

**Czech University of Life Sciences Prague**

**Faculty of Economics and Management**

**Department of Languages**



**Master's Thesis**

**Russian emigration in the 21st century and its  
demographic impact on Germany**

**Glotova Anna, BA**

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# CZECH UNIVERSITY OF LIFE SCIENCES PRAGUE

Faculty of Economics and Management

## DIPLOMA THESIS ASSIGNMENT

Anna Glotova, BA

European Agrarian Diplomacy

Thesis title

**Russian emigration in the 21st century and its demographic impact on Germany**

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### **Objectives of thesis**

This diploma thesis aims to analyze the process of emigration of Russian citizens to the EU from the point of view of migration waves, causes of migration, and the social status of migrants.

### **Methodology**

In the theoretical part, a comprehensive methodological approach will be adopted, including the evaluation of available statistical data and reviews of literature and other related data and collection of primary empirical data through qualitative and quantitative methods.

In the analytical part of the diploma thesis, an analysis of the documents and an overall evaluation of the causes of emigration from the Russian Federation and their demographic impacts will be studied. The research will focus on Germany which has the largest share of migrants from the Russian Federation.

**The proposed extent of the thesis**

60-80 pages

**Keywords**

Germany, demographic impact, DESA.UN, emigration causes, the European Union, employment, migrant, migration waves, the Russian Federation

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**Recommended information sources**

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## **Declaration**

I declare that I have worked on my master's thesis titled 'Russian emigration in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and its demographic impact on Germany' by myself and I have used only the sources mentioned at the end of the thesis. As the author of the master's thesis, I declare that the thesis does not break any copyrights.

In Prague on 30 November 2023

Glotova Anna

## **Acknowledgement**

I would like to thank my supervisor PhDr. Alena Drebitková Malá, Ph.D for patience, valuable advice and willingness to help whenever needed. Also, I would like to thank my family for their support during my work on this thesis.

# **Russian emigration in the 21st century and its demographic impact on Germany**

## **Abstract**

In this work, the author primarily focused on the theoretical aspects of migration, types, causes and the legislative framework of the European Union that determines migration. The analytical part analyzed the main reasons for migration from Russia to Germany, taking into consideration the historical, social, and economic context. The process of integration of immigrants in Germany in the context of economic, legislative, and social aspects was also examined. The author conducted a survey among immigrants from Russia to Germany; the main purpose of the survey was to assess the demographic influence of Russian immigrants on the demographic level of Germany. The survey examined diverse migration sentiments and the level of integration into German society.

**Keywords:** The Russian Federation, Germany, migration waves, demographic impact, migrant, the European Union, employment

# **Ruská emigrace v 21. století a její demografický dopad na Německo**

## **Abstrakt**

V této práci se autor zaměřuje především na teoretické aspekty migrace, druhy, příčiny a legislativní rámec Evropské unie, který migraci determinuje.

V analytické části byly analyzovány hlavní důvody migrace z Ruska do Německa s dopadem na historický, sociální a ekonomický kontext. Dále byl zkoumán proces integrace imigrantů v Německu v kontextu ekonomických, legislativních a sociálních aspektů. Autor provedl průzkum mezi imigranty z Ruska do Německa; hlavním účelem průzkumu bylo posoudit demografický vliv ruských imigrantů na demografickou úroveň Německa. Průzkum zkoumal různorodé migrační nálady a míru integrace do německé společnosti.

**Klíčová slova:** Ruská federace, Německo, migrační vlny, demografický dopad, migrant, Evropská unie, zaměstnanost

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## **1. Introduction**

In the contemporary world, global development is occurring through the process of globalization, exerting a substantial impact on worldwide migration processes. The movement of people has become more unrestricted and effortless. Moreover, disparities in economic, social, and political development contribute to the migration of individuals from less developed countries to more advanced ones. This phenomenon gives rise to migration flows, which in the 21st century is both global and of considerable scale. Migration adjusts the life of local communities and affects the policies pursued by states. The ever-increasing mobility of the population in search of better living conditions significantly increases the importance of studying the migration factor. One nation that has witnessed a noticeable influx of immigrants in the 21st century is the Federal Republic of Germany.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian migration flows increased, and Germany became one of the most attractive destinations for international migration. In addition to the close historical ties associated with the return of ethnic Germans to their homeland, Germany has become a host country for highly qualified professionals, students, and refugees. For many years, the Russian diaspora has been one of the largest in Germany.

The spread of an urban lifestyle, an increase in the level of education, and the attraction of women to work in various industries in Germany also had an impact on demographic indicators and led to a decline in the birth rate. The current demographic situation creates a problem in providing industries with labor resources and migrants become an integral part of society, developing it, and making their own contribution.

Considering the above, it is of particular importance to study the demographic influence of immigrants from Russia on the demography of Germany as one of the largest diasporas. In this research, by conducting a survey among migrants from Russia in Germany, it is determined whether the Russian diaspora has an influence on German society, how integrated migrants are into German society, and what is their position in society.

## 2. Objectives and Methodology

### 2.1 Objectives

The **objective** of this work is connected precisely with the influence of Russian migration on the demography of Germany. The escalation in the scale of migration requires the examination of migration policy and its consequences on various aspects of the host country. Additionally, it is essential to consider the prospect that the majority of migrants will stay in this territory, with varying degrees of integration into the new society.

All these factors determine the relevance of this work, as the rise in foreign citizens presents a range of challenges for any state, including Germany. These challenges are related to the impact of migrants on the country's demography as well as their integration. Currently, there is no universal solution to integration problems. Today, Germany stands as one of the leading countries in the European Union, and this largely influences the choice of this state in addressing the issues associated with the increasing flow of migrants.

This work examines the migration period from Russia to Germany in the 21st century. The choice of this timeframe is motivated by various factors that have shaped the policy of the of Germany concerning arrivals from other countries. Specifically, a significant revision of legal aspects and policies for migration is linked to refugee crisis in Germany in 2015, which also had an impact on Russian immigrants.

Based on the above, the **purpose** of the work is to determine the influence of Russian immigrants on the demography of Germany. The concept of 'impact on demography' includes aspects such as the successful integration of Russian immigrants into German society, as well as social and cultural considerations.

Germany is one of the most developed countries in the European Union, and due to its policies, it was among the first European states which actively accepted foreign citizens into the country. This work aims to confirm the hypothesis that the increasing scale of migration flows from Russia has a positive impact on the demography of Germany.

To conduct the research and prove the hypothesis, a number of different sources were used. A special part was made up of documents and statistical reports from Germany, Russia, and the European Union, which gave a practical overview of the situation of migration flows. the works of both Russian and German scientists dealing with immigration issues were also used.

## **2.2 Methodology**

Several **methods** were used in writing this study. The historical method allowed the author to consider the internal processes of Russia, which influenced the increase in migration flows to Germany, and the internal politics of Germany as the receiving country of migrants. The statistical method of analysis also plays an important role, since the most accurate picture is conveyed by statistical data by country.

A survey was conducted within the Russian immigrant community in Germany. The survey aims to identify the reasons and motives for emigration, as well as to assess the overall situation of Russians in Germany.

### **3. Theoretical part**

#### **3.1 Migration**

##### **3.1.1 Types of migration (emigration and immigration)**

Population migration is a significant component of some of the most important processes of our time. The existence of the migration process is based on state borders and concepts of national security, differences in cultural values, and language variations, as well as climatic and natural features in different parts of the world. Population migration—the movement of people associated with a change of residence—is one of the global problems. It is considered not only as a simple mechanical movement of people from one region of the country to another but as a complex social process that affects many aspects of the socio-economic, political, and cultural life of society. Migration is an object of international regulation.

The term ‘migration’ comes from the Latin word *migratio* (*migro* - I pass), which means relocation, movement. The Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary presents the following definitions: 1) shift, resettlement; 2) the movement of the population - the movement of people associated, as a rule, with a change of residence. Following from the definitions of the concept of migration, there are two main types of migration: international (interstate) and internal (intrastate). Considering the current development of migration processes, it is possible to single out the most accurate definition of international migration of the population, which is the territorial movement of people across state borders associated with a change in permanent residence, citizenship, stay in the country - entry, having an irrevocable, seasonal, or temporary and pendulum character (92).

The main distinguishing features of international migration compared to internal migration are several important:

- state supervision of migratory movements through state borders of migrants and their subsequent stay in the country,
- the degree of openness of the state to the outside world, the desire of the state to integrate or isolate,
- state policy in the labor market, in matters of asylum, the fight against illegal migration (89, p. 64).

To identify the components of the migration process, its boundaries, and scales, it is possible to analyze the types of migration.

By temporary nature, the following types of international migration are distinguished, which are of the greatest importance, since they are associated with the development of society itself and its productive force

- irrevocable (migration to a permanent place of residence)
- long-term migration
- temporary (seasonal)
- short-term migration
- pendulum migration (89, p. 65).

Short-term migration takes place for a period of less than one year. Seasonal migration, which can be both internal and international, closely resembles temporary migration. It involves the relocation of mainly the able-bodied population to places of seasonal work (such as harvesting or construction) for a usually several-month period, with the obligatory return to their places of permanent residence. Pendulum migration refers to the daily multiple movement of the population between their place of residence and the place of work or study, not associated with a change in permanent residence (91, p. 37).

In general, immigration refers to mass movements of people caused by various issues in countries and regions. It involves a change of residence and includes crossing state borders, often with indeterminate time frames (50, p. 21).

Emigration, on the other hand, is the process of individuals leaving their country for permanent residence in another. Immigration encompasses the entry of individuals from another state into a country, either on a permanent or temporary basis and for distinct reasons. In other words, if a person leaves their country, they are considered an emigrant by its inhabitants. Simultaneously, for the host state, such a person is an immigrant as they enter it.

Thus, it can be concluded that international migration aligns with societal processes. Migration, in all its forms, significantly influences the entire economy of a country and public life. It corresponds to the ongoing processes in society and impacts the socio-economic, cultural, and political development of the country.

### **3.1.2 The influence of globalization on migration flows to the European Union**

Globalization is considered one of the main reasons for modern migration waves to more developed and wealthy states, particularly towards those in the European Union. In today's globalizing world, the international migration of the population has become a crucial factor in global development, fostering flexibility in the international labour market. It facilitates the inclusion of less developed countries in the world's production culture and allows for a more

rational redistribution of production factors from the perspective of global progress. This, in turn, promotes interaction and mutual enrichment of cultures. In the past, the primary migration drivers were linked to physical safety and protection, such as variations in population growth rates, wars, and colonization processes. However, in the 21st century, these factors have been supplanted by economic and social considerations. Modern migrants seek a higher standard of living, decent wages, and more advantageous occupations, which may include education and various commercial activities (66, p. 76).

The most important factor causing modern global migrations is disproportion in demographic development between developing and developed countries worldwide. For instance, according to the UN in 2018, the number of older people exceeded the number of children under the age of five, and by 2050, there will be more elderly individuals than teenagers and youth combined (from 15 to 24 years old). Some regions, such as Europe, already face a significant problem connected with the aging of the population and fertility decline (83).

The decrease in the birth rate is attributed to changes in attitudes towards children, a decrease in their perceived value, shifts in people's way of life, and greater involvement of women in public life. All these factors operate within a system and have specific country characteristics, imprinted by traditions, religious attitudes, moral norms, etc. Birth rates can vary significantly among religious, racial, and ethnic groups within the same state and region. While the global average is 2.7 children per woman of reproductive age, in the countries of the European Union, this figure is much lower—only 1.5 children. For instance, in France, the birth rate is 2 children per woman; however, a significant contribution is made by immigrants from Arab countries, along with measures of social support for them (66, p. 76).

The reduction in the birth rate against the background of an increase in life expectancy has led to a change in the age structure of the population. In economically developed countries, older people aged 60 and over accounted for 21% of the population. In the world, this figure was only 11%, and in developing countries - a little more than 8%. The 'oldest' countries of the world include Italy, Germany, Sweden, Greece, Austria. The increase in the proportion of older people creates an additional burden on the pension and social systems of countries. This is reflected in the education system, which does not receive the usual number of schoolchildren and students. To preserve the network of educational institutions, it is possible to attract foreign schoolchildren and students from other regions and countries to study. It is this path that many economically developed countries have now taken, which have launched programs to attract foreign educational migrants (49).

Besides the declines in birth rates and population aging, labour migration due to globalization takes place in the European Union states. Migration today is becoming a tool that provides the necessary composition of national and regional labour markets. For European countries facing population aging, migration becomes a resource that fills labour shortages and provides an influx of young workers. This influx can increase the dynamism, innovation, and mobility of the labour force (78, p. 242).

Current forecasts for the European Union suggest that the dependency ratio, currently 2 retirees per 7 employed, will rise to 4 retirees per 7 employed by 2050. This would mean either doubling the burden per worker or doubling the income of pensioners. Labour migration, as noted, provides benefits for those unable to reach a decent standard of living in native countries. However, on the other side, in less developed countries, migration pressure is growing in those countries where such opportunities are available (48).

With growing competition among highly qualified employees, the newcomers must be involved into so-called dirty work, which locals are not willing to perform. Steady demand for migrant labour comes from such industries as agriculture, processing of agricultural products, construction, cleaning services, reconstruction, restaurant, and hotel business. In fact, for a long time, migrant labour has been used in developed countries as a convenient and cheap means of supporting low-competitive enterprises and sometimes entire sectors of the economy that simply would not have survived without cheap labour from foreigners. Neoclassical theory focuses on the reasons for the migration mobility of the population laying in the differences in wage levels between areas of origin and destination of migrants (51, p. 144). Migration is a tool that reduces this inequality, therefore, in the migration studies, neoclassical theory has been called 'spatial-economic balance' (41, p. 28).

Apart economic factors, globalization is able to significantly simplify migration process due to mixture of people with different cultural, religious and historical backgrounds. In XX century, 'Salad Bowl' theory was introduced, which idea was that in a society, whose members are representatives of different cultures or ethnic groups, cultural differences are not erased in the process of assimilation, but are preserved in their original form, like ingredients in a salad bowl. In a 'Salad Bowl society', each culture remains unique and authentic, in line with the principles of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism (16, p. 250). From the other side, natives of a particular state may observe migrants as a threat to their national-state identity; as a result, xenophobia is formed, that is, the fear of strangers, concretized into so-called migrantophobia. However, the reaction of the society to migrants mostly depends on the state involvement into migration question. It is a quite common conclusion among migration nexud, the state should

actively participate into establishing mutual benefits of the processes of modern migration for host countries and departure ones. In the European states there is a big number of cultural and language courses for migrants based on voluntary movements. Such events let newcomers integrate into a new society more rapidly, realize the differences between their home country and a host one and respect the rules and traditions of their new home.

### **3.1.3 Impacts of migration to European Member States**

Nowadays international migration is a global, complex, large-scale, dynamic, and influential process. An imperfect migration policy enhances its negative consequences, namely: an increase in illegal migration; unconstructive economic activity of migrants; growth of economic chaos; increased social tension; increased risks of inter-ethnic, inter-ethnic, inter-confessional and other conflicts; deterioration of the crime situation; outflow of cash income. Currently, in the European Union, due to the escalation of many conflicts, the opinion is spreading among the population that the state should take tougher measures to stop the negative impact of migration processes on public life.

The following negative externalities for the receiving country because of international migration are highlighted:

1) Growth of the shadow sector of the economy.

First, the migration factor creates the danger of growing economic and social tension. The reason for this is that very often migrants are not able, for one reason or another, to integrate into European society and become its full members. They settle in disadvantaged areas and become a source and participants in illegal business, the 'shadow' economy (55 p. 42).

2) Additional costs for the neutralization of social tension and criminalization.

An increase in the number of immigrants can stimulate an increase in crime, affecting all segments of the population of the region, and not just foreign communities. Immigration often causes discontent and aggression on the part of the local population, as the influence of another culture changes the local one, which contributes to destabilization in society. The nation loses its identity and cohesion, certain groups of people appear with radical ideas, both on the one hand and on the other (43, p. 52).

In 2014 European Social Survey was conducted where regular observations of attitudes, attitudes, visitation, and settlement of the population of European countries are studied. The main attention in the work is paid to the consideration of attitudes of the population in relation to external migration (28). The study showed that the attitude of the population of European countries towards migrants is closely related to their race and nationality. Most respondents in

each of the countries where the study was conducted (from 55.1% in Germany to 92.9% in the Czech Republic) believe that the influx of migrants should be controlled to some extent. Only a minority of the population is convinced that the opportunity to move should be given to many migrants, i.e., without significant restrictions. There is a certain connection between the attitudes of the population and the homogeneity of the host society. The population of countries such as Sweden and Germany have a wide experience of dealing with migrants of other nationalities and at the same time demonstrates one of the highest rates of readiness to receive. The ratio of the population of European countries to migrants, depending on their race and nationality (% of the number of respondents in each country).

Table 1. Should people be allowed to move to live in our country?

Should people be allowed to move to live in our country?								
	the same race or nationality as the majority of the population				whose nationality or race is different from the majority of the population			
	Many	Some	Few	Don't let anyone	Many	Some	Few	Don't let anyone
Austria	21.1	46.5	23.9	6.6	11.8	38.3	35.1	13
Belgium	17	56	19.3	7.3	9.6	49.1	28.7	12.4
Germany	44.9	44.9	7.8	1.2	25.1	50.5	19.6	3.5
Denmark	25.9	56	14.5	2.1	14.2	46.1	32.6	5.5
Ireland	17.7	42	30	8.4	12.9	38.5	33.8	12.5
Netherlands	16.5	54.9	22.7	5	15	51.7	26.3	6.1
Norway	30.4	52.9	15.2	0.7	21.8	54	21.7	1.6
Poland	18.8	47.1	24.1	6.5	13.7	41.1	30.4	10.5
Slovenia	19.3	52.7	17.6	6.2	13.5	47.9	23.9	10.5
Finland	16.4	47.9	31.9	2.4	12	34.1	44	8.3
France	16.6	56.1	19.1	6.1	11.7	49.1	26.5	11.3
Czech Republic	7.1	34.7	39.8	16.4	2.1	25	42.7	28
Switzerland	21.7	60.8	13.7	1.5	11.6	49.9	32.4	3.9
Sweden	43.2	49.4	4.9	0.4	41.8	49	6.9	0.6
Estonia	21.2	48.8	23	4.5	8.1	37.3	39.1	13.7

Source: ESS. Data portal, 2014.

The political sphere of life also is affected by migrant flows. This situation undermines the established political system in European states that also keeps Europe safe.

The newly formed sections of the population are fighting not only for rich rights, but also for the opportunity to live as a separate ethnic group, which provokes separatist sentiments and conflicts occur on their basis. The political activity of migrants generates an increase in the popularity of ultra-right political parties, which act as active antagonists of the further migration process, defending the identity of their state. Supporters of the ideology of ultra-right political parties actively oppose the further acceptance of migrants by European states. They believe that this process will forever change the established order in European countries for the worse, because of migrants who are carriers completely different cultural values and traditions. This situation could be seen in the 2017 French presidential election. The popularity of the political far-right National Front party, led by Marine Le Pen, showed the acute social tension in the country and the desire to rid the state of a huge flow of migrants, who destabilize the internal situation in the country. In turn, political instability is another cause of social tension, since the local population of Europe, fearing such an active political activity of migrants, opposes the further process of accepting migrants in Europe. Xenophobic sentiments and antagonism between the European population and migrants are growing, which in turn has its consequences in the form of violent protests and even armed clashes (43, p.52).

In 2017 the report of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was published, where the role of migration and its significance in the economy of countries receiving migrants is observed. The OECD document should consider the following dimensions: to the labor market, to the national budget and to economic growth. Positive impact on the labor market:

- over the past ten years, migrants have increased the number of available labors in Europe by 47% and by 70%.
- migrants will be interested in important niches, such as in fast-growing sectors of the economy.
- migrants make the labor market more flexible, especially in Europe.

Migration contributes to the replenishment of the state budget: the amount of income in the form of taxes and social payments is more than they receive in the form of benefits or send to their home countries. Migration raises the level of the working-age population, they arrive with already significant skills and contribute to the development of human growth in the host countries. For many countries facing an aging population, immigrants are becoming an increasingly valuable tool in filling emerging vacancies, and therefore it is so important for a country to formulate sound policies aimed at ensuring a positive impact both for the host country and for the immigrants themselves. Work is the most crucial factor in the economic contribution

of a migrant to a country. Only when a labor migrant rises to the same level as a local resident, then does GDP growth begin to become noticeable. Migration increases the population as well as the age balance towards a younger workforce.

Assessing the consequences of population migration at the global and national levels, it is worth noting the positive impact of its processes on the state of the quality of life of people and the global economy. In general, the ratio of the pros and cons of population migration is determined by the mutual balance of interests of the states participating in the population exchange, the ratio of the optimal and real parameters of migration processes and the possibilities of purposeful control over them, minimizing the scale of illegal migration.

## **3.2. Migration policy**

### **3.2.1. Regulation of migration in the world (treaties, organizations)**

Migration as a world-wide phenomenon is a very sensitive and controversial political and social issue which needs to have standardized procedure of supervision from governmental side. Political battles are also reflected in national legislation, which creates the prerequisites for infringement on the rights of migrants. States are adopting increasingly restrictive measures, often fuelled by popular hostility towards immigrants. Policies and laws that restrict opportunities for legal migration often result in an increase in the number of undocumented migrants, who are highly at risk of exploitation and abuse. Consequently, the problems of migration affect the fundamental interests of both the individual and the state.

Human rights, which are guaranteed by both national and international law, are central to the protection of migrants caught in the middle of these powerful forces. The Global Migration Group states that ‘among the fundamental rights of all persons, regardless of their immigration status includes the following (86):

- The right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention, and the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution.
- The right to be free from discrimination based on race, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, or other status.
- The right to be protected from violence and exploitation, to be free from slavery and forced labour, and to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
- The right to a fair trial and legal assistance.

- The right to the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to health, an adequate standard of living, social security, decent housing, education, and just and favourable working conditions.
- Other human rights guaranteed by international human rights instruments to which the State is a party and customary international law (85).

Human rights are the same for all by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (85).

The main legal international acts are supplemented by regional ones, but the basic principles of migration remain unchanged regardless of the region. A basic principle of international human rights law is that States have an obligation not only to respect, but also to protect and fulfil human rights. The duty of compliance requires the state not to take measures that directly violate this right. The duty to protect requires the state to ensure that rights are protected through legislation, policy, and practice, including by taking measures to prevent third-party violations (83).

Of paramount importance for migrants is the internationally enshrined right of all people to enjoy human rights based on the principle of equality, in the absence of discrimination based on race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political and other views, national, social and origin and ancestry, property and other status. International and regional judiciaries have repeatedly stressed the importance of the obligation placed on states to respect and ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights and freedom from discrimination on prohibited grounds. They addressed the issue of what constitutes a prohibited ground of discrimination, noting that, in addition to the grounds directly referred to by the provisions of international treaties, such a ground as ‘other status’ covers several grounds, such as: age, disability, economic and social status, health status, marital status, sexual orientation and gender identity.

Speaking of the regulation of international migration and the rights of migrants, one cannot fail to mention the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967 (jointly, the ‘Geneva Convention on Refugees’), supplemented by regional treaties and standards. International refugee law is discussed in Chapter 1 of the Geneva Convention. Since violations of labor rights are typical of the migration phenomenon, international conventions adopted under the auspices of the International Labor Organization are discussed in Chapter 6 of the Convention. Finally, two areas of law that affect migrants in certain situations should be mentioned: one of these is international criminal law related to trafficking and smuggling, which will be briefly covered in

Chapter 1. The second area, which is also dealt with in Chapter 1, is the international law of the sea, which applies to those migrants who try to reach the host country by sea.

One of important terms regarding migration is the term 'refugee' and how an individual can be considered as a refugee. The right to seek asylum in this country has been internationally extended in the General Declaration of Human Rights, article 14, paragraph 1, which means that 'everyone has the right to seek asylum from the border in other countries and enjoy asylum' (36, p. 100).

Although the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not provide for the right to asylum, in conjunction with its Additional Protocol of 1967 (the 'Geneva Convention relating to Refugees') it contains several rights that flow from the recognition of refugee status.

For refugee status to be recognized under the Geneva Refugee Convention, the following criteria must be met:

1. Well-founded fear of being persecuted.
2. Persecution must be based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
3. The person must be outside the country of his/her nationality or, in the case of stateless persons (person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law), outside the country of his/her former nationality (82).
4. A person is unable to avail himself of the protection of that country or is unwilling to avail himself of such protection owing to such fear.

Since the adoption of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, many states and regional interstate organizations (IGOs) have provided for several other forms of protection for persons who do not fall within the definition of 'refugees' given in the Convention. For example, temporary defence, which represents 'a specific temporary defensive response to situations of mass influx of population, with the immediate granting of emergency protection against refoulement', without formal recognition of refugee status. This protection type of system is designed for the benefit of 'displaced persons', i.e., 'third-country nationals or stateless persons who were forced to leave their country of origin or were evacuated, in response to the appeal of international organizations and cannot return to conditions of security and stability due to the situation in the country. Some States have legal provisions under which they may grant optional protection on 'humanitarian' or 'compassionate' grounds. These forms of protection are also used in situations where international law does not provide for an obligation to apply them.

### **3.2.2 Legal frameworks of migration in the European Union, legislations, and treaties**

The migration policy of the European Union remains a fundamental problem both financially and in the context of the security of the countries of the European Union. The problems of international migration, the location and support of migrants, regardless of the type of migration, affect all countries. In terms of the number of migrants, according to the UN, the EU ranks as the third one in the world.

The refugee struggle was first put on discussion on February 26, 1921, within the framework of the League of Nations, when a resolution concerning Russian refugees was signed. As a result, in 1923 the number of refugees in Europe reached 2.5 million people. At the first session of the UN General Assembly in 1946, the issue of refugees was put on the agenda, which required the urgent creation of various approaches. The positions of the participating countries were ambiguous, since countries with a socialist ideology insisted on the immediate repatriation of visitors to their homeland, and the states of Western Europe were convinced that they should adhere to the principle of free movement and use repatriation only on a voluntary basis (82).

One of the most significant organizations was the International Organization for Migration - IOM (1951), whose task was to organize the movement of migrants. Today, its mandate includes:

- 1) recruitment of migrants
- 2) preparation for the migration process
- 3) promotion of language training
- 4) conducting activities to inform visitors foreigners
- 5) passing a medical examination
- 6) location of migrants
- 7) holding and organizing various events for promoting acceptance and integration.
- 8) providing advice on migration issues (83)

The UN Convention of December 18, 1990, is based on the disclosure of definitions of types and categories of labour migrants. The document reveals the meanings, indicates the scale of migration processes that are related to almost all states; takes into account the impact of migrant worker flows on host countries; seeks to establish norms to promote coordination among host States by establishing principles for the treatment of migrant workers and their families; predicts an insecure situation in which migrant families do not live in their countries of origin, but are in the host country, which causes difficulties in the host state (82).

In the modern European Union, migration policy is coordinated with the help of sources of international, European law, guided by the national legislation of each EU member state, which is related to the competent issues of founding agreements. To regulate migration flows, the European Union uses two directions: legal regulation and integration measures (84). Regulatory acts affect the size, number of the flow of migrants, in this measure, nation states and European institutions are the subjects, and migration flows, and the results of migration are the objects. Integration acts as a forced measure for a fundamental change and integration of foreigners into the national society of the host country.

The migration policy of the EU member states is carried out through transnational processes that exclude the possibility of violating the sovereignty of any state.

The modern migration policy of the EU states is aimed at:

1) to build a migration policy, with the help of which migration will be legal in nature and exclude any possibility of illegal migration

2) facilitating the conditions for entry into the country for workers with high qualifications

3) to improve the process of integration of those arriving and remaining for permanent residence in the host country

4) to resolve migration, ethnic issues, organize a unified legal system and create conditions to promote integration

The signing and adoption in 1977 of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers was a significant event in the field of streamlining migration and its processes in Europe.

In 1957, between 6 countries (France, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium) the Treaty of Rome was signed establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), which regulates the right to freedom of movement of labour migrants located in the countries of the European Union. The 1992 Treaty, signed in the Netherlands (Maastricht), laid the foundation for the existence of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) contained fundamental provisions on the conduct of a joint immigration policy, cooperation of the members of the treaty in the field of justice and internal affairs. This document sets out the basic rules for granting asylum to foreign nationals, crossing the borders of Member States (28).

The most important stage in the development of the state migration policy of the countries of the European Union are the Schengen agreements (26). Based on these Agreements, in 2009, a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union was

concluded, which established the Visa Code. The Code consisted of a set of unified rules that regulated the procedure and principles for issuing entry permits for foreign citizens of the Third World countries crossing the borders of the Schengen Agreement member states (29). In the field of forced migration, readmission agreements, which include the reception, transit, and return of illegal migrants and refugees, are most widely used. Such agreements were signed by the European Union with the countries of the Western Balkans. This concept is applied on the condition that the migrant is already moving through the territory of the EU countries and is within the Union. Under such conditions, countries may not be under any obligation to identify the individual as a potential refugee. This concept restricts an individual from freely and unrestrictedly choosing any EU state as a destination for seeking asylum. According to the rules, along the way, the migrant is obliged to stay in the first state that is safe for him and apply to the migration service or to the authorities with a statement. This is demonstrated in Article 29 of the 1990 Convention governing the use of the Schengen Agreement.

It should be noted that much attention is paid to the regulation of the fight against illegal migrants in the legal sphere. The legal norms created to regulate illegal migration are extensive. Illegal migration is influenced by methods of combating international crime and ways of regulating migration flows. Strict rules for the admission and employment of migrants in the country may lead to an increase in illegal migrants, which may provoke the introduction of new restrictions in the migration legislation.

Summing up, it can be concluded that today the European Union, being a special form of the commonwealth of various states, has developed its own system for the legal regulation of migration flows, which is supported by various international documents, legal acts of institutions and organizations, constituent agreements, acts acting directly to the participating countries and do not need the actual implementation of obligations at the international level, passing into national legislation. To resist and prevent illegal migration, the system of legal acts provides quite extensive aspects that reflect migration problems in general. But at the same time, the EU countries do not have a unified strategy for conducting migration policy, since each country follows its own course, not seeking cooperation with EU member states.

### **3.2.3 Types of migration and their processes of regulation in the European Union**

Migration policy in the European Union is one of the most sensitive topics on the agenda. Despite the variety of migration waves that are mentioned below, the entire European migration policy is based on the Geneva Convention of 1951, which describes the basic concepts related to

migration issues. All further decisions functioned as additions to the provisions of the Convention. The 1951 Convention has become a fundamental act for the further development of international migration law. Ratified by 145 State parties, the convention defines the term 'refugee' and outlines the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obligations of nations and states to protect them. The core principle is non-refoulement, which asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. This is now considered a rule of customary international law. Standards and procedures for enacting the convention were agreed to in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. For the countries of the European Union, due to open borders and freedom of movement, a comprehensive approach is needed to ensure that the required standards of refugee protection are met. Procedures must at the same time be fair and effective for the entire European Union and not subject to abuse. Public and political discussions intensified with the outbreak of hostilities and the increase in the flow of victims of military operations in Syria and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the migration waves consist not only of refugees and forced migrants, but also there are highly educated specialists, who are always desired in the European Union labor market.

There is no single form of migration, so its unified regulation is also impossible. At the national level, countries respond to waves of migration in diverse ways. There are the following forms of migration.

Table 2. Forms of migration

<b>Migration type</b>	<b>Peculiarity of migration type</b>
Family reunion	Basis of international movements of migrants. In most countries, it is limited to spouses and children.
Work migration	Such kind of migration assumes the entry to a host country for a limited period limited by employment. Labor migrants usually receive a time-limited residence permit and work activities.
Circular migration	This type of migration describes repeated or regular returns of migrants who, after the expiration of their work permit, leave for their home country and then return to this or another country. Normally such kind of migration is associated with season works in such sectors as agriculture, manufacturing.
Refugees	The migration of asylum seekers is, according to the UN, 10% of all migration. Its legal basis is the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), which provides for the procedure for recognition of refugee status and permission to stay. In 2022 according to UN statistics, about 3 million refugees from Ukraine came to the European Union.
Irregular migration	The number of irregular migrants in the world currently reach about 10-15%. The forms of irregularity differ depending on whether entry, stay or work is irregular (51, p.132).

The current migration system that has been formed in Europe is distinguished by close economic, cultural, political, geographical relations between the ‘central’ states, which makes it possible to define it as a single migration system. Today, the population of the European Union is more than 450 million people 43 million, of which appeared outside the states of its members, while the main center of migration flows in Europe over the past century has existed and remains Germany, in which more than 10.1 million migrants. However, the EU still experiences a lot of financial and social issue due to huge migration flows. The European migration crisis reached its pick at the beginning of 2015 during the increasing flows of refugees and illegal migrants to the European Union from the countries of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and the EU’s unpreparedness to receive and distribute them. This migrant crisis is considered the largest in Europe since the Second World War. From January to September 2015, more than 700,000

people seeking asylum were registered in the EU member states. In general, in 2015, according to various estimates, from 1 to 1.8 million refugees and illegal migrants arrived in the EU. For comparison purposes, approximately 280,000 were recorded in 2014.

The amount and rapidness of this crisis caused a diverse reaction in the European society. The current situation with migrants has become a manifestation of the ineffectiveness of European institutions and organizational structures formed to regulate migration flows, a symbol of the failure of the 'managed migration' policy. Such events demonstrated the policy failure of Dublin agreement, which idea was that a migrant is able to apply for asylum only in the EU country of entry. Thus, the EU countries have shifted the responsibility, which should lie with 28 countries, to the countries that are the first on the way of refugees to Europe: Italy and Greece, driving these states into deep migration crisis. Apart from Dublin Agreement a significant role in refugee issue in the EU is taken by the Common European Asylum System, which outlines the general rules and requirements for hosting countries to accept refugees and states the minimum level of benefits available for these people. All stated objectives are aimed to standardize those who may be identified under the definition a 'refugee' and the hosting states to observe persons who need international protection and the rights attached to that status.

Despite the overall active support of the Europe of migrants, there are the states, which are not willing to accept newcomers on their territories. The Visegrád Group (also known as the Visegrád Four, the V4, or the European Quartet) is an alliance of four Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The V4 countries opposed the decision on how many immigrants can be accepted into their own territory, taken by the European Commission. In 2015, the European Commission approved a program for the mandatory redistribution of immigrants who arrived in Europe between member states. Hungary protested against this decision, and the other member countries of the Visegrád Group supported it. Slovakia and Hungary filed a lawsuit against the European Union, but they lost the court in Luxembourg. Other EU member states also spoke out against the mandatory redistribution of immigrants, which led to the fact that the EU Commission stopped this program. However, the Visegrád Group remained the centre of resistance, opposing the uncontrolled intake of immigrants. The resistance of the Visegrád Group and the rejection of the common European agenda in solving the migration problem underscored the conceptual shortcomings of the EU's immigration policy. The Commission did not see the differences between immigrants but wanted to intervene in the process of their redistribution among member states (93).

## **4. Analytical part**

### **4.1 Emigration from Russia to the European Union**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, migration waves changed over the whole Western Union and especially from Russia to Europe. Such traditional causes of migration as the state of the labour market, differentiation of living standards, and education lost their former importance for some time, and stress factors such as armed conflicts, nationalism, and separatism came to the fore in terms of their impact. The collapse of the USSR was accompanied by large-scale armed conflicts, resulting in massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, a significant part of whom rushed from the Russian Federation. As per Rosstat, Central Statistical Database after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 approx. (67, p.5). 60.000 Russian citizens moved from Russia to Germany, in 1998 this number dropped to approx. 55.000 people. However, as per German statistics 100.000 people arrived from Russia to Germany in 1998. Such disparity between Russian data from the 2000s and foreign migration sources' estimates - chiefly in its significant underestimation of the scale of emigration outflow.

There are several distinguishing features for active migration from the former USSR which can be highlighted and reviewed below.

#### **4.1.1 Reasons for emigration based on historical development in Russia**

Among various economic issues in a newly established Russia, the armed conflicts had a considerable influence on those who left the country. The weakening of state power in the USSR during the years of perestroika led to the activation of nationalist movements, including in Chechen-Ingushetia. In 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen People was created, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. A massive anti-Russian campaign began in Chechnya, the genocide of the entire non-Chechen population. Most non-Chechens were forced to leave Chechnya, expelled from their homes, and deprived of their property (58, p. 386).

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and economic, political, and social changes, a demographic crisis, and mass emigration began in Russia. The natural increase in the population was replaced by a decline due to a decline in the birth rate and a simultaneous increase in mortality. For example, ethnic Germans living in large numbers on the territory of Russia chose to return to their historical homeland. The formation of a German diaspora in the countries of the former USSR has historical roots: ethnic Germans were invited to develop the territory of the Russian Empire about 250 years ago. The Soviet period in the life of the Germans

was contradictory. During World War II in 1941 – 1945, the Germans were accused of aiding fascism and were deported deep into the country, mainly to the regions of Northern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia. The able-bodied population was conscripted into the so-called ‘labor army,’ and a regime of special settlements was established in the places of residence themselves. In 1972, restrictions on the choice of place of residence were lifted, but their return to their ancestral territories in the center of the USSR was prevented in every possible way (68, p.129).

As a result, the oppression and restrictions imposed on the Germans prompted their move to Germany. According to the Russian statistical yearbook, in the period from 1990 to 1999 570.000 people left the country for Germany. In Russia, according to Rosstat for the period 2002 – 2010, the German population decreased from 597.000 to 394.100 (33).

Many ethnic Germans in Russia chose to emigrate to Germany for several reasons, including the desire to reconnect with their cultural roots, escape economic challenges in post-Soviet Russia, and seek better opportunities in a reunified Germany, which was experiencing economic growth and stability at the time.

During the 1990-s the newly established Russian Federation recorded the migration process mainly only for those individuals, who declared their relocation.

However, those who left on temporary work contracts, but then remained abroad, were not included in these statistics. For example, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, only 110 thousand citizens emigrated from Russia in 1995, but Germany alone accepted 107 thousand Russians for permanent residence in the same year. For the period 1990 – 2000, Russia faced a ‘brain drain’, that is, the most educated citizens and scientists, who left Russia to integrate into world science and business (33). A study of emigrants in 1990, the data of which was cited by A. G. Allahverdyan showed that respondents were most dissatisfied with the working conditions in Russia - the lack of equipment and equipment critically necessary for the natural sciences; this was followed by a catastrophic decline in the prestige of scientific work; Afterwards, survey participants cited the impossibility of providing a good education to children and the lack of normal connections with foreign scientists. And only then, in fifth place, was money (4, p. 189).

In the second half of the 1990s, in search of paid work, Russians increasingly became temporary labor migrants, occupying a wide variety of niches (from unskilled to those requiring university training, knowledge, and pleasant experience) in the labor markets of economically developed countries. In the early 2000s. Interest in economic partnerships with foreign countries is developing. The stage of initial accumulation is practically passed. Roles are distributed. The most affluent groups are looking to the more peaceful and secure Western markets to continue commercial and entrepreneurial activities Wealthy social groups are able to send their children to

study abroad and acquire real estate for permanent or temporary residence. The outflow of young people who received a good technical education in Russia but did not get access to well-paid jobs in public and private corporations is not weakening but increasing.

#### **4.1.2 Reasons for emigration based on economic development in Russia**

The collapse of the USSR and the reforms of the 1990s had extremely negative demographic consequences. First, it is a sharp decline in the standard of living of the population. During the 1990s the socialist economy ended up: with the unified socio-political will of the ruling party, the merging of the country and the party, the dominant location of public property, and the planned concept of management. The government no longer controlled the cost of basic products, wages, and employment. Within a few years, the rigid structure of enterprise management by the state ceased to exist, and liberalization of foreign trade was carried out, which led to the termination of the policy of protectionism. Restrictions on the import of imported goods were abolished, and price discrepancies were eliminated. In 1998, the ruble-denominated, and by the middle of the year there was a default on domestic obligations, the collapse of the ruble exchange rate, and an economic crisis began (39, p.76)

One of the most noticeable reforms of that time – privatization of public properties did not reach desirable results. The official justification for privatization was largely based on the idea of forming a wide layer of owners in the country and creating a socially oriented market economy. The following argument was also put forward: it is necessary to return to the people what was taken from them in 70 years, to restore social justice through a kind of ‘expropriation of the expropriators’, dividing the accumulated evenly among the citizens. Not the last role was played, apparently, by the consideration that in the conditions of a falling standard of living of the population, this would be a kind of outlet for easing social tension. A decline in production volumes, unprofitability, the inability of local management to effectively manage a property, and a reduction in investment led to the opposite negative results. In addition to growing unemployment, oligarchs and their dramatic enrichment appeared in Russia, a strong economic recession, and the collapse of industry. Using vouchers, the distribution was proposed in late 1992 - early 1993, it was supposed to distribute state property worth about 1.5 trillion rubbles among 148 million Russian citizens rubbles (in 1992 1 US dollar = 152 Russian rubbles). The initial face value of one voucher was set at 10.000 rubbles, which corresponded approximately to the cost of a passenger car. However, the market price of the voucher began to decline rapidly even with a high inflation rate. In the first months of 1993, it fell to 4000-5000 rubbles - the cost of a loaf of sausage, by the end of 1993 it rose to 20.000-25.000 rubbles, and only by the end of

voucher privatization it exceeded the initial face value by 3-3.5 times. But during this time, the rubble managed to depreciate by 10-15 times (46).

Another reform that was actively criticized was the so-called shock therapy introduced by the economist Egor Gaidar. The main idea of the reform was to 'heal' the economy with quick and radical measures. Price liberalization has become one of the main program points and implemented opportunities. On January 2, 1992, retail and wholesale prices for most goods were released from centralized control by the state apparatus. The state retained the right to limit the cost of only a narrow range of essential goods and services, such as bread or public transport. Later this year, these restrictions were also lifted. The main purpose of eliminating price control was to create market competition and establish demand-offer functioning. According to government forecasts, prices should have risen by an average of two times. In the first month alone, the average price increase was almost 400 percent. In addition, the reforms were designed to change people's thinking - to encourage them to take the initiative, to strive in the current conditions to earn money on their own, instead of waiting for help from the state. Price liberalization has become one of the most important steps towards the transition of the country's economy to market principles. However, price liberalization was not coordinated with monetary policy. As a result of price liberalization, by mid-1992 Russian enterprises were left with virtually no working capital (57).

Price liberalization led to hyperinflation, depreciation of wages, incomes, and savings of the population, increased unemployment, as well as an increase in the problem of irregular payment of wages (57).

The confluence of these factors, coupled with economic recession, heightened income inequality, and disparately distributed earnings among regions, precipitated a sharp decline in real earnings, compelling individuals to seek opportunities abroad for enhanced financial prospects.

#### **4.1.3 Reasons for emigration based on political development in Russia**

One of the most significant events in the world history of the 20th century is the collapse of the USSR, which was formalized by the Belovezhskaya Agreement between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus on December 8, 1991 (44, p. 131).

Refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries entailed the massive collapse of pro-Soviet communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. In Poland, former leader of the Solidarity trade union Lech Walesa comes to power (December 9, 1990), in Czechoslovakia - Vaclav Havel (December 29, 1989). In Romania, unlike other countries of Eastern Europe, the

communists were removed by force, and the dictator-president Ceausescu was shot by a tribunal. Thus, there was an actual collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence (44, p.131). According to many historians and political scientists, it was from the moment of the disappearance of the USSR and many other countries of the so-called 'socialist camp' that era of globalization started, which caused the flows of migration from Russia. After the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, the lack of legislative registration of borders in Russia aggravated many territorial disputes. In addition to conflicts with the Baltic countries, Russia had serious disagreements with Ukraine over Crimea (as of October 2023, the territory of Crimea was annexed by Russia) (90, p. 287).

The economic crisis of the early 1990s, which aggravated the political situation, led to a harsh confrontation between the legislative represented by the parliament - the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and executive powers represented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin (69, p. 67).

The President advocated the speedy adoption of a new Constitution, strengthening presidential power and liberal economic reforms. Parliament - for maintaining full power with the Congress of People's Deputies (until the adoption of the Constitution) and against excessive haste, thoughtlessness, and abuse in carrying out radical economic reforms. The constitutional crisis led to a significant strengthening of the position of B. N. Yeltsin and a significant weakening of his opponents. The consequences of the collapse of the USSR in the short term were the almost immediate implementation by Boris Yeltsin and his supporters of a broad program of reforms to dismantle the socialist system. In the political field - the ban on the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR (November 1991); the liquidation of the system of councils of people's deputies (September 21 - October 4, 1993).

The pervasive political instability and challenges experienced in the early 1990s failed to instill confidence among the populace. As the nation's citizens faced a swift descent into poverty and found themselves excluded from the political maneuverings of the ruling authorities, emigration emerged as a viable recourse for many individuals.

## **4.2. Demography**

### **4.2.1 Demography in Russia**


Apart from migration outflows modern Russia in the 21st century is faced with such problems as a low birth rate, widespread one-child family, which does not ensure population reproduction; continued aging of the population, changes in the ratio between workers and pensioners, worsening problems of pension provision; family crisis, high divorce rate.

To analyze the demography of Russia, the main demographic indicators were chosen: birth rate, mortality, life expectancy, and migration. Below every one of these indicators will be analysed in a certain time frame.

As per the graph below, since 2000, an increase in the birth rate has been recorded in Russia. In 1992-2012 The mortality rate exceeded the birth rate, and the peak occurred in 2003. However, after 2003, mortality gradually decreased, and in 2012 its level became equal to the birth rate.

Due to the implementation of national projects, which began in 2006–2007, aimed at reducing mortality and increasing the birth rate of the Russian population, the natural decline was replaced by a natural increase.

Figure 1: Population change of Russia by factors (9, p.78).



Source: Federal State Statistics Service, 2018.

Since 2000, a reduction in natural population loss in Russia has been recorded. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the demographic development of Russia and mortality has increased. According to Johns Hopkins University, as of November 8, 2020, in Russia, there were 305.000deaths (13th place in the world) (79).

In 2022, 1.9 million people died, in 2021 – 2.44 million, in 2020 – 2.1 million, and in 2019 – 1.8 million. Rosstat has not published detailed data on causes of death since 2022 due to the war in Ukraine and statistics manipulation (33).

In 1991 the Russian Federation was in 6th place in terms of population, then according to the ranking of countries in the world by population for 2023, Russia ranks 9th in the world (144.444,359 -0.19 % per year) (95).

Life expectancy is the most important integral demographic indicator. As per statistics, in 1990 the average life expectancy among males was 63.7 years and among females 74.3 years. In 2010 this indicator changed to 63 for males and 74.9 for females. The difference in the average duration of life expectancy between women and men was 11 years and it has not changed significantly over last 20 years (21, p.32).

Regional differences in average life expectancy in 2010 exceeded 18 years. The highest life expectancy was recorded in the Republic of Ingushetia, where the average life expectancy is more than 75 years. Next come the Republic of Dagestan and Moscow - more than 74 years.

The outsiders are the territories of the Russian North. Such significant differences could be explained by several factors, such as natural and climatic conditions, lifestyle, level of income, education, and economic development. As per the most recent Rosstat data, for 2020 the average male's life expectancy reached 68.24 years and female's 78.17 (65). The results confirmed the earlier noticed difference in the life expectancy between female and male. Such a gap can be explained by military conflicts that took place during the 1990-s in the territory of the former USSR, where males are involved more often, poverty and lowering of the education level.

The migration flows and outflows also play a significant role in estimating national demography. In 2007, the number of immigrants who legally arrived in Russia for permanent residence (about 286.956 people) was six times greater than the number of emigrants from Russia (47.013 people), namely only 3164 individuals moved to Germany (33).

Contrariwise, in 200 the number of for those who moved to Russia was 359.330 people, and those who left Russia 145.720 people, namely 48.363 individuals moved to Germany. Following the commencement of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, substantial waves of migration emanated from Russia. However, precise quantification of the departing population remains unattainable due to the absence of accurate and transparent statistical data provided by the Russian authorities (68). According to the German statistical office, from March to December 2022, almost 24.000 Russian citizens applied for residence permits in Germany, from January to February 2023 – another 4211 individuals (18). However, the above-mentioned data

cannot be considered accurate, as those Russian nationals may reside already outside of Russia and do not fully reflect the migration flows from Russia.

#### **4.2.2 Demography in Germany**

In the contemporary context, both Russia and Germany are witnessing demographic shifts marked by aging populations and declining birth rates, with Germany experiencing a notable decline in births from the 1990s through 2023. According to data from the German statistics center in 2022, the country's population stood at 83.8 million (14).

Germany, classified among developed nations, exhibits an exceptionally low birth rate. As of 2023, the birth rate in Germany is 9.373 births per 1000 people, a marginal increase from the 2000 level of 9.256. When examining the birth rate over the period from 2000 to 2023, the average rate for this timeframe is calculated at 8.88525 births per 1000 people (40).

It is noteworthy that Germany is among the European nations with one of the lowest birth rates. A comparative analysis reveals Sweden's distinction as having the highest birth rate in the European Union, with a rate of 11.733 births per 1000 people in 2023.

As per the latest available statistics on the mortality rate, in 2023, the death rate in Germany reached the level of 11.744 inhabitants per 1000 (75).


As per analysis of the statistics for the period 2000 – 2023, the average mortality rate was on the level of 10.84282609 per 1000 inhabitants (48).

As per the data of European Union countries, in 2021 Germany takes 12<sup>th</sup> place among all European Union countries based on the mortality rate statistics (30).

This decline in birth rates and the resultant aging of the population pose significant challenges for the nation. Germany faces the complexities associated with sustaining social welfare systems, ensuring a productive workforce, and addressing the economic implications of a declining and aging population.

Migration flows play a crucial role in addressing the complexities associated with an aging population. Germany, cognizant of its demographic challenges, has actively embraced immigration as a means to bolster its workforce and sustain social welfare systems. 1971 was the last year in which the number of births exceeded the number of deaths. Since 1971 there has been a negative natural balance (Chart The population growth since then has been dependent upon the level of net immigration (19).

Figure 2: Population Balance in Germany, 1950-2011




Source: Federal Statistics Office, 2014.

After experiencing several years of declining population due to low or negative migration balances, Germany saw a slight increase in its population in 2011. This growth was primarily attributed to a significant rise in net migration. Since 2015 Germany has experienced considerable immigration inflows, which significantly changed its demographic landscape of Germany causing so-called ‘migration crisis’. In 2015, there were 350,000 initial applicants from Syria, 170,000 from Afghanistan, and 120,000 from Iraq seeking asylum in the European Union (31).

Since the onset of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022, over a million individuals, predominantly women and children, have sought refuge in Germany from Ukraine. In contrast, the refugees arriving between 2013 and 2016 were mostly young men (16).

Figure 3: Arrivals from Ukraine



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2023

The population of Ukrainian citizens residing in Germany increased sevenfold since the onset of the conflict. It made up 9.0 percent of the foreign population by the end of 2022 and 1.4 percent of the total resident population in the country.

In conclusion, Germany's demographic landscape reflects the intricate interplay of various factors, including aging populations, low birth rates, and migration dynamics. Despite evident trends indicating an aging population and declining birth rates, Germany has managed to sustain its demographic stability through the influx of incoming migrants.

### **4.3 Immigration in Germany**

#### **4.3.1 German legal system and immigrants.**

Immigration to Germany is a common phenomenon in the modern German migration nexus which led to the institutionalization of migration and integration processes by implementing a number of legal procedures devoted to placing the migration process in a legal frame.

In order to comprehend the legal processes associated with immigration to Germany within the framework of the country's demographic situation, this paragraph aims to analyse the primary legal documents delineating migration concerns and deliberate upon their key provisions. These laws encompass a wide range of topics, including visa requirements, work permits, asylum and refugee status, family reunification, and naturalization processes.

Germany's migration policy primary follows the commitments established by the European Council, reflected in documents such as the European Convention relating to the Legal Status of Migrant Workers of 1977 (25); European Social Charter 1961 (26); European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (27), etc.), such as:

- Solidarity between Member States and cooperation with third parties' countries.
- Organizing legal immigration and promoting integration.
- Controlling illegal immigration and ensuring returns illegal immigrants to their countries of origin or to the country transit.
- Effective border control.
- Comprehensive partnership with countries of origin and transit.
- Providing asylum since Germany has this as its historical and humanitarian obligation.

German migration policy is determined by four main actors in a fragmented system of division of responsibilities between various levels of the political administrative system. Firstly, the European Union level is responsible for the protection of the external borders of the EU and the implementation of the Dublin system (144), and secondly, the federal level is responsible for

the legal conditions of immigration and economic, labor, and social policies in Germany. At the federal state level, sixteen federal states are responsible for the management and implementation of migration policies on their territory (42, p. 119).

The fundamental document concerning migrants in Germany is known as the Immigration Act (Das Zuwanderungsgesetz) adopted in 2004 (39). The Immigration Law structured the legal basis for entry and stay in Germany and made changes for certain groups of immigrants, making it easier entry of highly qualified migrants from third countries, especially countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, and at the same time tightening financial, organizational, and labor requirements for them (56, p. 34).

The main directions of immigration policy in the law are regulated as follows:

1. The law repeals those existing since January 1, 1991, according to the law 'On the entry and stay of foreigners on territory of the Federal Republic of Germany', four forms of residence permit in Germany and introduces a more simplified scheme: two residence permits - temporary and permanent (71, p. 66).
2. Highly qualified specialists (e.g., scientists, IT specialists) from non-EU countries can obtain residence permit immediately upon arrival in Germany. The necessary conditions for this are: the presence of a specific offer from the employer, the absence of applicants for the job from citizens of Germany or the European Union, and a guarantee from immigrants of financial security for living without state help.
3. The law prescribes attractive conditions for studying at German universities. Unlike previous documents, the law stipulates the possibility of extending your stay in the country for one year to look for work or work.
4. For the first time, immigration of persons with their own business is regulated. They receive a residence permit if Germany sees its economic interest and funding for a business project in Germany has been secured for this group of people. Applicants must invest at least 1 million euros in Germany and create at least 10 jobs in Germany (71, p. 66).

In August 2007, Germany reformed the 2004 Immigration Act (Die Reform des Zuwanderungsgesetzes) and a new version of the Immigration Law of August 28, 2007, came into force, which supplemented and expanded the rights of foreigners staying in Germany (80).

Amendments to the law introduce changes to the number of permissible investments (they are lowered to 500 thousand euro) and reduce the number of new jobs required to be created to 5 instead of 10. The amendments in the law liberalized conditions for students and

researchers. An important innovation is the mandatory integration courses for so-called old migrants.

Due to the lack of one unified immigration legal code, the rules on the integration of immigrants in German law are spread over many different legal sources and their amendments, such as Act on the Residence, Economic Activity, and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory (which primary states the regulations the entry, residence, and deportation of foreign nationals in Germany (2)).

It covers various residency purposes, including work, study, family reunification, and asylum. Act on the Employment of Foreigners (Aufenthaltsgesetz): This law governs the employment of foreign workers in Germany. It includes provisions related to work permits, labour market access for non-EU/EFTA citizens, and the recognition of foreign qualifications. EU Blue Card Directive, which establishes the conditions of entry and residence of highly qualified non-EU nationals in EU countries (22).

German refugee law is a system of legislation and enactments that provide for the adoption of regulation, accommodation, as well as economic and professional integration carried out from different states. The legal status and concept of 'refugee' are determined by the norms of international law, which are contained in two main document UN 1951 Status of Refugees, Schengen legislation, Dublin Convention 1990, which were earlier analyzed. The main legal aspect that determines the possibility of obtaining refugee status in Germany is the applicant's compliance with the requirements of the Asylum Law (3, p. 187).

According to many German laws mentioned above, this right is given to persons who in their homeland are subject to various persecutions for political beliefs by representatives of government authorities. According to German law, persecution on the basis of religion, race or nationality, including membership in any social group, may also serve as a basis for possible receipt of refugee status.

#### **4.3.2 German economy and immigration**

The German economy has been significantly influenced by immigrants, who play an important role in various sectors and contribute to the country's economic growth putting additional pressure on the German economy.

The initial influx of immigrants, occurring in the post-war migration era, proved highly advantageous for Germany. Predominantly comprising low-skilled male workers from Southern Europe, this first wave of migrants significantly differed in nature and composition from subsequent arrivals. These early migrants secured stable employment, thereby making


substantial contributions to the preservation of the social security system, with minimal financial demands. At the end of the 20th century, the main immigration pattern changed; immigrants tended to arrive seeking political asylum and family reunification. The areas that are now developing at the fastest pace - tourism, trade, information services, transport - put forward different requirements for the quality and quantity of the workforce, including migrants, than was the case in the 60s and 70s. Newly arrived immigrants are unable to integrate into the labor market, resulting in increased dependence on social assistance and a burden on the German national economy (56, p. 34).

According to the Federal Statistical Service, in 2018, Germany spent a record 23 billion euros on helping to integrate more than one million refugees (63).

It is important to highlight that immigrants not only rely on social benefits but also make significant contributions to the German economy.

Germany's gross domestic product is the most important indicator for assessing the performance of the German economy. GDP data were systematized using the grouping method, using as a grouping indicator the number of foreign citizens (73), as well as GDP indicators which is shown in the table below (48).

Figure 4. Correlation between GDP (billion dollars) and migration inflow (thousand people)



The above data from the table was used to calculate the correlation coefficient. Thus, having calculated the correlation coefficient and based on the grouping results, we can draw the following statistical conclusions about the relationship between the number of immigrants and

GDP. The resulting correlation coefficient is 0.6888. As a result, the moderate correlation coefficient and visual analysis of the results indicate a strong dependence on these indicators. So, having found out that there is a relationship between GDP and the flow of migration, you should understand which components of GDP contribute to its increase.

GDP is produced from resources, namely capital, labour, and natural resources, and also takes into account the level of technology. Immigration can affect GDP, as it was discussed above, by increasing the share of working-age people in the total population, since migrants tend to be predominantly of working age. Migrants who initially enter Germany via student visas provide the greatest economic benefit (24). This is because they are young and well-educated. Holders of this type of visa also provide significant economic benefits, which are largely due to their high labour force participation and skill levels. Skilled independent migrants also gain significantly, reflecting their relative age, language, and technical skills.

In conclusion, GDP stands as a crucial metric for evaluating the impact of immigration on the German economy. It underscores the fact that immigration does not merely expand the economy by increasing the population, irrespective of individuals' visa statuses. Immigrants make a per capita contribution that surpasses that of existing residents. Their impact extends beyond mere population growth, as they actively contribute to substantial economic advancement.

In the economic sphere, migrants remain one of the ways to develop the German economy and business. However, in the medium term, there is an economic decline, which will be facilitated by the costs of maintaining refugees in Germany, where a lot of money has been invested. The results of these investments will only appear in the future, but forecasts are clouded by the lack of desire to work among more than half of migrants, which could lead to increased unemployment and a slowdown in the development of the consumer market.

### **4.3.3 German educational system and immigration**

Apart from the legal framework of immigration to Germany and its economic impact, immigrants face the issue of integration, whose primary aspect is strongly related to the educational nexus. Germany is well known as a country with a highly regarded education system, where education acts so-called 'as a social elevator', providing the opportunities for social and economic advancement of the individual.

For Germany as a country facing huge waves of immigrants with various professional backgrounds from highly educated professionals to individuals who do not know the German

language the process of integrating immigrants into the educational system is a complicated task requiring the application of several initiatives. Those initiatives are going to be analysed below.

The wave of immigration in 2015 took German society by surprise and escalated the migration situation, causing structural overload of all government systems, including educational one. Already in 2015-2016, the results of the Jugend Schell Studie showed the unequal distribution of children by type of school education (51). This is due to the German education system, which is known for its selective nature. The four-stage model (Hauptschule, Realschule, Gymnasium und Sonderschule) promotes the selection of children immediately after primary school.

Based on the above-mentioned division of educational institutions, the main way for a German student to enter a German university is to complete a 9-year course at a gymnasium, therefore this type of education is considered the most prestigious and entails increased competition for places in German gymnasiums. In Germany, a child's academic performance is closely linked to his or her parents' professional background, financials, and overall social status, with immigrants and their descendants disproportionately affected by structural inequalities being one of the most vulnerable groups in the society. According to representative data for all German federal states, 33.5% of refugee students in grade nine attended lower secondary schools, while only 8.1% went to Gymnasium in 2019 (37).

This gap is primarily due to insufficient knowledge of the German language among migrant primary school students. According to the assessment of language skills, 39% of migrant children aged 3–6 years do not communicate in German in their families (13, p. 94).

The language barrier is seen as the primary obstacle for immigrant students to obtain a higher level of education as the German education system is mistakenly assessed as reduced abilities and general learning disability.

Analysing above-stated data, it could be concluded that immigrants are facing difficulties and unequal knowledge distribution already at the early stage of education compared with the same-age native Germans which later led to unemployment and social marginality, and for some of them involvement in a criminal environment. In this regard, Germany is launching various governmental initiatives related to the active involvement of immigrant youth in the education process by building a number of childcare institutions providing places for migrant children under three years of age. The government proposed to create 4.579 German language classes for €17.5 million, with a further €31.5 million allocated for general integration projects at the local level (56, p. 34).

However, Germany is popular among young skilled professionals, coming to the country for education. Based on the data of the international study 'National Brand Index', Germany is among the top 5 countries in the NBI rating for such a parameter as the 'immigration/investment index' (the final score is calculated as the average score for 6 assessed parameters: exports, government, culture, people, tourism, and immigration/investment). The last indicator is interesting because it measures the level of attractiveness of a country for highly skilled immigrants and foreign capital (37).

Germany realizes the issue of the ageing of the population, the lack of local highly skilled professionals, and which consequences it could cause for domestic industries. Therefore, foreign students are highly welcomed in Germany and can apply for various state grants and programs. One of the most successful initiatives in terms of attracting graduates to Germany is the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), which provide financial support for immigrant student by paying scholarships for various academic activities. Since 2011 the most talented immigrant students may apply to Deutschlandstipendium (Germany Scholarship) on an equal basis with native German students (8, p.73).

Graduation from a German university is considered as a benefit for the immigrant in the German labour market, simplifying the process of receiving a residence permit. As other European Union states, Germany offers a 'Blue card', residence permit with the right to work in the European Union for specialists with higher education.

To conclude, governmental participation in immigrant integration into the education system is seen one of the most crucial factors in the overall successful integration of newcomers into German society. While it cannot be said that today an effective working plan has already been created, covering all levels of education for immigrants, and additional systematization of processes and monitoring of their implementation is required, there are various governmental activities devoted to immigrant involvement in educational process. Also, Germany realizes the need for skilled newcomers and actively encourages the interest of immigrants to come to Germany, supporting them financially and legally.

The healthcare system in Germany concerning immigrants aims to guarantee equality in accessing medical services and satisfy the healthcare requirements of individuals regardless of their visa status and backgrounds. In this paragraph, the general conditions of receiving medical services for immigrants will be analyzed as well as the difficulties faced by both immigrants and the German health care system.

Persons arriving in Germany from abroad must have health insurance. The rules applicable to health insurance for foreigners arriving in Germany depend on two main factors: country of origin and occupational group. In Germany, both public and private insurance are available. For example, public insurance is compulsory for all employed persons in Germany whose income is above the subsistence level. The number of contributions depends on income and is 14.6%. Treatment costs are covered directly by the health insurance company, so insured persons do not need to make an advance payment.

As for private insurance, the amount of the premium depends on the services provided for in the contract, age at the time of concluding the contract and state of health. Unlike state insurance, income is not a factor. Foreign citizens with private health insurance often benefit from shorter waiting times. In addition, they gain access to innovative treatment methods faster than citizens who have entered a public insurance contract (1).

The health monitoring system (Gesundheitsberichterstattung) currently is considered as the most comprehensive source of representative health data in Germany (35). It should be noted despite the significant proportion of the German population having a migration background (according to statistics, in 2022 this number reached 29% data sources used in the official health monitoring system in Germany does not include the information regarding migration status, focusing instead solely on nationality (74). As a result, the data presented in this paragraph relies primarily on a limited number of surveys and records that gather information about migration types, length of stay, residency status, and language proficiency, for example, Robert Koch-Institut research/

Although at the state level native Germans and emigrants have equal access to medicine, migrants face a number of difficulties that limit them from receiving timely medical care (35). Such gap is noticed in the DEGS data for adults and the KiGGS study for children suggest that people with a migration background, encompassing women, men, and children, tend to underutilize preventive healthcare services and screening (64).

These observations highlight the presence of obstacles that immigrants encounter when seeking access to healthcare. In the case of immigrants to Germany, barriers related to lack of necessary resources, such as understanding where to address for medical help, knowledge of the German language to get help, and other reasons related not enough level of immigrant's awareness. These obstacles lead to the insufficient usage or inappropriate provision of care, potentially causing negative effects on the health of immigrants.

However, as was mentioned earlier, the health databases do not keep records regarding the migration status of the patients, therefore the statistics analysis requires diligence avoiding

generalization. Immigrants come to Germany from countries with different healthcare standards as well as with different social statuses.

A research devoted to pregnancy and childbirth statistical analysis among native German females and immigrants revealed no significant difference in the usage and outcomes of pregnancy-related care between immigrants and non-immigrants. Women with a migration background were not recorded noticeable differences in addressing for medical help regarding childbirth comparing to locals. The only notable difference was observed among pregnant women with a migration background who had recently arrived in Germany and had limited proficiency in the German language; they were more likely to forego antenatal care in comparison to other women, irrespective of their migration background (61).

Thus, it should be noted, immigrants may face the challenges related to accessing necessary treatment due to limited resources for coping with health issues. Disparities in prevalence, risk factors, or behaviour are, to a significant extent, outcomes of social inequalities.

Refugees and asylum seekers are considered as a separate social group whose health care status and access to it is defined separately in German healthcare system. The Asylum-Seekers' Benefits Act limits social services for individuals seeking asylum. The emphasis on healthcare is directed towards addressing 'acute diseases and pain' (6).

In 2015, when huge waves of refugees headed towards Germany, German healthcare system faced serious pressure, seeking for additional capacity from the third parties, such organizations as German Red Cross (GRC). The German healthcare system, even before the arrival of the large wave of migrants, experienced some difficulties, for example, a lack of qualified personnel, a high level of bureaucracy, and long waiting times for structured. After 2015, the limits of acceptable access to medical care for refugees were urgently established. For example, it was established that if a refugee stayed in the country for less than 18 months, only emergency medical care services are available to them, the refugee is obliged to cover all preventive procedures related to health themselves (6).

As in matters of education and immigration, the responsibility for receiving medical assistance for migrants lies with the federal states. As soon as the asylum seeker is assigned to a certain municipality, the communes take over the responsibility. In order for refugees to consult a doctor, they must possess an authorization document referred to as 'Berechtigungsschein'. This form is obtained from officials at the social services office. The office grants approval for the medical examination and outlines the scope of the service.

To conclude, Germany provides immigrants the equal right to obtain medical help. However, the chance to receive professional medical services in time is complicated by a

number of factors, such as language barrier, bureaucracy, and long waiting. Access to the German regular health care system for immigrants must be improved as Individuals with a migration background, including those with uncertain or irregular residence status, are expected to make up an increasing proportion of Germany's population in the coming years and the system should be more flexible. The insufficient representation of immigrants in health reporting and epidemiological studies poses challenges in recognizing prevailing health inequalities and healthcare requirements among immigrants. Preventive programs should be customized to address the needs of immigrants.

#### **4.3.4 German society and immigration**

For the German state, ensuring the integration of foreigners is one of the most important tasks of home affairs policy, since integration will provide migrants and refugees with a life in unity with German society, laws, social, economic, and cultural life. Therefore, the state proposes different local integration projects, which differ in their focus. Currently, municipalities help NGOs and initiatives by coordinating activities, providing financial support, and training and upgrading the skills of both volunteers and immigrants.

The participation of non-profit organizations (NPOs/NGOs) and volunteers in social assistance depends on the relevant activities. Financial assistance to refugees and asylum seekers is primarily a government responsibility. Relief in other areas is often carried out through non-profit organizations, while some activities are carried out primarily by volunteers or non-profit organizations.

One of the most successful projects aiming immigrants to integrate to the German society is Arrivo (5)

Arrivo was established more than three years ago by activists based in Berlin. Their objective was to offer immigrants job orientation and training opportunities in Germany. The motto 'refugee is not a profession' has guided its work. Arrivo Berlin concentrates on skill development, providing German language courses and training in various trades. The aim of these programs is to help refugees obtain internships and ultimately secure employment. Up to this point, Arrivo has provided training to approximately 450 individuals, with one-third of them successfully transitioning into apprenticeships. The preparatory courses typically span six months. Arrivo collaborates with trade businesses facing challenges in filling vacant positions, particularly those that are often considered unappealing by many young people in Germany. The Arrivo project is an example of a private initiative that received active support from the governmental level and overall gained benefits both for immigrants and German society.

Aside from major urban centers and metropolitan areas in Germany, a significant immigrant population resides in smaller towns and villages, characterized by relatively closed local communities making the integration more difficult and time-consuming. One of the initiatives named Bike Bridge took place in Freiburg by the local municipality aiming to increase mobility and facilitate social and cultural integration of refugee women & asylum seekers in Freiburg through cycling. The programs include a two-month cycling training segment combined with German language classes, guided city tours, repair workshops, and leisure cycling excursions for participants, their families, instructors, and residents.

The integration policy in Germany's multi-level system is carried out at the level of the federal states, which are responsible for the integration of immigrants on their territory. All German federal states have developed their own integration concepts and corresponding guidelines. The systematic integration of immigrants is not consistently well-coordinated, leading to societal discord and disagreements as it performed separately by federal states.

Nevertheless, Germany's refugee policy is an important model, justified not only by the duty to allow refugees into Germany but also by the positive duty to provide the necessary conditions to enable refugees to ultimately live in dignity as full and equal members of society. The policy includes government provision of minimum conditions—housing, health care, and minimum living expenses—roughly equivalent to German social security. Secondly, it includes vocational training and language courses, paid for by the state, to ensure social and labor market integration.

#### **4.4 Russian diaspora in Germany**

According to the statistics, in 2021 the biggest number of people living in Europe with Russian citizenship lived in Germany (239.000 people). Since the 20th century, Germany has been one of the most popular destinations for emigration from Russia, despite strict legislation in this area. Many of those who left Russia a long time ago received a German passport and integrated into German society, however Russian diaspora is still considered in the top 10 of the biggest foreign diasporas in Germany. Depending on the context, a definition of 'Russian diaspora' has both a narrow, specific, and broad interpretation. From the one hand, 'Russian' may mean only citizenship, and then the Russian diaspora can mean Russians. On the other hand, 'Russians' are considered to be everyone who speaks Russian or knows Russian, regardless of ethnic origin, although there is a more correct definition for this - Russian speakers (73).

Issues related to the support and protection of the Russian diaspora abroad are dealt with by Rossotrudnichestvo, the Government Commission for Compatriots Abroad, and the Foundation for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad. Thus, in all major cities there are many associations, organizations and clubs for children, and youth with a migration background, which on the one hand, help newcomers adapt to a new country and on the other hand, they are engaged in the promotion and preservation of the Russian language and culture (82).

#### **4.4.1 Past**

In total, 5 main waves of migration from Russia to Germany since the 20th century can be distinguished. The first two waves (1920–1930, 1940–1950s) were forced by the change of political regime in Russia, namely with the consequences of the 1917 revolution and the Civil War in Russia. Intentions to emigrate primarily spread to the intelligentsia (a social group known as well-educated ones with an interest in culture and politics) (81, p. 49). Who disagreed with the Bolsheviks who came to power. Streams of immigrants rushed to many European cities, to Germany, whereby that time a considerable part of the immigrants who had moved before 1914 had settled. Speaking about the factors in the formation of the center of Russian emigration in Germany, one must also keep in mind that some Russian citizens ended up in Germany involuntarily. They fled potential persecution and terror, often spontaneously, as part of mass evacuations and retreats.

Russian emigration of the second wave is the name of citizens of the USSR who, for various reasons, ended up on the territory of Nazi Germany and other European countries during the Second World War, and did not return to the USSR at the end of the war (70, p. 27).

Russian emigration of the third wave is the name of emigrants from the USSR who left the country in 1965–1988. Most of them were Jews and members of their families. Unlike the ‘first wave’ and ‘second wave’ emigrants, the ‘third wave’ emigrants left the USSR legally, with the consent of the authorities (72, p.355).

In the 1990s – early 2000s, the fourth wave of emigration left Russia. Ethnic Germans were actively returning to Germany during this period, but the ethnic coloring of the initial phase turned out to be far from the only distinctive features of the fourth wave of emigration. A characteristic feature of the fourth wave of emigration was the high intellectual level of immigrants. Scientists from Russia were invited to work abroad, where their professional academic skills were highly valued and generously paid. Russian statistics are incomplete because they count as emigrants only those who have renounced their citizenship, which the vast

majority do not. As a result, according to Rosstat, for 1992–2004, 686.885 people left for Germany, while according to the German Ministry of Internal Affairs, about 640.800 people of ethnic Germans alone entered the country (59, p. 254).

#### **4.4.2 Present**

The Russian-speaking diaspora in Germany remains one of the largest in Western European countries. According to Germany's Federal Statistical Office, currently, around 235.000 Russian citizens live in Germany (33).

After the invasion of Russia to Ukraine in February 2022, unlike many European countries, Germany still issues visas to those wishing to leave Russia for the purpose of work and study, as well as family reunion. Also, since May 2022, Germany has been rapidly issuing humanitarian visas to Russians who are 'at particular risk because of their commitment to the fight against war, for democracy and human rights, or because of actions critical of the regime' (19).

If newly arrived immigrants after 2022 generally do not agree with Russia's political course, flee from persecution by the authorities, and come out in support of Ukraine, the Russian diaspora in Germany is divided in those views and sentiments. Many Russian speakers in Germany support the Putin regime and justify Russian aggression. Pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian blogs on social networks gather hundreds of thousands of subscribers among the Russian-speaking diaspora, and the most fantastic xenophobic ideas find numerous adherents. Some representatives of the Russian diaspora are actively organizing pro-Russian rallies and, according to them, are fighting against discrimination based on language and nationality in schools and public places.

After the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the Union of Russian-speaking Parents became especially popular in political education. The association is engaged in the political and civic education of compatriots in Germany and helps them integrate into European society.

In Germany, there are a number of NGOs founded by Russian immigrants and taking initiatives regarding their compatriots in Germany. The initiatives of the organizations are different: some are completely apolitical and advocate cultural unification, and some are active players in the political arena, being the opposition to the Kremlin in exile. It is worth noting that many organizations receive support and funding from the German Foreign Ministry (60).

If most NGOs are aimed at working with Russians in Germany, UnKremlin is one of the few organizations that primarily addresses German society. In April – May 2021, UnKremlin

organized a protest camp at the Brandenburg Gate, then the ‘Putin Trial’ action, which had a public outcry (62).

To conclude, at present the Russian diaspora in Germany holds polar views and in most cases, the reason for the split is political events related to the war in Ukraine. Early settlers to Germany advocated support for Russia, later settlers found refuge in Germany and continued their struggle with the current Russian government.

#### **4.4.3 Future**

It is difficult to state about the prospects for the development of the Russian diaspora in Germany. In many ways, the future of Russian immigrants depends on the political course of Russia and the political relations between the two countries of Russia and Germany. If Russia continues its militaristic position in Ukraine, improving relations between states will hardly be possible. As the experience of other European countries shows, political games most often have a negative impact on immigrants. Namely, the introduction of unspoken sanctions relating to visa issues, the closure of bank accounts due to citizenship. The disappointment of part of the Western community associated with the ongoing war in Ukraine also leads to new claims against the Russian political opposition in exile. There are accusations against her that she is not capable of influencing the situation in Russia, either now or in the future. Moreover, unsubstantiated speculations are being circulated about the many agents of the Russian special services in the ranks of the emigration. All this usually ends with calls to stop helping Russian emigration altogether and to take them seriously (15).

On the other hand, we should not forget about those representatives of the Russian diaspora who support Russia’s political course. supporters of these views are increasingly inclined to dissatisfaction with Germany and there is a certain interest in returning to their homeland. While writing this work, a group on the Facebook social network ‘Returnees. The road home’, numbering more than 3.000 participants, was analysed. The main idea of the community is a question/answer/discussion format from Russian immigrants from all over the world planning to return to Russia. To analyse the sentiments of Russian immigrants in Germany, posts were selected from December 2022 to September 2023. Many Russians are interested in the issue of transferring money from Germany to Russia, the possibility of receiving a German pension when moving, as well as the adaptation of children in Russia. the reasons that influenced the move to Russia, many community members note the belittling of the dignity of Russians in Germany, the ban on Russian culture, history, and language, as well as LGBT propaganda in schools. Although it is difficult to accurately track the percentage of those

returning to Russia due to the opacity of Russian migration policies, it should be noted that such sentiments in Russian diaspora are clearly visible.

Thus, the future of the Russian diaspora in Germany depends entirely on the chosen political course of Russia and the reaction of the German government to it. in the event of increasing repression by the Russian authorities, more and more Russians who disagree with the political vector of Russia will look for a new home, including in Germany, since Germany is favorable to many who want to move for the purpose of work and study. also, some representatives of the diaspora, on the contrary, are full of support for the Russian authorities and many are seriously considering the prospect of returning to their homeland.

## **5. Questionary**

The following chapter is devoted to the analysis of the conducted questionnaire and the presentation of the results.

A quantitative survey method was chosen for the research itself questionnaire. This study holds significant academic importance by delving into the complex migration processes and providing insights into the societal and demographic consequences of migration from Russia to Germany. The following hypothesis was stated: The survey among Russian immigrants in Germany aims to demonstrate that the impact of Russian migrants on the German demography is significant. The findings are anticipated to highlight the measurable contribution of Russian immigrants to the demographic landscape of Germany.

Through a comprehensive 20-question questionnaire, the research demonstrates the motivations and challenges faced by Russian emigrants, clarifying the nature of migration's impact on the German demographic landscape. The survey was originally placed in the Russian language to simplify the understanding of the questions for the recipients and later translated to English to reflect the results in this work.

To ensure a diverse range of perspectives, the questionnaire was placed across various platforms used by individuals related to emigration to Germany. The questions were placed into different social media such as Facebook groups 'Russian Emigrants in Germany' and similar thematic communities, collectively boasting around several thousand members. Additionally, influential bloggers in the Russian emigrant community shared the questionnaire with their followers, expanding a wider audience. Personal connections and networks were also tapped into, embracing a grassroots approach to participant recruitment. In total, 160 respondents participated in the survey, offering valuable insights into the emigration experiences. The survey was conducted via Google Forms tool and was completely anonymous.

In the survey, different types of questions were answered by participants, each fulfilling specific purposes. Open-ended questions were utilized to collect detailed qualitative insights, enabling respondents to share their experiences in depth. Closed questions featured predefined options representing likely reasons, facilitating general trend analysis. Structured response options were provided through multiple-choice questions, ensuring clarity in participant answers. Additionally, ranking questions allowed respondents to express their agreement, disagreement, or neutrality on specific issues.

### **5.1 Questionnaire survey**

1. Structure of respondents by age.

Chart No. 1 illustrates the age distribution of the respondents who emigrated from Russia to Germany and were interviewed for this study. The respondents were categorized into six age groups: 15-20 years, 21-29 years, 30-39 years, 40-49 years, 50-59 years, and 60 years or older.

The most prevalent age group among the respondents was 21-29 years, comprising 56 individuals out of the total sample size of 160, constituting 35% of the participants. The age bracket of 30-39 years accounted for 31.3% of the respondents, totalling 50 individuals. The third most represented age group was 40-49 years, encompassing 33 respondents or 20.6% of the total sample. Following this, the age group of 50-59 years involved 12 participants, making up 7.5% of the sample. The category of 60 years and older was represented by 5 participants, constituting 3.1% of the total, while the least represented group was 15-20 years old, comprising only 4 respondents.

The survey successfully covered a wide range of age groups. Discrepancies in participation frequency can be attributed to various factors, such as the possibility that the oldest age group may have immigrated to Germany in the 20th century, thereby falling outside the scope of this research, or their limited usage of technology, including social media platforms where the survey was primarily placed.

## 2. Structure of respondents by gender.

Chart No. 2 displays the demographic distribution of respondents based on their gender. The results indicate that 54.4% of the participants, overall, 87 individuals, identified as female, while 44.4% of the respondents, constituting 71 people, identified as male. Additionally, two participants self-identified as 'other', comprising the remaining fraction of the sample.

## 3. How old were you when you moved to Germany?

Chart No. 3 presents the findings related to the age at which the respondents relocated to Germany. The respondents were provided with several age ranges: 15 years or younger, 16 – 20 years, 21 – 29 years, 30 – 39 years, 40 – 49 years, 50 – 59 years, and 60 years or older. According to the results, the predominant group among the survey participants moved within the age range of 21 – 29 years, constituting 37.5% of the total respondents (60 individuals). Following this, 31.9% of the respondents relocated during the 30 – 39 years age bracket. Additionally, 18 individuals (11.3%) relocated within the age range of 16 – 20 years, while 10% of the participants moved between the ages of 40 – 49 years. The remaining age groups each represented less than 5% of the respondents, indicating a minimal proportion in each category.

#### 4. Structure of respondents based on the year range when move to Germany.

Chart No. 4 illustrates the outcomes concerning the years when survey participants relocated to Germany. The provided timeframes encompass distinct historical periods: before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 1991 – 2000, 2001 – 2005, 2006 – 2010, 2011 – 2015, 2015 – 2020, and 2021 – 2023. According to the findings, a major part of respondents (48.1%, overall, 77 individuals) moved in the most recent period, specifically between 2021 and 2023. Subsequently, 21.3% of the respondents relocated during the period from 2015 to 2020, while 19 individuals (11.9%) moved between 2011 and 2015. Further analysis reveals that 8.1% of participants relocated during 2006 – 2010, 6.9% during 2001 – 2005, and a solitary individual (0.6%) migrated between 1991 and 2000. Additionally, a minority of respondents, comprising 3.1% (5 individuals), moved before the dissolution of the USSR, however, as was recently mentioned, our research scope is focused on migration in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, therefore the results concerning the migrants moved before the collapse of the Soviet Union was filtered out and not considered at results presentation.

#### 5. Structure of respondents by place of relocation.

Chart No. 5 shows the findings pertaining to the places of origin of migrants. Recipients were categorized into specific groups: Capital (Moscow), major cities (such as St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, among others, encompassing the five largest cities in Russia), regional hubs, smaller towns (comprising cities with populations of up to 300,000 individuals), rural areas, and an 'Other' category to accommodate respondents from diverse settlement types.

The results reveal that 41.9% of the participants, totalling 60 individuals, migrated from major cities, while 19.4% (31 individuals) relocated from smaller towns. Additionally, 18.8% (30 individuals) moved from regional centres, and 13.8% (22 individuals) hailed from Moscow. A minority, constituting 4.4% (7 individuals), originated from rural areas. Furthermore, specific instances falling under the 'other' category were recorded: one person moved from Prague to Germany, another individual migrated from Almaty (Kazakhstan), and one participant relocated from Serbia, having previously moved from Moscow to Serbia.

#### 6. Structure of respondents by the highest level of education.

Chart No. 6 illustrates the data concerning the highest level of academic education attained by the respondents. Several options were provided for selection: incomplete secondary

education, complete secondary education, incomplete higher education, college or equivalent, university - bachelor's degree, university - graduate degree, university – doctoral degree. Additionally, the 'other' option was included to accommodate responses reflecting the intricacies of the Russian education system.

The results indicate that 29.4% of the respondents hold bachelor's degrees, while 28.7% have master's degrees. Furthermore, 14.4% have completed college or equivalent education, and 10.6% have not finished higher education. Under the 'other' category, one response highlighted education from the era before the introduction of bachelor's and master's degrees in Russia, denoted as 'University, Specialist degree (5 years of study)'. Responses falling under the 'Other' category primarily pertain to specific majors or fields of study, aligning with the existing answer options.

#### 7. Structure of respondents by employment status.

Figure No. 11 illustrates the findings pertaining to the employment status of the survey respondents. According to the data, 33.1% of individuals are engaged in employment for 40 hours or more per week, while 32.4% are also employed but work 39 hours or less per week. Additionally, 17.9% of respondents are involved in entrepreneurial activities, 6.2% are currently not employed and not actively seeking employment at the time of the survey, in contrast to 4.8% who are unemployed and actively searching for work. Furthermore, 3.4% of respondents are retired, 1.4% are incapacitated, and 0.7% have categorized themselves as "students".

#### 8. Structure of respondents by level of income.

Chart No. 7 depicts the respondents' income levels, categorized into three options: below average, average, and above average. The results reveal that 66.2% of the participants, constituting 96 individuals, perceive their income as average. Additionally, 16.6% of respondents believe their income is below average, while 17.2% report an income above the average level.

#### 9. Structure of respondents by place of accommodation living.

Chart No. 8 illustrates responses to a closed question, offering four primary options: residing in one's own flat, a rented flat, one's own house, or a rented house. The data indicates

that 68.3% of the participants, totalling 99 individuals, live in a rented flat. Furthermore, 15.9% of respondents, comprising 23 people, reside in a rented house. Additionally, 9.7% of the participants, accounting for 14 individuals, inhabit their own flat, while the remaining 6.2%, represented by 9 individuals, reside in their own house.

#### 10. Structure of respondents by marital status.

Chart No. 9 delineates the family status of the respondents, offering several categories for selection: married, not married, living in a civil partnership, widowed, and 'other'. The data indicates that 53.1% of the participants are married, while 27.5% are not married. Additionally, 15.6% of respondents are in a civil partnership, and there are 5 widowed individuals. Under the 'other' category, a response was recorded as follows: 'I have a boyfriend, we are going to live together', which is categorized as 'not married' for analytical consistency.

#### 10. Optional question: Structure of respondents by their partners' place of birth.

Chart No. 10 presents a comprehensive analysis of survey participants who are in relationships and provides insights into their partners' countries of origin. Respondents were given the following options: post-Soviet countries, Russia (USSR), Germany, other European countries, and 'other'. The results reveal that 37.9% of participants are in relationships with individuals from Russian/former USSR nations, 25.8% with post-Soviet nationals, excluding Russia. Moreover, 14.4% have partners who are German nationals, and 10.6% are in relationships with individuals from other European Union countries. The 'other' category includes respondents whose partners were born in Africa and Australia. This data sheds light on the diverse international relationships among the surveyed participants.

#### 11. Optional question: Structure of respondents by the language spoken at home.

Chart No. 11 delineates the linguistic preferences of survey participants within their households. The options provided were German, English, Russian, and 'other'. The findings indicate that 71.6% of respondents speak Russian at home, while 14.2% converse in English, and 12.8% use German as their household language. Additionally, within the 'other' category, responses were recorded mentioning the usage of both English and German.

#### 12. Main motives for migration.

Survey participants were presented with a comprehensive list of factors that could potentially influence their decision to migrate from Russia to Germany. Participants were allowed to select multiple options and were also given the opportunity to provide their own personalized reasons. The provided options included: new life experience, family circumstances (such as marriage and relatives), host country stability, political situation in Russia, tolerance level in German society, opportunity to obtain a passport from the host country, opportunity to travel more, climate in Russia, infrastructure (including roads and transport) in Russia, availability of interesting and promising job opportunities in Germany, quality of healthcare in Germany, level of social support (including benefits and pensions) in Germany, desire to live specifically in Germany, quality of education in Germany, quality of cultural life in Germany, conditions for doing business in Germany, and 'other'.

The results revealed significant concerns among participants related to political situation in Russia, namely 55% consider this particular reason as a primary factor to move to Germany, 45.6% emphasize the stability of the host country. Furthermore, 45.6% of respondents were motivated by the opportunity for more frequent travel, and 42.5% were interested in obtaining German citizenship. Additionally, 28.7% of participants decided to relocate due to appealing job prospects. Conversely, factors such as cultural life in Germany (1.3%) and the quality of education (1.3%) were deemed less significant reasons for immigration.

Noteworthy individual responses included the ease of relocation due to obtaining a residence permit and language proficiency (approximately 3%). Approximately 6% of respondents cited the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions, which made life in their home country untenable. Additionally, a few participants mentioned their decision to move after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Some respondents highlighted the adherence to laws in Germany and the societal norms of the German population as factors influencing their migration decision. These varied responses underscore the multifaceted nature of the motivations behind the decision to migrate from Russia to Germany.

### 13. Primary factors leading to the recipients' disappointment post-relocation to Germany.

In addition to the previous inquiry addressing the primary motives for migration to Germany, respondents were prompted to identify potential sources of dissatisfaction following their relocation. Standard categories provided for their responses included safety, societal tolerance levels, interpersonal interactions (including behaviour, appearance, and communication), social support levels (such as benefits and pensions), environmental conditions, climate, infrastructure (comprising roads and transportation), healthcare quality, educational

standards, cultural amenities, business environment, career prospects, political climate, and 'other.' Participants were allowed to select multiple options.

The outcomes reveal that a significant percentage of respondents, 42.8%, expressed discontentment with interpersonal interactions. Additionally, 32.4% were dissatisfied with the quality of healthcare services, 31% harboured uncertainties about their career prospects, and 28.3% were apprehensive regarding the political landscape. Conversely, only 9% reported dissatisfaction with the ecological conditions in Germany.

In response to the 'other' category, diverse replies were received, but efforts were made to categorize them thematically. Four individuals reported no dissatisfaction, while another four expressed dissatisfactions with bureaucratic inefficiencies and subpar service quality, encompassing aspects like delivery and banking systems. Two participants cited concerns about the high cost of living and observed a declining standard of living. One individual expressed concern regarding 'LGBT propaganda'.

#### 14. Germany rate by respondents based on certain characteristics.

The following question was structured as a ranking inquiry, wherein respondents were presented with a series of statements and requested to evaluate them on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 indicated 'very satisfied' and 1 denoted 'extremely dissatisfied'. The criteria for assessment encompassed various aspects: safety, ecological conditions, societal tolerance levels, climate, infrastructure (encompassing roads and public transport), quality of healthcare, educational standards, cultural amenities, conditions for entrepreneurial activities, career prospects, political landscape, and interpersonal interactions (including appearance and behaviour).

The recorded responses revealed that 58 individuals expressed 'very satisfied' sentiments concerning safety in Germany, whereas 6 respondents indicated feeling entirely unsafe. Furthermore, 51 participants rated safety as '4,' 33 individuals as '3,' and 12 respondents as '2.'

Regarding the ecological situation, the majority of respondents (60 individuals) rated it as '4,' with an additional 59 participants expressing 'very satisfied' sentiments ('5'). Conversely, only 3 individuals reported extreme dissatisfaction, while the remaining respondents were divided into '2' (10 participants) and '3' (28 participants) categories.

In terms of societal tolerance levels, a majority (59 individuals) evaluated this factor as '4,' while 43 respondents rated it as '3,' and 40 participants as very satisfied meaning '5'. Additionally, 14 individuals expressed dissatisfaction by rating it as '2,' and 4 respondents indicated the lowest satisfaction level ('1').

The climate factor yielded the following responses: 60 individuals rated this factor as '3,' 39 respondents as '4,' 33 participants as '2,' 22 individuals expressed high satisfaction by ranking this factor as '5,' and 6 respondents reported extreme dissatisfaction.

In relation to the infrastructure factor, 46 individuals rated it as '4,' 43 participants as '3,' 36 respondents expressed the highest level of satisfaction, 27 individuals assigned a rating of '2,' and 8 participants expressed significant concerns regarding the state of the infrastructure.

Regarding the quality of healthcare, the majority of respondents (60 individuals) rated the healthcare system in Germany as '3,' indicating a moderate level of satisfaction. Additionally, 39 participants assigned a rating of '4,' signifying a relatively positive evaluation. Conversely, 27 individuals expressed a lower level of satisfaction with a rating of '2,' while 25 respondents were highly satisfied, rating the healthcare quality as '5.' Furthermore, 9 individuals conveyed complete dissatisfaction, assigning a rating of '1.'

Regarding the quality of education, 46 respondents rated this factor as '4,' indicating a favourable assessment, while 45 participants assigned a rating of '3,' suggesting a moderate level of satisfaction. Furthermore, 41 individuals expressed the highest level of contentment, giving a rating of '5,' indicating outstanding satisfaction. On the other hand, 22 respondents assigned a rating of '2,' reflecting a less favourable evaluation, and 6 individuals conveyed complete dissatisfaction with a rating of '1.'

In relation to the quality of cultural life, 52 individuals rated it as '4,' indicating a positive evaluation, while 46 respondents assigned a rating of '3,' reflecting a moderate level of satisfaction. Additionally, 34 participants expressed a high level of contentment, giving a rating of '5,' signifying exceptional satisfaction. In contrast, 18 individuals assigned a rating of '2,' indicating a less favourable view, and 13 respondents conveyed complete dissatisfaction with a rating of '1.'

Regarding the facilities for conducting business in Germany, 69 individuals assigned a rating of '3,' indicating a moderate level of satisfaction. Additionally, 50 respondents gave a rating of '4,' signifying a relatively positive evaluation. In contrast, 21 participants expressed dissatisfaction by assigning a rating of '2,' while 13 individuals conveyed complete discontent with a rating of '1.' Notably, 7 people assigned the lowest rating of '1,' emphasizing their significant concerns about the business environment.

In terms of career prospects, 55 respondents assigned a rating of '3,' indicating a moderate level of satisfaction. Additionally, 44 individuals gave a rating of '4,' signifying a relatively positive evaluation, while 30 participants expressed a high level of contentment, assigning a rating of '5,' denoting exceptional satisfaction. Conversely, 19 respondents expressed a less

favorable view with a rating of '2,' and 12 participants conveyed complete dissatisfaction, giving a rating of '1.'

Regarding the political situation, 55 respondents assigned a rating of '3,' indicating a moderate level of satisfaction, while 46 individuals provided a rating of '4,' signifying a relatively positive evaluation. Additionally, 25 participants expressed a less favorable view with a rating of '2,' and 19 respondents expressed a high level of contentment, giving a rating of '5,' denoting exceptional satisfaction. Notably, 15 respondents assigned the lowest rating of '1,' emphasizing significant concerns about the political climate.

In regard to the factor of interpersonal interactions, 53 respondents assigned a rating of '3,' indicating a moderate level of satisfaction. Furthermore, 46 individuals provided a rating of '4,' suggesting a relatively positive evaluation, while 31 participants expressed a less favorable view with a rating of '2.' Additionally, 19 respondents conveyed a high level of contentment, assigning a rating of '5,' denoting exceptional satisfaction. Notably, 11 respondents assigned the lowest rating of '1,' indicating significant concerns about interpersonal experiences.

#### 15. The structure of respondents' level of satisfaction with living in Germany.

The survey question was designed as a structured ranking inquiry, where respondents were presented with a set of statements and asked to assess them on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 5 indicated 'very satisfied' and 1 denoted 'extremely dissatisfied.'

The results revealed that the majority, comprising 45.6% or 73 respondents, rated their overall impression as '4'. Another 43 individuals, constituting 26.3% of the participants, expressed moderate satisfaction levels. Additionally, 22 respondents, accounting for 13.8%, indicated strong satisfaction with their life in Germany. Meanwhile, 21 participants (13.1%) provided a rating of '2', signifying a less favourable view, and 2 individuals conveyed complete dissatisfaction with their life in Germany. These varied responses provide valuable insights into the diverse levels of satisfaction experienced by the respondents, contributing to a nuanced understanding of their overall impressions of living in Germany.

#### 16. Structure of respondents' most important factors in Germany

The subsequent open-ended question provided respondents with an opportunity to articulate their perspectives on the most significant factors for them personally in Germany. Participants were encouraged to elaborate on their thoughts and ideas within a paragraph of text.

To enhance the precision of the gathered data, the responses were categorized based on common themes. A total of 55 respondents provided feedback in response to this open question.

Approximately 20% of participants emphasized factors associated with a general sense of safety, encompassing stability, confidence in the future, respect for individual rights, tolerance, local adequacy, freedom of speech, security, compliance with laws, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, family safety, and societal adherence to legal norms.

Another category revolved around a friendly environment and community, including shared worldviews with locals, the opportunity to establish genuine friendships in adulthood, university studies aligned with personal interests, social connections, travel opportunities, comfortable living conditions, and amicable interactions with people.

Family ties emerged as another significant factor, particularly for individuals with children whose parents were also residing in Germany, as well as considerations related to spousal relationships.

Furthermore, a substantial number of respondents cited the political situation in Russia as a driving force behind their decision to relocate to Germany. These individuals expressed sentiments such as a sense of security, assurance that authorities and the legal system stand in support, genuine freedom of expression, assembly, religion, conscience, and speech, all guaranteed by the state.

Additional factors highlighted by respondents included the opportunity to obtain German citizenship, a transparent taxation system, favorable climate, and promising career prospects in Germany.

These varied responses underscore the multifaceted considerations that influence individuals' choices to establish residency in a foreign country.

#### 17. Ranking question to define respondents' opinion regarding certain statements.

The survey question was structured as a formal ranking inquiry, wherein respondents were presented with a predefined set of statements and tasked with evaluating them on a scale from 1 to 5. In this scale, a rating of 5 indicated 'totally agree,' while a rating of 1 signified 'totally disagree.'

Participants were queried about their intention to remain in Germany. The responses revealed that the majority of respondents (74 individuals) expressed a firm commitment to staying in Germany, rating this statement as '5,' signifying their strong intention not to leave the country. Additionally, 39 participants rated this statement as '4,' indicating a high level of agreement. Twenty-six individuals rated the statement as '3,' suggesting moderate agreement,

while 16 respondents assigned a rating of '2,' indicating a partial agreement. A minority of 5 individuals indicated strong consideration of relocating from Germany, reflecting a potential willingness to explore alternative residency options.

The subsequent question was formulated to ascertain the respondents' intention to achieve fluency in the German language. A significant majority of participants, comprising 88 individuals, expressed a strong determination to attain fluency, assigning a rating of '5' to the statement. Additionally, 40 respondents endorsed this intention with a rating of '4,' indicating a high level of commitment. Eighteen participants assigned a rating of '3,' suggesting a moderate degree of intention, while 10 individuals rated the statement as '2,' indicating a relatively lower level of commitment. A minority, specifically 4 individuals, rated the statement as '1,' implying a limited or negligible intention to achieve fluency in the German language.

The subsequent question aimed to gauge the respondents' satisfaction with local norms and traditions. Sixty-four individuals expressed a high level of contentment, assigning a rating of '4' to their satisfaction. An additional 38 respondents indicated an exceptional comfort level, assigning a rating of '5.' Forty-one participants demonstrated a moderate level of satisfaction with a rating of '3.' Fourteen individuals expressed a relatively lower satisfaction level, assigning a rating of '2.' Lastly, a minority, consisting of 3 individuals, gave the lowest rating of '1,' indicating a notable dissatisfaction with local norms and traditions.

The following question examined the participants' willingness to integrate into the local German society. The findings reveal that 49 individuals expressed a strong intention to become an integral part of the local community. Additionally, 45 respondents rated their intention at '4,' indicating a substantial interest in integration. Thirty-eight participants demonstrated a moderate level of interest, receiving a rating of '3.' Twenty individuals displayed a relatively lower interest level, with a rating of '2.' Notably, 8 respondents expressed a complete lack of willingness to integrate into the local society.

The ensuing question delved into the issue of lack of the communication faced by participants in Germany. A significant portion of respondents, precisely 33 individuals, confirmed the statement, indicating a pervasive lack of communication in their experiences. Furthermore, 31 participants acknowledged this issue by assigning a rating of '4,' signifying a substantial concern. An additional 40 respondents expressed moderate dissatisfaction, assigning a rating of '3'. Similarly, 40 more participants rated the communication challenge as '2'. Notably, 16 individuals were most satisfied with the quantity of communication, assigning the biggest disagreement.

The subsequent inquiry pertained to the respondents' perceptions of their sense of being an outsider within German society. Out of the participants, 51 individuals expressed their disagreement with the statement by assigning a rating of '2'. In contrast, 47 respondents indicated their moderate agreement by assigning a rating of '3'. Remarkably, 23 participants reported feeling no sense of alienation within the society, while 11 individuals strongly identified with the statement. The remaining 28 respondents concurred with the statement, assigning it a rating of '4', signifying their agreement.

The final statement in this inquiry pertained to the respondents' inclination to return to Russia. 46 individuals emphatically disagreed and categorically denied the possibility of repatriating to Russia. In contrast, 42 participants expressed a strong agreement by assigning a rating of '4'. Additionally, 26 individuals indicated their moderate agreement with the statement, assigning it a rating of '3'. Noteworthy, 29 respondents expressed a propensity to consider returning to Russia, while 17 participants unequivocally endorsed the statement, signifying their complete agreement.

#### 18. Probability of respondent's relocation to reside in Russia.

The inquiry focused on the likelihood of respondents returning to Russia or considering alternative locations for relocation. The question presented four response options: 'I will never return to Russia', 'I am contemplating relocation, but not within Russia', 'I am planning to relocate back to Russia', and 'I am considering a return to Russia'.

According to the survey findings, 32.5% of respondents expressed a preference for moving to a location other than Russia. Additionally, 31.9% of participants indicated contemplation about returning to Russia, while 30.6% adamantly disagreed with the prospect of returning. Noteworthy, 8 individuals, constituting the remaining portion, confirmed their intention to return to Russia.

#### 19. Optional question for those respondents, who would like to Russia and their main motivation.

The open-ended question was directed towards participants who had declared their intention to relocate to Russia. Specifically, they were requested to elucidate the reasons underpinning this decision. The responses received have been categorized into distinct groups based on the primary motivations articulated.

Six participants cited family reasons, such as obligations towards elderly parents or sick relatives residing in Russia. Additionally, two individuals emphasized Russia's vibrant cultural scene, an aspect they felt was lacking in Germany.

Three respondents underscored their positive perception of the societal transformations in Russia over recent years. Their decision to return was influenced by agreement with the prevailing political direction, adherence to traditional values, and the perception of a conservative social milieu.

Five respondents expressed apprehensions about Russia's future. One respondent's rationale for returning was grounded in the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, repentance among the Russian populace, acknowledgment of governmental mistakes, regime alteration, a shift towards pro-European policies, political purges, and the abolition of restrictive laws. Another participant emphasized the desire for the restoration of freedoms, cessation of repressive measures, and the rehabilitation of international relation.

## **5.2 Summary of questionnaire survey**

The primary objective of the survey was to ascertain the principal motivations underlying immigration from Russia to Germany, analyzing the factors that influenced individuals' decisions to relocate, and assessing the extent of immigrants' integration into German society. As already mentioned in the description of data collection methods a total of 160 respondents filled out this questionnaire.

The analysis of the survey commences by categorizing the temporal aspect of the relocation process. During the analysis, research data was imported into Microsoft Excel and Pivot tables tool was used, enabling the application of filters to the pertinent variables, and facilitating the necessary data manipulation and examination.

The acquired data unequivocally demonstrates that a significant majority of immigrants chose to relocate to Germany during the period from 2021 to 2023, 77 people of the surveyed population, 35 people were male and 42 female ones. The majority of immigrants were at the age group of 21 – 29 years. Based on the data obtained, newly minted immigrants in overwhelming cases moved from Moscow (13 people) or large Russian cities (49 people). Individuals who migrated during this specific timeframe exhibit a high level of education, possessing advanced academic qualifications. Among this group, 31 individuals hold master's degrees, 24 individuals possess bachelor's degrees, and two individuals have attained doctorate degrees. Furthermore, a substantial proportion of respondents within this temporal group engage in gainful employment, dedicating a significant commitment of 40 or more working hours per week. Specifically, 30

individuals fall within this category. Additionally, 15 respondents are employed for less than 40 hours a week under contractual arrangements. 47 respondents assessed their income as average and currently they stay in a rented apartment. 43 people are married, however only 8 individuals have a German partner and only for 5 people German is the language to be spoken at home.

The preponderance of respondents from this specific period are seriously concerned regarding security nexus, prioritizing a secure environment as their primary requirement. Their discomfort within their country of origin is predominantly rooted in political factors, marked by dissatisfaction with the prevailing regime, dearth of civil liberties, and widespread corruption. These issues instill in them a pervasive sense of fear, peril, hopelessness, and despair. The majority mention the reason for moving: the political situation in Russia, the stability of the host country, the opportunity to obtain a German passport. It should be noted that the data obtained clearly reflect the political events that took place during this time period. In particular, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when many who disagreed with Russia's political course were forced to leave the country, as well as large international companies massively relocated their employees from Russia. In September 2023, partial mobilization was announced in Russia, which caused a new wave of emigration, especially among those trying to avoid conscription into the army.

The majority of respondents from this time period are satisfied with Germany as a country for emigration in various aspects. Using the average value in the pivot table, the following maximum average values of satisfaction of respondents were identified in the following categories: ecology (approx. 4,3), safety (approx. 4,4%), social tolerance (approx. 3,9%). Respondents are least satisfied with such indicators as business conditions (approx. 3,1%) and the level of medicine (approx. 3,2%).

Observing the trends and sentiments of emigrants from this time group, it can be noted that 44 people out of 77 do not plan to move from Germany yet, 52 people plan to learn German, 30 people are actively trying to integrate into German society and 50 people do not intend to return to Russia in the near future time.

From the extensive survey results, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Emigrants 2021-2023 are distinguished by their youth, high level of education and stable work. This sample of respondents moved from large cities and is politically active.
2. There is a desire for integration into German society, openness to new cultural experiences, and learning the German language.
3. Many of the respondents do not plan to move to another country or return to another country in the near future.

Considering above mentioned outcomes, the hypothesis ‘Russian migrants influence on the German demography significantly’ is proved. Population migration is one of the main factors of demographic development. In a very short period of time, it affects the dynamics of numbers, national-ethnic and age-gender composition of the population.

## 6. Conclusion

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century migration is one of the primary components of the globalization of the world. As it gains importance, migration forces states to respond promptly, requiring adjustments to legal systems and processes for the integration of migrants.

In this study, Russia served as an example of an immigration donor, and Germany as the receiving party. The research revealed that people leave for more developed countries with a favorable climate for various reasons. Host countries are confronted with a range of problems that necessitate careful analysis and solutions.

The purpose of the work was to assess the influence of Russian immigrants on the demography of Germany. The choice of Germany was based on the presence of one of the largest Russian diasporas in Europe. Additionally, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Germany is grappling with significant internal problems related to demography, primarily stemming from low birth rates and an aging population.

The first chapter examined issues related to migration as a social phenomenon, identified the main types of migration, and explored the impact of migration processes on the European Union as a whole. Additionally, it briefly examined general migration indicators, and both positive and negative trends in influence were identified.

Positive trends include the following characteristics:

1. European countries are grappling with the challenges of an aging population and low birth rates, which are alleviated by the influx of immigrants.
2. Migrants actively contribute to the EU workforce, filling gaps in both skilled and unskilled labor sectors.

The main negative trends are primarily associated with problems related to the integration of immigrants, as well as a significant burden on the economies of European countries linked to financial support for migrants.

In the second chapter, the primary reasons for migration from Russia to Germany, linked to historical, political, and social aspects, were analyzed. It is evident that the main reasons for moving to Germany from Russia were:

1. Political instability at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
2. Poor financial situation of Russians linked to extreme economic reforms.
3. Protests in the territories of the Russian republics and war conflicts.

The situation of the Russian diaspora in Germany was also examined retrospectively. As a result, it can be concluded that the Russian diaspora is not a unified entity and lacks a so-called center. Opinions regarding political issues in both Germany and Russia diverge, creating confrontation between the 'early' immigrants and those who arrived in Germany after the start of the war in Ukraine.

The final part of the study was the results of a survey conducted among immigrants from Russia in Germany. The survey was devoted to proving the hypothesis that Russians in Germany have a significant impact on German demography, as they are well-integrated and involved in German society.

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
**APPENDIX U.** Table 7. Structure of respondents by a number of reasons impacted their decision to move back to Russia

## 9. APPENDIX

### APPENDIX A

Figure 4. Structure of respondents by age


Mention your age



### APPENDIX B


Figure 5. Structure of respondents by gender

Mention your gender



### APPENDIX C

Figure 6. Figure Structure of respondents by age of relocation



## APPENDIX D

Figure 7. Structure of respondents by year of relocation


Please select the year range when you moved to Germany:



## APPENDIX E

Figure 8. Structure of respondents by place of relocation



You moved from?



## APPENDIX F

Figure 9. Structure of respondents by education level

Mention your highest level of education:



## APPENDIX G

Figure 10. Structure of respondents by employment status


Which of the following categories best describes your employment status?



## APPENDIX H

Figure 11. Structure of respondents by income


Your total income



## APPENDIX I

Figure 12. Structure of respondents by type of accommodation


You live:



## APPENDIX J

Figure 13. Structure of respondents by marital status


Mention your marital status



## APPENDIX K

Figure 14. Structure of respondents by partner's place of birth


If you have a partner, please indicate your partner's place of birth:



## APPENDIX L

Figure 15. Structure of respondents by language spoken at home

What language do you mainly speak at home?



## APPENDIX M

Table 3. Structure of respondents by reasons to move to Germany

Which of the following influenced your decision to move to Germany?

More than one option could be chosen.

New life experience **57 (35,6 %)**

Family circumstances (marriage, relatives...)	33 (20,6%)
Stability of Germany	73 (45,6%)
Political situation in Russia	88 (55%)
Level of tolerance in German society	37 (23,1%)
Opportunity to obtain a German passport	68 (42,5%)
Opportunity to travel more	73 (45,6%)
Climate in Russia	20 (12,5)
Infrastructure (roads, transport...) in Russia	17 (10,6%)
Interesting, promising job in Germany	46 (28,7%)
Quality of medicine in Germany	18 (11,3%)
Level of social support (benefits, pension...) in Germany	31 (19,4%)
I wanted to live specifically in Germany	29 (18,4%)
Quality of education in Germany	29 (18,4%)
Quality of cultural life in Germany	17 (10,6%)
Conditions for running business in Germany	16 (10%)
Infrastructure (roads, transport...) in Russia	3 (1,9%)
<b>Other:</b>	
I was relocated by the employer.	2 (1,2%)
The relocation is related to the events of February 24, 2022, and the offer from the employer.	1 (0,6%)
Tolerance to LGBTQ+.	1 (0,6%)
Predictability and adherence to the law.	1 (0,6%)
The opportunity to receive a quality education in Europe and work in a developed field in Europe.	1 (0,6%)
War in Ukraine held by Russia.	1 (0,6%)
Germany is one of the friendliest countries for students to move to in Europe.	1 (0,6%)
Simplified version of obtaining a residence permit related to education.	1 (0,6%)
This was the best possible option; I already knew the country well before moving and had lived in it for a short time before.	1 (0,6%)
I knew the language.	1 (0,6%)
We left after the war started. The employer relocated to Germany.	1 (0,6%)
Events of 2014 (annexation of Crimea) and the further political course of Russia, left in 2015, as there were relatives in Germany.	1 (0,6%)

## APPENDIX N

Table 4. Structure of respondents by impression about the Germany after relocation

Which of the following disappointed you after moving to Germany?


You can choose several options.

Safety	20 (13,8%)
Level of tolerance in German society	19 (13,1%)
Level of social support (benefits, pension...) in Germany	31 (21,4%)
People (how they behave, look, communicate...)	62 (42,8%)
Ecological situation	9 (6,2%)
Climate	16 (11%)
Infrastructure (roads, transport...)	36 (24,8%)
Quality of medicine	47 (32,4%)
Quality of education	27 (18,6%)
Quality of cultural life	38 (26,2%)
Conditions for running business	39 (26,9%)
Career prospects	45 (31%)
Political situation	41 (28,3%)
Other:	
Migrants	2 (1,4%)
Nothing disappointed	3 (2,1%)
Bureaucracy	3 (2,1%)
Quality of everyday life (small choice of tasty food, low quality of houses, low level of quality in the service sector).	1 (0,7%)
Queues everywhere possible	1 (0,7%)
Number of Muslims refugees	1 (0,7%)
The number of migrants who are completely supported by Germany and do not intrigue them in any way	1 (0,7%)
Lengthy processes, bureaucracy	1 (0,7%)
Undeveloped banking system	1 (0,7%)
Quality of service	1 (0,7%)
German society is not very welcoming to migrants	1 (0,7%)
Service sector, long waits for receiving them	1 (0,7%)
In recent years, Germany has become a very expensive country to live in, the standard of living has fallen.	1 (0,7%)
For 7 months nothing disappointed me, everything met the expectations that were before the move.	1 (0,7%)

Service, delivery, banking, receiving medical care takes a lot of time	1 (0,7%)
Many things are backward and are developing more slowly than in Russia. Bureaucracy, lack of clear laws and rules, 'whoever you get,' 'smile,' 'try in another department' - what is this all about? Lack of places in kindergartens and nurseries, few places in clubs for children - for now it seems that working for a woman with a child is more difficult than it was in the Russian Federation. Inappropriately expensive real estate if you buy your own.	1 (0,7%)
Real estate market	1 (0,7%)
Nothing. Everything meets expectations.	1 (0,7%)
Terrible dirt, homeless people, constant delays of DB, constant delays of s Bahn, paper letters, bureaucracy, cash, giro card, problems with SIM card activation, working hours of services and services.	1 (0,7%)
Current government decisions are dragging Germany into economic problems. It's difficult to get to doctors.	1 (0,7%)
Nothing disappointed yet	1 (0,7%)
Service and services, nothing developed	1 (0,7%)
Propaganda of LGBTQ+	1 (0,7%)
Unreasonably high taxes spent on refugees and migrants	1 (0,7%)

## APPENDIX O

Figure 16. Structure of respondents by a number of characteristics mentioned



How would you rate Germany as your country of residence based on the following characteristics?

Figure 17.




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


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


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


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


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


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



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


## APPENDIX Q

Table 5. Structure of respondents by satisfaction level living in Germany

How much do you like living in Germany?

Rate from 5 to 1, where 5 means very satisfied, 1 means extremely dissatisfied.



## APPENDIX R

Table 6. Structure of respondents by the most important characteristics in Germany

What is the most important thing for you in life in Germany? Please, indicate.

1. Stability
2. Confidence in the future and respect for my rights
3. Security and community loyalty
4. Cultural heritage
5. Large pension and state support in terms of medicine
6. State aid
7. General coincidence of worldview with local ones
8. The opportunity to develop and not need anything
9. The freedom of action
10. To be with my family and grandchildren
11. Student life
12. Freedom of speech
13. No threat to one's own life, comfort, stability
14. The ability to live, not survive
15. My family, friends, work
16. Freedom
17. To be close to my family
18. Convenient tax payment system
19. General standard of living - both financial and cultural
20. Safety of your family
21. Tolerance and adequacy of people
22. Freedom of speech, security, compliance with laws
23. Big Russian community
24. I managed to find real friends as an adult in Germany
25. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression
26. Safety
27. Adequate laws
28. To be surrounded by like-minded people, to have freedom of self-expression and

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self-realization

29. Security, freedom of action, understanding where your taxes go to
  30. My studies at the university, which I really like, friends, travel
  31. Safety of my family, freedom of action, society respects the laws of its country
  32. My family
  33. Safety and prospects for professional development
  34. Comfort of life
  35. Possibility of self-realization
  36. Economic situation, average standard of living, freedom of speech and movement
  37. Freedom of speech, social and economic stability
  38. Calmness
  39. German language
  40. The opportunity not to live in Russia
  41. Opportunity to obtain German passport
  42. Confidence in the future for the children. The climate is a nice bonus
  43. Friendly locals
  44. Comfort in everything
  45. Security, the understanding that the authorities and the law are 'for me', a real feeling of freedom of expression, assembly, religion, conscience, speech, and then guaranteed to me by the state
  46. Safety, respect for human rights and freedoms, quality of life (including food quality), the ability to speak your favorite language
  47. It's easier to plan the future than in the Russian Federation. I see where taxes go (although they often don't go where I would like to spend them)
  48. My husband
  49. Nothing. I hate Germany.
  50. You can live and work in Germany, since you already had to leave St. Petersburg. For me personally, territorial proximity to my parents, who have lived here for a long time, is important.
  51. Freedom
  52. My family
  53. Safety, predictability, enforcement of laws
  54. My children, family, friends, favorite job
-

## APPENDIX S

Figure 25. Structure of respondents by a number of agree/disagree statements mentioned

### I strive to learn German language at a good level.

Rate from 5 to 1, where 1 - Completely disagree 2- I don't agree 3- Somewhere in the middle 4- Agree 5- Completely agree




Figure 26.

### I don't plan to move from Germany yet

Rate from 5 to 1, where 1 - Completely disagree 2- I don't agree 3- Somewhere in the middle 4- Agree 5- Completely agree




Figure 27.




Figure 28.




Figure 29.




Figure 30.






Figure 31.



## APPENDIX T

Figure 32. Structure of respondents by their plan to move back to Russia

How likely is it that you will return to live in Russia in the future?



## APPENDIX U

Table 7. Structure of respondents by a number of reasons impacted their decision to move back to Russia

If you would like to return to Russia, explain what the main reason for your return there would be.

1. Relatives
2. Only if I was kicked out from the EU
3. I miss my homeland
4. Quality of service, relatives
5. Culture and theatres
6. Standard of living
7. I agree with Russia's political course
8. This is my home
9. Russia has changed for the better over the years of emigration, now it is a decent country to live in.
10. I was forced to move to Germany temporarily and for family reasons.
11. The mentality of people in Russia is closer than in Europe.
12. Changes in the political situation.
13. My mother remains in Russia and my daughter is receiving higher education.
14. Expensive housing in Germany and, as a result, a drop in quality of life, because even with a relatively high salary I cannot save money, and as a result I feel unprotected in the future, which is not good for me
15. 20 years ago, it was a completely different country, now Germany cares more about refugees and illegal migrants than about its citizens.
16. I would like to return to Russia when the political system changes.
17. Delicious food and native land
18. Classmates and friends
19. I am not ready to return to Russia, but I would like to move from Germany to a country with a warmer climate and a higher standard of living.
20. I miss home and family, since my parents stayed in Russia, I would be glad to return and live in a happy Russia of the future.
21. Lack of communication in Germany, inability to integrate 100%
22. Communication with loved ones. But subject to a change in political course and the opportunity to earn more than in the EU.
23. Communication with parents, freedom from war and repression.
24. I plan to return when Russia is safe, and the war is over.
25. Change of political regime
26. Restoring freedoms, ending repression, restoring international relations.
27. Family
28. Illness of a close relative
29. Change of political regime in Russia
30. The system will change and there will be an opportunity to build a normal country, for this we will need normal people, most of whom have left. But will there be strength for this? Of course, ideally you want to live in your own culture. But I also want to live well and peacefully.
31. Change in the political course of the Russian Federation

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32. Home, parents

33. The end of the war in Ukraine, repentance of the people of Russia and recognition of the mistakes of the authorities, regime change, change of the country's political course to pro-European, lustration of politicians, abolition of idiotic laws and restrictions.

34. 'Motherland needs you'

35. Friends

36. Parents

37. This is my homeland.

38. I hope that the war will end, the social life and structure of Russia will take on human characteristics, and in this case, it will be possible to return there. I hope, but overall, I'm rather sceptical about this prospect.

39. On retire :)

40. Most of my family stayed in Russia

41. Propaganda of LGBT and non-traditional values in Germany, imposition on children from a young age