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**Comparison of the EU and US
approach to Libya in
the context of the Arab Spring**

Master's Thesis

Olomouc 2022

Bibliographic record

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Title of Thesis: Comparison of the EU and US approach to Libya in the context of the Arab Spring

Degree Programme: Political science

Field of Study: European Studies with a Focus on European Law

Supervisor: Mgr. et. Mgr. Ondřej Filipec, Ph.D.

Year: 2022

Number of Pages: 77

Keywords: European Union, Libya, United States of America, Muammar Gaddafi, Arab Spring

Bibliografický záznam

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Katedra politologie a společenských věd

Název Práce: Komparace přístupu EU a USA k Libyi v kontextu Arabského jara

Studijní program: Politologie

Studijní obor: Evropská studia se zaměřením na evropské právo

Vedoucí práce: Mgr. et. Mgr. Ondřej Filipec, Ph.D.

Rok: 2022

Počet stran: 77

Klíčová slova: Evropská unie, Libye, Spojené státy americké, Muammar Kaddáfi, Arabské jaro

Abstract

The Arab spring had unprecedented political impact on various regimes in the Arab world, questioning its legitimacy, stability and existence. This is also the case of Libya under the reign of Muammar Gaddafi who was killed during bloody civil war accompanied by the intervention of Western powers. This thesis compares the EU and USA approaches towards Libya in three distinctive periods: before, during and after the Arab spring. The position of key actors is interpreted in three different lenses of international relations theories, who are aimed at deeper understanding of foreign policies. Are they complementary, consistent or diverging? The analysis revealed that the foreign policies of the two actors were complementary at the beginning of the intervention. In fact, at the beginning there was cooperation between the states under the NATO banner. After the Arab Spring, the positions of the two actors began to diverge. The US started to stand aside and considered Libya as a problem for Europe. At present, the positions of the two actors are diverging and the stability of Libya is therefore not in sight.

Abstrakt

Arabské jaro mělo bezprecedentní politický dopad na různé režimy v arabském světě a zpochybnilo jejich legitimitu, stabilitu a existenci. To je také případ Libye za vlády Muammara Kaddáfího, který byl zabit během krvavé občanské války doprovázené intervencí západních mocností. Tato práce porovnává přístupy EU a USA k Libyi ve třech odlišných obdobích: před arabským jarem, během něj a po něm. Postoj klíčových aktérů je interpretován třemi různými optikami teorií mezinárodních vztahů, které jsou zaměřeny na hlubší pochopení předcházejících politik. Doplnují se, jsou konzistentní nebo se rozcházejí? Analýza odhalila, že se zahraniční politiky obou aktérů se na začátku intervence doplňovaly. Na počátku totiž existovala spolupráce mezi jednotlivými státy pod hlavičkou NATO. Po arabském jaru se postoje obou aktérů začaly rozdělovat. USA začala stát stranou a považovala Libyi za problém Evropy. Aktuálně se postoje obou aktérů rozcházejí a stabilita Libye je tedy v nedohlednu.

Affidavit

I hereby declare that this master's thesis on the topic of "Comparison of the EU and US approach to Libya in the context of the Arab Spring" is my original work and I have acknowledged all sources used.

In Olomouc, on 30th November 2022

.....

Mgr. Veronika Zichová

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank the supervisor of my master thesis, Mgr. et. Mgr. Ondřej Filipec, Ph. D., for leading the work, his advice and comments, and his help overall.

I also thank my parents for the dedicated support they have given me throughout my studies.

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List of terms and abbreviations

| | |
|------|--|
| ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| EC | European Community |
| EDF | European Development Fund |
| EMP | Euro-Mediterranean Partnership |
| EU | European Union |
| GNA | Government of National Accord |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| ISIS | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Terrorist organization) |
| LNA | Libyan National Army |
| NTC | National Transitional Council |
| OUP | Operation Unifies Protector |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| USA | United States of America |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

Introduction

North Africa is key to Europe's approach and policy towards the MENA¹ region. This is due to its geographical proximity and strong historical, economic, and social links. Viewed from Brussels, the MENA region is included in the category of the 'wider neighbourhood', which is gradually expanding. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the outbreak of the Arab Spring represents an important landmark. Indeed, the Arab Spring triggered many revolutions, coups states or protests of the political system. In the MENA region, the European Union (EU) focused on its influence in the region after the Arab uprisings. It did it by discussing the prevailing framework and the available toolkit.

While the Arab uprisings in 2011 and the United States (USA) invasion of Iraq in 2003 represent the two sets of events with the deepest and most far-reaching impacts on transforming the existing regional order, the approach of the EU to the region has changed primarily because of other events that directly affected it in 2015. Terrorist attacks in various European capitals and the refugee crisis have awakened EU leaders who had previously paid little attention to the African region. The rise of anti-immigration and Islamophobic political forces in several European elections has indicated that regional conflicts in Libya are changing domestic and regional dynamics in the Europe.

The USA remains the most powerful global actor in the region, but its influence and ambitions in the region are perceived to be waning. This is due to structural factors such as the United States' decreasing dependence on oil produced in Libya, and the unfavourable factory developments that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the weakening of trust between the United States and its traditional allies, particularly under the Obama administration.

While there may have been some competition between the EU and the USA for trade and investment interests in the region, the EU has always welcomed a strong USA presence in the Mediterranean, either directly or through the North Atlantic Treaty

¹ MENA regions include following states Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Yemen, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Tunisia and the West Bank and Gaza.

Organization (NATO). On this and many other fronts, the USA has generally been seen as a security provider, and its perceived retreat has been seen as a signal that the EU will be asked to increase its commitment to the region.

Libya is indeed a very interesting topic in international relations because of the presence of a dictator and its specific approach to international issues, including the image of a "rogue state".² This is because Muammar Gaddafi, at the beginning of his dictatorial career, wanted to create a unified Arab state at the head of which he could rule, and he did not give up his dream until his death. After his election to lead the African Union in 2009, Gaddafi continued to push for and believe in the realisation of his vision. However, he encountered resistance from some African leaders who saw the creation of the United States of Africa, which was intended to give individual African states greater clout in international affairs, prevent famine and improve the performance of the common economy, and resolve mutual conflicts, as a loss of status. Be that as it may, the realisation is still far from Gaddafi's dream to this day. In 2002, Libya was also one of the founding members of the African Union, which survived Gaddafi and is still functioning today. However, this is not the end of the list of the various African and Arab associations in which Gaddafi was involved. There has, after all, been a certain decline in pan-Arab politics. Gaddafi felt abandoned by his Arab associates during the sanctions. There has been a cooling of relations and in his last years Gaddafi was more concerned with the African than the Arab world. However, Libya's strength and prestige lay not in its size or population, nor in its cultural and civilizational potential, but only in its economic strength, which it derives exclusively from oil production. However, Libya is often neglected, and much work tends to focus on the issue of Syria and Libya is also important to the EU in terms of the EU's neighbourhood policy because Libya, for example, has criticised

² Rogue states have been viewed as significant potential threats in nuclear doctrines since the 1990s under the Bush administration. The Bush administration referred to Libya, Syria, and Cuba as "Beyond the Axis of Evil" states. John Bolton, George W. Bush's security advisor, who also devised the invasion of Iraq, is credited with this designation.

For more details:

BOLTON, J. Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction. *heritage.org* [online]. 6 May 2002 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.heritage.org/denise/report/beyond-the-axis-evil-additional-threats-weapons-mass-destruction-0>

the Mediterranean Partnership and refused to participate therein. Therefore, this is rather specific state with modern history worth of analysing.

The example of Libya will be used to illustrate the shift in the policies of the USA and the EU over three time periods, i.e., before, during and after the outbreak of the Arab Spring until 24 December 2021. This is a case study that aims to show the similarities and differences in the foreign policies of the two main actors, i.e., the USA and the EU. The foreign policy of the USA towards the Libyan government has varied over the years, from hostility to cooperation.

Several aspects of the thesis were subject of the previous research conducted by the author. However, the publication entitled *"EU and US Policy towards Libya"* provided initial analysis, which is further explored in much broader scope employing analysis through the lenses of three major international relations theories.

Therefore, this thesis aims to analyse the impact of the Arab Spring in Libya and to focus on comparing the approach of the two actors in three different periods, before the Arab Spring, during the Arab Spring and after the Arab Spring, i.e., until the end of the 2021. This is the year in which this thesis ends because democratic elections were due to take place on 24 December 2021. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the governments of the various parties.

In this context, the thesis sets several subobjectives. The first is to explore the key events of the Arab Spring in Libya. The second objective is to compare the EU and USA foreign policy towards the conflicts in Libya. The author of the thesis has defined several research questions in relation to these objectives:

1. *"What was the evolution of the Arab Spring in Libya?"*
2. *"What can define the similarities and differences in the EU and USA approaches to Libya?"*
3. *"Do the positions of the two actors overlap, complement each other or are they fundamentally different?"*

The first research question is aimed at exploring key milestones and most important factors shaping situation in Libya. As a result, the answer will characterize the background and the nature of the problem, which is a subject of the EU and US foreign policies.

The other two research questions are aimed at the comparative dimension of the analysis and its answer will contribute to reveal true effects, tools and conduct of the EU and US foreign policy towards Libya.

This thesis aims to find similarities and differences between the approaches of the two actors (the EU and the USA) and to identify areas where the methods overlap, complement or where they conflict. Methodologically, the thesis is developed in the context of international theories, which inevitably overlap with the field of European integration and can thus successfully serve to interpret EU and US foreign policy.

This thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter defines the theoretical framework of foreign policy. In the introductory section, three theories of foreign policy are introduced and further discussed. The first is neorealism. Neorealism is based on realism, which incorporates independent and interacting variables (elite ideology, USA economic pressures, USA elite perceptions of opposition in Libya, congressional dynamics, and public opinion) at the system or unit level. Within the neorealist conception of Libya, it is important to draw on the concept of rogue states. According to the USA, Libya was one of these states. The military intervention of the USA and other states in Libya was more about advancing national security interests in an anarchist system by removing a rogue regime using force. Through a neorealist interpretation, it is human rights that are irrelevant to this primary goal. Moreover, neorealists reject the liberal argument that international law can mitigate anarchy and regulate state behaviour, arguing instead that international law is simply a tool to be used and abused by powerful states. The next of the three strands of theory is neoliberalism. Libya's regime is of a wholly undemocratic nature, and therefore is prone to conflict. In particular, the unpredictable behaviour of the dictator Gaddafi and his non-transparent state policy have been one of the main causes of Libya's isolation from global cooperation. And the last is constructivism. There have been violations of basic human rights in Libya, including the right of citizens to political participation. Moreover, Libya has refused to engage in international affairs and has not cooperated with like-minded states. For this reason, Libya has become the target of international sanctions. Within the framework of role theory, which falls under constructivism, it can be said that Gaddafi's role in the international political system has evolved

greatly. From a young ambitious dictator who wanted to harm the big powers such as the USA to an old man who realised that international sanctions were destroying his idea of a strong Libya. For all that Gaddafi began to cooperate with the USA and, in some cases, the CIA in the fight against terrorism at the beginning of this century, this did not change his personality. His role has thus evolved and changed on the outside but remained the same on the inside.

The second chapter deals with the events of the Arab Spring in Libya and is divided into two subchapters. The first one briefly introduces the situation in the country before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, specifically the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, which had existed in the country since the 1970s. The second subsection discusses the political situation in Libya after the death of Muammar Gaddafi until the failed democratic elections that were to be held on December 2021.

The third chapter examines the foreign policy decisions of the US and EU in relation to military intervention in the Libyan conflict so that it can be used as a benchmark for a deeper analysis of the impact of domestic factors or constraints on the measures taken. Furthermore, the foreign policy decisions of the US and EU after the Arab Spring in relation to Libya are analysed within this chapter.

This thesis draws on the sources and literature listed in the final list. This thesis has drawn mainly from the literature in the English language. The primary sources used for the first chapter of the thesis were the monographs *Theory of International Relations* by Petr Drulák, *Theories of International Relations* by Scott Burchill and *Constructivism and energy security in international relations* by Petr Ocelik. Also, articles have been used, such as *Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics* by Keohane Robert or Stephen Ever's article *Guide of Methods for Students of Political Science* or Miche Huysseune's article *Nationalism and identity politics in international relations*. The secondary sources used in this chapter consist mainly of internet articles discussing foreign theories, published on *columbi.edu*, *researchgate.net* and *academic.oup.com*. All these sources and many others were the building blocks for the first chapter of the thesis.

For the second part of the thesis, books and internet articles dealing with the history of Libya were used as the main sources. Newspaper articles available online, mainly from

American (*nytimes.com*) and British (*bbc.co.uk*) periodicals, were the main sources in describing the course of the uprising in Libya. The Arabic periodical Al-Jazeera English (*aljazeera.com*) was also an important source, providing an in-depth analysis of the issue. Other important article that needs to be mentioned in this paper is *4 hours of fire and chaos: How the Benghazi attack unfolded*. Newspaper articles and other studies were mainly a source of facts concerning the course of the revolutions. The monographs used included the book *Libya from colony to revolution* by Ronald Bruce St John. Ronald Bruce's monograph is well-written for understanding Libyan history and cultural context, but for the purposes of this thesis it is somewhat broad in subject matter, and it was necessary to supplement the valuable information from this source with other sources, such as a monograph by *Frederic Wehrey's Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya*. This book is very well written and contains very valuable information useful for the writing of this thesis, in particular the description of the uprising against Gaddafi, European and American involvement in Libya, and the attack in Benghazi and the civil war between Libyan factions.

The last chapter of the thesis is based mainly on official statements by President Barack Obama, as well as a publication by the think tank Council on Foreign Relations entitled the *New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What It Means, and What Comes Next*, which includes several papers on the events of the Arab Spring. This chapter also includes online articles by *Yahia Zoubir: Libya in USA foreign policy from rogue states to good bellow*, *Christopher Blanchar - Libya: Transition and USA Policy, In the area of the European Union*, the internet articles *Maximilian Overbeck - European debates during the Libya crisis of 2011*, *Francesco Carolta - EU-MENA Relations from the Barcelona Process to the Arab Uprisings: A New Research Agenda* were used. Other sources include official statements by international organisations and their bodies: the European Council and the UN Security Council.

1. Foreign Policy in Theories

This chapter presents the theoretical anchoring of this thesis, which will be divided into further subchapters. The main aim of this chapter is to present three distinct theories of foreign policy that will be further implemented in the EU and USA foreign policy in the context of Libya, specifically in three periods, i.e., before, during and after the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the political upheaval until on 24th December 2021.

In such a globalised world we live today, political upheaval, or instability on one side of the planet can easily affect life in another part of the world. National leaders make decisions at the level of the individual, group or coalition that processes information. The rules they use significantly influence their decisions and the events in the world. For this reason, foreign policy analysis is an attractive topic for all political scientists and will be discussed in this thesis.

This is because this theory allows for a "positive" understanding of the reality of domestic political relations. It provides an answer to the question of how things are and is a guide to understanding reality. The theory also suggests the US what kind of data to focus on and what connections it makes between our observations. Based on this, we can understand the past of international relations, navigate the present, and prepare for the future.

The theories introduced in this chapter include neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, and role theory. These are different prisms through which international relations and foreign policy can be viewed. However, given the broad context of the thesis, the analytical framework has to be narrowed, and it is also for this reason that this thesis does not aspire to offer a deep or perhaps innovative perspective on the aforementioned theories, which are only used as a basic analytical framework through which to interpret key events and their developments.

These theories (neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism) will present their main premises, hypotheses and basic ideas that emerge from their orientation and approach to international politics. All the above theories will be interwoven throughout the thesis and will be interpreted together on the EU and USA foreign policy in relation to Libya.

1.1. Neorealism

As events unfolded historically, the shortcomings of realism began to become apparent. With the development of new technologies and the economic interdependence of states, it became clear that the mere assertion of power interests would not ensure the survival of states. After the debates in the 1970s, realist premises³ underwent a transformation that resulted in a theory that better reflected the state of modern society but preserved the basic principles of realism. This theory was neorealism, led by Kenneth Waltz, who was the first to put forward new theoretical concepts.⁴

Neorealism seeks to develop realist theory, especially in the economic and structural fields, and enriches it with scientific elements. The foundations of neorealism are formed by realist theory, which is based on several theses. The first thesis involves human nature, which is seen negatively by realists. One is subordinate to his instincts, and his personality makes him strive for power, a fundamental element of neorealism. As Morgenthau's first principle of realism states: "*politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature.*"⁵ These laws have not changed over time. If the actor in international relations is a rational individual, one can predict his actions and thus interpret international relations. Politics is an autonomous sphere the primary goal of which is the seizure of power. Therefore, ethical principles cannot be applied there.

³ 1. State as a primary actor of the International Realism – states are the central actors in international politics, rather than leaders or international organizations.

2. Anarchist nature of the International Realism environment – realists believe that there is no centralized global authority that limits sovereign states and determines their actions. For this reason, national states are the only legitimate actors in international affairs and neither supranational nor domestic actors can restrict them. Under conditions of anarchy and an unpredictable future, nations rely only on themselves. That is why the main driving force in the self-help world is the national interest. The central concern of foreign policy is survival because of the uncertain future of the international system.

3. Self-help system and the priority of survival – states act in their national self-interest within the international system.

4. Balancing and bandaging behaviour, state as a "black box" – states desire power to ensure self-preservation.

For more details:

MORGENTHAU, H. Realism in International Politics. *Naval War College Review*, 1958, 10(5), pp. 1-15.

⁴ HOLLIS, M. and S. SMITH. *International Relations Theory: Interpretation and Understanding*. 1st ed. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2000, p. 127.

⁵ MORGENTHAU, H. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp.4-15.

Neorealism takes over from realism the following: the idea of the anarchic nature of international relations, the concept of balance of power, the superiority of military force, and the security-free dimension. On the contrary, neorealism de-emphasizes the realist assumption of corrupted human nature to raise the scientific level. It emphasizes the principle of falsification and the model of neoclassical economics.⁶

An important concept here is the structure of international relations, which influences the behaviour of states. The way states make decisions is influenced by the structure in which they exist. If a state behaves rationally, it can benefit from the structure of international relations. This is particularly evident in the security-free state, which seeks to ensure its own security. The moment a state begins to neglect its own security, it is in danger of extinction. The main features of establishing international relations are anarchy, homogeneity of units, and power distribution.⁷ In an anarchic system, there is no justice or higher authority to decide mutual disputes. *"Everyone is formally equal to everyone else. No one is entitled to command; no one is required to submit."*⁸ All states are suspicious of each other's intentions. Cooperation between them occurs when a common enemy emerges and seeks to increase its power potential. Against this enemy, a group of states can form an alliance that balances the resulting imbalance. There are exceptions from which power balancing does not occur, namely when the threatened state has no allies, cannot form an alliance, or faces inevitable defeat. In preparation for a potential conflict, states then face a security dilemma. Fearing for their security, one form starts to spend more on armaments, which makes neighbouring states feel threatened and might as well increase the expenditure on armaments. This puts the actors in a vicious circle caused by the anarchic structure.⁹

States cooperate when they perceive a threat and assess it as a common threat. When such a threat disappears, cooperation weakens. Neorealists view international

⁶ DRULÁK, P. *Theory of international relations*. 2nd ed. Prague: Portál, 2010, p. 168.

⁷ POWELL, R. Anarchy in international relations theory: The neorealist-neoliberal debate. *International Organization*, 1994, 48 (2), pp. 313-344.

⁸ WALTZ, K. *Theory of International politics*. 1st ed. Berkeley: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 63.

⁹ Ibid.

security relations as an ongoing competition between states for power and security. They see economic and especially military power as the main tools for achieving security interests.¹⁰ The main concern of any state is survival. Neorealists consider military interventions to be risky in the interest of spreading democracy and stability. They acknowledge that interventionist armies can create a favourable external security environment, but they point out that intervening troops are not equipped to develop constitutional arrangements abroad. Peace can only exist based on an equal balance of power. This is, admittedly, not an ideal solution to achieve justice. But at the same time, the balance of power is the only adequate safeguard against egoism, bullying, and the tendency to hegemonism. The need to ensure survival in an anarchic pro-environment without a sovereign to provide security means that states themselves must provide the means to ensure their survival.

According to neorealism, intervention in a third country and the use of force in international relations are influenced by two factors: the protection of the state's interests and its efforts to survive and the maintenance of a balance system of power. Intervention in third countries is an effort to preserve the balance of power and thus the security of one's own state. States cooperate when they feel threatened by a third party because there is no one in an anarchist environment whose interventions are legitimized by efforts to preserve their security and survival.

Following the above, the Libyan war conflict is in the nature of a domestic struggle to achieve a stake in the government of the state. The result of this struggle shall threaten the existence of Libya. Neorealist thinking has commonly treated these conflicts as a domestic matter of one member of the structure, which is irrelevant to the functioning of the system as a whole and cannot be analysed within the field of International Relations. Within the neorealist mindset, this is a threat to a state seeking the maintaining of its security that is disrupted by forces non-state in nature. Thus, neorealism cannot affect these units at any of the analytical levels, as they are not relevant actors in foreign policy. However, the impact of their behaviour disrupts the objective national interest of the state, which is its security.

¹⁰ EICHLER, J. *International security at the beginning of the 21st century*. 1st ed. Prague: Agentura vojenských informací a služeb, 2006, p. 231.

In the context of the above, the facts that have influenced the situation in Libya are now set out. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a transition from bipolarity, which suited Libya better, to unipolarity, i.e., the dominance of the USA. Unipolarity eased the international constraints on the USA, resulting in greater freedom to decide USA foreign policy. Thus, the USA was expected to "act without restraint and without fear of reprisal," as it had in other military interventions the USA had undertaken since the 1990s. However, this has not happened, for the USA foreign policy has been altered by the influence of non-state actors and other coping mechanisms, e.g., nuclear weapons and terrorist groups.

Since Libya took no action in early February 2011, after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, even after the adoption of the United Nation (UN) Security Council Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973, military intervention represented the last resort to prevent violence against civilians. The initiative for military intervention was taken primarily by France, with the help of the USA and the United Kingdom (UK).

1.2. Neoliberalism

Neoliberal institutionalism is based on liberalism, which originated in the 18th century when liberals and businesspeople of that time preferred peace to war because it was more convenient for this group of people to trade and make a profit in peacetime rather than in wartime. They concluded that war could be reduced if democracy was preferred to aristocracy, free trade to closed economies, and collective security to a balance of power system.

For Immanuel Kant, peace was the highest value to which society naturally tends and can be achieved through establishing and observance of international law. Natural law predisposes humanity to live in harmony and cooperation. On the other hand, war is regarded as unnatural and irrational, and it is, therefore, necessary to remove fighting from the lives of human beings to achieve progress and further development.

The leading theorist of liberalism in international relations was Norman Angell.¹¹ In the run-up to the First World War, Angell published his book the *Great Illusion*, which by its very title builds on the belief that war can bring material benefits. According to Angell, the basis of international relations is freedom of international trade and investment. States where businesses become more interdependent reduce the probability of armed conflict. In his view, aggressive war is not rational since, through international trade and investments, it is possible to profit from the resources of other states more effectively than through military occupation.¹² The fundamental factor for liberalists in international relations is the individual and the actors constituted by collectives of individuals as social interest groups existing within societies within individual states.¹³

Liberalists do not regard the state as an autonomous actor because the foreign policy actions of the state in their conception are not independent of society but depend on their demands. Indeed, different state leaders and units of the constituent state apparatus may, in the liberal concept, pursue other interests or evaluate international events differently and act differently in international politics. Also, in the liberal vision, the state often does not work as a rational actor, and its actions may not be guided by utility maximization from the state's perspective. Again, this assumption is related to the overall view of liberalism, according to which foreign policy action is not the result of the state's position in the international system but the result of the interests of particular social actors or negotiations between these actors.¹⁴

Neoliberalism responds to these theses. Its main authors are Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who emphasise the state as the main actor in international relations, but also acknowledge the importance of other actors such as international organisations. In their view, the individual plays a role either as a part of society that shares power or as a representative of the state. A new phenomenon is the internationalization of domestic politics,

¹¹ NAVARI, C. The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell. *Review of International Studies*, 1989, 15(4), pp. 341-358.

¹² NYE, J. Neorealism and Neoliberalism. *World Politics*, 1988, 40 (2), pp. 235-251.

¹³ HOLLIS, M. and S. SMITH. *International Relations Theory: Interpretation and Understanding*. 1st ed. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2000, p. 132.

¹⁴ DRULÁK, P. *Theory of international relations*. 2nd ed. Prague: Portál, 2010, p. 204.

caused by the spread of transnational relations, thus blurring the distinction between domestic and foreign politics. International relations occur outside the governmental level, i.e., between companies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).¹⁵

Robert Keohane creates his new theory through the premise and says that *"he shares the neoliberalism premise of the anarchist structure of international relations. However, in neoliberalism, the anarchic structure is not an obstacle to the cooperation of states. The state is considered a rational actor, and neorealism uses the methods of economics to formulate its theoretical postulates. Politics is seen as a non-zero-sum game, and states thus favour absolute gains over relative ones."*¹⁶ The main interest of states is therefore the maximization of profits. In his functional theory, international organizations, regimes, and conventions exist and matter. According to Robert Keohane, international organizations are institutionalized groupings based on a system of rules and objectives whose most prominent feature is the administrative apparatus and formal and material elements such as headquarters, staff, hierarchy, and organs.¹⁷ According to Robert Keohane, international regimes are groups of states sharing norms and rules according to which their behaviour in the international arena is determined. This counteracts the adverse effects of anarchy, reduces the uncertainty of establishing rules of cooperation, and reduces the transaction costs associated with negotiating cooperation projects.¹⁸

The latest international conventions, as the author said, are at the lowest level of international cooperation. They are therefore haphazard groupings of states that behave according to given rules only to the extent which benefits them. This is because the rules are somehow not contractually defined. Regarding security and intervention in third countries, neoliberalism's approach is restrained. The basic premise is eradicating military conflict, and much emphasis is placed on cooperation between countries, which leads to more significant gains than war. According to the neoliberal theory, the observance of international peace is essential and is the main point of international law they promote.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 205.

¹⁶ KEOHANE, R. Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics. In: KEOHANE, R. (ed.) *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 1989, pp. 1–20.

¹⁷ WAISOVÁ, Š. *International Organizations and Regimes in Central Eastern Europe*. 1st ed. Prague: Eurolex Bohemia, 2003, p. 97.

¹⁸ DRULÁK, P. *Theory of international relations*. 2nd ed. Prague: Portál, 2010, p. 207.

This is because, according to Kant's theory, democratic states never wage war with each other, and the overthrow of an undemocratic system is an effort to establish a democratic government that engages in international structures and the affairs of other democratic states. Thus, good is done in this way. In the case of neoliberalism, intervention, and the use of force in international relations are influenced, firstly, by an attack by one state on another, which results, under international law, in intervention by the community of conditions associated with the collective security system. Secondly, it is the desire to spread democracy and to create a stable international environment where states do not wage war with each other and are governed by international law.

Furthermore, the theory described above is applied to the case of Libya. The dictatorial regime in Gaddafi's Libya did not fulfil any of the characteristics of a democratic peace or any other form of democratism. It was therefore a regime of a wholly undemocratic character, which by its very nature is prone to conflict. In particular, the unpredictable behaviour of the dictator Gaddafi and his non-transparent state policy have been one of the main causes of Libya's isolation from global cooperation.

After Gaddafi's death, neoliberal democratic reforms emphasized a policy of democratization in which reforms become a ruling class or elite project. However, there has been an undermining of democratization in Libya, resulting in constant anti-government protests and other forms of activities that have undermined the democratic process in Libya. As a consequence, the free-market reforms promoted by the West for post-Kaddafi Libya were aimed at institutionalising a liberal capitalist system of state organisation that guarantees private (foreign) ownership and control of Libya's oil fields and production. Such a neoliberal reform proposal remains unpopular among Libyans who consider such a reform agenda anti-Libyan. Data on popular protests and attacks on Libyan government officials reported clashes between militias and government forces, sabotage of oil production, and attacks on diplomats of foreign allies have been presented as evidence of the lack of popular support for democratic reform in Libya. The result is endemic instability and crisis in Libya.

1.3. Constructivism

Constructivism is one of the critical theories that attempt to reveal the dependence of knowledge, norms, and institutions on both every day, and historical context. In contrast to positivist theories, which are understood to be objective and value-free, critical ideas always have a political goal and criticize the social order that results from the intervention of positivist theories. Critical theories are also interpreted differently to questions about the nature and mode of knowing the reality of international relations.

Constructivism is the youngest of all critical theories. The foundational work is Alexander Wendt's article "*Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Constructivism of Power Politics*" from 1992.¹⁹ Constructivism attempts to find a compromise between realists and liberals on the one hand and critics of international relations on the other.²⁰ The rise of constructivism occurred in the 1990s when many phenomena in international relations could not be explained. As the Cold War ended, a period of change came in the global order that did not fit into already established theoretical concepts. Constructivism thus became a new theoretical approach that made it possible to explain the changed international political situation and the behaviour of individual states.²¹

In constructivism, states remain the central units of international relations, but their identity is influenced by social structures, human activity, and states' internal politics.²²

Wendt takes the international anarchist structure from neorealist theory and responds to it. He emphasizes the influence of structure and its impact on state decision-making. The structure is characterized by the so-called culture of anarchy, which defines the interrelations between states. In contrast to neorealism, which regards anarchist structure as non-changing and thus conflicts as its basis, constructivists are based on the idea that with a higher frequency and depth of contact between individual actors, this anarchist

¹⁹ WENDT, A. *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*. *International Organization*, 1992, 46(2), pp. 391-425.

²⁰ HOPF, T. *The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory*. *International Security*, 1998, 23(1), pp. 171-200.

²¹ BURCHILL, S. and R. DEVETAK. *Theories of International Relations*. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 216.

²² WENDT, A. *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*. *International Organization*, 1992, 46(2), pp. 391-425.

structure can evolve in three ways. The first is Hobbesian anarchy, in which states seek to destroy the adversary. The second is Lockean, in which states already recognize each other and try to force the adversary to retreat through wars. In the latter, the Kantian culture of anarchy, states already renounce violence in resolving disputes.²³ Constructivism aims not to replace existing theories but rather to find answers to new questions arising from the changing global environment by analysing norms, cultural, national, and non-matrilineal aspects.

In international security, constructivism is characterized by the doubt that there are immutable and fixed structures. There are no laws that predetermine the behaviour of actors and are therefore socially constructed.²⁴ According to constructivists, the structures of security relations are influenced by states and affect each other. As a result, the international security environment changes.

Constructivism has two main premises on which the vast majority of authors agree. The first is that knowledge is context dependent. Thus, there is no independent and objective external observer because knowledge is socially constructed and depends on subjective interpretation and language. The second premise argues that people give different collective meanings to the world around them, which they then share and move within. This means that even the shared reality is not objective and fixed because it is also constructed. The actors are to some extent influenced by the social, or in this case international, structure, but on the other hand, they shape it, so it is entirely dependent on them.²⁵

The thesis will also discuss role theory, which provides a useful middle ground between transnational constructivism and social constructivism. Respectively, role theory is able to overcome the shortcomings of both of these extreme positions and offer an analytical and conceptual framework for constructivist analysis of foreign policy.²⁶

²³ DRULÁK, P. *Theory of international relations*. 2nd ed. Prague: Portál, 2010, p. 210.

²⁴ EICHLER, J. *International security at the beginning of the 21st century*. 1st ed. Prague: Agentura vojenských informací a služeb, 2006, p. 263.

²⁵ OCELÍK, P. and P. ČERNOCH. *Constructivism and energy security in international relations*. 1st ed. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2014, p. 21.

²⁶ BENEŠ, Vít. Role theory: A Conceptual Framework for the constructivist foreign policy analysis 4/2010. *ceeol.com* [online]. 2010 [viewed 11st July 2022]. Available from: <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=91742>

Role theory is one of the analytical and conceptual frameworks used in foreign policy analysis. Although the word "theory" appears in its title, it is not a theory as we usually understand it. It is an analytical and conceptual framework that provides concepts and terms useful in foreign policy analysis (e.g., the term national role concept). Role theory does not offer specific hypotheses about the relationship between phenomena in the social world.²⁷

Within role theory, it is essential to distinguish the concepts of role and identity, which are often found within the definition of role theory, especially in the context of social constructivism. In international relations, the notion of national identity manifests itself, for example, in a long-term profile in a particular area that results from a domestic consensus and stems from historical experiences and traditions.²⁸

Role theory, as a specific analytical and conceptual tool, has been first presented in 1970, when Kalevi Holsti published his ground-breaking article, considered helpful in foreign policy analysis, the *Concept of the National Role in the Study of Foreign Policy*.²⁹ The authors used this term in their role analyses without bothering much about its systematic and sophisticated conceptualization. They did not reflect on the path to the role concept other social science disciplines have taken. Holst attempts to remedy these conceptual deficiencies and, after a brief reflection on the current use of the term role, comes up with a definition of the national role concept, which is the backbone of the entire role theory. Holsti's work can be seen as a critique of dominant systemic approaches whose analyses, based on the bipolar nature of the international system of the time, give an oversimplified view of the roles adopted by individual actors, the sources of their foreign policy, and, ultimately, the system as such.

The notion of role is a central concept of role theory. Even though constructivism and role theory are used simultaneously and complement each other, to some extent, I

²⁷ EVERA, S. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. 1st ed. New York: Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 36.

²⁸ HUYSSSEUNE, M. Nationalism and identity politics in International relations. In: WIENER, J. (ed.) *International relations*. 1st ed. Oxford: Eolss Publishers Co Ltd, 2009, pp. 200–202.

²⁹ HOLSTI, K. National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 1970, 14(3), pp. 233-309.

intertwine, so that role and state identity should not be confused. Identity is long-term and permanent. The concept of role is defined functionally and is a dynamic aspect of the state, which means that it refers to behaviour.³⁰

Ralph Turner defined a role as *"a normative concept, a set of rules of conduct. He complements this definition with his assertion that an individual - for the work of the state - is assigned a status, i.e., an identity, by society. Individuals perform a role when they use the rights and responsibilities that flow from this identity."*³¹ Although it seems that the concepts of identity and role should be consistent, this is often not the case, which does not mean that it is wrong.

Thus, role theory examines states' roles in the international system. It is, therefore, a reality that the actors portray in the play, the performance of which is predetermined by a specific script, the instructions of the director, the performances of other colleagues, and the audience's reactions. This metaphor can be transferred to the real world, in which actors portray politicians, and social norms and current societal events influence their role. *"Role theory assumes the same performance as if we were in a theatre or cinema, i.e., that the performance results from social regulations and other people's behaviour. Role theory encompasses such a wide range of work that no coherent body of thought or research encompasses the theory. Rather, these are many different strains loosely grouped under the rubric of role theory, representing a general orientation or approach of individual actors rather than a theory. Although various elements of role theory are applied in foreign policy, relatively few of them exist for further application."*³²

Throughout history, various authors have incorporated several concepts into the conceptual framework of role theory. The essential idea is national role conception (abbreviation NRC), first introduced by Kalevi Holsti. He defines the federal role as how *"politicians at the general level define the decisions, commitments, rules, and actions appropriate to their state, the function if any, that their state is to permanently perform in*

³⁰ BENEŠ, Vít. Role theory: A Conceptual Framework for the constructivist foreign policy analysis 4/2010. *ceeol.com* [online]. 2010 [viewed 11st July 2022]. Available from: <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=91742>

³¹ TURNER, J. *Handbook of Sociological Theory*. 1st ed. New York: Springer, 2006, p. 233.

³² *Ibid.*

the international system or the subordinate regional system. It is their 'image' of their state's appropriate targeting and function with and within the external environment. ³³

This definition of Holsti speaks of a state's role in the international or subordinate regional system. Therefore, given the focus of this thesis, only the term "subordinate regional system" will be used, which symbolizes the European Union and, consequently, it is foreign and security policy.³⁴

This original definition is the basis for many authors, such as Krotz, who defined the concept of national role as "*nationally shared positions and awareness of the proper role and purpose of a given state as a collectively in the international environment.*"³⁵ Yet, even today, many authors draw on Holsti's original article and use his definition and terminology; therefore, this thesis will also draw on the original theory.

Next, this theory will be presented using the case of Libya. When the Cold War ended, the international environment changed. The international system experienced two significant changes. The bipolar conflict ended and the USA, as a participant thereof, had to reorient its foreign and security policy in a different direction. However, the end of the USA-West rivalry also meant a relaxation for the rest of the international system, which brought with it new opportunities for Third World states.³⁶ The behaviour of some of these states caught the attention of the USA, and the concept of 'rogue states' was coined to refer to states that, because of their unsystematic behaviour and violations of international norms, were perceived by the USA to pose some threat to the rest of the world. This concept still attracts considerable attention and controversy in political circles.³⁷

There are different views on the reasons for the emergence of the concept of rogue states. According to Kenneth Waltz, after the end of the Cold War, the United States

³³ HOLSTI, K. National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 1970, 14(3), pp. 233-309.

³⁴ BACKMAN, C. Role Theory and International Relations: A Commentary and Extension. *International Studies Quarterly*. 1970, 14(3), pp. 310-319.

³⁵ KROTZ, U. National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared. *CES Germany and Europe Working Paper*, 2002, 2(4), pp. 1-45.

³⁶ Rogue states and the United States: A Historical Perspective. *wilsoncenter.org* [online]. 19 September 2011 [viewed 8th October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/rogue-states-and-the-united-states-historical-perspective>

³⁷ HOMOLAR, A. Rebels Without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in USA Security Policy. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2011, 17(4), pp. 705-727.

focused on rogue states as a new threat.³⁸ The United States addressed the rogue state concept because there was an increased need to address other foci in the system that exhibited deviations from identity or were perhaps more visible through system transformation than was the case during the Cold War. The Soviet Union as a threat disappeared after the end of the Cold War. National security policy was thus shaped by national ambitions and domestic political pressures. In order to maintain its dominance in a now unipolar world, the USA reoriented itself toward rule-breaking states because these states were creating weapons of mass destruction or supporting terrorism.

These states became very dangerous to the USA because there was no way to influence them through internationally accepted rules. There were violations of basic human rights in Libya, including the right of citizens to political participation. Moreover, Libya has re-engaged in international affairs and has not cooperated with like-minded states. For this reason, Libya, like other states such as the DPRK, Iran and Iraq, has become the target of international sanctions.

The European Union has all along sided with the West and supported it in its efforts to destroy terrorist organisations. The EU has also had its own guidelines in this fight (e.g., the Barcelona Process), but Libya has ignored them. On the other hand, Libya already had the problem of a problematic state that 'exports' terrorism (Lockerbie bombing)³⁹.

In this chapter, three theoretical concepts of foreign policy have been introduced which are useful for the whole thesis. Each of these theories highlights slightly different aspects of EU and US foreign policy, helping to realise the priorities of the EU and US foreign policy over the years.

³⁸ WALTZ, K. Structural Realism after the Cold War. *columbia.edu* [online]. [viewed 8th October 2022]. Available from: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf

³⁹ KENEALY, D. Releasing the Lockerbie Bomber: National Interests, Intergovernmental Relations and Para-Diplomacy. *Scottish Affairs*, 2017, 26(4), pp. 411-434.

2. The initial situation of the Arab Spring in Libya

To understand EU and USA foreign policy, it is first important to analyse and understand developments in Libya. This chapter of the chapter deals with the events of the Arab Spring in Libya and is divided into two subchapters. The first one briefly introduces the situation in the country before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, specifically the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, which had existed in the country since the 1970s. The second subsection discusses the political situation in Libya after the death of Muammar Gaddafi until the failed democratic elections that were to be held in December 2021.

In this part of the thesis, the following research question will be answered: "*What was the evolution of the Arab Spring in Libya?*" It is important to answer this question to understand the whole situation in Libya and the system of its functioning. This chapter is providing deeper context, in which foreign policy of the EU and USA will be compared.

In 1911, Libya became an Italian colony and the Italian population began to settle on its coast.⁴⁰ However, the Italians only managed to occupy the coast. They never reached the inland because they encountered resistance from various local tribes. Subsequently, between 1943 and 1951, the French and the British took over the administration of Libya. In 1951, after a series of riots, the country became a kingdom led by King Idris al-Senussi, who suppressed the development of independent state institutions, banned political parties, and restricted the press.⁴¹ Thus, Libya changed hands a lot, and its geographical parts were very different, which they still are today. It is essentially an artificially created territory with high ethnic diversity, which had, and still has, implications for the political stability and security of the region. A few years later, in 1969, the Libyan king was overthrown by a group of army officers led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled the country in an oppressive manner for over 40 years, and during this period he built up an authoritarian regime. Until his overthrow, Gaddafi ruled without state institutions or

⁴⁰ WOOLBERT, R. Italian Colonial Expansion in Africa. *The Journal of Modern History*, 1932, 4(3), pp. 430-445.

⁴¹ The Lust for Libya: How a Nation was Torn Apart. *aljazeera.com* [online]. 18 October 2018 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-big-picture/2018/10/18/the-lust-for-libya-how-a-nation-was-torn-apart>

a constitution.⁴² Diversity in the country created political tensions even during Gaddafi's rule, who held Libya (social peace) together by force and repression against certain groups of the population, at the cost of covert violence and human rights violations. This was also characteristic of other secular regimes.

The outbreak of the Arab Spring gave the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, including Libya, hope for positive political and economic development. During the protests, more liberal protesters demanded more freedom, a better quality of life and much greater political participation. It should be noted that the protests in Libya were not directly inspired by the events of the Arab Spring, as in other Arab countries such as Tunisia or Egypt but were caused by the specific domestic policies of Gaddafi, who used violence to promote his ideas.⁴³ It is therefore no coincidence that the situation in Libya began to break down with the Arab Spring. The preconditions for an uprising had been ripe in the country long before that, because of sky-high unemployment, economic stagnation, corruption, nepotism vs. the palace of the powerful and repression.

2.1. The situation in the country before the Arab Spring and the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Libya

The biggest problem with the Gaddafi regime has been its human rights abuse. Numerous repressions have affected elites of tribes supporting the original monarchy, university professors, lawyers, and others. Several people have been executed and more than a thousand residents have been sentenced to life imprisonment for their views. In the 1980s, Gaddafi called for the physical elimination of political dissidents, and there are several documented cases of their abduction and murder.

Throughout 1987, Libya was already experiencing protests linked to a worsening economic crisis. Libya was also facing increasing isolation in the political and diplomatic environment within the international community. At the 13th session of the General People's Congress in 1987, harsh criticism of the economic situation and the regime's foreign

⁴² GOMBÁR, E. *History of Libya*. 1st ed. Prague: NLN – Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2015, p. 83.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

policy appeared. One of the greatest instigators of discontent and targets of criticism were the Revolutions Committees, which had gained greater powers over time.⁴⁴

Gaddafi's rhetoric became desperate after the Benghazi bombing and his confidence was clearly shaken by the situation. A series of problems in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s marked the most difficult period for the Gaddafi regime. After the imposition of international sanctions on Libya in 1992, to which many Arab countries took a neutral stance, the ruler's ideological and foreign policy changed significantly, much to Gaddafi's surprise. Gaddafi abandoned long-standing plans for Arab unity and began to criticise some countries for their subservience to the US. After the Lockerbie incident in 1988, Libya's international standing deteriorated further, and Gaddafi even had to retreat from his fiercely confrontational foreign policy.⁴⁵ The changing international environment also contributed to this. As communist states became democratic, Gaddafi lost allies (including Czechoslovakia). Conversely, post-socialist states began to criticize him and sided (at least rhetorically) with the US, further isolating his regime.

In the late 1990s, the unfavourable economic outlook caused by a long period of centralisation and deregulation forced Gaddafi to gradually adopt economic reforms. Removing Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism was also essential to economic recovery. In this light Gaddafi strongly and immediately made decision condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and offered cooperation to the CIA and other organisations in the fight against terrorism. Here it could already be seen that the US was beginning a 'purge', cf. Afghanistan and Iraq. Respectively, at least seemingly, because the Gaddafi regime was ultimately cheating in this regard. More details on Gaddafi's apparent cooperation with the US below - the Abdul Qadeer Khan affair

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⁴⁴ WEHREY, F. *The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya*. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018, p. 13.

⁴⁵ The Lust for Libya: How a Nation was Torn Apart. *aljazeera.com* [online]. 18 October 2018 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-big-picture/2018/10/18/the-lust-for-libya-how-a-nation-was-torn-apart>

⁴⁶ He stole the technology of centrifuges to enrich uranium from the Dutch firm Urenco for Pakistan in 1974. The network that Khan later built supplied nuclear technology knowledge and equipment to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, confirming that a country that misuses civilian technology for a military nuclear programme can itself become a source of proliferation.

Subsequently, Gaddafi announced an end to Libyan efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and in 2004 allowed the Americans to remove facilities that could be used to develop such weapons. These concessions resulted in the lifting of UN sanctions as well as several unilateral USA sanctions. The lifting of sanctions and the development of oil production has thus provided Libya with one of the best economic levels in the North African region.⁴⁷

It is here that Gaddafi's contradictory personality, highlighted by the author in the framework of role theory, is manifested. Gaddafi's role in the international political system was initially focused on supporting terrorism, as evidenced by the Lockerbie bombing. By the beginning of the century, Gaddafi's personality began to change – he rejected all terrorism and condemned the actions of Al Qaeda. On the other hand, he cheated in the affair Abdul Qadeer Khan⁴⁸. Thus, Gaddafi's personality evolved only on the outside, but he remained the same on the inside.

In Libya, another very important milestone was the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation between Gaddafi and Berlusconi (Italy) in Benghazi on 30 August 2008. The treaty was ratified by Italy on 6 February 2009 and by Libya on 2 February 2009. This agreement brought Italy significant financial commitments. Based on this treaty, Italy paid Libya USD 5 million in compensation for the Yemeni occupation. In return, Libya took measures to prevent clandestine emigration from the Libyan coast, and in return Libya undertook to encourage investment in Italian companies.⁴⁹

A wave of protests and uprisings began in other Arab countries as early as 17 December 2010. On this day, an unemployed young man, Mohamed Bouazizi, burned

For more information: Profile: Abdul Quadeer Khan. *bbc.com* [online]. 20 February 2004 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3343621.stm

⁴⁷ VANDEWALLE, D. A History of Modern Libya. *Cambridge University Press* [online]. [viewed 8th October 2022]. Available from: https://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/19393/front-matter/9781107019393_frontmatter.pdf

⁴⁸ More information in previous notes about Abdul Qadeer Khan.

⁴⁹ Legge 6 febbraio 2009, n. 7. "Ratifica ed esecuzione del Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione tra la Repubblica italiana e la Grande Giamahiriya araba libica popolare socialista, fatto a Bengasi il 30 agosto 2008". *parlamento.it* [online]. 30 August 2008 [viewed 8th October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/090071.htm>

himself after an unauthorized stall was confiscated. His death sparked violent public protests and riots that led to the fall of President Ben Ali in mid-January 2011.⁵⁰

These anti-government uprisings gradually spread from Tunisia to several other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, leading to regional instability. The ongoing instability in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia shared typical economic demands and the same calls for responsible government and a better quality of life for citizens in each country.⁵¹ Although the factors behind these uprisings varied from country to country, they involved varying degrees of resistance. Although the Arab Spring had a lot in common in each country, it was no longer an Arab uprising.⁵²

In Libya, the situation was unique because the country has the largest oil reserves and the second largest gas reserves in Africa, making Libya one of the wealthiest countries with active ties to Europe. Although Gaddafi tried to avoid the culmination of the situation and continued to spread the myth that his downfall would lead to chaos and civil war, the rebels emphasized the desire for national unity and the power of national sentiment.⁵³

In response to the impending bloodshed, the United Nations Security Council (which can be abbreviated to “UN Security Council”) adopted a resolution in late February 2011 imposing sanctions on Gaddafi and his closest associates.⁵⁴

On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council declared a 'no-fly zone over Libya'⁵⁵ and instructed the Member States to use all necessary means to protect civilians.

⁵⁰ ST JOHN, R. *Libya from colony to revolution*. 2nd ed. Oxford: One world Publications, 2012, p.71.

⁵¹ DALACOURA, K. The 2011 uprising in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications. *International Affairs*, 2012, 88(1), pp. 63-79.

⁵² MARTINI, J. The Musallim Brotherhood Its Youth, and Implications for USA Engagement. *rand.org* [online]. 2012 [viewed 27th July 2022]. Available from: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1247.pdf

⁵³ ST JOHN, R. *Libya from colony to revolution*. 2nd ed. Oxford: One world Publications, 2012, p.171.

⁵⁴ ČTK. DOCUMENT: Points of the UN Security Council resolution on the protection of Libyan civilians. *idnes.cz* [online]. 18 March 2011 [viewed 21 April 2022]. Available from: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravvy/zahranicni/dokument-body-rezoluce-rb-osn-na-ochranu-libyjskych-civ-listu.A110318_152340_zahranicni_btw

⁵⁵ A no-fly zone is a geographical area over which aircraft cannot fly. This can be manned aircraft, unmanned systems (drones) or both. Depending on the area and the specific regulations, there may be military, security or privacy reasons. There are many types of no-fly zones. For example, shooting down aircraft from the air or bombing even ground targets. In the case of Libya, the latter option has been put into practice, effectively bringing the states involved into the conflict on the anti-Gaddafi side.

As the violence escalated, Gaddafi and his allies left. An international arrest warrant was issued for Gaddafi and others in June 2011 for killing civilians and crimes against humanity.⁵⁶

The whole situation culminated in Gaddafi's death, after which Libya became a failed state. In the immediate aftermath, the EU supported the opposition government, which committed itself to a pro-democratic direction for the country. In fact, the EU would not build a democratic state in Africa, because the transition to democracy is too slow and ineffective and would only lead to further political strife.

The government of Libya was taken over by the National Transitional Council (NTC), which in March 2011 presented its vision of a modern, accessible, and united Libya based on the principles of democracy with a new constitution. The NTC was very successful in its diplomatic negotiations. It has managed to negotiate, among other things, the release of billions of dollars that have been frozen in various accounts abroad and the opening of a representative office in Washington, D.C.⁵⁷

At the beginning of October 2011, a transitional government was formulated, in which Jibril Mahmoud was ahead of the peace. After Gaddafi was detained and lynched, the transitional government declared freedom and pledged to hold regular elections within 13 months period.⁵⁸

2.2. Post-revolutionary Libya and the civil war

The first free elections in Libya were a milestone in modern history. It took place in July 2012 and was won by the National Forces Alliance. Ali Zaydan was appointed Prime Minister and sought to establish a new democratic constitution and form a government. However, there were major disagreements between politicians at the time, which led to the government failing to gain control of the whole territory of Libya and eventually

⁵⁶ ČTK. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Gaddafi. *e15.cz* [online]. 27 June 2011 [viewed 21st March 2022]. Available from: <https://www.e15.cz/zahranicni/mezinarodni-trestni-soud-vydal-zatykac-na-kaddafiho-672732#>

⁵⁷ ST JOHN, R. *Libya from colony to revolution*. 2nd ed. Oxford: One world Publications, 2012, p.193.

⁵⁸ MÜHLBERGER, W. Libya After Qadhafi: Reshaping the Political and Security Systems. *Connections*, 2012, 11(3), pp. 1-20.

ending. Other significant events that contributed to the collapse of the government were the two attacks on the US consulate in Benghazi on 11 and 12 September 2012 by radical militias led by Ansar al-Sharia, in which four Americans were killed.⁵⁹

Following these events and several other armed clashes with militants, Ali Zeiden resigned in March 2014 and was replaced by Abdullah al-Thani, who resigned in August 2015.⁶⁰ After the general election, the House of Representatives has been divided into two chambers and began to function as a divided body with two seats.⁶¹

In December 2015, the UN tried to create the Government National Unity, known as GNU. However, this attempt failed as quickly as the previous ones, and triggered the so-called second Libyan civil war.⁶² Government National Unity was not created, because it did not gain the confidence of parliament. This is even though the Government of National Unity was expected to bring stability to the country and be able to deal with the Islamist radicals infiltrating Libya.

The second Libyan civil war divided Libya into two parties – eastern and western. On the one side, there was the eastern government based in Benghazi, which was backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by a military defector from the Gaddafi era, Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who was supported by Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. On the other side, there was the western government, known as the Government of National Unity, which was officially backed by the UN. There was also the radical Islamic State organisation involved in the fighting, which controlled the city of Darnah in the east as well as some areas around Sirte from the year 2014 until June 2018. Eventually,

⁵⁹ The attack on The Consulate in Benghazi? USA won't seek death penalty for accused. *lidovky.cz* [online]. 10 May 2016 [viewed 9th October 2022]. Available from: https://www.lidovky.cz/svet/utok-na-konzulat-v-benghazi-USAA-trest-smrti-pro-obvineneho-zadat-nebudou.A160510_222734_In_zahranici_sk

⁶⁰ AARTHUN, S. 4 hours of fire and chaos: How the Benghazi attack unfolded. *edition.cnn.com* [online]. 13 September 2012 [viewed 9th October 2022]. Available from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/12/world/africa/libya-consulate-attack-scene/>

⁶¹ VOLK, T. Biden's Libya Policy. *kas.de* [online]. 28 April 2021 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://www.kas.de/en/country-reports/detail/-/content/biden-s-libya-policy>

⁶² STEPHEN, Ch. War in Libya – the Guarding briefing. *theguardian.com* [online]. 29 August 2014 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya>

the Islamic State was ousted by Hafran's LNA, which is why this thesis states that the fighting was on two fronts, between the west and the east.⁶³

During the 2020s, multilateral diplomatic initiatives began to achieve a ceasefire. In October 2020, UN officials selected and convened the 75-member Libya Political Dialogue Forum to restore the country's disrupted political transition. Based on the Agreement on a Permanent and Immediate Ceasefire in the country, signed in Geneva on 23 October 2020, members of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum nominated appointees to replace the government and lead the country until parliamentary elections in December 2021.⁶⁴ On the basis of this agreement (the Agreement on a Permanent and Immediate Ceasefire in the Country), the military delegations of Libya's two warring parties concluded a formal ceasefire, officially ending the conflict that began on 4 April 2019. For the diplomats (from the UN, the USA, and the EU) who worked hard behind the scenes, this was a remarkable triumph, as they were instrumental in pulling Libya back from the brink and showing how sustained international political pressure on the combatants can lead to progress towards peace.⁶⁵

Throughout 2021, disputes persisted over presidential candidacy criteria and constitutional legal issues, with UN and USA officials trying to keep a cool head and steer the country toward negotiated elections. In the end, they failed to do so, as the vast majority of the debates did not lead to any consensus, but only to the expected one, i.e., the cancellation of the elections.⁶⁶ As a result of the postponement of the elections, consultations and political competition among Libyans intensified and Libya fell into the abyss again. Currently, Libya has two governments: The Government of National Unity led by Abdul

⁶³ Libya and USA Policy. *congress.gov* [online]. 2 September 2021 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11556>

⁶⁴ Council of the EU: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the announcement of the ceasefire agreement in Libya. *consilium.europa.eu* [online]. 25 October 2020 [viewed 9th October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/cs/press/press-releases/2020/10/25/declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-announcement-of-a-ceasefire-agreement-in-libya/>

⁶⁵ MEGERISI, T. Spoiler alert: How Europe can save diplomacy in Libya. *ecfr.eu* [online]. 22 January 2021 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://ecfr.eu/publication/spoiler-alert-how-europe-can-save-diplomacy-in-libya/>

⁶⁶ Libya plunges into the abyss, has two prime ministers again. *novinky.cz* [online]. 11 February 2022 [viewed 9th October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.novinky.cz/zahranicni/svet/clanek/libye-se-propada-do-propasti-opet-ma-dva-premiery-40386929>

Hamid Dbeibeh on the one hand, and on the other, the government that won the confidence of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives in early March 2022. The fate of the country and the new elections thus remain unclear for the time being, as they did in 2021.⁶⁷

Within this chapter, the major historical milestones of Libya were presented to answer the questions "*What was the evolution of the Arab Spring in Libya?*"

There were widespread protests in the country during the Arab Spring in Libya. Muammar Gaddafi tried to suppress these protests militarily, which led to the Libyan civil war and the regime was overthrown with the help of NATO and Gaddafi was killed in the fall of 2011. The overthrow of Gaddafi was supposed to bring greater political rights and civil liberties to Libyans. However, the country is significantly destabilised after the war. Society, in which tribalism persisted under Gaddafi, has completely disintegrated into many different factions. The fragmentation of society is also reflected in the composition of the legislature, which is largely made up of independent candidates. The post-revolutionary government has no control over the Libyan territory, and armed clashes between different groups continue in most places.

Chaos and unrest in the country are accompanied by an economic slump. Therefore, until the government succeeds in disarming the rebel groups and gaining full control of the entire territory, no calming of the situation can be expected. The Arab Spring in Libya has removed an authoritarian leader; however, it has not solved any of the long-term problems of the Libyan society. Given the continuing armed clashes, the government's inability to assert its authority throughout the territory and the deteriorating economic situation, the situation in Libya can be assessed as worse than before the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The difficult transition to democracy and the first democratic elections are nowhere in sight.

⁶⁷ MEGERISI, T. Spoiler alert: How Europe can save diplomacy in Libya. *ecfr.eu* [online]. 22 January 2021 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://ecfr.eu/publication/spoiler-alert-how-europe-can-save-diplomacy-in-libya/>

3. Foreign policy of the EU and the USA before, during and after the Arab Spring

After establishing the basic defining features of foreign policy theories and presenting the situation in Libya, the application of EU and USA foreign policy to the case of Libya follows. Libya was chosen for several reasons, namely its long-standing internal conflicts, political instability, collapsing economy, humanitarian and migration crisis and widespread violations of basic human rights.

On the contrary, Libya has huge oil reserves and a very strategic location, i.e., access to the Mediterranean Sea, and it is also a country that has become a staging post for migrants heading to Europe. For all these reasons, Libya has become a country that has attracted the attention of regional and world powers that are directly or indirectly involved in the national conflict.

The last chapter of the thesis is divided into two subchapters and deals with the EU and USA foreign policy towards Libya. The first subchapter of the thesis will deal with the EU and USA foreign policy before the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The second subchapter will focus on the EU and USA foreign policy during the Arab Spring and after it until December 2021. This subchapter will also present situations that may arise in Libya-EU relations and possible solutions to them.

The aim of this chapter is to set out the basic expected foreign policy decisions of the USA and the EU in relation to military intervention in the Libyan conflict so that it can be used as a benchmark for a deeper analysis of the impact of domestic factors or constraints on the actions taken. It is a measure of how the intervening variable reinforces or causes deviation from expected foreign policy decisions, which are assumed to be driven primarily by the interests and threats of the USA and EU that are exposed to those interests. Furthermore, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the foreign policy decisions of the USA and the EU after the Arab Spring in relation to Libya.

This chapter will answer the final research questions addressed in this thesis: *"What might define the similarities and differences in the EU and USA approaches to Libya?"*,

"Do the positions of the two actors overlap, complement each other, or are they fundamentally different?". The answers are key to achieving the aim of the thesis.

3.1. The EU-USA foreign policy before the Arab Spring

At the time when most African states were fighting for independence, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was taking place on the international political scene. African national liberation movements enjoyed considerable attention from the Eastern and Western blocs. Both global powers sensed an opportunity to extend their direct influence into other regions at the expense of the waning colonial powers. They also wanted to pledge support to the emerging states for future political and economic cooperation (against their future rivals).⁶⁸

Local power struggles thus often consisted of asserting either Soviet or Western influence in the newly created African states. However, neither American nor Soviet political doctrine was able to produce variants of their ideologies that were applicable in the African environment. Western pluralist democracy with its knowledge of opposition was as alien in Africa as the Marxist theory of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, however, the bipolar rivalry between East and West increased the importance of the young African states on the international scene and provided them with greater opportunities to obtain external assistance from both sides.⁶⁹

The USA efforts led to the creation or at least the support of anti-communist regimes in Africa to a secondary manifestation, i.e., the maintenance of autocratic and dictatorial regimes, which provoked resistance to African radicalism, thus opening the way for Soviet influence in the part of the continent that fell within its political, commercial, and economic sphere of influence.

Relations with the countries of the African continent have developed and changed from the point of view of the European Community (EC) or the EU since 1964. European

⁶⁸ KLÍMA, J. *The Last Colonial War*. Prague: Editorship: Libri, 2001, p. 142.

⁶⁹ NÁLEVKA, V. *Twilight time. The collapse of colonial empires after World War II*. Prague: Editorship TRITON, s.r.o., 2004, p. 184.

states have been influenced primarily by their colonial experience and have felt the need to maintain economic and political ties with the countries of the African continent. A number of agreements were therefore concluded which fell within the field of economic cooperation (aid). As part of this process, the countries concerned were entitled to support from the European Development Fund (EDF) and the possibility of exporting goods at zero tariffs, which was intended to contribute to their development.⁷⁰ However, not all of the money has fallen on deaf ears. Much of it was used for non-existent projects or stolen.

In the following sub-chapter, the diploma thesis will present the foreign policy of the EU and the USA in relation to Libya before the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

3.1.1. The EU policy towards Libya before the outbreak of the Arab Spring

The relationship between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union is today the most developed and continuous system of cooperation with developing countries. In the almost 50 years of its existence, this relationship has undergone a turbulent evolution, both in terms of the growth in the number of participants and in terms of the prioritisation and implementation of cooperation. The relationship between the two groups has been influenced by both internal and external stimuli from the international community, be it criticism of preferential trade provisions from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the growing emphasis on respect for human rights and democracy in the international community. From an internal point of view, it could not go unnoticed that, despite long-term cooperation and substantial investment, the economic situation in developing countries has not improved over time, quite the contrary. The Community's response to this was 'aid fatigue', which led both to a reflection on the priorities for economic and development aid and to a call for other issues to be included in the relationship.⁷¹

⁷⁰ OBBIE, J. The European Union's international development policy: Leading and benevolent? *ugent.be* [online]. 2008 [viewed 10th October 2022]. Available from: <https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/410830>

⁷¹ CIHELKOVÁ, E. *External economic relations of the European Union*. Prague: C.H. Beck, 2003, p. 340.

Another very important partnership that was established between the EU and the Mediterranean countries was the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was launched in November 1995 and is also known as the Barcelona Process.⁷² This was a breakthrough between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries, which involved linking economic and political priority. The partnership had three pillars: the creation of free trade, cultural exchange, and political cooperation. According to Bichhi, *the creation of the EMP was a response to the end of the Cold War and to new potential threats.*⁷³ An implicit goal of the Barcelona Process may have been to reduce illegal migration to Europe from the southern Mediterranean countries. All EU countries (15) and 12 southern Mediterranean countries were members of the agreement. Currently, the agreement includes all EU Member States and the 15 countries of the MENA region (Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Turkey, and Syria, which is currently suspended). These are therefore almost all countries bordering or near the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Libya is not a member of this partnership because it was not invited to Spain by the European Union in 1995 because of UN sanctions.⁷⁴ The EU-Libya relationship was established on the basis of these agreements. This is also the basis for the political decisions discussed later in the thesis.

Political decisions and responses in the EU following a series of popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes in various parts of Africa, including Libya, began to take shape after the adoption of UN Resolution 1970, which repeatedly condemned the actions of the Libyan authorities. The EU gradually implemented UN resolutions and imposed sanctions on selected members of the Gaddafi regime. However, when the military intervention escalated in March 2011, the EU's common stance evaporated. Only France and

⁷² CARAPICO, S. Euro-Med: European Ambitions in the Mediterranean. *Middle East Report*, 2001, 31(3), pp. 24-28.

⁷³ ADLER, E. The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region. *onlinelibrary.wiley.com* [online]. 18 May 2007 [viewed 18th October 2022]. Available from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00720_3.x

⁷⁴ CATORTA, F. EU-MENA Relations from the Barcelona Process to the Arab Uprisings: A New Research Agenda. *tandfonline.com* [online]. 2014 [viewed 18th October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2014.922237>

the United Kingdom supported military action against Gaddafi. Germany, on the other hand, decided not to participate in the military intervention, probably because elections were approaching in several German countries. In the case of the United Kingdom, there was broad consensus in the House of Commons in favor of military action, which was reflected in relatively high public support.⁷⁵ Thus France and other countries such as the UK, Spain and Italy took part in military intervention. These countries were convinced that, given their geographical proximity, the security of their borders could be threatened because of the huge numbers of refugees that the humanitarian crisis was generating. Meanwhile, of course, there were also ulterior interests, namely that France wanted to become a superpower and thus improve its relations with the USA. Furthermore, there was still the possibility that Gaddafi would win. This could mean that Libya would go back to supporting terrorism and thus threaten national security. Otherwise, the supply of Libyan oil, which fuels a large part of the European economy and is supplied to European countries, could be reduced, or stopped altogether.

European foreign and security policy until the turning point of 2011 clearly preferred the stability of Arab authoritarian regimes to possible destabilizing changes. In the use of political conditionality, the EU and its Member States preferred positive conditionality. The impossibility of EU accession for the Arab Mediterranean states played an important role in this approach, depriving European foreign policy of possible effective motivations for pressure. The EU has responded to the post-2011 developments by placing renewed emphasis on existing forms of assistance and cooperation.

3.1.2. USA policy towards Libya before the outbreak of the Arab Spring

On 1 September 1969, a group of young military officers led by Muammar Gaddafi staged a bloodless coup and seized power in the country. The USA did not pay much attention or concern to this change. The USA did not begin to pay attention to Libya until

⁷⁵ DEMBINSKI, M. Libya and the Future of the responsibility to protect – African and Europe Perspectives. *academia.edu* [online]. 2011 [viewed 31st August 2022]. Available from: https://www.academia.edu/40553511/Libya_the_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_the_Future_of_Humanitarian_Intervention

a few years later, when the USA sense of optimism faded and international relations with Libya began to deteriorate. At the beginning of the deterioration in relations was Gaddafi's decision to partially nationalize oil resources in the 1970s. This did not sit well with the USA or the UK, which attempted to boycott this nationalisation, and so the beginning of hostilities was in sight.⁷⁶ Relations between the USA and Libya continued to deteriorate as Libya decided to move politically and militarily closer to the Soviet bloc. However, the ideological differences between the USA and Libya were so great that the Libyan leader always supported governments and national liberation movements that were black-listed by Washington, D.C.

In the 1980s, hostile relations between Libya and the USA reached their peak. The USA President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goal was to provoke Gaddafi into taking a step that would be contrary to international law, thus providing the USA with a pretext for action.⁷⁷ This is what happened. Gaddafi sent air missiles at USA ships off the Libyan coast, and the Americans bombed Libyan missile launchers in retaliation. And thus, Gaddafi devised a retaliation that was unprecedented at the time. On 21 December 1988, Gaddafi's agents planted a bomb on a plane that was scheduled to fly between London and New York. It did not reach its destination, however, because the plane broke in half over Lockerbie, Scotland, it started an open war between Libya and the United States and a war between the United Nations and Libya. Following the attack, the UN imposed sanctions on Libya, which had a fatal impact on such a developing country.⁷⁸ It is clear that the Reagan administration has spoken out strongly against the Gaddafi regime and has sought to punish Libya severely, as evidenced by the air strikes that have been carried out on Libyan cities. The European powers, although they are and have always been a strong ally of the USA, have condemned the USA air strikes on Libyan cities. This has

⁷⁶ ZOUBIR, Y. Libya in USA foreign policy: From rouge state to good bellow? *tandfonline.com* [online]. 25 August 2010 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590220108162>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Muammar Kaddáfi. The Libyan dictator was lynched by a mob after a brutal civil war. *mall.tv* [online]. 17 February 2021 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://www.mall.tv/zivoty-slavnych/den-hnevku-kruta-obcanska-valka-skoncila-lyncem-diktatora-kaddafiho?fbclid=IwAR3B4sdKcMEiA4JU6-JWHOM0nz43S0NNg5cKDUo4fg2WeMBVgAOAaxh-WPc>

strengthened Gaddafi's position in the African world, and, in the eyes of many states, Gaddafi has become a victim of American bullying and hegemonic power.

Based on this situation and after many further incidents, Libya was placed on the list of so-called rogue states. USA policy towards Libya between 1980 and 1992 therefore included military coercion, diplomatic isolation, and unilateral sanctions. As a result of these sanctions, Libya began to feel the weight of the sanctions and Gaddafi realized that it was time to change the political relationship with the USA.

After years of USA rejections, the Clinton administration joined secret talks with Tripoli in 1998, led by the UK. The George W. Bush administration also continued the dialogue. The Libyan government took steps to end its support for terrorism and cooperated with the Scottish court set up to prosecute the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. At the beginning of the new century, there was a period of rupture and relations between the USA and Libya were normalised, specifically on 11 September 2001, when Gaddafi established a policy aimed at confirming Libya's disengagement from terrorism and support for extremist movements. Behind this decision was not Gaddafi's goodwill, but a common enemy – the extremist organisation Al-Qaeda.⁷⁹

As a result of these situations, there has been a period of improving relations between US and Libya. An important signal that Gaddafi was taking his words seriously was the solution to the problem on the island of Jolo in the Philippines, in which Libya acted as a mediator and had a decisive influence in resolving the crisis and releasing the hostages.⁸⁰ This situation has confirmed that Libya no longer wants to participate in terrorist or similar campaigns and wants to become a recognized partner for the individual international community and states, including the United States.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ ZOUBIR, Y. Libya in USA foreign policy: From rouge state to good bellow? *tandfonline.com* [online]. 25 August 2010 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590220108162>

⁸¹ BLANCHARD, Ch. Libya: Transition and USA Policy. *everycrsreport.com* [online]. 28 March 2012 [viewed 11st March 2022]. Available from: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20120328_RL33142_7ab68e7aecc3cdde572fe666c263ba67bcc96da4.pdf

3.2. EU-USA foreign policy during and after the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring in the North African region has had a significant impact on the foreign policy of the USA and the EU towards the region. The United States has historically pursued foreign policy in regions with abundant energy resources but volatile state-to-state relations. It has sought to promote stability and peace in the country. Libya was one such country. While President Barack Obama and European leaders supported the overthrow of authoritarian leaders in North Africa in favour of a transition to democracy, a more concrete expression of support was lacking. European leaders have been cautious about the amount of aid they have pledged to North Africa. For this reason, the European Union was initially not very involved in the situation in Libya and was more of an observer.

The United States and the European Union knew that the Arab people were strong enough to fight their repressive regimes and would not be so receptive to outside help and influence. The approaches that the United States and the European Union took in the region were different; however, they were linked in some ways.

It is true that when the United States entered Iraq, it most likely did not anticipate their presence there to be so long-lasting for establishing a new government after its people have lived under a violent dictatorship is challenging and demanding – both in time and money. With the advent of the Arab Spring, the United States has had to rethink its approach to democracy promotion and find a new and better way to do so. The European Union saw the transition to democracy as an opportunity to forge a new, stronger economic relationship that would benefit both sides. Gradually, however, the difficult process towards democracy has been replaced by stability, which has become more important.

In the following subchapters, we will look at the foreign policy of the EU and the USA during and after the Arab Spring until 24 December 2021. The last part of the first subchapter will present the author's *de lege ferenda* considerations on situations that could arise in EU-Libya relations and possible solutions. The second subchapter will discuss the policy of the Barack Obama administration and his successors in the presidency

towards Libya. The main objective of this section is to find similarities and differences between the foreign policies of the two actors.

3.2.1. EU foreign policy during and after the Arab Spring

Disagreements between Member States over a possible Common Security and Defence Policy mission have put the EU on the back burner. France and the United Kingdom have played a significant role in this matter.⁸² France convened a summit in Paris on 20 March 2011 to discuss a strategy for military intervention. The intervention itself began with the French air force shooting down Gaddafi's forces. This was followed by attacks by the UK and the USA. The mission was thus led primarily by France and the United Kingdom, supported by the United States. The European Union, in the form of the Council and the European Council, contented itself with declaring its support for the military intervention and endorsing the action taken.⁸³

In early March 2011, Italy joined France and the UK. At that point, it was quite certain that Gaddafi would not remain in power. Italian diplomacy therefore attempted to create an Interim National Transitional Council. Unlike France or the UK, Italy remained isolated from the main diplomatic negotiations on the future of Libya. At the end of March 2011, Italy agreed to actively participate in an operation whose main objective was to protect Libyan civilians. Italy thus abandoned its friend Gaddafi under international pressure and sided with the Western powers, believing that their actions would have a positive impact on future negotiations with the new Libyan government.⁸⁴

However, after a few days of military action led by the UK, France, and the USA, it was necessary to bring the intervention under the umbrella of the NATO to maintain continuity of attacks, as the EU was too divided on the issue of military intervention to cover the operation itself. The umbrella of operations in Libya was brought under

⁸² Libya conflict: Cameron and Sarkozy visit Tripoli. *bbc.com* [online]. 15 September 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14926308>

⁸³ FABBRINI, S. The European Union and Libyan Crisis. *papers.ssrn.com* [online]. 12 April 2014 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423286

⁸⁴ Ibid.

the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on 31 March 2011. Only 10 of total 21 EU Member States continued under the banner of NATO and the rebels until 20 October 2011, when Muammar Gaddafi was captured and subsequently beaten to death.⁸⁵

By the end of April 2011, Libyan rebels had already begun fighting in earnest to capture key areas of the country. These operations were conducted from the air by NATO. Although only some EU Member States joined the mission, the military solution to the conflict in Libya already had the support of countries such as Germany. As an organisation, the EU has already lost the opportunity to play a significant role in the Libyan conflict. The only tool that the EU had left in the spotlight was sanctions. There was again an overwhelming consensus among all states to tighten sanctions, even though the extended sanctions of 12 April 2011 were aimed primarily at the energy industry. In this respect, the strategy of the Member States was to prevent one of the main sources of funding for the current regime, namely the attempt to reduce the revenues from oil and gas sales. A more significant step in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was taken by Member States earlier this month when, at the Council, they agreed to set up their own military operation in support of humanitarian aid, 'EUFOR LIBYA'. This mission would be carried out at the request of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. However, this has not happened. Thus, this operation remained on paper only. Nevertheless, it was a significant development within the EU's CFSP, demonstrating the EU's desire to play a more active role in international conflicts.⁸⁶

At the turn of June 2011 and July 2011, a controversial event took place when French troops dropped large quantities of weapons and ammunition over Libya. These were intended for supply to the rebels, but according to the French side, these supplies did not in any way violate the arms embargo, as they were intended to protect civilians. This

⁸⁵ CAPASSO, M. Libya Country Report. *cidob.org* [online]. 2020 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/eu_listco/libya_country_report

⁸⁶ HENNEBERG, S. Europe's Libya Problem. *foreignaffairs.com* [online]. 20 July 2017 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/libya/europes-libya-problem>

move by the French army was opposed by Russia, which protested that the weapons could end up in the hands of Al-Qaeda and lead to even greater destabilisation.⁸⁷

At the end of August 2011, the war began to end. There was a reversal when the rebels captured Libya's capital city of Tripoli. Since then, the rebels, with unstinting NATO air support, have had the upper hand. Gaddafi was thus forced to hide until 20 October 2011, when he was lynched and murdered by a mob of opposition soldiers. NATO's task was accomplished, which is why the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2016 on 31 October 2011. This unanimously adopted resolution ended Operation Unified Protector (OUP).⁸⁸

Based on these facts and with hindsight, it can be said that the international community did not carefully measure the level of evidence and selectively relied on inflammatory speeches by the Libyan leader and ignored other more peaceful appeals. At the same time, it presented the military intervention as necessary to liberate the civilian population. Secondly, the quick call for a no-fly zone completely pushed aside the possibility of diplomatic efforts, as sought by the African Union, for example. Finally, the biggest shortcoming of the 2011 intervention in Libya was the failure on the part of all actors involved to help the country with a comprehensive stabilisation process after the military operation. Currently, two separate governments are struggling to control the eastern, southern, and western regions of the country, while armed groups continue to operate with impunity. As foreign involvement in the form of military intervention has contributed to the collapse of the central authority in Libya, local actors have adapted very quickly to this new system of interference and external assistance.⁸⁹

The consequences of military intervention for Italy were bad. Because of the violation of the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation (in which Italy declared

⁸⁷ PAOLETTI, E. The foreign policy process in Libya. *researchgate.net* [online]. June 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254253718_The_foreign_policy_process_in_Libya

⁸⁸ Operation Unified Protector. *nato.int* [online]. 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm>

⁸⁹ The Lust for Libya: How a Nation was Torn Apart. *aljazeera.com* [online]. 18 October 2018 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-big-picture/2018/10/18/the-lust-for-libya-how-a-nation-was-torn-apart>

in Article 4 that it would not allow its territory to be used for any act of aggression against Libya)⁹⁰, Italy could no longer count on Libyan assistance in the illegal migration system.

After the end of the civil war, the unstable situation in Libya proved to be the biggest problem. The Libyan government concentrated mainly on consolidating power and stabilising the country internally, without being able to take control of the entire Libyan region, let alone the borders.⁹¹ This has been exploited primarily by organisations involved in criminal activities, i.e., people smuggling. The number of illegal migrants has increased rapidly since 2011.

The French and British activism in the intervention in Libya was not shared by all EU member states, which is why France and the UK proceeded on the basis of international cooperation between countries in favour of military intervention, with the operation eventually coming under NATO leadership.⁹² France became involved in the whole conflict in Libya for several reasons. The first was the friendship forged between Sarkozy and Gaddafi during the year 2007. Sarkozy supported Gaddafi in the belief that mutual cooperation would promote the stability of his regime in exchange for overlooking the human rights issue in Libya. Relations between the two leaders became relatively close. After this rapprochement, curiously, France was the country that was the first European representative to urge other states in the UN Security Council to intervene in Libya. There are several reasons why “Gaddafi's friend” Sarkozy made this decision concerning an intervention in Libya. Apart from the actual overthrow of Gaddafi and the establishment of a more friendly, cooperative regime, other reasons can be given. It is no secret that the French public was concerned about France's declining influence in the world, and so intervention in Libya was of great value to them. The second major reason for the French intervention in Libya was to confirm Sarkozy's superiority in the region,

⁹⁰ RONZITTI, N. The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean? *gla.ac.uk* [online]. 2009 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_126121_smxx.pdf

⁹¹ Surviving the deadliest migration route from Libya to Italy. *bbc.com* [online]. 2017 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-40642347>

⁹² Libya and Sarkozy's moment. *bbc.com* [online]. 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhe Witt/2011/03/libya_and_sarkozys_moment.html

and not only within the European international environment. France thus confirmed its role as a superpower on the European continent, gaining superiority also at sea after the great disarmament of Great Britain.⁹³ Moreover, the fact that the operation was led by France and not by Italy, which could not intervene because of its strong ties to the dictatorial regime, opened new doors for France.

In the context of the migration crisis that erupted in 2015, the European Union responded with an agreement. The EU-Libya migration agreement was made to help Italy with people coming across the Mediterranean.⁹⁴ As part of increased cooperation on migration, the Malta Declaration was concluded in February 2017. The EU aimed to improve the situation of migrants on the ground in Libya and at sea into implementing measures - through funding - to reduce the number of people coming to Europe. After the slave trade in Libya came to light, the EU was labelled by several countries as complicit in the situation.⁹⁵

The above shows that some EU countries have been more involved in the whole situation in Libya than others. Italy, on the other hand, was aware of its previous close contacts with Libya from the outset and did not want to draw too much attention to it. France has done the opposite. It decided to trump its previous close relations with Libya with an activist policy. The same could be said of the UK. Italy, more than other states, felt threatened by the potential consequences of the Libyan conflict, including a possible refugee wave.⁹⁶

Initially, the Arab Spring was seen in a positive light. However, it is now clear that these expectations were false. The main problem that Europe, and by extension also the USA, will face is the transformation of the Arab world. For the last few years, these continents have been used to living in a kind of quiet symbiosis with Arab dictators.

⁹³ Libya: France and Italy to send officers to aid rebels. *bbc.com* [online]. 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-13152122>

⁹⁴ MCLEAN, Ch. EU must stop helping Libya on migration and border management. *Socialist Lawyer*, 2020, 85, pp.8-11.

⁹⁵ PRESS, R. Dangerous Crossings: Voices from the African Migration to Italy/Europe. *Africa 2017, Today*, 2017, 64(1), pp. 3-27.

⁹⁶ Europe's migration crisis. *bbc.com* [online]. 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78631/europe-s-migration-crisis>

This is now changing radically, and the biggest challenge is to digest the changes taking place on the continent. The implication is that new, ideally democratic governments will have to respect the attitudes of the electorate in their foreign policy, and these may not be favourable in Europe.

Now, the thesis presents the author's *de lege ferenda* reflections in relation to EU policy towards Libya. If we disregard the different attitudes of the different states towards Libya and consider that Libya is a potential partner for all EU member states that share the same values, it is very important to have this country on our side, if only because of its oil wealth or because it can somehow correct the number of refugees from Africa.

Should the Member States of the European Union fail to find common ground on how to resolve the concerns (migration, violence, cooperation in the oil industry), they risk external powers deciding the future of Libya and, indirectly, the security of the European Union. However, a scenario in which an external actor such as Russia gains dominance over the region seems unlikely due to the relatively stable balance of alliances and the reliance of the main rivals for power in Libya.

1. **A threat to the distribution of energy flowing from Libya**⁹⁷ - this threat could again occur based on new fighting that could damage existing infrastructure, either by mistake or by deliberate attacks. This situation has already arisen during the Arab Spring, but also after it. This is evidenced by several ongoing or completed investment arbitrations against Libya. Electricity can also be a problem for the Libyans themselves, as the ongoing disputes mean that there is no guarantee of a full day's supply of electricity to local households.
2. **Perpetual Libyan failure** - This scenario could unfold as a partial or profound decline of Libyan statehood. First, the more densely populated northern regions would stabilize through the institutionalization of the current energy balance and their economic interdependence on oil exports. However, the southern region, with its

⁹⁷ More information about electricity crisis in Libya:

ASHRY, M. Why Does Electricity Crisis Continue in Libya? *eurasiareview.com* [online]. 2022 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.eurasiareview.com/14072022-why-does-electricity-crisis-continue-in-libya-oped/>

nomadic social tradition, would not find sufficient unifying factors, and so they would build a nation-state that would lead to persistent jihadist feuds, whether of local origin or from the wider Sahel region. This situation would destabilize neighbouring states and, not least, Europe. In the event of a total failure of Libyan statehood, these explained consequences would be felt on a much larger scale.

In order to avoid the scenarios described above and to achieve the difficult goal of establishing democracy in the country, the European Union and its Member States should implement one of the following policies:

1. **Stronger strategic focus on the Sahel** - developments in Libya, particularly in its southern region, are interlinked with conflicts in the wider Sahel. The EU is already in a favourable position there thanks to the ongoing French military intervention. A wider EU military base and civilian mission, in cooperation with the G5 Sahel, taking control of the identified main routes leading to Fezzan could weaken the position of jihadist groups and other criminal organisations there. This would in turn allow Libya's south to be linked to the north. In addition, the European Union could easily gain access to Libya in order to apply pressure, if necessary, thus denying Libyan invaders access to the wider sub-Saharan African region.
2. **Nationwide renegotiation of a future Libyan state** - This negotiation process should include all relevant parties to the conflict, both those with legitimate influence and those with real influence. In order to achieve a stable long-term solution that all Libyan stakeholders are willing to accept, foreign powers must agree on a common position in advance. This common position must be based on the three main objectives of the European Union. Given that all three points affect certain countries, it seems realistic that they could agree on them.
3. **Promoting stability through trade and investment** - this will come out of a new all-inclusive negotiation that should help EU countries with favourable terms of trade and structural investment in infrastructure and diversification of the Libyan economy. In addition, educational partnerships could be offered to train young Libyans to build their country.

This subchapter summarises the major milestones that have influenced the decision-making of EU Member States and the EU as a whole. It also presented the situations that led individual countries such as Italy and France to behave as they did during and after the intervention.

In the following subsection, the policies of each USA president and their impact on Libya will be presented.

3.2.2. USA foreign policy during and after Arab Spring

When Barack Obama took office, he had a vision to change the world for the better through diplomatic missions, and he wanted to do it better than his predecessor George Bush.⁹⁸ Because of the new international order, Obama had to develop a strategy to deal with states that were determined to stay out of the plot or disrupt it in some way. He articulated his vision of changing the world towards a more secure and peaceful environment in a speech given in Prague in 2009. There, Obama spoke of a call for a world free of nuclear weapons that consisted of four parts.⁹⁹ He considered the greatest threat to global security to be the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The main objective of his administration was therefore to create a new nuclear arms control treaty, which included negotiations with then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

The Obama administration did not use the term 'rouge states' as his predecessor Bush did, but began to deal with states through democracy, referring to them as 'outliers'. He used this word to define outlier states in terms of accepted values and norms. These included Iran and North Korea, primarily because of their nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁰ Obama considered the biggest threat to be that Iran could sell nuclear weapons to North Korea, which would use them. Obama mentioned that he was willing to negotiate and cooperate

⁹⁸The Lust for Libya: How a Nation was Torn Apart. *aljazeera.com* [online]. 18 October 2018 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-big-picture/2018/10/18/the-lust-for-libya-how-a-nation-was-torn-apart>

⁹⁹O'SULLIVAN, M. Will Libya Become Obama's Iraq? pp. 306-313. *The New Arab Revolt*. *sal-danha.pbworks.com* [online]. 1 April 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <http://sal-danha.pbworks.com/w/file/attach/46350036/The%20New%20Arab%20Revolt.pdf>

¹⁰⁰FORSYTHE, D. US Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Situating Obama. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 2011, 33(3), pp. 767-789.

with these states if they gave up their practices.¹⁰¹ This was a somewhat naive plan which, on the other hand, improved the image of the United States and showed the world that it was trying to solve pro-issues peacefully.

In 2010, disturbing reports reached the President that indicated growing dissatisfaction among the local populations of Arab states with their governments. The Obama administration had the situation investigated. However, according to the results of the investigation, this information was confirmed. Washington D.C., however, was reluctant to take a position on the situation and did not comment on it for a whole week, so this time, France took the position of world leader.¹⁰² The problem was that the USA was divided and did not have a unified view. Among the leading sceptics of a possible air strike were current President Joe Biden and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. However, she later changed her mind and is now considered one of the main actors who mobilised NATO.¹⁰³

Thus, in 2011, the USA was directly involved in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime by actively participating in the NATO mission to establish a no-fly zone over Libya, which was launched three days after the no-fly zone resolution was passed. Barack Obama ordered USA forces to launch attacks against Libyan military targets. The USA led military action has been dubbed Operation Odyssey Dawn.¹⁰⁴ In addition to protecting the civilian population, the military action was intended to weaken Gaddafi's military forces so that they would be unable to resist the air invasion.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ The Lust for Libya: How a Nation was Torn Apart. *aljazeera.com* [online]. 18 October 2018 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-big-picture/2018/10/18/the-lust-for-libya-how-a-nation-was-torn-apart>

¹⁰² DALACOURA, K. US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East Since 11 September 2001: *A Critique*. *International Affairs*, 2005, 81(5), pp. 963-979.

¹⁰³ HARWOOD, J. Opportunities and Perils for Obama in Military Action in Libya? *nytimes.com* [online]. 27 March 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://archive.nytimes.com/thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/opportunities-and-perils-for-obama-in-military-action-in-libya/?searchResultPosition=8>

¹⁰⁴ QUARTARARO, J. Libya's Operation Odyssey Dawn: Command and Control. *PRISM*, 2012, 3(2), pp. 141-156.

¹⁰⁵ SHEAR, M. Will Obama Speech Address Region or Just Libya? *nytimes.com* [online]. 28 March 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://archive.nytimes.com/thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/will-obama-speech-address-region-or-just-libya/?searchResultPosition=9>

After the execution of Operation Odyssey Dawn, Barack Obama hoped that the United States would be able to hand over the leadership of the operation to other entities. He considered NATO to be the most suitable candidate. He was also supported in this idea by France and Italy. On the other hand, Germany, and Turkey, opposed and made their opposition clear to NATO leading Operation Odyssey Dawn.¹⁰⁶ However, this did not change the fact that NATO assumed sole command of the international military operation in Libya on 31 March 2011. The United States retained a supporting role throughout the operation, and its assistance was to consist of supporting allies who did not bear the bulk of the military burden.¹⁰⁷

Despite Barack Obama's announcement that the USA would no longer participate in the Libyan conflict, it was confirmed in the following months that USA military forces were still involved in some NATO airstrikes. For example, the United States provided special anti-radar missiles that were used to destroy Libyan air defences, or drones and aircraft that allowed for in-flight refuelling.¹⁰⁸

As part of Operation Unified Protector, several countries deployed small teams. The United States was considering arming opposition forces, as was France, because Hillary Clinton also viewed the no-fly zone resolution as a relaxation of the arms embargo. In the end, however, the USA stuck to providing funds to the Transitional National Council, which was its main interest. Although at the time President Barack Obama viewed USA involvement in Libya positively, he later admitted that there was no long-term USA strategy for Libya after the military intervention.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ WASHINGTON POST. In Libya, How Obama Can End a Mission That Started Badly – Gideon Rose. pp. 279-284. *The New Arab Revolt*. *saldanha.pbworks.com* [online]. 1 April 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <http://saldanha.pbworks.com/w/file/attach/46350036/The%20New%20Arab%20Revolt.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ ZELNY, J. Huntsman Criticizes Obama on Libya. *nytimes.com* [online]. 20 May 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://archive.nytimes.com/thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/huntsman-criticizes-obama-on-libya/?searchResultPosition=6>

¹⁰⁸ The Lust for Libya: How a Nation was Torn Apart. *aljazeera.com* [online]. 18 October 2018 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-big-picture/2018/10/18/the-lust-for-libya-how-a-nation-was-torn-apart>

¹⁰⁹ Libya is the biggest failure, Obama said in assessing his presidency. *idnes.cz* [online]. 11 April 2016 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/zahranicni/obama-hodnotil-selhani-libye-nejhors-i-a-nejlepsi-den.A160411_164456_zahranicni_rych

After the end of the military intervention, the NTC took control of Libya and its leaders were able to start establishing a new democratic state. Barack Obama gave a speech after Gaddafi's death, in which he spoke of the persistence of the USA, NATO and the Arab League in protecting Libyan civilians and helping the rebels take power. Barack Obama on the day Gaddafi died said: *"This is an important day in Libya's history. The dark shadow of tyranny has been lifted. And with this great promise, the Libyan people now have a great responsibility – to build an inclusive, tolerant and democratic Libya."*¹¹⁰

The hope associated with Gaddafi's death quickly faded. Instead of building up democratic ranks in the country, Libya immediately found itself in chaos, accompanied by infighting between different militias. Obama himself admitted that the United States had not sufficiently prepared the rebels to take over Libya.

One of the consequences of this fighting was the attack on the USA embassy building in the Libyan city of Benghazi. The attack took place in September 2012 and the US Ambassador Chris Stevens has been killed by the attackers. Chris Stevens had helped build partnerships with Libyan revolutionaries and assisted them in planning the organisation of the new Libya. After Gaddafi's death, Stevens, under Barack Obama, *"worked tirelessly to support this young democracy, and together with Hillary Clinton, we relied heavily on his knowledge of the situation in Libya."*¹¹¹ Barack Obama's statement on the death of the US Ambassador did not include any subsequent USA response to the attack, which Obama has been criticised for.

At the time the USA ambassador was killed, the CIA was conducting a covert mission in Libya, around which there were many question marks. One of the main questions

¹¹⁰ The White House. President Barack Obama. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya. *obamawhitehouse.archives.gov* [online]. 28 March 2011 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>

¹¹¹ The White House. President Barack Obama. Remarks by the President on the Deaths of US Embassy Staff in Libya. *obamawhitehouse.archives.gov* [online]. 12 September 2012 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya>

was whether the CIA had somehow contributed to the security failure in Benghazi.¹¹² Another was by whom and for what purpose the attack was carried out. While the Obama administration considered the attack to be the result of a spontaneous protest, Hilary Clinton blamed the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in her private emails.¹¹³ Although counterterrorism was not a primary objective in the Libyan conflict, it was an all-of-the-above strategy of the Obama administration that was not applied in Libya.

The situation of the Arab Spring has put the Obama administration in a difficult situation. If he continued to support the unpopular Gaddafi, he would alienate those who would come to power in the future. At the same time, siding with the rebels would mean the definitive end of cooperation with Libya if Gaddafi manages to survive. It follows that the Obama administration's decision was definitely not easy.

Economic and security interests in this case clearly contrast with the USA commitment to defend freedom and promote the development of democracy. In the end, the USA made the following decision. In 2011, the USA switched from supporting autocratic regimes in North Africa to supporting citizens and their demands. In doing so, it has seemingly moved from a policy of realism in international relations, supporting the rulers in Libya in the interests of mutual cooperation, to supporting idealism and the demands of citizens. The change in USA policy, which took place suddenly and was accompanied by hesitation, clearly shows the difficult decision-making situation of the Obama administration. The military intervention by the USA and other countries in Libya is evidence of an unwillingness to give up a privileged position in the region. Another explanation for the USA foreign policy in Libya is the theory of 'offshore balancing'.¹¹⁴ This is an attempt by the USA to create a balance between Eurasian states in order to prevent the emergence of another superpower, but at the same time avoid direct involvement in the country. These steps were taken by the Obama administration during the military intervention in Libya,

¹¹² The White House. President Barack Obama. Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi. *obamawhitehouse.archives.gov* [online]. 12 September 2012 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/statement-president-attack-benghazi>

¹¹³ STROBEL, Warren. In emails, Hillary's outside advisers pushed hawkish Afghan line. *reuters.com* [online]. 2 July 2015 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-clinton-emails-afghanistan-idUSKCN0PB67H20150701>

¹¹⁴ PAPE, R. Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, 2005, 30(1), pp. 7-45.

as the operation was secured by a UN Security Council resolution and was conducted under NATO control. After this bloody massacre, the United States can only fear another radical upheaval in the region and the threat of new Islamist groups.

The foreign policy of the other US presidents who have been in office after Barack Obama, namely Donald Trump and the current US President Joe Biden, has no relevance in the region. The Trump administration had no interest in Libya. The only thing that mattered to Trump was trying to support Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who at the time controlled two-thirds of the territory.¹¹⁵

The Trump administration was trying to achieve a reconciliation between the warring parties in Libyan politics on the surface. This was after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's call for a halt to the offensive against Tripoli by Libyan leader Khalifa Haftar (LNA). A more coherent USA policy reflected the growing concerns of Washington, D.C. The latter was concerned that a prolonged conflict on Libyan territory would improve Russia's chances of further entrenching itself in Libya. Based on these realities, the United States called for a cessation of hostilities and an end to the attack on Tripoli. Donald Trump was prompted to take this action by phone calls with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, who were staunch allies of Haftar, despite the UN arms embargo.¹¹⁶

Donald Trump's gesture was merely an attempt to get Haftar to agree to more oil exports to the USA, as Trump had it in his election manifesto that he would restrict Iranian oil exports. However, this has not happened, and the Trump administration has been unsuccessful. At that time, Russia became a major player in Libyan territory.¹¹⁷ Russian influence in Libya is growing by the day. Russia refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Libyan National Unity in Tripoli, which was formed with the support of the international

¹¹⁵ RUBIN, M. Why the Trump Administration Is Wrong on Libya. *aei.org* [online]. 5 August 2020 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/why-the-trump-administration-is-wrong-on-libya/>

¹¹⁶ Trump change U.S. policy toward Libya. This is why it matters. *washingtonpost.com* [online] 3 May 2019 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/03/trump-changed-us-policy-towards-libya-this-is-why-it-matters/>

¹¹⁷ GORDON, P. Trump's Support for Haftar Won't Help Libya. *foreignpolicy.com* [online] [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/24/trumps-support-for-haftar-wont-help-libya/>

communities, and since the USA had no interest in Libya at that time, Russia had a clear path to Libya.

The current President, Joe Biden, on the other hand, is pursuing a very different policy to that of his predecessor. This means that the United States is a more decisive partner that wants to move in the same direction as Europe. Since Biden took office, the US government officials have increasingly spoken out on Libya. In their statements, they have stressed the need to strengthen multilateralism and have emphasised the role of the UN and traditional European partners such as Germany. For years, US diplomats and officials have emphasised a political solution to the Libyan conflict but have not convinced or persuaded Libyans and their various patrons to move away from confrontation; perhaps now, under the new President, that will happen.¹¹⁸

The US Administration welcomed the election of the LPDF-initiated interim government of national unity and strongly recommended that the date for parliamentary elections set for 24 December 2021 be met (which it was not; elections have not yet been held).

Based on USA projections, the elections were to be followed by the destruction of compliance with the UN arms embargo and the withdrawal of all foreign policy towards Libya. USA Secretary of State Antony Blinken in October and called on all international actors to withdraw their fighters and mercenaries as soon as possible, and if the December elections were postponed, the government of the USA was urged to become more engaged in Libya.¹¹⁹

In this chapter, the foreign policies of the European Union and the United States in relation to Libya were presented. The intervention in Libya highlighted the different perceptions of conflict resolution through military means. The EU member states, together with the USA, had different perspectives on the threats and what was in their strategic interest. Only 14 states participated in the intervention in Libya under NATO auspices. The reason why NATO, not the EU, took command of the operation is primarily due to NATO's better preparedness for any international threat. Unlike the EU, NATO regularly

¹¹⁸ VOLK, T. Biden's Libya Policy. *kas.de* [online]. 28 April 2021 [viewed 11st October 2022]. Available from: <https://www.kas.de/en/country-reports/detail/-/content/biden-s-libya-policy>

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

prepares for various crises around the world and so has no problem intervening immediately if necessary. The EU has therefore shown itself to be lacking in crisis management capability and unable to act quickly. In addition, it has become apparent that the EU does not make decisions at such moments, but rather each state individually. Thus, individual states did not hesitate to act at their own discretion.

It was only when the states were leading the operation and gradually coming under NATO leadership that the European Union issued the Decision on the European Union Military Operation in Support of Humanitarian Aid in Response to the Crisis in Libya. This operation was solely concerned with supporting humanitarian organisations in Libya and ensuring the safe relocation of evacuees. Moreover, the launch of this operation was conditional on a request from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which did not do it.

However, the intervention in Libya was primarily an intervention by personalities who, in their own way, wanted to make a name for themselves in politics. Barack Obama and Hilary Clinton spoke for the USA, Nicolas Sarkozy for France, David Cameron for the UK, and German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle opposed the intervention. It was Germany's non-participation that was unexpected. This can be attributed to the domestic political scene and Germany's long-standing reluctance to intervene militarily. France has been the most active. It was the first to push for a no-fly zone, it recognised the Transitional National Government in Libya, it proposed the formation of the Libya Contact Group and French aircraft were the first to attack Gaddafi's defences. France was thus one of the few countries that did not want to hand over the leadership to NATO, as Sarkozy feared that this would slow down the operation and he would lose control. Another reason may have been France's return to the alliance's structures in 2009, and thus its still weak confidence in its organisational capabilities. It is also suspected that Sarkozy's quick reaction was linked to the 50 million dollars from Gaddafi to the presidential campaign.

Another country, the UK, was more in favour of intervention under NATO auspices. Indeed, Britain has long seen NATO as the bedrock of its security and has favoured its extensive experience in multinational missions. The United States has behaved

relatively surprisingly in this intervention. Washington D.C. was initially reluctant to intervene, and so it may have appeared that it was France that was drawing the U.S. into action this time. The United States took a more supportive role, providing mainly technical and electronic equipment. Obama has tried to make it clear that Libya is close to the EU and so this is a problem for European countries.

After the military intervention, Libya became a so-called failed state. This has fuelled terrorism, organised crime, and migration in the country. Gradually, a division of labour between the EU and the UN has been formulated. The USA then kept a low profile and did not get too involved in further activities in Libya. The UN took on the role of negotiator and developed the process of the support mission in Libya. The EU was mainly concerned with its migration problem. Considering the growing importance of migration issues in the European debate since 2015, it is not surprising that the EU has responded to this dynamic in a purely securitised manner. Three years later, unilateral, and often pro-conflicting interests and positions have been taken over by single member states. Tensions in the first 6 months of 2019 were exacerbated by the disputes between Italy and France. Indeed, each of these countries supports a different ruling party in Libya. In light of the changing conflict realities in the region, the EU does not seem to be fulfilling the expectations of support and peace and security in its own 'neighbourhood' through engagement, which has always been one of the key declarative behind-the-border objectives of the policy. What has been lacking, especially since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, is a comprehensive and coherent approach to dealing with conflict realities in the region, beyond the sometimes-limited tools of conflict prevention. These tools are now focused on promoting Libya's resilience and limiting the damage in Libya. If the EU wants to play a more significant role.

In this chapter of the thesis, the author set out to answer the following questions: *"What are the similarities and differences in the EU and USA approaches to Libya?"*, *"Do the positions of the two actors overlap, complement each other or are they fundamentally different?"*

To answer the first question, *"What are the similarities and differences between the EU and the USA approach to Libya?"* – the policies of the two actors differ. The EU is

only acting as an observer to the problems, whose role is only to impose sanctions. The European Union has not itself become involved in the war situation in Libya. It was only individual Member States that tried to do something. On the other hand, despite the fact that the USA initially shied away from the whole intervention, it eventually emerged as a strong ally, just as France and the UK wanted to see it. So, there are definitely differences in approach between these actors.

To answer the second question: *"Do the positions of the two actors overlap, are they complementary or are they fundamentally different?"* – in a way, the positions of the actors are complementary. At the beginning of the intervention, there was cooperation between the different states fighting under the NATO umbrella. On the other hand, after the Arab Spring, we see that the USA has begun to stand aside and to treat Libya as a problem for Europe. Now, the positions of the two actors are diverging. The European Union is trying, at least through strategic plans and financial support, to slow down the migratory wave and to support Libya on a humanitarian basis. However, there are still countries such as Italy and France, which are supporting individual governments in Libya and thus undermining the whole system of transition. Of course, they are not the only ones, which is why the transition to stability in the country is complex and time-consuming.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU AND THE USA BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

Table 1 – Summary of EU and USA foreign policy towards Libya

| The Events | | United Kingdom | France | Germany | USA |
|---|------------------------|----------------|--------|---------|-----|
| Intervention support | | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ |
| Sanctions | by the UN | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | by the EU | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Recognition of the Transitional National Council | | 15.7. | 10.3. | 15.7. | ✓ |
| Reaction to the use of violence and call for an end to it | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Speaking out in between. Organisations and international conferences on Libya | UN | | | ✓ | |
| | Contact group meetings | | | ✓ | |
| | G8 | | | ✗ | |
| | London Conference | | | ✓ | |
| UN resolutions | 1970 | | | | |
| | 1973 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | 2009 | | | | |
| Calls for the resignation of Gaddafi | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Provision of humanitarian aid | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Offer to establish EUFOR Libya | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Support for NATO missions | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Release of frozen assets | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Humanitarian aid after the Arab Spring | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Supporting the reduction of migration | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |

Conclusion

This master's thesis dealt with the foreign policy of the EU and the USA in relation to Libya and also with Libya itself. In the first chapter of the thesis, three theories of foreign policy were presented and then applied to the situation in Libya, and consequently to Muammar Gaddafi and the foreign policy of the two aforementioned actors. The second chapter of the thesis discussed the basic historical milestones of Libya and its modern history, i.e. the situation after the death of Gaddafi. This chapter introduced the basic historical framework of Libya, which was necessary for the third chapter of the thesis. The last chapter of the thesis discussed the foreign policy of the EU and the US before the Arab Spring, during the intervention and after the Arab Spring until the end of 2021.

The thesis had several sub-objectives. The first was to describe the key events of the Arab Spring in Libya. The second objective was to compare foreign policies of the EU and the USA towards the conflicts in Libya. The author of the thesis set several research questions in relation to these objectives:

1. *"What were the developments of the Arab Spring in Libya?"*.
2. *"What can define the similarities and differences in the EU and US approaches to Libya?"*.
3. *"Do the positions of the two actors overlap, complement each other, or are they fundamentally different?"*

The first objective of the thesis was fulfilled in the second chapter of the thesis, which dealt with the major events that took place in Libya. In this chapter, the author answered the first research question *"What were the developments of the Arab Spring in Libya?"*.

There were widespread protests in the country during the Arab Spring in Libya. Muammar Gaddafi tried to suppress these protests militarily, which led to the Libyan civil war and the regime was overthrown with the help of NATO and Gaddafi was killed in the fall of 2011. The overthrow of Gaddafi was supposed to bring greater political rights and civil liberties to Libyans. However, the country is significantly destabilised after the war. Society, in which tribalism persisted under Gaddafi, has completely disintegrated into

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many different factions. The fragmentation of society is also reflected in the composition of the legislature, which is largely made up of independent candidates. The post-revolutionary government has no control over the Libyan territory, and armed clashes between different groups continue in most places.

Chaos and unrest in the country are accompanied by an economic slump. Therefore, until the government succeeds in disarming the rebel groups and gaining full control of the entire territory, no calming of the situation can be expected. The Arab Spring in Libya has removed an authoritarian leader; however, it has not solved any of the long-term problems of the Libyan society. Given the continuing armed clashes, the government's inability to assert its authority throughout the territory and the deteriorating economic situation, the situation in Libya can be assessed as worse than before the outbreak of the Arab Spring. And the difficult transition to democracy and the first democratic elections are nowhere in sight.

The second objective of the thesis was met in the third chapter of the thesis, which answered two of the three research questions. The answer to the second question of the third chapter, *"What are the similarities and differences between the EU and the USA approach to Libya?"*. The policies of the two actors differ. The EU is only acting as an observer of the problems, whose role is only to impose sanctions. The European Union has not itself become involved in the war situation in Libya. It was only individual Member States that tried to do something. On the other hand, despite of the USA initially shied away from the whole intervention, it eventually emerged as a strong ally, just as France and the UK wanted to see it. So, there are definitely differences in approach between these actors.

The answer to the last research question: *"Do the positions of the two actors overlap, are they complementary or are they fundamentally different?"* In a way, the positions of the actors are complementary. At the beginning of the intervention, there was cooperation between the different states fighting under the NATO umbrella. On the other hand, after the Arab Spring, we see that the USA has begun to stand aside and to treat Libya as a problem for Europe. Now, the positions of the two actors are diverging. The European Union is trying, at least through strategic plans and financial support, to slow down

the migration wave and to support Libya on a humanitarian basis. On the other hand, there are still countries such as Italy and France, which are supporting individual governments in Libya and thus undermining the whole system of transition. Of course, they are not the only ones, which is why the transition to stability in the country is complex and time-consuming.

The work dealt with the view and assistance from the European Union and the USA towards Libya. It follows from the above that if the states do not find common ground on the situation in Libya and how to address these common concerns as a bloc, they risk the future of Libya in their own hands. And thus, external powers will indirectly decide on the security of the EU. However, a scenario in which a single external player such as Russia gains control of the region seems unlikely due to the relatively stable balance of alliances and the reliance of Libya's main power rivals on various foreign powers. The worst scenarios concerning the EU's main goal are the disruption of energy flows from Libya and the permanent failure of the Libyan state. Neither of these options is good. And we can only hope that all powers will always agree and none of the above will ever happen.

Foreign policy integration has not deepened much since its inception. Against this, in the case of the Arab Spring in Libya, we can see a clear effort by the actors under scrutiny to act together. In the vast majority of responses to the events of the Arab Spring in Libya, actors have acted together. They regularly consulted with their partner. However, the limits of the current, intergovernmental set-up became apparent when each EU Member State had a different view on the use of military instruments. Thus, in the current set-up, the EU can only be a strong global actor if all member states reach a consensus.

Over the last decade, the EU as a whole has not played the strong hand in foreign policy that it might have wished. This is particularly the case when it comes to dealing with crisis situations such as various armed conflicts. In the absence of at least partial supranationalisation of the CFSP, more than in the form of qualified majority voting, without the possibility of exercising the right of veto or at the minimum strengthening cooperation in the field of security and defence, the main actors in international affairs will be independent states, not the EU as a whole. However, it depends on the states and their

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determination to get involved in given situations. The European Union as a whole will then continue to play a secondary role as a passive actor, commenting on the actions of the various international communities but taking no action itself. The European Union's only instrument will be the institution of sanctions.

With every conflict, there is a situation where EU states would like the CFSP to be more effective, however, these states are not willing to take the steps that would make this possible. Thus, the hybrid, mainly intergovernmental set-up continues, within which it is irrelevant to criticise the fact that some states have a different view of a possible solution to others.

As the very involvement of states in a military operation under the auspices of NATO, led by the UK and France, has shown. Only some EU Member States were willing to get involved or support the conflict. For such a case, the institution of enhanced cooperation is precisely the appropriate instrument, where not all Member States need to be involved and yet the EU can act as a strong global player. In the event of military intervention, the necessary minimum number of participating EU Member States would be found, as it is the minimum number of EU Member States that would be involved in a military operation under the auspices of NATO.

If the EU wants to be an equal international partner to states like the USA or other superpowers, it will have to aspire to play a much bigger role in the field of foreign policy. A way forward might be to retain the veto right only when voting on the general direction of EU foreign policy in the European Council, but in the EU Council the veto right could be replaced by a blocking minority as a kind of insurance against qualified majority voting. This would replace today's unanimous voting.

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