

Mendel University in Brno
Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies

Bachelor's Thesis

**Analysis of the nuclear program in Iran and its
impact on the security situation in the region**

Dorota Kramárová

Brno 2015

Mendel University in Brno

Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies

Study programme: International Territorial Studies

Field of study: International Development Studies

Bachelor's Thesis

**Analysis of the nuclear program in Iran and its
impact on the security situation in the region**

Dorota Kramárová

Thesis supervisor:

Ing. Zbyšek Korecki, Ph.D.

Department of Territorial Studies (FRDIS)

Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies

Brno 2015

Declaration:

I declare that I carried out this thesis; independently, and only with the cited sources, literature and other professional sources.

I agree that my work will be published in accordance with Section 47b of Act No. 111/1998 Coll. on Higher Education as amended thereafter and in accordance with the Guidelines on Publishing University Student Theses.

I understand that my work relates to the rights and obligations under the Act No. 121/2000 Coll., the Copyright Act, as amended, in particular the fact that Mendel University in Brno has the right to conclude a license agreement on the use of this work as a school work pursuant to Section 60 paragraph 1 of the Copyright Act.

Before closing a license agreement on the use of my thesis with another person (subject) I undertake to request for a written statement of the university that the license agreement in question is not in conflict with the legitimate interests of the university, and undertake to pay any contribution, if eligible, to the costs associated with the creation of the thesis, up to their actual amount.

Brno, May 2015

Dorota Kramárová

Acknowledgement:

I would like to thank Ing. Zbyšek Korecki for his inspiring advice and overall leadership and the gratitude goes also to my loved ones who supported me throughout the formation of this piece.

Abstract

Kramárová D., *Analysis of the nuclear program in Iran and its impact on the security situation in the region*. Bachelor's Thesis.

Brno 2015

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the possible development of nuclear program of Iran and its impact on the security in the region. The thesis considers the attitudes of Great powers and analyzes the possible threats from the side of Iran.

Key words: security, regional security, security hegemony, sanctions, great powers, nuclear program, nuclear weapons.

Abstrakt

Kramárová D., *Analýza jaderného programu Iránu a jeho dopad na bezpečnostní situaci v regionu*. Bakalářská práce.

Brno 2015

Cílem této práce je analýza možného vývoje jaderného programu Iránu a jeho dopad na bezpečnost v regionu. Práce bere v úvahu postoje velmocí a analyzuje možné hrozby ze strany Iránu.

Klíčová slova: bezpečnost, regionální bezpečnost, bezpečnostní hegemonie, sankce, velmoci, jaderný program, jaderné zbraně.

Table of contents

List of abbreviations:	8
List of annexes	8
Aim of the paper	9
Methodology	9
Introduction.....	11
1. Literature review	13
1.1. Theoretical approach to the Security situation	13
1.1.1. Security complexes	13
1.1.2. Security sectors	14
1.1.3. Revolution concept	17
1.1.4. Religious diversity of Islam.....	19
1.2. Nuclear program of Iran	22
1.3. Security hegemony and its influence to regional or global security	25
1.3.1. Liberal approach	25
Benevolent hegemony.....	26
Coercive hegemony	26
1.3.2. Realistic approach.....	28
1.4. Theoretical approach to sanction policy	31
1.4.1. Coercive and sanction actions	31
1.4.2. Objectives of sanction policy	32
1.4.3. Classification of sanctions.....	33
1.4.4. Economic sanctions.....	35
1.4.5. Multilateral economic sanctions.....	36
1.5. International subjects responsible for nuclear programs	39
1.5.1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	39
1.6. Attitudes of Great Powers towards Iran.....	41
1.6.1. USA vs. Iran	41
1.6.2. EU – 3 vs. Iran.....	43
1.6.3. Russia vs. Iran.....	44
1.6.4. China vs. Iran.....	45

2. Practical Part.....	46
2.1. Analysis of the regional security development with the focus on Iran.....	46
2.1.1. Security situation after WW2 concepts and actors	46
2.1.2. Missile threat	49
2.2. Analysis of the development of nuclear program in Iran.....	51
2.2.1. Analysis of the security during major events in the region with emphasis on possession of nuclear weapons	51
2.2.2. Suspicions of a possible military targeting Iran's nuclear program.....	52
2.3. Analysis of the security hegemony in relation of the Iran nuclear program	54
2.3.1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vs. Hassan Rouhani	55
2.4. Analysis of the sanctions to the economic development	57
2.4.1. UN sanctions	57
2.4.2. USA sanctions.....	60
2.4.3. EU sanctions.....	61
2.4.4. Russia and China	62
2.4.5. The impact of sanctions on Iran's economy	62
2.5. Attitudes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) towards Iran	64
2.6. Analysis of the attitudes of Great powers towards Iran	66
2.6.1. Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program	67
2.6.2 Iran's statement on the proposal agreement.....	69
2.6.3. Criticism of agreement by Israel	70
3. Proposal part	71
3.1. Possible security developments in attitudes and key players.....	71
3.2. Possible scenarios of security in the region	72
4. Conclusion	73
5. List of references	74
6. Annexes	81

List of abbreviations:

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CISADA	Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
EU	European Union
EU – 3	EU three, France, Germany, United Kingdom
GDP	Gross domestic product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IEEPA	International Emergency Economic Powers Act
ISA	Iran Sanctions Act
MFN	Most favored nation
MRBM	Medium-range ballistic missile
NGO	A non-governmental organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SALT I,II	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAVAK	Organization of Intelligence and National Security
SRBM	Short-range ballistic missile
TEL	Transporter erector launcher
UN	United Nations
UN CHARTER	United Nations Charter
USA, US	The United States of America
USD	The United States dollar
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD, WoMD	A weapon of mass destruction
WW2	2 nd World War

List of annexes

Annex 1: *The articles of original Statute*

Annex 2: *The Authorities of the IAEA*

Annex 3: *Iranian Short-range ballistic missile threat*

Annex 4: *Iranian Medium-range ballistic missile threat*

Aim of the paper

The aim of the paper is considering possible risks arising within International Relations from a potential Iranian possession of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to assess whether Iranian leaders may want and against whom they have to use at least psychological effects of the possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is important to find out:

- Whether the present and future of Iran's nuclear capabilities allow technologically active nuclear deterrent,
- Whether Iran's domestic and foreign policy is ready and able to use the nuclear arsenal as a tool to influence its relations with the outside world,
- and also whether the motives for the nuclear option and current relationships and links to other states are sufficient stimulus for the finalization of Iranian efforts to become nuclear state.

These individual points together constitute the partial hypotheses. I will analyze the basic hypothesis, and serve them as the main framework for the construction of the entire text. Work will therefore be divided into several parts. Those parts will address Iran's appearance, internal structure political organization and possible motives leading Iran to try to dispose nuclear arsenal. This will be followed by an analysis of current relations with the countries concerned and outline potential risks eventuality of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Methodology

The methodology used for the final analysis and recommendations will be focused in further analysis of the context of the surrounding area of Iran, but also in the wider global prospects, especially since the attitude of the world's major powers will decide on the real possibilities as well as the form of Iran's nuclear program.

Thus, the organized structure of the text should serve as a cornerstone for the evaluation of sub-hypotheses and main hypothesis. The work is based largely on freely available expert foreign and also Czech materials, which have been subjected to content analysis, each compares and synthesis of pieces of information together with an analysis individual levels of Iran's nuclear program is the basis for conclusions this work. The concept is applied and applicable mainly to the question of production, dissemination and use of any weapons of

mass destruction. The final chapter summarizes the current form of strategic culture of Iran of weapons of mass destruction (hereinafter WMD), compares the strength of subcultures, and on this basis outlines possible preferences or trends in the behavior of Islamic Republic of Iran.

Introduction

Relations between Iran and the international community have long tense, mainly due to ambiguity in Iran's nuclear program. Understand the strategic thought and action in this country seems to be important task not only for professionals, but also an essential prerequisite for successful diplomatic relations towards Iran.

The World Factbook (2013) is referring, that the Middle East is one of the most strategic and the most economically important region in the World. The Middle East, which may due to mineral wealth and turbulent political developments be really perspective between international securities, is one of the most sensitive regions including Iran among the largest and most powerful states. Iranian oil production and natural gas belongs to the most important in the world. Iran still suffers from political and economic insulation – mostly from imposed export controls, embargoes and sanctions imposed by the United Nations, United States and the European Union. Country, despite the huge income from exports of oil and gas is struggling with inefficient economy. On the international scene, Iran is known for its controversial stances of its representatives and also because of activities in Lebanon. Iran is also suspected of supporting and financing terrorism and is said to be problematic actor in the field of nuclear proliferation. The development of Iran's nuclear program is referred to peaceful purposes. Continued pressure of the international community testified that the world is not convinced about Iran's intentions to focus only on non-military uses of nuclear energy.

Iran maybe seeks to become a leading power in the region of the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea and seeks to use nuclear weapons as a "main characters" of power. From this interpretation in Global Security (2011) is clear, that Iran is about to obtain nuclear weapons and this will be only a matter of time. Iran may additionally later declare that nuclear weapons entered into in an effort in purpose to intimidate before accession the forceful use of WMD. Whereas in the past (In the Iraqi-Iranian war) Iran became a victim of chemical weapons attack.

During the time, the problem of a nuclear Iran is becoming increasingly urgent and complicated, as well as several interlinking different states that are interested in this issue, including their different economic, cultural and geopolitical interests. Over time, therefore Iranian civilian nuclear program has become an important topic of international relations, thanks to its overt military potential; the Islamic Republic of Iran has integrated to its research also technologies that are easily abused towards the production of nuclear weapons. In combination with relatively advanced missile program that raises significant concerns about security in the Middle East and Central Asia. Nevertheless, Iran has strong linkages with other Asian power centers so practically the concerns are rising across whole Asia.

In Tuček (2012) is defined: *“The international community has a wide range of non-military means against the development of nuclear technology. Since the writing of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and II, signed in the 70s, to the harder measures which represent the current unprecedented sanctions against Iran's nuclear program.”*

Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will have a destabilizing effect on the security and development of power relations not only in the Gulf region, but also in the wider context. It will mean increased pressure on existing nuclear Triangle (China, India, and Pakistan) (Bano, 2014). China, India and Pakistan wedge in strategic triangular relationships that share a historical conflicts and border disputes. All three have nuclear weapons and necessary delivery system with asymmetrical threat perceptions.

1. Literature review

1.1. Theoretical approach to the Security situation

The main idea which is associated with the theme of this work is security. One of the basic securities is national security. Buzan at al. (2005) in this context assumes that security is synonymous with survival in maintaining the very existence of the object. The presence or existential security threat then brings the use of emergency funds to manage them. Existential threat cannot be understood except in relation to a reference object, and in particular with the situation.

For security analysis identifies three types of Copenhagen school units according to which the researcher works. These are concepts - reference objects, actors' securitization and functional actors. Reference objects can be defined as entities that are existentially threatened and they can claim the right to survival. The traditional reference object of security is a state or nation. Survival means preserving the sovereignty of the state and nation for identity preservation. For reference object it is possible to mark almost anything depending on the topic and focus of analysis. Actors securitization then Copenhagen school characterizes as actors who claim to reference objects for existential threat. These are thus usually political leaders, bureaucracies, governments and other groups. Functional actors act on the dynamics of the security relations in the sector and significantly influence political decisions in the field of security, without the reference object or actor securitization. Buzan at al. (2005) show as an example of a functional actor a company that pollutes the environment.

1.1.1. Security complexes

In the classical theory of security complexes defines the Copenhagen school security complex as the group of units (states), whose main security concerns and views are so intertwined that the problems of national security of each of them cannot be adequately analyzed or addressed separately. Among the states inside the security complex is mutual security dependence much more intense than in the States outside the complex. This dependence is influenced by the distribution of power and historically established relations of friendship and enmity (Buzan at al., 2005).

The theory above was talking about the limits of the application form only for the military sector and political. If we want to include research and other sectors (economic, societal and environmental), cannot avoid modifying the classical theory of a security complex. In a new analytical framework can no longer security complexes confined to national and interstate relations or political-military issues. Copenhagen school came with a change in the definition, when characterizing security complex as the group of units whose major securitization or desecuritization acts are so entwined those security problems each of them cannot be adequately analyzed or addressed separately. In the framework of the classical theory of security complexes politico-military relations depends heavily on geographic distance. Threats of this type operate more efficiently at a distance shorter than longer. In countries as the reference object so it depends who they have for their neighbors. Political, military and economic power states stems from their territorial sovereignty. Other sectors are less susceptible to the influence of geographical distance. That does not mean that the application of new analytical framework was not possible to use the regional system (Galatík, 2008).

Buzan at al., (2005) present three main reasons why remain a regional level of attention in the safety analyzes.

- Assumption that the greatest influence on political events will continue States whose responses will grow out of territorial identity.
- Regional security dynamics remains globally significant in sectors where security relationships are most dependent on geographical distance. Thus, where the dominant military and political sectors.
- Some environmental and economic issues through its structuring further strengthen the existing regional security complexes. This is e.g. sharing of water resources, participation in the supply or transportation of raw materials through oil and gas pipelines, and more.

1.1.2. Security sectors

Copenhagen school defines sectors as the thumbnail for an international system that priorities one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction between all its units. Analytical sense of sectorized approach is then to distinguish species interactions - military, political, economic, societal and environmental. For the sectorized approach can be expected

that some units and values will be tied to a specific sector, although they may be present in other sectors, and survival strategies and character of threats will vary Sector by sector and from unit to unit (Buzan at al., 2005).

1.1.2.1 Military sector

The military sector is dominated by the position of the reference object state, though it does not need to be the only reference object. This is due to the fact that states usually have the largest military means. The state also monopolizes the legitimate right to the use of force within its borders and beyond. The basis of the modern state is sovereignty. The confirmation is being said in defense of the right to use force against armed opposition inside and outside the territory. Reference objects except State may also be tribes, nations, private armies or with certain restrictions and religion. In terms of threats is accentuated by the interaction potential of two military units and degree of friendship or enmity between them. Military threats and vulnerabilities are seen primarily in terms of military capabilities of potential aggressors. Effect on threat assessment has own and geographical location of the enemy, which consists of two variables – distance and character of the terrain. Now geographic perspective has a great influence on the regional focus of the theory of security complexes (Buzan at al., 2005).

1.1.2.2. Political sector

The main reference object in the political sector is the state. As another possible reference objects can be identified organizations that replace the State, or work in parallel with it. It is the emerging 'superpower' as the European Union, some self-organized social groups without statehood (tribes, ethnic minorities, etc.), and the transnational movement with sufficient loyalty of supporters, as some religions of the world or less significant religious sect. In the political sector occurs element system of the reference object, which binds to the international community. In addition to participating States in international organizations and institutions may be a systemic reference object is considered an international non-governmental organizations and leading international media (O'Heffernan, 1991).

Threat in the political sector mainly represents an attack on the sovereignty of the state. It is an existential threat, even in cases when there is little significant violation of sovereignty.

Target of threats can be an existing government structure or challenging the ideology that it confers legitimacy, as well as the territorial integrity of the state by supporting separatist activities and existence of the state itself questioning its right to autonomy or independence (Buzan at al., 2005).

1.1.2.3. Economical sector

The economic sector is characterized by a wide range and large number of possible reference objects from individuals across social classes, states the system itself to the world market. For securitization actors in the economic sector are then considered particularly state representatives, international organizations and in some cases even companies (Buzan at al., 2005).

The main reference objects are states. Security is directed primarily to the states, not companies. The main causes that may be outside are the economic sector. This is usually a concern for the preservation of military capability country, concern about the threat of disrupting the political status of the country (declining hegemony) or the danger of political levers, which is known for abuses by the suppliers of strategic goods and raw materials (Klare, 2001).

If we take the reference object for individuals and economic security represents the fulfillment of their basic human needs. Problems move to food security, drinking water, clothing, shelter and education (Buzan at al., 2005).

1.1.2.4. Societal sector

Reference objects in the societal sector are any larger groups who show loyalty to subordinates, including a common identity, which they consider vulnerable. The most important reference objects are present in this sector as tribes, clans, nations and ethnic groups like the nation, civilization, race and religious systems. Definition of Nations in certain circumstances may coincide with the national borders. In these cases refer to the nation of the head of state authorities (Kohn, 1981).

1.1.2.5. Environmental sector

Reference object of environmental security is mainly the environment as such. For the second reference object is marked with maintaining the current level of civilization. Threat and stands on the premise that mankind will come to achieve the level of civilization and return to the days of primitive social relations. Actors' securitization may be states, but rather highlights the environmental scientific community that creates and then feeds the agenda of the media and political elites. The leading actors of the political agenda are various activists' lobbyists and Non-Governmental organizations (NGO) (Mintzer, 1992).

1.1.3. Revolution concept

The concept of revolution is in the social sciences traditionally very frequently discussed and belongs to the broad area of social dynamics and social change. It was the belief that we live in a period of profound social change, which stood at beginning with the birth of sociological science in the decades following the Great French Revolution. The first concept of revolution dates from the old Latin word "revolutio" that means turnover.

Popularizing the concept of revolution has brought French event in 1789. 19th century then indeed becomes an "*age of revolution*" as called his monumental synthesis of the history years 1789 - 1848 Eric Hobsbawm. The concept of revolution gradually began to be associated with revolutionary changes of political regime, moreover, usually ongoing violence. During the 19th century it spread as a designation for basic and profound transformation of the economy or technology (e.g. in the sense of industrial, agrarian revolution). The concept of revolution in the social sciences was described by various authors and also defined in various ways.

1.1.3.1. Main authors describing and defining revolution

- **Samuel Huntington**

Samuel Huntington says (Sanderson, 2005) that revolution is a *"quick, fundamental and violent inner change prevailing myths and values in society, its political institutions, social structure, governance, government activities and policy."*

- **A. S. Cohan**

According to A. S. Cohan revolutions have these features:

- Changes in class composition elites,
- cancel previous political institutions and their replacement by other,
- changes in the social structure, which can be accompanied by changes in the classroom layout or redistribution of wealth.

- **Theda Skocpol**

According to Skocpol (1979) is possible to distinguish between social revolutions, political revolutions and rebellions.

- The social revolution mean fundamental transformation of society within the creation revolts classes that are below the ruling elite,
- political revolutions thus represent a transformation of state structure without changing the structure of social,
- and rebellions are the result activities of sub-layers, but without the ability to carry out fundamental changes in society.

1.1.3.2 Political revolution

Political revolutions are a phenomenon of modern times. In recent decades the attention of Social Sciences also earned the Cuban Revolution in the late 50s, the *Iranian Islamic revolution in the late 70s*, the revolutionary *"Autumn of Nations 1989"*, which led to the collapse of state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, and finally the *"orange revolution"* at the beginning of the new millennium in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, which overthrew the domestic authoritarian government.

- **Karl Marx**

For Marx was driving force of the revolution differences between classes and contradictory tensions between production equipment and production ways.

- **Max Weber**

For Weber, the revolution is inevitable consequence of formation or routinization of charisma that can possibly result in setting of rational authority.

- **Vilfredo Pareto & Pitirim Sorokin**

Pareto and Sorokin consider revolutions as cyclical phenomena¹; they are for them a kind of instrument inevitable social change.

The Pareto concept loses ruling elite over time their virtues, degenerate and is the inevitably replaced by someone new.

Sorokin's company still oscillates between sensual and ideal variant forms of revolution and the transitions between them.

Especially Marx's and Weber's ideas are the leading ideas of other works dealing with Revolution Studios.

1.1.4. Religious diversity of Islam

Today Iran is located on the territory previously called Persia, according to the dominant ethnic group. The geographical position of the country, as defined in the Caucasus in the north, the south of the Arabian Peninsula, India and China to the east and Mesopotamia and Syria to the west, from time immemorial been exposed so that the field has made the scene of important historical events and twists. Weakened empire in the mid-7th century breaks despite efforts to centralize power. In the power come the Arab tribes, which are grouped under the idea of Islam. Arab expansion and the Islamization meant until intervention into the local culture. Islam considers itself the final revelation of God's word, from his perspective, therefore, is not a new religion, but the restoration of the two original Abraham religions – Judaism and Christianity (Willis, 2006).

Islam considers itself the final revelation of God's word, from his perspective, therefore, is not a new religion, but the restoration of the two original Abrahamic religions - Judaism and

¹ **Cyclical theory of revolution:** in principle, every revolution passes through the same phases → we can predict the evolution of revolution

Christianity. Islam considers itself the final revelation of God's word, from his perspective, therefore, is not a new religion, but the restoration of the two original Abrahamic religions - Judaism and Christianity.

Shortly after Mohammed's death, Islam had split in several sects. Inside Islam there were formed two main branches:

- The Shiites - followers of Ali ibn Abi Talib,
- the Sunnis - considered for maintainer of sunny.

When splitting Islam it was not a religious difference as the question of who is to become the rightful caliph²:

- The Shiites (10%) recognize only the Quran (most modern Iran),
- the Sunnis (90%) also accept the Sunni and elevate Mohammed over the common man.

This division resulted in the issue of succession to the Prophet. Gradually, the differences between Sunnis and Shiites increased, formed different traditions and customs due inter alia ethnic interests (Kubeš, 2005).

1.1.4.1. Sunnah and Sunnis

Sunnah is the main branch of Islam. Sunnis are therefore followers of mainstream Islam, which is divided into four recognized schools of jurisprudence and its about 90 percent represents the majority of Muslims. Sunnis are describing themselves as followers of the Sunnah; they reject any deviation from the rules laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The implication is directed primarily against the Shiites, who by Sunni concept abandoned the Sunnah. Sunnis consider Shiites unlike the first three Caliph (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman) as well as Ali considered valid, but views on further development of the caliphate even among Sunnis disagree.

1.1.4.2. Shi'a and Shiites

Shi'a was based on Sunni criticism mainly on dogmas, in the political sphere began to organize opposition from the dissatisfied clients, from layers confronting Arab aristocracy. SIA developed without the support of state power and its numerous offshoots be seen as

² **Caliph:** a person considered a political and religious successor to the prophet Muhammad and a leader of the entire Muslim community.

undesirable. Its followers were persecuted, arousing feelings of injustice and strengthened faith in its own right. From there sprang internal tendency to search for the truth as well as unreserved humility before the authorities.

Shiites represent the second largest branch of Islam. For the Shia are considered those Muslims who for legitimate leader of the Islamic community consider only the descendants of Muhammad's family in the line beginning his cousin and son in law Ali ibn Abu Talib. Shiites after Muhammad's death in 632 did not recognize the rightful Caliph Abu Bakr and his successors Umar and Uthman. Only Ali, who became the fourth caliph elected, according to Shiite Muslims right leader, Imam, and then another of his birth.

1.1.4.3. Differences between Sunnis and Shiites

In terms of religious practice are differences between Sunnis and Shiites not too apparent. Shiites as well as Sunnis recognize five basic duties of every Muslim known as columns or pillars of religion (Kubeš, 2005):

- Religion,
- prayer,
- alms,
- lent,
- pilgrimage to Mecca.

1.2. Nuclear program of Iran

There is no way pioneering stating that Iran's nuclear program goes far beyond the past and several state form that Iran for the period 1957-today passed. The Iranian nuclear program was formally established March 5, 1957, when under the supervision of the Eisenhower program "Atoms for Peace" has been signed an agreement on cooperation in research and the peaceful use of nuclear energy between the US and Iran. The US team wanted to ensure the creation of investment opportunities in Iran's civilian sector, particularly in health and use of radioactive substances in health care (Greg, 2010)

Iran began quickly finding a use for these advanced technology and have built Tehran Research Centre in 1967, which is a 5 MW research reactor driven by high-enriched uranium, the reactor is supplied to Iran by the USA. Year late Iran acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreement, which is a signatory to this day. The last decades of the Shah was marked by grand plans - Iran planned to build in 2000, 23 nuclear power plants (Squassoni, 2006), the following grandiose plan was perceived negatively if only title that Iran did not seek its own uranium enrichment and was always willing to buy fuel from abroad, especially from the USA.

After the oil boom in the early 70s Shah said the oil to be too scarce raw materials than to waste it for energy production, and decided to give priority to electricity from nuclear power. Iranian scientists to the international cooperation to study at prestigious universities abroad and thus enhance nuclear know-how of the country. Cooperation not only with the United States, but with a number of other Western countries continued until the fall of the Shah during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Islamic Revolution brought about a change likely in all areas of public life in Iran, not excluding nuclear program. Regime change in Iran and mood meant drastically limiting foreign cooperation on its nuclear program, which Iranian officials interpreted as the impulse to convince them that it is not reliable to depend on the delivery of nuclear fuel from abroad and the need to produce its own nuclear fuel. At the same time a cluster of several events - opposition to nuclear power by Ayatollah Khomeini's entourage, the exodus of nuclear scientists and to the destruction of Iraq's nuclear facilities by Israel of 1981, putting an immediate threat to Iran, pushed the importance of Iran's nuclear program in the background (Greg, 2010).

During Khomeini's tenure in office, it led to the Iran-Iraq war, which dramatically changed the view of Iranian officials on unconventional weapons. Iraq has repeatedly used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians and Iran lacked adequate deterrent potential. The demonstrable resumption of Iran's nuclear program occurs with the onset of Ayatollah Khomeini, who openly supported the restoration of Tehran Nuclear Research. Iran, which is considering the historical experience as really bad, relied mainly on itself, renewed nuclear program in order to manage all stages of the fuel cycle. In 1984, then-President Ali Chámene'í obtained from Khomeini permission to restart nuclear program. Iran had to seek for experienced partners who would be able to help during the development of its nuclear program and supply of technology and know-how. In the mid-nineties, Iran is actively cooperating with Russia in the construction of a power plant in Bushehr, in which period the fuel supplied Russia. Iran has built an extensive network of uranium mines, enriching centers and research reactors. With the beginning of the new millennium, there were increasing concerns about the US and later the EU and Russia on Iran's peaceful intentions, since many activities Iran began to oppose his proclamations. (Edelman at al., 2011)

Already in the 70s, the United States feared the possible intentions from the Iranian side about the use of nuclear forces. However, Iran's nuclear program became the center of attention in 2002, which saw a disclosure secret complex in Natanz. Renewed Iran's nuclear activities have been of particular interest.

The Iranian nuclear program was not perceived as urgent security threat until the year 2002 when the exiled opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran discloses information about yet unannounced nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. This discovery was from the beginning considered an important event, since the complex was to provide uranium enrichment.

The staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began clamoring for access to these nuclear facilities and wanted more information. In accordance with the IAEA regulations but Iran was not supposed to allow controls. It was not even supposed to inform IAEA about the existence of these devices, because the rules of the IAEA required this information six months before laying of the nuclear material in new facility.

The incident drew international attention, however, to a renewed Iranian nuclear program. After a few months the device visited IAEA inspectors, who were supposed to control only

the research centers reported by Iran. If not reporting complex at Natanz was a violation of obligations to the IAEA or not, dispute between the Agency and Iran (Squassoni, 2006).

These obligations arise from the fact that Iran is a signatory to the NPT. As such, it is subject to the control mechanisms under the scheme, which establishes the agreement. On the contrary, Iran undoubtedly acted contrary to law framework agreements already in 1991, when China bought from uranium hexafluoride, without agency informed. These two events symbolize the whole story - Iran with the IAEA largely cooperates, while still concealing something, and leads the agency disputes the interpretation of key documents. Agency staff regularly compiles a list of questions that would like to discuss with Iran; from Iran August 2008 on a consultation rejects that suspicions are based on forged documents.

In the following years the discovery of facilities at Natanz and Arak the EU-3 negotiated with Iran about halting the uranium enrichment and even though Iran temporarily, for almost two years, suspended enrichment, long-term solution could not agree. With the advent of Ahmadinejad as president in 2005 worsen the already bad relations US and tensions over Iran's nuclear program grows. Many saw hope for change in Barack Obama, who in the White House was replaced by George Bush junior. Obama's discourse differs significantly from Bush: speeches about the "axis of evil" were replaced by greetings to the Iranian people and its leaders. Thus, the US prepared to negotiate better conditions in which along with Russia and France offered Iran enrichment of approximately 70% of its stocks of low enriched uranium. The process should take place in Russia and France; enriched uranium would then be shipped back to Iran. However Iranians rejected after a certain time.

1.3. Security hegemony and its influence to regional or global security

In this chapter will be discussed hegemonic stability and fundamental insights into the theory. Hegemony is the political, economic, or military predominance or control of one state over others.

In Zeitoun and Allan (2008) the hegemony is defined as *"the leading position based on the authority. It differs from the concept of dominance, which is defined as the leading position based on coercion."* Successful hegemonic strategy builds consistency and compliance with its leadership rather their attractiveness than intimidation, but for its effective functioning is needed right combination of these two factors. Hegemony is also different from the position of dominance in terms of individual actors, who are in this case formally equal. Hegemony therefore can be described as: *"the effect of superiority, which is in the hands of the first equals, through a combination of coercion (force) and (received) authority."* (Zeitoun and Allan 2008)

The twentieth century is seen as a century of economic progress. Compared to previous centuries brought a much greater economic interdependence between countries. The economic interests of the states began to take an unprecedented importance. From the history of the two world wars showed the surface as much in modern conflicts depends on the economic development of the state. One of the most important theories that were based on these facts developed the theory of hegemonic stability.

1.3.1. Liberal approach

1.3.1.1. Charles P. Kindleberger

The founder of the theory of hegemonic stability is considered an American political scientist and economist Charles P. Kindleberger. To express the theory Kindleberger led exploration of the Great Depression of 1929, in which just a huge interconnection of world economies showed more clearly than before. Fundamentals of the theory were first published in the Kindlebergers book: *"The World in Depression 1929-1939"* (Kindleberger, 1973).

Kindleberger (1973) did not specify exactly which attribute should be characterized by a hegemonic power, however defined several major benefits of hegemony, or "public goods" produced hegemony, which are listed below.

- Stabilization of global trade. Hegemonic state would be Kindleberger example, in times of crisis to open its own market. This applies in particular sectors which are more sensitive to crises, such as the automotive industry. In the case of declining investment should become hegemonic support at least a regular flow of capital,
- stabilization of monetary relations so that the stabilizer provides rediscount mechanism in time of international crisis provides liquidity in the form of long-term loans. If the loan resources internationally exhausted should become hegemonic take on the role as lenders of last resort,
- providing a relatively open market for the distribution of scarce goods, favoring redistribution of capital through foreign aid,
- manage the international monetary system, which implements support for the exchange rate mechanism and stabilize macroeconomic policy,
- Providing international security.

An important prerequisite superior to the ones described above is that the hegemonic State must have the sanction mechanism, which would penalize those who are only abusing the system (Krpec and Pšejja, 2006; Guzzini, 2004).

Benevolent hegemony

In terms of international relations theory, there are two basic types of hegemony. The first type is called *benevolent hegemony*; the dominant state assumes responsibility for the resulting system, which monitors long-term or strategic objectives. In this case, usually alone bears most of the cost of operating and maintaining the system.

Coercive hegemony

Rather the concept of *coercive hegemony* counts situations where hegemony under threat of exclusion from the system collectively beneficial uses its superiority and power to other actors forced to bear a greater cost than would be the case for the existence of a benevolent hegemony (Krpec and Hodulák, 2011).

1.3.1.2. R. Keohane "After Hegemony"

The closest to Kindlebergers original concept is in my opinion the theory of hegemonic stability by R. Keohane presented in his book *After Hegemony*. According to him, the theory stands on two basic propositions.

- The first is the order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant superpower behavior in specific sectors of international politics then determined by international regimes, in providing necessary public goods. The origin and nature of the regime are dependent on the will and action hegemony,
- the second main principle is the argument that maintaining order in world politics requires the existence of persistent hegemony.

Keohane (1984) defines hegemony as the supremacy of law in material resources, which has four main parts. Hegemony must have control over raw materials, sources of capital control over markets and must have a competitive advantage in the production of goods with high added value. Such hegemony will strive to establish a liberal international economic system, because it will be in his interest. In order for the regime pushed him all you need to have sufficient superiority in specific areas in which they must be ensuring that the public good.

Keohane's concept is influenced by the goal of his work. He tried to prove it by comparing skepticism realists that say that cooperation between states in international relations is possible when states share mutual benefits. His concept has other significant benefits, which are considered very important for the whole concept. In his work he defines the relationship between military force and international political economy. Hegemonic state must have sufficient military force to protect the regime of international political economy from adversary attacks. Suffice it to his power will be sufficiently deterrent. Hegemony does not have to be able to actively enforce its will throughout the world, just as other states within the system will be aware of his skills and will thus be sure that the benefits of cooperation are sufficiently protected. (Keohane, 1984).

1.3.2. Realistic approach

Krasner and Gilpin realistic approach differs from the preceding of emphasis on various aspects of the theory of hegemonic stability and questioning, or rather undervaluation, the consequences of the free market and especially in the long term.

1.3.2.1. Krasner's concept

Krasner (2007) in his book "*State Power and the Structure of International Trade*" focuses on the relationship between the interests and power of the most important states in the international environment and the degree of openness in the international economy. This is a classic text explaining international economic relations from the position of realism.

According to Krasner, there are four main areas of national interest, which are influenced by the structure of international trade.

They are:

- Political power,
- gross domestic income,
- economic growth,
- social stability.

The concept describes the way in which he measures the relationship between political power and business structure. Large countries are less dependent on international trade, free trade, thus increasing their power, because small countries are far more dependent and its opportunity costs are incomparably higher.

Krasner in his text analyzes the relationship between the types of international arrangements and free trade not only in terms of magnitude, but also economic development states. A presents the conclusion that the only realistically possible structure favorable for the establishment and functioning of the free market is the dominance of large developed country – hegemony (Krasner, 2007).

1.3.2.2. Gilpin's concept

Another author who publishes in the spirit of realism R. Gilpin applied, like Keohane, the theory of hegemonic stability in more areas than just international economic relations. We can say that the content is the most sophisticated of the concept presented here. For the establishment and functioning of liberal market system are required by Gilpin two assumptions - hegemony of liberal ideology and common interest of States.

Gilpin, as Kindleberger, argues that liberal open world economy requires support for its existence hegemonic power. Gilpin was the first who systematically investigate why the hegemony decides to seek the establishment of a liberal economic order. The key role was played by its domestic economic structure.

Another necessary condition for the emergence of a liberal economic order is the common interest of the other major powers on it. Hegemony can to encourage the adoption order, but not coerced. Hegemony is in this sense founded on the common beliefs of other countries about its legitimacy. Smaller countries are taking leadership of the hegemony because of its prestige and status.

Gilpin also focuses on the characteristics and functioning of hegemony is based upon the concept of Kindleberger. According to his version of the theory of hegemonic stability liberal of economic system cannot function by itself, but in the long run, it is necessary to maintain a leading economy, which must provide the following public goods:

- An open trading system,
- a stable currency.

Hegemony must also constantly combat the threat posed by states unwilling to pay for the consumption of public goods, the so-called action. They are usually called "Free riders" or other states that are trying to exploit its market position. For this purpose hegemony creates international schemes (Gilpin, 1997)

In furtherance of their interests hegemony uses its economic strength and its dependence on other markets. The most important source of power hegemony is flexibility and adaptability of its economy.

Hegemony must respond adequately adapting its economy. After some time, but its potential is exhausted and it is based international order begins to crumble. Consequently, the hegemony trying to use the remnants of his position to strengthen its role, which further

undermines it created order. In the world economy can potentially appear a situation similar to zero-sum game.³

The theory also does not say that international cooperation is not possible without hegemony; it is only by her far less likely. The exception is the cooperation within the framework of a liberal economic regime. Its existence depends on the existence of public goods, and you can provide a single hegemony, not only in their own interest.

³ **Zero-sum game:** what one player gets, the other loses.

1.4. Theoretical approach to sanction policy

Each state is sovereign in international relations; the only limit its actions represent the reaction of the other actors in international relations. There are only a limited range of options available to force the states to perform its duties. At each state depends on whether and how to enforce respect for their rights in other states. One way is to use coercion sanctions. Their use is recommended both in law and political science, many reasons for them to find and the international political economy. The various punitive measures are being taken by individual states and groups of states collectively, the International Organization. May point in diplomatic relations and economic contacts, links between the States to intervene or otherwise restrict state coercion, thus forcing it to meet its liabilities. Uses of sanctions, their forms and procedures for charging while recently suffer from the substantial changes.

1.4.1. Coercive and sanction actions

Sanctions or in other words punitive measures include a broader group of so-called coercive means, where international customs regulate their use. International law defines as a means of coercion "*targeted pressure on the subject of international law*" and considers it one of its key institutes (Malenovský, 1993).

From a legal perspective coercive actions represent a response to a violation of applicable international legal norms. A violation of mandatory standards leads to liability commitment between the offender and the victim.

Failure by an infringement of fulfillment of obligations brings accountability to the injured party to have the opportunity to pursue their claims through direct coercion damages (David at al., 2004).

Law enforcement agents are usually divided into retorsion and reprisal. Retorsion represents a milder form, because they have the character of harsh acts. They can be used in virtually any situation without the risk that the entities belonging to them, exhibited sanctions based on international law liability. Reprisal actions have the character of a breach of international law, but the fact that it is a behavior which is accessed at coercion here excludes illegality.

The term punitive measures (sanctions) in legal science uses particularly for those coercive actions not involving the use of force and are not only the only state (unilateral action), but realizes it is part of the international community (multilateral action).

The main development of sanctions and their formation into its current form occurs after the Second World War. The impetus to the dynamic development was the emergence of UN sanctions and a mechanism of collective sanctions based on UN Charter.

Overcoming the bipolar world in the late eighties and nineties created space for the unthinkable use of sanctions and also significantly increased the possibility of imposing sanctions and implementation of regional international governmental organizations. Currently penalties mainly used as an alternative to military intervention.

At the same time it can be seen as an indication of the presence of pressure ethical elements in foreign policy (Hill, 2003).

1.4.2. Objectives of sanction policy

In terms of foreign policy is the imposition of sanctions crucial decisions in which coercive state must take into account the large number of facts on their side and on the side of coercion state.

During imposing sanctions, there are couple facts that play very important role:

- The relationship with coercion country (political, economic, business people but also cultural),
- size of the states concerned,
- seriousness of the offense which raises penalties,
- public opinion,
- obligations towards third countries (particularly with regard to sanctions announced by the international organizations).

1.4.2.1. Division of sanction objectives

- **Changing the policy in the target country:**

Leave violations of civil and political rights generally or in specific cases, to avoid persecution on grounds of religion or race, resolve disputes expropriation, stop tolerating the drug trade and so on.

- **Changing the ruling regime in the target country:**

Particularly during the Cold War was a series of sanctions regimes, announced by United States of America (USA), focused on government destabilization in states that its policy approached the Soviet line. Currently the democratization is frequent target of sanctions announced by the European Union.

- **Disruption of military aggression of target country**

- **Cancellation military potential target countries**

Sanctions widely used during ongoing or about to war, their long-term effect is to weaken the economic and military strength of the adversary. Currently are used against countries in conflict with international obligations seeking to acquisition or development of nuclear weapons.

- **Another change in the behavior of the target country**

Hufbauer at al., (1985, 2007) present as the example of aimed sanctions the sanction imposed on Iraq after the occupation of Kuwait was leaving the occupied territories.

1.4.3. Classification of sanctions

Sanctions used in practice can be divided into:

- **Arms embargoes**

Arms embargoes purpose is to prevent the escalation of conflict by cutting off the aggressor from the supply of arms and other material pertaining to military purposes.

- **Economic sanctions**

Economic sanctions directed into the economy and prevent the use of particular economy for war purposes.

The main types of economic sanctions include in particular

- *Partial and full embargo;*
- *boycotts of strategic commodities* whose export is sanctioned become a major source of funding for the war (such as oil, diamonds, timber tropical trees;
- *freezing of funds* - assets on accounts abroad, the loans, investments etc.

- **Other types of sanctions**

Other sanctions that could further affect the state sanctioned or applied to increase the efficiency of the previous types of coercive means. The other types of sanctions can include:

- *Diplomatic restrictions* (withdrawal or refusal of state visits, absence at a major international conference, the appeal of its own diplomats, foreign diplomats statement as *persona non grata*⁴ etc.)
- *Travel bans and flight prohibitions* (grounding of aircraft, railway connection restrictions, a ban on entry of vehicles of public transport, etc.)
- *Scientific-technical relations* (constraints or a ban on participation in scientific and technical research, ban on the provision of industrial property rights or intellectual property rights and other)
- *Cultural Relations* (restrictions on the provision of cultural goods)
- *Sports contacts* (ban on people or groups at a sports game or other sporting event)

Depending on the number of participating countries is possible sort penalties - as mentioned above - as unilateral (announced by one country independently of the others) and multilateral, imposed by international organizations.

⁴ The term **Persona non grata** represents an undesirable person.

The sanctions are announced by:

- United Nations, or the League of Nations in 1945,
- European Community / European Union,
- Arab League,
- Organization of African Unity / African Union,
- Organization of American States,
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Sanctions may be imposed on more states at one time. Among the states there are substantial differences in how often they attach to punitive measures or initiate them themselves. Clear leadership in terms of number of announced regimes include the United States. Since 1914 they imposed penalties either alone or as part of a coordinated procedure more than a hundred times (Hufbauer at al., 2007).

1.4.4. Economic sanctions

1.4.4.1. Utilization and objectives of economic sanctions

Group of economic sanctions is very rich, includes measures affecting trade and financial flows. Typical sanctions of the first group include (Hill, 2003):

- Embargo,
- Boycott,
- tariff increases,
- appeal of most favored nation MFN⁵,
- refusal to import or export licenses.

Measures of financial nature are usually stored together with trade sanctions. Are less visible, but more enforceable, verifiable and can be very effective (Hufbauer at al., 2007).

Economic sanctions are from approximately half of the last decade, the subject of intensive investigation as those who impose sanctions, as well as the scientific community and civil society, represented mainly by Non-Governmental organizations (NGO). Their analysis is not assessed as very satisfactory and shows that in addition to direct agents of security threats, sanctions affect already suffering civilian population.

⁵ MFN: most favored nation is a status or level of treatment accorded by one state to another in international trade

Penalties are successful when it reaches their goals or penalties are successful if the level of damage in coercion state is really high. The first view at evaluating of the success belongs to political science, and the second view belongs to the economic science.

- **Economic science** is based upon evaluation of the effectiveness of the way in which sanctions acts on the market of goods and services and capital market in the State coercion. Economic sanctions deemed meaningful if they are universal and coercion state on imported commodities and capital largely dependent (Mayall, 1984).

General theoretical conclusion, therefore, is that multilateral economic sanctions are more effective than unilateral (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999).

- **Political science**, in terms of international sanctions policies, assesses the sanction as successful if there are achieved objectives, which removed a situation that gave rise to the imposition of sanctions.

1.4.5. Multilateral economic sanctions

1.4.5.1. UN sanctions

The sanctions approved by the UN Security Council are typical for their broad scope because they are binding all UN member states. When deciding on sanctions, permanent members of the Security Council have the power of veto⁶, and therefore the imposition or non-imposition of sanctions in a particular case speak of the current international political situation and the balance of power. The United Nations was founded in 1945 as a global organization in charge of monitoring compliance with international peace or restoring international peace. Define its mission based on the idea of collective security. The power of collective security issue has a number of powers. These include in particular the possibility to use different types of funds for the peaceful resolution of international disputes, adoption of interim measures in the event of a breach or threat to international peace and the use of coercive measures to international peace was restored (Charta Spojených Národů, 2014).

⁶ A veto– is the power to unilaterally stop an official action.

Coercive measures applied by the United Nations can be divided into two basic groups:

- **Measures with the use of force**

Include various types of air, sea and ground military operations

- **Measures without the use of force**

The UN Charter belongs to measure without using force complete or partial interruption economic relations, interrupting rail, sea, postal and communication links, and the severance of diplomatic relations (Charta Spojených Národů, 2014).

1.4.5.2. EU sanctions

An example of an intergovernmental organization that implements UN sanctions and next to them has its own active sanctions policy, the European Union. Provisions on economic sanctions have already been incorporated into the founding documents of the European community. The Single European Act (1987) European political cooperation was integrated into the structures of the European Communities, which also brought the Commission's responsibility for implementing the sanctions.

The use of sanctions belongs to the political and economical instruments of hard power, but the activities of the Community around the late eighties of the 20th century were in the spirit of soft power. It means that in practice the Community was using „softer” - diplomatic means rather than "hard" - military or economic to achieve their goals.

Over time, EU started to use sanction mechanisms autonomously. And currently the EU document prefers the term *restrictive measures* before the term *sanctions* (Council of the European Union, 2004)

By the definition of EU, sanctions are tools of diplomatic or economic nature, designed to bring a change in activities or policies which violate international law or human rights (European External Action Service, 2009).

Objectives of EU sanctions:

- Ensure the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
- strengthen the security of the Union in all directions,
- preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, and even at the external borders,
- promote international cooperation,
- develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The European Union may impose sanctions as against third countries, as well as to groups of people (e.g. terrorist) or against individuals. The range of imposed sanctions is wide (see 1.4.3. Classification of sanctions). EU's sanctions policy has become more visible at the beginning of the 21st century.

1.5. International subjects responsible for nuclear programs

1.5.1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter IAEA) is regarded as the highest international authority in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection is an independent intergovernmental organization in the UN system for science and technology in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

IAEA was established in 1957 with the aim *"... to accelerate and expand the use of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. If it is in its power to ensure that assistance itself, at its request or under its supervision or control is not used to serve any military targets"* (The Statute of the IAEA, 2014).

Provides technical assistance to the 164 member states (March 2015) and promotes the use of nuclear research and technology for sustainable development.

Monitors and verifies compliance with bilateral agreements and international conventions on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensuring that nuclear material and equipment are not diverted for military purposes. On all continents, with more than 900 projects that fall within the IAEA safety program, participating in approximately 250 inspectors.

The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. It has two *"Regional Safeguards Offices"* which are located in Toronto (Canada) and in Tokyo (Japan). The IAEA also has two liaison offices which are located in New York City (United States), and in Geneva (Switzerland). In addition, the IAEA has three laboratories located in Vienna and Seibersdorf (Austria), and also in Monaco.

The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide. The programs of the IAEA encourage the development of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against misuse of nuclear technology and nuclear materials, and promote nuclear safety (including radiation protection) and nuclear security standards and their implementation.

1.5.1.1. The Statute of the IAEA

The statute of the IAEA is something like a law that the organization shall comply. The statutes are divided into 23 articles. The Statute of the IAEA was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was held at the Headquarters of the United Nations. It came into force on 29 July 1957 (The Statute of the IAEA, 2014).

The articles of Original Statute are shown in annexes: **Annex 1: *The articles of Original Statute.***

Authorities of the IAEA:

- Board of Governors
- General Conference
- Director General

The authorities of IAEA and their responsibilities are shown in annexes: **Annex 2: *The Authorities of the IAEA.***

1.5.1.2. Missions of IAEA

The IAEA is generally described as having three main missions:

- **Peaceful uses:** Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by its member states.
- **Safeguards:** Implementing safeguards to verify that nuclear energy is not used for military purposes
- **Nuclear safety:** Promoting high standards for nuclear safety

1.6. Attitudes of Great Powers towards Iran

1.6.1. USA vs. Iran

Although it may seem paradoxical today, however, at the outset of Iranian nuclear program was the United States. In 1957 the USA signed an agreement with Teheran about cooperation with civil nuclear field within Atoms for Peace program. Virtually until the revolution of 1979, Iran had Washington in support of its routing program. USA without major opposition also supported the decision of the Shah Pahlavi regime to build a nuclear power plant in Bushier with the help of German group Kraftwerk Union.

The period of 20th century is particularly important for the mutual relations between the US and Iran. During the 20th century occurred the most fundamental events that led to not really favorable situation in the present. But it was not just one event, which has affected these relationships, but many planned or accidental situations. Among the most crucial surely belongs rise of radicalism and Islamism in the Middle East and also an increase in the importance of oil and increased interest in the countries that have this commodity (Taterová, 2010).

After the Second World War, the previous influence of Great Britain replaced the influence of the United States. At this time, the development of relations between these two countries was on a very good way. Actually the US was regarded as the country that liberated Iran from the British sphere of influence and also as the country, which may help Iran economically. But the rise of the Israel reversed this idea very soon. Unlike the USA, Iran had really negative attitude to formation of Israel. In the 50s of last century, the post of Prime Minister of Iran held Mohammad Mosaddeq. His biggest effort was to return oil industry back to the Iran from the hands of Great Britain. But The United States did not support the Prime Minister Mosaddeq, and also under the pressure of Great Britain and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi also merit for his dismissal. After that Mohammed Reza Pahlavi came to power. He was known primarily for his harsh methods, secret police SAVAK, and liquidation of all opposition and already mentioned alliance with the US (Iran Chamber Society, 2015).

In the 60s became J.F. Kennedy president of the USA, he made no secret of his sympathy for Israel and the Zionist movement as such. Also thanks to him there was an increase in the supply of arms to Israel, and public support for this country. Hostility to Israel and the US from Iran was increasingly deepened.

In the 70s, Iran was included in the American press among the states that most repress the Human Rights. Pahlavi was considered incapable and cruel ruler and according to Iranians the USA was the actor that keep him in power. After his dismissal United States lost the position in the region. During the Khomeini reign the wave of anti-Americanism could fully manifest itself. The United States were by Khomeini labeled as "Great Satan"⁷, which itself demonstrates a bad opinion about this state. According to Khomeini and his followers, the US was the cause of all evil. In the 80s occurred Iran-Contra Affair⁸. There were several goals to be achieved. The United States should support the Iran with the supply of weapons and spare parts. In return they expected help against kidnapers, who detained the American hostages in Lebanon. Everything had to happen in secrecy since the US declared an embargo on the supply of arms to Iran. But in the end the whole affair emerged to the surface (Ritter, 2008).

In the early 90s, Iran was regarded by the Western powers and the American media as dangerous element. This trend persisted through ideas from the Khomeini government. It was based on measures of the US government, which should prevent Iran to become hegemony in Central Asia and the Middle East. The debate was especially about an ideological threat posed by Iran and the growth of religious extremism supported by Iran.

Relations between Washington and Tehran have not changed even after the onset of Bush by Bush Jr. Bush labeled Iran as one of the Axis of Evil⁹, mainly due to concerns about terrorism and developing of weapons of mass destruction (Horák, 2005).

Iran's nuclear program is these days monitored very closely. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) constantly monitors if the nuclear facilities are used for peaceful purposes only. Iran is obliged to follow the NPT. Thus, if occur any breach of this agreement, the matter would be presented to the Security Council. This would most likely mean the start of military action in Iran. Due to the United States very strong and manipulative position it is only a matter of time before Iran will find inspiration for attack and the United States will consequently try to change the Iranian regime.

⁷ **The Great Satan** is a derogatory epithet for the United States of America in some Iranian foreign policy statements.

⁸ In 1986 it was found that the Reagan administration was selling illegal weapons to Iran and Iran was at that time on the list of countries supporting terrorism so the USA was not allowed to export weapons to them.

⁹ **Axis of Evil** defines all states that facilitate terrorism and produce weapons of mass destruction.

1.6.2. EU – 3 vs. Iran

The EU three (or EU-3) refers to a group consisting of the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. These countries are considered great powers, with their influence within the European Union and outside it.

Despite the great potential of the EU's relations with Iran, relationships are not as strong as they could be. This is mainly due to the Iranian nuclear program and the issue of human rights. The US-Iranian hostility is prevailing for years - thus increasing the potential for negotiations with EU. On the issue of Iran's nuclear program, most visibly involved a group of states, which consists of permanent UN Security Council members and Germany. Three out of six of these countries are also Member States of the European Union. France, Germany and Great Britain have such a common sight on the issue of a nuclear Iran, that this trio is often understood as one unit (abbreviated as EU-3), which corresponds to their joint initiative towards the Islamic Republic. All three countries have with Tehran relatively large number of historical and economic ties and in the past have been closely associated with the beginnings of the development of a nuclear Iran (Einhorn, 2004).

With the change of the regime in 1979, friendly and cooperative approach of the EU-3 had changed and currently belongs next to the US to the biggest critics of Iranian ambitions in the nuclear field. The EU-3 shares with the USA similar, though not quite the same view on Iran's nuclear intentions. Both sides of the Atlantic also share concerns about possible impact of nuclear Iran on global non-proliferative regimes and stability Middle East, where the US and the EU-3 have series of economic and political interests. The results of such a framework are common goals of their policies, which are designed to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons.

1.6.3. Russia vs. Iran

Iran and Russia established the diplomatic relations in the 15th century. Under the Shah's regime the relationships were rather hostile because during the Cold War Iran was focused more in the USA. During Iran-Iraq war the USSR was on the side of Iraq, who was his ally.

Iran has been historically tied up with Russia due to common strategic interest in the region of the Caspian Sea, which was in the 20th century one of the main source of many conflict, but also a platform for the development of mutual cooperation. After the year 1979, the Soviet Union, or the Russia became for Iranian cleric liberal counterweight to the United States. This development stemmed more from geopolitical necessity, and choice of the lesser evil. Ending the war enabled the improvement of relations between the USSR and Iran. They concluded the agreement on trade and military cooperation. The turning point in their relations was the USSR's collapse. Countries are no longer considered a threat to each other. On the contrary, these countries began to perceive common threats. Since the disintegration of the USSR, Iran recognizes the importance of relations with Russia. These could replace relations with the West. For Russia, Iran became an important partner, because Russia was trying to establish friendly relations with Islamic societies. Friendship with Iran, which has great influence in Islamic countries, can help Russia to make friendly relations with Islamic societies.

Russia as well as Iran rejects US hegemony and the presence of foreign players in Central Asia and the Caucasus. On the basis of their size and influence these countries can play an important role in resolving regional conflicts. But Iran wants Russia as a strategic partner on the international stage, while Russia, and by contrast emphasizes the role of Iran in particular bilateral relationships. Russia has a very pragmatic policy, and therefore will cooperate with Iran only if it does not threat its other interests. Therefore, Russia does not consider Iran as a real strategic partner (Sanaie, 2007).

1.6.4. China vs. Iran

China and Iran are countries that strengthen their position not only in the region but also in the world. In mutual relations the main points are arms trade, energy and a different relationship to the USA. Iran in its relations with the US takes a tougher approach than China. China is expanding its trade and political relations with the US (Dorraj and Currier, 2008).

Relations between China and Iran are dated back far into the past. Among the countries was running a trade route (i.e. The Silk Road). For relationship between these countries, is important the fact that there has never been war among them and both have experience with colonialism (Cristiani, 2006).

In Iran's nuclear program, as well as in the development of advanced ballistic missiles, played a key active role next to Russia also China. In the 20th century the relationship deepened, despite the fact that in 1949 Communists came to power in China and in Iran ruled pro-American regime, whose task was to containment of communism. Relations in the 50s were not very good, but trade was developed between the countries. In the 60s the relationships have improved because of diversion of China from the USSR. Iran already didn't have a value for the USA and had become more independent. Both countries were forced to seek new allies. At the end of 60s, Iran has supported China's membership in the UN, while it voted against in the past. During this period the trade between these two countries has increased significantly and in 1971 Iran and China established diplomatic relations. Consequently, the volume of trade between these countries has increased significantly since China considers Iran as a potential trading partner and energy supplier. Iran in turn regarded China as a counterweight to the US and the USSR.

2. Practical Part

2.1. Analysis of the regional security development with the focus on Iran

2.1.1. Security situation after WW2 concepts and actors

The defeat of German Nazism, Italian fascism and Japanese militarism in World War II and Allied victory established long-awaited peace immediately. The subsequent domination of Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the colonial powers in Asia and Africa induced changes the political system associated with the wave of violence and problems. After the Second World War to change the political map did not avoid the region of the Middle East. Peace in the region was unstable and was embroiled in an amount of combat clashes against domestic and foreign enemies.

Middle East was although not exposed to traumatic reality as Eastern and Central European countries, which, immediately after World War II got in the power of Soviet sphere and influence or colonies in South and Southeast Asia, which are emancipated from Britain, as well as the potential conflicts of smaller scale change for greater intensity conflicts (Agha, 2003).

Iran was never colonized. Previously there was a strong influence of the British and Russians, who divided Iran into spheres of influence (the Russians north, the British South). After the WWII the Soviets and the British occupied Iran directly. In Iran, the Shah ruled.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (reigned 1941-1979) introduced the so-called White revolution - industrialization, empowerment of women and wanted secularization. He was strongly supported by the USA. Shah was supplying to USA a lot of oil and the US took his country as a buffer against the expansion of the USSR. Shah ruled dictatorially and was leaning on the secret police (Curtis and Hooglund, 2008).

2.1.1.1. The Islamic Revolution in Iran

1979 - The Islamic Revolution in Iran is one of the most important domestic political events of Iranian history in the 20th century. The result was the establishment of the Government of the Islamic Shiite fundamentalists, although in its unleashing participated in leftist and liberal forces, respectively.

"The Islamic Revolution of 1978–79 established the Islamic Republic of Iran as a republic with nominal separation of powers among the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The senior figure in the system is the faqih¹⁰, an expert in religious law, who is referred to in the constitution as the Leader of the Revolution" (Curtis and Hooglund 2008).

The revolution began in 1978, was definitively established in the first half of the following year. Already in 1978 began protests against the regime, the Shah was overthrown. In 1979 he returned from exile in Paris to land Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (lived 1902-1989) and became the highest representative of Iran. Shah and his followers had fled the country. Almost all Iranians are Shi'a, Shi'a a branch of Islam became the official state ideology and the country turned into a religious dictatorship (fundamentalists). State name changed to Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran was the adversary but also the USSR. *"Neither East nor West, but the Islamic Republic"*, it was Khomeini motto (Patočková, 2013)

Among the largest, heaviest and bloodiest conflicts that took place in the Middle East after the Second World War was the Iran-Iraqi War of 1980-1988.

¹⁰ A **faqih** is an expert in Islamic Law, and, as such, the word Faqih can literally be generally translated as Jurist.

2.1.1.2. Iran-Iraqi War (1980-1988)

Iran - Iraqi War followed up directly on events in Iran, which took place in 1979 Islamic revolution led by Shiite spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini, which ended the government of the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, trying to liberalization and secularization of the country. After the revolution and the total weakening Iran wanted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to regain the disputed area around the Shatt al-Araband potentially connect the Iranian province Khuzestan to Iraq. These assumptions are not met and war acquired the character of protracted conflict, which according to estimates, 400,000 people were killed and 750 000 were injured. The economic impact on both countries were disastrous - Iraq 452.6 billion USD, Iran - 644.5 billion USD (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2003). The boundaries after the war remained virtually unchanged. The Iran-Iraq War was widely using chemical weapons.

2.1.2. Missile threat

Iranian missile development began during the war with Iraq, during which Iran was the target of Iraqi missiles Scud B. Means for adequate response initially obtained thanks to the missiles of the same type that was purchased from Syria and Libya. In 1987 Iran began to collaborate with North Korea, which supplied copies of Scud missiles Hwasong 5. On behalf of the late '80s Koreans build (in exchange for oil deliveries) factories for the production of these weapons. In 1990 Iran received Korean missiles Hwasong 6, which was modified longer-range Scud. Soon Iran began to run the production of copies of those missiles called the Shahab-2. Iran also produces self-propelled launchers on the chassis of the Russian truck MAZ 543M (Visingr and Kotrba, 2007).

Today, Iran has proven only missiles that belong to category of the Medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM). Iran these days certainly does not possess the Intercontinental range missiles. However, it could be reasonably assumed that they definitely have technology for production of these missiles and that they can be trying to develop such missiles. On the other hand there are no guaranteed information about their development and construction.

Certainly the most common are short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), having a range of up to 1000 km. This is primarily due to the export. Iran's missile program has moved up to a higher level, because it also mastered the technology for solid fuel engines. Iranians have been presenting new types of rockets, but by appearance, it seems that most of them copy the Shahab series. It can be only assumed that Iranians also work on multi-stage rockets and missiles with intercontinental range (Cordesman, 2014).

Type of SRBM	Range	In service (year)	Launcher
Tondar 69	150	1980	*TEL
Zeal 1/2/3	150-210	1990	TEL
Fateh A 110	200	1990	TEL
M11	280	1990	TEL
SCUD B/variant	200-300	1990	TEL
Shahab-1	200-300	1990	TEL
Shahab-2	500-700	2000	TEL
M9	up to 800	2000	TEL

Table 1: *Types of Short-range ballistic missiles in operation from the year 1990*

*TEL=transporter erector launcher¹¹

¹¹ A transporter erector launcher (TEL) is a Missile vehicle with an integrated prime mover that can carry, elevate to firing position and launch one or more missiles.

According to this table it can be said that during years 1990-2000 were developed only the Short-range ballistic missiles which are able to hit the target up to range of 1000km. But the first of them had the range only about 200km they could use them for example during the next potential threat from the side of Iraq (Hildreth, 2009).

The ranges of the current SRBM are shown in annexes: **Annex 3: Iranian Short-range ballistic missile threat**

The yellow circle shows the missiles with the range from 150-200km, the blue one shows the range from 280-300km and the widest range of SRBM, from 500-800km are shown by the red circle.

Another threat in the form of missiles of medium-range missiles came up with the new millennium.

Type of MRBM	Range	In service (year)	Launcher
Shahab - 3	2100	2003-now	TEL
Musudan BM -25	2500-4000	2006	TEL
Fajr 3	2500	2006	TEL
Ghadr 110	2000-3000	2007	TEL
Ashoura	2000-2500	2012	TEL
Sejjil	2000-2500	2014	TEL

Table 2: Types of Medium range ballistic missiles in operation from the year 2003

When we look at the Table 2 it's obvious that during the first decade of new millennium Iranians started to develop better faster and stronger missiles.

The ranges of the current MRBM are shown in annexes: **Annex 4: Iranian Medium-range ballistic missile threat**

The purple circle demonstrates the ballistic missile that can hit the target from 2000-2500km, the green circle demonstrates the range from 2600-3000km and the biggest circle shows the widest range that Iranian ballistic missile can reach. Iran has only one MRBM that can reach up to 4000, it is called Musudan BM -25, which was originally made by North Korea (Hildreth, 2009).

2.2. Analysis of the development of nuclear program in Iran

2.2.1. Analysis of the security during major events in the region with emphasis on possession of nuclear weapons

It is questionable, however, why the Islamic Republic decided to secretly pursue its enrichment program in the mid-1980s, in the middle of the war with Iraq. The Iranian concealment policy and its safeguard failures could be explained on two accounts:

- technological discriminatory restrains;
- Saddam's Weapon of mass destruction (WMD) preparation.

Iran's decision was in part a response to the explicit technological discrimination envisaged in the Western countries' policy of refusing Iran technological access, and to the Western countries' self-assigned role of denying Iran its legal rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to access the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In addition, Iraq's application of WMD against not only military targets but also civilians during the Iran-Iraq War left Iran with no choice but to engage in preliminary phases of enrichment, far short of a nuclear deterrence, to discourage such a belligerent enemy from entering into a mutually expensive nuclear arms race.

Despite many speculations that Iran is looking for nuclear weapons, the country is a member of the NPT and has repeatedly denied any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons. It has, however, long been involved in developing nuclear technology. Thus, if Iran decides to produce a nuclear explosive device, there is an embryonic capability to do so in a certain period of time, albeit under harsh and risky international, as well as regional, circumstances.

2.2.2. Suspicions of a possible military targeting Iran's nuclear program

Activities of the Islamic Republic and also the way of Iran's activities inform the international community imply that in Iran there is at least an attempt to achieve nuclear hedging capability¹², and should assess the political representatives of the state as necessary (Bureš and Šmíd, 2010).

The fact that Iran is trying to achieve nuclear capability hedging can be deduced from the three basic elements. The first is the fact that Iran has tried for many years of his status as a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT to make the most to seamlessly acquire nuclear fuel from nuclear states, whereas up to 2002 has been more fundamental doubt that Iran is trying to mainly to build a stable network of nuclear power plants, which would reduce its dependence on energy from oil while increasing overall energy supply by increasing the country needed. The second reason to think that the purpose of Iran's nuclear hedging precisely, is the fact that Iran has repeated tendency to conceal its nuclear activities and facilities before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and the moment of their detection tends sufficiently cooperate with the agency. The third reason is that simultaneously with the development of its nuclear program is also developing Iran's missile program, while military leaders have an important role in the Iranian nuclear program (Bowen and Brewer, 2011).

As indicated above, in the literature there is consensus on the fact that it is impossible to identify with certainty of the Iranian nuclear program for military or based exclusively peaceful. In this chapter I'm going to summarize further points on which the literature and which corresponds to a significant extent, sets the context to the issues examined in this work.

Firstly, it is important to summarize the way in which a potentially nuclear Iran is perceived as a threat, while the proposed response of authors to confront either the Iranian efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, or to counter nuclear-armed Iran.

¹² **Nuclear hedging capability** means maintenance strategy, or at least pretending that there is maintained; real possibility of rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, which is based on sufficient technical facilities capable of producing nuclear weapons at the time of several weeks to several years.

The first point, which coincide literature, is the fact that at the time of obtaining a nuclear weapon by Iran comes to the Middle East unstable bipolar confrontation. The argument is mostly developed in the text, "*The Dangers of Nuclear Iran*" (Edelman, 2011).

Although there is no evidence that it was decided to focus towards military nuclear program, Iran has several reasons to do so.

FEAR OF THE US AND ITS INTERVENTIONS AGAINST THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Iran is afraid that the US and the West are seeking to dismantle the current regime. In this regard, decides Iran logic of deterrence external intervention through ownership of nuclear weapons.

MASTERING TECHNOLOGICALLY COMPLICATED PROCESS TO PRODUCE A FUNCTIONING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

These technologies and processes have considerable political potential - the achievements in the field of science and technology are usually perceived positively by the public, and especially so in Iran, it may serve to increase the popularity of the government Ayatollahs.

COMPETITIVNES

Not to mention the ideolocial potential of the fact that the neighboring Sunni Pakistan has nuclear weapons, and this process has already mastered, while Shiite Iran did not.

2.3. Analysis of the security hegemony in relation of the Iran nuclear program

When considering national security and strategy we have to focus on three key factors.

- Pursuit of regional hegemony,
- pursuit of profit deterrent arsenal,
- efforts to rely only on itself.

Iranian elite is based on factors such as geography, demography or access to mineral resources, and last but not least for historical and ideological reasons, believe that the country should be a dominant player in the Gulf region, which also requires the necessary military capabilities. Iran is therefore looking for an alliance with US competitors like Russia and China and the countries or non-state actors who would like to disrupt the status quo. As already mentioned, Iran lacks long-term reliable allies or patronage some of the superpowers. The country is strategically lonely.

After the Islamic revolution in year 1979 led by Shiite cleric Ayatollah Khomeini that forced the Shah to leave the country and installing a new regime led by the Shiite clergy. New, aggressive, revolutionary Shiite Iran Balboa Sunni and other conservative states feel a direct threat. This was compounded by many Iranian attempts to export the revolution to neighboring countries, supporting Shia minorities and effort on Iran position of hegemony in the region.

"The Iranian sense of isolation and abandonment was increased by the apathetic response of the international community to use chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. This experience has left deep wounds in the Iranian national psyche and instill a deep distrust of international arms control treaties, as well as international organizations like the United Nations" (Eisenstadt, 2011).

Iran seeks to minimize its dependence on foreign supplies of weapons or their components to prevent recurrence of bad historical experience. Likewise, the desire for self-sufficiency one of the key reasons for Iran's nuclear program.

Despite Iranian efforts rapprochement with the countries of the region, these countries felt against the Islamic Republic continue to mistrust and still perceived it as a threat. Threat in Iran sees the West, especially the United States and Israel.

The Iranian regime is perceived as hostile to Western civilization, as main supporter of terrorism, as a destabilizing element of regional security and also as threat regular supplies of strategic raw materials.

The Iranian threat was greatly articulated mainly in the period when the leader of the country since 2005, was controversial President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He was known for his highly conservative sensibilities, to fundamentalist religious establishment, considerable populism in domestic politics, irreverent sayings holocaust, rhetorical attacks on Israel and the United States and the support of Iran's nuclear program.

However in 2013, was elected as the new president of the pro-reform Hassan Rouhani. The former nuclear negotiator is considered one of the biggest critics of the previous president Ahmadinejad.

2.3.1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vs. Hassan Rouhani

2.3.1.1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is one of the most controversial politicians in the world. He is known for his opposition to Israel, which according to him should be erased from the map. The biggest concern is the fact that he supports Tehran nuclear efforts. He claims that Iran's nuclear program is peaceful, but the international community suspects that the country wants to acquire nuclear weapons, especially when Iran tested a ballistic missile. The election of Ahmadinejad represented in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran means a major breakthrough. He is the sixth Iranian president, but the first who is not spiritual. His victory in the elections insured the fact that he supported the poor layer of the population.

His election in 2005 meant the strengthening of conservatives in the country. His tenure as president is a characteristic of increasing tensions with the United States and the rapid development of Iran's nuclear program. The problem with the Iranian nuclear program appeared in 2002, when the opposition has published till that time secret information about programs in Natanz and Arak. Iran had concealed these activities for almost 20 years. Finally it confessed and began to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (Novinky.cz, 2015).

During his reign the security in the region significantly decreased due to the fact that he sought Iran as the hegemonic power in the region.

Evidenced by the following facts:

- promotion of Iran's right to nuclear program
- disregard for UN resolutions against nuclear program
- resistance and hostility towards the US
- policy against Israel (described the Jewish state as "*a cancer that should be moved to Europe*")
- strengthening of relations with countries that have a critical attitude towards the US

In 2013, however, Iran hopes on better times. In a short time will be to the Iran presidency indicated Hassan Rouhani. There is no doubt that the new space will open up in relations between Iran and the West.

2.3.1.2. Hassan Rouhani

Rouhani won the elections in 2013 for three reasons:

- to improve the economic situation of the country, which is rapidly deteriorating due to the Western embargoes;
- restoring the acceptable relations with the United States, thereby releasing the deadly pressure of sanctions;
- to negotiate the nuclear program with the great powers and setting what direction will the development of nuclear technology continue

The agreement on nuclear program is actually hiding this aspect: To what extent is Iran ready to retreat from the regional power, and if is able to leave the position of hegemony in the region, which was conquered by the former president Ahmadinejad.

So far, Rouhani during his reign demonstrated that he is not an ideologist, but a pragmatist. If there is possibility that between Tehran and the West is going to be rational compromise, it will be definitely easier now, than during the regime of two loudmouths Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and George Bush (KSM, 2013).

2.4. Analysis of the sanctions to the economic development

The economic situation of Iran is closely monitored since the very inception of the United Nations sanctions regime, and it is absolutely crucial indicator. Early October 2012, the international community could observe significant changes in this area since there was the sharpest drop in Iranian Rial against foreign currencies. This provoked a reaction on the part of the international community and to Iran domestic scene.

Since 2006, when the sanctions regime against Iran was established, it was the first moment that supported the international community in retention of solid view about Iran's nuclear program. Natural starting point for both parties of dispute was to describe the international community sanctions as a reason for the sharp slowdown in economic performance of the country. Especially for the USA it was kind of possibility how to represent the clear evidence, that sanctions are working.

2.4.1. UN sanctions

Sanctions regime against Iran was established by Resolution 1696, issued by the UN Security Council in December 2006. The Security Council decided to solve the long-running stand-off associated with Iran's nuclear program, whose origins date back to the fifties. Since 2006 the UN Security Council, has approved six resolutions against Iran because of its controversial nuclear program. Each resolution was designed to increase pressure on Tehran and to suspend uranium enrichment and ballistic missiles - two of the three important steps for the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon. UN sanctions gradually targeted to state officers, government structures and business related to Iranian nuclear program and the army. The resolutions include a travel ban and the freezing of assets of individuals, front companies and banks. Resolution gradually began to focus on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - an elite branch of the Iranian army and alleged ringleader of nuclear program. USA and European powers are facing problems with agreeing any further resolutions, mostly from the side of Russia and China (Starr, 2003).

2.4.1.1. The list of resolutions issued by the UN

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 (2006)
<p>The very first resolution specifically touching Iran's nuclear program was adopted in July 2006. The Member States of the UN Security Council refer to the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General and the Governing Council. They are demanding immediate suspension of all activities connected with processing, enrichment and nuclear research, which has to be verified by the IAEA. Resolution supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear program, but stresses the role of the IAEA in monitoring during the fulfillment of obligations according to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran is urged to openness and elimination of points of dispute and it also has to fully cooperate with the IAEA.</p>
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006)
<p>Resolution 1737 was adopted by the UN Security Council on 23rd December 2006 and imposed the first sanctions. The import and export of sensitive nuclear materials was banned and to the financial assets of people or companies involved in the nuclear program were frozen. This resolution required Iran for the immediate stopping of all activities related to uranium enrichment and heavy water, including research and development. All States should prevent trade with Iran, which could be related to nuclear and ballistic research.</p>
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007)
<p>In March 2007, was from France, Germany and Great Britain (EU – 3) adopted the resolution 1747, which responded on Iran's refusal to conform to the requirements within the specified time of the previous resolution. Sanctions started to apply to the import and export of weapons from and to the Iran. The financial sanctions against persons and organizations were expanded and involved the spread of nuclear technologies. The UN Security Council also called for the international financial organizations not to provide loans or other financial assistance except humanitarian and development to Iran. In the same year, the IAEA announced that Iran had not only failed to comply with UN Security Council demands to stop uranium enrichment, even though its production has increased.</p>

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008)
Resolution 1803 was adopted on the 3 rd March, 2008. The resolution calls for ending of relations with banks Melli and Saderat ¹³ , which were associated with activities around the Iranian nuclear program. It urges Member States also to monitor maritime and air transportation to or from Iran, in which there is a reasonable suspicion of transporting illicit materials.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)
The last tangible expression of consensus between states P5 came in 2010 in the form of resolutions 1929. This again extends financial and travel sanctions, requires close supervision of financial activities of representatives of the country and commercial activities It also confirms the embargo on certain weapon systems and expands the number of individuals and entities included on the sanctions list, which the UN Security Council restricts the movement or freezes accounts.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984, 2049 and 2105 (2011-2013)
Resolutions 1984, 2049 and 2105 extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for the one next year. The UN Security Council requests this Panel to submit mid-term report and a final report at the end of the mandate. Further these resolutions confirm the validity of all previous.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2159
This resolution confirms the validity of all previous resolutions, including resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007), resolution 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1887 (2009), 1929 (2010), 1984 (2011), 2049 (2012) and 2105 (2013), and reaffirms their provisions.

(Security Council resolutions, 2006).

¹³ **Bank Saderat Iran** (BSI) is an Iranian multinational banking and financial services company headquartered in Tehran and **Bank Melli Iran** is the first national Iranian bank

2.4.2. USA sanctions

The United States apply sanctions against Iran since the Islamic revolution for nearly the entire time till now. They developed since the 80s of the last century, when they were specifically aimed at forcing Iran to renounce support for terrorism. Since 2014 sanctions and related restrictions started to be much more enforced. During the last decade the US sanctions targeted primarily at Iran's nuclear program. Because of this fact there are couple laws dealing with the nuclear power:

- Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (1995),
- The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) (1996),
- Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) (2010).
(Mora and Storm, 2011)

US sanctions do not target only on Iran and state companies, they have also large extraterritorial character and they try to compel foreign companies that cooperate with Iran to end those ties through the application of measures which negatively affect economic relations. During the administration of President Bush were imposed unilateral sanctions on the Revolutionary Guards and Iran's three largest banks. There was also further freezing of the assets of individuals and companies associated with supporting terrorism, destabilization of Iraq and nuclear program. Sanctions were imposed on dozens of foreign entities, mostly Chinese and Russian due to aiding Iran in these programs. The US powers were significantly expanded in this area in 2006 due to the NPT, which included Iran, North Korea and Syria. The US government created the Ministry of Justice units that forcefully penalized individuals and companies accused of selling weapons and parts to Iran (Wright at al., 2010).

Under the administration of President Barack Obama in 2010 passed a law on comprehensive sanctions. There was a ban on importing certain Iranian foods and e.g. carpets. The important fact was that Obama could afford to encourage foreign oil companies in purpose to stop fuel exports to Iran. (Iran due to insufficient capacity of refineries imports about a 1/3 of its gasoline). (Jones, 2013)

In late 2010, the US wasn't the only one who applied sanctions. Other major countries in the Western world started to apply sanctions as well. The companies act as well as the countries; they made a decision that the Iranian market is not worth the trouble (Wright at al., 2010).

2.4.3. EU sanctions

After years of failed diplomatic efforts to deal with Iran, European leaders came to the conclusion that it is necessary to move to sanctions to push Iran to its international obligations including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the end of the year 2010 Europe has joined the US in the application of sanctions.

Before 2010 was the role of EU in imposing sanctions against Iran very limited by the enforcement of targeted sanctions imposed by the UN. Since 2010, three rounds of implementation of the sanctions that go beyond the requirements of the United Nations took place.

The first of them, in 2010 was about the European ban on investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry and a ban on the provision of key equipment.

Second round of EU autonomous sanctions took place in January 2012. It imposed an embargo on the import, purchase and transport of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products. There was also ban on financing, insurance and transport of these products and ban on the export of key equipment and technologies into these industries and the freezing of assets of Iranian central bank within the EU. The measures included a ban on trade with gold, diamonds and other precious metals with the Iranian government.

The third round of economic sanctions of the EU took place in October 2012. There was a ban on the import and transport of Iranian natural gas, together with insuring and financing of these activities and the export of graphite and semi-finished metals, including aluminum and steel. Other things that third sanction included:

- a ban on the provision of key naval equipment and technology for the production and maintenance of vessels,
- a total ban on financial support for trade with Iran (with humanitarian exceptions),
- a ban on all EU transactions with Iranian banks, unless prior permission is granted,
- the construction ban oil tankers to Iran, providing shipping or storing Iranian oil and petrochemical products (Patterson, 2013).

2.4.4. Russia and China

These two permanent members of the UN Security Council share the opinion, that they will only apply sanctions imposed by UN resolutions. It is maybe because Russia has invested considerable resources in major projects in Iran and moreover does not want to unnecessarily provoke Islamist movements in Muslim regions of Russia. The clear example is the nuclear reactor in Bushehr. In January 2014 Russia negotiated barter trade with Iran. This trade would daily supply Russia with about 500 thousand barrels of Iranian oil in exchange for unspecified Russian goods. China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil, and therefore cooperation with the US was crucial in the effort to reduce Iran's oil revenues (Katzman, 2015).

However this year (2015) the Russian President Vladimir Putin made changes in the yield of the measures in fulfillment of UN Security Council: Head of State has authorized the delivery of anti-aircraft missile complexes S-300 to Iran. The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed surprise at the reaction of Western countries that Russia lifted the embargo on deliveries of S-300 to Iran. On the Russian ministry stressed that the system S-300 is entirely defensive system and does not endanger anybody. In addition, the transfer of these weapons to Islamic Republic is definitely not in contradiction with existing international regime (Sputnik, 2015)

2.4.5. The impact of sanctions on Iran's economy

During the Iran-Iraq war in the 80s had a fall in oil prices much higher impact on the Iranian economy, than US sanctions. However the news in 2013 reported an unstable economic situation. The Iranian government owes the banks, cities and suppliers. Entrepreneurs in the country are struggling to survive due to sanctions imposed by the United States.

President Rouhani wants a quick solution, and therefore offers a deal on the nuclear program. Iranian politicians in the past argued that sanctions on Iran have no harmful effects. But the present politicians acknowledge difficulties.

In Particular the sanctions imposed from 2010 dealing with international financial transactions have appreciable implications. Iranian media wrote that the government owes millions of dollars to banks, cities and suppliers. A sale of oil, which accounts for 80 percent of state revenues, has been halved due to the sanctions. One of Iranian analysts consider punitive environment not as an oil-for-food program, practiced once in Iraq, but the program Oil for scrap. Because the sanctions authorize to spend money from oil sales only in countries that use this oil, the Iranian market is flooded with low-quality Chinese goods. Iranian infrastructure is build by Chinese enterprises instead of local ones, while China enjoys quality Iranian oil (Hospodářské noviny, 2013).

2.5. Attitudes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) towards Iran

Iran's nuclear program became the center of attention of IAEA in 2002, when it came to disclosure of the secret complex in Natanz. This discovery was from the beginning considered an important event, since the complex was to provide uranium enrichment. After a few months the IAEA inspectors visited the device for the first time. The IAEA was till this time supposed to control only research centers that were reported by Iran.

Iran's commitments on reporting of all research centers are resulting from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Iran is subjected to the control mechanisms introduced within the regime of this treaty. Iran ratified the Convention on the guarantees in 1976. The former wording of article said that Iran is obliged to report every facility 180 days before the nuclear material will be placed into. However in 1992, the Governing Council had adjusted this part of Convention. Government added that Iran must report beginning of construction or even authorization of the construction of a new nuclear facility. Iran accepted these changes in negotiations with the Agency in 2003.

Iran cooperates with the IAEA quite fairly. But it still conceals something, and leads with the agency disputes about the interpretation of key documents. Agency staffs regularly compile a list of questions that would like to discuss with Iran; Iran rejects consultation since August 2008 with the fact, that suspicions are based on fake documents.

In 2010, information from the annual threat assessment started to emerge to the surface. US believe that Iran is developing several nuclear facilities aimed in moving closer to produce a nuclear weapon. Since 2010 the number of discussions with Iran increased. It is thanks to the credibility of the agency and logical requirements.

In 2012 International Atomic Energy Agency has expressed serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Tehran by international agencies significantly expanded activities at the so-called uranium enrichment. Tehran by the IAEA document, additionally failed to convincingly explain what happened with the uranium that agency records in its possession. Diplomats believe that Tehran could use this uranium for experiments related to the development of nuclear warheads. IAEA in each of its report shows how Tehran despite UN sanctions continues to enrich uranium. Agency also says that Iran in its underground complex in Fordo has installed approximately 350 new centrifuges to enrich uranium. IAEA report showed that Tehran since early 2010 has produced nearly 110

kilograms partially enriched uranium. Western experts argue that nuclear weapons it must be 250 kg (Česká televize b.), 2012).

IAEA for more than ten years, since the nuclear program started to be discussed wasn't able to identify with certainty whether the Iranian nuclear program is really peaceful. They say it is because Iran is working insufficiently. The agency created a special team that has to deal with agreements between the IAEA and Iran and the IAEA and the UN resolutions, which is supposed to supervise suspicious nuclear activities. A working group composed of experts on nuclear weapons and intelligence analysts.

In 2013, Iran signed an historical agreement with the United States and five other powers. For the first time in the last ten years has adopted strict limits on its nuclear program in exchange for the cancellation of some international sanctions (Britské listy, 2013).

The sentence that was said by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle : *"Iran should understand that only it has the key to end sanctions against its economy"* has become the key element to the present (2015) discussion of the nuclear program.

In the beginning of April this year (2015) 6 Great Powers met in Lausanne to negotiate a Framework Agreement on Iran's nuclear program. The current framework agreement of Lausanne, which was concluded in April 3rd 2015, will build on the successful Joint Plan of Action adopted at the platform P5 + 1 in November 2013.

In addition to the points dealing with suspension of further development of the nuclear program, the Framework Agreement also requests Iran to allow IAEA to perform expanded inspection and monitor all of its nuclear facilities for 20 years. All nuclear facilities mean uranium mines and chemical treatment plants, where the production of uranium concentrates - so-called 'yellowcake' - takes place.

2.6. Analysis of the attitudes of Great powers towards Iran

“Diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue have produced several proposals for a negotiated settlement or to build confidence between Iran and the international community. Thus far, none of those proposals have gained acceptance from all of the involved parties and efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program continue. As Iran progresses down a path towards a nuclear-weapons capability, the difficulties in finding a compromise that would protect against a nuclear-armed Iran while being acceptable to the leadership in Tehran have grown.” (Devenport, 2014).

At present, there are still problems that hinder the improvement of bilateral relations. The reason is suspicion of an effort to acquire nuclear weapons, Iran's support for terrorism, establishing cooperation with anti-American governments in the Western Hemisphere and human rights violations in the country.

As was described above the relations between USA and Iran are really complicated. The USA is rather strict and puts a lot of pressure on Iran, because they are afraid. They are afraid of possession of nuclear weapons, but also of terrorism, due to the events of 2001. US policy in the negotiations with Iran focuses on Iran's rejection, intransigence, enforcing sanctions and putting pressure on other players in the international relations towards the isolation of the Islamic regime. This strategy has been used for over two decades, which seems to have failed. Maybe making less pressure from the side of US would lead to greater influence on Iranian decision-making processes.

The current policy of the United States, allows creating the necessary pressure on Iran, but on the other hand, strengthens commitment to the acquisition of Tehran's nuclear arsenal. Tehran sees the USA and its intransigent position opposing the main source of danger for the ruling regime.

2.6.1. Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program

The latest information about Iran's nuclear program brought negotiations, which took place in Lausanne, Switzerland. The six world powers have recently met to negotiate an agreement with Iran on the dreaded nuclear program and they also agreed on the fact that a definitive agreement will be ready till the end of June 2015.

- USA
- EU-3 (Germany, France, United Kingdom)
- Russia
- China

According to negotiators, talks stuck on three fundamental issues.

- period during which the restrictions apply to Iranian nuclear activities,
- arrangements in interference of sanctions
- if to restore them in the case that Iran does not fulfill the agreement

They negotiate also about how long these restrictions will apply to Iran. US advocate votes for 15 years, the Iranians are willing to accept only 10 years, but France requires 15 to 20 years. Israel, which continues to criticize the deal, says that even a twenty-year delay will not prevent Iran make a bomb. Negotiators want Iran to be strictly monitored during negotiated period (Lidovky.cz, 2015).

The foreign ministers of Russia, France and China left the meeting after the first day. It was not due to the fact that great powers didn't agree on the mutual aim. The head of Russian diplomacy Lavrov said that they managed to find consensus. *"If the good will will be on all sides, the agreement is possible,"* says the German representative. Lavrov left Lausanne then, as well as the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang I. and so did their partner Laurent Fabius from France. He said he will return to Switzerland in the case it will be helpful.

So at the meeting left only the representatives of USA, UK and Germany. USA didn't change its strict approach –nevertheless Washington admits that in this case the diplomatic solution is considered as the best. Talks with Tehran, which Washington was heavily involved are now in full swing. In exchange for limiting nuclear program the West offers to reduce or even eliminate the anti-Iranian sanctions, which in combination with the price of oil significantly damaging the local economy (Česká televize a.), 2015).

The US approach in this negotiation was that Iran would not abuse its nuclear program for another 15 years to produce a nuclear bomb. In return, the West cancels economic sanctions. If the planned agreement will be signed, it will very positively affect the Iranian-American relations. US President Barack Obama described the preliminary agreement with Iran as historical.

"I am confident that the agreement will make our country, our allies and our world safer" he added. If the agreement is signed, Washington and Tehran will only communicate or argue for more than a decade. But there will be nothing to fight for. President Obama also says that there is not any alternative to conditions, which were agreed on the negotiation in Lausanne. And thanks to his statement no other option seems real - such as the option to keep the sanctions in place and push Iran to continue reducing its nuclear infrastructure. Obama also added that the agreement is not based on trust, but on an unprecedented verification: if the Iran tries to cheat, the World will know. The US president will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, while a diplomatic solution is considered as best (Daňková, 2015).

From the number of fifteen thousand installed centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium, Iran will leave only one-third of them in operation for another 15 years. The Centrifuges, which Iran will give up, are going to be under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the next 25 years (Havlická, 2015).

2.6.2 Iran's statement on the proposal agreement

It is also necessary to add statement of main powers of Iran towards the great powers and their proposal of freezing the nuclear program for about 10-15 years.

Agreement may at first sight seem like a clear win for global security and stability. However the winner is especially Iran that will be deprived of sanctions. Rejecting the agreement would mean an increase in prices of almost anything, while cancellation of sanctions will lead to a cheapening of all western goods, market expansion and liberalization of trade.

Obama has declared that sanctions will be cancelled only after signing of the agreement and the subsequent evaluation of its compliance. But there is also another hitch from the EU. The European Union have announced that the sanctions that were imposed on Iran and that should be cancelled this year, will be extended in the full text to the next sanction period, regardless of whether Iran will sign or will not sign an agreement on its nuclear program. In practice the requirements of Iran can hardly meet, because Iran requires abolishing unilateral US sanctions all at once. It's really difficult because a number of them have been introduced in response to various events, and some of them have nothing in common with nuclear program (Ze Světa a., 2015).

The head of Iranian diplomacy Zarif declared that Iran will not accept *"excessive and unreasonable demands"*, but talks will continue. He also argues that Obama's opinion is expressed unacceptable and threatening sentences and Iran will not accept unreasonable and illogical demands. Tehran's talk on nuclear program with six major powers will continue, "said Fars Zarif. *"No agreement to sign, if on the date of signing will not be cancelled all sanctions,"* said Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on the occasion of celebration of the Iranian nuclear technology, which the Islamic Republic recalls achievements in the field of nuclear research (Ze světa b., 2015).

2.6.3. Criticism of agreement by Israel

The Middle East countries that dispose of nuclear weapon are only Israel and Iran. So if Iran possesses the nuclear weapon, the region of Middle East would be under its leadership. Due to this fact the most prominent critic of the agreement is Israel, which under the right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu warns against any long-term peace with Iran.

Since the Islamic revolution relations between Israel and Iran have changed a lot. From quite close ties that existed between these two countries during the Pahlavi era, the relationships moved up to the present hostilities. After the Islamic revolution Iran has severed all diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel. Iranian government refused to claim the existence of Israel as an independent state. Thanks to the development of Iranian nuclear technology, gap between these two countries deepened and takes the form of almost existential hatred. Israel very carefully monitors Iran's efforts to develop its nuclear infrastructure and the highly fears that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. His political leaders consider Iran's nuclear program as the most serious threat towards Jews since the Nazi Holocaust. Israel in any case will not tolerate Iranian nuclear independency (Telegraph, 2009).

Even though there is a partnership between Israel and the USA, which in its territory to expand the nuclear shield and helped him through financial and material assistance to build a system of defensive and offensive capabilities, it does not mean that Israel is safe. It is based on simple geographical and military realities. Israel must face the state that is able to destruct it, and that state is less than 1500 km from the border. A nuclear-armed Iran with long-range missiles is able to deliver a nuclear warhead on its territory at only a few minutes after warning Israel.

Due to those facts Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists on negotiating a new agreement, which must include recognition of the Jewish state by Tehran. *"Israel will do everything to ensure that the agreement has been modified"* said Netanyahu. He thinks that it's necessary to make pressure on Iran and force it to negotiate a better deal. *"Israel requires final agreement to include a clear recognition of Iran's commitment to Israel's existence"* (IDnes.cz, 2015).

3. Proposal part

3.1. Possible security developments in attitudes and key players

Considering the nature and status of Iran's nuclear program, character of the ruling elite and international status is pointed out to numerous risks, which would result from the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran. If Iran would acquire nuclear military capability, status of Tehran would be immediately changed.

When we focus on attitudes powers against Iran, certainly there is a loophole which cannot be overlooked. These are Russia and China. Although China and Russia belong to the community of great powers dealing with Iran's nuclear program as an issue, it is clear that on the other hand they see in Iran a potential business partner.

It would seem that with the election of a new president in 2013, the relations between Iran and the West finally calms and Iran agreeing to a framework agreement repeals the sanctions. Nevertheless Iran still seeks for the alliance with US competitors like Russia and China and the countries or non-state actors who would like to disrupt the status quo.

Last year (2014) at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Rouhani said that Iran and Russia have an interest in projects relating to nuclear energy. Their interest in greater cooperation in trade and energy is running for a long time. The core is the subject of dispute between Iran and the West because the West suspects Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons ambitions. However, in the past Russia had supported the sanctions imposed on Iran by the UN Security that considerably distresses the development of the Iranian economy. If now these two countries are closer together, it would not be just a courtesy act. To this couple can join probably also China, which has increased its interest in oil imports. If this trend continues, there will be perhaps a large Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance, which will be in the next years and decades a really considerable challenge for the US position in the world.

3.2. Possible scenarios of security in the region

Great powers accuse the Islamist regime in Tehran of supporting some terrorist organizations and movements around the World, but also the implementation of a secret nuclear program. Since the early 80s the USA carried out a consistent weakening policy aiming on regional isolation of Iran.

The main worry of all negotiating countries is the Iranian nuclear program. Due to this fact the Great powers P5+1 (China, Russia, USA, EU3- Germany, UK, France) started to negotiate the agreement on the nuclear program. Because the worry is justified the international community must unite its efforts and make clear to Iran that it will not allow the creation of nuclear weapons.

Interim Accord from November 2013 essentially froze the most problematic elements of the Iranian nuclear program and the agreement has contributed to increasing the safety of the region. Currently, negotiations are trying to reach a long-term comprehensive agreement. Americans and other countries belonging to P5 + 1 ask from Iran for much more, as well as Iran is asking for much more from them. In both countries, there are strong power blocks that do not believe that the other party could follow the final agreement.

Long-term agreement that follows the interim strengthen the confidence that Iran chooses not develop nuclear weapons. If so, the international community has about a year for it to crack. Even countries that demand pressure on Iran will still have to follow US leadership, they will see that the US actually stands for a diplomatic solution. This approach has no alternative and Iran should understand that only it has the key in its hands to end Western sanctions.

4. Conclusion

The work answers the research questions that were set out in the introduction. The first research question was dealing with the Iran's nuclear capabilities. Iran is for many years seeking for the status of the strongest regional power, and for this position it is necessary to have relevant military force. Tehran has the superiority over most of neighboring states; conventional military forces and possession of nuclear weapons would only magnify this situation. Certain risks associated with Iran's nuclear program therefore exist, however, still remains the fact that Tehran does not own nuclear weapon yet.

The next question deals with Iran's domestic and foreign policy and if it is ready to use the nuclear arsenal to influence its relations with the outside world. The current status of Iran's nuclear technology and equipment does not allow immediate execution of test – or any other explosions of nuclear bombs, mainly due to the fact that some important projects are still not completed. The nuclear program is additionally still confronted with significant financial and technical problems as well as under the constant monitoring of International Atomic Energy Agency. Due to this fact, there is very low possibility that Iran will use its nuclear arsenal to influence the relations e.g. with Israel or even the USA.

The last question was dealing with the motives for the nuclear option including relationships and links to other states. The only real threat to Iran is the United States and Israel, but even here cannot be assumed the direct use of nuclear weapons by Iran. Nuclear arsenal of Tehran would be in a possible conflict very limited comparing to the US and also the use of nuclear weapons would mean an Iranian suicide. Therefore, the role the Iranian arsenal is likely to be as a deterrent and reliable tool for exerting pressure and concessions. Possession of nuclear weapons could also mean more space for negotiation with regional rivals in the conflict about the leading role in the Gulf region. Simply if Iran would possess the nuclear weapon, it would definitely gain the status of regional security hegemony. Although Iran is aware of the potential consequences, probably will never want to actively use nuclear weapons, and these weapons will mainly serve as a means of exerting pressure on neighboring countries. But such a development would mean great increase of regional instability and increased security threats.

5. List of references

Agha, P. (2003). *Irak a Blízky východ po vojne: klíčové moment*, Listy SFP, Bratislava.

Bano, S. (2014). *China-India-Pakistan Nuclear Triangle: The Post India-US Nuclear Deal Scenario*, International Studies Association/ International Security Studies Conference, University of Texas at Austin. Retrieved from <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/ISSS%20Austin%202014/Archive/81010459-f826-4b16-afe8-9b2d26bfa246.pdf>

Bowen, W.Q. and Brewer, J. (2011). *Iran's Nuclear Challenge: nine years and counting*. International Affairs, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 4. Retrieved from <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x/abstract>

Britské Listy, (2013). *Írán uzavřel dohodu se Západem*. Britské listy, ISSN 1213-1792. Retrieved from <http://blisty.cz/art/71143.html>

Bureš, O. and Šmíd, T., (2010). *Globální bezpečnost v Obamově éře*. Praha: Metropolitní univerzita Praha, ISBN 978-80-86855-58-5. Retrieved from <http://www.mup.cz/cz/download/sbornik-globalni-bezpecnost-v-obamove-ere.pdf>

Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and Wilde, J. (2005). *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. 1st ed. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

Council of the European Union. (2004). *Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)*. Council doc.10198/1/04. Retrieved from <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?!=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201>

Cordesman, A. (2014). *CSIS: Iran's Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options*. Center for strategic & International studies. Retrieved from http://csis.org/files/publication/141007_Iran_Rocket_Missile_forces.pdf

Cristiani, D., (2006). *China and Iran Strengthen their Bilateral Relationship*. World Security Network. Retrieved from <http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/China-Iran/Cristiani-Dario/China-and-Iran-Strengthen-their-Bilateral-Relationship>

Curtis, G. and Hooglund E. (2008). *Iran: a country study*. Washington, DC Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. 5th ed., ISBN 978-0-8444-1187-3. Retrieved from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Iran.pdf

- Česká Televize, a.). (2015). *Lausanne hlásí shodu; Osud íránského jádra se doladí do konce června*. Česká televize. Retrieved from <http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/svet/306768-lausanne-hlasi-shodu-osud-iranskeho-jadra-se-doladi-do-konce-cervna/>
- Česká Televize, b.). (2012). *MAAE: Írán urychlil produkci obohaceného uranu*. Česká televize. Retrieved from <http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/svet/165793-maae-iran-urychlil-produkci-obohaceneho-uranu/>
- Daňková, Š. (2015). *Při jednáních o íránském jaderném programu byly prolomeny ledy*. Český rozhlas. Retrieved from <http://www.rozhlas.cz/plus/svet/ zprava/pri-jednanich-o-iranskem-jadernem-programu-byly-prolomeny-ledy--1476071>
- David, V., Sladký, P., Zbořil, F. (2006). *Mezinárodní právo veřejné*. Praha, Linde 3rd ed. ISBN 80-7201-628-8.
- Devenport, K. (2014). *History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue*. Arms Control Association. Retrieved from http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals
- Dorraj, M., Currier, C. L. (2008). *Lubricated with oil: Iran-China relations in a changing world*. Volume XV, 2nd ed., Middle East Policy Council. Retrieved from <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/lubricated-oil-iran-china-relations-changing-world>
- Edelman, E.S., Krepinevich, A.F., Montgomery, E.B. (2011). *The Dangers of Nuclear Iran*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. XC, No. 1. Retrieved from <http://ehis.ebscohost.com/eds/detail?sid=2748fd90-90d6-4b75-9dcd-29028f71b391%40sessionmgr12&vid=1&hid=3&bdata=Jmxhbmc9Y3Mmc2l0ZT1lZHMtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=56625553>
- Einhorn, R. J. (2004). *A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran's Nuclear Program*. The Washington Quarterly. Retrieved from http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/04autumn_einhorn.pdf
- Eisenstadt, M. (2011). *The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Operational and Policy Implications*. Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/the-strategic-culture-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-operational-andpolic>
- European External Action Service (2009). *Sankce*. Evropská komise. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_cs.pdf

Farouk-Sluglett, M. and Sluglett, P. (2003). *Irák od roku 1958. Od revoluce k diktatuře*. Volvox Globator, Praha 1st ed. ISBN 80-7207-500-4.

Galatík, V. (2008): *Vojenská strategie*. Ministerstvo obrany České republiky, Praha, 1st ed. ISBN 978-80-7278-475-2. Retrieved from <http://www.mocr.army.cz/assets/multimedia-a-knihovna/publikace/bezpecnostni-temata/22-vojenska-strategie.pdf>

Gilpin, R. (1997). *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton University Press, Princeton. ISBN 978-0691-0226-28.

Global Security. (2011). *Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)*. Retrieved from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm>

Greg, B. (2010). *Iran's Nuclear Program*. Council on foreign relations. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p16811>

Guzzini, S. (2004). *Realismus v mezinárodních vztazích a mezinárodní politické ekonomii*. 1st ed. Brno: Barrister & Principal. ISBN 80-85947-84-6.

Havlická, K. (2015). *Dojednali jsme budoucí dohodu, oznámil svět výsledek jednání s Íránem*. Zprávy IDnes. Retrieved from http://zpravy.idnes.cz/svetove-mocnosti-se-dohodly-s-iranemdsz/zahranicni.aspx?c=A150402_202228_zahranicni_kha

Hildreth, S.(2009). *Iran's ballistic missile programs*. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22758.pdf>

Hill, Ch. (2003). *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0333754238.

Horák, S. (2005). *Střední Asie mezi Východem a Západem: pravda o plánech Bílého domu na změnu iránského režimu*. 1st ed., Praha, Karolinum. ISBN 80-246-0906-1.

Hospodářské Noviny. (2013). *Íránci přiznávají dopad sankcí na ekonomiku, podnikatelé bojují o přežití*. Retrieved from <http://zahranicni.ihned.cz/blizky-vychod/c1-60931370-iranci-priznavaji-dopad-sankci-na-ekonomiku-podnikatele-bojuji-o-preziti>

Hufbauer, G., Schott, J., Elliot, K., Oegg, B. (2007). *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. 3rd ed. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. ISBN 978-0-88132-412-9. Retrieved from <http://bookstore.petersoninstitute.org/book-store/4082.html>

Hufbauer, G., Schott, J. (1985). *Economic Sanctions and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Vol. 18 No. 4, American Political Science Association. Cambridge university press. Retrieved from <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8772878&fileId=S1049096500022654>

Charta Spojených Národů, (2014). *Charta Organizace spojených národů a Statut mezinárodního soudního dvora*. Retrieved from <http://www.osn.cz/dokumenty-osn/soubory/charta-organizace-spojenych-narodu-a-statut-mezinarodniho-soudniho-dvora.pdf>

IDnes.cz .(2015). *Jaderná dohoda naštvá Izraelce i ajatolláhy, obyčejní Íránci slaví*. Retrieved from http://zpravy.idnes.cz/dohoda-s-iranem-ohrozi-preziti-izraele-volal-netanjahu-obamovi-pvb-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A150403_063325_zahranicni_wlk

Iran Chamber Society. (2015). *History of Iran: Historic Periods & Events*. Retrieved from http://www.iranchamber.com/history/history_periods.php

Jones, S. (2013) *A History Of U.S. Sanctions Against Iran*. US Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/A-History-Of-U-S-Sanctions-Against-Iran.htm>

Kaempfer, W. and Lowenberg, A. (1999). *Unilateral versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective*. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1. DOI 10.1111/0020-8833.00110.

Katzman, K. (2015). *Iran Sanctions*. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>

Keohane, R. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-06911-22489

Kindleberger, Ch. (1973). *The World in Depression 1929-1939*. University of California Press. ISBN 0520055918. Retrieved from https://books.google.cz/books?id=tXo6CAkhorc&printsec=frontcover&hl=cs&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

Klare, M. (2001). *Resource wars: the new landscape of global conflict*. Metropolitan Books, New York. ISBN: 978-08050-55764.

Kohn, H. (1981). *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*. Peter Smith Publisher, Incorporated. ISBN 978-08446-23979.

- KSM. (2013). *Irán: Hassan Rouhani, překvapení mezi bouřemi*. Komunistický Svaz Mládeže. Retrieved from <http://www.ksm.cz/ze-zahranici/iran-hassan-rouhani-prekvapeni-mezi-bouremi.html>
- Krasner, S. (2007). *State Power and the Structure of International Trade*. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.ir.rochelleterman.com/sites/default/files/krasner%201976.pdf>
- Krpec, O. and Hodulák, V. (2011). *Politická ekonomie mezinárodních vztahů*. 1st ed. Brno, Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav. ISBN 978-802105-4813.
- Krpec, O. and Pšejka, P. (2006). *Mezinárodní politická ekonomie*. 1st ed. Brno: MPÚ MU, Studie 44. ISBN 80-210-4121-8.
- Kubeš J.,(2005). *Islám-Sunnité a Šíté*. Masarykova univerzita. Retrieved from http://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2005/MVE413/um/islam_sunite_siite.pdf
- Lidovky.cz, (2015). *Jednání o iránském jaderném programu finišují. Výsledek nejistý*. Retrieved from http://www.lidovky.cz/jednani-o-iranskem-jadernem-programu-finisuji-vysledek-nejisty-pwg-zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A150330_141454_In_zahranici_msl#utm_source=clanek.lidovky&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=a-souvisejici.clanky.clicks
- Malenovský, J. (1993): *Mezinárodní právo veřejné. Obecná část*. Brno: Doplněk, Masarykova univerzita.
- Mayall, J. (1984). *The sanctions Problem in international economic relations: reflections in the light of recent experience*. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4.
- Mintzer, I. (1992). *Confronting Climate Change Risks, Implications and Responses*. Cambridge University Press, London. ISBN 978-052142-1096.
- Mora, M. and Storm, B. (2011) *Crisis Guide: Iran*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CG_Iran/index.html
- Novinky.cz, (2015). *Mahmúd Ahmadínežád*. Švamberk, A. Retrieved from <http://tema.novinky.cz/mahmud-ahmadinezad>
- O'Heffernan, P. (1991). *Mass Media and American Foreign Policy*. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-089391-7296.
- Patočková, S. (2013). *Vybrané konflikty a krize -po-druhé světové válce*. Retrieved from <http://patockova.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Vybran%C3%A9-konflikty-a-krize-po-druh%C3%A9-sv%C4%9Btov%C3%A9-v%C3%A1lce.pdf>

Patterson, R. (2013). *EU Sanctions on Iran: The European Political Context*. Middle East Policy Council Vol. XX, No. 1. Retrieved from <http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/eu-sanctions-iran-european-political-context>

Ritter, S. (2008). *Cíl Írán: pravda o plánech Bílého domu na změnu íránského režimu*. 1st ed. Praha: Mladá fronta. 237 s. ISBN 978-802-0417-930.

Sanaie, M. (2007): *Problems and Prospects of Iranian-Russian Relations*. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved from <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1137.html>

Sanderson, S. (2005). *Revolution: A Worldwide Introduction to Political and Social Change*. London: Paradigm Publishers. ISBN 978-1594510496.

Security Council Resolutions. (2006). *Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/resolutions.shtml>

Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. ISBN 9780521294997.

Sputnik. (2015). *Rusko a Írán připraví během měsíce smlouvu o dodávce S-300*. Retrieved from <http://cz.sputniknews.com/svet/20150417/276320.html>

Squassoni, S. (2006). *Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments*. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21592.pdf>

Starr, J. (2013). *The U.N. Resolutions*. The Iran Primer. Retrieved from <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/un-resolutions>

Taterová, E. (2010). *Kořeny a vývoj antiamerikanismu v Íránu a Saúdské Arábii během studené války*. Obrana a strategie. Retrieved from <http://www.obranaastrategie.cz/redakce/index.php?lanG=cs&clanek=47142&slozka=17481&xsekce=47132&prid=24526&vlid=5846&#.VTYVSiG8PGc>

Telegraph (2009). *Israel pledges to protect itself from ,new Holocaust' threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/5195326/Israel-pledges-to-protect-itself-from-new-Holocaust-threat-posed-by-Irans-nuclear-programme.html>

The Statute of the IAEA. (2014). *IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency*. Vienna. Retrieved from <https://www.iaea.org/about/statute>

The World Factbook. (2013). *Iran*. Central Intelligence Alliance. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>

Tuček, F. (2012). *Irán a sankce: Dlouhodobý vztah bez výsledku*. Mezinárodní politika. Retrieved from <http://www.filiptucek.com/2012/10/iran-sankce-dlouhodoby-vztah-bez.html>

Visingr, L. and Kotrba, Š. (2007). *ATM: Rakety tisíce a jedné noci*. Praha, Aeromedia. ISSN 1802-4823. Retrieved from http://blisty.cz/files/2007/11/28/atm_122007.pdf

Willis, S. (2006). *The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. Retrieved from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/iran.pdf

Wright, R., Posch, W., Starr, J. and Clawson, P. (2010). *The Iran primer: power, politics, and U.S. policy*. Washington, D.C., Published in collaboration with Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, ISBN 978-160-1270-849. Retrieved from http://books.google.cz/books?id=MDgwl59s_hUC&printsec=frontcover&hl=cs#v=onepage&q&f=false

Ze Světa.cz a.), (2015). *Nenechají se vydírat, proto Bílý dům kritizoval postoj iránských vůdců k jaderné dohodě*. Retrieved from <http://www.ze-sveta.cz/?p=25037>

Ze Světa.cz b.), (2015). *Rouhani: Dohoda nebude pokud nezrušíte sankce*. Retrieved from <http://www.ze-sveta.cz/?p=25014>


Zeitoun, M. and Allan, J. (2008). *Applying hegemony and power theory to transboundary water analysis*. London Water Research Group, King's College London. Retrieved from http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.147022!ZeitounAllan_Power_Hegemony_Theory_HH_Special_Issue.pdf

6. Annexes

Annex 1: *The articles of Original Statute:*

- I. Establishment of the agency
 - II. Objectives
 - III. Functions
 - IV. Membership
 - V. General conference
 - VI. Board of governors
 - VII. Staff
 - VIII. Exchange information
 - IX. Supplying of materials
 - X. Services, equipment, and facilities
 - XI. Agency projects
 - XII. Agency safeguards
 - XIII. Reimbursement of Members
 - XIV. Finance
 - XV. Privileges and immunities
 - XVI. Relationship with other organizations
 - XVII. Settlement of disputes
 - XVIII. Amendments and withdrawals
 - XIX. Suspension of privileges
 - XX. Definitions
 - XXI. Signature, acceptance, and entry into force
 - XXII. Registration with the United Nations
 - XXIII. Authentic texts and certified copies
- ANNEX: Preparatory commission

Annex 2: The Authorities of the IAEA



Annex 3: Iranian Short-range ballistic missile threat



Annex 4: Iranian Medium-range ballistic missile threat

