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EUkraine: Political Identity and Identity of Politics

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Declaration

I, Olena Chepurna hereby declare that this thesis, entitled "(title)", submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed   Olena Chepurna

Date   15 December 2009

Table of contents

I. INTRODUCTION

*"If politics is the art of the possible,
than getting rid of illusions should lead
to the common strategy of all democratic forces."*
(Holovaka 202)

Being the largest European neighbor of the European Union, Ukraine is treated in ways that constitute a new image of the European Community. Positioned at the frontier "hard" border, yet "in the ring of friends" (Zaiotti, "Of Friends and Fences"), Ukraine is undergoing a major period of self-evaluation and assessment of neighboring states whose images influence the policy making and aspirations of the country.

Despite the lack of attention in the past decades, nowadays Ukraine takes top ranking in the international news in all vectors. Due to the economic crisis the country has entered the list of the 20 most unstable countries in the world with the leading position of default risk prospects – 53.7% ("Global Sovereign Credit Risk Repot")[1]. Also, the flu epidemic has been quite dramatic for the population. Moreover, the protracted political instability on the eve of the presidential elections in January 2010 is of ill omen.

However, the country is participating in some essential positive news. The 13th EU-Ukraine summit took place in Kyiv on the 4th December 2009 – the first high-level event with EU participation after the historical Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December. The agenda dealt with the new Association Agreement, replacing the functioning on Partnership and Cooperation. Despite membership aspirations on Ukraine's part, the country was given a stern admonition by the EU that no membership prospects are presently on the agenda. The aim of the summit was to "send clear messages on the need for determined and decisive action on reform" (Rettman, "EU-Ukraine summit to mark new chapter in relations").

Will Ukraine survive throughout the winter and upcoming elections with the summit's harvest of "unrealized Fruits" and "astronomical distrust"? (Gomez, Krasnolutska "EU Delays Free-Trade, Accession Pacts with Ukraine") Will it stay warm and supply necessary heat for the EU in order not to deteriorate relations even further?

Judging from the data above, the image of the country leaves much to be desired. But is it the genuine one? That is the question the present paper will tackle. A more

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[1] Global Sovereign Credit Risk Report is released by CMA, the credit information specialist, and covers activity in the sovereign CDS (credit default swap) market between July and September 2009.

pragmatic chapter in bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine requires that one should look deeper and question the reasons for failing aspirations of one party and increasing dissatisfaction of the other. Are they rooted in politics only?

Our answer suggests looking for the answers on different levels – those of identity and political culture. For the perception of the country is largely constituted not only by the self-image, but also by the ideas and beliefs of outsiders. During the Europe-Ukraine International Forum in 2008 experts tried to define the nation's historical memory and its connection to the European identity. As Gunter Saathoff felicitously noticed, "every nation has the right to its past, to its self-identification. But one should look not only in one's own mirror but in the neighbour's as well …The European community can save its every member from defeat. Germany, for instance, did not recover from Nazism all by itself" (Popkova, "Experts advise Ukrainians to look into their mirror and their neighbors").

The same advice can be applied to EU as well, for in order to realize the image of oneself, the neighbor's mirror is the most trustworthy and challenging direction to look. Ukraine's perception in this case is of great value due to the proximity of geographical, cultural and political areas. It is also the main ingredient for understanding and creating a fair cooperation in the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle.

The constant problems of Ukraine to build a strong nation state and overcome the Communist legacy, to foster healthy relations in the region can not but make one wonder: is the failure due to the responsibility of the elite that leads the nation? Or is it the fault of the nation for having chosen such leaders? What is the difference between mass and elite perception and which one is being more reasonable? Moreover, the post-Communism successful transformation depends upon the extent to which the old elite is replaced and on the professionalism of cadres, that mostly came from the womb of Soviet Union. Is there a new political elite forming in Ukraine?

Ukraine in this sense provides a perfect case-study for identity and mass versus elite representation research, for it is unique in terms of its historically and politically rooted borderline. The Dnipro River divides the cerebrum of Ukraine into two sides: East and West, both with their separate cultural heritage and political culture heritage.

In order to fully answer that question the study investigates the political culture of Ukraine and frames the typical characteristics of the Ukrainian character with both strong and weak points. Only considering the genuine character of the mass population it is possible to open a truly new era of bilateral relations. Moreover, it is crucial for the Ukrainians as well to understand the nature and subconscious motives of their identity which, as a damaged compass, leads the nation to the abyss.

The focus on the political culture is crucial for the time being and Ukraine itself. This important determinant must be considered due to the proximity of the political elections in Ukraine and the expected change of the political elite.

Moreover, the dynamic nature of the European Union puts a special accent on the relations between political identities – namely ethnic, citizen, national, European – and their influence on politics. Ukraine, positioned in Eastern Europe, still undergoes a period of state-building. In the EU the national identities are challenged both from below by growing regional identities, and from above by European one. The problem to pose is: will the European integration establish a common EU identity or just reinforce cross-national ones that drive towards autonomy? That question is impossible to answer without exploring the Eastern Europe perspective: will the establishment of national identities there endanger the emergence of the European identity? How can those two identities coexist, substitute one another? And if they are in conflict, what is the impact on the politics in the region? (Conover, Hicks, 11)

It is controversial to say that the European Union has been tuned up for the messages from Ukraine. At present, however, the fatality of the situation deserves mentioning: the country is hanging over precipice. Unfortunately, the present Ukrainian political elite uses the foreign vectors of EU, Russia or USA as positive or negative depending on the aim to win the electorate or blame the neighbors for own inconsistency as well as to escape from responsibility. Creating unhealthy and distorted images of the neighbors, the elite does not try hard enough to change the relations from "tip me" into "win-win" approach.

Moreover, the current Ukrainian government doesn't possess enough experience, qualities and will to use available internal and international resources to provide security to the country and its citizens, their material and economical welfare, economic growth and prosperity. And does the active power set such priorities in general? ("How to save the country? Or as the sentence is declared, is there a right to appeal?") If not, maybe the European Union should address the issue in a different manner. The paper suggests the possible ways of looking at the situation at a new, constructive and effective angle.

It is obvious that there is no turning back to not so long ago functioning, adjusted and customary system of values and custom coordinates, for the world has changed after the crisis, and so did the neighbors of Ukraine. In the upcoming years only the countries, which are able to mobilize the resources and citizens would be able to survive and solve urgent tasks. Will Ukraine be able to use its chance or is there a chance for the country by itself? Who will provide Ukraine with the political and moral compass to follow the right direction? ("How to save the country? Or the sentence is passed. Is there a right to

appeal?") What role can the European Union play in strengthening the biggest democratic country in Europe?

It is not that Ukraine has a wide choice: if it doesn't use its last possibility prior, during and after the upcoming elections (and this time it is really *the* last one), it will simple fall to external governing. And the "external" scenarios for Ukraine are not favorable. "Finlandization" by Russia, ruling not only external but also internal politics of the country as it was between USSR and Finland till 1991 (Riabov, "Power"). Or grey dumping area between Russian empire and supranational European Union. However, there is still a hope that Ukraine will and be able to act as a model for the EU relations with the region within the Eastern Partnership Agreement.

But the main point to understand is that without internal will power and active position of the nation, neither Chip, nor Dale Rangers will rescue the country. Each and every citizen of Ukraine, in the country and abroad, should ask if it's possible to save Ukraine from its inconsistency, where to look for resources and the most important – does the country understand why, who and what shall be saved? President, parliament? Agriculture, bank system? What shall be sacrificed and what decidedly cast aside as disastrous ballast? What value categories shall Ukraine consider in order to dispute the imposed sentence and find forces for a new break through, for mobilization of human resources and solving the questions that those, who call themselves Ukrainian elite, are not able to give answers to? ("How to save the country? Or the sentence is passed. Is there a right to appeal?")

Delay in addressing the main conflicts in Ukrainian politics, economy, socium deprives the country from the last safety factor and robustness. That is why we feel necessity to present the study in the time for Ukraine, when there is still, though the last one, but a chance to prevent the country from turning into agonizing, buffer territoria incognita. As the country's deputy foreign minister K. Yeliseyev states, "there is a lack of strategic political thinking in the EU as far as Ukraine is concerned … I hope the current bad weather with regard to our European aspirations does not lead to a permanent ice age" (Rettman, "EU-Ukraine summit to mark new chapter in relations").

Ukraine has spouts that are worth fighting for in order to abolish the most severe sentence to the Ukrainian *nation*, for elite always has an escape way. Hopefully, the European Union not only sees the gem, but experiences, shares and enjoys it in new relations with Ukraine.

In order to bring understanding to both international and academic sector and with it, more productive working scheme between Ukraine and the European Union, let us turn to the scientific grounding of the paper.

1.1. Aims, Objectives and Methods

The research *aims and objectives* envision:

To investigate into Ukrainian opinions on the European Union, utilizing non-traditional sources, particularly contrasting the difference in opinion of the Ukrainian mass populace and Ukrainian political elite.

The hypothesis of this paper is that there is a long-term stagnation in the relations of EU-Ukraine due to the lack of understanding and lack of consideration of all components that influence the political decisions. To them we relate the identity and political culture of the country. Another crucial point is the difference in perception and opinion on the EU between common people and the elite of Ukraine. Second *assumption* follows: the present political culture and identity of the country, if based on the ideas of the mass population, rather than elite, might be closer for the EU identity and more efficient for the bileteral relations.

Thus, to determine how the actors arrive at their "failing" identity perceptions, we focus not only on their perception of self and the other, but also on reasons grounded in political culture and ethnopsychology of the region. The consideration of both can help to establish a genuine relationship between Ukraine and the EU. Moreover, showing sometimes favorable, mostly transitory nature in present relations between Ukraine and European Union and through both elite and common people's perception on the European Union, we can observe transformations that previous works have been unable to account for. Lastly, studying the interface of the ethno-psychological character of the Ukrainian nation and "ordinary" citizen, we incorporate a new level to the understanding between the EU and Ukraine.

The primary argument backing up the hypotheses stresses that the perception of the European Union in Ukraine has moved away from favorable to less acceptable. But the paper questions the real reasons behind it. One of them is that the change has happened due to inability of the Ukrainian political forces to solve the inner problems: the present pre-election appeals to the role of Ukraine in a new Eastern European project and minimum attention to the EU integration is just a way trick the electorate and mask the inability of the ruling elite to cope with set goals. The puppet electorate is being led into the direction, favorable for the politicians.

The comments of common Ukrainians at the times, when the country is drifting further away from genuine democratic change, point out the discrepancies in elite approach and in the politics of the European Union as well as its attitude towards the biggest neighbor of the European Community.

The work's *second argument* presents the ground for the new possible approach and twist in the relations between European Union and Ukraine. Comparing the view of elite and common people, it becomes visible that it is the mass that has shown the aspirations for democratic change during the Orange Revolution. As the political elite has been inconsistent and unable to perform the promised reforms, the policies of the European Union should be stricter for Ukrainian governmental level. Instead, EU projects should aim at bypassing the elite and working with the civil society: the mass population can be taught with the example of the EU how to become more active and get involved into the political life of the country.

The final argument claims that the European and Ukrainian identities fit together and have more in common than is generally believed. The prospects for their harmonization and mutual compensation are high. The Ukrainian identity is closer to the European Union than it seems, if "accepted" and understood by the EU, and more importantly, if there is a common interest in doing so.

The study looks at how the political, cultural and historical ties have contributed to the transitory character of relations between the EU and Ukraine and examines how the perceptions of the EU project the image of both Ukraine and the European Community in the future.

General research methods: comparative analyses of arguments, presented in the secondary literature; analyses of agreements between the EU and Ukraine, internet blog comments, journal articles, official statistics, news and reports of the EU and NATO external relations sector, scholar books, first-hand interview with the government officials, the EU-Ukraine partnership agreements, comparative analyses of Ethnic/Civic appeals in party programs, content analyses of 2010 candidates pre-election programs.

Non-traditional methods: our research design involves the non-traditional sources including blog comments on articles of prominent politicians; numerous polls data. The analyzed attitude and comments of the average Ukrainian citizen would provide an interesting material for investigation into the identity of the European Union as well.

The political elite position is identified through Ethnic/Civic and Foreign Relations statements analyses, found in political party programs. The analyses scheme and coding data was developed by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI).[2] The range of programs for Ethnic/Civic statements is from 1994 till 2009, while the Foreign Relations one is based on present presidential programs for the elections on 17 January 2010.

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[2] *The European Centre for Minority Issues* (ECMI) is a non-partisan and interdisciplinary institution that advances minority-majority relations in the wider Europe through action, research and publications.

Thus, another *aim* would be to outline the profile of Ukrainian identity and political culture based on secondary literature and blog comment analyses as well as previously mentioned empirical data; to compare how well the Ukrainian identity may coexist with a European one is the final *goal* of the study.

To conclude, the paper uses a qualitative approach and research strategy with "how" question, for the primary goal is to get an in-depth understanding in the stagnated relations between the EU and Ukraine. Through the research that proceeds between the data and relevant theory, the paper aims at unveiling the identity and political culture portraits of Ukraine and the European Union.

Chapter 1 will firstly look at the theoretical framework and use the notions of identity and political culture to explain their popularity in modern theories. With that approach, the paper supports the position of distinguished authors and argues that in order *not* to look at the present EU-Ukraine relations through rose-colored obstacles, the current political approach should be indubiously diluted with identity and political culture profile. The chapter would provide the reader with the overview of the literature that touches the notions of identity, image of "self" and "other" as well as political culture.

Secondly, the political theory of constructivism would be applied to the present research as the chain that links both political and identity study. Characterizing the politics of modern period within cultural and sociological framework will allow the study to move to a coherent analysis of present EU–Ukraine relations through the prism of identity and political culture theories. It would allow us to see the origin of the pitfalls in the EU–Ukraine relations and provide crucial knowledge for mutual understanding.

Finally, the overview of Ukrainian (Yaniv, Kuzio, Kulchitskiy Subtelnij, Gdal, Magun and Rudnev) and international authors (Batt, Besters-Dilger, Boeckh, Taras, Janes, Garnet, Jackson) on the peculiarities of Ukrainian identity and national state building process would equip the reader with a powerful tool in recognizing the specifics of the country's legacy, turbulent years of independence and nation formation. Additionally, they would pave the way for the profile of the Ukrainian identity, dealt with in the last chapter of the paper.

Chapter 2 will use the speeches and articles on political agreements between EU-Ukraine and the reaction of mass population to them, expressed via internet blogs. Through them one sees an undistorted view on the European Union through the eyes of the representative of average population of Ukraine, unleashed from pressure and ideology of the ruling elite. Questioning the image of the "Other" has important implications for the development of the "Self" as well. An unstable and non-transparent nature that feeds the deformed EU-Ukraine relations thus becomes easier to eradicate.

Moreover, the empirical data from ECMI coding program on ethnic and civic statements of the parties from 1994 till 2009 give an insight into the attitude of major political parties towards the European Union, as well as their policies in nation building and common idea for the unity of Ukrainian nation.

Lastly, the analyses of the pre-election party programs for 2010 on the foreign policy vector statements provides a clear view on the attitude towards the European Union as compared to mass population.

Chapter 3 investigates into the character of the Ukrainian nation via ethno psychological and cultural values, showing how history formed attitude towards neighbors and the style of relations established in the past. This chapter "peels off" the historically acquired identities in order to re-find the genuine Ukrainian values and characteristics: only such knowledge would help to build the country with satisfied citizens. Consistently, the author shows the changing nature of the Ukrainian identity profile, pointing out the difference between imprints of Soviet legacy as well as the first independent decades.

Moreover, the final part of the work covers the question of European character and its typical characteristics. The conclusions present the similar and diverse roots in Ukrainian and European character, and prospects for their successful "cohabitation".

Why is this study important?

A combined theoretical approach to encompass the notions of identity, politics and political culture will facilitate a number of important moves forward. *Firstly*, a clearer format from which to draw casual inferences will be established. *Secondly*, the important school of thought, collectively known as constructivism, as well as political cultural thought, will offer new and important insights into the dynamics of EU-Ukraine relations. *Thirdly*, those interested in the regional relations and political culture of Ukraine will have a new theoretical background from which to debate and look at EU-Ukraine relations and their composites.

In general, the study seeks a greater theoretically informed understanding of EU-Ukraine relations. The examining of the relationship through a constructivist theoretical lens will contribute to how the cultural and ideological constructs of Ukraine and the EU have created transitory and present "antagonistic" constructs between them. It empirically and statistically demonstrates how cultural norms became hardened and continue to be misunderstood by these two players.

The study shows what group in society the EU should aim at in order to support the democratic progress and change. In most of the cases, as the research data suggests, it

should be done bypassing the politicians, or at least not measuring their failures as the failure of the state and its population.

Why is Ukraine important?

As a national and peaceful state, Ukraine is important for its sound judgment and formally "outsider's view". That knowledge helps to grasp the proper perspective of European politics and European community. In order to spread democratic ideas, the European Union should realize that without its active and persistent support, Ukraine is likely to become an authoritarian regime or stagnate to the point of disintegration of the state.

The importance of Ukraine lies in its European history, favorable geopolitical position, an enormous potential as intellectual labor market and productivity. A history of the EU–Ukraine relations can work towards providing stable and transparent relations in the region. Moreover, the identity question and successful integration of Ukraine can be answered by acknowledging Ukraine as a peaceful state that only *seems* to be distant from the EU, but whose citizens share the same European values and aspirations. Ukraine is not only a key to the regional CIS states, but also a key test for the Lisbon Treaty and the European Union's foreign, or better to say ideological policy.

To sum up, the paper would examine how cultural and political ties as well as prejudice have contributed to misunderstanding between EU-Ukraine; how and why cultural and mentality changes in Ukraine are not considered by the political elite. Through the evaluation of Ukraine's perception on European Union, both from the view of the political elite and the common people, the picture of political culture of both countries becomes vivid. That is the needed help for two actors to understand each other and change for better as well as reevaluate some issues, that before were considered pitfalls.

II. THEORETICAL GROUND
2.1. Identity and its political determinants

Despite the numerous books and articles written on Ukraine and European Union relations, there has been little or no attempt at framing the relations at the angle of identity and political culture perception: a lens that allows us to see any transitory dynamic. The approach here through the party manifestos data and blog translations will present different opinions from Ukraine and allow new insights into changes of the past, and likely future directions.

In numerous debates on globalization, Europeanization, nationalism and post Cold-war era it is identity that takes the first seat on the priority list of both cultural and political researches. Let us turn to the prominent writer of modern time, Stuart Hall (2), who brilliantly states that one can not grasp the sense of identity through the old Cartesian metaphysical sense as active, rational and unified. Just on the contrary, identity is a self-sustaining essence, with its originality and unity that have to be investigated. Identity, according to Hall (3), exists in the moment between emergence and disappearance and is 'under erasure'.

Talking about identity also involves the coverage of such notion as stereotyping, where one turns to Pickering for definition: "Stereotypes are one-sided characterisations of others, which operate as a means of evaluating and attempting to fix in place, other people or cultures from a particular and privileged perspective. Stereotyping is a unilinear mode of representing these characterisations" (Pickering 47).

These two notions are connected through the concept of the 'Other': it is the beginning and the ending of stereotyping. The differentiation between "them" and "us" seems to be an eternal game that common people play at the aegis of politicians. Stereotyping can serve as a powerful method of manipulation in the public life of the country. Bronfen in Pickering (75) argues that "In discourses of the Other, the central co-ordinates of differentiation are always implicated in relations of power. The Other is constructed in and for its subordination, in and for its 'inferiority' to the self—dominance

who has produced it. This is an aspect of power in that those who construct and discursively reproduce the Other are able to do so, are enabled by their power to command the autonomy and means for transforming others into heteronomous [sic], subordinated types who cannot retaliate in kind. 'The stereotype of the Other is used to control the ambivalent and to create boundaries. Stereotypes are a way of dealing with the instabilities arising from the division between self and non-self by preserving an illusion of control and order" (Pickering 47).

The particular interest in stereotyping for this paper is based in the revelation and image construction that it presents, for the 'Other' is the way to discover oneself and investigate into one's identity. In order to provide decent analyses of bilateral agreements or relations between parties, the researcher can not omit the importance of image construction, identity formation and stereotyping as representation while dealing with political agenda.

Moreover, to launch the notion of European identity requires a degree of categorizing: "European" opposed to "non-Europeans" (Conover, Hicks, 19). Can it be done in a different, more tolerant way of looking at the Eastern Europe behind the EU border?

At present, the question, so well posed by S. Hall and Paul du Gay hasn't lost its viability: who needs identity?[3] Or, re-applying it to the research agenda: who needs to know about identity? In our case, the answer is: EUkraine, both the European Community and Ukraine, that are facing the same dilemma – how to bridge the multivariate society without cement too strong to cast the states away, in what way can the deficit in identity be overcome?

In order to find the answer for the question, the modern scholar can not but turn to a notions' definition and a number of publications, namely: Etienne Balibar and his "Europe, an "Unimagined" frontier of democracy", Ales Debeljak on "Reflection on Elusive 'Common Dreams', Fritz Groothues and his "Imagine: A European Identity", "Rethinking Europe: Idea, identity, reality" by G. Delanty, Jean Baudrillard, David Kideckel in his "Us and Them: Concepts of East and West in the East European Tradition".

The notion "Identity", or the "real me", was used in spheres of psychodynamics and psychology, originally by Freud in his theory of identification, lately by Erikson for World War II patients who had lost the feeling of sameness and historical continuity.

James and Mead referred to identity as the "self" with "I" (inner, determining factor) and "me" (socially determined), that both observe their nature through language.

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[3] In "Questions of Cultural Identity" by Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay.

Structuralism and post-structuralism intensified the language factor in making the identity: Saussaure claimed that the social experience, values and gains are all produced within the language system and that identities are constructed by the notions and meanings we assign to particular forma of conducts. Foucault was the first to observe the multiple nature of identity: within two different perspectives, one can be a football player (a contradictory version of self) and a male (social practice), thus having a double identity that constantly interacts with one another.

Further studies developed the concept of "the hybridity of cultural identities", suggesting they are the by-products of mixing, dealt with Diaspora identity – 'born across the world'. Lacan, in particular, stands on the ground that identity is a separation between the external 'ideal ego' and the internalized 'ego ideal' and touches the subject of narcissism identification.

Parapella in his compilation "A new Europe in search of its soul. Essays on the European Union's Cultural Identity and the Transatlantic Dialogue" investigates the possibility of consensus of a successful EU Constitution that "must be based on a genuine cultural identity, not even on mere economic and political considerations" (Parapella 131).

Etienne Balibar states that "The end of the Cold War and the nullification of the Yalta agreements have reopened a historical and philosophical question with respect to the very meaning we attach to the name "Europe" (36). He depicts the world as the battlefield of capitalist economic powers, that launch their "military operations" globally, but the constraining results are mostly felt in "frontier-zones" (36). "Thus, constructions that define identity following the end of the Cold War have established nothing positive with respect to European identity, but they stigmatize a group of excluded people in order to mark the differences between Europe and the rest of the world. Essentially these refugees and migrant workers occupy that slot in society, both imaginary and real, of internal or domestic political enemies who are nothing more than a construct of the State. These people are seen as threat to security while in fact having no security themselves" (37).

Even though the European Union is actively trying to promote its values, common history and cultural heritage, the reason for lack of success lies in the "inward" nature of the process. Ales Debeljak, for example, argues that a stressed necessity in Western Europe is its internal integration rather than looking "outside" (3). Moreover, "Maastricht is a metaphor for the EU's privileging of its own integration process, as if this process is the goal itself and not the means for a higher form of political order. As such, it functions in accordance with that specific vision of the future that only with considerable

difficulties accepts the reality of East and Central Europe, of the Balkans and Baltics…"(3).

Dealing with inner problems, the European Union doesn't look "outside of the house" and follows the line that "business must go on even if there's a sick person in the family (4). The Marshall Plan and Organization for European Economic Cooperation – those were the pillars that shaped the values of Europe: capitalism instead of democracy gave birth to daily habits, standards, and lately, institutions of European Community. "In this regard, the triumph of capitalism and democracy after the "velvet revolution" in 1989 was seen as the confirmation of the universal status these norms and values seemingly possess" (Debeljak 6).

Further on, being rooted in the post World War II order, the modern notion of Europe was formed in the Cold War era, thus still preserving the distribution of "them" versus "us" (Kideckel 134-144). One can then question the brotherhood feelings in the European Union, when comparing to the ex-USSR: would it ever reach such level of brotherhood between the nations? Would ever a Spaniard fight with as much gist for his land as for Holland, for instance?

Debeljak casts light on yet another problematic issue in the identity formation of Europe. Its space was mapped with the back view of the "Iron Curtain" and communist enemy, and only by distinguishing what Europe was *not,* rather than what it *was.* "The physicality of the contrast between ' the free world" and " the empire of the red star" has strengthened and legitimized the fearful asymmetry of Europe and its walls, barbed wires, mine fields, and trigger-happy guards. In such a context, the mental structure of European identity remained determined by the "foreign" element, by the damaged and damaging. Moreover, even the positive substance that eventually came to be constructed throughout the last fifty years in Western Europe has been put in the service of boundary maintenance" (6).

The answer and solution is that "Concentric circles of multiple identities in the construction of "Europeanism" have to ensue from mutual respect and not from hierarchical scale. The moment that the rhetoric of the number and size of individual European nations takes over as a criterion for participation in the construction of a common cultural and mental framework, the awareness of cultural diversity will be lost. With regard to other larger geopolitical systems, the cultural diversity is Europe's greatest comparative advantage (19).

Evolving is the idea of exceptional importance of identity studies. Moreover, it can be concluded from the cited that the construction of the European identity lies largely on the shoulders of the European Union, thus the search for political identity becomes

one of the dominant issues in constructing the welfare of Europe. For "To change the role that Europe plays in the world would require not merely new institutional arrangements – that was the fundamental error of the failed constitutional arrangements – but also a new political identity, which would have to be embedded in a different sort of civic culture and expressed in a different kind of state" (Sheehan 223).

What is it that prevents the Europeans from attaching their emotions towards the European identity? To be specific, the primary stereotype is about the fixed character, or unchangeable nature of identity, followed by "a zero-sum game" where the increase of identity in Europe as a whole is inversely proportional to domestic identity; finally, it is the possibility of "top to down" approach, where the European Union imposes its identity on citizens (Groothues).

To distinguish "us" from "them" one needs to know the root of differences, and here Gerard Delanty and his five uniting notions are helpful to consider: Christianity, Enlightenment, discussions on culture of 19th and 20th century, post-1945 or Cold War talks and modern discourse on Citizens of Europe and Europe, surrounded by a wall (Delanty 13-14).

Distinguishing freedom, creativity, democracy, individuality, pluralistic nature as the foundation stone of European values, Rietbergen (434-437) shows the transformation process, where the European citizen finds himself cherishing prosperity, safety and freedom. With the "invention of Europe" theory one tends to argue about the mysterious process of identity formation that became fixed with the notion of Europe, thus intensifying the sub ordinance of periphery to the center.

Delanty (15) suggests that exactly the European citizenship is an opportunity to create the European identity, for it can not sustain itself, in multinational Europe, on religion, nationality, language not, simultaneously, provoking the conflict situation and drawing new division lines. Even better possibility would be a Europe, united by activeness, autonomy and participation rather than exception and fiction. The time has not yet come to look at Europe as a fully implemented project; there is still some growth and potential to discover.

Ukraine adopted its Constitution in 1996 as a way to start the nation-building process. The EU Constitution was not yet successful, but it seeks to achieve the same aim, though having some contradictions that prevented its ratification: "The emerging EU Constitution seems to look in two opposite directions: that of the Enlightenment and that of Humanism. Those who believe that the best always arrives at the end of a process will opt for the Enlightenment and dismiss as obscurantist the Christian Humanistic

option. Both need to be mutually exclusive and to make them so is to be oblivious of the true identity of Western Civilization (Parapella 105).

Eurobarometer of September's 2007 edition aimed at finding out what European culture is all about and to investigate the concept of its existence. The citizens related to diversity (77%), shared history (77%), Europe as a continent of culture (68%) as well as cultural pluralism (53%) as the distinctive features of the European culture, as compared with other continents. At the same time, the values to preserve and promote were nature/environment-friendliness and peace.

Common values or not, the potential danger there is that "Western Civilization owes to itself not to abandon its identity. Christianity with its Judaic and Hellenic traditions as integral part of the Western legacy would suggest that despite Rousseau, people, as reasoning beings, are capable of great good and great evil and the only defence against the temptation to evil are institutions, that… make it more attractive to follow our better angels, and provide sanctions when we do not do so. The new West, largely held by the triad of reason, liberty and prosperity, ought not to be distorted into rationalism, self-gratification and hedonism (Parapella 123).

Jean Baudrillard considers the idea of European identity as utopia, saying: "Until there was prestige, glory, and culture there was no need to tell oneself: "I am this, here is my identity, I exist, I am here". When one truly exists because there is strength and glory, at base, there is no need for identity. Identity is a weak value, a refuge value somehow. Today it is on this that Europe is being built" (521).

He argues that in order to create even a country, one had to eliminate the differences and bring them down to nations, that were born at the same time with the idea of Enlightenment, "therefore the universal has been created in some sense by Europe, not the feudal Europe of singularities, but the Europe of Enlightenment, humanist Europe, Europe of nation and bourgeoisie" (524).

One of the main goals of current research is to show the difference in perception – of Europe and its identity – between elite and common people of Ukraine. This is also the distinction and the gap in opinions between two groups that the author acknowledges. "Also, the distinction between the elite, the technocrats, those who are in power, who invent this abstract generality, who manage things, and the others should be considered. … It is known that the leaders of all countries will want to be integrated in Europe, at some point all of Africa will want to join Europe, it is fantastic. But totally idiotic. This is the project of elite, not in a qualitative sense; let's say of a minority that manages things, that has all the means to make them happen. Therefore there will be Europe, but it will be

a kind of pseudo political event; in reality, deeply, politically, nothing will happen" (Baudrillard 527).

The identity debate leaves room for both optimists and pessimists: the first can freely self-actualize and choose the individuality, to reapply the range of identities, whereas the latter grieve for homelessness, loss of authority and growth of narcissistic personality, or pure selfishness.

In general, no clear notion of identity is found. But it can be said that identity comes from expectations that are assigned to the roles we take in society. The main question also stays open: is there an original self "behind the various masks which we present to others"? ("Identity", A Dictionary of Sociology). Thus, in order to foster the healthy integration, one needs to investigate into the identity, its composure, with a special stress to political identity of the accessing country and recipient: for the price for malfunctioning would be too high to pay.

2.2. Political identity and identity of politics

Common sense cannot be altered overnight.
It may be a decade since Communism crumbled as a political system,
yet a decade of public euphoria that is being increasingly replaced by skeptical
and more often not outright negative attitudes toward peoples, habits,
expectations, and mores of former Communist lands is emphatically not sufficient
long enough to allow for a radical,
more inclusive reorientation of West cultural and political identities.
(Balibar 4)

Nowadays, the question about identity seems to appear more and more in the sphere of International relations. The paradox lies in the fact that "…the identity will often determine one's fate is not dictated by the person whose life is being channeled. Instead, identity is being fashioned – and constructed by others, others who have a stake in making up certain social categories and in trying to make people conform to them" (Zalewski, Enloe 282). But one shouldn't view oneself as the string-attached actor, manipulated by others; the process is rather mutual: one is trying to grasp his true identity, while the other is trying to influence the answer and the person's choice.

At any case, the importance of identity nowadays has tremendous effects on job search, relations, expectations, career path, and enemy/friend distinguishing. While considering the question of international relations, the identity matters even more, for

why do we consider one state as a major actor and another as less privileged? To rely on the states as the main actors may have worked during the Cold War area, but not anymore. If the researcher doesn't pause and think about deep reasons for state policy or agreement, tries to consider the wish and identification of the common people with one or another procedure, he would never be able to provide the adequate help to the research sphere or help people in general (Zalewski, Enloe 284).

The problem of viewing the state government as an actor has more disadvantages than advantages. Is it really true that government represents all its citizens? Can we trust all proclaimed ideas as being valid and coming from all people's identity character? The answer is largely negative (Zalewski, Enloe 284). Thus investigating in the sphere of political identity of Ukraine, one has to consider the representation of common people as well as elite claims. Only then, through the prism of unbiased view and neutral approach the truth can be revealed about the broad mass of people, their attitude and for their and elite's direct benefit.

NATO would be a good example to illustrate the identity paradigm change: being the only inter–state alliance in 1990, and resting on European identity, NATO nowadays has very little in common and does not represent the core of European community identity, thanks to the help of peace movements in Britain, Spain, Germany and Greece (Zalewski, Enloe 284).

It is interesting to notice that identities become more evident when there is a real perceived threat to them, or they have been pushed too far. One wants the outer world to recognize *all* current identities, not just those that correspond and fit or do not fit the international order (Zalewski, Enloe 285). That is why the question on Ukraine's identity is crucial in improving the situation in the region: the country has been viewed for too long as the Soviet-Union legacy space. However, the post-Soviet Union period has lately ended; the new-formed identity should be both studied and acknowledged by the European Union.

When defining the identity, the present research goes further than assuming the need for global community, the fact that identity is fixed or that one has only one, not multiple number of identities. The question to ask would be: "Do we have to be content with the continuation of the success of particular national identities at the expense of other sub-national and transnational identities?" (qtd. in Zalewski, Enloe, 287).

The significant role of identity construction in international politics can be traced by the following examples: construction of gender identity, for example, plays a main role in scores of military thinking and ideology; the sexual and racial identity

construction was a major determinant in the Gulf War, as Abouali Farmanfarmaian states (qtd. in Zalewski, Enloe 284).

The application of constructivist theory is determined primarily by inability of other theories to deal with identity in its narrow sense: "…realists are far too committed to the empirical nature of transnational processes; structuralists/globalists are far too committed to economics and classes to allow much room for the consideration of questions of identity in international relations" (Zalewski, Enloe 296). "It is worthwhile spending some time thinking about boundaries, especially the insight that boundaries often become invisible, at least clearly, only when they are overstepped" (Zalewski, Enloe 300).

It can be argued that there is an unaccounted blend of realist and constructivist led foreign policy objective, what Stephen Cohen calls the "realist-midealis conundrum" (Cohen 308). The methodological difficulties EU-Ukraine case poses for international relation theories is due to its awkward juxtaposition between the shared ideas of a once partly singular terrain and the imposition of sovereign structure in 1991. This work suggests the failure of international relations to seriously address this methodological problem and move forward will continue to add to stagnation of the relations in the region.

It is therefore necessary to discuss Wendtian constructivism that seeks to join the macro stricter of neo-realism to a micro inter subjectivity between nation state. The Wendtian constructivism through inter-subjectivity seeks to understand the nature or socially constructed type of anarchy that fills the structure as a cause explanation. It is a far better approach than structural theoris which rely on structrue to explain cause, or post-strucutralis approaches that challenge the very existence of structure (Cohen 308-310).

Ukraine as well as the EU is real and existant, thus the post-structuralism approaches, challenging the very existence of structure is not applicable here. To rely on the structure to explain the cause, as structural theories suggest, would help in this work in terms of dealing with the EU structure and legacy peculiarities. But for the combination of EU-Ukraine relations and EU-UA-Russia triangle the methodology is too vague to grasp the necessary keystones and peculiarities of the relationship. Thus the Wendtian constructivism is the most applicable in combination with cultural theories and political culture characteristic.

The work's epistemology poses between the articles and blog comments, a quantitative structure of the international system and triangulates between Wendtian constructivist theory, interviews with diplomats as well as secondary sources. The multi-

dimensional approach will be necessary to confirm the positions held and views expressed by interviewee's with the theoretical perspective and secondary sources. The theoretical approach of implementing both political and cultural theories is a deductive one and it will guide research findings and inform the knowledge collected from interviews; newspaper articles, blog comments and data collected from secondary literature sources.

If theories inform the facts, then theories too must be examined carefully and inferences drawn, for what those theories do not say are just as imporant as what they do say. This subchapter is an attemppt to strike an epistemologial balance in the theories of EU-Ukraine relations in order to tighten up the methodological framework and help to stabilize the region by moving the relations to a new, better stage.

Concentrating on political identity and culture, we take constructivism as the focal theory to navigate within this paper as the one that stresses the importance of material and normative structures, the role of identity in shaping the political action, and the relations between agents and structures as well.

The rise of contsructivism is explained by motivation to reassert the non-rationalist perspetives and the failure of neo-realists and neoliberals to explain the tranformations after the Cold War ended. Thus the modern researches use the opportunity to look at the old question with new eyes, leaving the borders of well-known, but ineffecient theories (Reus-Smit 216). They claimed that along with the material structure, the normative structures could as well influence and form the behavior of political actors.

What mattered in terms of influence on social and political action for constructivists was the system of shared beliefs, valued and ideas, for "the material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded" (Wendt 16). Constructivists also consider the normative and ideational structures important, in terms of forming the social identities of the actors on political stage.

Why are identities so important? According to the provided theory, they "inform interest and, in turn, actions." When the actor's interests are being exogenously determined, how can they not treat another player with the already existing set of preferences? And exactly the understanding of the actor's interest development is the key to explain the political actions. "Identities are the basis of interests", as Alexander Wendt argues (Wendt 17). All human beings and their motivations are driven by their identities: the title of scientist, manager or even mother provides the person with certain interests (Reus-Smit 217).

While the actor's identities and interests are conditioned by normative and ideational structures, the structures themselves would not appear without the knowledgeable practices of those actors. The norms of the educational establishment provide the person with certain identity, which brings along the interest in research and education, but it's only with the help of practices of academics that the norms exist in the first place and are sustained.

The actor's identities are formed by normative and ideological structures through communication, imagination and constraint. In terms of the first one, the state, while trying to justify its behavior, would appeal to established norms of conduct. The imagination factors imply what actors perceive as the possibility: what they think their actions should look like, what strategies they can imagine in order to achieve the set aims (Reus-Smit 219).

In case of lack of influence on actor's behavior, the normative and ideational structures still imply a constraint on its conduct. When the actor appeals to norms for justification, the very act itself proves that it did provide the constraint on action. So to say, the theory corresponds to the scope of work in terms of treating actors as social bodies, with interests that are endogenous to the interaction as a result of identity, acquired through communication and memories of prior experience. And it is the sphere, realm that produces the actors as social agents and makes them the way they are (Reus-Smit 220).

Considering three different forms of constructivism, namely unit-level, holistic and systemic, we would apply the systemic one, developed by Wendt. It claims that identity is the factor that influences the state interests and its actions as well. Distinguishing the social (role, status that international community ascribes to the actor state) and corporate (cultural, internal, human factors that make the state the way it is) identities of the state, the present work would consider the corporate identity of the state while dealing with Ukraine and social identity of the EU while dealing with the European community (Reus-Smit 221).

Unit-level constructivism focuses on the relationship between social domestic and legal norms and identities of the states. The holistic one tries to close the gap between the international and domestic sphere, treating both as the two sides of a single political order. The importance of changing ideas of international odrers as well as the framework of knowlegde are the things on priority list of this group of constructivism. This methodological approach would allow us to explain, through the development of the normative sturctures, the present international system and social identites of both Ukraine and the EU they have evoked, endagered and changed.

With the end of the Cold War the whole concept of enemy and center of threat has changed dramatically. And it's not as much about the change of the actual actor, his motivations and policies, but the key lies in people's perception: people have changed their opinion about the issue, looking at another actor though the warm prism of affection rather than foe axes. All material of international relations considers not only the physical side, but the meaning people attach to these physical things, making them socially constructed from the area of our social interaction (Reus-Smit 223).

This way we construct as well the sphere of international relations through agreements, ideas, communication and imagination. Those can be transformed into a threat or a gesture of friendship only when we interpret them in terms of the idea context

The constructivist turn in the study of international relations highlights the power of ideas in the international system. While scholars may discuss the importance of concepts such as identity, beliefs, norms, regimes, and advocacy networks, there has been little work on how, and under what conditions these ideas are communicated. This paper will address the theoretical issues and challenges to start thinking more concretely about the process of communication in international relations. It will argue that the literature in political communication provides some useful and theoretically powerful ways to advance the study of ideas in International Relations (Nicholson 122-123).

To stress the importance of cultural aspects in politics, Jean Baudrillard's address on the political identity words would sum up the subchapter in the best manner: "…what is culture if not the substitute of a political identity not to be found? As political energy, political reality dissociated and cannot be found, culture substitutes it. Culture becomes a kind of plasma that everybody can access democratically and share. Now, I do not think that real culture is something democratic that can be shared in whatever way, in the multimedia for instance. That is hyperculture that will clearly be the place, the abstract space-time of a utopia in which, through culture, the political can be reached, whereas in reality culture replaces absent politics" (525).

Values, attitudes and politics all have the connecting point, for they are the constituent's ground for the political culture. Encompassing not only the political environment, but also our attitude towards it, the notion of political culture is accumulated both historically and through repeated experience; the transmitting agencies in this case are family, friends, school and, of course, media. The definition follows: "Political culture is a pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among the members of a political culture system. Such individual orientations involve several components including a) cognitive orientation, knowledge, accurate or otherwise, of political objects and beliefs; b) effective orientations, feelings of attachment,

involvement, rejection and the like, about political objects; and c) evaluative orientations, judgments and opinions about political objects which usually involve applying value standards towards political objects" (Muir, Paddison, 23-24).

According to the definition, "…involving both the ideals and the operating norms of a political system, political culture includes subjective attitudes and sentiments as well as objective symbols and creeds that together govern political behaviour and give structure and order to the political process" ("Political culture", The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World). Here one may talk about elite, mass political culture as well as regional and ethnic differences.

Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Tocqueville state the important role of tradition, morals and customs, but it was only after World War II that the concept of political culture was widely used, due to psycho-cultural theories, sample survey and social sciences development. From then on the psychological characteristics of the society were considered when investigating the political climate of the country. The modern times brought the influence of mass media and institutions on the culture and determined the degree it can change under their effects ("Political culture", The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World).

To provide some examples, political culture characterizes the specific society, so one can talk about originality of national character. Thus, the main features of USA political culture include individualism, dependence on own strength, democracy as equal conditions, and understanding of freedom as the absence of foreign coercion. Americans never protect the land, they fight for freedom. And that idea of freedom defence is clearly represented in the foreign policy of the USA. Ukrainian culture, on the contrary, is dominated by the idea of land and territorial integrity protection, a search for the "truth" (Yurij 15). Thus, the political cultures are dictated by the mentality, explaining the range of the research area for the present study.

Why is the concept of political culture and identity crucial to the present paper? There is no stable society without the citizen's faith in the state, as stated by Gabriel Almon and Sidney Vebra in "The Civic Culture", and instability happens as a result of scandals and failures of politicians – for it is the political culture collapse that leads to the crisis of legitimacy, as the examples of CEE and ex-USSR of 1989-91 show. Thus Ukraine as a state of the post-Soviet Union area provides an excellent case to study and differentiate between genuine political culture that has the strong support of citizens, and those dictated from above (ideologies). The winner would determine the attitude towards ethnicity and nationalism. Also, it is a way to estimate, how well the present politicians

preserve the political culture, for it should be their main objective for the sake of political peace and stability in the society ("Political culture", A Dictionary of Sociology).

To be more specific, "the concept of political culture refers to the ideas, attitudes, beliefs, values, and knowledge about politics, or which have a political relevance, held by people in a particular political unit or location", including both positive and negative attitudes towards the political system and understanding of its operation. In this research we would like to shatter the myth about the non-importance of elite and general political culture studies. One has to note that the main rivals of political culture have always been the ideology and discourse that see the international world state through the notions of power and conflict.

Critics describe the political culture is as a 'garbage can variable' that people use to accredit any notion that can not be described in any other way, because political culture does not provide a decent explanation. Just on the contrary, as presented in this paper, the knowledge of political culture as well as the sketch of political identity profile can dramatically help to grasp the repressed leitmotifs of the political life ("Political culture", The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics).

The research interest deals with community that resides in the state, or the state itself but it goes also further to the subgroups – political elite, minority, and ethnic group. Two landmark books with a data on range of country – the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico – deserve a special attention: Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture (1963)*, and Lucien Pye and Sydney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development (1965)*. The first distinguishes between three attitudes people have towards the state: the parochial (citizen expects nothing from the political system), the subject (interested in outputs), and the participant (on the position of active citizenship). *"The Civic Culture"* answers the questions: how is a political culture reproduced, what is the distinction between mass and elite politics, as well as regional, ethnic and class group. Margaret Somers makes a point that correlates to the objectives of the present work: the notion of political culture has survived a number of changes in usage, expressing the alteration in politics-culture relationship ("Political culture", The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics).

After ups and downs, the interest in political culture revives in 1980s, with the controversial question of the development path in post-Communist countries. Being under authoritarian regime, what way would they go when unleashed? ("Political culture", The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World).

And what does the notion of political culture encompasses? One can make a list from anthems, memorials to popular ideas of freedom of speech, as well as myth, parental discipline, and personal effectiveness learnt back from childhood.

One of the criticisms pointed out that the works on political culture are largely based on ethnographic material rather than survey methods. Thus, in present research we intend to combine both: ethnographic material in drafting the image/profile of the Ukrainian average citizen and possibly, elite representative, and the quantitative survey methods, namely blog survey data and ECMI party programs coding results.

"Political culture undergoes changes over time. This process ranges from gradual and engineered to rapid and out-of-control change" (German 3). What way is experiencing Ukraine right now? While Europe is trying to establish its identity playing on "Other" notion (Eastern Europe, Balkans, Muslim world, USA, Asia), the paper would further investigate into the political identity of Ukraine and try to find in it both points of contacts as well as discrepancies with the EU.

From a theoretical point of view, this study will show that culturally constructed ideas of identity are reflected in state perception about itself and others and as such play a constitutive role in state identity and policy formation. But the fact that these identities are learnt and socially constructed through social process and inner subjectivity shows that a socially constructed learned process can be unlearned and changed. The challenge here is to show that a constructivist approach and insight into political culture can illuminate a social process whereby a true genuine change can come to EU-Ukraine relations in particular and regional relations in general. To accomplish that we consider the prominent authors and works on Ukraine, it's identity and the process of nation and state building in the next subchapter.

2.3. Identity: Ukraine as a study case

"The West can make a difference,
if making a difference is in West's strategic interests"
(Motyl 14)
"Who we are, how we are, who defines us,
how international processes and events
are molded and manipulated by identities:
those are all questions relevant to international politics.
Anyone trying to make sense of international political trends
in the near future who treats these maddeningly complex
and infuriatingly dynamic identities
as a mere mosquito to be swatted away risks being surprised."
(Zalewski, Enloe 302).

Having covered the problematic notion of the European identity as well as theoretical framework, let us turn towards the overview of Ukrainian and foreign literature on the subject of identity formation. The portrait of Ukrainian political identity will be presented in the last chapter of this work, providing the theoretical background and giving a perspective from an East-European angle.

Both Ukraine and the European Union are searching for their identity. But one is using inductive, another – a deductive method. While the EU is trying to become a supranational state with supranational identity, Ukraine has gone the opposite way: from the supranational state with a strong brotherhood identity to the national state with a vague idea of self-identity. In this case, European Union is more experienced; it had a longer time to realize what needs to be done. Ukraine's national emergence has been compressed. Even though the identity search in the EU is complicated by the amount of member states, in Ukraine it's the break-up within society, the rapid change in society and order as well as the dominative factor of powerful neighbors that complicate the identity search.

Indeed, all post-Communist states faced the difficult task of finding the political and civic keystone for national identity, even now far from being successful in accomplishing the task (Wolchik, X, Preface). It seems that political leaders in Ukraine have lost the insight into necessity and powerful meaning of national identity. Is Ukrainian identity too late to re-construct or is there anything as powerful as identity to reconstruct?

Both civil society fragility as well as unstable democracy of democratic institutions is grounded in the lack of national identity. The second president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, in 1998 said, "Even today, in our eighth year of independence, we have failed to eliminate our population's division into "eastern" and "western" Ukrainians" (Wolchik, X, Preface). In our case, 11 years later, Ukraine has not only failed to move forward, but may have stepped back to the precipice of no return. The post-communism transformation era is finished; at least it is time to stop pleading ignorance and direct excuses of the country's chaos on the failure of Communist edifices. The identity and political culture of Ukraine presents an interesting case for it emerged in 1991 with one identity, but 19 years later the identity has dramatically changed. It seems that, unfortunately, the identity of the country has been constituted in those first troubled decades of independence.

The first quotation from an unpopular president moves us towards a wonderful compilation of essays. "Ukraine: The Search for National Identity" edited by I.Wolchik,

from both Ukrainian and American scholars share thoughts about post-communist Ukraine on its the way towards nation-state-building and search for identity (Wolchik, Preface).

Ukraine's beginning period of transition is of great importance for it establishes the general trend of elite connections as well as foreign relation that provide a long-lasting influence on the country afterwards (Wolchik, Preface).

The geopolitical situation of Ukraine has complicated the identity search as well. The chapter on "Nation-Building and Foreign Policy" by Ilya Prizel depicts the country's image of the "Other" self and interaction with the "Other" as the large determinant in the process of nation-building. For who was "the Other" for Ukraine: Russian or Hapsburg empire? (Wolchik, XIV, Preface).

Goble abstracts from the traditional view on Russian political culture and stresses the inter-dependence, though unequal, of Russian and Ukraine, where "each finds itself caught by the existence of the other: neither can achieve its own goals by directly pursuing them precisely because of the existence and nature of the other" (Wolchik, XVII, Preface). Exactly the understanding of the nature of our neighbors and through them ourselves, is among the aims of the paper on the way to genuine stability in the region.

Another chapter of primarily importance for our survey would be the joint work of authors Arthur H. Mille, Thomas F. Klobucar and William M. Reisinger, that raise the question of elite versus mass perception of democracy and answering the key question for modern Ukraine: "If the members of the elite are leading, are they taking the people where they want to go?" (Wolchik, XVIII, Preface). The Orange Revolution can serve as a part of the answer to this question.

And finally, Evhen I. Holovakha's article on dangers for Ukraine's young democratic process might be outdated, but the practical information for the present topic unveils when Holovaakha states that Ukraine has acquired a specific post-communist model of developemnt, very different from Baltic, Russian and Caucasian ones, a "half-open" society: being open in liberties of politics, but "closed" in the area of economic reform. The author claims that "such a political-eocnmic hybrid cannot survive long. The post-Communist political elite exploits the pecularities of mass consciousness in Ukraine by imitation reform but in reality doing little to pursue social change" (Wolchik, XVIII, Preface). It is of considerable interest to draw a line betwenn 1999 and 2009 and find out what has changed in the political culture of Ukraine and what other hybrids were created or banned.

The author with, probably, the biggest number of works on Ukraine is Taras Kuzio, whose work on "Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics in Post-Soviet Transformation" this paper will consider first. "Ukraine has inherited regional identities, lack of a unified political culture, incomplete modern nation and weak national consciousness" (Kuzio, "Contemporary Ukraine", Preface).

The author addresses the issue of relations with Russia through the prism of identity as well: Ukraine and Russia fail in stabilization of their relations and start a strategic partnership while they inherited different national identities. Thus the understanding of the political and strategic partnership is different: "Ukraine – treated as appendage of Russia or in its sphere of influence" (Kuzio, "Contemporary Ukraine, Preface).

It is advisable for our research work to consider another prominent author from Kuzio's compilation work, namely Alexander Motyl. Despite the dreadful effects that the country is still repaying with interest, the generally unpopular attitude towards the first two presidents of Independent Ukraine, namely Kravchuk (1991- 1995) and Kuchma (1995-1999, 1999-2003), the author has to give them praise at least for keeping the country together, moreover consolidating the nation by non-ethnic criteria and free usage of Russian language and no large disputes with Russia (Motyl 4-7). The Orange revolution and present breakdown in public opinion from Western to Eastern Ukraine shows how essential the question can become.

In the past, Europe showed little real interest in helping Ukraine to overcome the insecurities. "The real danger facing Ukraine is not creeping totalitarization, but creeping Zaireization, as corrupt elites feed off their state, their society, and their economy, ultimately driving them all to possible perdition (Motyl 5). Thus, the Zaireization of the regime, as prognosed, did take place and should not surprise the West (Motyl 11). But in the scale that was hard to predict: as the weed, which grows even in bad soil, the "Super Size Me" Zaireization has grown into something that Ukrainian people are used to: "Super Size Me" corruption in a parasitic state, which reflects directly upon the life of the common people. It is said in Ukraine that one is born and dies in corruption: the nurses has to be "bought" or " cajoled" in order to pay extra attention before and during delivery. And one sometimes needs to bribe the graveyard keeper to get a place to bury a person.

Does this fact correlate to the identity of the Ukrainian nation? Not in particular, but the *constantly* and *persistently* occurring political system and social system defaults are what composes the sorrow and can not but leave a deep mark in the soul of every citizen of Ukraine. Under such circumstances, is there time to pause and think

about…"The simple question "Who am I?" and "Who defines who I am?" For this matter might be revolutionary for the discipline of international relations as that of the little boy who questioned not the magnificence of the Emperor's clothes, but whether he had any at all!" (Zalewski, Enloe 302).

In his other work "Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence" Kuzio dives into the notion of nationalism as the cement for identity building process. Whereas identity is not provided on the grounds of shared culture, the other possibilities are: to supply it from above (state) or below (intelligentsia). Krawchenko states that it is social change that produces "upward mobility" that is of importance, for it influences the elites who in turn hold the reins of culture formation carriage ("Perestroika to Independence, 15). Referring back to Motyl, the culture is important only when it's in the interest of state, thus culture turns against state when the state loosens its grip, or serves the state under its dominance and manipulation. The struggle between "national moral patrimony", a traditional identity of Ukrainian nation, and "proletarian internationalism" was the most vivid and important during perestroika era. For with the disappearing Utopia about Soviet Union in 1960s, the state still hasn't provided any moral or cultural basement for the community to stay together as soon as it is overwhelmed by myth- and memory-contradicting Glasnost (Kuzio, "Perestroika to Independence", 15).

The state crisis during perestroika was also the crisis of identity and at that time only nationalism seemed to supply with an alternative of moral codes, values, myths and a feeling of "we" or identity, a follower of Soviet identity. Though one may argue that it was just a natural way to "return to own-self", for the Soviet identity served only as suppressor of stronger national identities (Kuzio, "Perestroika to Independence", 15).

The identity myth and apparent strength for Ukraine lay in nationalism. Nationalism provides the most compelling identity myth in the modern world with its power of "transcending oblivion through posterity and restoration of collective dignity through an appeal to a golden age, the realization of fraternity through symbols, rites and ceremonies", as stated by Smith. Basically, the appeal to Nationalism increases the nations' self-esteem, one turns to the nations' uniqueness (Kuzio, "Perestroika to Independence", 16).

There is no wonder that Ukraine constantly faces the "who is the master?" dilemma. The answer to this is following: "The loyalties that are generated in the cultural sphere are distinguished from material or political interests precisely by their capacity to meet deep-rooted individual and collective psychological and identity needs, and therefore tend to be "either-or" (in this case Soviet or Ukrainian) that is, not divisible or easily transferable. It may be possible for some individuals to feel "multiple" or

"situational" loyalties, in more stable social epochs, but a Gresham's law tends to operate in more conflictional periods, as the strongest loyalty squeezes out the rest" (Kuzio, "Perestroika to Independence", 17).

The next joint work of Russel Farnen, Daniel German, Henk Dekker and Rudiger Meyenberg investigates into the notion of political culture in East and Central Europe. Even though not providing a specific chapter on Ukraine, at least one idea is where the present paper can make a start: East and Central Europe countries present the typical Gemeinschaft (social people/group culture), whereas Western Europe is Gesellschaft (state/social culture), where it is easier to maintain political stability and talk about strong political culture and identity.

In the process of our work other works will be used and other authors cited, but for those presented above constitute the theoretical bulk. In conclusion, the relations of EUkraine are tied in both politics and culture, the first getting more attention than it should for lack of progress. However, the cultural paradigm is what can help both parties to re-load the relations and set common aims. Thus, grounded in politics and culture, the dilemma needs an approach of a combinatory nature, investigating the question of Ukrainian and European identity as well as political culture of Ukraine. Moreover, both states are undergoing a period of re-constructing and strengthening of their identity and searching for a more stable place on the political scene.

The culture, perceived as based on difference and opposition was transformed into a culture based on ignorance and carelessness. The explanatory variable here is European foreign policy that did not and does not take into account the cultural interface that had been established in Ukraine prior to communism rule and changes that took place in the last decade. The perception of Ukraine as a failed state and Ukraine's history as one starting from 1991, the collapse of Soviet Union, would never allow EUkraine relations step from the "vicious circle" and establish genuinely stable, reliable and truthful relations.

The study would further seek causal inferences as to the transitory nature of EUkraine relations to reach a clearer and more theoretically informed understanding of the variables that drive EU relations and to offer further questioning and hypothesizing on these important and sometimes dangerous relations. For the main concern is to offer a new epistemological approach and framework for analyses for EUkraine relation. Also, it's not the aim to prove one approach right or wrong because the truth is not the sole preserve of one approach. The debate in our case is more helpful and significant, so let us continue with the main part of the thesis.

III. ELITE VERSUS MASS: MYTHS AND REALITY GENERATOR

Ukraine is a country of one official
millionaire, a song for
hirsute ladies, a maritime agency
providing crew.

Ukraine is what?
Ukraine is being blundered
by foreign words, as ugly
as a road diverting

Gas, doing the splits, guilty
Of the Black Sea.
(Yakich 100)

The search for identity and inner self haunts most countries in the modern era, with a particular meaning for the common, yet diverse composition of the European Union. In the scientific researches on the identity theme, the importance of image from outside is usually underestimated. This chapter deals with the Ukrainian view of the European Union and examines the factors that build and influence this perception.

The question guiding the chapter investigates into the degree of historical, cultural and political influence on the image construction. It also focuses on the possibilities for both the EU and Ukraine to create a clearer view of each other and promote truly undistorted and healthy relations in the region.

Ukraine was the first CIS country to create a political agreement with Europe, but now it erroneously remains one of the last to be given membership despite the priority of European vector in the foreign policy of the country, stated back in 1996 by Kuchma (Pidluska). The eternal question "to be or not to be" in Ukrainian context sound close to "will they let or not let us be" and rarely "to enter or not to enter". The poll results sound optimistic: 55% of population in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the UK are in favour of Ukraine joining the EU - after it meets all necessary conditions – when 34% are against and 10% have not formed an opinion yet ("Europeans and Ukraine's Membership of the European Union").

The polls carried out in Ukraine show that the concept of Europe is well known only to a limited group of experts, while the vast population is not properly informed on the subject. In 2000 48% of the political elite favored the idea of European integration while 57% of the general Ukrainian population supported the idea of integration with the

CIS and, primarily, Russia (57%). The trend was describes as: "Mind towards the West, heart set for the East?" (Pashkov, Chaly).

Nevertheless, in 2007 59% of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine would join in next 10 years (Victor Pinchuk Foundation 4). In 2008 56% were still in favor, 25% against, 19% could not say for sure. The survey of 2008 represented a negative downturn in support compared to the year of 2007, when 64% would vote for entering the EU, but a positive one compared with the year of 2005, when only 47% would say "yes". The belonging to the European family is acknowledged mostly by Western Ukraine: since 52% of Ukrainians as a whole feel belonging to CIS (mostly citizens of Donbas and Crimea) would be a more advantageous course. Forty-two percent of respondents say they do not wish to belong to CIS. As one of the forum commentator states, "Ukrainians wish to be in EU, so what! And brunettes wish to be blondes…" ("Ukrainians wish to enter the EU").

What political agreements happened at that time that influenced and changed the image of EU in Ukraine? During the 1990s, the EU was busy completing its single market, introducing the euro and helping the Central and East European applicants get ready for accession. It paid little attention to the countries beyond its new eastern borders, such as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova simply offering them all more or less the same treatment: a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) from 1998 for closer trade and political ties, and financial aid and expert advice under the Tacis assistance programme (Wolczuk).

In 2004, the Commission presented its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and unveiled action plans for closer ties with all of EU's immediate neighbors by land or sea. This policy remained separate from the process of enlargement, although without prejudice on the further development of their relations ("European Neighbourhood Policy"). The idea behind ENP is vague: what does European neighbourhood mean? Is Ukraine a neighbour of Europe or neighbour of European Union? Where does the European Union end? ("In between European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU's Strategic Partnership with Russia."). Moreover, the EU withheld its membership aspirations by subtly declaring: 'Don't ask us for candidate status because the answer would be "No" (Wolczuk).

The Association Agreement and EU-Ukraine Action Plan followed, but EU did not show particular affection towards Ukraine until Orange Revolution in 2004, but in terms of Agreements as late as 2009. Then a last minute initiative from the Czech presidency in EU Commission during the May 2009 Prague summit introduced the

agreement with six former Soviet states. The initiative, which is said to irritate Moscow, is aimed at fostering closer ties with countries like Ukraine and Moldova (Willoughby).

Let us look back at the first decade of independence in order to trace the change, if there is any, in elite and mass perception of Ukraine's development as well as its possible place within European Community, or at least West democratic model. The surveys from first seven years of Independence, carried out in 1991, 1993 and 1996, show that Ukrainian population still hasn't replaced the totalitarian political culture – this fact definitely influenced the elections of 1998 and 1999, as well as electoral attitude in the new millennium (Holovaka 200).

The cause for this is primarily the attitude of the elite. Indeed, it was the population that supported the main line of the political orientation, proposed by authorities, but only because it contained the idea that radical changes bring chaos. This phobia of chaos gave the political elite the ace of trumps to "pay lip-service" to true democratization and economic development process, lingering when it required concrete action. "The elite fears it will lose power, and the majority claims that a "bad peace" is better than a "good war" and sees in the elite a guarantor of the return to the good old days when sausage was cheap" (Holovaka 202). With such a dysfunctional and hypnotized couple of Ukraine leaders and the general populace, birthed during the era of political independence, does it seem strange in 2009 that the real change has not yet occurred? The Orange Revolution could have been a time to create positive interaction, but they were still walking in their sleep.

In 1991 56% of Ukraine's general population optimistically felt Ukraine was moving towards being a western democracy but this dropped to 49% by1996. More troubling was an increased belief in the statement that "democracy will never be established in Ukraine" and that Ukrainian and Western democracies have nothing in common (Holovaka 203). So the major problem to consider was that Ukrainian society, after the first years of independence, did not believe that democracy would help to solve the problems of the state government.

Only 8 % believed that government was concerned with the society in general, which naturally led to a decrease in public trust towards the political system. But one must also consider the ignorance of electorate; only 6% were acquainted with party programs! (Holovaka 207). These are the consequences of authoritarian rule that required not only the presence of coercive elite, but the absence of vox populi: suppressed political participants, that hardly needed to make a choice, to evaluate and criticize the candidate in order to make a reasonable decision. Thus, it is the lack of political culture that produces the vicious events, leading the country to disaster. And it was the mistake of the

politicians who were too afraid to lose their sharp power and the ignorance of the masses, instead of introducing programs to develop public interest and participation in building a new democratic society.

These facts prove the necessity of a multi-layer approach and support the use of a constructivist theory. Hall's quote is keeping to the main point as well: "The cultural politics of difference means living with incommensurability through new ethical and democratic frameworks, within a culture that both recognises difference and is committed to resolving its antagonisms" (Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora", 107).

Ukraine entered the Independence era with the invisible, but determinant division line – in 1991 the Eastern regions were for CIS convergence, while Western regions leaned to the West, without nostalgia for "Slav core" (Holovaka 207). In 1995-96 the support for CIS decreased throughout all regions of Ukraine due to the lack of economic benefit, as well as support for relations with Western countries. At the same time, the positive trend for strengthening Ukraine sovereignty on its own resources increased rapidly (Holovaka 208). In the first five years after the break up of the Soviet Union as Ukraine's general population faced the "Brave New World," a dissatisfied electorate reacted with apathy, mistrust, lack of interest and understanding, but also the association of independence with the power of criminals – not Communists, but democrats – leading to viewing democracy as a harmful process for state-building. All of these negative opinions were on the political mental map of Ukrainian population by the middle 1990's.

The scenario of elite looks even worse. Ukraine's leaders treated the citizens "as simple objects of societal experiments within the boundaries of a paternalistic state, a declining economy, and an old-fashioned system of social security. The ideology of such attitude is based on the combination of residual socialist stereotypes, folkloristic anti-imperial motives, and appeals to the utopian market economy and the concept of the law-based state" (Holovaka 210).

The traditional elite, being content with the all-sided Russian's superiority over Ukraine, was double-faced, with no one truly looking in the direction of state welfare. Instead they had self-serving reasons to preserve the existing system of "top-down" economy redistribution, and enriching the party members who were playing on the "bifurcated nature" of Ukrainian consciousness of mass apathy. And the society, being torn in opinions as well, kept this strategy alive due to its psychologically closed character (Holovaka 211).

The authors proposes the model where the state would not be in charge of all social tasks, but rather promote the civic society participation in conflict resolution. But

being slow in changing, with tangled political culture, Ukrainian society is not coping with the problem (Holovaka 811).

Ukraine is a perfect case study for identity and mass/elite representation research, for it is unique in terms of its historically and politically rooted borderline. The Dnipro River divides the cerebrum of Ukraine into two sides: East and West, both with their separate cultural heritage and political culture heritage. What is the degree of geographical representation in a country's political culture? Is it agreeing with both western and eastern outlook?

The fact of ethnic Ukrainian concentration in the West, and ethnic Russian in the East provides the biggest paradox: for to build a national identity, the minority has to be considered as well. At the same time, after a long dominance of Soviet Union, it is understandable that ethnic Ukrainians react to the issue with hypersensitivity (Miller, Klobucar, 214). The point of tangency in such case can be only a common political culture: it would provide competence and allow the necessary degree of toleration, as well as unite the country, providing the healthy representation of both East and West political views in the government.

The article provides the results of a number of surveys. Primarily, the comparison of mass beliefs about democracy showed that for most Ukrainians (in the year of 1992 and 1995) democracy means freedom, majority rule and the rule of law. Though, there is a definite ethnic and language difference among surveyed population to talk about common regional political culture (Miller, Klobucar, 218).

The reaction of the political elite on the meaning of democracy proved to be different from the general population. The first gave more votes for the rule of law and responsibility for own actions rather than general ideas of freedom. So there is no clear ground to talk about the common set of democratic beliefs for both the mass and elite layers (Miller, Klobucar, 221).

Comparing the mass population and the political elite's attitude towards reforms showed differences on several topics. The mass population considered income equity as something that must be granted by the government. The representatives of the government did not see this as a legitimate responsibility of the state. Secondly, citizens tended to place the responsibility for democracy and economic reforms on government, while the latter favored to put the burden on citizens (Miller, Klobucar, 214).

The general data of the research summed up the different views the political elite and the mass population held on democracy in 1992, and yet there was a stable growth of convergence in attitudes closer to 1995. By the mid 90's both parties gave less meaning to market economy and democratic principles, while still being too distant on other

points. Language, religion, education, ethnicity played an important role in opinion formation, still not strong enough to state that the geographical "political culture" provides the division between Ukrainian population. It is the view of the mass population and the political elite that differs the most (Miller, Klobucar, 226).

Striking is the fact that the difference in East/West elite representatives is greater, than the viewpoint of the mass population in East and West. Western legislators gave preference to Ukrainian language and identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians, thus following the results of the mass poll. A major difference was in attitude towards religion: for 93% of the mass population considered themselves religious believers, whereas only 34% of the lawmakers's thought of themselves as believers. The educational level between mass and elite in both West and East leaves much to be desired. On the scale of 1 to 10, from the general towards higher education, elite got 9 points, and only 3.7 went for masses, showing the low higher educational level among the general population. But for religion and education, the Western mass and elite share the same identity and ideas on democracy (Miller, Klobucar, 227).

The East follows the same track, but here the difference is in language, for the majority of the mass populace identified Russian as a native tongue, while lawmakers claimed Ukrainian.

To sum up, the residence status doesn't provide a controversy on the views on democracy and economic reforms with more controversy in terms of language, religion and education (Miller, Klobucar, 227). Moreover, "it seems that the primacy predictor of elite attitudes is the mere fact of their membership in the elite" (Miller, Klobucar, 229). The research showed an unexpected result: Western and Eastern lawmakers share the same values, but the division between East and West is not vivid when talking about democracy and economic reforms. The major differences are dictated by language, education and religion, so to say "those drawing conclusions about an Eastern versus Western Ukraine political cutlure need to be more aware of the underlying historical, social, and demographic factors that differentiate the regions" (Miller, Klobucar, 229). With populars support of democratic principles being more tenuous in 1995 than in 1992, the author stressed the importance of active and fair interaction between mass and elite.

The East-West division as well as mass/elite controversies can be double-checked by tracing the first independent elections as far back as 1991, when communist Kravchuk won by 29 to 23 percent, against nationalist opponent Chornovil. It is important to know that the socio-ethnic structure of Ukrainian population is composed of Ukrainian speaking ethnic Ukrainian, (40%), Russian speaking ethnic Ukrainian (34%) and Russian speaking ethnic Russians (20%). Ukrainian speaking ethnic Russians account to only 1-2

% (Khmelko, Wilson, 75). Moreover, "the phenomenon of biethnicity is quite common in contemporary Ukraine" (Khmelko, Wilson, 74), meaning that the borders between them are flexible, and so can be their identities.

Thus, the middle or buffer zone between ultra Ukrainians and Russians in ethnical life of the country is composed by Russian speaking Ukrainians. This social role is a burdensome one, and Hall's words are applicable: "I believe it is an immensely important gain when one recognizes that all identity is constructed across difference and begins to live with the politics of difference" ("Minimal Selves", 117). Ukrainians have to learn to live peacefully within Ukraine, free of labeling and stereotyping.

In the 1991 election Kravchuk wasn't able to win all the regions of Ukraine, gaining the biggest support in the central part of Ukraine. Kravchuk lost to national candidates in the West, while the East voted for the protection of Russian-speaking population under Hryn'ov. Kravchuk's "victory was due mainly to support from electors who held negative or mixed attitudes toward private enterprise, had positive or mixed attitudes toward the socialist system, and displayed authoritarian political attitudes." The polarization of Ukraine that is apparent today did not decide the 1991 election (Khmelko, Wilson 60-61).

However, the situation changed by the parliamentary elections of 1994, when the east-west axis became the pulse of voter's polarization: "the overwhelming dominance of the right in the western region, a relative balance between right and left in central Ukraine, a clear advantage for the left in the south, and its absolute dominance in the east" (Khmelko, Wilson 66). A survey on voter's intentions, carried out in 1993-94 by Kyiv International Institute for Sociology, revealed differing attitudes towards private property/enterprise, membership in CIS, political liberty, legal equality and Ukrainian disarmament. This analysis by Khmelko and Wilson showed that the difference between left wing and centrist party supporters showed different viewpoints on private property/business sphere, freedom of speech and press, attitude towards CIS, Russia and Russian language as official state language. The differences between right wing and centrist party programs focused on membership of Ukraine in CIS, closer ties with Russia and the Russian language as second state language. The differences between left and right wing parties were the same as between right wing and centrist parties.

The polarization became more vivid during the presidential elections of 1994, when Kuchma failed to win the majority of votes in the west, and Kravchuk could not win east of the Dnipro. The split in opinions can be explained by two major factors: decline of living standards (for "an underdeveloped national consciousness disillusioned with the idea of Ukrainian independence" (Khmelko, Wilson, 71) after Kravchuk's first

term, when many Ukrainians linked their idea of prosperity with the revival of the USSR) and cultural developments (they included more freedom and new horizons for Ukrainian speaking population, contrasted at the same time with the fear of Russian speaking Ukrainians not be able to preserve their culture and use Russian language).

The policies of Kravchuk were tinged with a negative attitude towards using Russian language, and the denial of Russian-speaking culture's very existence. Political elites at that time built "their conceptual framework on the unique rights of indigenous culture, and dismissed the Russian-language culture in Ukraine as being equal to the forcible acculturation politics of the tsarist and Soviet regimes. Moreover, they tended to assume that the resultant unnatural bifurcation of ethnic Ukrainian society would automatically wither away after independence (Khmelko, Wilson, 77). According to Taras, "the sensitivity shown to minorities so far suggests that a form of statism, rather than nationalism, is the end goal of leaders" (Taras 109).

To sum up, the identity of Russian speaking ethnic Ukrainians is constituted by a number of linguistic and ethnic factors. The 1994 elections demonstrated the potential danger of nationalistic doctrine. That doesn't take into consideration the historical composition of Ukrainian society and culture. "The result can only be to widen the difference between mainly Ukrainian–speaking West Ukraine and the mainly Russian–speaking east and south, and play into the hands of imperially minded politicians in Russian who are already seeking to protect and, if possible, "reunite" all Russian–speaking people, including Russian–speaking Ukrainians living in Ukraine" (Khmelko, Wilson, 78). Thus, the true analyses and consideration of east-west axis reasons is of the biggest importance for the future sovereignty and unity of Ukraine.

And it should be so for the political forces as well, but do they consider it? For example, Arthur H. Mille, Thomas F. Klobucar and William M. Reisinger investigate the question of democracy versus authoritarian approach, as well as importance of a system of common basic beliefs between citizens and leaders, namely communication and representation, essential for developing a healthy political identity. If a politician understands democracy as the economic market, would his public speech on democratic progress set off public support for economical determinant? Same with communication: is the politician operating with language and terms, understandable for an average voter? (Miller, Klobucar, 214).

We performed the content analyses of political party manifestos from 1994 elections till present according to the coding manual developed by the European Center for Minority Issues. The extracted sentences were the ones that dealt with Ethnic and

Civic categories, thus showing how the party addressed urgent issues and what ideas it proclaimed to cement the country and develop statehood.

The 1994 presidential elections, namely the winner's party programme of Kuchma, favored the development of state Ukrainian language as well as state support for national minorities. The 1999 presidential elections brought claims by Moroz and Simonenko to solve the language problem and to provide free usage of both Ukrainian and Russian languages (ECMI coding sheet).

The 1994 and 1998 Parliamentary party programme statements can be grouped into some categories. The first one unites The Socialist, Communists, Labour Party, Civic Congress, that proclaim the ideas of collectivism, solidarism and national patriotism as well as equal status of both Russian and Ukrainian language (ECMI coding sheet).

The second bloc is represented by Social Democrats, Party of Democratic Rebirth, Christian Democrats, Democratic Party, Party of Crimean Renaissance, Green Party, Progressive Party – they position themselves as the forwarders of Ukrainian culture, favouring the development of other nationalities, while appealing to unite society on the common ground of tolerance, Christian moral and traditional cultural values.

The ultra Ukrainian nationalistic approach is represented by the Party of National Movement of Ukraine – RUKH, Ukrainian Republican Party, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Conservative party, Ukrainian National Party, Community and the National Front claiming that there are conditions that endanger the independence and free development of Ukrainian culture, criticizing the Communist influence and Russian legacy, appealing to the patriotism of citizens in the building of a new Ukraine. The winning parties in 1994 elections were the Communists, Socialists and RUKH, while in 1998 the 4% barrier was crossed by the Communists, RUKH, Socialists, the Green Party, Democrats, Community, Progressive Socialists and Social Democrats. One can see that there was a trend to choose either a pro Soviet Union approach, or strictly pro-Ukrainian one (ECMI coding sheet).

The Parliamentary elections of 2002 showed quite the change in people's choice, bringing Victor Yushchenko's Bloc "Our Ukraine" with RUKH within it on the leading position, then followed by Communists, the Bloc "For United Ukraine", Tymoshenko, Socialist Party of Ukraine and United Social Democratic Party. What were the claims of the leading party programs? Victor Yushchenko stressed the common moral values, justice and goodness, tolerance as well as mutual respect. The Communists followed the line of developing the culture and language of national minorities and fighting the pseudo-culture that destroys the Ukrainian moral values. The Bloc "For United Ukraine" appealed to a Renaissance of traditional family values as well as representation of all

regions, but without regional egoist. The party states that they need active citizen participation in order to build a functioning state. Thus, one notices the drive of citizens towards more democratic values, still with the Communist party holding the top 3 positions (ECMI coding sheet).

The Presidential elections of 2004 followed by the Orange Revolution and Yanukovich's pro-Russian statements marked not only the break point in the tension, but also influenced the political programs from then on. The 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections party programs can also be distributed into 3 main groups: Party of Regions with the motto "Two languages, one nation!" and favoring unity through diversity in regions of Ukraine were in the same group with Communists and Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko (ECMI coding sheet).

The middle was represented by Litvin National Bloc and statements on strengthening the society values of intellect, culture, art, role of intelligentsia, preservation of cultural heritage and originality of national minorities. Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko and "Our Ukraine" favored private freedom, flourishing of the culture and general democratic values (ECMI coding sheet).

The elections brought the Party of Regions on the first place, followed by Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and "Our Ukraine" in third.

The analysis of present party programs in 2009 makes it clear that the parties sing same old songs and the society doubts that it's possible to teach old god new tricks. The Party of Regions fosters integration of all nationality representatives and ethno regional groups that inhabit Ukraine, in to one political nation. It also would fight for the second language status for the Russian language and putting an end to the split of the nation (Programme of Party of Regions).

The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko promotes patriotic education as well as a renaissance of morality and intellect (Programme of BYUT). "Our Ukraine" favors the multiethnic state with civil consolidation, protection of minority languages as well as the titular group ("New Era. Party of the European Type", Programme of "Our Ukraine" bloc).

The Socialist Party appeals to family values, patriotism, spirituality as well as civic education. "We are one nation" and multiethnic community ("A Just Ukraine", Program of Socialist Party). The Communists criticize the encroachment of Western, primarily American values in Ukraine, urging to put a stop to propaganda of nationalism and not letting the development of culture and spirituality of one nationality to be implemented at the expense of another (Programme of the Communist Party). Finally, the Litvin bloc stressed the necessity of the renaissance and establishment of high morality

and spirituality on the base of Christian values, as well as solving the language situation in the country (Programme of National Party).

To sum up, one can distinguish 3 vectors of ideas in party manifestos that appeal to: 1) preservation of roots with Slavic countries; 2) developing the "all live in peace" approach with both EU and Russia; 3) stating the necessity of titular group development and renaissance of Ukrainian glory. There are a number of issues that "divide" the opponents, namely, attitude towards the national warriors OUN–UPA that fought for an independent Ukraine, against Russia and against Germans in the World War II and are now considered heroes in the Western Ukraine, traitors in the Eastern part. The second issue is the usage of Russian language, followed by approach to NATO.

Thus, the conclusion shall be made that these are the issues addressed by political leaders to catch the voters. The shallow promises have never been solved in the after-election reality. Bud do the catchers in the rye reach their aim? Or better to pose the question this way: does electorate favour the options, how do voters perceive the statements, how close are the words to the public? To answer the question one has to investigate into the mentality of the nation, in order to realize how to address the public correctly and what the mass truly wishes.

For now, according to Taras and data above, the political independence did not provide a greater sense of well being in society, but this is also due to economic problems rather than to fear of identity. "Identifying with…Europe as western Ukrainian do may exacerbate identity diffusion when Eastern European reality remains so remote from these preferred models. When citizens become aware that state actions provide little benefit to them, shared identity may eventually break down. Violations of minority rights, discrimination and ethnic conflict than become more likely (Taras 109). Isn't that exactly what happened before and lead to Orange Revolution?

We tackle this question in the third chapter of the work and now turn to more pessimistic (or realistic for some) view on Ukrainian state building.

Judy Batt claims "Ukraine is not and cannot be a nation-state not only because it contains a sizable minority of Russians with deep historical roots on the territory, but also because Ukrainians themselves are far from constituting a coherent and unified nation" (Batt 56). The language division should not be overestimated. For example, the case study of Zaporizhzia town that contains a large Russian-speaking population, finds it without strong pro-Russian orientation and resistance to Ukrainian language education system. Louise Jackson explains that by the nature of identity: cultural groups are not completely determined by language, that cultural identity is multilayered, and under constant reconstruction. One can even speak about mixed "Soviet identity", for in identity

studies, no matter how an insider is trying to block the outsider, " the other is never outside or beyond us: it emerges most forcefully within cultural discourse, when we think we speak most intimately and digenousely "between ourselves" (Jackson 102).

In general, the elite should play an important role in this question. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union didn't promote a turly healthy integration of Ukrainian culture, bur rather a stepping stone for the separatism in the regions. And elites are aware of this, manipulating the issue to their own benefits.: The "regional elite act as a block on the center's policy for reform whenever these challenge the socio-economic interests of their region. When socio-economic interests coincide with a distinct national identity on a given territory, the ingredients are there for a major threat to the integrity of the state" (Batt 58-59).

This attitude of the political elite is not surprising, for "the new postindependent political elite primarily consisted of the old ruling class that adopted nationalist colors. With the escalating crisis in the USSR, they capitalized on an opportunity to retain their positions and to expand their autonomy as controls from Moscow became progressiveley weakened" (Bugajski 167). Western politicians share the same ideas on Ukrainian regionalism as the elite interests, trying to be promoted to the central government (Nemiria 185).

Is that historically rooten? At least one overriding fact looms like a monolithic barrier. The face itself that Ukraine from the 14th century till 1991, excluding 1918/1919 years, was a part of neigbouring empires or foreign federations makes regional diversity no mere as coincidence (Piehl, Schulze, Timmermann, "Die Offene Flanke der Europaischen Union", 346).

Huntington, for example, divided the cultural front between East and West Christendom at the Eastern border of West Ukraine, along Sbrutch river. From 1772 to 1918 this region was the border region between Austro- Hungarian Empire and Russia, and from 1920 to 1939 between Poland and Russia. It could not but affect the style of life and people's aspirations in the regions, that now see Ukarine future within EU as a return to Europe process (Schneider-Deters, Schulze, Timmermann, "Die Europaische Union, Russland und Eurasien", 257). Fifty years of Sovietisation versus 150 years of Monarchy played left its track that is visible till now. Eastern Ukraine has clearly more reasons to identify with Russia, including shared history, and common myths, besides economic and language identities.

Thus, the connection of Ukraine to the question of European identity is a serious one: the category "European "is a poor basis of identity. For Eastern Europeans, even within the EU, the ethnic or national identities are still stronger. "…some East Europeans

may have a territorial understanding of Europe that actually excludes them. By treating the categories of Western Europe and Europe as one and the same, they may conceive of the eastern boundaries of Europe in a way that, be definition, eliminates them from Europe. Even if they count themselves as members of Europe, the category still may not be identified with because its level of inclusiveness might be too high to be optimal, even for those individuals or cultures that are more interdependent. Moreover, the category of "Europe" typically lacks a contrast adequate to make it salient…But perhaps more important, purely territorial understanding of Europe provide little sense of a collective good that is associated with the group, making it less likely that people will develop strong European identities" (Conover, Hicks, 31).

But if one approaches Europe as "nation" from non-territorial perspective, the chances for creating European identity are far greater. Eastern European can cast aside the territory rigid factor in favour of a better group membership. Secondly, European means appealing to common culture, market of benefits and defense. In such way national identities will most likely not come to conflict with national ones.

In Eastern Euorpe region the identification varies from coutnry to country: stronger there where individuals have "more interdependent'conception of the self, as well as higher level of visit from and to European coutnries. The conclusion is that the strongest level of cohesiveness is to be found in countries bordering Western Europe (32), as applicable in our case, bordering the border of the EU. The author's point of view backs our statement on the identity of Western Ukraine being the closest to the EU.

This leads to the question of political culture and the concept of "civil society": in Western Europe it is the relation betweenen "civil society" on one hand, and state and nation on the other. In the post-Communist space it is hardly implacable – both state (state capacity and state development) and Civil Society (community, political culture and identity) are under development and construction.

Being a chicken and egg problem, it is still clear in what negative way a weak state capacity and national identity influence the civil society (Kuzio, "Staatskapazitat, national integration und zivilgesellschaft", 51). With no effective political parties, national bourgeoisie to provide a future vision for Ukraine, no consolidated democratic platform, there is no wonder to find both weak state and society in Ukraine. Five areas, belonging to institutional core of civil society are still under development in Ukraine: namely, limited and law obedient government, the rule of law, market economy with private enterprise, free and free will associations as well as open culture of debates (Kuzio 52-53).

Incompatibility of totalitarismus with the civil society makes it clear that in post-Communist area civil society doesn't position itself in the opposition to the active government right away. Why doesn't it, though it should? The author provides a clear explanation: in that area civil society and state need each other and they develop in tandem, not one at the expense of the other (Kuzio 53).

The biggest problem when considering Ukraine is "four pronged transition" (Kuzio, "Contemporary Ukraine", 165-180). The processes of democratization, the development in market economy area happen along with the state and nation building, with the civil society change and mechanisms of social relations, which it is not the best option for the state. Having developed itself from the low level and under the political culture, dominated by for a long time by empires and totalitarian system, it is only the Western Ukraine that has the "cultural and political memory" about the civil society in Galicia, Tranthcarpathian region and Bukovina.

The union of state and civil society lies in the constitution, values and traditions as well. In case of Ukraine, the terms of "Nation" and "People" are translated into Ukrainian with a single word "narod" (meaning both nation and people). With the break down of Soviet Union, the biggest part of the Ukrainian population lost their Soviet and Soviet - Union identity and went back to local ones, for ethnic were not available. With time and common actions, group solidarity can later change the local identity and foster the integration of the nation, providing there is a feeling of "belongness".

Gellner (in Kuzio "Staatskapazitat, national integration und zivilgesellschaft" 57) specifies the ideal candidates for the civil society: only "the modular citizens", both cultural and political, make it possible to have both plurality and civil society in one community. Modular citizens don't belong to any social layer, but to culturally defined group (Kuzio 57-58).

And this is hard to accomplish in Ukraine, where more than 30% of nation have identities that are as territorially Ukrainian, as also culturally East Slavic, Eurasian and Soviet. Without the pre-existent "citizen nation" (qtd. in Kuzio 58), there is no civil society, no collective "consciousness" and no formed community. The important components that help developing the State and Civil Society are the rebirth of culture, language, and history.

While ethnic groups are most visible due to distinctive features, "'citizens' are the most naturally invisible because the grounds for determining membership in a political community are typically so abstract" (Conover, Hicks, 26-27).

With ethnic identities so national especially in Eastern Europe, can their divisive nature be improved by putting more stress on citizens, national or European identities?

"Could citizen identities redirect the focus of Eastern European away from ethnic identities? Given the variety of citizen identities, it is a real possibility. Citizen identities can be associated with the "real" political communities of cities and villages, and therefore provide the same level of distinctiveness that ethnic identities have to offer. If they are linked to real political communities that produce common goods hared in the deepest sense, citizens' identities may be powerful "we" identities supplanting ethnic identities. For this to occur, however, the category of citizen would have to be made more meaningful and more visible through local political discourse. Leaders would have to stress the ways in which everyday public life involved the exercise of local citizenship in the form of practices such as civility and tolerance…if citizen identities with national political communities are to be a viable alternative to ethnic identity, external framing through political discourse must play a major role in making the category of "citizen of the nation-state" visible, and in defining its meaning" (Conover, Hicks, 28-30). Moreover, without integration within the nation and state capacity it is unlikely that Ukraine will ever form strong civil society (Kuzio 59).

Unfortunately, the plans of the government to create the common civic society on the basis of common spiritual space remain weak, wrong conceptually and just confusing. They do not seem to include the aspect of the political culture, identity, values, but all mentioned, civil society and democracy are closely linked with one another (Kuzio 59).

Historically, with 1994 Kuchma's victory in Ukraine, the civil and political culture was questioned by different regional, clan and oligarch opponent groups, with self privileges rather than common culture and unification space as their priorities. No common values – no civil society. Another pillar of common society, the intelligence, which is mostly represented by Ukrainophobs and national democrats, was often ignored during the state building, and Russophobe intelligence simply was absent (Kuzio 61).

With the development of "new Ukrainians" that represented middle class, another problem arose. Speaking Russian and being indifferent towards Ukrainian culture and language, they formed no links and contact with the intelligence. Having economic interest in state economy, they supported the central or middle political parties and their so called "third way".

Is there a way out for cosmopolitan society? Some researchers tried to consolidate the nation of Ukraine on the basis of cosmopolite liberalism, democratic values and Western European way. They mistakenly consider it possible to support patriotism on one hand and on the other to stress East Slavic, pro-Russian one. But one can't have it both; it is possible to support either cosmopolite way as Habermas or Sternberger, or alternative ethno- cultural definition of Ukraine (Kuzio 62).

Most post Communist countries were facing the same dilemma and viewed by the West analogically: it is unlikely that they countries would return under totalitarian regime or imperialism, but at the same time, looking at Belarus authoritarian regime, one might never know. The results of half step back, defined by Gati, is happening when earlier the gravitation force of democracy has lost a lot from their swing, bringing this way an authoritaritive regime, a hybrid between Totalitarism and democratic market economy mode. Only in 7 of 27 post communist states the process of democratization hasn't stopped. Among them are Baltic state, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia. One doesn't see the name Ukraine among them (Kuzio 63).

Loss of trust towards democratic systems is due to instability of a new system to carry out overcome economic and social promises, adding to the feeling of cynism and betrayal in the nation. One should, thus, stop to identify long stagnation as "Transition"; the water is still, it doesn't have any current, nor leads to waterfall. Privatizing by "Nomenclatura" only added to the later weakness of political parties to protect the interests of citizens, without a common vision for the future (Kuzio 64).

Those who got to Parliament through this "Nomenklatura" method are most likely to support and foster "the 3rd way" of President Kuchma, adopted since 1995. Not being able to solve economic and social problems that were result of distrust in Parliament, to keep the positions by power sinecure the only way was to block the civil society access to politics. This third way led to stagnation in the second half of 1990 by preserving social structure, minimizing social change, stressing common society from below. The strategy of the 3rd way was to "mask" social conflicts, so the oligarch's elite would look as legitimate at power (Kuzio 66)

The third way means Ukraine will be torn between capitalism and communism, minimal social change and eliminated political activity: trying at the same time to preserve societal balance and minimize social change. What happens as a result? Instead of the "modular people", there is no one that has a true united system of values. By not joining either side, they end up at the end without belonging to any society and without anything common with others. Thus part of the society end up being tied to clan and oligarchs, while other is cut from the political process (Kuzio 67).

It is still impossible to overcome the treasury of national wisdom: if you run after two hares, you would catch neither…Ukrainians hasn't learned the history lesson of others: divide and rule. They should remember one for themselves: join or die. And the political elite as well, for and as we would see, the mass and elite do not share the same views on the main political and cultural issues. The ruling class and elite are aliens on the planet called Ukraine.

In general, one considers 4 factors that block the successful transition of Ukraine: fixed nomenclature and oligarchs clan, that are by sinecure/feeding rack favouring stagnation from civil society; the absence of red plurality, for due to fear of losing statehood, political parties agree to consensus possible nature of citizens during elections, due to "political memory "in connection with democracy and finally, the fear of breaking down the country, that results in over centralisms. Solving the question of multiple national identities, loyalty and weal national integration is seen as threat for national stability and democracy. In this way, blocking and locking the civil society and its political activity at the local level, the political elite fosters the weak interest of the civil society in politics (Kuzio 69).

The problem with the third way is also the amorphous society of Ukraine, where more than 45% belong ideologically to the left center, a group that dominated Ukrainian politics from 1994. The "3rd way" wants to take the best from both options: either is capitalism versus democracy, or European integration versus Eurasian political vector. Subtelny described it as the mistakes of ideological compass (Kuzio 70).

The same applied to the amorphous identity of the Russophobes that appear active only during elections. The situation is better in Western and Central Ukraine, where the Urakinonophobs dominate the state centers in cultural and demographic terms. At the same time, in Lemberg, there is an active ethnic Russian organization that exists there, where there is a clear national identity of the opposite group. So to say, without the civil culture and political one, there in no individual choice, for freedom and identity depend upon culture (Kuzio 71).

The inherited local identity, multiple and Russophobe identities are also in the way when it comes to evolution from link parties and such political spectrum. If the Titular nation in Ukraine did not fall apart, like in Poland or Lithuania, it would in unity follow the way of state oriented and social democratic ideology (Kuzio 72).

Communist party with its negative ideas on titular Ukrainian nation represents the extreme side of the left parties. Moreover, it lessens those of link parties that are for Ukrainian independence. The very negative line of thought about Ukrainian independence is as harmful as it gets for the formation of civil society.

This is one of the many elements that Ukraine is missing in building of strong civil society. The weak position of civil society is also connected to the elite group that defines themselves as "centrists" and support "Ukrainian 3rd way" that freezes the relations between the state and civil society and thwarts the democratically way of Ukraine far behind (Kuzio 73). Thus, the third way is not slope, or diagonal, but zigzag one. It is not the way itself, but a justification for the course, that just happened to be, and

happened to be in the politicians' hands. It was not planed to be carried out as a specific strategy.

Looking back at the articles that covered first 10 years of independence, it is even worse to notice more indifference in the society, wider gap between Ukrainian and Russian speaking population, less chances for a clear vision between EU and Ukraine. If the politicians have not helped over the period, but rather made things complicated, it is high time for the citizens to analyze the past, present and form the future vision of Ukrainian way.

The blog comments show how this idea and the question of the "third way" are implemented in the consciousness of average people and how unprepared the mass is to distinguish the sheep's from the goats. The blog comments present as well clearer view on the European Union. When an average Ukrainian hears about EU agreements, what kind of image stands out in his head and is it possible to alter it? What was done to improve it and what happened in the paradigm change of the average Ukrainian?

The following data is collected from the Forum of Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly) newspaper[4], a printed source that is exclusively interested on politics. Being easily accessed on the Internet both from West and East, South and North of Ukraine and worldwide, it critically and objectively represents the attitudes among common people towards aspirations of the political elite. The briefing shows the reaction of the elite to the EU-UA key dialogues and parallel tracks the comments of Ukrainian citizens. Due to scarce Internet access among the population, the comments on newspaper site began to appear in late 2006. The overview of the articles on EU-Ukraine relations and, more importantly, the comments of the Ukrainian citizenry create the perceived image of the EU and hint at decisions viewed as unfavorable among Ukraine's population.

The article "European Integration is for the Unworthy" from September 2007 reflects on ENP agreement. The main points highlight the futility of ENP policy with no individual approach towards the countries. While Ukraine was at that time led by Kuchma and thus in a bad political position, the country was eager to agree for anything that would strengthen ties with the EU. Looking back, the author concludes that the ENP agreement was created only for those nations deemed unworthy of integration. No allowance was made for the possibility that one of the countries might be successful enough in achieving status for EU integration according to the article. If only 40% of the

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[4] Zerkalo Nedeli (The Mirror Weekly) is a popular Ukrainian newspaper that is known for its unbiased approach and healthy criticism which is extremely helpful and objective in representing the reality of politics and everyday aspirations of elite and average Ukrainians. < http://www.mw.ua/editorial/address/>.

citizenry agree that Ukraine should join EU this country cannot lay claim to becoming an EU member (Hetmanchyk "European Integration is for Unworthy")**.**

The comments:

- *The VVP in Ukraine is twice as low as in Poland or Estonia, but 3 times bigger than in Moldova. Make your own conclusions… As far as the Ukraine's aim to enter the concerns, we should definitely have a referendum. Personally I do not want to live in EU, nor in Russia.☺ Main reasons: taxes, political correctness, less of private liberty. Yes, yes. These are common reasons for not entering the EU as well as Russia. The situation is better in Ukraine (*Zlodej*)*

- *But in general, do we need to enter the EU at all? Is it panacea from all our troubles? We need to build Europe in Ukraine, and not beg for attention and money from western bureaucrats. If Ukraine would set order in its own home, she would easily be one of region leaders. Neither South Korea, China nor Singapore is the EU members, but they are world leaders. EU would bind us with tons of obligations that would never allow us to become regional leaders. We need our own project (*Normann*).*

- *This peacockery, so to say, how could they equal us with… is what harms us. For Ukraine to reach some of the indexes (including the intensity of cooperation with EU) is a far fetch. And absolutely unjustified, Ukrainian bureaucrats want some kind of special treatment, a la "stimulate and invite us". We are not Norway and not Sweden. Relax and work. For they seem to worry too much they would overdemocracize Ukraine* (Fleur).

- *An erroneous essay in "euro romantics" spirit, that doesn't care about development of relations with EU in the spheres, that are beneficial for UKRAINE, instead they turned a "signal" in a fetish of "signal" and treated it like the doomsday. ENP gives possibility to enrich UKRAINE, in fact it can lead to the "entering without membership", meaning to the economic integration without the participation in political institutions. Would someone argue that it is not an advantage?*(SD)

- *WEC (part of EC, secretary general Solana) is waiting for Ukraine from 1997, Visegrad group (created for uniting efforts to join EU and NATO) thought, that Ukraine would become its member in 2008, but Ukraine doesn't even mention it! Ukraine has no foreign policy, only imitations and wish-washing. Kuchma, Tymoshenko, Yushchenko, Tarasuk all promised heaven! But where are those talking birds? The country is fed up with banging in empty pans!* (PAN)

The following article from 2008 "Another summit, or how to step from geography into real practice "discusses the 12th summit EU–Ukraine in September 2008 led by the French presidency. At this summit the Ukrainian question was again set aside. Vague

remarks questioned the national priorities in Ukraine. Europeans are also alerted to the excessive politicization of Ukrainian society, and they need a clearer understanding in economic and trade spheres. The author, chairmen of the EU-Ukraine delegation, stresses the importance of strong government that would explain and demand the execution of agreement (Veselovsky, "Another summit, or how to step from geography into real practice").

The Comments:

- *Europeans are also alerted to the excessive politicization of Ukrainian society". And Ukraine is scared of youth riots with burnt autos and broken windows in Paris stores. So it's not an argument. Europe is also not a saint* (1991).

- *Mr. Diplomat! Change your nickname to Provocateur! It suits you. By the way, countries are asking for a membership in EU and NATO, but in SES (Ukraine-Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Common Economic Space, transl. comment) they are driven by force* (Lisevych Taras).

- *I understand that Euro-integration is some absolute blessing that someone has already decided on and it is not discussed anymore…it seems not right to me… I'm not convinced and I think 70% of population supports me, that we need to get in there…there are surely some good arguments for it… I would like to ask the deeply respected Mr. Veselovsky to explain to his compatriots, if we are knocking there, then – why???*(Andrey)

- *"development, economy progress, safeguarding of spirituality, private security of Ukrainians can be guaranteed only thanks to the membership in EU"— Well, I do understand that Ukraine is a poor country. But is it as all that poor?*(Diplomat)

The article of 2008 *"But no matter how you name us, friends…"* briefs on the new Eastern Partnership. The agreement goes back to the Polish-Swedish proposal on creating the Eastern Partnership, where all 27 member states would cooperate with their six east-European neighbors – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgian, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belorussia. EU clearly stated again that the agreement is not a stepping stone for membership. The initiators of EP explains the advantage of building up ties in the region, which are already good enough and do not need being focused upon, according to Ukrainian media. Despite the new name, it is clear that the EU does not want to distinguish Ukraine among other countries in the region (Silina, "But no matter how you name us, friends…").

The Comments:

- *Dear friends Ukrainians! You should read Klychko in this edition. Nobody wants a partner that can not make out with it. In order to make it easier for Europeans, you shouldn't constantly ask for the foreign help, but show yourself what you are capable*

of doing, as to develop, work out your own problems and co work with the partners that have the same aims. By asking and asking until we, Europeans, give up, you will not achieve a thing. But we are ready to help (Jacob).

- *Dear Jacob, as a majority of Europeans, you are paltering in terms of Ukraine. You would like to help yourself, and Ukraine for Europe is just the attractive lickerish slice, where one can feed oneself big time. Europe is implementing an evident parasite policy towards its Eastern European partners – by closing down the enterprises at the West, transferring them to East in order to earn milliards, serving it with the sauce "we are creating working places"* (Solomija).

- *How many more times one needs to say! Isn't it clear that such Ukraine is NOT NE-DEED! In the place of EU, I wouldn't accept Ukraine as well. First it is necessary to become independent and strong, and then people would love us. But with such state of things...Who on earth needs us with our level of political work and problems. EU has its own problems. Less imitation, more work. Arbeit macht frei* (Normann).

- *I think Europe should be interested in closer relations with Ukraine with all our maturity. For them, taking into consideration the authoritative evolution in Russia, it is important to get us to NATO, and this is possible only when our citizens will directly "feel" Europe and see the difference between it and Russian. It seems to me, they are starting to grasp it over there* (Uncle_iggy).

- *The only help desperately needed from EU – neutralization from outer pressure in any form, notably the utmost support of independence!!! For that it is non obligatory to accept us somewhere...God please help us "disentangle" our inner problems, with the help of a back-seat drivers!* (Female citizen from Odessa).

- *We are pushing and pushing to this Europe as those poor relatives, that don't even have a piece of bread. This is very then quite evident! They shovel us back and say: go away, but we are still pushing. Because we shouldn't slam and yell and screech to the whole world – help, save us etc. No, we need to build the county and bred up those citizens, so that in evil, bad Europe would be frightened of our neighborhood. Frightened in the sense that they haven't noticed such a beauty with terrific diamonds* (Ku-ku).

- *Until we do not set order in our own house, until we break down the habit of our nation servants to steal from the nation that they serve and at the same time shed crocodile tears. But Europe is afraid of such our fair politicians, where all EU help would definitely end up in their pockets* (Ilona).

- *When something of this manner is done by Germans – it's called "locust attack", but their own policy towards EE countries they name as "direct investments".*

The same concerns the wonderful promises for Ukraine "so you let us pasture at your field, and then we will think, whether to accept you in the community or not". And this is called the game on fair conditions?? Or next hypocrisy? The author is quite right! Super article. Thank you (Solomija).

- *As usual, we are blaming someone and we are offended. This is nonsense. Baltic States wanted (but they all wanted) and they are in the EU. We all have our own meanings here and all barging with it as to the cash desk. We learn to be a united nation, we learn to respect ourselves – and then maybe we would live like it's supposed to be with order, without Europe. Russia is not asking to get in EU, but it "orders" them ...and is doing it pretty good, so it is respected , and they are afraid of it... don't wait for bounties form nature (Viktor).*

Ex-deputy of foreign minister of Ukraine Eliseev in the article *"Ukraine and the EU: partnership – association – membership"* explains that there has been a change in the spirit of the European Union integration and the Eastern Partnership agreement as a result. One should be objective and realize that the times of politically motivated "waves" are over and in its place is the epoch of step-by-step integration, "infiltration". Even though the EU politicians are hard to convince, one should not forget, that EU membership is a standard that brings Ukrainian bureaucrats to at least some kind of minimum common denominator. The government apparatus is slipping on the bureaucratic level, that's why the EU integration should be a national project (Eliseev, "Ukraine and the EU: partnership – association – membership").

The author highlights the following advantages of EP: it is the first agreement that is based not on geographical factor, but on real partnership, adapted specifically to Ukraine, that is assigned the status of the key partner in the region. The Ukrainian side tries to bring out to its European colleagues that the unification of EU is a process far away from being completed. When there is still a country knocking on EU door, this process can not be viewed as complete, and enlargement as successful (Eliseev, "Ukraine and the EU: partnership – association – membership").

The Comments:

- *"Europe has built a new iron curtain, but these dreamers either can not get it or as usual are lying for plebes to buy into it"* (Neways).

- *"'This is the way of consecutive, step by step liberalization of visa regime' – I am deeply moved by those Ukrainian Euro makers. In 90th I could enter to Poland, Hungary, Slovakia just showing my passport, than the national visas came, now it is Shengen that humiliates dignity* (Neways).

- *"Ukraine, Moldova and other members of the group have only one normal check point – aspirations towards the circle of modern states, where a HUMAN being and his problems are on priority, and that is EU. And moving towards Asia means moving towards the dead end. The sooner our politicians would adopt needed reforms, the better it would be for the citizens* (Ivan Turbinke).

As one can see, the messages of the articles are skeptical and realistic, with the uniting idea of developing a national project rather than concentrating on either EU or Russia. It is thought that Ukraine should choose, rather than ask to be chosen. The image of EU is portrayed as the power from outside, one that is not quite interested in treating Ukraine as an important partner, while the agreements seem as "same old song" with new decorations, that are already old-fashioned. Citizens mostly accuse the present government of being unable to consolidate itself and thus presenting the country in a bad manner on the international stage.

Even though the society is not happy, there is no potential for social protest. The data from the Institute of the Sociology "Ukrainian society" and "Sozis" show that discontent with the life in Ukraine is discussed mainly within the circle of friends, and is not challenged by organized actions (Stegnij, "New president will and new elite will not improve the situation in the country"). The answer is that the situation in the country has changed, but not dramatically, while society has hidden shadow incomes and ¾ of the population receives regular hidden payments that are unreported to the government. The government reacts to pacify the populace with another round of paltry doles, miserable pittances – it is its last trump card before the elections.

Civic peace and tranquility are more important for Ukrainian society than establishing justice and order. That fact explains the alerted attitude of the society to the nations' representatives, from which some active actions can be expected.

We have covered the recent history of the post-Communist years and now move forward to the upcoming elections and present position of political elite in Ukraine and their views on external vectors. The 2010 election offers a fresh and intriguing opportunity to forecast the possible results. We have analyzed and translated the present party programs for the elections considering specific statements that express the attitude towards the European Community and foreign policy. This will help both the European Union and Ukraine see each other without distortion and stereotyping, for the written word remains.

The Party of Regions led by Victor Yanukovich as the presidential candidate promises:
- The external policy of openness and neighbourhood;

- Preservation of nonaligned status of Ukraine;

- Considering the present geopolitical realities, … nonaligned status of Ukraine is the key element of national security, the guarantor of improvement of its international influence and authority;

- Re-creation of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the Russian Federation, the countries of CIS, providing the strategical partnership with the USA, EU and G20 countries ("Ukraine – for People", Preelection Programme of the Candidate for President Post V. F. Yanukovich).

Litvin as a candidate from Socialist Party promotes the following:

- realization of politics of nonaligned status of Ukraine based on active neutrality status;

- building two poles of state security: based on improving the relations with neighbourhood countries; intensifying the cooperation with international institutions and countries in borders, guaranteeing the territorial unity and sovereignty of Ukraine;

- realization of one common Economic Space with Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan;

- reaching an agreement with the EU on cooperation towards free movement of people, goods, services and capitals ("People's time", Preelection Programme of the Candidate for President Post V. Litvin).

Simonenko, representative of the Communist Party, promises the following:

- The foreign policy of Ukraine would be cardinally changed. The main priorities would be: legislative provision and international juridical establishment of neutral, nonaligned status of Ukraine;

the present regime, by involving Ukraine in NATO is ruining relations with Russia, betraying the national interests;

- Accession to international political and economical organizations and participation in integrational processes would be performed only in conjunction with the national interests of Ukraine;

- active support to the idea of forming of new structure of common European and Euroatlantic security, that is based on the refusal of confrontation thinking and bloc approaches;

- an important step in this direction will be entering of joining CES with Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan;

- an important contribution in European integration would become the creation of three-lateral energetic consortsium with the participation of Ukraine, Russia and the countries of the European Union;

- Active politics in all directions – in the national interests of Ukraine;

The question on entering of Ukraine into the CES and non-acceptability of its entering into NATO would be put up in 2010 for all-state Ukrainian referendum (Preelection Programme of the Candidate for President Post P. M. Simonenko).

Some different ideas come from Arsenij Yatsenuk, ex-Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, and a new candidate on political arena.

- We have to learn how to join ourselves, not only to be joined;

- Ukraine, as a sovereign nation, should take the initiative and responsibility for new integration;

- Kyiv should return itself the role of the center and the leader of Eastern European civilization;

- We propose a new Eastearn European project and the base for the integration at the beginning would include four common policy areas: common policy in the sphere of energy and energy security, transport and connection, participation in international production market and common development of sciences, industry of high technologies and aviation;

- The countries of Eastern Europe have to be united not only by organizational and administrative forms, but also by common means and common activity. Kyiv can and should become the leader of Eastearn European integration project;

Ukraine should be the iniator and coauthor of the project of a Big Europe and make this project a determined and purposeful focus ("New Course", Preelection Programme of the Candidate for President Post A. Jatsenyk).

Jatsenyk also addressed the issue of split of Ukraine:

- Ukrainians, Russians and Belorussians during the centuries widened the borders of European civilization towards East, opening Europe to the Pacific Ocean and Middle Asia. A bipolar world and cold war divided Europe into East and West. This split is preserved even today and goes through our country, dividing it into Western and Eastern parts;

- Only by solving the problem of a split of Europe, can we solve the problem of a split of Ukraine;

- The modern world is entering the epoch of bipolarity and competition of contitnents. If we, as Europeans, do not want to lose this global competition, we are obliged to form one common spase of Big Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Europe doesn't end with the borders of the European Union. Ukraine, as many other

countries, that have not entered the EU remain as before historically, culturally and civilizationally European,

- For all of us, Europeans in the West and Europeans in the East, the common space of equal relations between countries, the space of common European humanistic values, formed by Christianity and European philosophy is needed;

- We, Europeans, must create the new continental unity without external barriers, wars, conflicts and resistance;

- We need a Big Europe as a space for free people, goods and trade movements; space for political dialogue and common economical projects. Big Europe must strive as much as possible of mutual interdependence of European countries. This is the true guarantee of European security;

- Ukraine should initiate the building of a Big Europe, and become one of the leaders of this process – that is…the geopolitical and historical mission;

- Ukraine, as a member of big common European family, should build partnership relations with other influential centers of the modern world, in particular with China and the USA;

- Developing the integrational processes in the Eastern European project and intitiating the project of Big Europe, we need to provide the development of national Ukrainian culture and state Ukrainian language ("New Course", Preelection Programme of the Candidate for President Post A. Jatsenyk).

Is it that some political forces still see the European Union and "West" as the root of evil for everything bad that happened in Ukraine? Anyways, the programs do not provide a decent variety of freshness, not mentioning lack of choice for a voter with European aspirations. Thus one may expect the change of the political elite after the elections.

The first think to notice is that "EU is running on empty in Ukraine" (Gnedina, "EU is running on empty in Ukraine") "Ukrainian politics… like Mexican telenovelas" where "the characters are the same for years and years: charming but cunning Tymoshenko, dull but pragmatic Yanukovych, idealistic but weak Yushchenko, plus the whole plethora of old faces from Litvin to Tihipko. Yatsenyuk is the only new face, campaigning with smart khaki billboards, but with surprisingly old-fashioned views". However, there is a change in theatrics: no solid pro-EU message that had been present in programs of previous elections. The EU is loosing its popularity, with the popular support for European integration decreasing from 65% in 2002 to 43% in 2008. It is the idea of the "third way," that Kuzio talked about.

Does a pro-EU electorate have an option? Yatsenyk's Eastern European Space is a version of Slavic brotherhood "with a Ukrainian spin" (Gnedina, "EU is running on empty in Ukraine") Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych are rather moderate as well, Yushchenko, though the most pro-European, has political life with low popularity. Vladimir Lytvin and Serhiy Tihipko are in favor of a Ukrainian project. Ex-Pro-European Anatoly Gritsenko claims that in five years we would be knocking on the doors of neither the EU, nor NATO, nor the Tashkent agreement nor the Single Economic Space. He says that internal efficiency is now the Ukraine's priority. And a strong army." (Gnedina, "EU is running on empty in Ukraine")

Thus, the programs narrow down to 2 main vectors of "dogma" flow: either eastwards to Russia or a self-project. Is EU integration worthy or unworthy? In considering the answer, the elite has forgotten something essential. "European integration is able to foster internal reforms that are objectively necessary for the progressive development of Ukraine, for guaranteeing our security, free movement of our citizens, fighting corruption and the development of economy" (Filliphcyk, "How not to get lost between pan-Ukrainian imperialism and Euroscepticism").

 It is said: "EU is not ready to give us membership perspective and does not see us as European." This is the guiding principle of those conceiving a group project of East European nations under the guidance of Kyiv or pan Ukrainian imperialism. Blame for lack of preparedness for EU integration is not placed on the lack of Ukraine internal reform, not on consecutive destruction of Ukraine state institutions, not on misrule and corruption, but unpreparedness of the European Union to open its warm embrace and wallet for us" (Filliphcyk, "How not to get lost between pan-Ukrainian imperialism and Euroscepticism").

This is the idea that should boggle the minds of Ukrainians in East and West. Donbas, Eastern "black" heart, a concentration of heavy industry and Russian speaking population. This coal feeder of ex-USSR, represents the image of Ukraine's faded glory and city grieves over its economic plight rather than ethnic situation. Contrasted to Donbas is Lviv in the Western Ukrane, so European and mysterious, reflecting genuinely the Ukrainian spirit of high mythical traditions… Where is the line to connect these two opposing examples? Is it the pulse of ardent Ukrainian heart and golden hands?

The parties' statements and positions present another hidden danger for the politics of Ukraine that Taras Kuzio talks about, namely "the third way." Moreover, the main problem is that no one from the politicians addresses the real problems of the country, which is quite dramatic. "The 2010 elections do not give the electorate any political policy choice, and that is why the choice would be geopolitical. Everything

depends upon the way the elections go, whether they would be recognized as illegitimate. The future scenario depends on that as well. And then the scenarios of external influence would be carried out" (Podgornaja, "The future elections would be the beginning of change of the political elite). Thus the EU should strive with all its force so that it will be ready to fill in the vacuum. The percentage of people who would vote against all the candidates is close to 60%.

Being incapable of compromise, as the last 5 years have shown, the two possible scenarios of the elections are: one political party would dispute the victory, followed by a temporary balance of power, and then new round of struggle for power; elections would be cancelled or recognized as illegitimate. That would show that the government has come to the political bankruptcy, and there is a possibility of the consolidation of new political power (Podgornaja, "The future elections would be the beginning of change of the political elite).

Now we turn to the position of the common people, do they understand it, and do they approve? The average businessman is not likely to be in favor of EU integration ideas, for their financial interests are outside the EU, particularly when you add fears of new regulations, elimination of bribery and competition.

The Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies stated in 2000 that the idea of EU integration is primarily supported only by the decision-making elite (48%). The general population favoured the integration with CIS, primarily with Russia (57%) versus EU (29). At the same time, the mass population considered that EU is interested in Ukraine's accession (49%) and majority of experts were sure that the EU will most likely not provide any membership road due to Ukraine's slow mode of democratization process and all-state reforms (Pidluska, "Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integration").

What can be learnt from this data? First of all, that the idea of integration is discussed solely in a specific, limited group of elite, while it is absent in the every day topic of discussion by the mass population. Secondly, the genuine information about the EU is lacking: 74% of elite named the provided information on the EU accession as totally inadequate, with 1/3 of mass population confessing to having no idea on the topic at all. Both groups operate mainly on stereotypes and myths. The reason might be the skeptical attitude of the elite on the prospects of the EU to open its market for Ukrainian goods and cancel anti-dumping measure. Meanwhile, both the elites and the general population operate on myths rather than facts. The elite also appears to be reserved about the prospect of opening EU markets to Ukrainian goods and services, particularly referring to politically-motivated rejections of Ukraine's projects (like the Antonov-7X

cargo aircraft) and a number of anti-dumping investigations (Pidluska, "Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integration").

What are the reasons that weaken Ukraine's aspirations for the EU? Experts agree on "slow reform (90%), rampant corruption (90%); flawed taxation policy, lack of transparency and instability of economic legislation (90%). Far fewer are concerned with lack of democracy (54%) and lack of respect for intellectual property rights (41%)." Only 33% mentioned Ukraine's dependence on Russia for energy and hindrance of integration by Ukraine's CIS membership, meaning that elite doesn't consider the area, where their interests lie, as a challenge to the integration of Ukraine into the world community(Pidluska, "Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integration").

Interestingly, only one third of the experts surveyed by UCEPS (33%) pointed to Ukraine's excessive dependence on Russia for energy sources, and very few believed that Ukraine's prospects for EU integration were hindered by Ukraine's membership in the CIS. The reasons for this view may be the reluctance of Ukraine's business-political elite to see the CIS, and primarily Russia, where most of their business interests lie, as a challenge to Ukraine's EU integration course, which most of them, in their turn, see as something abstract.

Ukrainian analysts agree that Ukraine is not doing a good job in promoting European integration, and that necessary reforms are slow to being realized. The main challenge lies in too little coordination of state institutions on EU accession and low interest of a public that triggers low support and lack of demand for the integration (Pidluska, "Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integration").

Key challenges are seen as a lack of coordination and coherence in the actions of state institutions with regard to European integration efforts and lack of institutional capacity, as well as lack of public interest, awareness and support and demand for European integration.

The dynamics of attitude towards the European Union through 2002 till 2008 among the mass population are presented in the table below (Pidluska, "Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integration").

	YES	NO	HARD TO TELL
December 2008	44.7	35.2	20.0
October 2008	47.2	30.2	22.7
April 2008	49.9	30.7	19.4
February 2008	50.9	29.2	19.9
December 2007	54.2	29.5	16.3
September 2007	45.7	36.1	18.2
December 2006	48.5	32.0	19.5
September 2005	40.1	36.1	23.8
November 2004	44.7	28.6	26.7
September 2003	53.1	26.4	20.5
November 2002	65.1	12.9	22.0

Comparing with the results of 2007, the previous table shows a good tendency. However, the chart below is valuable in terms of the answers people provided: namely why did they NOT want to enter the European Union (Pidluska, "Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integration").

Distribution of answers to a question:
"What is your attitude to the idea of Ukraine joining the European Union?"
(Data percentage to the total of respondents)

33,00%   35,20%

31,80%

- Do support completely
- Do not support
- Not sure

Some of the most frequent answers to an open-ended question: **"If you "do not support" the idea, could you tell why?"** (the style of answers is kept)

- First of all, it is needed to establish interallied relations with other countries only afterwards putting in order your own one.

- For Ukraine there is much more benefit to develop international contacts within the Uniform Economic Space with Russia, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan.

- Everything is good there when we are not present. The European Union is not waiting for Ukraine, but for cheap labour force.

- We have another mentality.

- They already have more than enough hangers-on.

- Our economy will collapse and become an appendage of more developed countries.

- It will result in complete loss of our independence.

- It is worthwhile to join various leagues and unions only after getting the country up.

- We should join the European Union only together with Russia who will always support and protect us.

- In the European Union Ukraine is seen only as a trash dump for their cull products.

- Ukraine is not ready to join the EU.

- Joining the EU is a form of economic slavery.

- It will result in loss of domestic manufacture.

- There is no confidence to the European countries. They have always been bringing us wars and destruction.

- We should develop our manufacturing ourselves. For example, agriculture of Ukraine could feed all Europe without joining it.

- But we are already in the center of Europe!

- Of course, it is much better to live there, but they won't let us live as well as they do.

- Not at any price. I don't support it, because I have already been there and could see what Europe is living by.

- As an independent state we should rouse our independent economy.

- We don't need it.

Nobody is waiting for us there, and so on (Pidluska, "Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integration").

Judging from the answers, the European Union is seen as industry partner that at the same time poses a danger for economy and independence of Ukraine. The benefits of the joint programs, grants, development researches are not taken into consideration. Or common people are just now aware of it, preferring to live with myths on EU perception and "pink dreams" about Ukraine being able to stand tall by itself dominate the minds of the people. Still, three main approaches are visible here as well: self-state, integration with CIS and EU, the last being the least favourable.

This phenomenon allows the politicians to maneuver and play on social demagogy. They clearly understand that the society is still not ready for the active protest actions. One then realizes the necessity of external healthy support.

And what views do the external actors have on Ukraine? Though it lacks official status as a candidate country, many observers are of the view that the Ukraine will, one day, also join the EU. This forms the context to Yalta European Strategy's third survey of the opinions of Europeans and the Ukraine's membership in the European Union. This follows on from two surveys on the same theme, carried out in March and November of 2005.

Public opinion on Ukraine's EU membership has become more clearly defined. 55% of all respondents in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the UK say that they would be in favour of Ukraine joining the EU should it meet all necessary conditions. Over a third (34%) says they would be against and 10% say they are unable to form an opinion. Support has increased since November 2005 (by +4%), with the opinion becoming more delineated and fewer respondents giving a 'don't know' answer. The youngest generation are particularly enthusiastic towards Ukrainian membership, with

63% of those aged between 18 and 30 in favour. Polish opinion remains the most favourable towards this particular accession. At 73%, the Polish level of public support here has increased by 9% since November 2005. Opinion is more favourable towards the potential accession of Ukraine (55%) than it is towards those of Russia (45%), Turkey (40%) and Morocco (35%) ("Europeans and Ukraine's Membership of the European Union").

Although the highest level of opposition is seen in Germany (50% against), the highest increase of opposition can be observed in the UK, where now 10% more are against the Ukrainian membership than earlier. It should be noted that the increase in opposition to Ukraine joining seems to be more due to a general trend in opinion in the UK against further EU enlargement ("Europeans and Ukraine's Membership of the European Union").

The vast majority seems of the view that Ukraine's entry to the EU is inevitable. Only 9% of the respondents say it will never happen. Compared to November 2005, public opinion now envisions that Ukraine's accession has moved closer. The majority (59%) believe that Ukraine will join in around 10 years' time the latest (around 5 years, 26%; around 10 years, 33%). Only a small proportion foresee the accession process taking place more slowly (15 to 20 years, 14%), although it should be noted that almost 1 in 5 (18%) lack a clear opinion. The Polish public is most likely to see enlargement as happening within five years (37%), with the French public least optimistic (18%) ("Europeans and Ukraine's Membership of the European Union").

Younger respondents are more enthusiastic towards Ukrainian membership: 7 in 10 of those aged between 18 and 30 say that this will happen in around 10 years or sooner.

The majority of respondents in the EU believe the EU should take a proactive approach to Ukraine. Over half (52%), say that they think the EU should acknowledge that Ukraine's eventual future lies within the EU, with a view to encouraging the internal reforms necessary to opening negotiations in the future. This view is shared by 7 in 10 (69%) of those who favour Ukraine's accession ("Europeans and Ukraine's Membership of the European Union").

Twenty-six percent favour a more passive 'wait-and-see' policy, given that Ukraine exhibits few signs as to future possibilities. Less than 1 in 10 (9%) would rather open negotiations immediately. This figure remains low (14%) amongst those who favour Ukrainian accession, indicating that even here there is strong recognition of the need for reforms to take place before formal talks can commence ("Europeans and Ukraine's Membership of the European Union").

On the contrary, Ukrainians feel how hard it is to acquire a status of being European: the Eastern Partnership, drafted by Czech Republic, was corrected by "elder" EU countries: thus " European" countries turned into "eastern European partners" or "partner countries" and "visa simplification process" changed into "long-term perspective" for it sounded way too "pro-enlargement". Only the restricted summit didn't change into something new: the partnership question has stayed as limited (Fediashin, "Summit 'Eastern Partnership': how hard it is to become European").

To sum up, the regional division between Western, Eastern and Central Ukraine, the voting results in all three regions, as well as different history and political background results in three dominant ideas on the future prospects for Ukraine: pro-European, pro-Russian/Eastern and national idea.

But the major question remains: why the changes in Ukrainian society are so slow? Both the Western and Ukrainian politicians set aims that do not touch the bleeding Ukrainian heart and soul, exhausted and swallowed by the constant political crisis. For grounded in economic, personal, pocket-enrichment rush, they do not really know the electorate and do not care for the real development. In order to improve the political life of the country, the politicians should take a deeper and intent look from their golden political throne into deep and truly invaluable Ukrainian soul.

Let us point out that the majority of blog comments were grammatically built with the usage of impersonal sentences ("it is needed to change.., it is worth reforming"…rather that "we should change", "reform"…) that shows a key element to understanding the Ukrainian mind and its perception of EU. The European fairy tale goes: "And the father planted the tree that gave golden apples". Whereas a Ukrainian one would be "The father *heard* that in a far-away land *someone* planted the tree that gave golden apples. And he sent his sons to get them." The root of misperception of each other lies within the images and myths in mentality of population, thus let us look at Europe and Ukraine at this angle in the next chapter.

Before proceeding, we turn one more time towards Stuart Hall's theory that states that identity is self-sustaining between emergence and disappearance. The emergence of Ukraine as a nation after the Soviet Union collapse and the times before, with the emergence clues happening again and again, provided the Ukrainian identity that disappears in similar ways. The country has been swallowed up by Russia and others again and again, making it hard to distinguish the layers of genuine identity and the forced one. As every identity characteristic is always fluid, always under erasure, we turn to Hall's two kinds of identities – identity as being (sense of unity) and identity as

becoming (process of self identification with gaps in the formation of identity). It is exactly these layers that would be considered in the third chapter.

"Identity is formed at the unstable point where the 'unspeakable' stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of a culture. And since he/she is positioned in relation to cultured narratives which have been profoundly expropriated, the colonized subject is always 'somewhere else.' The colonized subject is doubly marginalized, displaced always to other than where he or she is, or is able to speak from" (Hall 115). The next part of work would try to find out where the Ukrainians are "speaking from."

IV. MENTALITY: AN EQUATION WITH N UNKNOWNS

Ukraine is a country of one official
millionaire, a song for
hirsute ladies, a maritime agency
providing crew.

Ukraine is what?
Ukraine is being blundered
by foreign words, as ugly
as a road diverting
Gas, doing the splits, guilty
Of the Black Sea. Of course
Ukraine is ready to acknowledge
Its debt, obligated to marry
(Yakich, "Brilliant Pebbles" 16-18).

We only thing sad songs about our former greatness
and about ruling in our own land…
We have created a beautiful poetical myth about ourselves,
lullabied ourselves and do not want
to raise a finger in order to become a great nation in this world."
(Slaboshpitskiy 9).

Reflection of the mentality in the political life of Ukraine nowadays is not favourable. It is most unlikely that at present Ukrainians would find something to support in one of the political doctrines, for the nation became more split than before, the national heroes turned into losers and betrayers. The parties still appeal to the things that have been promised a long time ago, but never carried out. Repetition is the mother of learning of course, but this time learning brings negative impulses. But is it possible that the root of the problem is not in the leaders, but in the nation itself?

One can notice how politically composed the image of the EU is, but is there something else to it? Being so close, but yet so far away, what kind of a spiritual mentality does European represent? And to what degree can a Ukrainian identify oneself with such a mentality? To grasp the genuine meaning of Europeaness one needs to feel European. The day when an average Ukrainian stands on the Steppe and lets Europe run into his veins is on the 9th of May, the Day of Europe. On that day in Kiev and other cities of Ukraine the EU countries present their culture, tradition, food, and simply are

there to talk and to appraise. On a big board is a question: "Who is a European?" All over the board are handwritten responses and ideas ranging from "to be European is cool" to the more direct "a highly cultural, tolerant and conflict-free person" and "a European is a Ukrainian yesterday, today, tomorrow, always" (Kornijchyk, "All Europe in one day").

What is also creating the image of EU are Ukrainian working migrants, that constantly send money, presents, and letters back home, telling about advantages of life in Europe as well as advising to "get out of the country, for the next 20 years nothing would change much" (Kornijchyk, "All Europe in one day").

As far as describing the negative sides, it is mostly connected with the mentality of European citizens: law obedient, knowing how to enjoy their free time and life, punctual, strict, a deadline-oriented approach in work and studies, individualism without a personal approach, friendships which are not intermixed in workplaces, and if workplace friendships do exist, they are not as deep as in Ukraine where friends are considered the second family and claim attention and time apart from the workplace.

A direct solution to creating a real image of EU would be the ability of Ukrainians to travel abroad without feeling oneself as a third-world citizen and endlessly waiting in embassy lines. The feeling of dignity abuse accumulated to such a degree, that the revenge "visa" wall that Ukraine lately planned to reconstruct united the society in most outrageous joy and support: "Symmetrical proposal to EU countries: the entrance to Ukraine is possible only with a valid Ukrainian visa; the visa fee is 35 Euros. The documents needed for submission: a colorful photo 5X4.5, light blue background, without any irrelevant objects and marks, the dentist record card, absence of previous charge confirmation, substantial bank account confirmation, confirmation on employment. And those who are against can initiate processing at Pechersk or Kolomijsk region Court which are known for slow work requiring months of waiting in queues before a case is considered" (Uncle_iggy).

It is said in Ukraine that "the neighbor is sometimes closer than the relative" and such closeness brings high expectation. The political scientist Derakchev states that Ukrainians see EU with a consumption mentality, expecting help. The idea of European integration is popular as long as people perceive a real value. Ukrainians expect Europe to pressure our government and to remind them about promised obligations. Compulsion to new reforms is more needed than helping ongoing ones. Europe provides an example to solve our problems, but Ukrainians are tired from shallow promises of improved life standards. Ukrainians want the result today, and EU cannot provide that ("What can EU bring to Ukraine and how they can benefit from it").

Europe does provide everyday norms and beliefs, European cultural traditions. The following survey compared the values of Ukrainian population of Ukraine with the values of 24 EU member states.[5] The results show that Ukrainians have a stronger expression of Preservation values (Comfort, Tradition, Security) and have weaker values in the "Openness for change" group (Self-dependence, Hedonism, Stimulation). They are less likely to 'Leave their "I" but more eager to put price on value of Power (Self-assertion category).

The values differ within Ukraine as well and not in the traditional cliché of East versus West, but between West and Central Ukraine. Western Ukraine is stronger oriented on values of Openness for Change to the detriment of values of Preservation, with Central Ukraine favoring Conservatism.[6] The results show the following characteristics of modern Ukrainian society: high cautiousness, need in protection from a strong state, conservatism, fear of social condemnation, and as a result, Ukrainians are relatively weak need in novelty, creativity, freedom, self-dependency, and readiness to take care of surrounding population (Magun, Rudnev, "Life values of Ukrainian population in European context").

It is clear that Ukrainians are not that different in terms of European values, but what might cause the angular disparity can be seen from basic trends of mentality, its reciprocal interaction and two-way perception. Ukrainian philosophical system operates under the mentality of two general and opposing types. The first type is agricultural,[7] defined by the cult of bread, worship of peasant work, priority of woman over the man. The second type is the Cossack, based of Original Ethno-social Organization. The Cossack state supports the priority of a man who is a strong and courageous "knight." The knight is an adventurer, not a conqueror always on the road, travelling. The clash of

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[5] The comparisons were based on the data from Schwarz methodology during the second round of European Social Survey. 17 social groups based on gender, age, profession, education of EU was compared with the same groups in Ukraine according to 4 value categories and two value axes – "Openness for changes – Perseverance" and "Exit behind the border of one's "I" – self-assertion".

[6] Western Ukraine turned out to be closer to 18 EU countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia) than to Central Ukraine, that is traditionally more conservative and is alike only with 3 EU members: Greece, Ireland and Poland. Values of population of South of Ukraine are the same with 10 countries: Greece, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Poland and Slovakia, while those of East are similar to the values of 13 countries: Belgium, Greece, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Luxemburg, Poland and Slovakia.

[7] The agricultural nature of Ukrainian mentality is also seen in their cosmogony: only Ukraine has a myth about "earthy" origin of a man: God created a man from earth, and a woman from of dough".

these two natures formed the controversy of opposition "home-road", "war-peace", "woman-man", "stability-mobility" forming such typical traits of Ukrainian character as exalted sense of tragedy and sympathy to human suffering. The duality of mentality has is noticeable in the organization of Ukrainian society. Ukrainian society is oriented on inner mechanisms of self-organization (kinship, favoritism, family connections, brotherhood, community, guild network) in order to resist foreign invasion, and labiality of social system, that which tolerates breaches and violations in the sphere of communication and conduct (Gdal, "Two types of Ukrainian mentality: peasant and Cossack").

Having lived under authoritarian governments for generations, Ukrainians still feel distanced from power and are used to strict leaders and paternalistic government where people beg for a personal favor instead of using standard codified procedures. This leads to corruption and bribery. Someone who asked for a favor would pay back the favor when his fortunes improve and he has power. The expression "I would gild you" comes strictly from Soviet Union system of favors and "tooth for tooth" attitude ("Ukraine's Soviet Legacy. Life in post-Soviet Ukraine"). Other "limping" clichés include "own shirt is closer to body" or "my home is aside" come from the influence of the "big brother", which was accompanied by real-life deprivations of shooting, famines, betrayals, Gulags, and forcing of new tradition and Soviet gods. Collectivization was the beginning of the end. To survive and save one's family, a Ukrainian had to close eyes to evil around him and stay quiet (Mykhailova, "Ukrainian Mentality").

The Ukrainian name for family is "simja" ("sim"= 7; "ja"= I). The Ukrainian word points out to the long tradition of "multi-society," happily coexisting under one roof despite the diversity. With the European Union, one can talk about the family of 27 "I's". Especially with the acceptance of Slavic countries to the EU, it became impossible to talk about common European, historically shared mentality and identity. The reason is hidden in the roots of two different approaches to defining a nation. The first is the Slavic primordial model, based on ethno cultural kinship tradition that searches for a national myth. The second is the modern model, rational, cosmopolitan, with the common ground of Enlightenment where Kant, Russo, Montesquieu, Weber and others formed the nuclei of European mentality (Dirk, Meyer, "European Identity: facts and inventions").

Unfortunately, identity and stereotyping go hand in hand with one another. Stereotypes are mutually created and Europe hasn't gone beyond "prejudices" to an "un-biased" approach. Europe still sees Ukraine in the sphere of Russian special interest, whereas Russia no longer has its former influence over the life of the country. Moreover, Ukraine is viewed as being under communist regime too long to ever be able to become

European. Ukraine is also viewed as being too big and problematic for painless integration to EU. Some politicians ground their rejection on the basis of "non-belonging" to European traditions (Zlenko).

Fortunately, slowly, but steadily, the image of Ukraine as divided between "a westerner – bloody UPA member" and "easterner – Russian communist" gives place to the country of Andriy Shevchenko, Viktor Yushchenko, brothers Klychko, Ruslana and Euro 2012. The image of Ukrainians is changing from a mystery guy to a qualified, but still low-paid worker, a student with a fresh view on things, managers or professional programmers (Chehlov).

The myth of Chernobyl and its horrible 30-km zone is still hovering over Ukraine, whereas the sphere of politics seems the most flexible one. The Orange Revolution dethroned lots of myths and stereotypes about Ukraine, substituting the "kuchmist", "radianskist" and "criminality" with "Orange Ukraine", "Orange Revolution, "Orange opposition" and "Majdan values." Some economical stereotypes being transformed are from " Ukraine – Russia #2", "Moscow's footstep" and "EU enemy" to "European country" and "EU partner" (Pavlukh 258). It is better to sum up this change with the data in the table. The European Community can identify its own "Ukrainian stereotypes" from Poland's experience. The data below clearly represents the change of paradigm (Pavlukh 253-261).

The image of Ukraine before 2004 in the Polish press	The image of Ukraine after 2004 in the Polish press
Deteriorated country, mafia, corruption, poor country, oligarch power, poor culture and civilization, political repressions, kuchmism, dictatorship	European country, Slavic culture, EU partner, democracy, law-governed state, prowestern orientation, euroidentity
The image of Ukrainian before 2004 in the Polish press	The image of Ukrainian after 2004 in the Polish press
Polishphobe, alcoholic, bandit, bandera-follower, beggar, lazy, neglected.	Patriot, tolerant, peaceful, benevolent, hospitable, hard-working.

There is another point that unites Ukraine and Europe: namely, the three main projects on building of Europe within EU[8] that are three different approaches correlating to an understanding of the main concepts of European mentality.[9] The first is based on the historical tradition of Germany which favors close integration till the forming of one common federative union. The second approach is England – that prefers a more free flow integration process, with the stress at economic rather than political The third approach is French which strides the middle between those previous two ("Phantoms of Ukrainian and European identity").

The advantage of the three approaches lies with the ability to compensate one damaged member state identity with another European identity. But the biggest advantage to Ukrainian integration lies within the discovery of a Ukrainian mentality that also has 3 vectors: they have as well served as the basis for three different mentalities. Eastern and South Ukraine historically had up to 95% of communal ownership of land and like Russia preserved the Russian traditions. Western Ukraine has a completely different mentality that is oriented towards Europe due to ex-Austro-Hungarian heritage and relations with Poland, following the traditions of provincial Europe. Central Ukraine didn't have communal ownership of land in big quantities (up to 5% of farms) and is of individual (the kurkul) character, balancing between West and East (Malinkovych, "Three Ukraine – three mentalities").

However, some difference can be found in the public poll through a big project "Attitude of the European Union to the countries outside of the EU". Ukrainian citizens' opinions showed that there is some socio-cultural break between Ukraine and the European Union. Expressing the ideas on the European Union, Ukrainian citizens pointed out the high economical status, observance of democracy and economical stability. Talking about their own country, they mention tolerability, religious tolerance, meaning they view themselves in different coordinates: EU is perceived as how it is brought up in the news – stable, democratic, dynamic. But it is important also to have the basic cultural understanding of the neighbour that Ukrainians are lacking due to their own attention towards primarily economic situation.

Moreover, every fifth person could not state the most characteristic features of the Ukrainian society are. This shows that people are at the stage of political and social chaos resulting from confusion in the mass mentality. This is unfortunate, for the government

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[8] Dirk and Meyer state the following 3 ways: 1. Seeing Europe as the superpower on world arena; 2. Orientation on human rights and social values; 3. Protection of national interests and strengthening their individual role in uniting Europe.

[9] Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1976). Moralentwicklung und Ich-Identität. in: J. Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

can use the change to move the society in a totalitarian direction (Stegnij, "New president will and new elite will not improve the situation in the country"). "…The basic type of political culture in our country is democratically passive, but when people lose direction, they can not even answer themselves, in what type of country they wish to live. Although "pink glasses" have fallen down, we now evaluate the position in our country and for ourselves in a more sober way" (Stegnij, "New president will and new elite will not improve the situation in the country")

Our goal is to eliminate the reasons for the passivity and what has kept the pink glasses on for so long. Ukraine's psychologically closed character adds to keeping some of the habits of the past alive, playing on the hand of political elite. It can be best seen by the popular suspicion that others take the best assets from Ukraine, while providing low quality things in exchange, resulting in rejection of foreign land ownership within the country (Holovaka 210).

Due to psychological characteristics of Ukrainian thrift/economical household management skills, there is no option to prevent the proposed purchase. For everything can be used for something in the household, and is not to be wasted, so therefore the trade always naturally takes place. As a result, it stresses the idea of trading bad for worse, leaving the citizens with negative attitude towards the deal and feelings of injustice. At the same time, the feeling of distrust towards authorities grows, along with shame for not being able to carry out a beneficial deal. This is just a small example of "guilt-trip path" of an average Ukrainian citizen.

Let us look at the nation's portrait with the broader angle. Apart from opinion articles, the main literature used in this section is presented by the work of respected Ukrainian writer Yaniv and his "Sketch of the History of the Ukrainian Ethnopsychology", published in 1993. The book covers 7 topics using the inductive method: Opposition of East and West from the Psychological Point of View, The Problem of Psychological Occidentalism of Ukraine, and The Ideal of Ukrainian Person from Primary Sources of Literature, Social Instincts of Ukrainians, The Religiousness of Ukrainians from the Ethno psychological Point of View and lastly, The Ukrainian Character and our Educational Ideal.

However, the list of authors that tried to grasp the notion of identity and mentality also includes Kostomarov, Dragomanov, Hryshevskiy, Dontsov, Mirchuk, Vawenko, Lipa, Kulchitskiy and many more. With a number of different approaches, the general pattern and comparison of the working papers create the general outlook of the genuine portrait of Ukrainian's psychological character.

Another valuable source is the Collection of Scholarly Papers edited by Anatoliy Karas, published in 1993 by the Ukrainian Free University of Munich. The book covers the areas of Ukrainian question in History and Literature, Philosophy and Culturology of National and Spiritual Renaissance of Ukraine, Law thought in the aspect of state building and development of Civil Society, and lastly, Economical and Social motives of state building.

In that book Hrabinskij points out that the effectiveness of ecological and economical system, as well as the effectiveness of political government depends on their correlativeness to the system of national values, which is determined primarily by the self-realization of person's place in the Universe. When a person realizes they came into the world as the result of God's creating will, this realization becomes the source of that person's "ethical values", and it can accept the individual-competitive or group-cooperative values. The person, who realizes, that she is the result of nature's evolution, acknowledges only the laws of nature and is guided by group cooperative or elite collective values. The person, who views the human being as the biological chance, considers the person itself as the source of "ethical values" (314).

The acknowledgement and understanding of main nation values and peculiarities of its mentality is the keystone for modeling of political government, and the latter in turn models the ecological and economical system. If this is ignored, the state will become ineffective, leading to its ruin. The history of all empires proves that the more the dominant nation tries to impose its system of values others, the more the wish grows among oppressed people to realize the system of their national values in own independent country (Hrabinskij 314-315). Fortunately, both the EU and Ukraine can realize this in time to prevent the catastrophe.

The Ukrainian national mentality is based on group-cooperative values, formed with the influence of East Orthodoxy, according to Hrabinskij. The author states that a Ukrainian always felt himself as a part of the community and didn't oppose himself to the group, for it was considered as negative to demonstrate one's advantage over others. The individualism in work and everyday life included the ability to cooperate was a key factor in the development of Western Ukraine in 20-30th. These cooperative and group values determine the political system that in this case is incompatible with the power of one political party, but needs the representation of different political forces according to their real support among the mass population. It doesn't require the clear distribution of power into legislative, executive and judicial, which can be noticed in many countries with the multiparty parliament. For the economical and ecological system of that type the private ownership is untouched, as well as private market, decent reaction of the government to

the ecological problems, with the main goal – accumulation of capital. The advantage of such model is the possibility to accomplish the consensus between the government, entrepreneurs and workers on the questions of common national aims and priorities. It is characterized by antagonism between society and nature, workers and entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs and government. The French model can serve as an example of such model, and Ukraine in its turn aims at building this particular model at home (Hrabinskij 314-315). Theoretically it should work, but unfortunately, it doesn't in practical real life experience. The reason behind this is both the inability of the ruling elite to unite the society and the insecurity of the mass population with their current status, which awakens both negative sides of Ukrainian national character.

Andrusiv goes deeper into six factors that form the ethno type:

1) Somatically – psychological/genetically For Ukrainians typical racial characteristics are the features of "osti"/eastern race – person of mood, and "dinar" race – person of passion.

2) Geopsychological – connected to the natural environment and means of existence. For Ukrainians this includes ideas of fertile, "honey" land, agriculture.

3) Geopolitical – influence of history: Ukraine's centuries of stateless position.

4) Psychologically – social or connected with the social order.

5) Culturally morphed – influence of culture on forming of ethno type as well as influence of ethno type on forming of the culture.

6) Deep psychological – relation between consciousness and unconsciousness, character of psychological processes course (Andrusiv 132).

The genetic and deep psychological processes formed the fundamental base of the Ukrainian ethno type. Ukrainians have a *Cord centrism* of character – concentration of psychological activity around the heart, as well as *introvert* nature: the need to have time with God and world alone, to take responsibility for one's behavior and soul, as well as constant expectation that danger will strike. This is due to life in the "trench." All this led to formation of *individualism*, when person fences oneself in to a self-created space, creating walls and the family border being the strongest one. *The self-destructing egoism* of the Ukrainian community reaches its peak with the verbal formula, literally when the Ukrainian family states, "my hut is aside" (it's no business of mine) (Andrusiv 133).

The totalitarian system attempted to devour all individualistic aspects, destroyed the fortress, borders of world of Ukrainians, where the latter in every word felt the presence of God. The communist system took away the sacred time for communication with the God, and threw the nation to the cell of loneliness. The present brutality is not only the fear in front of economical hardships, but also the cosmic, existential feat,

spiritual claustrophobia without God and own space, House (Andrusiv 133). And it was only the "earth" that a person escaped to, so called escapism from the social world into the embrace of the nature (Sokirko "Mental peculiarities of Ukrainian philosophical thought in the Romantic era: anteism"). The Ukrainian person is lost in the universe, and in order to be heard, the individual bangs into the doors of existence: we are here, God, we exist! (Andrusiv 133). The *individualism* is what connects the Ukrainians with the Europeans, and that might be the first door the country is knocking at.

The agricultural genes and pleasantness equipped Ukrainians with *anteism* – connectedness to nature, to the Earth-Mother, as well as each family's Mother, woman-mother and love towards her – presents increased interest not towards the idealistic world of abstract theories, but to the "earth", for only here one can find the "truth", which is the aim of philosophical search. The *escapism* can also lead to the loss of "self" and failure (Sokirko "Mental peculiarities of Ukrainian philosophical thought in the Romantic era: anteism"). The escapism also leads to *infantilism*, fear of adult life and an inability to adjust and survive in the world. This leads to the *wish to hide from the unknown and cruel world* to the warm embrace of the Mother with negative behavior patterns of constant regression, nervousness and sometimes even a hereditary tendency for painful mental complications (Andrusiv 134).

The author explains the unfortunate history of Ukraine relative to this trait as well. Ukraine has not prepared for the harsh, cruel relations of "adult" nations. Ukrainians constantly regress and they turn their thoughts to the past, swim in sorrow. This *sadness* is seen by their folk songs, and their gravitation towards nature, showing *emotiveness* of character with insufficient intellectual and abstract base. That in particular adds to the nations' "*straw spirit;*" the ability of feelings, hopes and ideas to braze up fast and to die out as fast. This leads the Ukrainian heart to *lyricism*, a poetical way of world perception, as well as *quietism* – escape from reality, *social passivity, and indifference* (Andrusiv 134).

This nature serves not only as self-identification of Ukrainians, but also creates an imagined place for their meeting with their soul, as a shelter or a hiding place. This produces the *dreaminess and idealism* of the nation and leads to the *loss of reality feeling, aestheticism, cult of beauty* – even to the Ukrainian decoration of the houses, common things etc. The negative side to it is the expression of extra femininity of national character in males, for the beauty is feminine in its nature (Andrusiv 135).

The typical masculine trait of character is *non-aggressive*, most often non–military, so that some scholars it is considered the result of exogamy, leading to the establishment of own dignity, and patience. One can cooperate with a Ukrainian "in a

friendly way" in all spheres, even steal his statehood, language and historical memory, if there is no outward demonstration of disrespect towards his human dignity. If this border is crossed, the patience is changed into anger and revenge. But, not a long-lasting one, for Ukrainians thaw out as fast, forgive the attack, imagining it as false, and repent about their so-called sin of revenge (Andrusiv 135).

Being determined in the building of his own dwelling – the equivalent of a small state and sometimes not even real – a Ukrainian tends to be *incapable of engineering a big state building*. The primary reason for that is reluctance to acknowledge another main architect above, rather than God. Ukrainian small state is his family, providing him with human dignity. The big state – always foreign – never accomplished this for the typical Ukrainian. *Individualism*, through centuries of long "yoked" conditions and absence of its own statehood has resulted in small state instincts. A person that is not the equal member of the state has no habit of thinking in categories of unity and society. Instead history has formed such traits of character as *lack of subordination, proclivity to anarchism and "Hetaman"/"Cossack chief leader" style.* These self-destructive traits of character produce the locked circle, where without respect for authority one never gains the respect of authority and self glorification (Andrusiv 136).

This uncontrollable thirst for self elation and its impossibility in reality due to reluctance to acknowledge the authority of others create negative reactions. Instead of working hand in hand to achieve a better reality Ukrainian trips up his Ukrainian brother because, strangely, the success of foreigners is easier to accept (Andrusiv 136). We deal with a "false understanding of equality that we understand now as the equality of state, the equality of mastering one's world. This doesn't exist anywhere else in the world" (qtd. in Andrusiv 136). From this position one can interpret such beautiful trait of Ukrainian character as altruism, compassion as the subconscious egoism: we can help and feel for those, who are in worse position, but not able to rejoice for compatriots that are doing better than we are (Andrusiv 136).

Without the revival of the Ukrainian village and the Ukrainian master then the material, spiritual and cultural revival is impossible according to Roman Nakonechnij (177). For the primordial Ukrainian character is to be a peasant in its foundation. This was common for most of the European countries till the beginning of XX century as well, due to agricultural type of production. The most vivid trait of character of the Ukrainian is the *mysterious, non typical contact with the spirit of earth,* and it is not surprising taking into consideration the Tripilska culture of Ukrainian ancestors. This core connection was destroyed during the years of colonial dependence, and now is crucial for renewal. And it doesn't mean that Ukraine should become granary again. "This durable

and ardent Ukrainian husbandry – is, maybe, one of the most productive spiritual energies between Baltic, Balkans and Ural… *Husbandry energy* – is primarily the collective honest work and responsibility. This was developed by centuries of tradition and is impossible to destroy by any domestic or foreign groundlessness. This is the power of its methodical and hard working nature. This particular stabilizing and always-effective character of the cultivator has created the fact that Ukraine in own time has given so many cultural novelty to the West and East of oneself" (qtd. in Nakonechnij 178). According to Ukrainian legends, God created man from clay, and woman from dough!

One of the problems to face is the overcoming of the *slave habit of insignificance, low self worth and worshipping of conquerors*. This task is within the power of the "person of the new spirit", that has not a "slave heart" and a "slave brain". This new spirit is the husbandry idea is connected to the traditional philosophy of Ukrainians – the philosophy of work at the land (Nakonechnij 178).

During the Ruin period, when Ukraine lost its statehood, it was only the peasantry that stood through the hardships. The Cossacks and the aristocracy couldn't perform the leading role in society. From the end of XIX century it was peasantry who became the true representatives of the nation. That strong class should have been able to stand out and support the Ukrainian state, but the social stratum of Ukrainian society was destroyed by kolgosp, proletariat, genocide of 1932 – 1933 and political repressions. By destroying the village and the peasant the Communist party aimed well at eliminating Ukraine and its strong men. In the middle of XX c the village and the master were destroyed, everyone was searching for a place of refuge in the big cities. Industrialization killed the cultivator and its culture with its collective mentality. After the renaissance of XIX – beginning of XX century, which was the classical peasant renaissance of Europe with 95% of people residing in villages, the 50 – 60s of XX c became urbanized and local. It does make Europeans and Ukrainians similar, but the latter are still affected by the village mentality (Nakonechnij 180-181).

The present day Ukrainian nation is plundered and without its ethno cultural fundament is a completely different society than 100 years ago. Erased from political map of Europe, cleaved between two empires, having lost its historical initiative or its role in the drama of world spirit (according to Hegel), the Ukrainian nation is going through state emancipation and renewal of national and state consciousness (Nakonechnij 180-181). The independent years showed that the consolidation of nation around the Ukrainian national idea and the idea of Ukrainian statehood is not working well in the constant political and economical turmoil. The process of statehood building, if aimed at

European community, should be done oriented on partially European values as they are close to the nature of Ukrainians.

Moreover, there is need to develop and strengthen the middle class that would become the true supporter for democracy. Bureaucracy and tyranny do not easily blackmail the owner of the cottage and small landowner. The Ukrainian peasant, as he rises to becoming middle class, can overcome the crisis in society and gradually enter the European family, building the strong Ukrainian state on the base of its powerful key husbandry energy (Nakonechnij 180-181).

Anatolij Karas touches the important question of renaissance perspectives for Ukraine, looking at revival of the nation as the return of socio-normative identity of Ukrainian culture, which is the base for the forming of civil society of European sort. The "challenge of history" as coined by Toynbee revives the political will for the renaissance of the nation that starts from the accumulation of national consciousness, fixing the immanent wish for the cultural and self – identity. Along the way, the national culture protects such relations between people that keep the certain amount of minimum opportunities for the self-realization of the individual. The violation of that minimum results in forced immigration into another culture. The narrowness of intellectual field in Ukrainian culture, caused by political powers, resulted in transit of Ukrainian talents to another culture (Karas 153).

With the socio-normative area being separated from the "truth about the person", the Ukrainian succumbed to the power of forces of non authentic civilization origin, sometimes foreign for the mentality of the nation. Traditional values of individual and civil activity or respect towards the woman met with the collective values, Cossack freedom, selectiveness of power, freedom of trade were eliminated by the policy of Tsar Russian. The lack of political freedom brought moral slavery. An individual, being a representative of the traditional traits of the nation, loses the perspective of choice of oneself as the bearer of these traits, having to migrate into another field of self-realization. Those who don't immigrate stay on the road of political resistance or conformism, known in Ukraine as "malorossijstvo" – small Russianness (Karas 155).

Thus, the author sees the renaissance of Ukraine in the social and political areas ensuring self-realization of human talents in specific culture. The Ukrainian perspective is the revival of humanitarian principles of civic social and correspondingly state order with equal opportunities, rights and responsibilities for all citizens, regardless their ethnic background. The actual freedom of all social and ethnic groups would foster and unify the self-realization of Ukrainian socio normative area with European democratic dimension (Karas 156).

It is interesting to cast a look into the mentality of the Prince Era in Ukraine, where the origin for the relations are the meanings for "status dignity", "loyalty", and devotion of vassal to suzerain. There is no term of patriotism; only pure dignity of the warriors. The State at that time is the military institutes of suzerain, "the father", judge, commander, power itself, which provides the normative standards and cares about protection of territory and "goods" of the people. The nation in Ukraine Rus was formed on the binary opposition of "us" and "them", as any other nation is being constructed (Skrinnik 157).

From the 16th century, the Ukrainian nation was at a constant threat of annihilation. In the Steppe – the resistance to Poland resistance was consolidated by the differences of religion. The resistance preserved its traditions as "ours", encompassed the language, culture. This resulted in the formation of a self-reproductive social body – the nation, on the basis of "others" image. The liberation war of Hetman Khmelnitsky finished the consolidation of the nation, where the subject now was not suzerain, but whole population of the country. The power of the state is represented by the Hetman. The nation did not get rid of its medieval mentality or its loyalty to the power body and habit to serve the suzerain. Trusting the Moscow tsar was disastrous, leading the country to the loss of statehood and the Ruin (Skrinnik 160-162).

The answer to the thesis question lies partly in the solving the problem of self–identification. The pagan morality of Ukrainians expressed itself with the close connection to the nature, its admiration and forming of mystery connections between the world of earth and people. The people used non-violent methods of "taming" the world, without dissecting any fragments from the world's cosmic picture. This approach influenced the mentality of the nation, added to its imagination and formed the community's vivid world outlook.

Christianity, adopted in 988 by Kyivan Rus, did not oust this joyous pagan outlook but, on the contrary, created a synthesis of culture, so deep in morality and symbolical sense, but at the same time growing up from everyday life and material basis. The round of pagan view with its "eternal return" was stretched into the spiral of Christianity: the ascent spiral of a Ukrainian to its self, his identification of earthly purpose and heavenly mission. Ukrainian cosmos was a living being, and while each individual felt itself as a part of the "goodness", a valuable piece of the system, the society stayed together. The feeling of membership, appurtenance, was and is a powerful staple that held and kept the nation united (Mazur 165).

The spirituality of the Ukrainian nation always came from the earth. When parts of the country were ripped off it naturally brought the disparity of self-identification in

the moral world as well. The present drastic ecological situation explains the dreadful state of Ukrainian spirit. Thus, the return of Ukraine to the civilized family of nations is possible with the return of its own eucumena: it is the source and powerful strata of culture which primordially gave the nation the ability to unerringly self – identify. Today, when the society bathes in egoistic and individualistic orientations, there is a need to clear out the strata of so called civilization, in order to return to civil tradition that encompassed *Christian values*; this way would finally set the order in Ukraine. The author ends up with the powerful advice: "Thinking about the question of how to become Europe, we come to conclusion, that first we need to become ourselves, return to our origins. To those, who continue in the sweat of one's brow to hack the "window to Europe", we would like to remind the words of Rome satiric Persil "do not search for your self from outside" (Mazur 165-167).

However, due to a lot of wasted time and all–round crisis, it is quite impossible to imagine people forgetting about their basic needs and starting to meditate on their origin, searching for one self. This is a crucial aspect, but the sick body should be treated first in order to overcome disease, and then with the clear mind and fed body start the process of self-improvement.

Meanwhile, there is an urge in present Ukraine to exterminate the organism from illness in a fast surgical way, to solve all its problems once and for all. That is the very reason why the idea of a unified state Church grows like mushrooms after the rain. Isichenko Igor warns us against this idea. It may seem that the Unified Church, uniting the loyal Christians from West and East, would be able to resist the intervention of foreign religious centers such as Rome and Moscow, providing the political support for confessions, damaged by communism. But the idea proves meaningless when looking at the potential consequences of common state Church in the perspective of country's return to Europe. The statehood of such Church doesn't combine with the Christian doctrine and the European model of social and religious relation. One can look at the Western experience: Catholic Rich Pospolita, divided by foreigners, France of the times of religious wars, Anglican Church ruled by the king with a policy of which caused the Puritan emigration and persecution of Catholicism (Isichenko 203-204).

It is clear that the idea of state Church could emerge only behind the iron curtain of post totalitarian ruin. The genuine Ukrainian Church emerged, as did the Christian Church of Europe, in the conditions of persecution. This fact was the impulse towards its revival. Christianity became the natural protector of fundamental values of European culture: holiness of human life, freedom of thought and speech, civil equality, respect to one's dignity etc. (Isichenko 204).

The model of state religion in Asia is too heavy for the cultural heritage of Europe. The cultural experience of Ukraine, on the other hand, is quite valuable for Europe, for it adds to its common heritage, its original and unique traits. One just has to consider the phenomenon of Ukrainian orthodoxy, discriminated but at the same time blooming in the Kiev Moghyla Academy. The Evangelistic studies of Ukrainian Protestants that did a lot to spread the Bible in Eastern Europe and North and Central Asia, the search of Catholics for a Byzantine style of synthesis model for Western discipline and Eastern spirituality…how deep and nourishing is the Ukrainian Christianity! Its art development, TV time, spread of Bible and intercultural dialogue can do more for the unity of Ukrainian Christians and integration of Ukraine into the European civilization (Isichenko 204).

Ukrainian philosophy can also serve its function. It can inform people on the necessity in considering the system that is soul, paradigm of other cultures as well, and the possible baleful reaction due to culture forceful merging. Philosophy of history of Ukrainian ceases to be the philosophy, but crossed into the sphere of social and practical idea. This would give the chance to ground and develop the idea of own way for Ukraine and of course, the mission of Ukraine, making it close and understandable for everyone (Dzun 168-170).

The moral and world outlook vacuum that was formed at the beginning of XX century by European society, destroying the Greek Catholic, Christian cultural and philosophical traditions urged for the search of new planetary consciousness. The cultural optimism was renewed only at the end of the XX century in the life of Europe thanks to renaissance of ideas of personalism, humanism, and democracy. The present Ukrainian consciousness is going through something similar in the XXI century. "The healthy spirit is not afraid to take along the burden of past", so when one notices the decline of morality, then Ukrainian philosophical heritage should serve as the leading star. The totalitarian regime drew a boundary line between Ukraine and the European channel, after "slipping out from history." During the years of independence it was and still is crucial to find the least painful way of reintegration with the West (Vilchinska 172-176).

Hlotov and Fartushniy argue that the national character is formed at a slow pace and can not be changed fast, thus the influence of last destructive 70 years on the psychology of Ukrainians should not be overestimated (182).

It is said that the Frenchman is light-minded, the Pole is boastful, the German is punctual and pedant and Englishmen are businesslike. To continue the chain, a Ukrainian is a sluggish, despondent person, inclined to be melancholy, hard working and submissive to destiny. The national character of Ukrainian, according to Chizevskiy, was

formed based on the existence in the steppe: therefore one talk about emotiveness, sentimentalism, sensitivity and lyricism in political culture, individualism and the urge towards freedom, restlessness and liveliness. But the steppe plain attire forms reluctance to everything, that is higher above the surroundings, tendency towards the egalitarianism; that lack of national pride and loftiness gave roots in the character of Cossack, that still lives in the nation (Hlotov, Fartushniy 183).

The Cossack era and Zaporizhian Sich formed the leading trait of the Ukrainian nation, namely democracy. The Cossacks fought with Poles because they were aristocratic in origin. Both the Ukrainian elite and the common man were motivated with this justification. Dontsov puts the blame for the statelessness of the country on the leading class, the democratic intelligentsia that adjusted to the taste of the lower class. He critically says that the outlook of the cultivator was raised to the symbols of national life, and borsch became one of the symbols of renaissance. The way out was seen by Dontsov in hierarchical society, where the leading class would return to the spirit of old Kiev, the prince era, transforming Cossacks into a more noble class (Hlotov, Fartushniy 184).

The Ukrainian journey was characterized by two *intertwined paradoxical tendencies*: the fight for the nation state alongside with anarchy, lack of unity or/solidarity. During the times of civil war the peasant movements were aimed against any kind of statehood. While the collective sub–consciousness of the Muscovite people led to the formation of a hereditary power of monarch, the Kyivan princes changed too often. Among Cossacks there were always too many who were only motivated by the venture, pleasure and the spoils of war. The present political life of the country, with the democracy crisis of corruption and an unworkable bureaucracy can be easily explained by "sofa" parties when all the party members can fit on one sofa. This never could lead to consolidation of the nation, but to eternal fragmentation, leading to societal illness. It is true that the Cossack state did function, and it happened in union with the intelligentsia and priesthood, protecting their interests. But later on Hetmanate turned from military organization to territorial power of monarch type with the tendency to heredity (Hlotov, Fartushniy 184).

The combination of individualism with the idea of equality and intolerability of violence from power was typical for the longest period of Ukrainian history, resulting in urge for freedom. In ideal form, the nation's love for freedom should be directed towards the urge for power. Ukrainians couldn't resist this combination or Poles, or Russians. When both of the nations were rousing the national pride up to national frill, self realizing them, pressing down foreign nations, Ukrainians lost the powerful Kyivan Rus and trustfully gave themselves to the Moscow slavery (Hlotov, Fartushniy 185).

In Ukraine, according to Vinnichenko, there were three orientations prior to the February Revolution in Russia: at "Russian grace", at "German bayonet" and at "own self". This very lack of confidence in one's own strength pushed the nation to look for the allies: the nationalists tried to use the war to build the independent state, forgetting the doctrine of their leader Konovalets, that stressed the necessity of war games based on own forces against all occupants, not with one against the other (Hlotov, Fartushniy 185).

Peaceable disposition, lack of expansionist inclination, trustfulness, and discouragement in one's own forces pushed the nation at the roadside of the political life of Europe. The Kyivan state was the factor for national formation, but the imperial nation should have the tendency for growth, expansion. And the misfortune of Ukraine is that the nation has had too few people, ready for the radical reorganization of Ukrainian existence. That is what the country lacks nowadays as well: a strong leader to change the status quo. According to Dontsov, the nation should be represented not by "working intelligentsias" or cultivators, or aristocrats from the crowd, but only by the separate section of "best people". Nobility, courage, wisdom and wish for power form the conditions for the genuine Ukrainian statehood. The will for life is the will for state power. "Nation is the rope, stretched between ethnos, primordial on the land and national state." Until the nation would change shyness towards brutality, and invertebrate nation loving to aggressive nationalism, there can be no Ukrainian nation (qtd. in Hlotov, Fartushniy 186).

It is sad to notice that the question of orientation vectors still hasn't changed much over the years. Ukraine is still struggling with the "swinging" politics, and that's when the question of existentialism, West or East, is rising in meaning again for Euro Asian Ukrainian nation. Europe with its market and pluralism, or its older brother, Russia? The answer is formed both by the traditional traits of character as well as the urge to break "stateless" and indefinite position of Ukraine between two worlds. To make a well – thought choice, one has to know oneself, nation's character with its truth and faults, to recognize the genuine nature of the people.

In any case, the road to oneself should start with the question 'So who am I? And can I not become better?" The Ukrainian statehood faced a number of questions, or better to say, thesis and antithesis: vocalizing them should help the nation in the process of statehood formation; the raised questions have stayed too long without the answers, so there is necessity to remind: the question has been posed since independence of Ukraine, but no decent and unifying answers were provided so far.

Nina Rizhko lists the following thesis and antithesis in the sphere of Ukrainian Politics: The person and society can be free only with a democratic regime, so the rudiments of totalitarian regime should be abandoned.

- Antithesis: The destruction of totalitarian system led to chaos, ignoring juridical laws, social and political vulnerability of majority of population, mafia group formation.

- Thesis: Today there are a lot of parties that aim at improving the life of people and realizing the sovereignty of Ukraine.

- Antithesis: such a large number of parties scatter the power of the nation, producing continual fights for the leadership and it is national statehood formation that suffers from it.

- Thesis: Democracy creates the conditions for the representatives of people to decide the state questions on all levels of government.

- Antithesis: Administration, created under the government of representatives of president, can decide all questions of state government and change the deputies.

- Thesis: the division of power into legislative, executive and judicial and means of information is the balanced way of democratic governing.

- Antithesis: the division of power leads to the fighting between the branches and their resistance, subjugation of one to another.

- In economical sphere the most vivid is:

- Thesis: The sovereign nation should have a national economy. The less it is dependent on the processes in other countries, the more chances it has for the sovereignty.

- Antithesis: the sovereignty of the state foresees a high level of its economic development, not the reticence of the economy.

- The cultural sphere provides some interesting examples as well:

- National statehood formation is the only guarantor for the renaissance and development of national culture, including art, science etc.

- Antithesis: The young national state is not capable of supporting the financially capacious spheres of art, fundamental sciences, for it simply doesn't have money for it. That is why the national art and science are regressing, and the state experiences prevalence of foreign pop culture of the lowest quality. The scientists either stop their work and participate in other activity, or look for work in other countries.

- Thesis: the national language should be the state one, for it represents the culture, mentality of the nation.

- Antithesis: There should be at least another official language, for the tradition of using Russia language, especially in the cities is quite long.

- The military doctrine thesis: in the modern world the weapon of restraining and protecting stability is atomic and missile.

- Antithesis: the destruction of atom weapon assures non-aggressiveness of the state, attempt to be at peace with the neighbors, and would bring the sympathy of the world community.

- West-East relations thesis: Ukraine had strong economic ties with the ex-USSR countries, so we should orient at its further support and development, especially considering the fuel and power complex and raw material base of these countries is located in the proximity of Ukraine

- Antithesis: There is a necessity to integrate into Western economics, for its better developed, represent the last word in modern economical processes, technologies of production etc. (Rizhko 239-241).

The problem with choice is the dilemma with the golden middle variant: one has to remember about the "Buridan's donkey", that didn't know from what side to take the haycock and died of starvation. Theses and antitheses have to be treated with criticism as well: everyone realizes that the totalitarian regime should be destroyed, but it was the fanatic leaders that perverted it. In real life, totalitarian style is just the simplified system to provide the easiest way of governing from the center, supremacy of one human being above another, so well formulated into saying, "you are the boss, I am the fool; I am the boss, you are the fool" (Rizko 240-242).

The energy of a nation that consolidates the society and forms the state is blocked in Ukraine. To gain authority is possible only when one knows very well the people one is ruling, their psychology. That is why it is essential for the elite to realize the psychological background of the nation, as well as better understand themselves. Moreover, the Ukrainian mentality possesses a number of characteristics that hurt the forming of clear rational positions of full nation consolidation, led by total national unity around the common idea. Understanding and knowing of their nature would help to foresee and create the conditions, when in all forms spheres of social life (bringing up of the children, civil activity etc) the positive characteristic of the nation would be first acknowledged and finally activated, while the negative would be corrected and suppressed.

Suliatitskiy points out that in order to regain the highway of state building process, we have to analyze own national psychological architecture. The strength and vitality of society depends, as with any other organism, on its hierarchy and building.

Having compared the reasons of historical failures in Ukraine's state building processes by observing the typical features of the Ukrainian nation, the author previously affirms a number of traits of Ukrainian personality traits that have the least favorable influence on the state building formation and directive of the nation. Among them is the *introvert character* of the nation: trying to reach the ideal of moral beauty and kindness, by undervaluing the intellect's importance as well as outer culture (technology, agricultural craft, trade, industry etc.). *Egocentrism* as well as *isolationism from the world* is another trait that is responsible for every Ukrainian political collapse, starting from the first loss of statehood in XII – XIII c. This primitive feeling was aimed at the throne, hetman mace or region. The result was the narrowing of external life, low activity in state building, and the overwhelming reserve character: "meek and mild" of its citizenry (126). The Cossack legacy of "vita heroic" and thus "maxima" the Ukrainian conditions created "vita minima" or anabiosis state: "I stand aside, it does not concern me" mentality (Kulchitskiy).

Another "failure" trait is *anarchical individualism.* This trait can not really be fascinated by something for a long time, to strive and long for something strongly in order not to sacrifice. The byproduct is lack of interest and aloofness in the wide civil scale that would foster solidarity. Moreover, individualistic society is oriented on small – group organization and government that leads to the split of the nation and inability/lack of willpower to form and bring to life global political programs. The roots of anarchism go to the traditional Ukrainian family, where there was equality of sons in question of inheritance. The strong family factor, the father as the representation of power, with his role restricted to punishment measures, is lingering in the adult life of a person as well. Thus, the grown up let aggression out, aimed against any suppression or orders from above. On the political level, the anarchism is the result of long colonial position: the power is perceived by Ukrainians as something foreign and artificially brought (Sokirko 3).

The traits of the Ukrainian man was formed in two contrary conditions due to geopolitical situation of the country, at the very of East of Europe and West of Asia, "from Varangians to Greeks way" as well as Scandinavian – Mediterranean line. The nation lived at the "border of existence possibilities", on the verge of "fighting, accident, guild, suffering, and death threat" (Kulchitskiy). The pressure of geopolitics on one hand, and strong need in God, reliability on senses and intuition on another formed the dominance of peasant community in civil life, periodical losses of leading class, elite, aristocracy, as well as remoteness from West European centers of rationality and scientism. It also explains the "philosophy of heart"; dominance of sensual sphere over

the will and mind, the slowed brain would never grasp something as delicately as the heart can feel (Suliatitskiy 128-129). Ukrainians believe and trust things only after they "went through" the heart and left imprint there.

The Christian traditions, so important for the nation, originated from Byzantine traditions, but were not rooted in classical Greece or Rome political cultures, but in mystic Small Asia: This Byzantine influence was dominated by Theology simplified by the slogan "God is great," In this theological tradition the position of the human being is diminished and only the authority of power is raised. This reflects in relations between the citizen and civil power. Not a single society of Easter Christianity has formed the aristocratic branches in its history. That would participate in historical development (Suliatitskiy 130).

An interesting fact to point out is the connection to the antique Greek cultural basis. Roman ideas were never adopted on Ukrainian territory and remained rootless in the culture. The Rome qualities of politics, state, military and law, as well as discipline, hierarchy, organization are lacking in the mentality of Ukrainians. In their place are extra sensitivity, ardency/quick temper, lyricism that results in changeable preferences, orientations and ideas, lack of character in political questions, lack of endurance and inability to bring the ideas to the final end, to realize them by persistent and firm work. Constant irritation doesn't help to make the idea become a reality (Suliatitskiy 131).

There is a hope that people do start to question their own psychological aspects. It appears that they are at least half aware of their "own trap". The sociological research in 1994-1995 questioned the traits of character that negatively influence the formation of society thinking pattern. The respondents agreed on the following traits: 1) weakness of will power, 2) tendency towards sentimentalism, 3) jealousy towards the strongest or luckiest, 4) unsteadiness of orientation points; 5) lack of endurance and 6) decorativeness of deeds (more value into flourishing, rather than deep meaning). Through realization and the self-improvement work one sees that it is not the external danger, impending over the nation's statehood existence, it is internal cloud and absence of national consolidation (Suliatitskiy 130-131).

Kulchitskiy states that Ukraine's position at the periphery of Europe resulted in weakening and lateness of three important waves of ideas. These are: Catholicism (brought Europeans discipline, social organization), Renaissance (individualism, logics, discovering the human nature) and Enlightenment (rational knowledge, scientism, personalization). The Ukrainian as cultivator and peasant with traditional, esthetical values culture was shielded to most of the waves, but most closely accepted the scientism

and personalization, the latter of occidental vector. From then on orientation on Europe as well as Asia Renaissance both became possible.

At the end of the chapter it is necessary to refer one more time to Yaniv and his essay on the problem of Opposition of East and West from the Psychological Point of View, namely the problematic issue of modern European spiritual crisis. Let us point out the topicality of his approach that has become more crucial with the problem of common identity of the European Union. Only through crisis one can discover the central characteristics of one's identity. For the troubled waters eliminate the "untrue layers" or "adapted/forced", leaving only the genuine characteristics.

Yaniv points out several features of the European profile starting with *gen for technology*. Technologic progress is the feature that distinguished Europe from Asia. The victory over the prehistoric hardships of life gave the impulse to self-improvement, (also evoked by feeling of fear that one day the human power would not be enough to survive). The triumph over the successes of the techniques results in the feelings of mastership over the natural world, self assurance, wish for self expression; all this leads towards the *instinct of self glorification* (Yaniv 113).

The antipode of this instinct is the Eastern tendency to subdue. The difference is clearly visible in the political aspect as well. The developed instinct of self-glorification should lead towards the theory of equality of all people, to ensuring the equality of the state as the base for democracy. The Eastern despotism is a result of mass subordinance and lack of wish to stand out. The set from the top order conflicts with the personal value status.

The evolution instinct of self-preservation begin with the wish to become a member of the world. This motivation is realized in so many pages in the history of Europe. The belief in the mission of humankind strengthens the instinct of self-glorification. Technology is viewed as part of the God's order in the Book of Genesis to "tame the Earth", posing a seductive component. Civilization used its ability to understand the powers of nature and turned this knowledge into the means of unlimited power, thinking it was a tyrant over nature. Civilization used to be an end in itself shaking the harmony between material and spiritual, and thus resulting in a crisis. Nowadays one no longer needs to know how to tame Nature, but it is essential now to "tame the taming of the Earth" (Yaniv 114-115).

Self-glorification is possible also only at the expense of the others. Too often Western leaders have only wished to convince, to enforce his thoughts or rule over the ideas of others. Europe has the whole apparatus that "presses" the thought, with the developed means of mass media, radio, TV and educational establishments. Spreading

from spiritual into material domain, the "pressing of thought" changes discovery spirit to warrior one; it is supported by the fact that imperialism blossomed in Europe. The East, on the contrary, believes the power has to be ashamed to sit on its throne; it has to give the way to love (Yaniv 116-118).

Coming back to the positive aspects of self-glorification instinct, it is necessary to mention the deep urge of the European to knowledge and discovery as well as creativity – inventiveness in science as well as art (Yaniv 117). Another connected feature is activity and dynamism of the European, contrasted to the passive character of Eastern people. It leads to the strong work ethics, to rush tempo and constant hurry mode. "The motive of the work would always be the European consciousness", for Europe doesn't know about the escapism, inactiveness, the God of XIX c is work (Yana 120-121).

Another contrast couple is *individualism of European versus collectivism.* Europe believes in the decisive factor of a single individual in history, while Asia, Russia and the USA believe in the general trend. In Europe it is people who create the history in Europe.

Thus connected to the history, the Europeans just need the past to provide the present life with meaning and sense, creating the specific mentality that surrounds monuments and architecture with the saint atmosphere. The European discovers the forgotten past with as much interest as the future. The collectivistic cultures see worth in legends, story telling, and myths – for them the individual is non–historical (Yaniv 124).

Individualism results in the individualistic family, separated from the outside and strong on the inside. Blood mixture doesn't suit this system, which strongly favours establishing monogamy and sexual morals that bring together in marriage two equal and worthy partners that can produce even better offspring. The polygamy of the East and Communist Culture forces destructive effects on family relations. Adding to the problem between the Ukrainian and Russian family understanding is that Ukrainians are more spiritually oriented with strong family ties while Russians are materialistic and disconnected from the genealogical tree tradition (Yaniv 125).

Individualism, via traditionalism in valuing the family, leads to *nationalism*. The nation is the highest and largest family unit and common good makes it possible for the individual to achieve individual happiness and full self-expression. The European is thankful to nature for the ability to act and live, giving it specific traits of sainthood that the citizen can act in name of. The concept of nation in the mentality of the East is dominated by the religion community that unites with the God and is dissolved in the universe (Yaniv 126).

In the *paradigm between will power, feelings and intelligence,* the European strives for distinguishing of those three functions and developing will power and

intelligence. In the East those 3 levels are intertwined and are in passive stage, but the first place is given to feelings. Logic versus intuition and feelings is one of the main differences between East and West.

While the non–division of three layers leads the East towards harmony, the European case is more complicated. The European dynamic nature leads to the dominance of intelligence and logic, to rationalism. But the force of dynamic energy rejects the aloofness of rationalism, for activeness needs voluntarism and emotion that comes with it. But the harmonious system is built on controversies, for harmony is a result of both antitheses merging together. The centuries of contrast situations formed the mentality of the European in a way that it can exist and develop only in the tense conditions. And Europe should not loose its contrast nature (Yaniv 127).

It is essential to distinguish another culture that belongs neither to East, nor to West. The Russian character is "in spite of oneself: The Russian is hysterical, drinker, criminal, poet, saint – all in one person. He loves everything and not afraid of anything, either good or evil, God or Satan hand by hand. The problem is to guide those different motivations and use them for one's own benefits. The Russian cannot do this, but the European can, for life for the latter is melody (Yaniv 128).

In order for this melody to sound again, the harmony between intelligence, will power and feelings has to be regained for the whole Europe. The one-sided individualism led Europe to rationalism, and the contrast constructed culture gave way to a one sided civilization, stressing individual, egoistic beginning, the drive to self glorification and forgetting the meaning of the word "value".

The way out of the crisis lies in return to the *European harmony of contrasts*. And that is when the nations that are more emotionally enriched have to help the process. Of course, these nations should psychologically belong to Europe, but at their periphery location still possessing their emotiveness and believe in values. And the country that has a lot to offer is Ukraine. To prove that let us investigate into the composition of Ukrainian character some more and distinguish the common traits for both nations (Yaniv 128).

The criteria for Ukraine's "proximity" and belongness to Europe raise the question of the essence or better to say psychological character of Ukraine in general. Only then it will be possible to fit it into the psychological concept of Europe. For now, so broadly discussed geographical factor is approached by Yaniv from a different angle, namely "remoteness" from Russia. Some other interesting discoveries in anthropology and linguistic studies prove that Ukrainians are different from Russians and Polish people. Discovering the differences would bring us to the question of Ukrainian

Occidentalism and discover the psychology of Ukraine. In order to decide upon membership or closeness to a community, one has to answer the questions "Why are we not close?" and "Is the problem external or the roots of misfortune lie deep down in us?"

The mentioned paradigm of will power – intelligence – feelings is dominated in the Russian mentality by the latter. While the harmony of all three lead to dynamism of the European nature, the predominance of only one bring passivism to Russian character. It is also observed in the sphere of religion. According to Russian beliefs the God's blessing doesn't require constant righteous acts, so Russian people want to live passively. The European feels the urge to become closer to God, to use his independent power for achieving this. Moreover, Russia and Asia are non-individualistic societies, with collectivistic interpretation of history and life and despotism of singles – satrapy and self-government is the feature of this model (136).

When talking about Ukraine, the country admires harmony, in the past it was even compared to the Helladic Empire. *The search for harmony* is the dominant motivation in the life of the Ukrainian. The nation's tenderness, tolerance, and pliability all show longing for balance. The *tolerance* is most visible in the political sphere, where one tends to complain about the quarrels of politicians. The quarrels exist among other nations as well, but Ukrainians tend to worry about the quarrels more and take them closer to heart.

Ukrainians differ from Europeans in the dominance of emotive feelings over power and intelligence. Moreover, there is a great degree of *border character* belonging to the nation: longing for the harmony, the nation is dominated by sensation part, typical for the East. This swinging misbalance was fostered during Communist times, making Ukraine a step further from the Europe. The inhabitants of Western Ukraine, for example, show no sign of Bolshevik's mentality because their land was under the Russian occupation only from 1939 (Yaniv 137).

 Yaniv also points out that it is this tension of *dynamism and passivism opposition* that shows the influence of the East on Ukrainian's mentality. The lack of understanding of work tempo is symbolized by a cart being pulled slowly by bullocks through the endless steppe. The component that ties Ukraine the strongest with the European mentality is individualism that is being criticized in Ukraine for its violent nature and lack of subordinance (Yaniv 138).

The question of boundary position of Ukraine is usually combined with lost of statehood. The state starts to exist where there are dynamics, strongly developed will power that connects differences as it is in Europe, or the passive, indifferent mass mentality, that can not oppose the despot and suppresses to its will power, as we see in Russia (Yaniv 139).

Ukraine, although belonging mostly to Europe, has been deflected from it too much. There is not enough will power to build the state; but we haven't come so close to Asia so that we would have a despot ruling the country. The paradox is *"we lost our freedom because we loved it too much"*. The nation was afraid of tyranny, and weakened itself with internal quarrels, without any external aspirations, so the foreigners began to rule the land (Yaniv 139).

However, the author believes that the border mentality will become the strength of the nation in the future, for it is our originality and mission. The distorted balance between intelligence, feelings and will power in Europe will benefit from Ukraine's fresh emotiveness and renewal of the occident and culture during the crisis (Yaniv 140).

In "Social Instincts of Ukrainians" the researcher points out such traditional characteristics of Ukrainian character as individualism, weak instinct of subordinance, problem of authority and lack of conquering warrior instinct. The knight and charity qualities are the protective "aggressive warrior" side of Ukrainian character (Yaniv 166-167). Having covered these traits via the works of other authors (that also referred to Yaniv), we would end on some new traits, left out by previous researchers.

Yaniv talks about Ukrainian *traditionalism* as a result of individualism: interest towards the historical sciences, national renaissance, and the cult of dead people, Cossacks' and prince chronicles are essential for the life of an average Ukrainian. Actually, the analysis of historical events prove that only due to the strong tradition the Ukrainian nation hasn't changed into the ethnographical mass due to Tatar Mongol invasion, double loss of leading social stratum, times of Ruin and centuries of enslaving. The wide mass became the carrier of the traditions starting from the XVI century and all the way to the XIX century (Yaniv 165).

The performing of help and aid is contrasted in the Ukrainian nature with the instinct of warrior and resulted, most surprisingly, in altruism. The help for old people is one of its forms. In general, the performing of help can be done in three ways: from bottom to top (helping the high positioned people); from top to bottom (assisting lower societal strata) and in one plane (helping people of the same social strata). For the lack of authority recognition, it is the later case that is most widely spread among Ukrainians. Prince Volodymyr the Great ordered the distribution of bread amongst all the ill, poor, and disabled people. The power of instinct to provide help leads to the erosion of social layers and adds to the social integration movements that unite various layers of Ukrainian classes. This instinct results in the strong feeling of solidarity (Yaniv 168-170).

Among other social instincts it is the life in community that is vital for Ukrainians. Firstly it shows in the well-developed family life. The highest form of

organized community life is the state, thus leading to the developed sense towards the state forms. The national consciousness is perfectly seen during the stateless period, in case of Ukraine one can refer to Lublinska Unia that divided Ukraine into two parts. As a result, all social layers started to unite and with unsuccessful attempts to regain statehood period, they tried to created own form in a foreign country – "a state within a state". As a result the Cossack formation appeared as the highest display of their community wish. The negative aspect is the lack of clear statehood idea during those attempts towards organized independent society (Yaniv 170-172).

The last feature to highlight is the finality of expression in its all forms – culture in a broader sense. The Ukrainian people show tendency towards creation of own culture: consider the endless volumes of Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies. This instinct is present among all the population: the aestheticism of common people can be seen and heard from their folklore songs and everyday life, decoration of the house (Yaniv 173).

Summing up the main features of Ukrainian character would be pointless without distinguishing strong and weak points in order to form the new generation conscious citizens. It is clear that putting the blame on politicians only is lying to oneself and simply not seeing a log in one's eye. There is a lot of work for each Ukrainian on his own "harvest field". How can the state help?

The negative mentality directives can be subdivided into natural and acquired. Extreme individualism, dominance of emotions over intellect and will power, peasant mentality belong to natural ones. In political culture these traits resulted in superiority of personal interests above the national and states ones, lack of subordinance to the government, suspiciousness towards government's increasing stability, tendency towards small forms of organizations, anarchism, critics, interstate fights, dominance of emotions over will power and intelligence, political fractions abundance, ottoman illness, rebellious nature, levelling of the status, lack of discipline, determination, civil responsibility (Yurij 15)

To the second, acquired group, encompasses psychological mimicry, formalism, relapse of slave mentality, complex of less significance and injustice. In political culture resulted in superficial, perception of political processes, underestimation of them as the determinant factors of national life, lack of understanding of main needs and interests of the nation, especially the need in own country, non-critical perception of foreign political values and norms, non belief in the powers of own nation and giving too much hopes for the charity help of other states, slavery service to foreign rulers, low feeling of national dignity, careerism with the price of betrayal of national interests, pro–Russian and other political orientations, mental fragmentarily composition of the society. So to say,

different trends formed various political motivations, taking the culture away form its traditional character (Yurij 15).

Thus, the identity question in Ukraine presents a chicken and egg problem. The nation neither accepts, nor identifies with the government, creating the rift between the common people and the Ukrainian elite. How is Ukraine supposed to solve it when their identity is almost against it? The way out would be in pedagogical methodologies and approaches that would work on lessening the negative traits of Ukrainian character such as too much individualism, lack of authority and subordinance, too little will power; and strengthen the positive ones: connection to the nature, strong determination, family values.

In "The Ukrainian Character and our Educational Ideal", Yaniv stresses the necessity to start the forming of the character with the school system, that originally was built on Christianity bases, combining both educational and educative functions. Another aspect should be added: self-perfection or improving vector. In order to pose the question of educative ideal, it is essential that the national negative traits should be lessened, while not touching the national characteristics. Further more, the traits of character should be categorized and brought/explained to the public consciousness (Yaniv 197).

The lack of external success and action leads the deepening into one's soul, into family; an isolated Ukrainian, being in his core the social creature, longs for the community, at least for the small one with the leading role of the mother as a symbol of good. Thus, the question of national faults correction has to follow not the line of weakening of Ukrainian individualism, but rather the strengthening of discipline, awakening of the wish to subordinate, to acknowledge another individuality, to value the accomplishments of another person (Yaniv 215).

This can be accomplished not by limiting of oneself, but "activating" of the character and setting oneself for the action, that has to be finished with the effect, the vivid result that brings the feeling of satisfaction and consecutively and automatically lessens the inferiority complex, giving birth to self-believe that results in more actions. The dynamism of the individual in its constant wish to complete one's accomplishments turns its attention from activity of the others, from jealousy, critics, from tripping someone up. Being satisfied with own deeds, people tend to acknowledge and recognize the merits of other individuals, that leads to the feeling of being "all right" with subordinance (Yaniv 214-216).

The determination towards activity results in stronger will power, bringing the balance towards the shaken paradigm feelings – will power – intelligence. The feeling of accomplished tasks would bring the feelings of success, and as a result, extirpation of

inferiority complex, enriching the person's character with the power to change for better (Yaniv 216).

The educational ideal should aim at bringing up the ideal, a fully developed individual, with their own view of the world, with the wish to influence the destiny of the world and humanity, with inner necessity to pose complicated, philosophical questions and find answers for them. Such an ideal should follow the line of Ukrainian believe in God–like creature of the person. At the same time, the "discipline" teaching should go not via forced punishment and threat, but by influencing the feelings of the child, paying special attention to the strong feeling of justice. The aesthetical element in education would be accepted by the child; the order would fail (Yaniv 216).

It is advisable to develop the methodological and pedagogical programme that would face such problems and aim at brining up new, traditional and mentally free generation of Ukrainians. But this is already a new study and a new project that nevertheless might and should use the data of the present research. The present research covered the question of image construction and importance of mentality as a key factor in "mirror" effect. By promoting the healthy image of Ukraine on the hand with the image of the European Union, EU–Ukraine couple would be able to look into each other's eyes and stay proudly by one another: by registering their common-law marriage into de-facto one, there would be no more project–kids, born out of wedlock. For the best marriage wows ever would be created. Let them finally say "Yes, I do"!

V. CONCLUSIONS

Sanabiles fecit Deus nationes.
(Lipinskij)

In Ukraine, the wishes of mass versus elite
are two poles between European membership aspiration
versus tournament "who wants to become a millionaire"
at the expense of the EU budget.
(Olena Chepurna)

One's destiny is one's character. But it's also the choices made in the past both by the country and by its neighbors, thus the responsibility for the present should always be shared. With the long and dark history of Ukraine, it's not easy to come to a common denominator and form the genuine image of an outsider. Without trying, though, the image will be simply imposed and dictated by powers that are not always worth listening to.

It is clear that Europe and Ukraine cannot understand each other unless a combined approach is used to look at their relations. In order to understand and improve them the paper covered the political, cultural and ethnopsychological specters of the problem. The main findings and conclusions state the points that should be considered by both the EU and Ukraine on the eve of the new and luckily, more successful paradigm of their relations.

A lot of literature covers the past, present and possible future scenario of Ukraine and EU relations, falling into two categories: realist (critical) and idealist (favouring the UA"s position). However, most of the works are one-sided, from specific area (either political, cultural or economic oriented), which is not sufficient at the present, long term stagnation period in the EU–Ukraine relations. Thus, using the complex approach the paper investigated into the attitudes towards the European and CIS integration from both elite and mass point of view. Also, it provided the critical view on Ukraine's mass ethno-psychological character that is not considered in the political studies, but is the key to understanding of Ukrainian nation and politics. The correlation between the hypothesis and findings proves that the most successful framework is the combination of constructivism theory that deals with both cultural and political aspects, as well as covering the notion of the political culture and character to both elite and the public of Ukraine and the EU.

The choice of literature justified the set aims: the identity review of well knows scholars Hall[10], Debeljak[11], Pickering[12], Parapella[13] etc. provided a broad picture on the identity question. The literature on political identity was sufficiently presented by publications in English (Bugajski, Shulman, Kuzio, Taras, Wolchik), German (Besters-Dilger, Boeckh, Piehl, Schulze, Timmermann, Ponomarenko) and Ukrainian (Chaly, Yaniv, Popkova, Yekelchyk), creating a clear picture on Ukraine's internal and external aspirations, the historical legacy and stereotypes. It is clear that with that number of publications and present work, the EU should be fully aware of the real situation of Ukraine, it's critical state of things. So there is no excuse for not taking pro–active position on the issue. The European Community on its official level should finally realize that in order to succeed in spread of democracy in Eastern Europe, only the aspirations are not enough. Instead, the EU policy should bypass the elite and aim at understanding and working with mass population in order to get some positive results from Ukrainian democratic process.

While the paper's arguments suggested the problem was partly in political elite, partly in the society itself, the research also touched upon the peculiar aspects of state building in Ukraine, the composition of society as well as the ethnopolitical character of the average Ukrainian. The main reason for that was to demonstrate individual's own faults, strength and weaknesses. Empowered with such knowledge, the nation would resist the political actors that try to pull the strings in pre–election heat. The ideal and the only successful scenario for society is to aim at eliminating the root of the problem in own character. By accentuating positive Ukrainian historical and traditional traits of national character as well as looking at European values as a positive target, it is possible to change the politics of states that are applying for the better. Through the EU criteria, the societies are able to achieve a more democratic society.

The further research discovered some major problems, firstly the weakness of the civil society in Ukraine. The comparative data of post Independence years and present period showed that the political elite wasn't able to consolidate the society, pursuing their own economic interests. Moreover, Ukraine's political identity is neither stable, nor

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[10] Hall, Stuart. "Who needs Identity?" *Questions of Cultural Identity*. Eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 1996). pp 1-17.Web. PDF file.

[11] Debeljak, Ales. "Reflection on Elusive 'Common Dreams': Perils and Hopes of European Identity." *Eurozine* 26.2 (2001): n.pag. Web. 19 April 2009.

[12] Pickering, Michael. *Stereotyping: The politics of Representation*. New York: Palgrave, 2001 Print.

[13] Parapella, Emanuel de V. *A new Europe in search of its soul. Essays on the European Union's Cultural Identity and the Transatlantic Dialogue*. Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2005. Print.

united: the political elite unbalanced and deprived it from traditional values by constant economical and political crisis creating stress to mental framework of the average citizen

Ukrainian population, being not homogenized in its nature, poses some tough choices for the middle group of Russian speaking Ukrainians, pressed between ultra Ukrainians and Russians. This is particularly the area where Ukraine should learn from the European Union how to be tolerant and deal with diversity within own country.

However, in reality the residence status (Russians or Ukrainians in Ukraine) doesn't provide a controversy on the views on democracy and economic reforms with more controversy in terms of language, religion and education (Miller, Klobucar 227). Moreover, "it seems that the primacy predictor of elite attitudes is the mere fact of their membership in the elite" (Miller, Klobucar 229).

The division line between the Western and Eastern Ukraine should be taken into consideration by the European Union as well. But the dividing factors are demographic, religious, historical and educational, while uniting ones are the views on democracy and economic reforms. And it is the difference between mass and elite perception that is most striking.

The country has become more vividly divided into Western, Central and Eastern according to language, ethnicity and political factor, which is favorable for the benefits of the ruling class. In reality, the difference between Eastern and Western Ukraine has to do more with difference between political and mass perception rather than difference in mass perception between the Eastern and Western part of the country. Thus we have proved that the instability and confusion of the mass identity was and is used by the political elite to stay in power and create a constituency.

The analysis of civic and minority statements in the political party manifestos from 1994 till present 2009 party programs showed the main arguments that unite and divide the country: attitude towards Russian language, OUN-UPA warriors and common values.

The analyses of forecoming presidential programs for 2010 additionally showed a major change in the political approach: the EU integration became less favourable, and is hardly mentioned. The original 3 – pro EU, pro Russian, and self project – are presented only by last two on the eve of 2010 January elections in Ukraine.

But does it show that the aspirations of the mass population and maybe their identity have changed as well? Is the polite sending the right message about the voters to the international community? The answer has been proven negative with the help of different data. Thus, we have proved the set forth hypothesis that the difference in elite

versus demos perspective is vivid and should be addressed when drafting a new agreement between the EU and Ukraine.

Moreover, the present the party programs declare the same old ideas and make people disinterested even in reading them. The programs' analyses proves that even after 17 years of independence the political elite considers it more worthwhile to "trick" the electorate and play on its feelings rather than improve and consolidate the society.

The political elite is now trying to go back to the third way, namely Eastern European Projects, not mentioning the EU integration process, even if it is done for the benefit of the country, so to speak Ukraine's "homework". They are playing on current political crisis, economical downhill etc. to get the support of the electorate, basically profaning the European Union for lack of support.

The inability of the government to comply with the rules and regulations of the European Union, lack of wish to eliminate bribery and corruption, failure at accepting the EU requirements – that are the genuine reasons of change in political vector. Once again, *unable* to perform well, they are trying to perform in election in order to keep their positions.

As long as the political culture of Ukraine would stay democratic, but passive, the country will continue going to the dead end. The specific negativity of the last five years is also playing its part – the colossal trust to the political elite of 2004 is lost. According to Peter Shtong it is called the psychological trauma of consciousness. Ukraine nowadays is the conglomeration of the politicians and businessmen on the one hand, and the escapism of number of leaders, their passivity and disappointment. Fortunately, the "pink glasses" has fallen off and people realize where the train "Ukraine" is heading and wondering if there are rails under the train (Stegnij, "New president will and new elite will not improve the situation in the country").

Last elections looked promising, but the promises of those times were unfulfilled. The present elections seem boring in comparison. The common people want the Ukrainian economy to work. The political vectors such as Russia language, foreign relations are secondary. Unfortunately, the main candidates do not talk about the change of the situation in the country: the power of law, judiciary system. Having the declarative power, the Ukrainian politics is not understood and accepted by the West. How can EU understand that in Ukraine one can "negotiate" with a judge, for example?

The blog comments of mass population on main articles of the elite as well as numerous polls have discovered the three main vectors in the societyal approach: pro Eastern, pro Western and Self-project, favouring the latter due to political influence.

However, the so-called "third way" presents the danger by "swinging" between two poles back from Kuchma`s time.

By acknowledging a still present communist-legacy trend in the political thought throughout the years of independence, Ukrainian society should cast away the indifference and take the most proactive and possible position in political life. At the same time, political elite should realize that without a strong society and its role in politics there would be no state very soon. By eliminating the access of mass to interfering into politics, the elite diminishes the chances for healthier and stable political relations.

But, as this process hasn't taken place for the last 17 years, one should not expect a miracle. The external forces play an important role in the inner state formation of the country. Thus, European Union, seeing the real danger, should take more active position on Ukrainian membership aspirations and Eastern Partnership Agreement. However, the citizens should not adopt a "sit and wait" passive position, because the faults of nation state building are also the faults of common citizens, and not only political elite or external friends.

To draw a line between positive and negative traits of a citizen, the detailed portrait of Ukrainian character was provided at the end of the work. Ukrainians are determined, cautious, and tardy. Ukrainians do not like to risk and usually take "halved" decisions. But on the other hand, Ukrainians are optimists: they are great householders, with genes to fix, set straight and rebuild everything. Just give a Ukrainian freedom, and he would move mountains! Ukrainians have a perception of the world in the Barocco style, with peacefulness, ability to avoid conflicts; a factor of stability, modesty and also the wish for prosperity will ultimately play a positive role for economy of the country and the European Union. Not mentioning the great Ukrainian intelligence and stamina that is still sleeping and unrealized. It takes a Ukrainian a long time to yoke the horses, but afterwards it's impossible to stop him!

The general character of Ukrainians has as well some major flaws that throughout history made them continually lose their independence and be stateless. There is a need to bring up a new generation of Ukrainians and create pedagogical programs that would aim at eliminating those traits of character.

Negative Ukrainian traits are:

1) *Expanded Ukrainian individualism* (synonyms are spiritual egocentrism, anarchy, lack of subordinance, unlimited individualism, personal will power, own way) – having crossed the line, it leads the nation into abyss.

2) *Border mentality* (transitivity, inconstant nature) is present not only in geographical, geopolitical and spiritual sense – one shouldn't miss the philosophical border state, that is the central problem of Ukrainian spirituality. The nation, being imposed the foreign rule for so long, results in hatred towards any kind of power, and lack of discipline.

3) The constant danger of the steppe, a struggle between death and life, all or nothing leads towards *"to make or mar" contrast attitude*. That, in turn, results in *passivism and minimized inner disposition towards fighting.*

4) *Escapism*, as a result, is sublimation from the world of cruelty, thus Ukrainians start to deny the war and later on the knight values, substituting the firmness with gentleness, destroy power with the creation of good, risk with understanding, hatred with love and charity. At the same time, Ukrainian *hospitality* is well known all over the world, as well as respect and help for old people.

5) The attempt to substitute the old heroic ideal aimed at foreign expansion, leads to the *tenderness of character* which is not favourable for the political sphere. The special meaning is attached to the mother, that feeling coming from the spiritual attachment to the ground.   This trend is typical for all cultivating nations, with the cult of mother that takes care after the children. Thus, the Earth acquires the features of the mother, sometimes even called ``great mother``.

6) The connection with the nature and the feeling of presence of God in every thing brings out the poetic nature and spirituality of the Ukrainians. The sensual *component of gaining power along with passiveness* leads to *quite reflexion and contemplation rather than external expansion*, mastering the world through intelligence and experience. The mastering of the world is a bigger value, than its conquering. *Reflection and contemplation* are the forms of escapism into the "small world".

7) The ideal of Ukrainian life, the fame lies in the element of good in all its beauty and humanity broadness. But as most of Ukrainian's creativity, it is quite hard to grasp, it dissolves in spanless. The feeling that it is "good" that drives the nation can be self–deceit, making *illusionism* another typical character of the nation: one looks for steady ground in the illusionary world.

8) The lack of effect, activity, and self-realization must bring the person to *dissatisfaction*. Adding the unfortunate state conditions, lack of freedom, the person stops valuing the full power of life, and dies without realization of one's mission, as a looser. It produces the *feeling of inferiority complex*, inability to be manifested, to find one's place in life. At this conditions, the success of the others do not bring happiness, but rather *jealousy*, and the wish to depreciate other person's success.

9)   With ineffectiveness of the actions and political instability one can mention with certainty the feeling of personal and *general injustice*, for why are Ukrainians not as others, what sins is this punishment for? These facts justify the feeling and wish for justice that belongs to another positive trait of Ukrainian character. While the thought in Western Europe circled around the gnoseological and natural science questions (experiment and test), the Ukrainian spirituality of the past century was occupied with the questions of historical destiny and truth.

10)   Kulchitskiy, in particular, makes a good point that in the final synthesis, the Ukrainian culture in the sphere of science is directed in the sphere of *inner humanistic reality cognition, drifting apart from scientism*. The *science acquires rather religious and ethical roots*, which corresponds to our contemplative and reflexive nature, rather than European dynamic and experimental directive (Yaniv 206-211).

The times of the Orange Revolution have proven basic traits of national character. Critics can point out the lack of discipline and lack of consistency, or subordinance to the power. But the overriding positive one was love for freedom and democratic values. Thus, the main conclusion that the European Union should consider is that Ukrainians have shown aspirations to join the European Union during the Orange Revolution. They went out in the streets in the cold to stand for the truth and freedom, to show the government that it is *enough*! And also to show the world that people are at the point of moral exhaustion, they need and want stability, and ready to work for it! They have shown the aspirations for joining the European Community.

The data also showed that the image of Ukraine was changed for better after the Orange Revolution, where the common people played the key role. It suggests that the best position of the electorate on forming the European common values is not passive, but dynamic. It is best summoned by the following line: "Ukrainian, if you want to be European, be one!"

Thus, there is a strong need for educational programs to eliminate the negative traist of national character and bring up a new generation of conscious people, active and interested in the political life.

The research also found out that the Ukrainian and European characters differ the most in their passive (Ukraine) and dynamic (Europe) traits, and coincide the most in the individualistic nature. Europe at present also searches for its identity and is undergoing the crisis of identity as a result of too vivid technology importance in life of everyone and the *instinct of "self glorification"*. The way out of the crisis lies in return to the European harmony of contrasts. And that is when the nations that are more emotionally enriched have to help the process. Of course, these nations should psychologically belong to

Europe, but at their periphery location still possessing their emotiveness and believe in its values. And the country that has a lot to offer is Ukraine as it also shares a number of common traits with the European Nations.

The study has proven that the European Society with no borders doesn't need the strict ethnical identity, but rather some flowing, plastic and situative one. Double identity does no harm to the most inhabitants of the Western Europe according to Eurobarometer results. Thus, Ukrainian identity fits the system perfectly, for due to the unique history of the country, it is already plastic and situative with plural loyalty ("A trip to post-modern identity: is Ukraine together with everyone?").

The research proved the importance of considering the political, culture, language differences, and education of mass population so that manipulators will not be able to play with the electorate. The questions "If the members of the elite are leading, are they taking the people where they want to go?" changed in 2009 to "If the members of elite are leading, will people follow them?" The Political elite stresses location rather than differences coming from language or ethnicity, and since the political elites analysis is a fallacy, neither West nor East would or could follow its leaders. The Ukrainian electorate doesn't even want to choose lesser from two evils.

Politicians continue demagogy about social standards, relations with Russia etc. "In reality nothing has been done, especially in the relation to the judiciary system. Systematic violations of the way at the top stream down with the wave of illegality, which became the everyday practice of our citizenship" (Stegnij, "New president will and new elite will not improve the situation in the country").

The common joke (from the movie "Back to the Future") says, "*Where we*'re going *we don't need roads*", and it is unfortunately applicable to Ukraine, as well as the movie title. The Ukrainian population should be aware of this and stick to the way they have chosen both in their hearts and souls! And the European Union should realize that in order to change the situation in Ukraine the policies of the EU should be as strict as possible on the political level, with set deadlines and penalties for not complying. And the most important thing they should aim at is the public sector, mass population. Evoking the citizen's activity in the politics, programs at civic education and participation would bring the best results.

The possible dilemma for the EU is of course lack of unity on its "Ukrainian" agenda. While former friends such as Sweden or British were in favor of our accession and provided adequate help, with French switching to being interested while Germany continued to be strongly against, at present it is only Lithuania, Estonia and Slovakia that support the "roadmap" plan for Ukraine. This includes the visa-free travel in the next

years. Even Poland, the biggest and closest historical friend of Ukraine apparently has had enough with Ukraine's inner instability (Rettman, "EU–Ukraine summit to mark new chapter in relations").

The EU has a strong excuse: the inner political situation in Ukraine seems to be in total chaos. But it should realize that chaos is not static, and in the case of Ukraine it *is getting worse*! Why, we ask, after Orange Revolution, when the state apparatus was functioning normally, and there was no lack of democracy, the accession was not on EU agenda? Who lost the genuine chance: EU, Ukraine or both?" (Filliphcyk, "How not to get lost between pan-Ukrainian imperialism and Euroscepticism"). The main thing to acknowledge is that moment will never come when Ukraine would solve all the questions. Even due to the simple truth that for every EU problem Ukraine has N of its own. The limit of "waiting" for the signal from Brussels has been too long and is over. It is Ukraine that is giving a clear signal now.

The notion of "European" identity itself is merely uncomfortable for some, while others accredit it with distinctivesess in hectic gloabalization rush. At any case, interaction is what matters. "In the immediate future, hopes for creation of strong European identity must rest on political leaders – on what must be their deliberate and sustained effort to raise the saliency of European identities both throughout political discourse ... and through the orgin of true common European goods" (Conover, Hicks, 31). In case of Ukraine, a first step towards the process would be visa facilitation agreeement.

The mix of Ukrainian population in Ukraine is geographically concentrated enough to provide an arena for common bonds among group members and visible to others. These population patterns not only provide many sustantive dimensions for an individual to form identities by contarsting themselve with neighbours, bur more importantly they are often configure in ways that make it easy for those identities to form.

"Political leaders play a substantial role in structuring situation so that they evoke particular political identities…raising the salience of more unifying identities through the use of political discourse. But such discourse cannot be 'empty words'. The willingness of individuals to use political identities that are framed prominently in political discourse ultimately depends on finding something of value in the group. European identities cannot be forged out of merely symbolic common goods like sports teams: they must rest on real collective goods of substantial value to Europeans" (Conover, Hicks, 33).

Thus, the most efficient policy of the European Union should have both vectors: vertical, aiming at governmental regulations and horizontal, aiming at public sector. If the EU gives a good example and shares the experience in state building in Ukraine with the

mass population, Ukraine would bloom. Because in doing that, the EU would establish and bring up a generation of friends among the common people. Later on, the control will be lessened and it would be the average Ukrainian doing the EU's former job from vertical vector: pressing for democratic change in the country, fighting the corruption, ensuring the European rights and values.

Only from changing the horizontal vector of mass participation into vertical one, including the region aspect, only by making a common Ukrainian a truly vertical root of the power relations, the EU would see Ukraine as the stable, blooming, successful country in the Eastern Frontier. For the country would be a real democracy, on the equal, adequate, reputable and deserved position with the European Union. If the EU is getting tired with being a "father", teaching and punishing the "naughty child", a wonderful grown-up personality would appear in the place of the spoilt teenager with implementation of proposed methods. If the European Community wants a true partner, that is the way to go. For the "poor neighbor is a dangerous neighbor" (Zalilo, "Poor neighbor is a dangerous neighbor").

Unfortunately, at present there are few candidates who can credibly promote the idea of European integration in Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukrainian elite, dealing even with the European Union, is using its inner-state policy: the relations are interclan ones, but instead they should be international! (Chaly, "Our relations should be international, not interclan ones"). The trend among the Ukrainian bureaucrats is the same. A Ukrainian official, dealing with European integration in Ukraine, aptly described his growing disillusion: "There are two types of people who work on the European integration in Ukraine: enthusiasts and idiots. If before, there were more enthusiasts than idiots; now there are more idiots than enthusiasts." In fact, new dismissive if not derogatory terms like euro-romanticism and euro-idiotism are entering routine discourse (Gnedina, "EU is running on empty in Ukraine").

However, European integration remains the main and perhaps only idea that can unite Ukraine's divided society, and set Ukrainian politicians on a path to modernisation. This adds urgency to the EU task. It is time for the EU to understand that promoting EU values abroad is not about some magic magnetism, it is hard work that should be done primarily for and *with* the civil population. Having ratified the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is now able to mobilise itself for more ambitious policies in the neighbourhood. Unless the EU presents a success story, be it in Moldova, Georgia or Ukraine, it may find even fewer believers in European ideas a few years down the road in the post-Soviet space (Gnedina, "EU is running on empty in Ukraine").

Apparently, questioning, patience, disguise to a falsehood are the main keys to find the scattered "I". Who are Ukrainians: citizens or just the holders of trident passports? The research shows how complicated are the intrigues of politics, the reality of everyday life and how crucial is the adequate, tolerant attitude toward each other. This gives hope to the possibility of changing the image of the EU for better. Primarily with the ability of a common Ukrainian to freely visit Europe with no visa limitations, with deeper academic exchange, the deeper dialogue between two countries can accomplish a lot. A good deal of problems comes from the subconscious tricks of Ukrainian mentality. It cannot be changed overnight, and it is not that Ukraine has even that amount of time.

It is essential that the task of Ukrainian citizens should be to engage in political activities, in understanding the true nature of proposed plans, to eliminate harmful projects as the ENP was in its time and support the useful ones as Eastern Partnership that promises a new step for legislation reform (Filliphcyk, "How not to get lost between pan-Ukrainian imperialism and Euroscepticism").

Again, the Lisbon treaty that came into power on 1 December 2009 puts forth a key question on the uniting of Europe as a whole. And Ukraine is the first test for the new European Community. For Ukraine does need the accession perspective. EU has had its "fall of the iron curtain" enlargement – with post–Communist countries. Also fall of the "fear" wall – with the flow of refuges from Balkans. It should have a "Maecenas" one – with Ukraine. The country is risky, it's big and problematic. But the consequences of not taking Ukraine into the European family would be much more dramatic. There were a lot of agreements on Common Neighborhood Policy and "common" agenda. But there should be one that is the most important: the Common Mental Space Agreement for EU-Ukraine to foster the formation of strong democratic characters and common cultural values.

Ukraine is suffering from the flu this winter, with not enough vaccination available. But there is other malady that is much worse – the political rabies that is leading the country towards the dead end. And the only external vaccination against it is the EU support. EU can give Ukraine an internal shot in the arm via programs and personal example. Also, a true Ukrainian citizen should feel pride in his own country and realize he has to step to a proactive position and not try, but to actually live to change the country for the better. This should be inculcated and cultivated into everyone. When a Ukrainian would wake up and go to bed with the thoughts about the country being the second most important prayer along with "Our Father", then Ukraine can stand tall and proud in the future, equal partner of the EU and world.

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