish officials and managed to convince the Cuban leaders to ease the situation of prisoners arrested during the Black Spring of 2003⁹⁴ and release fifty-two⁹⁵ of the “Group of 75” during the period of the second half of 2010 and the first half of 2011. Together with the fifty-two dissenters imprisoned in 2003, other

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1998/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19980121_lahavana-arrival_en.html (accessed 29 April 2011).

⁹² The Holy See Press Office, “College of Cardinals Biographical Notes: Ortega y Alamino Card. Jaime Lucas”, The Vatican: The Holy See, 24 February 2006,

http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/cardinali_biografie/cardinali_bio_ortega-y-alamino_jl_en.html (accessed 20 April 2011).

⁹³ Caritas Internationalis, “Caritas Internationalis – Cuba”, Caritas Internationalis,

http://www.caritas.org/worldmap/latin_america/cuba.html (accessed 20 April 2011).

⁹⁴ BBC News, “Spain to welcome Cuban dissidents”, *BBC*, 7 April 2011,

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13003125> (accessed 20 April 2011).

⁹⁵ Sara Miller Llana, “Why is Cuba releasing 52 political prisoners?”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 August 2010: 1.

prisoners of conscience were freed. As Fox News reports, Until April 8th, 2011, total of 115 Cuban prisoners have been released and left the country⁹⁶.

This important intervention of the Roman Catholic Church has taken place at very opportune time. It followed international critique of the existence of imprisonment for political reasons in Cuba, weekly protests of the Cuba's leading dissident group of women related to prisoners "Damas en Blanco" and the death of imprisoned hunger-striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo. Respecting the importance of the extradition of the prisoners and the value of the work of the Roman Catholic Church and Spanish officials, it still seems that through the release the regime in Cuba is, in fact, getting rid of the "undesirable dissent", sending them abroad. Most of the dissidents were freed and re-united with their families in Spain, Chile, the United States and the Czech Republic. As Mr. José Gabriel Ramón Castillo pointed out in the interview, the extradition from the prison is in fact a way of banishment (see appendix 4, p. 99). Also, during the releasing, number of jailed opponents of the regime refused to be freed and sent to Spain. "Only 12 from the "Group of 75" jailed in March 2003, remain in Cuba, having refused exile to Spain"⁹⁷. Reacting to this Cuba stopped the process of extraditing⁹⁸. On the other hand, as Voss reports, the regime has not granted exit visas to a previously mentioned dissident Guillermo Fariñas who was invited to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in December 2010 to receive the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought⁹⁹. This clearly shows that the Roman Catholic Church lead by the Holy See holds a strong position in terms of influence on the Castrist regime in Cuba. Reviewing the releasing of the prisoners, however, unveils that the regime does not execute these moves in order to pursue liberalization or improvement of the state of Cuban civil society.

In case of improving relations with Cuba, a kind of cooperation or diplomatic connections of the Holy See and the European External Action Service or the European Union as a whole is seen as very weak or non-existent. As Holcová, Corbalán, Castillo and Kurfürst agreed, the Holy See, in this problem, plays a role of an interlocutor and mediator (see appendix 4, p. 89, 92, 96, 101). As Martinho mentioned, EEAS maintains

⁹⁶ Fox News, "Spain announces end of prisoner releases in Cuba", *FOX*, 8 April 2011, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/04/08/spain-announces-end-prisoner-releases-cuba/> (accessed 29 April 2011).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Lidovky.cz, "Kuba pustila dva disidenty na svobodu. Proti jejich vůli", *Lidové Noviny*, 13 February 2011, http://www.lidovky.cz/kuba-propustila-dva-disidenty-na-svobodu-proti-jejich-vuli-po7-/In_zahranici.asp?c=A110213_174035_In_zahranici_jv (accessed 20 April 2011).

⁹⁹ Michael Voss, "Cuban dissident Guillermo Farinas refused exit visa", *BBC*, 15 December 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11997212> (accessed 20 April 2011).

up to date connections with the Holy See diplomats. Nevertheless, there are not any projects being carried out conjointly (see appendix 4, p. 84). This places Vatican into a favorable position of an independent player , and that is probably why it has been able to maintain the talks over the extradition with such success.

2.2.3 EU's Developmental Aid

Apart from the substantial financial aid provided by the European Union through the Council's decisions (see 3, p. 7), European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important role and a substantial amount of financial aid flowing from EU is provided through them. As Erikson claims, European governments do not expose any limitations on the activity of NGOs in Cuba. The activity of these organizations in fields of human rights, society development, healthcare, or education, is highly valued even though it is not centrally organized. NGOs in Cuba have the potential to get in touch with the people and thus influence the development of Cuban civil society. Erikson further mentions that some NGOs from Europe even cooperate with Cuban experts in order to provide healthcare and especially fight HIV-AIDS in developing countries of the third world.¹⁰⁰ Among others, an educational NGO British Council providing Cubans with connection to British books, films, scholarships, and so on can be named.¹⁰¹ Concerning human rights, a very active NGO in the field of healthcare is, for example, "Caribbean Medical Transport." This organization arranges projects of humanitarian aid in Cuba in a form of sending the medical treatment in mass-transport containers, organizes teacher volunteers to come to Cuba.¹⁰²

Also, concerning various NGOs that are active in Cuban questions, "People in Need" can be also mentioned. Within this organization, the mentioned International Committee for Democracy in Cuba (ICDC) (see 3.1.3. p. 9), has been created and the ICDC office is currently run in the People in Need's headquarters in Prague, Czech Republic. To provide an image of the activities of "People in Need" in Cuba, for example the project "Hotel Cuba" can be mentioned. This project focuses not on

¹⁰⁰ Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on Evaluation of the EU Common Position on Cuba 2951st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting Luxembourg, 15 Jun 2009", Council of the European Union, 15 June 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108471.pdf (accessed 30 April 2010)

¹⁰¹ British Council Cuba, "About us/some of our services," British Council, <http://www.britishcouncil.org/cuba.htm>, (accessed 8 May 2010).

¹⁰² Caribbean Medical Transport, "Home", Caribbean Medical Transport, http://cubacaribe.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=27 (accessed 9 May 2010).

Cubans, but rather on European tourists travelling to Cuba. The objectives of this project are to raise the awareness of the tourists about the real life in Cuba and encourage them to take an active part in providing aid in Cuba by bringing with them to their vacation at least books, newspapers, medicine, or even portable radios. As “People in Need” claim, such things are highly valued by Cubans as their access to various medicines and mainly information is limited and oppressed.

According to Gunn, there are numerous NGOs operating in Cuba. However, in her paper, she raises doubts of the independence of these NGOs over the Cuban government. Concretely, she says that the NGOs in centralized and one-party system, the NGOs have to follow various rules applied by the regime. As the NGOs have to make compromises between the needs of the people and the governmental requirements and conditions, they are becoming rather “puppets” of the system than inciters of functioning civil society and democracy.¹⁰³ According to this, the developmental aid cannot be considered as a full-value tool of Euro-Cuban cooperation. NGOs support the Cuban society with the money flowing from EU, but on the other hand face clashes with Cuban government. The Cuban society definitely profits from these projects, but the activities of NGO do not seem help to further develop reciprocal cooperation.

3. Czech Foreign Relations with Cuba

In order to depict the differences within the number of approaches throughout the European Union, this chapter provides a study of Czech foreign relations with Cuba. The Czech Republic and the Republic of Cuba have had troublesome relations since the early 1990s when the Czech Republic was established after the Velvet revolution in 1989 and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Velvet divorce, in 1992. There are many factors influencing such state, both historical and contemporary. Thus the third chapter, specifically, provides information concerning development of Czech individual approach towards the Republic of Cuba, its circumstances, reasons, and interests.

¹⁰³Gillian Gunn, “Cuba’s NGOs: Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil Society”, Trinity Washington University, http://www.trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/caribbean%20briefings/Cubas_NGOs.pdf (accessed: 9 May 2010): 2-3,17.

3.1. Information on Historical Development

Existence of relations of the Czech Republic and Cuba dates back to 1918 when Czechoslovakia was established. As Opatrný mentions, Cuba was among the first nations to recognize independent Czechoslovakia after the end of the 1st World War¹⁰⁴.

Cooperation of the two nations has been dramatically shifting throughout the 20th century depending on affiliation of politics in both countries as well as world politics development. Firstly, the cooperation was based on sugar trade solicitation and both countries maintained close trade-based diplomatic relations¹⁰⁵. The relations were developing mainly positively in the mood of lively business. Also, during the years of 2nd World War, being on the side of Allies, Cuba has officially recognized the Czech exile government in London and Czechoslovakia opened its independent embassy in Havana in 1942¹⁰⁶.

As mentioned before, during this period Cuba was led by Fulgencio Batista and his “puppet” government importantly influenced by the United States. Czechoslovakia, quite understandably, maintained correct approach towards allied nation in the times of war, valuing the importance of the trade with commodities Cuba offered.

3.1.1. Communist Cooperation

Major change in the relations has taken place during 1950s after Czechoslovak communist putsch in 1948 followed by the Cuban socialist revolution against Batista’s government gangsterism and the takeover of Fidel Castro in 1959. As previously mentioned (see: 2.1.), in 1959 Czechoslovakia, together with the Soviet Union, recognized newly established Cuban government led by the M-26-7 and soon after re-established Czech consulate in Havana. Since the beginning of 1960s, Czech-Cuban relations can be divided into two periods. Fast-growing cooperation of 1960s and 1970s and 1980s slower cooperation development within the system of Comecon influenced by the events of Prague Spring of 1968, Warsaw Pact invasion, and the period of “normalization” in Czechoslovakia.

¹⁰⁴ Josef Opatrný, “Československo-kubánské vztahy v období 1945-1989”, *Zahraničná Politika*, 30 June 2007, www.zahranicnapolitika.sk/index.php?id=231 (accessed 15 February 2011).

¹⁰⁵ Josef Opatrný, *Kuba* (Praha: Libri 2002):87.

¹⁰⁶ Josef Opatrný, “Československo-kubánské vztahy v období 1945-1989”, *Zahraničná Politika*, 30 June 2007, www.zahranicnapolitika.sk/index.php?id=231 (accessed 15 February 2011).

The system of cooperation in early 1960s was based on bilateral treaties. As Bortlová mentions, the first treaty between Czechoslovakia and Cuba was signed as early as 1960 and it regulated trade connections. Specifically, Czechoslovakia committed itself to provide Cuba with a loan of \$20 million with very favorable interest of 2.5% for ten years. The treaties were based on the export of goods, machinery, chemicals and food to Cuba in exchange for iron ore, cobalt ore, copper ore, chrome ore, nickel, coffee and tobacco¹⁰⁷. This cooperation was clearly very beneficial for the Cuban side. Importantly, in 1960, the Czechoslovak embassy in Cuba has begun a very important diplomatic institution as back then the Soviet Union did not have any representation in the island what so ever. Similarly, in 1962, the Czechoslovak embassy in the United States has gained higher importance when the embassy opened a new section representing interests of the Republic of Cuba¹⁰⁸.

Apart from such brisk recognition and speedy development of economic cooperation and diplomacy, the cooperation continued in deepening also in the cultural field. Certain connections between Cuba and Czechoslovakia have existed already during the World War 2. Czechoslovakia became known in Cuba thanks to the massacre of Lidice and Cubans named several neighborhoods, streets in Cuban cities after the Czech village destroyed by Nazis¹⁰⁹ and donated roses to the memorial site in the village¹¹⁰. Apart from this, a lively bilateral exchange of students between the two countries existed and therefore tighter connections were established between ordinary people of both nations. According to Bortlová, between 1960 and 1989 there were hundreds, according to partial records minimally 650, of Cuban students studying in Czechoslovakia. These, afterwards, commonly acquired influential positions in Cuban administration, various leading positions or diplomacy¹¹¹. Also, during 1960,

¹⁰⁷ Hana Bortlová, “Výstup vědeckého projektu RM 03/01/09 - Hospodářské vztahy Kuby a Československa v 60. až 80. letech”, Vědecký projekt MZV RM 03/01/09, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2009, http://www.mzv.cz/public/82/6b/2a/472119_356415_zkracena_verze_RM_03._01._09.pdf (accessed 27 April 2011): 2 – 3.

¹⁰⁸ Petr Pavlík, “Kubánská republika v ‘el período especial 1990-2000’”, in *Mezinárodní politika*, vol. 27, No. 3, 2003: 31-33.

¹⁰⁹ Lidice – memorial, “Ohlas Lidické tragedie ve světě 1942 – 2008”, Lidice – memorial, 2008, <http://www.lidice-memorial.cz/ViewAttachment.aspx/priloha.pdf?AttachmentID=48> (accessed 27 April 2011).

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Hana Bortlová, “Výstup vědeckého projektu RM 03/01/09 - Hospodářské vztahy Kuby a Československa v 60. až 80. letech”, Vědecký projekt MZV RM 03/01/09, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2009, http://www.mzv.cz/public/82/6b/2a/472119_356415_zkracena_verze_RM_03._01._09.pdf (accessed 27 April 2011): 9 – 10.

Czechoslovakia used to provide Cuba with various experts on development to expand Cuban economy, industry or politics. Among all, Mr. Valtr Komárek, who served as an advisor of Che Guevara in terms of economic development between 1964 and 1967, can be mentioned¹¹².

In terms of economy, the membership of Czechoslovakia in Comecon promised Cuba very lucrative trade conditions. With Cuba's accession to Comecon in 1976, Czechoslovakia became 2nd most active economic partner for Cuba with only the Soviet Union maintaining the level of economic cooperation highest¹¹³ among all of the council-member states. Nevertheless, in spite of Comecon membership has the Czechoslovak-Cuban cooperation during the break of 1960s and 1970s deteriorated. The relations were influenced by the societal changes in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the invasion of Soviet Union and allied armies of Warsaw Pact in order to suppress societal and political shift of Prague Spring. Evidence of a break between two eras of Czech-Cuban communist cooperation may be seen, for example, in the number of bilateral treaties concluded.

According to records of the Czech Embassy in Havana, between 1961 and 1968 there were concluded thirteen treaties, whilst between 1968 and 1975 only five treaties were carried out, with none between 1968 and 1971¹¹⁴. Also, as Bortlová mentions, the number of Cuban citizens studying or working on research in Czechoslovakia in the academic year 1967-68 have decreased due to the fact that some students had to "leave the country for ideological reasons"¹¹⁵.

During the period of 1970, and 1980, have the relations between the two Comecon member-states been stabilized. Czechoslovak "normalization" and the presidency of Gustáv Husák turned the country away from liberalization processes and attached the country to closer to its allies in the Soviet bloc including Cuba. Concerning cultural approximation, a cultural exchange was intensified with the establishment of

¹¹² Martin Miklošovič, "Rozhovor s Valtrem Komárkem, aneb Che Guevara – poslední politický romantik" Nekultura.cz, 23 January 2009, <http://www.nekultura.cz/film-rozhovor/rozhovor-s-valtrem-komarkem-aneb-che-guevara-posledni-politicky-romantik.html> (accessed 4May 2011).

¹¹³ Richard Gott, *Kuba: nové dějiny*, 1st ed. (Praha: BB/art, 2005): 360

¹¹⁴ Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana, "Souhrnná Teritoriální Informace Kuba", Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana, 1 April 2010, <http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/rubrika/kuba/1000788/> (accessed 22 February 2011).

¹¹⁵ Hana Bortlová, "Výstup vědeckého projektu RM 03/01/09 - Hospodářské vztahy Kuby a Československa v 60. až 80. letech", Vědecký projekt MZV RM 03/01/09, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2009, http://www.mzv.cz/public/82/6b/2a/472119_356415_zkracena_verze_RM_03._01._09.pdf (accessed 27 April 2011): 9.

the Committee for Czechoslovak – Cuban friendship in 1976¹¹⁶ and thus “revived” after the 1968 chill.

In terms of bilateral relations, this can be proved by several official visits of high representatives in both countries. As Opatrný states, already in 1970 a new consulate of Cuba was established in Bratislava and official press media – Cuban “Granma” and Czech “Rudé Právo” published articles depicting warm and friendly relationship of both countries based on mutual agreement, equal values and their membership in the socialist bloc.

Furthermore, a 1972 official visit of Fidel Castro in Prague can be seen as a key factor of approximation of Cuba and Czechoslovakia. The Cuban leader, according to Týden magazine, Castro paid official visit to Prague and was awarded an honorary doctorate in Law at Charles University¹¹⁷. Such honor is quite unusual and appears as Czechoslovak normalization regime needed to improve the relations and probably “impress” the Cuban revolution leader as much as possible and show Cuba and whole Comecon that the late 1960s retreat of Czechoslovakia was over. Cuba then entered Comecon in 1972.

Later, during 1970s and 1980s the cooperation between Cuba and Czechoslovakia, allied in Comecon, continued. Trade-related treaties were and contracts, once again, made more commonly and easily than in late 1960s. In the records of the Czech Embassy in Havana, there were some forty-two treaties concluded during the years of Comecon, which is between 1973 and 1991. This is more than ever before or after. In 1980, deterioration of the socialist economic system started to appear. As Bálek points out, the integration processes within the council were very slow and thus slowed down technological and economic development of the country¹¹⁸. Czechoslovakia, with its developed construction industry, carried a burden of subsidizing developing member-states of the council.

This planned system was quite unfavorable for Czechoslovakia. As Goodrich mentions, “Comecon was structured in such a way that the more economically developed members provided support for the less developed members in their major

¹¹⁶ Kuba Dnes, “O Nás”, Společnost česko-kubánského přátelství, 2011, http://www.kubadnes.cz//index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=6&Itemid=23 (accessed 27 April 2011).

¹¹⁷ Týden, “Fidel Castro – čestný doktor Univerzity Karlovy”, *Týden*, 2006, <http://test.tyden.cz/fotogalerie/fidel-castro-cestny-doktor-univerzity-karlovy/?imgOffset=6#foto-scroller> (accessed 1 May 2011).

¹¹⁸ Alexej Bálek, “Československá ekonomika v 80. letech 20. století”, in *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia*, Vol. 15 No. 7, 2007: 47.

economic sectors”¹¹⁹. Therefore, the addition of Cuba (9 million people) to Comecon in 1972 and Vietnam (40 million people) in 1978 quickly raised the burden of Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European bloc-members. Providing quantitative information, Goodrich points out that by 1987 “three-fourths of Comecon's overseas economic aid went to Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam”¹²⁰ Cuba served for Czechoslovakia a good outlet of their outdated and qualitatively uncompetitive goods that Czechs could not sell anywhere else as the western technologies were more advanced. Nevertheless, the exchange of goods and machinery for commodities or fruit from developing countries like Cuba was not adequate. International competitiveness of Comecon countries was much lower in comparison to the countries of Western Europe and the intra-Comecon trade was not fair. As Bálek mentions, the competitiveness of Czech economy was developing somewhat successfully before the adoption of soviet model which blocks the “freedom of intellectual development”¹²¹. With the society and economy dropping behind, Soviet leader Gorbachev started policies of “perestroika” (reconstruction) and “glasnost” (openness), This, without any enthusiasm of Fidel Castro, gradually led to the collapse of the whole bloc in 1989, dissolution of Comecon in 1991, and inherently, sharp deterioration and shift in Czech-Cuban relations.

3.1.2. Post-Communist Freeze

The year 1989 was a milestone in the history of Europe and the world of 20th century. The bloc of countries allied in Warsaw pact and Comecon under the leadership of Soviet Union has collapsed due to the pressure of economic ineffectiveness, inexistence of social development, competitiveness, and most notably problems of inexistence of free civil society, and liberty. With the end of the Cold War and the loss of support of Soviet Union, Cuba has lost an ally of Czechoslovakia as well. The love story of bearded Cuban revolutionaries and Czech socialists has turned into a quarrelsome relationship with accusations and bitter affairs. With the political turbulence of the break of 1980s and 1990s, Czechoslovakia became a democratic country, independent on the influence of USSR.

¹¹⁹ Malinda Goodrich, “A Country Study: Soviet Union (Former) – Appendix B: The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance – Soviet Union”, *The Library of Congress*, 2010, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/soviet_union/su_appnb.html (accessed 23 February 2011).

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Alexej Bálek, “Československá ekonomika v 80. letech 20. století”, in *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia*, Vol. 15 No. 7, 2007: 45.

Soon after the Velvet Revolution and democratic changes in Czechoslovakia, relations between the two countries had become troubled with numerous excesses. Firstly, already in January 1990, Cuban authorities deported one Czech reporter and the police physically attacked one cameraman of Czechoslovak Television¹²². Later, in 1990 an incident that may be referred to as “Embassy Crisis” occurred. On July 10th, 1990 a group of five Cuban dissidents demanding guarantees for travels to Europe and two students seeking political asylum entered the grounds of Czechoslovak Embassy. Czechoslovak Embassy press attaché Lubomír Hladík told Reuters during the crisis: “They are asking for guarantees to be able to work and engage in politics”¹²³. Nevertheless, the dissidents and student-activists after few days surrendered and left the embassy. After the incident Cuban officials accused Czechoslovakia from provocation which led to exchange of sharp-toned letters between Vaclav Havel and Fidel Castro. Havel, according to ČTK, asked for releasing of seven members of Cuban Democratic Integration Movement, whereas Castro understood this as a “shameful slander” and “gross violation of Cuban sovereignty”¹²⁴.

In 1990s, Czechoslovakia, under the administration of Václav Havel, clearly profiled itself as a democratic country condemning human rights infringement and fundamental rights guarantee failures of its own as well as others. Supporting this notion, in March 1990, Czechoslovakia supported a UNCHR commission-adopted resolution criticizing human rights violations in Cuba¹²⁵. Also, Czech Embassy in the United States closed down its section representing interests of Cuba.

However, both Cuba and newly democratic Czechoslovakia, together with their journalists, share a responsibility on worsening mutual relations and overall image of both countries. As Miller quotes Ondřej Kašina, then ČTK reporter in Havana:

“These days we’re more papal than the Pope. All what my editor wants is slanderous attacks on Castro. There’s an article I’m working on that I can’t interest him

¹²²Johanna Grohová, Pavel Pošusta and Martin Ehl, “Jak stát může pomoci, když má jeho občan problémy v cizině?”, *iDnes.cz*, 16 January 2001, http://cestovani.idnes.cz/jak-stat-muze-pomoci-kdyz-ma-jeho-obcan-problemy-v-cizine-pkv-/igsvet.aspx?c=A010116_104552_igsvet_hop (accessed 4 May 2011).

¹²³ Los Angeles Times, “2 Students Join 5 Cuban Activists Seeking Refuge in Czech Embassy”, *Los Angeles Times*, 10 July 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-10/news/mn-380_1_czech-embassy (accessed 3 May 2011).

¹²⁴ ČTK, “Czech Republic, Cuba - Former Friends, Now Opponents over Human Rights”, FIU Central Europe Online, 21 April 2000, <http://www2.fiu.edu/~fcf/czech42100.html> (accessed 3 May 2011).

¹²⁵ Ibid.

in about old American cars all over Havana. They don't understand back in Prague...”¹²⁶

With such limited approaches by the two countries, relations gradually worsened and diplomatic excesses multiplied. In 1992, previously mentioned reporter Kašina was beaten by the police and a leftist activist in Havana¹²⁷, and the following year, diplomatic relations of both countries were lowered to the level of chargé d'affaires after the disputation over Cuban debt to Czechoslovakia. Cuban officials refused to discuss the debt due to peaking political differences between the two countries¹²⁸ and the Cuban administration has not proceeded to pay the Czech claim until nowadays. In the end of 2010, the debt of Cuba to the Czech Republic reached a total of 6.447.054.000 Czech Korunas¹²⁹ which is approximately €265.7 million. Again, this is a problem with a very little chance of solution in foreseeable future. As Czech Vice-minister of Finance Tomáš Zídek pointed out:

“We have even hired two companies to negotiate. They, however, did not manage to negotiate anything. I discussed this with the vice-governor of Banco Exterior de Cuba. They have a basic attitude saying that, we became poor thanks to you because you have dissolved Comecon, so forgive us the debt. It is hard to deal with them”¹³⁰.

Following further relations of 1990s, official diplomatic connection was limited. As Pavlík mentions, for example all economic relations of both countries are carried out only on the basis of the Treaty of economic and trade cooperation from 1996 and a treaty between chambers of commerce of both countries from 2001. As he points out that this situation is caused by “Concrete foreign-policy moves of the Czech side based on newly defined national interests are the reason why the Cuban side refuses to accede to sign some formerly prepared treaties”¹³¹.

¹²⁶ Tom Miller, *Trading with the Enemy: A Yankee Travels Through Castro's Cuba* (New York: Basic Books, 2008): 64.

¹²⁷ Pavel Novotný, “Vztahy mezi Prahou a Havanou jsou stále chladnější”, *Lidové Noviny*, 19 April 2000: 3.

¹²⁸ ČTK, “Czech Republic, Cuba - Former Friends, Now Opponents over Human Rights”, FIU Central Europe Online, 21 April 2000, <http://www2.fiu.edu/~fcf/czech42100.html> (accessed 3 May 2011).

¹²⁹ Ministerstvo Financí České Republiky, “Roční souhrnná zpráva o stavu a vývoji zahraničních pohledávek ČR v roce 2010”, Ministerstvo Financí České Republiky, 20 April 2011, http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xchg/mfcr/xsl/vf_agendaCKA_zahr_pohled_61793.html (accessed 2 May 2011).

¹³⁰ Jaroslav Skalický, “Česko má ve světě 22 miliard korun. Skoro třetinu dluží Kuba”, *Český Rozhlas*, 6 April 2011, http://www.rozhlas.cz/zpravy/domaciekonomika/_zprava/875368 (accessed 2 May 2011).

¹³¹ Petr Pavlík, “Kubánská republika v ‘el período especial 1990-2000’”, in *Mezinárodní politika*, vol. 27, No. 3, 2003: 31.

With the existence of, limited cooperation and treaties, a stir between the countries has become to some extent quite common. In 2000, Czech and Cuban administration of foreign affairs have imposed reciprocal visa requirements for all travelers¹³². The situation further worsened with the Czech Republic, together with Poland, has propounded a resolution criticizing the state of human rights in Cuba at United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva (see 2.1.3). Cuban authorities then reacted sharply, condemning Czechs describing them as “lackeys” of the Washington office¹³³. On the other hand, Czech Vice-minister for foreign affairs Martin Palouš said during the interview with Helena Landovská:

“Accusations in a mood of a stiff Orwell’s newspeak brings us back to the past with which we have already dealt with. We are not USA’s lackey. Of course, we closely cooperate with the United States in terms of NATO or general political dialog within the international community. This has also been the case of this resolution. Our key partners in carrying through this situation were EU-member states, and democratic countries of Latin America. However, I have to emphasize that our concept of human rights is a part of a small Central European country with a totalitarian experience and therefore is not and cannot be fully identical with the concept supported by USA”¹³⁴. This was the first time when disputations of Cuba and the Czech Republic came to the surface within the international community. In diplomacy, therefore, the Czech Republic has become a clear opponent of the Cuban regime. Cuban authorities realized that Czech diplomatic service cannot be undervalued and that their position is firm and valued internationally. Therefore, their irritation with the Czech policies escalated excessively.

The Czech Republic renewed the continuation of its pre-war democratic values of Central and Western European societies. However, Cuban regime has understood this as a betrayal of an old ally. Thus, in the mood of criticism of opportunism and betrayal, massive protests took place in front of the Czech Embassy in Havana. Immediately after the commission’s approval of the resolution, approximately one hundred thousand people started protesting in front of the premises of the Czech embassy in Havana. According to CTK (Czech Press Agency) a representative of United Nations Cuban

¹³² ČTK, “Na Kubu od 19. ledna nutno jet s vízem“, *Večerník Praha*, 7 January 2000: 3.

¹³³ Alvarado Godoy and Percy Francisco, “Las meretrices de Bush en Ginebra” *CUBA SOCIALISTA Revista teórica y política*, April 2004, <http://www.cubasocialista.cu/texto/cs0042.htm> (accessed 5 May 2011).

¹³⁴ Helena Landovská, “Náměstek ministra zahraničí Martin Palouš řekl Právu”, *Právo*, 25 April 2000: 1.

Association, Carlos Amat, claimed that the resolution was engineered by Washington. The protesters slogans criticizing the Czech diplomacy were “puppets”, “lackeys”, or “betrayers”.

With such a complicated situation the cooperation between Cuba and the Czech Republic continued exclusively through trade. Nevertheless, probably the most striking excess of the bilateral relations took place in January 2001 during the peaking diplomatic actions of the Czech Republic criticizing state of human rights in Cuba on the field of United Nations. Two Czech nationals Ivan Pilip and Jan Bubeník travelled to Cuba and after meeting with Cuban dissidents were on January 12th detained and prevented from contacting the Czech Embassy¹³⁵.

As Opatrný mentions, Ivan Pilip’s and Jan Bubeník’s visit to Cuba was a turning point within the Czech-Cuban affairs, as this was the first time since 1989 Cuban regime intervened harshly in activities of foreign/Czech individuals in Cuba¹³⁶. Similarly to previous affairs, this one caused a strong irritation of Cuban officials but also became an international topic. What has made this situation problematic was the fact that Ivan Pilip was at that time a high-level representative of the Czech government, specifically a Member of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and that they travelled to Havana under the project of The House of Freedom, an American NGO, closely connected and financed by the United States Congress¹³⁷. According to Pilip’s testimony, the two arrived to Cuba in order to visit and support Cuban dissidents, bringing along a computer and medicine provided by the Freedom House organization in order to support the dissidents¹³⁸. Shortly after meeting with representatives of Cuban opposition were the two Czechs detained.

Connections with foreigners are very important for the Cuban dissent. Dissidents, as José Gabriel Ramón Castillo and Pavla Holcová mention, highly value material or moral support as they are constantly being harassed by the regime (see appendix 4, p.88, 98-99). Therefore, activities of NGOs can be clearly seen as

¹³⁵ MZV ČR, “Prohlášení MZV k zadržování českých občanů na Kubě”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 16 January 2001, http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/udalosti_a_media/prohlaseni_a_stanoviska/archiv_prohlaseni_a_stanovisek/archiv_2001/x2001_01_16_bubenik_pilip_zadrzeni_na_kube.html (accessed 7 May 2011).

¹³⁶ Josef Opatrný, *Kuba* (Praha: Libri 2002):88.

¹³⁷ Freedom House, “Freedomhouse Condemns Cuban Government’s Arrest of Czech Citizens”, Freedom House, 16 January 2001, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=91> (accessed 7 May 2011).

¹³⁸ Pavel Matocha, *Castrovi Vězni* (Praha: Jota 2002):163-169.

beneficial, regarding facts of oppressing laws, inexistence of multipolarity, freedom of speech and human rights adherence.

On the other hand, Cuban government officials perceive such activities of foreigners as either interference or even as contra-revolutionary efforts backed by USA, in this case the United States Congress. Concerning bilateral situation between the United States and Cuba, it is understandable that non-governmental organizations supported by USA governmental financial sources are not perceived well and a priori understood as seeking disintegration of Cuban political system. Still, the reaction of Cuban government-run daily “Granma” can be understood as rather hasty. Specifically, a “conspiracy against the revolution”¹³⁹ was the reason why the two Czechs were detained and ordered to be put to the court.

On the contrary, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Freedom House, and multiple Czech media have harshly criticized these steps. In the reaction on detaining of Pilip and Bubeník, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the Czech nationals during their stay in Cuba “have not deviated any principles that the Czech Republic, similarly to other democratic countries, respects”¹⁴⁰. The heated situation took almost a month with Pilip and Bubeník being arrested for a total of twenty-five days and released only after an intervention from Czech high representation and, importantly, presence of other international community representatives mediating the situation.

According to Brezovská, Petr Pithart, at the time the chair of Czech Senate, personally visited Fidel Castro in Havana assuring that “Pilip and Bubeník were not American agents” and that with their deeds they “did not represent interests of the Czech Republic”¹⁴¹. Pithart succeeded during the talks with Castro and managed to cool down the situation and prevented the Czechs to be sentenced. However, they had to stay in Cuba detained. According to Pithart, Castro commented on this that releasing the two with Pithart leaving would be “too spectacular”¹⁴². Later release of the pair was achieved only after a meeting of Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) led by Mr. Anders

¹³⁹ MZV ČR, “Prohlášení MZV k zadržování českých občanů na Kubě”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 16 January 2001, http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/udalosti_a_media/prohlaseni_a_stanoviska/archiv_prohlaseni_a_stanovisek/archiv_2001/x2001_01_16_bubenik_pilip_zadrzeni_na_kube.html (accessed 7 May 2011).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Kateřina Brezovská, “Předseda Senátu Petr Pithart přiletěl v úterý na Kubu, aby osobně promluvil s Fidelem Castrem o zadržovaných Čechách”, *Radio Praha*, 30 January 2001, <http://www.radio.cz/cz/rubrika/udalosti/predseda-senatu-petr-pithart-priletel-v-utery-na-kubu-aby-osobne-promluvil-s-fidelem-castrem-o-zadrzovanych-cesich> (accessed 8 May 2011).

¹⁴² Pavel Matocha, *Castrovi Vězni* (Praha: Jota 2002):154.

Johnson¹⁴³ and by Pilip's and Bubeník's writing of an official excuse letter to the Cuban government and people¹⁴⁴. As Pilip stated, "we have apologized to those who might have been offended that we have unknowingly broken Cuban laws..."¹⁴⁵. After returning back to Prague, Bubeník pointed out that he thinks that "Cuba wanted to send a message to the world that it will not tolerate any support of dissidents"¹⁴⁶.

Over all, such intemperance of Czech-Cuban relations may be also seen as positive. As Opatrný points out, thanks to Pilip's and Bubeník's affair, it has been achieved to establish a contact of highly positioned officials after quite a long time¹⁴⁷. Similarly, Jan Kavan, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, said "The Case of Pilip and Bubeník contributed to improving the relations of the Czech Republic and Cuba. We have achieved our goal without an apology of the Czech Republic to Cuba"¹⁴⁸.

As it is evident at this phase, Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Republic, has positioned itself to a place of a critic of the regime. This has lasted until nowadays and keeps on developing, being importantly influenced by Czech membership in the European Union. Unfortunately, the post-communist relations of the two countries have mainly taken part in the mood of numeral affairs and conflicts. The Czech Republic or prominent Czech nationals further in 2000s engaged themselves in active opposition of Cuban regime, seeking transformation of the regime by supporting democratic opposition projects such as Varela Project proposed by Oswaldo Payá. Also, with the harsh crackdown of this project and persecution of Cuban dissidents during the Black Spring in 2003 (see 2.2.), it was, again, a Czech – Václav Havel who, in cooperation with a Czech NGO "People in Need" established a committee specifically seeking democratic changes in Cuba – the International Committee for Democracy in Cuba (ICDC) (see 2.2.1.3.).

Concerning the democratic and civil society supporting incentives of the Czech Republic in Cuba, and above all the general idea of rejection of non-democratic regime suppressing its own citizens must be highly valued. The fact of existence of harassment

¹⁴³ Vivian Sequera, "Cuba Frees Prominent Czech Citizens", *Associated Press (AP)*, 6 February 2001, <http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y01/feb01/06e3.htm> (accessed 8 May 2011).

¹⁴⁴ iDnes.cz, "Pilip s Bubeníkem dorazili do Prahy", *iDnes.cz*, 6 February 2001, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zahranicni.asp?r=zahranicni&c=A010206_074957_zahranicni_zem&l=1&t=A010206_074957_zahranicni_zem&r2=zahranicni (accessed 8 May 2011).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Josef Opatrný, *Kuba* (Praha: Libri 2002):88.

¹⁴⁸ iDnes.cz, "Pilip s Bubeníkem dorazili do Prahy", *iDnes.cz*, 6 February 2001, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zahranicni.asp?r=zahranicni&c=A010206_074957_zahranicni_zem&l=1&t=A010206_074957_zahranicni_zem&r2=zahranicni (accessed 8 May 2011).

of individuals in the country, suppressing fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech, choice, etc. is very disturbing. However such direct actions of Czech individuals against the regime may not always be beneficial and unnecessarily heat up frangible relations between the two countries. Concerning the case of travels of Mr. Pilip and Mr. Bubeník to Cuba and the disposition of the regime in Cuba, their detainment seems as quite obvious reaction of the regime and has not brought any further positive development in following years. As mentioned above (3.1.2 p.52), the positive effect was soon after the affair considered by Opatrný or Kavan, and in fact it did not happen.

3.1.3. Contemporary Situation

Following the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union in 2004, relations of the two countries have gained a new dimension. The Czech Republic, apart from its own incentives within Czech-Cuban bilateral relations gained influence in decision-making of an important world player influencing Cuba and its development. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic and Cuba still hold only a lower diplomatic representation in their embassies in Havana and Prague with Mr. Milan Jakobec and Mr. Nelson Tamayo Caro in positions of *chargés d'affaires*¹⁴⁹. Apart from this, various affairs and excesses of Czechs supporting Cuban opposition and to this connected deportation and disputations between the officials have continued.

Among others, few examples of some critical moments for the contemporary relations of the two countries can be given. Probably the most striking affair took place in 2005 when Karel Schwarzenberg, a Czech senator was deported from Cuba after attending the inaugural meeting of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society in Havana. Furthermore, in 2006, a Czech diplomat Stanislav Kázecký was not prolonged Cuban and became “*persona non grata*” in Cuba without any explanation of Cuban administration¹⁵⁰, and also a famous Czech model Helena Houdová was briefly detained in Havana due to meeting with dissidents and taking pictures of a Havana slum¹⁵¹. All these affairs of fairly prominent Czechs have not brought the relations with Cuba

¹⁴⁹MZV ČR, “Vedoucí zastupitelského úřadu v Havaně a velvyslanec ČR v Bahamském společenství”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2010, http://www.mzv.cz/havana/cz/o_velvyslanectvi/velvyslanec/index.html (accessed 10 May 2011).

¹⁵⁰ Milena Štráfěldová, “Vztahy mezi Českem a Kubou se zhoršily, Kuba vyhostila českého diplomata”, *Radio Praha*, 14 April 2006, <http://www.radio.cz/cz/rubrika/udalosti/vztahy-mezi-ceskem-a-kubou-se-zhorsily-kuba-vyhostila-ceskeho-diplomata> (accessed 10 May 2011).

¹⁵¹ Daniela Lazarová, “The arrest of two Czech women puts further strain on Czech-Cuban relations”, *Radio Praha*, 2 February 2006, <http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/the-arrest-of-two-czech-women-puts-further-strain-on-czech-cuban-relations> (accessed 1 May 2011).

forward to any kind of reconciliation, especially during the time when the European Union imposes limitations on cooperation with Cuba reacting on 2003's Black Spring. The position of the Czech Republic favoring the side of Cuban opposition represented by Cuban prisoners of thought was further firmed in October and November 2010 when the Czech Republic became the 2nd country of EU sheltering Cuban ex-prisoners of conscience. Czech authorities granted political asylum residence permit to imprisoned and later extradited Cuban lawyer Rolando Jimenéz Pozada and his family¹⁵². This move, again, has sent a clear message to Cuban regime that Czech Republic supports democratic development in Cuba.

In terms-of Czech influence on Cuba through the European Union structures, Czechs do not have a strong representation within work teams in the European Commission or EEAS. As Martinho and Kurfürst congruently pointed out, it is usually nationals of countries such as Spain, Portugal or Netherlands who work in departments of European institutions dealing with EU-Cuban relations (see appendix 4. 82, 83). Lately, the Czech Republic has taken advantage of its European Union-membership and organized a high-level bilateral meeting of the European Union with Cuba On May 11th 2009¹⁵³. In fact, as Mr. Kurfürst pointed out, it was the first event of official bilateral talks between the Union and the representatives of the Republic of Cuba.

“The proof of the post-communist engagement of the Czech Republic in Cuba could also have been seen during the Czech Presidency of the EU when the Czech Republic organized 1st political dialog between the European Union and Cuba” (see appendix 4.p. 90).

The meeting of European Union's Troika with Cuban officials was led by His Excellency Jan Kohout, at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and President of the European Council; His Excellency Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Assistance; His Excellency Mr. Joakim Stymne, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden; and Mr. Karl Buck, on behalf of the General Secretariat of the Council on the side of the

¹⁵² iDnes.cz, “Kubánský politický vězeň získal český azyl, udělení ho došlo”, *iDnes.cz*, 11 November 2010, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/kubansky-politicky-vezen-pozada-ziskal-cesky-azyl-udeleni-ho-dovalo-lic-domaci.asp?c=A101111_170845_domaci_taj (accessed 1 May 2011).

¹⁵³ MINREX, “Ministerial Meeting European Union – Cuba”, *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, República de Cuba*, 2009, <http://embacuba.cubaminrex.cu/Default.aspx?tabid=10479> (accessed 10 May 2011).

Union and on the side of Cuba The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, His Excellency Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla¹⁵⁴.

Topics discussed during the meeting, as H. E. Jan Kohout said, ranged from climatic changes, a reform of the United Nations, to economic cooperation and human rights. Unfortunately the meeting has not brought any significant change¹⁵⁵ in the coherence of human rights adherence understanding according to the union and Cuba. Cuba reiterated its refusal to accept the 1996 common position (see 2.1.3. p. 15) and denied existence of political prisoners in the island. Specifically, Kohout said:

"We came back to the issue of political prisoners in Cuba and their health, and the answer we got was that in Cuba there are no political prisoners."¹⁵⁶

Nevertheless, the fact of Cuban and European officials, under the leadership of Czechs, organizing roundtable talks is very valuable step towards closer and more successful relations in future. Clearly, this has been the most successful achievement of Czech diplomats in stabilization of Czech-Cuban as well as European Union-Cuban relations. In the mean time, the relations still remain cold and their improvement will be a long-term process.

3.2. Czech Interests and Approach Reasons

Having covered the development of the relations of the Czech Republic and Cuba, clarification of such situation between the two countries follows. Clearly, during the 20th century, the two countries have not experienced very idyllic development of cooperation. After the twists and turns of the 2 World War two, emergence and fall of bipolar world, Czech Republic has become a country re-developing values of democracy and liberty established already in 19th century and applied with the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918. Czech experiences throughout the history as well as the present have therefore influenced Czech position towards Cuba. Among others, it is perceived that most influential factors of contemporary relations are Czech post-communism, Czech liberalism, absence of colonialism in Czech lands, but also a similarity of Cuban regime with the communist regime of Czechoslovakia or the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ MZV ČR, "Jednání s Kubou", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 11 May 2009, [http://www.mzv.cz/representation_brussels/cz/udalosti_a_media/jednani_s_kubou\\$218871.html?action=setMonth&year=2018&month=3](http://www.mzv.cz/representation_brussels/cz/udalosti_a_media/jednani_s_kubou$218871.html?action=setMonth&year=2018&month=3) (accessed 10th May 2011).

¹⁵⁶ BBC News, "'No progress' in EU-Cuba meeting", *BBC*, 11 May 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8045058.stm> (accessed 11 May 2011).

proximity of Cuban dissident opposition to the Czech prominent supporters of democracy.

3.3.1. Czech Post-communism and Liberalism

In the Caribbean region, Cuba is nowadays the only communist-led nation with one legal political party leading the country. The Czech Republic, in terms of Cuba, remains firm while formulating its diplomacy and determinedly continues with the rhetoric of critique of the Cuban regime. This may be seen as somewhat hypocritical in comparison to Czech relations with China or Czech engagement in the process of approximation of North and South Korea. This way of Czech diplomacy has, therefore, been a subject of criticism. According to Birns, the Czech diplomacy, being highly interconnected with American anti-Cuban policy, has rather odd reasons of being a harsh critic of Cuban regime. He points out that the reasons of Czechs for such polity are “along the lines of an almost biological odium for the Castro regime” seen by the Czech establishment as a “parental-mandated obligation”¹⁵⁷. This diplomacy is, furthermore, described as highly selective, disregarding or being less initiative in terms of other non-democratic regimes such as Belarus or China, and focusing solely to Cuba.

On the other hand, diplomacy of Czech officials can be explained and justified as reasonable. Such deep interest of Czech representation in development towards Cuban transformation comes from cultural and historical proximity and cooperation of Czechoslovakia with Cuba which was much greater than with other communist nations such as China and Korea. Also, features of the regime in Cuba are quite akin to those of Czechoslovakia¹⁵⁸ as well as the dissent movement. The “closeness” of Cuba and Czech Republic is also based on early post-communist development of the Czech Republic in 1990s. As Jaroslav Kurfürst stated, “The Czech Republic has, in this problem, special position for its quick transformation and avoidance of systems like ‘goulash communism’. Such model of transformation is by Cuban opposition seen as a role model (see appendix 4, p.90). It is simply understood that Czech having the experience may be helpful in possible transition as well as helping in avoiding mistakes that may

¹⁵⁷ Larry Birns, “Prague Finds a Cause: Czech Republic aims to undermine EU-Cuban relations”, *Spectrezine*, 5 November 2005, <http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/Birns.htm> (accessed 24 April 2011).

¹⁵⁸ České Noviny, “Kuba podle Schwarzenberga připomíná Československo 70. let”, *ČTK*, 26 July 2010, <http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/svet/zpravy/kuba-podle-schwarzenberga-pripomina-ceskoslovensko-70-let/508093?rss> (accessed 24 April 2011).

appear during the process. As Javier Martínez-Corbalán describing the view of Czech representation claimed “they have a clear vision of what would be the future of Cuba and how to fight against the dictatorship” (see appendix 4, p. 93).

Apart from the re-establishment of Czech democracy, as José Gabriel Ramón Castillo pointed out, Czech Republic’s membership in NATO influences the relationship of the two countries as well. When compared to Spain, NATO membership of a former Warsaw Pact member creates irritation of Cuban regime (see appendix 4, 99-100).

As it is evident, is it not only Czechs who engage themselves with Cuban question but also Cuban opposition which perceives the Czech Republic as an important partner in their endeavors of liberalization and democratization. That’s why the Czech approach focuses on adherence of human rights and liberalization of Cuba. That is why, the Czech representation acts very firmly against the Cuban government. As Pehe mentions, it is the role of “emotional factor” and “Havel’s heritage” which has shaped these relations.¹⁵⁹

Additionally, it is also money and trade what matters in Czech-Cuban relations. Even though positive diplomatic binds of Czech Republic and Cuba are nowadays based exclusively on trade, the connection of exporters and importers in both countries is still fairly small. Since 1989, the Czech Republic has lost majority of trade connections with the island as the deals professed through Comecon were usually favoring the Cuban side (see 3.1.1). Also in early 1990s, Czech companies previously exporting to Cuba faced problems with competitiveness in market economy and many of them bankrupted and could not maintain connections with Cuban partners. According to the official compendious study of the Cuban territory by The Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana the trade exchange has been experiencing slow growth influenced positively by individual deals, but also negatively by natural disasters and the global crisis of late 2000s. Nevertheless, the cooperation has not exceeded the level of Comecon cooperation¹⁶⁰. In terms of the European Union, after such break down of cooperation the Czech Republic’s economic interests concerning Cuba have are low and

¹⁵⁹ Jiří Pehe, “Česká politika vůči komunistickým zemím”, Jiří Pehe - Political Diary 2005, <http://www.pehe.cz/zapisnik/2005/ceska-politika-vuci-komunistickym-zemim> (accessed 25th April 2011).

¹⁶⁰ Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana, “Souhrnná Teritoriální Informace Kuba”, <http://services.czechtrade.cz/pdf/sti/kuba-2010-04-01.pdf> (accessed 22 February 2011): 49-50.

therefore the influence of companies on relations of the two countries such as in the case of Spain is nonexistent.

Covering the topic of economic binds, the situation, is rather negative due to indebtedness of Cuba to the Czech Republic. Lately, Cuba has refused to pay the debt to the Czech Republic. As Radio Martí reported, the Czech Republic has grouped Cuba to those countries having payment problems such as Kazakhstan or Iran. On the other hand, officials of the Cuban regime pointed out that Prague importantly participated in the activities leading to the dissolution of the socialist bloc which resulted in economic problems of Cuba¹⁶¹ As mentioned above, the debt of Cuba to Czech Republic is about €266 million (see 3.1.2. p. 48) which makes the Republic of Cuba the most indebted country for the Czech Republic. Undoubtedly, this is another negative influential factor deepening mistrust and deteriorates cooperation process.

Overall, the contemporary position of the Czech Republic in the structures of the European Union, NATO, and the international community as a whole clearly shows the difference of the path the country, compared to Cuba, intends to follow. Re-conciliation of Czech democracy combined with the experience of substantially similar regime brings Czechs to the side of critics of Cuban regime. Simultaneously, economic factors of indebtedness of Cuba and unimportant trade interests of large Czech companies does not pressure the Czech diplomacy to ease its demands on liberalization which, on the other hand, are reinforced by the existence of Czech NGOs engaged in Cuban cause.

3.3.2. Absence of Colonialism

In spite of the existence of strong connections of Czechoslovakia and Cuba during the 20th century, especially during the 2nd part when both Countries were bounded with common socialist values, cooperation treaties of Comecon, and common ideology (see 3.1.), the connection has never been that strongly maintained as with Spain which held Cuba as its Colony until the beginning of 20th century (see: 2.1.1.). If one compares the connection of the countries within the colonial system and the system of Comecon, substantial differences come into sight. Therefore, this may be considered as one of the reasons why the approach of the Czech Republic differs so much from Spanish or Dutch one.

¹⁶¹ Radio/TV Martí Noticias, “Cuba se niega a pagar deuda a la República Checa”, *Radio Martí*, 7 April 2011, <http://www.martinoticias.com/noticias/Cuba-se-niega-a-pagar-deuda-a-la-Republica-Checa-119396304.html> (accessed 24 April 2011).

Furthermore, such mingling of cultures and extensive migration, in case of Czech-Cuban relations has not taken place either. Similarly to the Czech, as Pehe says, “emotional factor”¹⁶² rooted in 20th century communist oppression, Spain has its own “emotional factor” too and that is the colonial dominion and its connections of society, language, culture, politics, and most notably trade. Unlike Spain, the Czech Republic simply builds up the relationship with Cuba on its previous experience and the lack of deeper connections of trade caused by the absence of colonialism only backs up the critical attitude towards the socialist practices of Cuban regime and support of Cuban opposition.

The absence of colonial history of the Czech lands is interconnected to the role the Czech Republic nowadays plays in united Europe. With inexistent colonial connections and broken relationship of the times of the Cold War, the economic bonds of the Czech Republic and Cuba are not very tight and the interests in democratization are not limited by benefits of companies that trade with the regime and have a potential to influence decision-making of European governments. Thus, as Jaroslav Kurfürst pointed out, “The Czech Republic, for example, cannot gain much from the liberalization of Cuba but its pressure on democratic values balances other member states’ views” (see appendix 4, p.92).

4. Influence of the Czech Policy on EU’s Policy, Reasons of Unsuccessful Relations

Having covered both European Union’s and Czech approach and their development, a study of influence of the Czech Republic within the Union follows. Based on the previous research, the Czech Republic plays the key role in Euro-Cuban relations. However, there are many distinctions between individual approaches of European Union member-states towards the problem of Cuba and actual cooperation with this country and these influence each-other. According to José Gabriel Ramón Castillo, there are up to four factors influencing the European Union’s policy created by EEAS.

First of all, it is the Czech position, influenced by the communist past. He specifically claimed that similarly to the Czech Republic who is a leader of this position

¹⁶² Jiří Pehe, “Česká politika vůči komunistickým zemím”, Jiří Pehe - Political Diary 2005, <http://www.pehe.cz/zapisnik/2005/ceska-politika-vuci-komunistickym-zemim> (accessed 25th April 2011).

“All the European countries that have lived under communist regime have behaved differently towards Cuba than the rest of the European countries” (see appendix 4, p.98).. In terms of other European countries, Nordic countries such as Sweden have shown greater concern about the way of political and human rights development in Cuba. The concern over Human Rights therefore puts post-communist and Nordic countries together. The third approach, according to Mr. Ramón Castillo is Spanish and French – based on bilateral relations or long-term relationship and cultural and economic connections. The fourth position, according to Ramón Castillo, is the position of NATO. Even though it may appear as not relevant in terms of European Union-Cuban relations, Ramón Castillo argues that NATO, led by the United States, has a strong influence on its member-states and thus influences the EU’s position towards Cuba bringing it closer to US approach.

Existence of such differences reinforces a kind of separation between the member states and especially a separation between the Union and the regime in Cuba (see appendix 4, p.99-101).

With its pronounced views, the Czech Republic therefore creates commonness with countries of northern Europe and thus creates an equal counterpart against Spain’s intentions of close cooperation and its leavening of Cuban problems with Human rights and, most of all, the undemocratic Cuban regime. The Czech influence brings us to actual question of functioning of Union’s Common Policy towards Cuba. Even though it may seem that nothing is being accomplished, it is a balance in European Union decision-making which has been created through the accession of post-communist countries. Interests of the Czech Republic are not profoundly big in terms of trade and the connections have been, as mentioned before, damaged with the collapse of Comecon and Warsaw Pact. Therefore, liberalization of Cuba is for the Czech Republic mainly a cause of promotion of liberty and human rights. Thus the balance is created. As Jaroslav Kurfürst stated “...the Czech Republic, for example, cannot gain much from the liberalization of Cuba but its pressure on democratic values balances other member states’ views” (see appendix 4, p.92).

With the Czech Republic being a harsh critic of the regime, the European Union can maintain trade with Cuba but also represent itself as a promoter of democratic values and human rights. With the presence of Czech Republic’s engagement in carrying out Common Foreign Policy towards Cuba, more aspects on this problem are therefore dealt with. Essential values of European society are promoted, a connection to

United States is kept and their policies revised, and in this case criticized, and on the other hand, goal of approximation and closer trade with Cuba, backed by Spain, is being limited but not refused.

5. Future Development

Reviewing the whole project, it appears that the socialist regime in Cuba established through the revolution in 1950s is not very likely to fall in foreseeable future. As both Martinho and Kurfürst congruently pointed out, it would only be possible solely with contribution of some natural disaster or other greater regional uprisings as in Arabic world in 2011 (see appendix 4, p 84, 92). As all of the interviewees of this project independently stated, a change leading to establishment of civil society, improvement of life conditions, freedom and democracy, may happen only from “inside” of Cuban society. No influence from outside cannot make the regime transform. As José Gabriel Ramón Castillo stated, the regime in Cuba keeps itself closed and rigid as its interest is not to develop but the key goal is to remain in power (see appendix 4, p.99).

Nevertheless, certain changes in Cuban regime have already started taking place. After the last Communist Party Congress of Cuba in April 2011, changes in ruling the country take place. Newly appointed First Secretary of the Communist Party in Cuba – President Raúl Castro – has introduced three hundred reforms drawing-up the regime closer to Chinese-like methods of economy¹⁶³. The major changes, specifically, are: the partial liberalization of entrepreneurship, liberalization of trade with automobiles.

“The Cuban president has championed a limited but significant shift to the free market since taking over from his brother in 2008. Changes announced last year allow Cubans to go into business for themselves in 178 approved enterprises, hire employees and rent out cars and homes.”¹⁶⁴ However, other basic rights such as traveling - therefore a right to free movement - are still very limited¹⁶⁵. What Cuban government seeks through these measurements is sort of a “gentle revival of socialism”. As Stasiński describes:

¹⁶³ MSNBC, “Raul Castro named 1st secretary of Communist Party”, *MSNBC*, 19 April 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42660456/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/raul-castro-named-st-secretary-communist-party/ (accessed 12th May 2011).

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Maciej Stasiński, "Co Hawana szykuje Kubańczykom", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10 May 2011, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,9573501,Co_Hawana_szykuje_Kubanczykom.html (accessed 10 May 2011).

“A 79-year-old Castro insisted that socialism must be “updated” and ‘rejuvenated’ because it lacks fresh blood and the ‘rear bench’. But at the same time announced that for this to himself, his 84-year-old brother Fidel and the other elders of the first generation of revolutionaries must continue to watch the dictatorial power, at least for another five years as this will not be any ‘shock therapy’, ‘neoliberal’ revolution or reformist, “improvisation”¹⁶⁶.

Concerning the slight loosening of the regime rules, a civil society development has to be taken into account. Even though it may seem that the regime in Cuba reminds of the one in Czechoslovakia of 1970s, the civil society in the country appears to be less disillusioned and dilatory. As Isabel Martinho pointed out,

“The state of civil society in Cuba is nowadays surprisingly healthier than you would expect. Even though the Cubans are prevented from organizing themselves in groups of interests, political parties, or any other movements, a certain activity of the civil society certainly exists.”

What helps is the support from the EU, Catholic Church, international NGOs but also, simple development of technology. Concerning this, an example of Yoani Sanchez can be given. Even though the regime limits access to the World Wide Web by imposing high prices on all computer technology and electronics and internet connection, Ms. Sanchez has become a globally renowned blogger who harshly criticized the government on a daily basis presenting the contemporary life in Cuba to anyone in the world and in several languages¹⁶⁷. Nonetheless, propaganda in the nation is still a strong tool to suppress democratizing activities. As Pavla Holcová said

“The government still develops actions against this development. For example, in case of Yoani Sánchez, she has been recently severely attacked by national television pictured as a contra-revolutionary backed by money from US” (see appendix 4, p.88).

On the other hand, as Holcová describes, Yoani Sánchez has already managed to become that well known internationally, that the government cannot risk imprisoning her as the international community would sharply protest (see appendix 4, p.88).

¹⁶⁶ Maciej Stasiński, “Kuba chce przeżyć. Prezydent Castro obiecuje reformy”, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 April 2011, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,9452109,Kuba_chce_przezyc__Prezydent_Castro_obiecuje_reformy.html (accessed 10 May 2011).

¹⁶⁷ Yoani Sánchez, “Generación Y – Mi Perfil” Yoani Sánchez – Blog, 2011, http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/?page_id=184 (accessed May 13 2011).

With the civil society slowly reviving itself, it may seem that the changes Raúl Castro's government has been doing lead to the island liberalizing itself. Unfortunately, this is not that easy, the changes as Jaroslav Kurfürst said have to be different

“Recent liberalization of small businesses is supported and valued but it is not enough. The support of Cuban civil society and the criticism of corruption and harassment of opposition are the focal point.” Similarly, José Gabriel Ramón Castillo says that the system in Cuba can be changed only “from bottom-up, not from the top-down” this theory further entitles the European Union to be a key player in promoting Civil society. Without help, Cuban opposition gets crushed by the regime whenever they try to call for more democratic changes” (see appendix 4, p.101).

The changes of the current administration do not seek liberalization but continuation of socialism and limited civil society. It is therefore, estimated that the Castrist regime in Cuba is not going to be changed quickly. It is more likely that Cuban society in the future will live under a system combining practices of Chinese socialist market economy and Venezuela's central planning backed by natural resources. Even after the death of both Castro Brothers who are basically the representation of the regime, it is not likely that events similar to the overturn in Europe in 1989 would take place.

Furthermore, concerning the future of the regime, it is important to take into account there a possibility of Raul's son Alejandro Castro Espín being appointed the next president in the family line and leading Cuba under “dynastic communism” as the Kim family does in North Korea. Alejandro Castro Espín already holds a high rank position in Cuban army as well as writes books in which he criticizes politics of the United States blaming the country from “state terrorism”, he investigates capitalism in general and deals with reasons for the crisis of the capitalist USA in late 2000s¹⁶⁸. According to La Gaceta, Alejandro is for the Cuban Castrist government a “new young blood” ready to save the aging regime with new ideas and leadership¹⁶⁹.

To sum up this, if Cuba needs to be changed in order to approximate itself to democracy and adherence to basic freedoms and human rights, the change must come

¹⁶⁸ Radio Nacional de Venezuela, “Hijo de Raúl Castro publica libro sobre capitalismo y crisis de EE.UU”, *Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y Información*, 17 February 2009, <http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?s=a8079d380421cb3840002de53da7d8eb&act=ST&f=16&t=90732&hl=> (accessed 14 May 2011).

¹⁶⁹ La Gaceta, “Alejandro Castro Espín: Un fin de raza” *Intereconomía*, 18 July 2010, <http://www.intereconomia.com/noticias-gaceta/internacional/alejandro-castro-espın-fin-raza#comments> (accessed 13 May 2011).

from within the society and from the bottom. Concerning the practices and the development of the administration led by Castro family, such a change is not, from their point of view is not desirable. Additionally, connections of Cuba with Bolivarian regime in Venezuela bring Cuba to further opposition to USA and EU which strongly support mentioned democratic ideas. A change is presumably possible with the support from outside but it is not likely to be quick but rather long-term and gradual.

Discussion

Regarding the differentiation of the European Union and therefore the differences of the approaches towards Cuba, it has been uncovered that the work of European External Action Service on Common Position towards Cuba can be considered as being developed successfully. Being criticized by Cuban authorities or other independent groups supporting Cuban government such as Společnost česko-kubánského přátelství (Association of Czech-Cuban Friendship) for being slow, ambiguous, or under the influence of the United States, the EEAS creates common policy seeking peaceful positive development of the country towards liberalization and democracy.

Concerning the differentiation of individual approaches of European Union member-states and therefore ambiguous representation on the outside, first two hypotheses of this thesis are being dealt with. Specifically, the hypotheses are: “The European Union’s system of Common Foreign Policy is, in terms of Cuba, not currently functioning well”, and “Czech relations with Cuba differ substantially from the EU’s Common Foreign Policy program intentions and thus ambiguity is created”. Based on the study, these hypotheses can be considered as erroneous. The study, as well as the processed interviews with engaged professionals disproved these presumptions proving the fact that all EU parties in the problem of EU-Cuban relations, meaning individual member-states, NGOs, the Catholic Church, and EEAS do their work seeking the same goal – the development of the Cuban society and the improvement of living conditions in Cuba.

Furthermore, concerning the decision-making of the EEAS, the fact that European Union does not apply any specific member-state approach and keeps on maintaining common position and further developing it means that the unanimous vote

works and therefore represents real view of the whole union. Differences, indeed exist, EEAS is the way how to find the balanced policy even though it takes time.

With the enlargement of the Union, stratification of votes in unanimous decision-making always changes and thus the views of the Union develop and change, respecting positions of all individual members. With the accession of post-communist countries an important change took place. Concerning Cuba, these states, particularly the Czech Republic, stand for views strongly opposing the Cuban regime. It may seem that it would create a problem between individual member-states. However, this cooperation is based on mutual respect and every member-state's approach is taken into account and respected. The new member-states therefore brought more votes demanding improving of human rights situation in Cuba and keeping the 1996 common position. A newly balanced policy, in terms of development and life conditions improvement therefore positively influenced the CFSP. The third hypothesis is then proved to be correct.

As the European Union through the tool of EEAS intends to improve the living conditions in Cuba, there are, unfortunately important obstacles in communication and alignment of European principles with the principles of Cuban regime. Therefore it is argued that the fourth hypothesis is erroneous. On the other hand EEAS projects have a definite higher capability of influencing Cuban society and the development in the country as a whole by supporting dissidents and providing humanitarian aid, as well as by cooperating with NGOs and the Catholic Church that are active in the island. Thus, democracy approximation may be achieved from bottom - up.

Conclusion

Reviewing the outcomes of the project, it comes clear that the external relations of the European Union have gradually become one of the key strategies. The Union, having aspirations on keeping and developing its global influence and thus maintaining internal as well as global security and trade, develops this strategy which brings various difficulties that needs to be dealt with. One of these problems is the coherence of individual member-state approaches which is studied in this thesis on a specific example of relations of the European Union and the Republic of Cuba. As the membership in the union means adherence of a member-state to European common policies, in this case Common Security and Foreign Policy, it may seem that a schism may appear. However, differences between the views of individual member-states and the discussion between them actually create common European approach which is the goal. Furthermore, with the European External Action Service established by the Lisbon Treaty, the cooperation has been further deepened and thus coherence of European Union on the outside is being achieved.

Concerning the influences of the specific problem of cooperation with Cuba brings to the scope of interest not only EU member-state foreign strategies but also various activities of numeral NGOs and a very influential player – The Holy See. These, in terms of EU-Cuban disputations usually play a role of Mediators. Even though it may seem that NGOs, financed by European or American associations or governments would function as promoters of European or American political views, they usually provide support to Cuban people seeking improvement of their life standards, rights, information access etc. Concerning the Holy See, it is a clear example of how mediation of talks between differently-minded political entities can bring them to one table and reach a consensus. The Catholic Church in Cuba has done a great deal of helping the dissidents in Cuba bringing Cuban and European officials to solve the problem. Yes, the clash between different political systems of Cuba and the European Union may be overcome. If the European Union aspires to promote its values, the best way is to use soft-power tools and cooperate more closely with NGOs and the Holy See. Also a way of supporting development of Cuban society could be cooperation with small entrepreneurs as well as promoting investments of European companies in the island.

Concerning the Czech Republic's role in this problem, its influence on the European Union in terms of adherence to human rights and criticism is understood as

valuable and creating a counterpart to Spanish approach which supports close cooperation with Cuban regime. This creates a balanced approach which is more likely to succeed in achieving the basic goals of CSFP mentioned before.

To sum up this, the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union towards Cuba influenced by the Czech Republic is on the right track of developing smoother relationship of the Union and Cuba. However, there still are obstacles that need to be solved such as the topic of human rights, as well as obstacles that are not likely to change and need to be respected, such as affiliation of Cuban government to the revolutionary and socialistic ideas and capitalism of the European Union as they are historically given. Therefore it is concluded that the cooperation should be also based on deeper cooperation with non-governmental/non-profit organizations and the Holy See which have abilities to influence the Cuban society and support its well being from the bottom, on individual and regional basis.

A developed relationship between the European Union and Cuba with the mentioned obstacles solved will be a step towards achieving global interconnectedness and all its ensuing advantages.

Bibliography

Adams, David. "Castro Labels EU the 'Superpower's Trojan Horse'". *The Times*, 28 July 2003. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article850973.ece> (accessed 20 April 2010).

ALBA – Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América. "Qué es el ALBA". ALBA. <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2080> (accessed 4 April 2011).

Aljazeera. "Bolivia Summit Adopts New Currency". *Aljazeera – Americas*. 17 October 2009. <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/10/2009101712255748516.html> (accessed 5 April 2011).

Bálek, Alexej. "Československá ekonomika v 80. letech 20. století". in *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia*. Vol. 15 No. 7, 2007: 47.

BBC News. "Castro meets Catholic Church leaders". *BBC*. 20 May 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10134050> (accessed 22 March 2011).

BBC News. "'No progress' in EU-Cuba meeting". *BBC*, 11 May 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8045058.stm> (accessed 11 May 2011).

BBC News. "Profile: Bolivia's President Evo Morales". *BBC*. 12 January 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12166905> (accessed 5 April 2011).

BBC News. "Spain to welcome Cuban dissidents". *BBC*. 7 April 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13003125> (accessed 20 April 2011).

BBC News. "Wikileaks reveal US concern on Cuba-Venezuela ties". *BBC*. 1 December 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11883465> (accessed 4 April 2011).

Bevans, C. I. "The Platt Amendment," *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776 – 1949*, no. 8. Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971.

Birns, Larry. "Prague Finds a Cause: Czech Republic aims to undermine EU-Cuban relations". *Spectrezine*. 5 November 2005. <http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/Birns.htm> (accessed 24 April 2011).

Bortlová, Hana. "Výstup vědeckého projektu RM 03/01/09 - Hospodářské vztahy Kuby a Československa v 60. až 80. letech". Vědecký projekt MZV RM 03/01/09, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. 2009. http://www.mzv.cz/public/82/6b/2a/472119_356415_zkracena_verze_RM_03._01._09.pdf (accessed 27 April 2011).

Brandt, Nadja. "Deutsche Telekom, Ryanair, Sol Melia: European Equity Preview". *Bloomberg*. 4 June 2007.

<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3mAN8YCYLUY&refer=europe> (accessed 17 March 2011).

Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. *“The European Union as a Global Actor”*. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Brezovská, Kateřina. “Předseda Senátu Petr Pithart přiletěl v úterý na Kubu, aby osobně promluvil s Fidelem Castrem o zadržovaných Čechách”. *Radio Praha*. 30 January 2001. <http://www.radio.cz/cz/rubrika/udalosti/predsesa-senatu-petr-pithart-priletel-v-utery-na-kubu-aby-osobne-promluvil-s-fidelem-castrem-o-zadrzovanych-cesich> (accessed 8 May 2011).

British Council Cuba. “About us/some of our services.” British Council. <http://www.britishcouncil.org/cuba.htm> (accessed 8 May 2010).

Caribbean Medical Transport. “Home”. Caribbean Medical Transport. http://cubacaribe.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=27 (accessed 9 May 2010).

Caritas Internationalis, “Caritas Internationalis – Cuba”. Caritas Internationalis. http://www.caritas.org/worldmap/latin_america/cuba.html (accessed 20 April 2011).

CNN Money. “Global 500: 2009 – Industry – Fortune”. *CNN*. 2010. <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/industries/20/index.html> (accessed 7 April 2011).

CNN Money. “Global 500: 2010 – Spain – Fortune”. *CNN*. 2010. <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/countries/Spain.html> (accessed 7 April 2011).

CNN. “Obama, Clinton agree to disagree”. *CNN*, 21 February 2008. <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/21/debate.main/index.html#cnmSTCVideo> (accessed 6 April 2011).

CNN World. “The Papal Visit to Cuba”. *CNN*, 24 January 1998. http://articles.cnn.com/1998-01-24/world/9801_24_pope.cuba_1_lina-ruz-havana-castros?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 20 April 2011).

Council of the European Union. “Council conclusions on Evaluation of the EU Common Position on Cuba 2951st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting Luxembourg, 15 Jun 2009”. Council of the European Union, 15 June 2009. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108471.pdf (accessed 30 April 2010).

Council of the European Union. “The Common Foreign Security Policy”. CONSILIUM– Foreign Policy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=248&lang=en> (accessed 17 January, 2011).

České Noviny. “Kuba podle Schwarzenberga připomíná Československo 70. let”. *ČTK*. 26 July 2010. <http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/svet/zpravy/kuba-podle-schwarzenberga-pripomina-ceskoslovensko-70-let/508093?rss> (accessed 24 April 2011).

Člověk v tísni. “O Člověku v tísni”. <http://www.clovekvtsni.cz/index2.php?id=176> (accessed 18 April 2011).

ČTK. “Czech Republic. Cuba - Former Friends, Now Opponents over Human Rights”. FIU Central Europe Online. 21 April 2000, <http://www2.fiu.edu/~fcf/czech42100.html> (accessed 3 May 2011).

ČTK. “Na Kubu od 19. ledna nutno jet s vízem“. *Večerník Praha*. 7 January 2000.

Edwards, Geoffrey in Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith. “The Pattern of the EU’s Global Activity”. in *International Relations and the European Union*. New York, OUP: 2005.

Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana. “Souhrnná Teritoriální Informace Kuba”. Embassy of the Czech Republic in Havana, 1 April 2010. <http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/rubrika/kuba/1000788/> (accessed 22 February 2011).

European Commission. “Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty”. <http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/others/84/en.pdf> (accessed 25 January 2011).

Encyclopedia Britannica – Academic Edition, S.V. “Fulgencio Batista”. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/56027/Fulgencio-Batista> (accessed 15 February 2011).

Erikson, Daniel P. “Puede Resolver España el problema de Cuba?” in *Política Exterior*. No. 133 Enero/Febrero 2010. <http://www.politicaexterior.com/2010/01/%C2%BFpuede-resolver-espana-el-problema-de-cuba/> (accessed 17 March 2011).

Erikson, Daniel P. “Europe’s Cuba Problem: The Limit of Constructive Engagement”. *IDEA – Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance*. http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Erikson_low_1.pdf (accessed 8 May 2010).

Erikson, Daniel P. and Adam Minson, “Cuba and China: the new face of an old relationship”. *Hemisphere*. 22 September 2006, <http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/national-security-international/3975916-1.html> (accessed 7 March 2011).

Espinoza, Juan Carlos. “Civil Society in Cuba: The Logic Emergence in Comparative Perspective”. 1999. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.124.5754> (accessed 11 April 2011).

European Commission. “Republic of Cuba – European Union Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period of 2011-2013”. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cu_csp10_en.pdf (accessed 14 March 2011).

European Commission “The Cotonou Agreement”. Development, Cotonou Agreement. http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm (accessed 29 April 2010).

European Parliament. “Guillermo Fariñas - winner of the 2010 Sakharov Prize – Press release”. *Europa*. 21 October 2010. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20101020IPR89528/html/Guillermo-Fari%C3%B1as-winner-of-the-2010-Sakharov-Prize>, (accessed 20 March 2011).

European Union. “96/697/CFSP: Common Position of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba”. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996E0697:EN:NOT> (accessed 29 April 2010).

European Union. “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. *Europa*. EEAS. http://eeas.europa.eu/ashton/index_en.htm (accessed 25 January 2011).

European Union. “Treaty of Lisbon, Final Act”. *Official Journal of the European Union*. 17. 12. 2007. C 306/27, vol. 50, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0231:0271:EN:PDF> (accessed 25 January, 2011).

Eurostat. “Cuba EU bilateral trade and trade with the World”. *Europa*. September 2006, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122460.pdf (accessed 13 April 2011).

Fox News. “Spain announces end of prisoner releases in Cuba”. *FOX*, 8 April 2011. <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/04/08/spain-announces-end-prisoner-releases-cuba/> (accessed 29 April 2011).

Freedom House. “Freedomhouse Condemns Cuban Government's Arrest of Czech Citizens”. Freedom House. 16 January 2001. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=91> (accessed 7 May 2011).

Fundación Hispano Cubana. “Quienes Somos”. <http://www.hispanocubana.org/> (accessed 18 April 2011).

Godoy, Alvarado and Percy Francisco. “Las meretrices de Bush en Ginebra” *CUBA SOCIALISTA Revista teórica y política*. April 2004. <http://www.cubasocialista.cu/texto/cs0042.htm> (accessed 5 May 2011).

Goodrich, Malinda. “A Country Study: Soviet Union (Former) – Appendix B: The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance – Soviet Union”. *The Library of Congress*, 2010. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/soviet_union/su_appnb.html (accessed 23 February 2011).

Gott, Richard. *Kuba: nové dějiny*. 1st ed. Praha: BB/art, 2005.

Grohová, Johanna, Pošusta, Pavel and Martin Ehl. “Jak stát může pomoci, když má jeho občan problémy v cizině?”. *iDnes.cz*, 16 January 2001. http://cestovani.idnes.cz/jak-stat-muze-pomoci-kdyz-ma-jeho-obcan-problemy-v-cizine-pkv-igsvet.aspx?c=A010116_104552_igsvet_hop (accessed 4 May 2011).

Gunn, Gillian. “Cuba’s NGOs: Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil Society”. Trinity Washington University. http://www.trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/caribbean%20briefings/Cubas_NGOs.pdf (accessed: 9 May 2010).

Havel, Václav. “Zvát či nezvat”, in *Project Syndicate*. January 2005. <http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/havel24/Czech> (accessed 5 May 2010).

Henken, Ted *Cuba. A global studies handbook*. Santa Barbara Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2008.

Himes, Joshua. “Cuban Development and the Sugar Economy: The Effects on Cuban Development of Changing International Economic Relations”. <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/ca/cuba/asce/cuba3/himes.html> (accessed 15 February 2011).

Horta, Loro. “A Brave New World: China Embraces the Caribbean”. *Defense and Security Analysis*. Vol. 25, No. 4, December 2009.

Human Rights Watch. *New Castro, Same Cuba – Political Prisoners in the Post-Fidel Era*. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).

ICDC: International Committee for Democracy in Cuba. “About ICDC”. ICDC. <http://icdcprague.org/index.php?id=10> (accessed 5 May 2010).

iDnes.cz. “Kubánský politický vězeň získal český azyl, udělení ho dojalo”. *iDnes.cz*, 11 November 2010. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/kubansky-politicky-vezen-pozada-ziskal-cesky-azyl-udeleni-ho-dojalo-1ic-/domaci.asp?c=A101111_170845_domaci_taj (accessed 1 May 2011).

iDnes.cz. “Pilip s Bubeníkem dorazili do Prahy”. *iDnes.cz*, 6 February 2001. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zahranicni.asp?r=zahranicni&c=A010206_074957_zahranicni_zem&l=1&t=A010206_074957_zahranicni_zem&r2=zahranicni (accessed 8 May 2011).

iDnes.cz. “Praha protestovala kvůli zakázané oslavě v Havaně”. *iDnes*, 2 November 2005. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/domaci.asp?r=domaci&c=A051102_173957_domaci_nelr (accessed 5 May 2010).

Kegley, Charles and E. R Wittkopf, *World Politics Trends and Transformation*. London: Thomson Learning, 2006.

Kuba Dnes. “O Nás”. Společnost česko-kubánského přátelství. 2011. http://www.kubadnes.cz//index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=6&Itemid=23 (accessed 27 April 2011).

La Gaceta, "Alejandro Castro Espín: Un fin de raza" *Intereconomía*. 18 July 2010. <http://www.intereconomia.com/noticias-gaceta/internacional/-castro-espín-fin-raza#comments> (accessed 13 May 2011).

Landovská, Helena. "Náměstek ministra zahraničí Martin Palouš řekl Právu". *Právo*. 25 April 2000.

Lazarová, Daniela. "The arrest of two Czech women puts further strain on Czech-Cuban relations". *Radio Praha*. 2 February 2006. <http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curaffrs/the-arrest-of-two-czech-women-puts-further-strain-on-czech-cuban-relations> (accessed 1 May 2011).

Library of Congress. "Cuban missile crisis". *The Library of Congress*. Cold War. 2010. <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html> (accessed 6 April 2011).

Lidice – memorial. "Ohlas Lidické tragedie ve světě 1942 – 2008". Lidice – memorial. 2008. <http://www.lidice-memorial.cz/ViewAttachment.aspx/priloha.pdf?AttachmentID=48> (accessed 27 April 2011).

Lidovky.cz. "Kuba pustila dva disidenty na svobodu. Proti jejich vůli". *Lidové Noviny*. 13 February 2011. http://www.lidovky.cz/kuba-propustila-dva-disidenty-na-svobodu-proti-jejich-vuli-po7-/ln_zahranici.asp?c=A110213_174035_ln_zahranici_jv (accessed 20 April 2011).

Lockhart, Melissa. "EU revising 'Common Position' on Cuba". *Foreign Policy Association*. Cuba, Continuity in Havana, Miami and Washington, 18 March 2009. <http://cuba.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/03/18/eu-revising-common-position-on-cuba/> (accessed 30 April 2010).

Los Angeles Times. "2 Students Join 5 Cuban Activists Seeking Refuge in Czech Embassy". *Los Angeles Times*. 10 July 1990. http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-10/news/mn-380_1_czech-embassy (accessed 3 May 2011).

Magnier, Mark. "US is Watching China's Latin American Moves". *The Los Angeles Times*. 15 April 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/15/world/fg-china15/2> (accessed 11 April 2011).

Matocha, Pavel. *Castrovi Vězni*. Praha: Jota 2002.

Miklošovič, Martin. "Rozhovor s Valtrem Komárkem, aneb Che Guevara – poslední politický romantik". *Nekultura.cz*, 23 January 2009. <http://www.nekultura.cz/film-rozhovor/rozhovor-s-valtrem-komarkem-aneb-che-guevara-posledni-politicky-romantik.html> (accessed 4 May 2011).

Miller Llana, Sara "Why is Cuba releasing 52 political prisoners?". *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 August 2010.

Miller, Tom. *Trading with the Enemy: A Yankee Travels Through Castro's Cuba*. New York: Basic Books, 2008.

Ministerio de Relaciones Externales de Cuba. "Cuba desires ever-widening relations with the European Union, but they must be based on mutual respect". *Trabajadores Digital*.

http://edicionesanteriores.trabajadores.cu/2003/mayo/20_ingles/textos_y_fotos/statement.htm (accessed 10 March 2011).

Ministerstvo Financí České Republiky. "Roční souhrnná zpráva o stavu a vývoji zahraničních pohledávek ČR v roce 2010". Ministerstvo Financí České Republiky. 20 April 2011.

http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xchg/mfcr/xsl/vf_agendaCKA_zahr_pohled_61793.html (accessed 2 May 2011).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. "China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC.

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm> (accessed 11 April 2011).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. "Cuba – bilateral relations". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/lmzs/gjlb/3488/> (accessed 11 April 2011).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. "President Hu Jintao Arrives at Havana and Starts State Visit to Cuba". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC.

<http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/lmzs/gjlb/3488/3490/t171661.htm> N2313446920101223 (accessed 11 April 2011).

MINREX. "Ministerial Meeting European Union – Cuba". *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, República de Cuba*.

2009. <http://embacuba.cubaminrex.cu/Default.aspx?tabid=10479> (accessed 10 May 2011).

Montaner, Carlos in Manuel Márquez-Sterling, *CUBA 1952 – 1959: The True Story of Castro's Rise of Power* Wintersgreen: Kleiopatra Press, 2009.

MSNBC. "Raul Castro named 1st secretary of Communist Party". *MSNBC*, 19 April 2011. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42660456/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/raul-castro-named-st-secretary-communist-party/ (accessed 12th May 2011).

MZV ČR. "Jednání s Kubou". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 11 May 2009.

[http://www.mzv.cz/representation_brussels/cz/udalosti_a_media/jednani_s_kubou\\$218871.html?action=setMonth&year=2018&month=3](http://www.mzv.cz/representation_brussels/cz/udalosti_a_media/jednani_s_kubou$218871.html?action=setMonth&year=2018&month=3) (accessed 10th May 2011).

MZV ČR. "Prohlášení MZV k zadržování českých občanů na Kubě". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. 16 January 2001.

http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/udalosti_a_media/prohlaseni_a_stanoviska/archiv_prohlaseni

[_a_stanovisek/archiv_2001/x2001-01_16_bubenik_pilip_zadrzeni_na_kube.html](#)
(accessed 7 May 2011).

MZV ČR. “Vedoucí zastupitelského úřadu v Havaně a velvyslanec ČR v Bahamském společenství”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. 2010.
http://www.mzv.cz/havana/cz/o_velvyslanectvi/velvyslanec/index.html (accessed 10 May 2011).

MZV ČR. “Vztahy ČR k zemím Severní a Jižní Ameriky.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. 2010.
http://www.mzv.cz/public/2e/fd/c/72942_14945_VztahyCRseZememiSeverniAJizniAmeriky.pdf, (accessed 2 March 2010).

Novotný, Pavel. “Vztahy mezi Prahou a Havanou jsou stále chladnější”. *Lidové Noviny*. 19 April 2000.

Opatrný, Josef. “Československo-kubánské vztahy v období 1945-1989”. *Zahraničná Politika*. 30 June 2007. www.zahranicnapolitika.sk/index.php?id=231 (accessed 15 February 2011).

Opatrný, Josef. *Kuba*. Praha: Libri 2002.

Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE. “Historia del Partido Socialista Obrero Español”. *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*.
<http://www.psoe.es//ambito/historiapsoe/docs/index.do?action=View&id=460110>. (accessed 25 April 2010).

Pavlík, Petr. “Kubánská republika v ‘el período especial 1990-2000’”. in *Mezinárodní politika*. Vol. 27, No. 3, 2003.

Pehe, Jiří. “Česká politika vůči komunistickým zemím”. Jiří Pehe - Political Diary 2005. <http://www.pehe.cz/zapisnik/2005/ceska-politika-vuci-komunistickym-zemim> (accessed 25th April 2011).

Phillips, Leigh. “EU and Cuba formally restore tie”. *EUobserver*. 24 October 2008.
<http://euobserver.com/9/26991> (accessed 8 May 2010).

Pstross, Tomas. “The Concept of Human Rights in Foreign Policy – An analytical and methodological study”. The ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Department of Human Rights. http://www.cubasource.org/pdf/Human_Rights.pdf (accessed 27 February 2011).

Radačičová, Simone. “Oswaldo Paya: Nerušte Sankce,” *Britské Listy*. 18 November 2004. <http://www.blisty.cz/art/20674.html> (accessed 6 May 2010).

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Cuba Releases Two Dissidents Against Their Will”. *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*. 13 February 2011.
http://www.rferl.org/content/cuba_dissidents_freed/2307684.html (accessed 22 March 2011).

Radio Nacional de Venezuela. "Hijo de Raúl Castro publica libro sobre capitalismo y crisis de EE.UU". *Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y Información*. 17 February 2009. <http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?s=a8079d380421cb3840002de53da7d8eb&act=ST&f=16&t=90732&hl=> (accessed 14 May 2011).

Radio/TV Martí Noticias. "Cuba se niega a pagar deuda a la República Checa". *Radio Martí*. 7 April 2011. <http://www.martinoticias.com/noticias/Cuba-se-niega-a-pagar-deuda-a-la-Republica-Checa-119396304.html> (accessed 24 April 2011).

Reuters. "China restructures Cuba's debt, backs reform". *Reuters*. 23 December 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/23/cuba-china-debt-idUSN2313446920101223> (accessed 11 April 2011).

Roy, Joaquín. "The European Union Perception of Cuba: From Frustration to Irritation," *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*. Vol. 3 No. 2, August 2003. http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/roy_EUCuba.pdf (accessed 27 April 2010).

Sánchez, Yoani. "Generación Y – Mi Perfil" Yoani Sánchez – Blog. 2011. http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/?page_id=184 (accessed May 13 2011).

Sequera, Vivian. "Cuba Frees Prominent Czech Citizens". *Associated Press (AP)*. 6 February 2001. <http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y01/feb01/06e3.htm> (accessed 8 May 2011).

Shapiro, Jeremy and Nick Witney. *Towards a post-American Europe: A power audit of EU-US relations*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations ECFR, November 2009.

Skalický, Jaroslav. "Česko má ve světě 22 miliard korun. Skoro třetinu dluží Kuba". *Český Rozhlas*. 6 April 2011. http://www.rozhlas.cz/zpravy/domaciekonomika/_zprava/875368 (accessed 2 May 2011).

Solana, Javier. "Europe's Place in the World". Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Copenhagen 2002. *Europa*. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/70719.pdf (accessed 17 February 2011).

Stasiński, Maciej. "Co Hawana szykuje Kubańczykom". *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 10 May 2011. http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,9573501,Co_Hawana_szykuje_Kubanczykom.html (accessed 10 May 2011).

Stasiński, Maciej. "Kuba chce przeżyć. Prezydent Castro obiecuje reformy". *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 17 April 2011. http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,9452109,Kuba_chce_przezyc__Prezydent_Castro_obiecuje_reformy.html (accessed 10 May 2011).

Staten, Clifford. *The history of Cuba*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Štráfěldová, Milena. “Vztahy mezi Āeskem a Kubou se zhoršily. Kuba vyhostila Āeského diplomata”. *Radio Praha*. 14 April 2006.
<http://www.radio.cz/cz/rubrika/udalosti/vztahy-mezi-ceskem-a-kubou-se-zhorsily-kuba-vyhostila-ceskeho-diplomata> (accessed 10 May 2011).

The Economist. “Cuba’s cocktail-party war: No eating my canapés any more”. *The Economist*. Vol. 367 No. 8329, 21 – 27 June 2003: 49.

The Guardian. “Seven freed Cuban political prisoners arrive in Spain”. *The Guardian*. 13 July 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/13/cuba-frees-political-prisoners-spanish-exile> (accessed 22 March 2011).

The Huffington Post. “Obama lifting Cuba travel restrictions”. *The Huffington Post*. 14 April 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/13/some-cuba-travel-restrict_n_186197.html, (accessed 6 April 2011).

The Holy See Press Office. “College of Cardinals Biographical Notes: Ortega y Alamino Card. Jaime Lucas”. The Vatican: The Holy See. 24 February 2006.
http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/cardinali_biografie/cardinali_bio_ortega-y-alamino_jl_en.html (accessed 20 April 2011).

The Vatican: The Holy See. “Welcome ceremony in Cuba: Address of John Paul II. 21. January 1998”. The Vatican: The Holy See. January 1998.
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1998/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19980121_lahavana-arrival_en.html (accessed 29 April 2011).

The White House. “Presidential Memorandum – Continuation of Authorities Under the Trading with the Enemy Act” The White House. 2 September 2010.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/02/presidential-memorandum-continuation-authorities-under-trading-with-enem> (accessed 4 April 2011).

Týden. “Fidel Castro – Āestný doktor Univerzity Karlovy”. *Týden*, 2006.
<http://test.tyden.cz/fotogalerie/fidel-castro-cestny-doktor-univerzity-karlovy/?imgOffset=6#foto-scroller> (accessed 1 May 2011).

U.S. Department of State. “International Religious Freedom Report 2009 - Cuba”, U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2009,
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127386.htm> (accessed April 19 2011).

Van Reenen, Saskia. “Dutch consider re-establishing ties to Cuba after secret trade mission”. *Havana Journal*. Cuba Business. 16 April 2008.
<http://havanajournal.com/business/print/8191/> (accessed 13 April 2011).

Vassiliki, Tzivelis. “The European Union’s Foreign Policy Towards Cuba: It Is Time to Tie the Knot.” in *Jean Monet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*. Vol. 6 No. 7, March 2006.
<http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Tzivelisfinal.pdf>. (accessed 20 April 2010).

Verlin Laatikainen, Katie. “Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN”. *CFSP Forum*. Vol. 2 No. 1, January, 2004.

Voss, Michael “Cuban dissident Guillermo Farinas refused exit visa”. *BBC*. 15 December 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11997212> (accessed 20 April 2011).

Voeux, Claire. “Cuba – no surrender by independent journalists, five years on from ‘Black Spring’”. *Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom*. March 2008. http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Cuba_report.pdf (accessed 22 March 2011).

YouTube. “Clinton, Obama on Cuba” *YouTube*, 22 February 2008. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eIjtp-PPNc&feature=related> (accessed 6 April 2011).

Appendices Contents


Appendix 1: Tables

Table 1:

External Trade of Cuba Figures:

The Major Import Partners			The Major Export Partners			The Major Trade Partners		
Partners	Mio €	%	Partners	Mio €	%	Partners	Mio €	%
Venezuela	2.078	29,6	China	733	27,5	EU	2.197	22,7
EU	1.645	23,4	Canada	719	27,0	Venezuela	2.114	21,8
China	939	13,4	EU	552	20,7	China	1.673	17,2
Canada	424	6,0	Caribbean	187	7,0	Canada	1.143	11,8
USA	359	5,1	Iran	84	3,1	USA	359	3,7
Brazil	260	3,7	Dominican Republic	69	2,6	Brazil	325	3,3
Russia	174	2,5	Brazil	65	2,4	Caribbean	270	2,8
Korea	172	2,4	Guyana	49	1,8	Russia	219	1,8
Mexico	152	2,2	Belize	47	1,8	Korea	174	1,7
Japan	142	2,0	Russia	45	1,7	Mexico	164	1,6

The Major Trade Partners Graph:



Appendix 2: Preliminary Interview Questions

What is your view on the cooperation of EU members in terms of the Common Policy towards Cuba? Is it functioning well?

Does their common communist past influence the relationship of the Czech Republic and Cuba, hence the relationship of EU and Cuba? If so, is it a positive or negative influence?

How do you understand the differences between the approaches of EU members towards Cuba? (Specifically Spain and the Czech Republic)

In the future, can we expect the European Union to follow rather Spanish-like or Czech-like approach?

Can, or should EU change its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) towards Cuba in the foreseeable future?

How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba reflected in the process of liberalization of the island?

How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba associated with the CFSP?

Do you see the cooperation of EU and NGOs as positive or negative?

How, according to you, will a fully functioning CFSP led by Catherine Ashton influence the relationship of EU and Cuba?

What, according to you, is the position of the European Union in Cuba in comparison to USA or China?

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to the CFSP? If so, how?

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to European NGOs working in Cuba?

Do you believe Cuba will change in the foreseeable future, with regard to its general liberalization and its adherence to international human rights norms?

Appendix 3: Interview Contacting Letters

Olomouc 9. 3. 2011

Vážená paní, vážený pane,

Jmenuji se Mgr. Ondřej Polišenský a studuji MA program Eurocultre na Univerzitě Palackého v Olomouci a Univezitě Deusto v Bilbao. Jako součást mého studia zpracovávám diplomovou práci na téma „Společná zahraniční a bezpečnostní politika Evropské unie vůči Kubě se zaměřením na česko-kubánské vztahy“. Jako součást této práce bych chtěl uskutečnit několik krátkých interview s profesionály zabývajícími se mezinárodními vztahy spojenými s Kubou. Tato interview by v práci sloužila jako primární zdroje.

Tímto, si Vás dovoluji požádat zda-li bylo možné uskutečnit s Vámi takové interview ať už osobně či po telefonu. K nastínění pole mého zájmu, příkládám seznam otázek na které bych se chtěl zeptat.

S vřelým pozdravem,

Mgr. Ondřej Polišenský
MA Program Euroculture
Palacký University, University of Deusto
<http://www.euroculturemaster.org/>

Olomouc 9. 3. 2011

Dear Sir, Madam,

My name is Mgr. Ondřej Polišenský and I study MA program of Euroculture at Palacký University in Olomouc and University of Deusto in Bilbao. As a part of my studies I am carrying out a Master Thesis entitled “The Common Foreign Policy of the European Union towards Cuba with Focus on the Czech – Cuban Relations”. In this thesis, I would like to carry out a number of short interviews with professionals engaged in Cuba-related international affairs. Through this, I seek primary sources of information for the thesis.

With this e-mail, I would like to ask you whether it could be possible to conduct a short interview either personally or over the telephone. To foreshadow the field of my interest, I attach here a set of questions I would like to ask.

Sincerely,

Olomouc 9. 3. 2011

Estimado Señor, Señora,

Me llamo Ondřej Polišenský y soy un estudiante del Master en Eurocultura en la Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao y Palacký Universidad en Olomouc, Republica Checa. Como parte de mis estudios, estoy realizando una tesis titulada “La Política Exterior Común de la Unión Europea hacia Cuba con efoque de los relaciones de la Republica Checa y Cuba“. En la tesis quiero hacer una serie de entrevistas (en Inglés) con los profesionales que trabajan en el ámbito de las relaciones cubanas. Con este e-mail quiero preguntarle si sería posible hacer una breve entrevista, personalmente, por teléfono o por Skype. Para presentarlos mi interés, os adjunto aquí una lista de preguntas que me gustaría preguntar.

Sinceramente,

Appendix 4: Interview Transcripts

Interview conducted with Ms. Isabel Martinho, Deputy Head of Cuban Unit at European External Action Service in Brussels, on March 23rd, 2011.

Given Questions and Answers:

What is your view on the cooperation of EU members in terms of the Common Policy towards Cuba? Is it functioning well?

The Union consists of 27 independent countries which have 27 independent approaches towards the topic of Policy towards Cuba. Therefore, the talks, as the whole system of the EU, can get rather complicated when regarding all the individual position. However, it is believed that this system functions and a joined position is gradually created. What I consider as an important obstacle for the Cuban relations is the fact that Cuba is due to its history and polity a “symbol” that causes that the discussions are not rational and usually tend to be heated as many EU members have rather strong opinions.

Does their common communist past influence the relationship of the Czech Republic and Cuba, hence the relationship of EU and Cuba? If so, is it a positive or negative influence?

Absolutely; I agree with the fact that the communist heritage of the member states of Central and Eastern Europe is the key factor influencing their attitude towards Cuba and therefore towards shaping of the CFSP. The influence, as she understands, is rather negative. Opposing this, it is important to realize that the polity of Cuba is not communism as known from Europe of the 20th century. It is rather socialism that plays a key role in Cuban society. Not communism.

How do you understand the differences between the approaches of EU members towards Cuba? (Specifically Spain and the Czech Republic)

Every member state has its own interests, and these need to be respected. Nevertheless, in terms of EEAS, me as a Portuguese, I have to admit that the representation of Spain and Portugal within the staff dealing with Latin America is

higher thanks to historical and cultural connections. This may be also partially influencing the position.

In the future, can we expect the European Union to follow rather Spanish-like or Czech-like approach?

I would say that none of these, rather radical member state approaches, will not be followed. Nonetheless, the European Union is promoting the trade and business connections with Cuba in order to support the well being of Cuban society, its development and gradual promotion of democratic changes. These changes, I think, must come from “within” the nation itself and not from any oppression or limitation from outside.

Can, or should EU change its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) towards Cuba in the foreseeable future?

It is still developing, and any radical change is not expected unless any random spark of sudden changes such as natural disasters, or sudden protests as seen in Tunisia, happens.

How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba reflected in the process of liberalization of the island? How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba associated with the CFSP?

The cooperation is existent in form of discussion and coherence of individual projects. Again, it is important to bear in mind that the union cooperates with the NGOs but does not seek any active engagement in changing the regime and rather wants to participate on accompanying the changing process and uses mainly the economic tools, and material humanitarian aid such as the one after hurricanes of 2008.

Do you see the cooperation of EU and NGOs as positive or negative?

Positive

What, according to you, is the position of the European Union in Cuba in comparison to USA or China?

Reviewing the positions of world powers in connection to Cuba, the European Union is for Cuba the closest player in terms of culture, historical proximity, and society model. On the other hand, the United States play as a very strong economic facilitator in the region and therefore in Cuba as well. Even despite the existence of embargo imposed on US-Cuban trade, the position of the United States is still very firm and if the embargo will be lifted, the position of a key economic partner will be clear as for the geographical position as well as economical supremacy in the American continent. On the other hand, Cuba may be, over all, considered to be closer to Europe as the society as well as government suffers of “paranoia” from a possible invasion of the United States which is similar to 1950s Cold War fear of atomic bomb attack on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Concerning China, I do not see the cooperation very dynamic and especially worked out. China is both geographically and culturally too distant from Cuba and due to these limitations cannot aspire to a position of the main globally influential partner for Cuba. I only see cooperation of Cuba and China on commercial level. Cubans simply buy cheap products made in China but for the moment China for them is not more than an economic partner.

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to the CFSP? If so, how?

The Holy See is not cooperating with the EU’s CFSP on any stated projects. However, very strong links between the Vatican diplomacy and the European External Action Service (EEAS) exists. Both sides actively communicate with each-other and thus a gradual development of improving of island’s situation of human rights but also a general state of society is coherently supported.

Do you believe Cuba will change in the foreseeable future, with regard to its general liberalization and its adherence to international human rights norms and civil society?

A change may happen any time, especially in a case of a sudden natural disaster like in Haiti. Nevertheless the state of civil society in Cuba is nowadays surprisingly healthier than you would expect. Even though the Cubans are prevented from organizing themselves in groups of interests, political parties, or any other movements then those approved and organized by the government, a

certain activity of the civil society certainly exists. I saw people at farmers' gathering openly complaining about the state of economy and criticizing the government.

Interview conducted with Ms. Pavla Holcová, Head of Cuban Unit at People in Need, Non-profit NGO, on March 28th, 2011.

Given questions and answers:

What is your view on the cooperation of EU members in terms of the Common Policy towards Cuba? Is it functioning well?

It is definitely not functioning well, the member states do not cooperate. Common position, however, stands as an immensely important sign for the Cuban opposition.

Does their common communist past influence the relationship of the Czech Republic and Cuba, hence the relationship of EU and Cuba? If so, is it a positive or negative influence?

I am not sure how could the communist past influence the relations of the EU or if I could provide a definition of positive or negative influence. Nonetheless, the communist experience puts the Czech Republic to the wing of critics of the Cuban regime. In terms of human rights, the post communist countries play a very strong role which is, in my opinion, needed in comparison to, for example, France where this kind of “drawing-room socialist” is in every French and that the Czech Republic’s opposition works as a good counterbalance to such countries.

How do you understand the differences between the approaches of EU members towards Cuba? (Specifically Spain and the Czech Republic)

The different approaches, even though they may seem different, have the same goal – the development of the Cuban society. The fact that the Spanish socialist government chooses the open dialog with the Cuban government and putting less importance on human rights is in economic-political context understandable. The fact that the Czech Republic can imagine the real situation on Cuba more easily and empathize to the situation of the opposition and human rights activists and therefore has chosen a construction of civil society as a goal is also understandable. The new government is a lot more opened to the regime than the previous one. The fact is that the Spanish do not deal with a question

whether to talk or not to talk with Cuban government. They simply provide the help giving Cuba no special conditions.

How do you see the presence of large Spanish companies in Cuba in terms of influence on Spanish government?

I think that for ordinary Cuban people is the presence of Spanish companies very frustrating. Concerning the hotel chain Sol Meliá, ordinary Cubans can never get to hotels as such. Living in a country where there is minimal new construction and everything falling apart, they can see that behind the wall of these resorts construction works and they cannot enter. For example, as the houses are not being built there is a huge lack of housing for people in Cuba and at the same time hotels on the beach quickly grow.

All right, however what about the European context and the fact that these companies may influence Spanish government actions in Cuba?

In terms of European context and decision-making of Spanish government, the companies certainly do have a share on decision-making influence.

In the future, can we expect the European Union to follow rather Spanish-like or Czech-like approach?

I am convinced that it cannot be expected. EU will not take any of these radical opinions as its own. Nonetheless, it will incline to the dialogue with the Cuban government.

Can, or should EU change its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) towards Cuba in the foreseeable future?

What matters is the position of Cuba. Otherwise, I do not think that the CFSP would be any priority of EU's foreign policy as well as I do not see any space or will to change it. Furthermore, after some years, the civil society has started to grow.

How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba reflected in the process of liberalization of the island?

Mainly the young people realize that freedom equals responsibility and that they want to be responsible for their lives.

So, you are saying that you agree with the fact that the civil society in Cuba grows?

Well, yes, I do. Nonetheless, the government still develops actions against this development. For example, in case of Yoani Sánchez, she has been recently severely attacked by national television pictured as a contra-revolutionary backed by money from US. On the other hand, she has managed to become that well known that the government cannot risk to imprison her. Also, her work and financing is very transparent so it is hard for the regime to accuse her.

How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba associated with the CFSP?

I do not know. I do not even know if there is any connection between human-rights organization and EU whatsoever. The projects financed from the union are usually apolitical, such as renovation of facades of buildings in downtown Havana. These projects are not very concrete with a specific future effect. Such projects are valued but concerning the importance, influence and power of the union, I think that there should be done more effective and influential projects.

Do you see the cooperation of EU and NGOs as positive or negative?

EU or EIDHR have never given any money to Cuban human rights-related projects. Therefore, on the field of human rights, I see the cooperation as lousy. Concerning the humanitarian and developmental projects, I consider the cooperation to be on the good level.

How, according to you, will a fully functioning CFSP led by Catherine Ashton influence the relationship of EU and Cuba?

I think that nothing will change substantially. Cuba is not a priority, not at least for now. Until any substantial change happens, the vaguely defined policy of the EU towards Cuba will continue.

What, according to you, is the position of the European Union in Cuba in comparison to USA or China?

It is absolutely different. The Cubans, traditionally, perceive Europe as their crèche; culturally as well as politically. USA and China are world powers

but they are too distant from the Cuban ideals, traditions and ideas. USA are controversial from the fundamentals of their foreign policy towards Cuba, and China, in terms of Cuban view, is looked down on and functions only as a major trade partner.

What do you exactly mean by “looked down” and why is that?

Historically, there has been a lot of Chinese living in Cuba and they used to do the worst jobs. Connected to such cultural and historical reasons, as well as Cuban patriotism and pride, China is not a role model Cuba would like become alike. Nowadays, it's changing but Cubans still perceive Chinese only as business partners. The only cooperation is therefore possible on economic basis but Cuba will never become China.

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to the CFSP? If so, how?

I don't think so. Vatican represents a very different sphere of influence. It is not that political as the European Union. I think that it is the advantage of Vatican as, during solicitations it can function as a mediator between Cuba and EU. It does not stand on any side of this “barricade” and I think that it should stay as it is.

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to European NGOs working in Cuba? Is Vatican a key player also politically or is it only a mediator?

Yeah, mainly charities – daily wards, vicarage-based youth organizations.

Do you believe Cuba will change in the foreseeable future, with regard to its general liberalization and its adherence to international human rights norms?

What's foreseeable future? If you mean two years, then no. If you mean seven years, then yes concerning the liberalization but not the human rights. This will take more time.

Given Questions and Answers:

What is your view on the cooperation of EU members in terms of the Common Policy towards Cuba? Is it functioning well?

I see the CFSP as fully functioning. The member states are through their talks pursuing consensus and every member has a right of veto. The veto, in terms of Cuba, is quite difficult to reach. That's, for example, similar to Middle East. The fact that they (the member-states) are not reaching the consensus means that it (CFSP) works. The "commonness" of the European Union's view is not therefore imposed by a single state.

Does their common communist past influence the relationship of the Czech Republic and Cuba, hence the relationship of EU and Cuba? If so, is it a positive or negative influence?

The transformation of post-communist countries plays a role of a "very important connector" to the situation of Cuba nowadays and on. The Czech Republic has, in this problem, special position for its quick transformation and avoidance of systems like "goulash communism". That's why the Czech approach focuses on adherence of human rights and liberalization of Cuba. Such model of transformation is by Cuban opposition seen as a role model.

The prove of the post-communist engagement of the Czech Republic in Cuba could also have been seen during the Czech Presidency of the EU when the Czech Republic organized 1st political dialog between the European Union and Cuba. Therefore we may see the Czech Republic acting positively taking advantage of the experience with communism. On the other hand, Spain's engagement in Cuba is rather based on business approximation. The Czech Republic does not criticize wider opening of the EU-Cuban trade as the establishment of the market economy in Cuba is among Czech interests. Nonetheless, the volume of the Czech trade in Cuba is considerably lower compared to Spain and some other EU members. Also, the Czech Republic does not support the idea of US embargo.

Difficulty is that Spain combines its internal politics and diplomacy.

Could Spain have its interest in Cuba due to their colonial history?

Spain has somewhat similar approach to Cuba as e.g. UK to the commonwealth countries. There is, however, an existing limitation in the form of strong influence and geographical proximity of the United States.

In the future, can we expect the European Union to follow rather Spanish-like or Czech-like approach?

The approach will be probably Spanish-like as the Czech Republic, even though being a critic of Cuba's human rights situation, is not against the development o business cooperation.

Can, or should EU change its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) towards Cuba in the foreseeable future?

What may bring a change is a shift in Cuban system. Recent liberalization of small businesses is supported and valued but it is not enough. Furthermore, the support of Cuban civil society and the criticism of the corruption and harassment of opposition are the focal point.

How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba reflected in the process of liberalization of the island?

NGOs do not have any key influence. Every activity has, however, its meaning. Their moral support is indispensable.

How is the work of European NGOs that work in Cuba associated with the CFSP?

Officially, it is not associated with it.

How, according to you, will a fully functioning CFSP led by Catherine Ashton influence the relationship of EU and Cuba?

CFSP lead by Catherine Ashton does not bring any breaking point in common position. Existence of the EEAS' head is here so that we have union's representation to lead the international relations of the Union. The national foreign affairs and particular views, however, remain.

What, according to you, is the position of the European Union in Cuba in comparison to USA or China?

The difference of policy coordination of the EU towards Cuba is evident as EU, unlike USA or China, is not a single-nation political entity. This makes EU to be, in a way, “weaker” pole in multipolar world. EU, simply, has to deal with the combination of national approaches. Such mixture can be both positive and negative. Czech Republic, for example, cannot gain much from the liberalization of Cuba but its pressure on democratic values balances other member states’ views.

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to the CFSP? If so, how?

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to European NGOs working in Cuba? Is Vatican a key player also politically or is it only a mediator?

Vatican, in terms of relations towards Cuba, is impartial. Apart from Caritas, Vatican does not stand very close to NGOs that openly criticize the state of Cuban society and support the development of civil society. The Holy See has no particular interest in CFSP. Nevertheless, the credit from the project of extradition of political prisoners belongs to Vatican diplomacy and namely cardinal Ortega. He has achieved something no one could before.

Do you believe Cuba will change in the foreseeable future, with regard to its general liberalization and its adherence to international human rights norms?

It is believed that a change can come but only under special circumstances, such as natural disaster sparking unrests, or death of Castro brothers. In future, providing no bumps in the development occur, Cuba would probably like to follow the Chinese model of restructuring of its economy. However, Cubans are not to achieve this for their different social and cultural models and historical consequences.

Interview conducted with Mr. Javier Martínez-Corbalán, Secretary General of Fundación Hispano Cubana, on March 29th, 2011.

Given questions and answers:

What is your view on the cooperation of EU members in terms of the Common Policy towards Cuba? Is it functioning well?

Spain's position differs in accordance to the actual Spanish government. The socialist government has different approach than the conservative one. Common position is a good instrument in order to work with Cuba as it is based on fixed European principles. It cannot be fundamentally changed by Spain's influence as the basic ideas of democracy, freedom and human rights are the minimal basis to work with any policy.

On the other hand, the main problem with Cuba is Cuba and the Castro regime itself. Anything that Europe tries to develop in Cuba is maneuvered by Cuban government for its profit while criticizing the EU. Also, as our main concern is the situation of Cuban dissidents and as we have the closest connection with them, we know that almost all of them, even 99% say that the Common Position is a good tool of European Union working with Cuba and that they are happy with the results of that.

Does their common communist past influence the relationship of the Czech Republic and Cuba, hence the relationship of EU and Cuba? If so, is it a positive or negative influence?

The communist past of the European countries is very important as, thanks to their experience, they can explain the problems to the international community and they have a clear vision of what would be the future of Cuba and how to fight against the dictatorship.

How do you understand the differences between the approaches of EU members towards Cuba? (Specifically Spain and the Czech Republic)

I think that it is a problem of private companies, not the different member-states. I think, that the Spanish government should think carefully about to the higher interest of the country and the nation and not to prioritize particular companies that have any kind of business in that part of the world.

But, I think that the socialist government in Spain has profound interests in cooperation and the national interests are placed above the interests of individual companies. Political aspects of human rights, freedom and democracy have to be the first to be taken into account in any kind of cooperation between the two countries (Spain and Cuba).

So what you are basically saying it that the influence of the companies is not that important?

Actual policy of Spain in policy with Cuba has something to do with the companies but what matters more is the ideological and political link rather than the commercial link. I think that there are other factors which have the weight on this structure of political links.

Do you see the cooperation of EU and NGOs as positive or negative?

The NGOs are very worried about the situation in Cuba. I think that the recent loosening of European restrictions imposed after Black spring was an error. In terms of human rights, the pressure on the regime must be maintained in order to avoid any further persecution of the dissidents. I think that the things keep on moving and the function of the NGOs is to point out and witness the real situation on the island in order to avoid the worsening of the situation of the common policy approximation.

What, according to you, is the position of the European Union in Cuba in comparison to USA or China?

The relationship of the EU and Cuba compared to others is quite different as it is a supranational organization and USA and China are single countries. We, in the EU, have to take into account our different points of view, different kinds of interests and governments. This is what creates the Common Foreign Policy because it is not a country but a different kind of political organization. There are many views as there is the council, the parliament, the commission and to reach the consensus with so many different views of the reality is sometimes difficult. However, in that way was the common position created and in some moments the union tries to push the Obama administration to put much lower pressure on Cuba from the position of USA. But, as I told you

at the beginning of this interview, it is always Cuban government which creates their conditions to benefit politically and blocks the cooperation and that is a big problem. You can do many things but if Cuba does not make any significant change the relationship will be still a worry.

In terms of China, the connection develops mainly in business level. But I think that China is not, in this problem, a main actor. I think that they act very strategically. Keeping in mind that China and Cuba are both communist regimes the Chinese are very careful when doing business with Cuba and also are aware and complain about Cuban credibility in terms of meeting the payments and so on. For Cuba, this cooperation has never been very important either, in comparison to US or EU. Also it can be caused by the geographical position as well as the cultural proximity of the US and EU in terms of culture and language.

So you are also saying that the change of the regime or the liberalization must come from the inside?

I think it is good to offer new routes of relationship but these have to be based on firm changes of the Cuban regime. Right now, there is no significant change in respect of human rights, all the power is still within the regime, there are no changes in the legal system and therefore it is difficult to maintain closer cooperation.

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to the CFSP? If so, how?

I think that the Catholic Church has its own path. Maybe in some ways it is connected, in a form of communication or conferences between the union and the Vatican. But I think that the Catholic Church has marked its own path to establish its presence on the island and nowadays, it has much more to do with the actual situation in the island rather than the political link with the European Union.

Also, inside the Catholic Church in Cuba there are different ways of understanding of this problem so the position of the Vatican has developed importantly with the presence of Cardinal Ortega opposing other prominent bishops in the island.

So you do not really see it connected?

No, I do not think so. However, their interest in promoting development of democracy in Cuba is the same. The paths differ.

Is the influence of the Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to European NGOs working in Cuba? Is Vatican a key player also politically or is it only a mediator?

Well, they are playing kind of this role right now establishing the negotiation. I think that the Cuban regime has searched for a counterpart in order to establish any kind of negotiation. Vatican makes this possible and the evolution of the regime can become to be changing. However, the regime has, however, always made the moves in order to survive and it wants to maintain its position in the country disregarding EU's position. So no matter what Europe does, Cuba will do what they want.

In terms of Spain, the relations with Cuba are importantly influenced by the type of administration which holds the government. Cuba's government is still the same and always clearly wants to promote the usual system and keep its propaganda in order to control the power. Even though has the government recently released political prisoners, the repressions are still present throughout the island

Do you believe Cuba will change in the foreseeable future, with regard to its general liberalization and its adherence to international human rights norms?

Of course, the Cuban regime has been here for over fifty years and all the people which have been in the leading positions of the politburo has been there for more than eight years. This means that in five or ten years, things must change. It is necessary. But, I think that the Cuban regime will try to keep all the resources of power in its hands in order to control as much as possible. Also, Cuba nowadays, is in need of financial help, and they are trying hard to obtain this from Europe and the United States. Based on my experience, analyzing different countries, I am convinced that Cuban government will always keep the main tools of self-promotion and self-development and that the regime will try to resist possible democratic and human rights changes as much as possible.

The economic situation in Cuba is critical, even though the persona of

Fidel Castro will be a psychological point of attention, in future, literally, anything can happen. What can occur is social violence caused by the economic situation, or even the fall of Castro brothers (not the government) which would be definitely a breaking point in the development of Cuba. The Regime nowadays, has the power and controls everything but the economic situation is critical, they need help from abroad but they will manage with that, I think. The current moves of the government which seem as approximation towards liberalization are just surface things that do not affect the functioning of the regime.

Interview conducted with Mr. José Gabriel Ramón Castillo, formerly imprisoned Cuban dissident, a representative of “Proyecto Ciudadano Cubano” (Cuban Citizen Project) on April 19th, 2011.

Given questions and answers:

What is your view on the cooperation of EU members in terms of the Common Policy towards Cuba? Is it functioning well?

Basically, it works well, and the policy that the EU introduced does not really have that much impact. EU has behaved towards Cuba as if it was a multinational state. When it comes to Cuba the EU position it was targeted only to a certain group of population not the whole nation. A lot of Cuban nationals left the country due to the regime and the EU policy is targeted to the people who stayed not the significant Diasporas abroad EU has not put clear policy towards Cuba. It privileged its relations with the regime not the nation.

The position of the EU in Cuba understood by political experts, but the common population has no clue about the existence of it. This topic remains solely on expert level in Cuba.

Does their common communist past influence the relationship of the Czech Republic and Cuba, hence the relationship of EU and Cuba? If so, is it a positive or negative influence?

There are four distinct positions towards Cuba within the union. One of them is the Czech position and it is influenced by the communist past which importantly influenced the way the policy is conducted towards Cuba as well. Other one is French – based on bilateral relations. All the European countries that have lived under communist regime have behaved differently towards Cuba than the rest of the European countries. This reinforced a kind of separation between the member states and especially the regime. In terms of other European countries, Nordic countries have shown greater concern about the way of political and human rights development in Cuba. In relation to the EU and some members, the membership in NATO also influences individual position of states towards Cuba.

How do you understand the differences between the approaches of EU members towards Cuba? (Specifically Spain and the Czech Republic)

In Cuba, there is no government as you in Europe understand what a government actually is. It works on Stalinist background and the only objective is to remain in power. For me, it is not a government, it is just a regime. The regime is only interested in establishing relationship with 3rd countries of the world that can help maintaining the existence of the regime by acknowledging it and this is why Cuba is not developing relations that would lead to a change in Cuban system, for example, the human rights adherence.

Even if Cuba establishes connections with EU, it will not lead to come to any adherence in common values as it happened among European countries. EU should keep that in mind when it proceeds to relations because if it tries to promote human rights, Cuba will not listen anymore. The fact that it is really hard to come up with an opposition in Cuba already blocks the possibility for a change Europe would be eager to bring.

Full democratization is not possible due to the absence of human rights adherence and the lack of public sphere. The opposition is not given an opportunity to speak up because the regime makes it appear as the result of a bad influence coming from the US or NATO or even the EU. Even if people wanted to protest against the regime, it is just not possible because the regime does not allow it.

Concerning the human relations and the fact that you are an ex-prisoner of the regime, how do you perceive the releasing of the Cubans and extraditing them to Spain forbidding them to stay in Cuba?

It has been a very important achievement for the Cuban dissidents, Cuban Catholic Church, and Spain that the regime was made to extradite the prisoners. However, the condition under which the ex-prisoners have to leave the country is obvious. Through this, the regime gets rid off the unwanted people.

Can, or should EU change its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) towards Cuba in the foreseeable future?

Well, it is really difficult to change due to the economic interests of individual countries. The EU policy towards Cuba is not coherent because of

responsibility of member-states which hold membership in NATO. The EU policy has therefore some contradictions and does not work as a common position.

Disregarding the policy itself, what is very important is the existence of European Union-member states and the international community support to the Cuban opposition and towards the exiled dissidents from Cuba, allowing them to come back and act for change.

In the future, can we expect the European Union to follow rather Spanish-like or Czech-like approach?

Based on what I said before, it will not be either Spanish or Czech as it still too much influenced by NATO and the United States. Spain, however, in terms of EU-Latin America relations works as a mediator. The reasons for this are clearly historical due to the colonization and cultural and linguistic proximity.

EU should work on establishing a new common position regarding the complexity of Cuban society and develop it as “fully European” and avoid any influence of NATO.

How, according to you, will a fully functioning CFSP led by Catherine Ashton influence the relationship of EU and Cuba?

Catherine Ashton did not really want to come up with a new policy-making system towards the Cuban regime as she has chosen to wait for more signs given from the regime itself and especially the congress of the Communist party in April 2011. However, the Communist Congress insisted on succession of socialism, not a transition towards democracy.

What, according to you, is the position of the European Union in Cuba in comparison to USA or China?

Of course, the policy comparison is difficult as they are very different. Even the United States will have to change their position as it is not working that well. EU’s position towards China, even though being a communist country, differs substantially from the one towards Cuba. Cuba and China are allies. The regime in Cuba can eventually be changed but not in accordingly to the Chinese model. It can change only under the circumstances of Cuban people actively

participating in the political life and it should be the European Union trying to promote establishment of civil society on the island.

Is the influence of Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to the CFSP? If so, how?

Position of the Vatican is basically based on the notion “all the roads lead Rome”. The diplomacy of Vatican is based on very traditional values, it has been able to develop its own position throughout the years of its existence and therefore it is independent from the European Union policies. It develops intentions of consensus-seeking instead of confrontation.

Is the influence of the Vatican on Cuba somehow connected to European NGOs working in Cuba? Is Vatican a key player also politically or is it only a mediator?

What is really influential is the role of the Catholic Church in Cuba. The role of the Church works as a civic power and not as a political power. As there is no evident persecution of the Catholics, the Church works as an interlocutor and mediator between the government and the people. The Church has its will for dialogue and therefore works as a mediator not an opposition. Also, I think, that it is the Church’s responsibility to appeal to the government, the people and the international community to facilitate change in Cuba.

The exiled Cubans promoting the changes in the island have a strong voice in the international community. Therefore, they should start working on organizing themselves so in case of changes of the regime they would help to promote democratic values more easily.

The Cuban population nowadays does not have the vocation of being enslaved by the regime. They have to be given a chance to be active and it will work only if the EU will have the common position and the international community will support this.

Do you believe Cuba will change in the foreseeable future, with regard to its general liberalization and its adherence to international human rights norms?

All this depends on the creation of civil society within the nation. The civil society in Cuba can be carried out but for now it is too much dependent on the system of the government. People should find a way to acquire more power for themselves within the regime. The regime can be changed from the bottom-up not from the top-down. It’s important to have a coherent policy towards Cuba

to help to create the civil society and this is the only chance to have an impact like this because whenever people try to call for more democracy it gets crushed by the regime.

Concerning the time phase of the change is not that important. What matters is the change of conditions for the people. It could happen within 5 months – what is determining is the position that will be formed towards Cuba. Problem of absence of law granting public consultation/referenda however blocks such development.

Appendix 5: The “Dangerousness” Law, Excerpt from the Cuban Criminal Code¹⁷⁰

TITLE XI

THE STATE OF DANGEROUSNESS AND SECURITY MEASURES

Chapter 1

The State of Dangerousness

Article 72.

A state of dangerousness is considered to be the special propensity of a person to commit crimes, as demonstrated by conduct observed in manifest contradiction to the norms of socialist morality.

Article 73.

1. The state of dangerousness is seen when any of the following hazardous indicators occur concurrently in the individual:

- a) habitual drunkenness and dipsomania;
- b) drug addiction;
- c) antisocial behavior

2. A person is considered to be in a state of dangerousness due to antisocial behavior if the person routinely breaks the rules of social coexistence by committing acts of violence, or by other provocative acts, violates the rights of others or by his or her general behavior weakens the rules of coexistence or disturbs the order of the community or lives, like a social parasite, off the work of others or exploits or practices socially reprehensible vices.

Article 74.

Mentally ill persons and persons of delayed mental development are also considered to be in a state of dangerousness, if, because of [their mental condition], they do not have the ability to comprehend the scope of their actions nor to control their conduct, provided that these represent a threat to the security of others or to the social order.

Chapter 2

The Official Warning

Article 75.

1. Anyone who, without falling under [the categories of] any of the states of dangerousness referred to in Article 73, by his or her ties or relations with persons who

¹⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch, *New Castro, Same Cuba – Political Prisoners in the Post-Fidel Era*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009): 1.

are potentially dangerous to society, to other individuals and to the social, economic and political order of the socialist state, may as a result develop a propensity to commit crime, will be given a warning by the competent police authority, to prevent the individual from pursuing socially dangerous or criminal activities.

2. The warning will be executed, in any case, by means of a written document that states the causes that establish the [state of dangerousness] and the information provided by the warned person, signed by the latter and by the acting [officer].

Chapter 3

Security Measures

FIRST SECTION: General Regulations

Article 76.

1. Security measures can be ordered to prevent the commission of crimes or as a result of their having been committed. In the first case they are called pre-criminal security measures; and in the second, post-criminal security measures.

2. Security measures are applied when the individual displays any of the dangerousness indicators referred to in Articles 73 and 74.

Article 77.

1. Post-criminal security measures, as a general rule, are applied after the termination of the imposed sanction.

2. If during the implementation of a security measure applied to a convicted person, a penalty of imprisonment is imposed on said person, the execution of the security measure will be suspended, to be renewed once the penalty has been served.

3. If, in the case mentioned in the previous section, the sanctioned person is conditionally released, the safety measure will be terminated on completion of probation as long as the probation has not been revoked.

SECOND SECTION: Pre-criminal Security Measures

Article 78. Once a person has been declared to be in a state of dangerousness by the corresponding process, the most adequate of the following pre-criminal security measures may be applied:

- a) therapeutic;
- b) re-educational;
- c) oversight by the agencies of the National Revolutionary Police.

Article 79.

1. The therapeutic measures are:

- a) internment in a welfare, psychiatric or detoxification institution;
 - b) appointment to specialized educational center, with or without internment;
 - c) outside medical treatment.
2. The therapeutic measures are applied to mentally ill persons and persons of delayed mental development in a state of dangerousness, to dipsomaniacs and to drug addicts.
 3. The implementation of these measures shall last until the state of dangerousness disappears in the individual.

Article 80.

1. The re-educational measures are:
 - a) internment in a specialized institution for work or study;
 - b) surrender to a labor collective, for the control and orientation of the conduct of an individual in a state of dangerousness.
2. Re-educational measures are applied to antisocial individuals
3. The term of these measures is at least one year and at most four years.

Article 81.

1. The monitoring by agencies of the National Revolutionary Police consists of orientation and control of the conduct of an individual in a state of dangerousness by officials of these agencies.
2. This measure is applicable to dipsomaniacs, drug addicts and antisocial individuals.
3. The term of these measures is at least one year and at most four years.

Article 82.

The court may impose the appropriate type of pre-criminal security measure according to its respective degree, and will establish its extension within the set limits of each case, choosing those which are of detentive or not detentive character, depending on the severity of the individual's state of dangerousness and the possibilities for his or her rehabilitation.

Article 83.

The court, at any time during the execution of the pre-criminal security measure may change its category or duration, or suspend it at the request of the agency in charge of its implementation or by the court's discretion. In the latter case, the court will ask for the executing agency's report.

Article 84.

The court will inform the prevention agencies of the National Revolutionary Police of

the decided pre-criminal security measures which should be carried out under conditional liberty, for the purposes of their execution.

Neorealist and neoliberal points of view

Appendix 6: List of Used Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ALBA	Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
Comecon	Council for Mutual Economical Assistance
ČTK	Česká tisková kancelář (Czech Press Agency)
EEAS	European External Action Service
EDF	European Development Fund
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
EU-MED	Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICDC	International Committee for Democracy in Cuba
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
LAC	Countries of Latin America and Caribbean
M-26-7	Movimiento de Julio 26 – Revolutionary Movement of 26th July
MINREX	Ministerio de Relaciones Externas de Cuba (Ministry of Foreign Relations of Cuba)
Mercosur	Mercado Común del Sur – Southern Common Market
MZV ČR	Ministerstvo zahraničí České republiky (Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Czech Republic)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
PRC	People's Republic of China
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
USA	United States of America (United States)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
WTO	World Trade Organization