

Intelligence and Foreign Policy in The Czech Republic



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MA Thesis

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In honour of those who lost their lives in the terrorist attack of November 2, 2020 in Vienna

| Abstract

The 21st century has been so far challenging for the nation-states. New threats to the national security, ambitious regional powers emerging and a coronavirus pandemic are some of the challenges the nation-states are currently faced with. In an international environment that is changing at a dramatic rate, the Czech Republic is need of a sound foreign policy. The argument is that the use of intelligence leads to a better foreign policy. The aim of the thesis is to compare the Czech intelligence system with the British and American systems in terms providing support for the foreign policy decision makers. By comparing, differences are sought between the Czech system and the British-American ones, which are known to implement intelligence well into foreign policy. Based on the empirics, suggestions are made on how to develop the function of the Czech intelligence system.

| Abstract

Das 21. Jahrhundert war bisher eine Herausforderung für die Nationalstaaten. Neue Bedrohungen der nationalen Sicherheit, ambitionierte Regionalmächte entstehen und eine Coronavirus-Pandemie sind einige der Herausforderungen, denen sich die Nationalstaaten derzeit gegenüber sehen. In einem sich dramatisch verändernden internationalen Umfeld braucht die Tschechische Republik eine solide Außenpolitik. Das Argument ist, dass der Einsatz von Geheimdiensten zu einer besseren Außenpolitik führt. Ziel der Dissertation ist es, das tschechische Geheimdienstsystem mit dem britischen und amerikanischen System hinsichtlich der Unterstützung der außenpolitischen Entscheidungsträger zu vergleichen. Beim Vergleich werden Unterschiede zwischen dem tschechischen und dem britisch-amerikanischen System gesucht, die dafür bekannt sind, dass sie Intelligenz weit in die Außenpolitik einbringen. Basierend auf den empirischen Erkenntnissen werden Vorschläge gemacht, wie die Funktion des tschechischen Geheimdienstes weiterentwickelt werden kann.

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PART I

| Introduction

Lord Palmerston (1784 – 1865), a well-known English statesman, speaking once in the House of Commons of what would be best for England’s national interests, he famously quoted “*we have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow*” (Cable 1983, p.188). For the Czech Republic, the national interests are defined by the country’s historical experiences and its present-day perceptions of vulnerability and weakness (Haughton 2009, p.1383). There have been quite a few times in the history that the Czech lands have fallen victim to foreign invaders. Dominant powers in the region, such as Habsburg Austria, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia, have all fought to conquer these lands. For the last almost thirty years though, the country seems to experience a stable independent statehood after a long period.

With the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, the newly founded Czech Republic¹ needed to adapt to the new geopolitical reality (Cabada & Waisova 2011, x). What served as a starting point for the Czech foreign policymakers were these bitter historical experiences along with the perceived vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Haughton 2009, p.1383). Being a relatively small country in the centre of Europe, the preservation of sovereignty and national security became top priorities. The constant fear of the Russian threat made the Czech Republic to seek integration into Euro-Atlantic organisations and military alliances (Cabada & Waisova 2011, x). Access to the EU single market, as well as membership of NATO, deemed necessary in the eyes of its foreign policymakers for the development of the economy and the protection of the state.

¹ After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Czech lands regained their independence but as part of a larger Czechoslovakia. Two years later, in 1993, the Czech Republic was established.

The beginning of the 21st century, however, found the European states, including the Czech Republic, facing new threats. After the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, terrorism also made its presence felt in the European continent (Bosilca 2013, p.8). A series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by extremist groups began to strike Europe (Bures 2016, p.58). Equally, over the last decade, the development of weapons of mass destruction, the growing challenge of cyberwarfare and the weaponization of migrants as means of asymmetric warfare have been added to the list. At the same time, the gradual withdrawal of the USA from Europe, the rise of Russia and China as hegemonic powers and the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic in the global economy, make it evident that the world is rapidly transforming. Many regional powers, like France, Germany or Turkey, are emerging on the canvas of the international politics, taking advantage of the space that is created in Europe and the Middle East by the absence of the US (Muzaffar et al 2017, p.49).

The inability of the EU-NATO security and defence structures to handle challenges like the ones mentioned as well as the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world (Muzaffar et al 2017, p.49) demonstrate the rising significance of the ‘nation-state’ in the globalised world. In an international environment that is constantly changing and where allegiances become unclear, an average state like the Czech Republic needs an active foreign policy. The argument on which this thesis is built upon is that intelligence gathering is a key element to developing an active foreign policy (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, viii). As the world becomes more complex, more intelligence is needed (Herman 1996, p.342). Herman exquisitely explains the importance of intelligence in achieving a country’s national interests by referencing a British Ministerial statement over the introduction of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. The statement upheld “*the continued need, in this ever turbulent and unpredictable world, for the intelligence services to be able to operate effectively*” and referred to their “*crucial part in*

countering the dangers that threaten the safety of our citizens and of this nation's interests around the world" (Herman 1996, p.342).

In the field of the Intelligence studies, there are two countries that have been over-researched by the scholars and are known to have a successful record in using intelligence to fulfil their foreign policy goals: the USA and the UK (Herman, p. 343). Both nations are world powers with enormous influence and a continually active foreign policy in the international arena. Since the use of intelligence has admirably served these two nations in expanding their foreign policy, then it is suggested that the Czech Republic should also rely on it. To produce quality intelligence and effectively implement it into the foreign policy, a well-organised intelligence system is needed. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to compare the Czech intelligence system with the British and American systems. By comparing, an attempt is made to discover what are the differences between the Czech and the British-American intelligence systems in terms of providing support to the foreign policy makers. Based on those differences, ideas are proposed on how to improve intelligence to support the foreign policy makers.

There are a few reasons that explain why this topic can be relevant to the research. First, according to a 2012 survey of editorial board members of *Intelligence and National Security*, the members were asked what the most under-researched topics in the intelligence studies are. Two of the highly valued scholars in intelligence studies, Robert Jervis and Richard Betts, replied that the most under-researched topic in the field of intelligence studies is the influence of intelligence on policy making (Johnson & Shelton, 2012). Additionally, the comparison with the systems of the USA and the UK, which are known to be effective and practical, can serve as a basis for getting a better understanding of other democratic countries' intelligence systems. The methodological approach for this study could also prove to be valuable and reliable for the

researcher who is interested in comparing the intelligence systems of totalitarian regimes (i.e. Soviet Union, China, North Korea).

The analysis of this thesis goes through the following parts. First, the theoretical framework concerns foreign policy analysis and the role of intelligence in the foreign policy decision-making process. Following, Chapter 1 discusses the intelligence systems of the US and the UK, which serve as role models in this study. Similarly, Chapter 2 explores the intelligence system of the Czech Republic. Finally, Chapter 3 makes a comparison of the Czech intelligence system with its equivalents from the US and the UK. Suggestions on how to enhance the Czech system are also included in this section.

| Literature Review

The literature that is relevant to the topic studied in this thesis is fairly extensive. A series of significant sources that can contribute to answering the research question of this thesis have been collected. The following pages will provide a comprehensive account of scholar work done by academics to shed light and drive this study. These sources are focused on the history of intelligence, the different definitions, methods of collecting intelligence and the role of intelligence in policymaking, particularly in countries like the USA, the UK and the Czech Republic.

To begin with, one of the best-known platitudes about human experience is that those who do not understand past mistakes are doomed to repeat them. That is precisely what has happened in the intelligence world, perhaps more than in any other subject (Andrew & Dilks 1984, p.1). For that reason, looking at the history of intelligence is considered an absolute must. There are numerous examples in the intelligence history that witness the importance of intelligence (Herman 1996, p. 343). Perhaps its significant contribution to politics and warfare can be best explained by one of the most successful intelligence operations in modern history: Operation Fortitude. Operation codenamed 'Fortitude' was a well-structured plan of the Allies to deceive the Germans as to the time and place for an invasion of Western Europe during the WW2 (Hesketh 2000, xi). By 1944 the Nazi Germany was aware that the Allies would need at a certain point to invade the continent of Europe in order to win the war. Given that Britain had not been invaded, the Germans trusted that an invasion was likely to take place somewhere in the coast of France. What was not in the knowledge of the Germans was the exact location of the assault. The Allies quickly realised that a mere invasion of Normandy would be catastrophic so, instead of a direct attack, they strove to convince the Germans that the attack was going to take place

in Pas de Calais and not in Normandy. To do that, one of the methods the Allies used was the 'Double Cross' system. Double Cross was a counter-espionage plan designed by the British Security Services, with the solid purpose of capturing German spies and using them as double agents (Harris 2000, p.6). Having already cracked the ENIGMA code at Bletchley Park (Britain's WW2 centre for codebreaking), the British knew exactly which German spies were operating in the UK as well as which operatives the Germans were planning of sending to infiltrate Britain. The British Intelligence captured and managed to turn almost all the German spies into double agents, thus using them to feed the German intelligence with misinformation on the invasion (Hinsley 1993, p.118). The Double Cross system was so successful that Germany, not only was convinced that the attack was going to take place in Pas de Calais but thought that Normandy was the diversion (Howard 1995, p.1).

Sooner or later, the accelerating rate by which countries began to rely on intelligence to combat national security threats and achieve foreign policy goals did not escape the academic interest. It was only thirty years ago where Intelligence Studies appeared to develop as an academic field. This delay was first and foremost due to the difficulty to obtain illuminating written records (Andrew & Dilks 1984, p.2). Thanks to the declassification of files at the end of the Cold War and the open access to them, as well as the multiple terrorist attacks in the US and Europe, academics geared their attention towards the research of intelligence (Scott & Jackson 2004, p.140). University programmes began to show up in places where there is intelligence history. As a discrete subject, Intelligence Studies has become a recognized part of history and political science courses at universities and colleges in the United States and Canada (Herman 1996, p.2); in Britain, for instance, universities with intelligence courses and options include King's College London, Brunel, Aberystwyth and others (Herman 1996, p.2).

However, despite the increasing enthusiasm about the research on secret intelligence, academic growth on the field has not been fast. In 1955, Sherman Kent, as one of the first experts in the field, observed that there is a lack of literature in the intelligence business (Kent 1955, p.1). Fifty years later, though there is surely a larger body of general writing on intelligence, most professional intelligence analysis still shares Kent's complain (Bruce and George 2008, p.1). Arguments as to why the literature on intelligence does not develop in a fast pace vary from scholar to scholar. Warner argues that a lack of one universal language on intelligence is the problem (Warner 2009, p.11). In turn, Marrin believes that this is due to the absence of proper literature reviews which result into repeating what has already been written (Marrin 2011, p.150). Bruce and George further support that many writers have instead concentrated on the past and current failings of intelligence or sensational intelligence operations (Bruce and George 2008, p.1).

It can be said without fear of contradiction that the most controversial topic in the Intelligence Studies is the definition of the term 'intelligence'. Attempting to define such a complex concept has remained a challenging task for academics and practitioners. Goodman accurately states it in one phrase that *"producing an exact definition of intelligence is a much-debated topic"* (Goodman 2006, p.58). Even though it has been extensively used throughout history as means to achieving political goals, consensus on a generally accepted definition has not been found yet. To get a better understanding of the difficulties in attempting to define 'intelligence', Gill comments that a comparative study of several definitions could be a helpful drill (Gill 2009, p.83).

There are several authors who have written on the definition of intelligence (Bimfort 1958; Warner 2002; Lowenthal 2009). According to Lowenthal, *"virtually every book written on the subject of intelligence begins with a discussion of what intelligence means, or at least how the*

author intends to use the term. This editorial fact reveals much about the field of intelligence” (Lowenthal 2009, p.1). While definitions among scholars may vary, most of the times they are found to describe the concept of intelligence either as a part of a larger process or as a specific form of knowledge (Davies 2002; Warner 2002). These two categories are where the US and the UK definitions are mapped. As Davies notes: *“the difference between British and US concepts of intelligence is that the US approaches information as a specific component of intelligence, while Britain approaches intelligence as a specific type of information”* (Davies 2009, p.15).

One of the most famous definitions used, which belongs to the British ‘school of defining intelligence’, is given by Sherman Kent: *“intelligence, as I am writing of it, is the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare”* (Kent 1965, xxi). This is a definition that can be characterised rather vague; however, in defence of the author, the book in which this definition is mentioned was not meant to be academic. On the other side, a well-known definition given by Bimfort belongs more to the ‘American school’ of intelligence definitions: *“intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and national security, the conduct of non-attributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organizations concerned with these, against unauthorized disclosure”* (Bimfort 1958, p.78). Much like Bimfort, the definition by Lowenthal claims that *“intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analysed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities”* (Lowenthal 2009, p.12-13).

Michael Warner further provides his own definition of intelligence: *“intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities”* (Warner 2002, p.21). More hybrid versions of defining intelligence also exist. The definition given by Goodman is a good example to that extent: *“intelligence is many things – it is the agencies themselves, the business they conduct, and the information they seek – thus, intelligence refers both to a process and a product”* (Goodman 2006, p.58).

As it can be seen, the definitions of intelligence vary, and so do the methods to gather it. Intelligence services use different sources for intelligence collection. These types of sources are divided into three main categories of intelligence gathering (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.8). The first and oldest one is the ‘Human Intelligence’ or ‘HUMINT’. HUMINT refers to all those methods of gathering information based on the human abilities and actions. This category includes those who are well known from the fields of literature and entertainment, such as special agents, spies, intelligence officers, covert operations operatives and informants. In reality, of course, the way modern spies are portrayed by the cinema is far from how spies operate on a day-to-day basis (Denece 2008, p.62). The job of intelligence officers and agents is very demanding, difficult and complicated. It includes various tasks and responsibilities. One of the most important tasks of a spy is to locate, recruit and run foreign agents. Intelligence officers usually target foreign officials who either possess a place in the government or maintain good relations with individuals in the government or have access to classified documents, which can provide the handler with an amount of significant information (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.11). In simpler words the higher the source, the more valuable the information for the intelligence officer. Surveillance is also an important skill of a spy’s offensive work. The process includes tracking down an/a object/person or observing a location under complete secrecy, as well as communicating with other intelligence services to exchange information on

matters of common interest (Denece 2008, p.63). Moreover, intelligence officers are responsible for establishing and maintaining secret lines of communications with other rival or hostile nation-states, even if the diplomatic relations between the countries have been cut. This is important and necessary because intelligence services must always have information on and access to all states (Denece 2008, p.63).

The second main category is 'Technical Intelligence' or 'TECHINT'. TECHINT in comparison to HUMINT, uses various means of advanced technology (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.22). This is one of the most impressive parts in the world of espionage, including types of intelligence gathering that are beyond imagination. One of these types is 'Imagery Intelligence' or 'IMINT'. It is probably the most important source for the collection of information. Large-scale photographs are used to get a picture of things or places to which intelligence services do not have direct access (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.22). These photographs can come from aircraft, satellites, recording balloons, radar, UAVs or video surveillance cameras (Denece 2008, p.95). Another type is the 'Signals Intelligence' or 'SIGINT'. SIGINT is the collection of information that comes from the interception of electromagnetic waves, known also as 'signals' (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.27). Any electronic equipment that emits electromagnetic waves can be intercepted and therefore, with the constant development of technology, it is an effective tool to which intelligence services often resort to in order to collect information (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.27).

The third and final main category is the 'Open-Source Intelligence' or 'OSINT'. OSINT refers to the collection of information that comes from open sources. This intelligence gathering discipline includes a variety of sources. These can range from books, scientific publications, radio, TV to internet commercial online services and electronic data with limited access (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.8).

In addition, the secret services are often called upon to perform another piece of work that is deemed relevant and appropriate to mention. This is the direct influence of political events through the use of 'covert action' (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.55). Covert action is one of the most crucial tasks carried out by the intelligence services, one that gives them the special and unique role they have as a policy tool. It is the task that is most directly linked to the foreign policy of a state since the aim is to execute actions using whatever means necessary to achieve the foreign policy goals (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.75). What is interesting to mention is that covert action is not considered to be pure information gathering, precisely because its purpose is to achieve national goals and influence international actors and events (Munton & Matejova 2012, p.755). This view proves and strengthens the direct relation of covert action with the foreign policy of a state while at the same time highlighting the important place that intelligence services hold in a government.

Covert action is used by the governments for various purposes, from the simplest to the most dangerous and corrupt. In order to achieve a foreign policy goal, a government may take a number of secret actions to influence another state (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.75). The ways to do this range from providing technical assistance and supporting other friendly countries in matters of intelligence to the use of propaganda (Stempel 2007, p.125) in order to influence and bring the interests of the foreign country closer to its own. In addition to technical, the help can be also material, specifically to political parties and the media (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.86). However, it has also its harsher forms. That is the influence of political events in a violent way, namely supporting a government or creating a coup to overthrow a government, the destruction of some infrastructure or even the assassination of a political leader (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.88-89).

A striking example of a country that has effectively utilised covert action to fulfil its foreign policy goals is without fear of doubt the USA. As it was mentioned in the introduction, the US constitutes a model of a country where intelligence plays an important role in foreign policymaking. There are brilliant examples that demonstrate the ability of the US intelligence to strengthen the political capacity of their country. One of these was the case of Iran in 1953. With the appointment of Mohammad Mossadeq as Prime Minister, the US saw some potential threat and the West's interests being harmed. Britain had suffered with financial losses following the privatization of the Anglo-Iranian oil industry by Mossadeq (Moyara 1993, p.467), while the possibility of a communist uprising backed by the Soviet Union was considered quite probable by the agencies and something the US would not allow (Moyara 1993, p.468). Thus, the US and the UK cooperated in conducting a secret operation to stage a coup in Iran and overthrow Mossadeq (Ruehsen 1993, p.469) to replace him with an official of their choice whom they could more easily control (Ruehsen 1993, p.474). This clear case of the use of covert action by the American intelligence agencies was one of many that existed during the Cold War. In addition, the covert action of the US intelligence agencies was a necessary political choice at another critical juncture; in the political scene of Guatemala in 1954. The Guatemalan president's alleged association with both the country's communist party and the Soviet Union was a matter of concern to the US. Without a second thought, it was decided on the part of the US to put a stop to this (Andrew 2005, p.489). However, a military intervention was judged to cause problems throughout the hemisphere, something that the US wanted to avoid (Andrew 1995, p.207). Hence, covert action was the only option available, leading the US agencies, and in particular the CIA, to stage the overthrow of the Guatemalan president (Andrew 1995, p.207).

Similar to the US, Britain is another example for whom the collection of secret information had and still has a special place in the minds of its government officials (Denece 2008, p.197). In fact, it has always been one of the country's strong cards (Herman 1996, p.343). Anyone who writes about British intelligence is deeply conscious of the fact that it is a central topic of the country's national security. The relationship and connection of the intelligence services with the government is exceptionally deep and close, something which facilitates their actions since their work is expressly recognised (Denece 2008, p.198). The immense emphasis the British place on intelligence gathering is perhaps best explained by Herman: "*apart from intelligence's influence on particular decisions, there is the cumulative influence on national standing of having well-informed policies. This has been particularly relevant to Britain as a nation of declining economic power wishing nevertheless to maintain world status...Intelligence has been one element in this position. Good intelligence has helped Britain to play bad hands with some finesse*" (Herman 1996, p.153). He further comments that "*intelligence contests are things which Britain expects to win, not lose. Intelligence support has been tacitly assumed as a prop for the position that 'British foreign policy since the war has seen successive governments attempting to maintain international responsibilities without the [material] resources necessary to meet them'*" (Herman 1996, p. 343).

There are several historical examples that martyr the potent skilfulness of the intelligence services. What might be the single greatest example from World War 1 (WW1) is the Zimmerman telegram. During the war, the British believed that the balance of the war would shift for Entente if they managed to convince the Americans to join the effort. With the help of the British Naval Intelligence, a secret telegram sent by the German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman to the German Ambassador in the US was decrypted (Tuchman 1958, p.146). The decrypted file contained the strategy and reported the intention of the Germans to attack the US

(Tuchman 1958, p.146). Knowing this, the British alerted the Americans, making the US enter the war.

In addition to the numerous academic sources that predominantly concern British and American intelligence, few come to shed light into the intelligence community of the Czech Republic. The course of the Czech intelligence services comes into view as markedly unstable. For the last hundred years, the Czech secret services have been trapped between two political regimes: totalitarianism and democracy (Graaff 2016, p.82). Therefore, most of the literature focuses on the Czech intelligence before and after the Cold War.

In the path to develop an intelligence system to support their own intelligence activities, the Czechs began to mimic the Austrian model (Graaff 2016, p.82). Following the end of WW1 though, there was a complete turn towards France. The new Czechoslovak Republic tried to imitate France politically, militarily, as well as in terms of intelligence gathering (Graaff 2016, p.82). This was the case until 1939 when the country was occupied by the Nazis, who brought a certain expertise into the field of intelligence (Graaff 2016, p.82). With the end of the WW2 and the withdrawal of the Nazis from the country, the German influence was replaced by the Soviet one.

The main turning point came with the Velvet Revolution in 1989 (Graaff 2016, p.89). When it came to building the new institutions, there was a general consensus in society that the new Czechoslovakian intelligence community must be based on appropriate and relevant laws, must have parliamentary oversight, must be stripped of all executive powers (arrests, interrogation), must be tasked and coordinated by the government and should limit its activities to information-gathering and analysis with special emphasis on terrorism, extremism, and organised crime (Cerny 2007, p.100). Despite the public consensus, the first attempts of the new political elite to organise the intelligence services were a complete disaster (Cerny 2007, p.100). This was

mainly the result of the lack of knowledge they had on the field. In addition, several laws were adopted aiming to purge the intelligence agencies from any accomplices that were related with the past regime's crimes (Williams & Deletant 2001, p.55). What the new political regime wanted to do was to attract young people and talented citizens to join the services in helping the government acquire information on special security threats (Williams & Deletant 2001, p.55). This was also seen as an attempt of the government to rebuild the trust of citizens to the intelligence agencies.

However, to organise the intelligence agencies in the first years of Vaclav Klaus' government was not an easy task to accomplish (Cerny 2007, p.103). As a Prime Minister of the newly founded Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus had little to no interest in military and intelligence issues. The apathetic attitude towards the intelligence agencies can be perhaps better understood by his famous quote "*I do not need intelligence services, CNN is enough for me*" (Williams & Deletant 2001, p.83). He often used to mock the intelligence agencies, calling them the 'Cinderellas' of the Czech establishment (Cerny 2007, p.103). Being an economics-focused pragmatic politician, Klaus' primary aim was to build an effective economy. The consequences of his total lack of interest to deliver changes in the intelligence community are still visible to the present day. Even though the agencies may have been staffed by patriotic and promising new people, they have been nonetheless mismanaged and undirected (Williams & Deletant 2001, p.114).

| Methodology

The approach to this research is a qualitative one, as it involves sources and data which are composed from words rather than numbers. The main source that is employed with the aim of adopting the most suitable method for this thesis is *Qualitative Researching* (2017) by Jennifer Mason. In the attempt to answer the research question on the differences between the Czech intelligence system and the British-American systems in terms of providing support for the foreign policy decision makers, secondary research sources (i.e. government documents, books, academic journals) are used. Using secondary research sources, a comparative study is made between the Czech and the British-American intelligence systems, to discover the differences and recommend any structural improvements the Czech Intelligence system can make.

Sources

Gathering data, especially empirical, in intelligence research studies can be problematic. The key element of intelligence is secrecy. Because of that, lots of information is usually kept hidden. However, it is not the case for this thesis. As Hastedt puts it, “the concern here is with delineating and comparing organisational standard operating procedures, lines of accountability, grants of authority and jurisdiction, and the bureaucratic culture which exists inside of intelligence organizations. Having strong roots in the political science literature, examples of the institutional approach to analysing intelligence organizations are readily found either as the basis of an entire study (such as Richelson's account of the US intelligence community, and Richelson and Ball's overview of the UK-USA countries) or as a major component of it (such as is often found in treatments of Soviet intelligence). The allure of

studying intelligence at this level of analysis is that data about organisational structures is often readily available” (Hastedt 1991, p.62).

A variety of secondary research sources are consulted for this thesis. These derive from different types of archives, academic literature from different fields and open sources. For the literature on intelligence, both scientific publications as well as literature from within the agencies are utilised. The sources consulted are primarily in the English language.

Research Method

To pursue the objective of this thesis and answer the research question, a comparative methodology is adopted. By describing and comparing different intelligence systems, one can get a better understanding of the similarities and differences between them, identify key problems in their structure and find solutions. As grounds for comparison with the Czech intelligence system, there are three major intelligence systems: the British, the American and the Soviet/Russian (Graaff & Nyce 2016, xxxii). These three have been used as general models for the organisation of most of the intelligence services in the globe (Graaff & Nyce 2016, xxxii). The British system has been mostly used by parliamentary republics; The American system has been adopted by countries where the US presence was dominant after WW2; and the Soviet/Russian system by most countries with communist and authoritarian regimes. It is these three countries (UK, USA, Russia) that can claim to have truly global intelligence coverage and activities (Collins 2007, p.253). This thesis chooses the British and American intelligence systems as models for comparison.

What explains this choice is firstly that these two models are known to have successfully incorporated intelligence into foreign policy making. Secondly, most of the countries which belong to the Western hemisphere have established their intelligence systems based on the

British and the American systems. Following, the third reason that explains the choice of these two country-models is the type of the political system. It is particularly important for the researcher who examines the organisation and functions of a country's intelligence system to take the political regime into consideration. Depending on the country, these intelligence organisations are found to be controlled by different government officials, in some cases operating above the law and against their own citizens. The democratic style of government, both in the UK and the USA, makes these two intelligence communities a perfect choice for a comparison with the Czech intelligence system. The fourth and final reason is the better access to unclassified and reliable information compared to other countries. The promulgation of previously classified information, along with the growth of the Intelligence Studies as an academic field in the Anglo sphere and the Anglo-Saxon tradition in espionage, provides a plethora of valuable information for this thesis to rely on.

The process to answering the research question in this thesis begins with the British and American intelligence systems. The two models are analysed in terms of how their intelligence communities are structured, how the agencies are overseen and what mechanisms exist to coordinate intelligence with foreign policy making. Next, the Czech intelligence system is approached and described in the same manner. Following the examination of the three systems, a comparison is made based on three criteria that are highlighted in the theoretical framework: a) the organisational structure, b) the political oversight of intelligence services, and c) coordination of intelligence and foreign policy. Conclusions extracted from this comparison give room for recommendations on how Czech Republic can improve its intelligence system to support foreign policymakers more effectively. The study focuses entirely on comparing civilian intelligence agencies and avoids intelligence branches of the military.

Limitations

Lastly, there are a few elements that put limitations to this research. Since the topic is sensitive in nature, namely intelligence, ethical considerations are taken into account. Thus, the extent to which this thesis is limited is due to its reliance on unclassified sources. All the references in this dissertation are traceable through the internet. In addition, the number of open sources for the Czech intelligence system are fewer compared to the British and American ones. This requires a more extensive analysis of the literature on the Czech intelligence system. Language is also an issue. The lack of additional language skills (e.g. Czech) limits the periphery of investigation for this research.

| Theoretical Framework

Foreign policy constitutes a level of analysis of the International Relations since it helps to understand the latter. It is considered particularly important because no matter how multidimensional the term 'International Relations' is and how many actors, changes and aspects it includes, everything that happens is the product of the foreign policy of one or many countries. This is true to the extent that International Relations consist of a network of foreign policy interactions (Clarke & White 1989, p.2).

Entering the sphere of foreign policy, various aspects of it are found, one of which is the analysis of foreign policy. Its significance lies in the relationship between itself and the general study of the International Relations (Clarke & White 1989, p.3). In the literature, foreign policy analysis is aptly characterised as a 'micro-perception' of International Relations and it is regarded important for several reasons (Clarke & White 1989, p.3). Initially, foreign policy analysis focuses on the state and the ways in which it relates to and exists in the international environment. Consequently, as a 'micro-perception' it explains the international relations explicitly from the point of view of the nation states; in other words, why nation states adopt a certain behaviour towards another and how they choose to do so (Clarke & White 1989, p.4).

Another reason foreign policy analysis is vital arises from the perception that it penetrates the realm of policymaking (Clarke & White 1989, p.4). It is believed that the analysis of a state's foreign policy can improve the quality of policymaking and thus, lead to better, for that state, results on the international stage and its relations with other states (i.e. in its international relations) (Clarke & White 1989, p.4). It is also important to note that in the analysis of foreign policy in the context of International Relations, the elements of international environment play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy. This means that the international events cannot be

ignored as, on the contrary, it can happen, for example, in the context of the political science where political and government actors play a bigger role (Clarke & White 1989, p.9).

Having highlighted the weight foreign policy analysis carries as a level of analysis of International Relations, it is time to move on to the practical level of what this process of analysis involves and focus on just a few aspects of it. Foreign policy analysis provides the necessary framework for asking the questions 'what', 'why' and 'how' so that foreign policy can be understood. The question 'what' refers to the very description of state's foreign policy and is often influenced by the questions 'why' and 'how'; that is, why states behave the way they do and how their foreign policy is conducted (Clarke & White 1989, p.4-5).

It is only natural for obstacles to appear in the process of analysis of foreign policy as in any other analysis. One of the obstacles found is in the collection of information on the foreign policy of other states; nation states tend to consider foreign policy a sensitive issue because of its direct relationship with the security of the country. As a result, they tend to keep a lot of information hidden. However, analysts also face a similar difficulty when they are in the possession of a lot of information. The pleonasm of conclusions coming from plentiful information creates confusion as to why a state behaves the way it behaves (Clarke & White 1989, p.8). Equally problematic in the analysis of foreign policy appears to be the confrontation with the human mind and specifically that of politicians. In this case, to interpret as accurately as possible politicians' behaviour and what they think about a specific issue, analysts must understand their mindset (Clarke & White 1989, p.8).

The last two matters, namely the process of analysis and its difficulties, lead to the aspect of foreign policy analysis that this chapter deals with: the intelligence services; in particular, to integrate and present the intelligence services as a state tool in the analysis and exercise of foreign policy, and by extension in international relations. To make this possible, another

theoretical approach is adopted; one that aims to incorporate foreign policy into a theory of International Relations.

Most examples of foreign policy lead to the assumption that all states have a coherent foreign policy in regard to certain actions; in simpler words, they all have some policy objectives for which they examine both the different types of action they can take as well as the consequences that might come with (Clarke & White 1989, p.11). That is why it is argued that foreign policy is the product of rational behaviour of nation states (Clarke & White 1989, p.11). The theory of Classical Realism sees the state making decisions based on its interests but also the costs and benefits of its alternatives. For that purpose, the analysis and the exercise of foreign policy is enlisted in the sphere of Realism.

The Realist theory views the international environment as hostile and dangerous. It theorises that the behaviour of states is influenced and analysed through this environment; in other words, it suggests that external forces and external events are what determine the formation of its foreign policy (Clarke & White 1989, p.11), not the domestic political environment. To survive in an international anarchic arena, the state must have power over its goals. Thus, increasing the relative power is the most critical thing for a state that wants to achieve any political goals.

Another thing related to the rational behaviour and thinking of states is the decision-making process (Clarke & White 1989, p.11). Here, there are three parameters involved: the decision, the decision makers, and the process itself. Classical Realism does not accept the effect of any human factor, be it an individual or a group of people in the determination of foreign policy, excluding any possibility of making irrational decisions. To that direction, the analysis and practice of foreign policy does not coincide with the doctrine of Realism. Nevertheless, foreign policy is essentially a series of decisions some decision-makers take (Clarke & White 1989, p.12). These decisions come not only as a result of external influences but also as a result of

internal processes, which may be, for example, the behaviour of some people who choose one course of action over another (Clarke & White 1989, p.12). That is why emphasis to decision-makers must be given.

Therefore, decision-making is determined both by the international environment, as defined by the Realists, as well as by the decision-makers within the states. The assumption is that decision-makers are rational actors who follow a rational decision-making process (Clarke & White 1989, p.12). The analysis, then, focuses on why a decision-maker chooses one course of action over another (Clarke & White 1989, p.12). One finds the answer to be that the selection process begins with setting clear goals (Clarke & White 1989, p.12). In turn, foreign policy makers, being rational actors, choose the most desired action based on the cost and benefits that may be. This process of deciding involves some analysis. Based on this analysis, the choice of one action over another regardless of the result is considered rational, precisely because it has been selected after some examination (Clarke & White 1989, p.45).

In addition, there is the argument that this traditional way of analysis, based on the rational decision-making process described above, must be supplemented with reports that are gathered by government organisations (Clarke & White 1989, p.16). If these organisations that are part of a government's mechanism classify as important for the drafting and exercise of a state's foreign policy, then their role should be examined. This thesis ranks the intelligence services as such.

Before looking more thoroughly into why intelligence services are important for foreign policy decision-makers, it is deemed necessary to first begin with a brief glance at the history of intelligence. Intelligence has been described by one distinguished diplomat as 'the missing dimension of most diplomatic history' (Andrew & Dilks 1984, p.1). This same dimension is also absent from most political and much military history (Andrew & Dilks 1984, p.1). Part of

statecraft is what a writer on war has called ‘the central importance of *knowing*, both in general and in particular’ (Herman 1996, p. 1). As a tool, intelligence gathering on enemy states has been vital since the ancient times. Almost 2500 years ago Sun Tzu, a Chinese military mastermind, stressed this point in one of the first treatises on warfare, the *Art of War* (Yuen, 2014). In the Chapter 13 of the treatise, he highlights the importance of using spies. For Sun Tzu, “*it is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to spy against you and bribe them to serve you*” (Sun Tzu 2002, XIII). The emphasis on using spies, and most importantly double agents, lies on their double ability to gather first-hand intelligence on how the enemy thinks while at the same time feeding him with misinformation.

Seventy-five years later, the vitality of intelligence is still visible. Daily discussions in newspapers, television, radio and on the web are generated around the subject of secret intelligence. The beginning of the twenty-first century found nation states relying on the use of intelligence to confront new challenges. In the place of ideologically driven expansionist states, nations are now faced with a diverse range of threats, from state-sponsored aggression to international terrorist organisations to lone wolf self-radicalized terrorists; each with the intent and sometimes the capability to challenge the states’ national security.

Following the introduction to the historical value of intelligence, attention is now shifted to how intelligence is processed. Intelligence "travels" a long way until reaching decision makers. As Lowenthal states: “*intelligence process refers to the steps or stages in intelligence, from policy makers perceiving a need for information to the community’s delivery of an analytical intelligence product to them*” (Lowenthal 2006, p.54). The process of "travelling" is best known as the ‘intelligence cycle’ model. This principal model has been used for many decades by intelligence services around the world.

In the literature, the intelligence cycle model is found to have different variations (Evans 2009; Lowenthal 2009; Phythian 2013). Several types of intelligence cycle models include fewer components (e.g. four) while others include more (e.g. seven). Despite the differences, commonalities among them exist in at least three components: collection, analysis, and dissemination. What entails the chosen intelligence cycle in this thesis are five component stages (Figure 1). This is the traditional model used by the CIA (CIA, 1995):



Figure 1. *The Five-Stage Intelligence Cycle Model*

1. Planning and Direction

The intelligence cycle notionally begins with direction. During this stage, policymakers initiate requests that identify core concerns (Johnston 2005, p.45). Taking a government as an example, intelligence services might be asked to provide detailed intelligence on a terrorist cell or a new advanced weapon of a hostile country that is perceived as a threat to the national

security. It is here that the issues and questions that need to be answered are determined, as well as what types of information must be collected. This information can be in the form of 1. 'foreign intelligence' (information related to the activities of foreign nations), 2. 'domestic intelligence' (information gathered to protect the national security from the actions of foreign governments), 3. 'military intelligence' (information on the capabilities of hostile militaries) and 4. 'criminal intelligence' (information relevant to the criminal activities of an individual or an organisation) (Cummings & Masse 2004, appendix 1). Analysts may also make use of previously completed intelligence products in order to possibly formulate a new plan for intelligence gathering and analysis.

2. Collection

Once tasked, the second thing the intelligence services do is to create a collection plan (Johnston 2005, p.46). The aim of this plan is to acquire as much information as possible that might be relevant to accomplishing the mission. In simpler words, the activities here are closely intertwined with what is commonly called 'spying'. This is done by use of human and technological methods (Johnston 2005, p.46) (see below).

3. Processing

The third phase of the intelligence cycle is processing. This is where all the collected information is gathered and turned into something usable (Johnston 2005, p.46). Decryption of files, translations, data reduction and interpretation of tapes are some of the tasks that intelligence officers preoccupy themselves with at this stage (Milberg 1980, Appendix 1-3). The main goal is to converse all the amount of information that is concentrated into substantial intelligence reports.

4. Analysis and Production

The fourth phase is analysis. At this part, analysts as a band of scholars and all types of experts, place the grist into the mill and turn it into a useful product (Johnston 2005, p.46). All the pieces of the puzzle are connected, and conclusions are made (Milberg 1980, Appendix 1-3). These conclusions are then put into words, creating actionable intelligence reports. Analysts often include in them assessments of events, such as when something might happen, where these might take place or what implications could they have for the government (Milberg, 1980). Here, analysts may also develop requirements for new information and collection.

5. Dissemination

The dissemination of product is the fifth and final stage of the intelligence cycle. At this stage, the final intelligence products are distributed to the policymakers and senior leaders who requested them (Johnston 2005, p.46). These seniors may be the heads of the intelligence services, foreign or domestic policymakers. It is important to emphasize here though a part that gets skipped a lot in light of the attractiveness of collection: all that collection and analysis comes to naught if the fruits of the analysis cannot effectively and clearly be put in front of the right decision makers.

So why intelligence services are important for foreign policy makers? How intelligence influences the decision-making process? To begin with, intelligence services are a tool of a state's political capacity (Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p.325). Their main objective, intelligence gathering, is addressed not only to the respective political actors but also to the general needs of the country. In the political environment of a state, there are plenty of political issues for which intelligence is required. Therefore, it is crucial to first identify what are the political needs and then decide what the intelligence services will deal with (Lowenthal 2006, p.54).

In foreign policy, the issues that a government must deal with also vary and it almost certain that, due to the nature of international arena, new ones will constantly emerge (Lowenthal 2006, p.55). There are always, though, some that are more serious than others (Lowenthal 2006, p.55). Since intelligence services contribute to policymaking, the issues they address should always be in line with their country's political priorities (Lowenthal 2006, p.56). In other words, policymakers are the ones who set the priorities, then transfer them to the intelligence services, the latter begin the process of collecting and analysing, and eventually hand it over to the policymakers.

However, policymakers are often unable to set their own political priorities and as a result they have no idea what to ask from the intelligence services (Johnson 2006, p.658). In this case, intelligence officers are the ones taking on this role (Lowenthal 2006, p.56). Many politicians, in fact, take it for granted that intelligence services are aware without their own guidance of what to do. Therefore, the intelligence services often fill this gap of setting clear political goals. This is no doubt a tough responsibility. It is, though, quite risky since mistakes can happen and consequently, they can be accused of invading the realm of politics (Lowenthal 2006, p.56).

The usefulness of the intelligence services' work is also detected in their ability to anticipate and prevent a situation. Many times, the priorities they set are based on this criterion (Lowenthal 2006, p.56). It can be that this choice might not be the right one based on the needs of the country, but it also means that it is not categorically wrong (Lowenthal 2006, p.56). Moreover, even if focus is on a specific issue, they always need to deal with a lot more. Their preoccupation with other issues comes from their competence to stay constantly informed about all countries and all issues that appear in the global scene (Lowenthal 2006, p.181). At the same time, they must remain committed to their important task of anticipating, as far as possible, the emergence of new problems, something which politicians often demand from them (Wilson 2005, p.101).

Furthermore, part of the job of the intelligence services is to also protect in some way the politicians they serve. Political leaders turn their attention to action, but often they do not think of covering their backs (Lowenthal 2006, p.186). This task is taken over by the intelligence services which, on the one hand, respond to the desires for policy action while paying attention to how they will do so without being perceived by the enemy and without giving away what the government is secretly up to (Lowenthal 2006, p.187).

All this shows the complexity of the work the intelligence services perform and their crucial role in politics, as they cover not only what is asked of them but also what is not asked or what may be needed. They, thus, give the government a valuable power. Without politics intelligence is indifferent while at the same time politics without intelligence is foolish (Kerr 1994, p.325).

Turning to how intelligence influences the decision-making process, the literature supports that intelligence gathering is an essential component (Herman 1996, p.138) thanks to the knowledge it can provide for other countries. Policymakers always need accurate intelligence about foreign countries, which will then constitute the basis for taking action (Herman 1996, p.138). In this way, the intelligence provided by the secret services enters the logic of the rational state and reinforces the rational behaviour of the states.

However, intelligence should not be considered the deciding factor in decision-making; the information provided may be inaccurate, incomplete, or even misleading (Herman 1996, p.140), which means that its usefulness is not always trustworthy. Intelligence is only one of the sources used by the politicians to make a decision (Herman 1996, p.141). It usually has a supporting role but it cannot cover the lack of sufficient power or competent leader (Treverton et al 2006, p.3). Hence, the importance of providing intelligence lies in increasing the chances of taking the necessary actions policymakers would not take otherwise (Herman 1996, p.140).

Based on the theoretical framework, the hypothesis is that there are differences between the Czech and the British-American intelligence systems in terms of providing support to the foreign policy decision makers. First of all, there are probably differences in terms of the organisational structure of the Czech intelligence community; by that it is meant the number of intelligence agencies and the type of the agencies (e.g. an agency tasked with gathering security intelligence, another agency tasked with gathering foreign intelligence). The assumption is that the Czech Republic most likely acquires only one intelligence agency tasked with performing all intelligence activities, compared to the British and American intelligence communities which are probably larger and likely to acquire separate agencies for different intelligence activities. That is thought to be so because, unlike the UK and the US, the Czech Republic a) is a small country, b) it does not have the financial capabilities to conserve multiple agencies, c) it relies a lot on its allies for its security, and d) it does not have a hegemonic role in the world to be in need of a larger intelligence community.

Additionally, differences are also expected in terms of how the intelligence agencies are overseen by the politicians. Since all three countries have democratic regimes, intelligence agencies must be overseen by both the executive and the legislative branch. Hence, it is likely that there is executive and legislative oversight over the agencies in the Czech Republic, just like there must be in the US and the UK. However, there are probably differences in terms of 'who' oversees 'what'. For example, a foreign intelligence agency in Britain could be overseen by the Foreign Secretary, whereas in the Czech Republic directly by the Prime Minister. To that direction, it is assumed that there are certain asymmetries in the Czech intelligence system compared to the British and American ones. This is thought to be the case because of the communist past. Given the nightmares that the Soviet agencies left in the minds of the Czech people under the authority of Soviet executives, it is likely that political oversight of the Czech

intelligence agencies must be indifferent, to the point of complicated. For example, during the communist era, the Czech domestic intelligence agency, StB (Committee of State Security) was under the authority of the Minister of Interior and remained loyal to terrorising the society until the last minute (Williams & Deletant 2001, p.62). Therefore, there might be scepticism in letting the modern equivalent of the StB under the authority of the Interior Minister thus, leading to debates over who should oversee the domestic intelligence agency.

Lastly, it is believed that there are differences in regard to how intelligence is coordinated with policymaking. Intelligence itself is of no use if it is not incorporated into policymaking. Thus, a relevant body consisted of the relevant people is needed to implement it correctly. The assumption is that the Czech Republic does not acquire a body that is responsible for coordinating intelligence and policymaking, whereas the US and the UK probably do so. The argument is that the Czech Republic is a newly post-Cold War founded republic and it is likely to have prioritised other things than creating a committee responsible for coordinating intelligence with policymaking.

PART II

| Chapter 1: British & American Intelligence Models

British intelligence system

Intelligence Community

The British intelligence community is made up of three major services that have had an outstanding performance in the history of intelligence: The Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). All three services are conducting their operations covertly thus, the identities of their employees are kept hidden and away from public exposure. To that direction, the British mainstream media have also decided to assist. Acting in a voluntary manner, they have agreed to avoid any publication regarding the national security.

The UK's domestic intelligence service, the MI5, traces its origins to 1909 (Kell 2017, p.6). It was created after Captain Vernon Kell's request for a service needed to carry out counterintelligence tasks (Kell 2017, p.6). It operates under the authority of the Home Secretary, who appoints the Director General of the agency. The legal framework of the Security Service Act 1989 defines the functions of the Service. The Section 1 of the Act states that *"the function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means"* (Security Service Act 1989, p.1). Paragraph 3 of the Section 1 of the Act further provides that the Service is tasked with protecting the *"economic wellbeing of the UK against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands"* (Security Service Act 1989, p.1). Thus, the main duty of MI5 is to safeguard the nation and ensure the economic wellbeing from any imminent threats. More

functions were added to the Services' list with the amended Security Service Act 1996. The Service is tasked with "*the support of the activities of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime*" (Security Service Act 1996, p.1). However, after 2006, MI5 began to refrain from dealing with various crimes (i.e. drug trafficking, organised crime) as most of these activities were taken by other agencies.

The British foreign intelligence service, better known as MI6, also originates in 1909 as the foreign branch of the Secret Service Office under the orders of Sir Mansfield Cumming (Kell 2017, p.6). As an agency, MI6 is under the authority of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The Foreign Secretary appoints the Director General of MI6 who is responsible for running the service. Statutory recognition for the SIS came later than the MI5. It had to wait until the Intelligence Services Act 1994. According to the Act, the functions of MI6 are to "*obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles*", and "*to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons*" (Intelligence Services Act 1994, p.1). These functions must be carried out "*in the interest of national security, with particular reference to foreign and defense policy...in the interest of economic well-being*" and "*in support of the detection and prevention of serious crimes*" (Intelligence Services Act 1994, p.1-2).

GCHQ was created in 1946 as a successor to the government code and cipher school that operated since 1919. The service obtained its legal recognition together with the SIS in the 1994 Act. It is headed by a Director appointed by the Foreign Secretary and holds a close working relationship with the other two intelligence services. The GCHQ is responsible for the UK's technical intelligence gathering. It is tasked to "*monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any equipment producing such emissions*' and to '*obtain and*

provide information derived from or relating to such emissions ” (Intelligence Services Act 1994, p.2).

Oversight and Coordination

Although the intelligence services already exist for more than hundred years, the concept of a wider democratic oversight is a relatively recent one in the UK. According to Gill, intelligence oversight is *“the scrutiny of agencies’ actions, whether contemporaneously or after the event, in order to ensure their effectiveness, legality and propriety on behalf of the public”* (Gill 2011, p.46-47). The oversight and coordination of all British intelligence services is carried out by a complex system of committees of which the most relevant ones are examined.

First, the executive control of British intelligence is performed by the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services (Lowenthal 2008, p.538). The Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is composed of the Ministers of Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finance. It performs a political analysis of the performance of the services, reviews their objectives, determines future government needs and, based on them, sets new objectives for the intelligence community.

To help the Ministers supervise the intelligence agencies, there is the Permanent Secretaries’ Committee on the Intelligence Services (Lowenthal 2008, p.539). It is chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet and it consists of the Permanent Undersecretaries of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence and Economy. Its main function is to make reports to the Prime Minister, in addition to supervising the budget of the various services.

The most public part of the architecture of oversight, however, has been the Intelligence and Security Committee. Established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (Gill 2009, p.931), the Committee exercises parliamentary oversight over the services. Several reasons, such as controversies about Northern Ireland or arms sales to Iraq, led to its creation (Gill 2009, p.931).

The Intelligence and Security Committee is constitutionally unique (Leigh 2007, p.181). It is considered to be a ‘committee of parliamentarians’ rather than a ‘parliamentary committee’ (Gill 2007, p.20). Its membership is determined by the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition (Gill 2007, p.21). It is composed of nine members: eight from the House of Commons and one from the House of Lords (Gill 2007, p.20). Additionally, the Committee creates and submits an annual report to the Prime Minister. The report, then, is also brought to the Parliament after the removal of any classified information (Gill 2007, p.20). The primary aim of the Committee is to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the three intelligence services (Gill 2009, p.931).

A key component in British intelligence is the Joint Intelligence Committee (Lowenthal 2008, p.539). It was first created in 1936 and was used during the World War (Cradock 2002, p.7). The committee is responsible for the supervision of the services, the review of the work and the coordination of intelligence with policymaking (Lowenthal 2008, p.539). Peter Hennessy describes the Joint Intelligence Committee as “*the apex of the British intelligence process*”, the bag into which information from all of the civilian and military services collects to be mixed with overtly acquired material, for analysis and assessment (Hennessy 2002, p.3). The Committee is chaired by the Head of the Committee and consists of officials from the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Exterior, Finance as well as all the three heads of the intelligence services. A group of experts, name the Assessments Staff, supports the Committee by producing intelligence assessments on key issues (Lowenthal 2008, p.539).

American intelligence system

Intelligence Community

If there is a truly complex and rich intelligence community, that is undoubtedly the one of the United States. The American intelligence community consists of seventeen intelligence agencies. The main three and the ones that this thesis is concerned with are: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA).

The CIA was established in 1947 with the National Security Act. It is accountable to the President of the United States through the National Security Council and the Assistant for National Security Affairs (Richelson 2016, p.15). It is America's foreign intelligence agency responsible for conducting clandestine activities abroad and collecting foreign intelligence. Section 102 paragraph D of the National Security Act 1947 on Central Intelligence Agency defines the duties of the Agency. These are as stated: *“(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security; (2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities...(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; (5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.”*

Under President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 12333, the CIA is permitted to gather secret

information within the United States as long as it does not target the domestic activities of US citizens and corporations (Richelson 2016, p.15).

The NSA, along with the CIA, is one of the most secret agencies that make up the US intelligence community. It was created in 1952 by President Harry S. Truman. The agency is tasked with gathering technical intelligence, with particular emphasis given on signals intelligence (Richelson 2016, p.31). A directive issued by the Department of Defence (DOD) in 2010 classifies the main functions of the agency. In particular, it specifies that the NSA shall: *“collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyse, produce, and disseminate SIGINT information and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions; provide SIGINT support for the conduct of military operations, pursuant to tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense; establish and operate an effective, unified organisation for SIGINT activities, including executing any SIGINT-related functions the Secretary of Defense so directs; develop rules, regulations and standards governing the classification and declassification of SIGINT; exercise SIGINT operational control and establish policies and procedures for departments and agencies to follow when appropriately performing SIGINT activities”* (Richelson 2016, p.31). The agency is part of the DOD, although, in practice, it enjoys enormous autonomy (Richelson 2016, p.30).

The FBI is one of the oldest agencies in the US intelligence community, older than the NSA and the CIA. It was created in 1908 and falls under the authority of the US Department of Justice (DOJ). Unlike all the rest of the agencies that were discussed so far, the case of the FBI is quite different. It does not constitute an intelligence agency, rather more of a law enforcement agency; hence, the agency has federal jurisdiction and the power to arrest in the US soil. The FBI's responsibilities lie predominantly in the area of criminal law enforcement (Richelson

2016, p.124). However, its duties further extend to domestic counterterrorism and domestic counterintelligence, as well as at times, foreign intelligence gathering (Richelson 2016, p.124).

Oversight and Coordination

Like Britain, in the American political system, control over the activities conducted by the intelligence agencies is done by the executive and the legislative branches.

The first executive mechanism responsible for overseeing the intelligence agencies is the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB). Under an executive order issued by President George Bush in 2008, the Board is tasked with assessing the quality, quantity and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and other intelligence activities (Richelson 2016, p.474). It is composed of sixteen members, which are sufficiently qualified distinguished personalities. The Board reports directly to the President and advises him on what actions shall be taken by the intelligence agencies (Ameringer 1990, p.352). Additionally, the Intelligence Oversight Board was created in 1981 as part of the Executive Office of the President. It consists of maximum four members and is responsible for informing the President of intelligence activities that may be unlawful (Richelson 2016, p.474).

Parliamentary control can be achieved by a single chamber or by both², usually through committees. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) ensures that intelligence agencies make complete and timely information available to the executive and legislative branches (Richelson 2016, p.473). It is made up of fifteen senators and its main task is to investigate the activities of the intelligence agencies. It is further responsible for handling the nominations of agency Directors, such as the Director of the CIA or the Director of National Intelligence (Wiarda 1996, p.186). Equally, the House Permanent Select Committee on

² The House of Representatives and the Senate.

Intelligence (HPSCI) is the Senate's counterpart in the House of Representatives (Wiarda 1996, p.186). Like the SSCI, it also executes political oversight over the intelligence community.

Coordination of intelligence and foreign policymaking in the United States begins with the President. The President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He is also the one responsible for conducting the country's foreign policy (Wiarda 1996, p.270). As the political and military leader of the nation, the final decision on crucial matters, after gathering all the necessary information, falls on him. Christopher Andrew aptly comments that American Presidents were always influenced by the information they received from the intelligence agencies (Andrew 1995, p.2). If this were not true, the reality of both WW2 and Cold War would be utterly different (Andrew 1995, p.2).

The National Security Council is the primary council for considering national security and foreign policy matters (Richelson 2016, p.470). It was established by the National Security Act 1947 as part of the President's Executive Office. The Act specifies that the duty of the Council is: *“(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security; for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and (2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.”* It further states that the Council shall be composed of the President, the Secretaries of Defence, State, Army, Navy and Airforce, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.

The Homeland Security Council was established in 2001 by the Executive Order 13228 of President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks (Richelson 2016, p.475). The aim of the

Council is to identify priorities and coordinate the intelligence agencies within, as well as outside the United States, to prevent terrorist attacks.

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created as a result of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act voted by the Bush administration (Richelson 2016, p.475). It replaced the previous post of the Director of Central Intelligence. The DNI is the head of all the seventeen intelligence agencies. The main responsibilities of the DNI are to oversee the US intelligence community and manage the National Intelligence Program (Richelson 2016, p.475).

| Chapter 2: Czech Intelligence System

Intelligence Community

The legal framework for the intelligence community of the Czech Republic is given by three main laws (Zeman 2014, p.72): the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. on Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic, the Act No. 154/1994 Coll. on Security Information Service and the Act No. 289/2005 Coll. on Military Intelligence (Zeman 2014, p.72). These laws concern the three existing intelligence services: the Security Information Service (Bezpečnostní Informační Služba – BIS), the Office for Foreign Relations and Information (Úřad pro zahraniční styky a informace – UZSI) and the Military Intelligence (Vojenské zpravodajství – VZ) (Cerny 2007, p.103). However, as mentioned earlier, attention will be given only to the civilian intelligence services.

The Security Information Service is the internal intelligence agency of the Czech Republic (Zeman 2014, p.72). It was established in 1994 by the Act No. 154/1994 Coll. as a counterintelligence agency. Its position, however, within the intelligence community must be sought in the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. Part §3 paragraph a) of the Act states that “*the Security Information Service....., its incomes and expenditures being defined in a separate Chapter of the State Budget*”. The non-subordination of the agency to a certain Ministry gives the impression that BIS constitutes a sort of a ‘special case’ for the community. The scope of BIS is defined in Part §5 paragraph 1) of the Act. It is stated that “*the Security Information Service (BIS) secures information on a) schemes and activities directed against the democratic foundations, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, b) the intelligence services of foreign powers, c) activities endangering state and official secrets, d) activities the consequences of which may jeopardize the security or major economic interests of the Czech*

Republic, e) information regarding organized crime and terrorism”. The director of the BIS is appointed after a discussion in the committee of the Chamber of Deputies responsible for security matters (Act No. 153/1994 Coll., p.2). In the performance of his duties, the Director of the agency is accountable to the Ministerial Cabinet consisting of 15 to 19 members (Zeman 2014, p.72). The agency is further subject to parliamentary control of a special seven-member commission in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Office for Foreign Relations and Information is the foreign intelligence agency of the country (Zeman 2014, p.78). The existence of this service is enshrined in Part §3 paragraph b) of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. where it is stated that ÚZSI’s budget is part of the State Budget Chapter of the Ministry of the Interior. Part §4 of the same law, mentions that the Director of ÚZSI is appointed and dismissed by the Minister of the Interior with the consent of the government. He is the director of ÚZSI from the performance of his function responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The agency is responsible for acquiring *“information of foreign provenance which is important for the security and protection of the foreign political and economic interests of the Czech Republic”* (Act No. 153/1994 Coll., p.2).

Oversight and Coordination

Political control of the intelligence services in the Czech Republic is firstly performed by the executive branch. The President of the Republic participates in the control of intelligence agencies primarily as a recipient of information from these services. He is empowered to evaluate the work of the intelligence agencies in terms of speed, comprehensiveness, quality of information processed, validity of the information submitted to him and the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of forecasts defined by the agencies.

The Ministerial Cabinet is in a similar situation, but in addition to the above, it also has a significant influence on the operations of the intelligence services. Consisting of 15 to 19

members, it oversees the functions and the results of the work of intelligence services (Zeman 2014, p.72).

Following the executive control, parliamentary scrutiny over the agencies in the Czech Republic also exists and it is divided into two categories: a) control common to all intelligence agencies, and b) special control for selected agencies. General parliamentary control of all Czech agencies is defined by Section 12 of Act No. 153/1994 where it is stated that the activities of the intelligence services are subject to Parliament. However, the Act does not define the scope nor the manner of the oversight. This is set more in detail by the Act No. 154/1994. The Section 18 of the Act states that the responsibility for overseeing the activities of BIS lies with a special oversight body, the Standing Oversight Commission, found in the Chamber of Deputies. It is a commission composed of seven members from the Chamber of Deputies. Along with BIS, subject to such special control by the Standing Oversight Commission is also the military intelligence agency VZ but not the foreign intelligence agency UZSI.

To facilitate the cooperation of the agencies with the government, the Council for Coordination of the Intelligence Services was established in the year 1991. The creation of this Council was inspired by the British model of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Cerny 2007, p.103). The aim of the Council is to coordinate intelligence gathering with policymaking by promoting bigger interaction between the intelligence agencies and the government (Cerny 2007, p.103). Its members are consisted of the heads of the intelligence services, the President's Security Advisor, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Interior and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Cerny 2007, p.103).

| Chapter 3: Comparison of Intelligence Systems

Thus far, the second part of the study has focused on discussing the selected intelligence systems. Chapter 1 completed an analysis of the two intelligence systems employed as models, the British and the American, while at the centre of Chapter 2 was the examination of the Czech intelligence system. This Chapter will make a comparison between the Czech and the British-American intelligence systems, and test whether the hypothesis is true or false based on the theoretical framework. Recommendations for intelligence reform in the Czech Republic will then be offered and argued.

Comparison

At the outset of the comparative analysis lies the organisational structure of the intelligence systems. According to the theoretical framework, it was predicted that the Czech Republic acquires only one agency tasked with performing all intelligence activities, compared to the UK and the US. From the analysis made, it seems that the US uses the FBI for domestic intelligence gathering, the CIA for the collection of foreign human intelligence and the NSA for signals and communication intelligence. Equally, the UK has MI5 as a domestic intelligence service, MI6 as the foreign intelligence service and GCHQ for TECHINT. Like its two allies, the Czech Republic has BIS as its domestic agency and UZSI for gathering intelligence abroad, though it does not acquire any agency for TECHINT. As a result, the prediction here was wrong.

Intelligence System	Domestic Intelligence	Foreign Intelligence	Communication Intelligence
<i>British</i>	MI5	MI6	GCHQ
<i>American</i>	FBI	CIA	NSA
<i>Czech</i>	BIS	UZSI	-

Table 1. *Comparison of British, American and Czech intelligence agencies*

The idea of having a separate agency, (i.e. only for conducting intelligence activities abroad) seems significant for two reasons. The first reason indicates that gathering foreign intelligence is something valuable and thus, it deserves special attention. The second reason is that it avoids problems between the need and provision of foreign intelligence. For example, just like it happens in some states, the Czech Republic could have only one intelligence agency tasked with gathering both security and foreign intelligence. Having one intelligence agency responsible for all intelligence activities, though, can create confusion. Priority would be most likely given to battling security threats.

Comparison is further made in terms of political oversight over the agencies. The assumption was that while executive and legislative oversight exists in all three systems, there are probably differences in terms of ‘who’ oversees ‘what’.

Domestic Intelligence	Executive Oversight	Parliamentary Oversight
MI5 (UK)	Home Secretary	Intelligence & Security Committee
FBI (US)	US Attorney General (Department of Justice)	SCI Senate SCI House of Representatives
BIS (CR)	Ministerial Cabinet	Standing Oversight Commission

Table 2. *Political Oversight of British, American and Czech domestic intelligence agencies*

In the case of the United States, the CIA is found to be accountable to the President of the US through the National Security Council and the Director of National Intelligence Community. The FBI is overseen by the US Attorney General of the Department of Justice and the NSA answers to the Secretary of Defence. Congressional oversight of the entire US intelligence is executed by the two Select Committees on Intelligence from the Senate and the House of Representatives. Furthermore, in the UK MI5 is overseen by the Home Secretary and whereas MI6 and the GCHQ are controlled by the Foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister is responsible for all the intelligence activities of the services through his Ministers. Parliamentary control is secured by the UK Intelligence and Security Committee composed of Members from the House of Representatives and the House of Commons. However, political oversight in the Czech system seems quite indifferent. Instead of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister, the foreign intelligence agency UZSI answers to the Minister of Interior. Also, the Czech security intelligence agency BIS does not report to a specific Minister (e.g. Minister of Interior) but to the Ministerial Cabinet as a whole. The legislative branch from its side oversees the functions of the agencies, mostly through the Standing Oversight Commission. Composed of Members from the Chamber of Deputies, the Commission opens the agencies to scrutiny from parliamentarians and ensures that oversight is not provided only by the Ministers. However, unlike the British and the American mechanisms, the Standing Oversight Commission found in the Czech system oversees only BIS and VZ, leaving the UZSI outside its periphery of investigation. Therefore, the prediction in this case was correct.

Foreign Intelligence	Executive Oversight	Parliamentary Oversight
MI6 (UK)	Foreign Secretary	Intelligence & Security Committee
CIA (US)	US President	SCI Senate SCI House of Representatives
UZSI (CR)	Minister of Interior	-

Table 3. *Political Oversight of British, American and Czech foreign intelligence agencies*

Final part of the comparative analysis concerns the coordination of intelligence and policymaking. Here it was predicted that the Czech Republic does not acquire a body that is responsible for coordinating intelligence and policymaking compared to the US and the UK.

Intelligence System	Coordination Body of Intelligence & Policymaking
<i>British</i>	Joint Intelligence Committee
<i>American</i>	US President National Security Council Director of National Intelligence Homeland Security Council
<i>Czech</i>	Council for Coordination of the Intelligence Services

Table 4. *Coordination Mechanisms in the British, American and Czech intelligence systems*

Without a doubt, coordination of intelligence and policymaking is found to be most plural in the American system. It starts with the President who is the Commander in Chief and the one strongly directing the foreign policy. He chairs the National Security Council responsible for national security threats and foreign policy matters, to which the Director of National Intelligence, the head of the American intelligence community, reports. Homeland Security

Council is another mechanism chaired by the US President where all the intelligence agencies are coordinated to prevent terrorist attacks. On the side of the UK, things are less complex. The British Joint Intelligence Committee is responsible for the coordination of intelligence and policymaking, chaired by the Prime Minister, including all heads of the intelligence services and their respective Ministers. Like its two counterparts, the Czech Republic has the Council for Coordination of the Intelligence Services which is structured after the British JIC and functions in the same way. Therefore, the prediction here was wrong.

Recommendations for reforms

After the comparative analysis between the Czech system and its American and British counterparts, attention is now shifted towards reforming the Czech intelligence system. The restructuring of an intelligence system is a particularly important process for achieving state security and information protection. Yet, it is an extremely difficult one. Usually, fundamental changes require a broader political consensus or a major political scandal and intelligence failure. It is not the intent of this thesis to come up with an extraordinary plan to profoundly transform the Czech intelligence system, but rather to offer ideas extracted from the two intelligence models that can be realistically implemented for its development.

The first recommendation for the development of the system concerns the Security Information Service, BIS, and how it is overseen by the executive. Currently, BIS is controlled by the Ministerial Cabinet. Hence, it is suggested that BIS should rather solely fall under the command of the Minister of Interior. For the Czech public, of course, such a suggestion constitutes a nightmare, if simply someone takes into consideration the history and the fear BIS' Soviet predecessor, the StB, spread under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. However, there must not be fear for a change like this. First, the political system of the country is now

different, involving lots of checks and balances; not to mention that BIS is a covert agency and does not have legal authority like the Soviet StB. Second, the Minister of Interior is the one responsible for internal security matters on a day-to-day basis. Hence, having a cabinet of Ministers, who are all preoccupied daily with the responsibilities of their own Ministries, to oversee the domestic intelligence agency is of no need. Third, there can be better coordination to prevent imminent threats to national security, since the police force is also under the authority of the Minister of Interior. For example, in the case of preventing a terrorist attack from a terrorist cell, the police and the domestic intelligence agency are the ones to be called in the front line. The BIS may use its resources to locate the targets and the police can move to make the arrest. Therefore, coordination in such cases can be easier if BIS also falls under the command of the Interior Minister.

The second recommendation involves the Czech foreign intelligence agency, UZSI. At present, UZSI is accountable to the Minister of Interior. One might argue that this is logical because foreign intelligence gathering is related to national security, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, this is true. To an extent, it makes sense that UZSI falls under the Interior Minister. For example, if there is a suspicious cargo heading from Belarus to the Czech Republic, the intelligence agent abroad, upon finding out, would alert the agency. The director would be then informed and, considering that the content of the cargo is a serious threat, he would in turn inform the Minister of Interior who would decide the necessary measures that need to be taken. However, it is recommended here that UZSI should fall under the authority of the Foreign Affairs Minister. While gathering foreign intelligence might be connected to national security threats, it is also there to help the Foreign Affairs Minister and the diplomats to promote the interests of the nation abroad. For example, assuming that it is in the interests of the Czech Republic to push into a military alliance with the members of the Visegrad Group, since they

feel threatened by Russia. Apart from the diplomacy, the job of the UZSI must be to spy on the other members of the Group in order to understand their goals, how prone are they to forming a military alliance or how they can be influenced or convinced. All this information that is collected and analysed in the headquarters of the agency must then be disseminated to the Foreign Affairs Minister. Since he is the country's top diplomat, he should be the one to ask what information is needed to serve the foreign policy goals of the country. Therefore, it is considered more useful for UZSI to answer to the Foreign Affairs Minister.

A third recommendation is made in regard to parliamentary control over the Czech intelligence agencies. As it has already been mentioned, there is a special commission in the Czech Chamber of Deputies that exercises strict control over the agencies. This counts, though, only for two of the agencies, namely BIS and VZ, and not for the whole intelligence community. It is, therefore, proposed that the Standing Oversight Committee should also exercise control over UZSI. First, in terms of parliamentary scrutiny, it is an asymmetry to control some of the agencies and not all of them. Second, apart from enhancing accountability of all the agencies, parliamentarians need to be informed about the activities of the agency abroad. Just like they scrutinise the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the same should be done with the foreign intelligence agency. There are various things which UZSI may do or not do that need to be of the parliamentarians' concern. For example, to what extent the agency has abused human rights abroad in order to obtain information. If, hypothetically, there has been an abuse of rights by an agent who perhaps used torture to extract information, then the Commission needs to know. Also, the intelligence agencies tend to liaise with foreign counterparts and exchange intelligence on specific matters. The Commission must be aware with whom the agency liaises abroad and to what level. They further need to be

informed what are any new threats that might arrive in the country and what does the agency do to disrupt them.

The fourth and final proposal is rather a subtle one. It is suggested that the creation of a separate signals and communications intelligence agency would be beneficial for the state. One could argue, of course, that this step is way out of range. For a country small, like the Czech Republic, to increase the number of intelligence agencies is considered a luxury, needless to mention the amount of expenses needed of such an initiative. However, this proposal is not too irrational as it may look like. The nature of intelligence work is becoming increasingly digital. The world has moved on from the Cold War-era listening posts. Emphasis is now given on digital and satellite surveillance. Even the nature of warfare in general has changed. Almost every armed conflict today contains some form of cyber dimension. Therefore, for these reasons, it is believed that forming a long-term plan dedicated to creating an intelligence agency focused only signals and communications information gathering is a requisite.

| Conclusion

To conclude, this thesis was an attempt to discover what are the differences between the Czech and the British-American intelligence systems in terms of providing support to the foreign policy decision-makers. The hypothesis that there are differences between the Czech and British-American systems was true. First of all, the Czech system appears to be similar to the British rather than the American one, with some differences. This starts with the core, meaning its political system, which is a parliamentary republic. Moreover, just like the US and the UK, it possesses a separate agency for domestic intelligence and another for foreign intelligence. This indicates that, for a rather small country, it places special attention to gathering foreign intelligence. However, it does not acquire an equivalent of the tech-giant agencies that the US and the UK have, namely the NSA and the GCHQ. In addition, the most notable differences are found in the political oversight. From the part of the executive branch, the Czech BIS is found to be controlled by the Ministerial Cabinet, while the British MI5 is overseen by the Home Secretary and the American FBI by the US Attorney General. Similarly, UZSI is accountable to the Minister of Interior rather than to the Foreign Affairs Minister, like in the UK. In turn, the legislative branch in the Czech Republic has a Commission that oversees BIS and VZ, but not UZSI; something which does not happen in the UK and the US where parliamentary scrutiny is exercised over the entire intelligence community. Coordination of intelligence and policymaking is done by the Council for Coordination of the Intelligence Services which was created on the standards of the British JIC.

Based on the comparison made, four recommendations were made as to how the Czech system could be reformed. The first was that change is needed in the executive oversight of BIS and argued that it is preferable to place the agency under the authority of the Ministry of Interior instead of the entire Cabinet. Likewise, the second one suggested that it is more appropriate if UZSI answers to the Minister of Foreign Affairs rather than the Interior Minister. Third, it was suggested that the Standing Oversight Commission shall also exercise parliamentary scrutiny over UZSI and fourth, it was proposed to create a single agency dedicated solely to signals and communications intelligence.

It can be said, overall, that intelligence reform is a hard and complex process. One country cannot simply and blindly begin to adopt 'ideal' overseas models from one moment to another. Changes to the constitution may be required as well as adoption of new acts, reflection to the history and mostly importantly political willingness. Nevertheless, this does not mean that that it cannot learn from other models and increase the efficiency of its intelligence system. If the Czech Republic as a small state wants to achieve more in this growing multipolar world, then investing on intelligence is the key. Its politicians and society need to leave behind the dark past surrounding the intelligence agencies and focus on creating a plan that will develop the functions and capabilities of its intelligence system.

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