

PALACKÝ UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Science

Department of International Development Studies

MASTER THESIS

**Expropriation of land in Latin America: its causes
and consequences in rural and urban development**

Supervisor: Mgr. Radovan Dluhý-Smith

Olomouc 2012

BSc. Mónica Michell AGUILAR LÓPEZ

I declare in lieu of oath that I wrote this thesis myself. All information derived from the work of others has been acknowledged in the text and a list of references is given.

Olomouc, 2012

.....

Signature

UNIVERZITA PALACKÉHO V OLOMOUCI

Přírodovědecká fakulta

Akademický rok: 2009/2010

ZADÁNÍ DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE

(PROJEKTU, UMĚLECKÉHO DÍLA, UMĚLECKÉHO VÝKONU)

Jméno a příjmení: **Monica Michell AGUILAR LÓPEZ**
Studijní program: **N1301 Geografie**
Studijní obor: **Mezinárodní rozvojová studia**
Název tématu: **Vyvlastnění pozemků v Latinské Americe: jeho příčiny
a následky v rozvoji venkova a měst.**
Zadávací katedra: **Katedra rozvojových studií**

Zásady pro vypracování:

The purpose of the thesis is to analyze the origin of this problem that basically is contributing that many people, specially farmers, leave their only form of sustenance. This is usually a problem not occurring only in rural areas, since also expropriation is part of urbanism, as many housing development is being carried and infrastructure for tourism is also being constructed in areas where indigenous people are living. With this research there will be also an analysis of the consequences in development for this region. As much as possible, interviews with indigenous and farmers in Honduras, Central America, will be held.

Rozsah grafických prací: dle potřeby
Rozsah pracovní zprávy: 20 - 25 tisíc slov
Forma zpracování diplomové práce: tištěná

Seznam odborné literatury:

Ruiz Mondragon, L; Angeles Sanchez, G. 2001. Guia de expropiación de bienes ejidales y comunales del Archivo General Agrario. Registro Agrario Nacional: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios superiores en antropología Social. México. Rendon Cano, J. 1986. Propiedad, tenencia y redistribución de tierras en la legislación de America Centra y México. FAO. Roma, Italia. Norton, R. 2004. Politica de Desarrollo Agricola: Conceptos y Principios. FAO. Roma, Italia. 591 p. Buckles, D. ed. 2000. Cultivar la paz: conflicto y colaboración en el manejo de los recursos natural es. Centro Internacional de investigaciones para el Desarrollo. Ottawa, Canada. 306 p. Banco Mundial. 1998. El Salvador: Rural development study. FUSADES (Fudacion Salvadorena para el Desarrollo Economico y Social. 227 p. FAO. 2007. Buena gobernanza en la tenencia y la administración de tierras. Roma, Italia. 72 p. Garcia, A. 2006. La estructura del atraso en America Latina: Hacia una teoría latinoamericana del desarrollo. Bogota, Colombia. Convenio Andres Bello. 412 p.

Vedoucí diplomové práce:


Mgr. Radovan Dluhy-Smitk
Katedra rozvojových studií

Datum zadání diplomové práce: 28. ledna 2010

Termín odevzdání diplomové práce: 13. května 2011

L.S.

Prof. RNDr. Juraj Ševčík, Ph.D.
děkan

Doc. RNDr. Pavel Nováček, CSc.
vedoucí katedry

V Olomouci dne 29. května 2010

Dedication

To my family &

To the farmers in Honduras, especially the ones living in the Bajo Aguán Valley, trusting that the conflict related to your lands will not oppress you anymore and will be over soon.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Mgr. Radovan Dluhý-Smith, who patiently revised the content and gave his valuable contribution for the completion of this work.

The achievement of this last chapter of my studies would not have been possible without the support of all the members of the Department of Development Studies of Palacký University at Olomouc, my friends in the Czech Republic and my family in Honduras. Thank you.

Abstrakt

Přestože vyvlastnění parcel připojených k pozemkové reformě mělo pomoci zemědělcům a farmářům bez půdy, historické pozadí a současná situace ukazuje opak. Vyvlastňování pro pozemkovou reformu se nepodařilo, protože byly favorizovány elity a zahraniční firmy. Přerozdělovací politiky, které daly během pozemkové reformy zemědělcům přístup k půdě, nebyly navíc doprovázeny vhodnými programy na venkově, přístupem k úvěrům nebo modernizací technologií. Cílem této práce je ukázat, že účel vyvlastňování parcel není vždy k prospěchu méně privilegovaných oblastí. Výklad je podporován teoretickým základem, který také demonstruje, že vyvlastňování existuje od dob kolonialismu až do současnosti. Na konci každé kapitoly je krátká analýza a je také stručně popsána odezva na zabírání půdy v Brazílii a Hondurasu. Jelikož bezpečný přístup k půdě vytváří bohatství a pomáhá snižovat chudobu, studie o vyvlastňování pozemků v Latinské Americe je důležitá k pochopení dopadů pozemkových reforem na rozvoj.

Klíčová slova: vyvlastnění parcel, pozemková reforma, držba půdy, diktatura, oligarchie, farmáři bez půdy, *hacienda*.

Abstract

Even though the expropriation of lands, connected to the land reform, aimed to help the landless farmers, the historical background and current issues shows the opposite. The expropriations for the land reform have failed because it has been favoring the elites and the foreign companies. Additionally, as the redistributive policies during land reform gave the farmers access to land, it was not accompanied by adequate rural programs, access to credit or modernization of technology. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the purpose of expropriating lands through land reform is not always favoring the less privileged sectors. The explanation is supported by a theoretical basis, which also demonstrates that expropriation has been since the colonialism until today. There is a brief analysis at the end of each chapter. Additionally, the repercussion of land expropriation in Brazil and Honduras is explained briefly. Because secure access to land generates wealth and helps reduce poverty. The study of the expropriation of lands in Latin America is relevant to understand its implication in development.

Keywords: land expropriation, land reform, land tenure, dictatorship, oligarchy, landless peasants, *hacienda*.

Resumen

A pesar de que la expropiación de tierras está relacionada con la reforma agraria y tenía como propósito el ayudar a los pequeños agricultores, el contexto histórico y los problemas actuales han demostrado lo contrario. Las expropiaciones de tierra han fracasado porque han favorecido a las élites y las compañías extranjeras. Además, durante la reforma agraria, las políticas de redistribución de tierras no estuvieron acompañadas por programas rurales adecuados, el acceso a créditos y la modernización de la tecnología. El objetivo de esta tesis es demostrar que la intención de expropiar las tierras a través de reformas agrarias no siempre favorece a los sectores menos privilegiados. La aclaración se apoya en una base teórica, la cual expone que la expropiación de tierras ha estado presente desde el colonialismo y sigue vigente hasta el día de hoy. También hay un breve análisis al final de cada capítulo. Adicionalmente, el impacto que la expropiación de tierras ha tenido en Brasil y en Honduras, es igualmente explicado brevemente. El asegurar que la población tendrá un acceso seguro a las tierras generará riqueza y ayudará a reducir la pobreza. El estudio de la expropiación de tierras en Latinoamérica es importante para comprender su repercusión en el desarrollo.

Palabras claves: expropiación de tierras, reforma agraria, tenencia de tierra, dictadura, oligarquía, campesinos sin tierra, *hacienda*.

Contents

List of abbreviations.....	1
Introduction.....	2
Objectives.....	5
Methodology.....	6
1. Why is land important for development?.....	8
2. Historical background of land tenure and expropriation in Latin America.....	11
2.1 Land tenure and land expropriation during the colonialism in Latin America.....	11
2.2 The origin of the <i>hacienda</i> during the colonialism.....	16
2.3 Land and independence movements in Latin America.....	21
2.4 Post-independence land tenure in Latin America.....	23
2.5 Land Tenure during the end of the nineteenth century in Latin America: The relation between land expropriation and the emergence of capitalism.....	27
3. Land tenure during the twentieth century: land reforms and its relation with land expropriation.....	33
4. Neoliberalist influence on land.....	40
5. Dictatorships and oligarchs: their role in land expropriation in Latin America.....	43
6. Analysis of the causes and consequences of the expropriation of lands in rural and urban areas Latin America.....	48
7. Brazil and land expropriation: an unsolved dilemma.....	57
8. The case of Bajo Aguán Valley in Honduras and the failure of land reform: the implication of land expropriation.....	62
Conclusions.....	65

List of References..... 66

List of abbreviations

CDM	United Nations' Clean Development Mechanism Program
CPRC	Chronic Poverty Research Centre
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FIAN	Food First Information and Network
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
INA	<i>Instituto Nacional Agrario</i> - Honduran National Agrarian Institute
INCRA	<i>Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária</i> - Agency for Land Reform
MST	<i>Movimento Sem Terra</i> - Brazil's Landless Rural Workers' Movement
MUCA	<i>Movimiento Unificado Campesino del Aguán</i> - Honduran Peasant Movement of Aguán
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Introduction

Land is the key component of wealth for rich and poor populations. It is an important source of political power and social prestige. Land represents one-half of the world's total economic wealth (Ling & Archer, 2005). By its income generation, land gives an access to education and healthcare in many countries worldwide (Barraclough, 1973; Ambaye, 2009).

By definition, land reform means the “redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm labourers” (Warriner, 1969 cited by Adams, 1995, 1). The Asian Development Bank (2007, 1), defines expropriation of land as “the compulsorily nationalizing land in the collective possession of peasants for public interests”. Public policies of Latin American governments concerning the access to land such as the land or agrarian reforms have been one of the most important and controversial ones. It has been partially due to the inheritance of unequal land ownership created during the colonial times (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2002). I will explain later in this work some of the colonial land ownership terms such as *latifundio*, *minifundio*, *hacienda*, *mita*, *repartimiento* and *encomienda*. Colonialism greatly contributed to the uneven land tenure, therefore, during the independence and post-independence times, the governments all over Latin America paid special attention to land assets. When the Latin American governments launched redistributive land reforms, to transfer land from large estates to landless or land-poor farmers, land ownership changed by transforming tenants into owners.

The objective of this dissertation is to focus on the land expropriation and to show that, in contrast to its traditional definition, these expropriations have not benefitted the landless. Instead, they reinforced the power of the conquerors and the governing elites formed during colonialism and post-colonialism. In addition, the expropriation of lands has had a big repercussion on the social and material conditions of urban areas as landless peasants have migrated to find an alternative to their difficult living conditions in the countryside.

My basic hypothesis is that the expropriation of lands favored oligarchy and foreign companies, leaving small farmers out of the development path. Why did not the good intentions of governments to relocate farmers to the land expropriated from large estates work out? One explanation might be that the strategies to improve the land access of the poor

through expropriation and land reforms have been expensive, contentious and nonviable in many countries (López & Valdés, 2000). Another reason might be that the attempt of expropriating large estates to transform them to small landholdings did not go hand in hand with other development tools. For example, the infrastructure, capital and education did not accompany the government policies and so as such did not decrease poverty. For instance, in Bolivia, the revolution in 1953 brought the distribution of *hacienda* lands to workers but programs to promote the efficient use of land by beneficiaries were not considered. Consequently, these farmers still live in poverty today. The same happened in Peru, where rural development programs did not accompany expropriation of *hacienda* lands (Albertus, 2010). Some of the consequences of such incomplete policies were the migration to big cities and other countries, or social unrest, and environmental problems.

First, I explain the historical background of the land tenure during colonialism and the land tenure during the post-colonial times. Then I continue with the land reform strategy during the twentieth century. I consider important to describe the land expropriation in Latin America during these periods to understand the current issues. I demonstrate my hypothesis on the Honduran and Brazilian examples of land reforms at the end of this document. These cases show that even if the land reforms are implemented in a country with the economic power of Brazil, it is still an unclear and expensive process. As the ex-president of Brazil said in an interview to BBC news in 2003, “We are committed to reform, but our government does not have enough money to buy as much land as we would like. Land reform will go ahead, not at the high speed demanded by the MST (*Movimento Sem Terra*), or at the slow pace hoped for by those against it (BBC News, 2003).” In Honduras, the land reform did not stop the process of increasing concentration of land ownership and still left many farmers landless. The landless peasants are now again claiming land to feed their families and to sustain their livelihoods (FIAN & La Vía Campesina, n.d.). These issues have derived a wave of protests and farmer movements, and violent reactions from the large landowners. The competent authorities have not been able to solve different issues related to land and in the Bajo Aguán Valley, they are planning to implement land expropriations of large estates as a solution to the conflict.

Finally, I consider land expropriations to be critical for the development of Latin American countries, but they need to be implemented fairly and effectively. De Janvry & Sadoulet

(2002, 1) state: “Expropriation based on the social functions of the land, the classical approach to land reform, remains an important option for many countries, but it should be pursued pro-actively to be effective”. Pro-actively means fairly, equally and progressively; its positive outputs will then boost real development in the countryside and urban areas.

Objectives

- Explain briefly the land tenure and land expropriation during the Colonialism in Latin America.
- Describe the relevant events of post-colonial land tenure and land expropriation in Latin America.
- Make a brief description of the history and relation between land reforms and expropriation of land in Latin America.
- Explain the general causes and consequences of expropriation of land in urban and rural areas.
- Finally, describe the impact of the of land expropriation in two Latin American countries.

Methodology

This paper is literature-based on the topic of expropriation of lands and land tenure in the Latin American region through the colonialism and post-colonialism, issues during the twentieth century and the influence of the governments and elites. At the end of each chapter has been included a brief analysis of the relevant events which supports the proposal that land expropriation due to land reforms has not benefited the landless or land-poor peasants throughout all Latin America. Hereby, it has been included literature mostly in English and Spanish. Some of the documents used come from case studies, individual researchers, researchers contributing to universities and NGOs, newspapers, magazines, scientific magazines, governmental and international reports, among them from the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization for the United Nations. The citations are done according to the sixth edition of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines. APA is an author-date citation system, separated by commas and included in parentheses. Each citation in the text is in the reference list. The publication date appears in parentheses, followed by a period and the abbreviation n.d. - no date, when no publication date is available. In the references, there is a list of alphabetized entries by author's surname or first word of group name.

The causes and consequences of the expropriation of lands in rural and urban areas are explained in a division of important factors of society. An explanation to demonstrate the interrelation of these factors for both rural and urban sectors is relevant for this part.

Additionally the case of Honduras in relation to the expropriation of lands and the conflicts generated by this processes are analyzed briefly, in base to recent articles that emerged from individual researchers, alternative journalists¹ and local newspapers. A personal communication is included during this part. The author through e-mails sent to the Advisor of the Minister-Director of INA (Honduran National Agrarian Institute) inquiring about the most severe impacts for the *campesinos* in the Bajo Aguán Valley and about how the situation has

¹ It is interesting how because of the media coverage which emerged from the coup of 2009 in Honduras, many international media is spreading news from the less favored sectors. Some of these are Aljazeera and The real news.

been after the 2009 coup in Honduras. Some of the inquiries were to explain how the problem has changed after the coup and what is the INA doing to help the farmers.

1. Why is land important for development?

Effective control over productive resources, especially land, by the rural poor is crucial to their capacity to construct a rural livelihood and overcome poverty. This is because in many agrarian settings a significant portion of the income of the rural poor still comes from farming, despite the diversification processes of means of subsistence that occurred in different places over time (Borras Jr., Kay & Akram Lodhi, 2007). Hence, the lack of access to land is strongly related to poverty and inequality.

According to Levine (2005), private property rights are essential for personal welfare and economic development. The protection of property rights should be a balance of an active government that implements property rights, because this makes easier private contracting, and applies the law in a fair way to all, then the governments are sufficiently forced not to involve in coercion and expropriation. Dollar & Kraay (2000) from the World Bank have stated that property rights are essential for growth and consequently, for the protection of the poor. Income inequality in Latin America is among the highest in the world (second only to Sub-Saharan Africa). It can be traceable historically to the unequal distribution of property, as the majority of the population could not participate in the process of economic growth (Goñi, López & Servén, 2008). Governmental policies can affect the distribution of assets, either through direct redistribution, such as land reform² or privatization processes. The patterns of access to land are probably the most important factor determining the distribution of income and wealth in rural areas (Öberg, 2007).

Land tenure³ is fundamental to agricultural production, ecological balance, poverty alleviation and it secures the livelihood of different households (Kirk, Löffler & Zimmermann, 2005). The land is also central to culture and identity for millions across the developing world and

² Land reform: as the rectification of the whole system of agriculture. It is normally done by the government where they redistribute the agricultural land among the farmers of the country (Economy Watch, 2010).

³ Land tenure: is the relationship, whether legally or traditionally defined between people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land (FAO, 2002).

large-scale land acquisitions can have lasting repercussions for the future of agriculture, including both agribusiness and family farming⁴ (Cotula, 2010).

Property rights are the core of any lucrative activity, but its productivity depends on secure private property rights. Moreover, only in a system of clearly stated private property rights can prices ensure economic efficiency (Heitger, 2003).

Birdsall and Londoño (1997) state that “Initial inequalities in the distribution of land and human capital have a clear negative effect on economic growth, and the effects are almost twice as great for the poor in the population as a whole. Assets as property rights, land reform, and access of the poor in legal systems and credit, and fair competition are critical to opening up opportunities in previously unequal societies and to eliminate the hidden privileges in asset markets historically enjoyed by the rich”. Even if conceding of tenure rights signifies an important achievement for many communities, in practice the new statutory rights do not immediately turn into rights. There are still challenges to convert rights into benefits: conflicts with other resource claimants; the lack of success of the state to warrant the land tenure right appropriately or defend it efficiently; problems with local governmental organizations; obstacles to community engagement with markets among others (Larson, Cronkleton, Barry, & Pacheco, 2008). Despite that world population is nowadays having an urban majority (in 2008, for the first time, half of the world’s population is living in urban areas); people in rural areas are still facing different challenges regarding land tenure. It is therefore not altogether surprising that the World Bank’s 2006 *World Development Report* that focuses on the question of equity has underscored the importance of land access. However, policy discussions around the Millennium Development Goals are yet to systematically and significantly include the issue of wealth and power redistribution in the rural areas, i.e. agrarian reform, especially in a situation where majority of the world’s poor are rural poor (CPRC, 2005).

Land reform is connected to the issues of efficiency (inequality as an obstacle to faster growth); equity (the *latifundio-minifundio* dualism and the governing elites); poverty (in spite

⁴ Family farm: A farm operated primarily with family labor, with some hiring in or hiring out of labor (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

of high urbanization, rural poverty still dominates in different countries); racial tensions (the demand of ancestral territories by indigenous groups) (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2002).

Land is essential today and will be in the future. Many of the properties that are being used for the supply of food (due to the population growth) and crops for biofuels are in countries where property rights are not clear, weak or poorly governed (World Bank; IFAD; FAO; UNCTAD, 2010). If the rights on farms, pastures, forests and other properties are not clear, then there is a high risk of loss livelihoods and considerable numbers of displaced people (Landesa, 2011). Land is crucial for the livelihoods of many farmers and is the basis on which industries, businesses, and therefore societies are formed. Then, how is expropriating relevant to land tenure and therefore for development? I attempt to answer this question in the following pages.

2. Historical background of land tenure and expropriation in Latin America

How has the land tenure and expropriation being different through the colonial and post-colonial (independent) era in Latin America? Many authors assume that the inequality in the former Spanish colonies of America is rooted in institutions based on an intensive extraction of natural resources through *encomiendas*, *repartimientos*, *haciendas*, among other systems (Dobado González & García Montero, 2010). However, after independence in the Latin American countries, exploitation of land continued, probably in a more intensive way and the agro-export led economy consolidated during this period. Land expropriation was relevant during both periods, and is explained in the following chapters.

2.1 Land tenure and land expropriation during the colonialism in Latin America

During the Pre-Columbian times, there were already systems of Indian land tenure. As Barton (1997) explains, the shared and productive units of non-Incan societies in the Andes, the *ayllu*, were grouped under a local official or *kuraka*. This institution called *mita*⁵ was based on an exchange of labour on the *kuraka's* land for a part of the agricultural production and military protection. In these lands, infrastructural projects as irrigation systems or hillside terraces were developed. The *mita* helped to expand the Inca's Empire and to maintain the redistribution of production (Barton, 1997). The Aztecs had also a property regime, which was very similar to the Spanish one (Gomez, 1985). All Aztecs possessed land and this was distributed among the families according to their needs; the land was returned at death to the community. However, this policy changed through the time; the lands began to accumulate anticipating what would be the *latifundio* in Mexico⁶. In the New World, the Aztec and Inca Empires were already very hierarchical, which made easier authoritarian forms of governance (Horowitz ed., 2005).

⁵ The word *mita* is derived from the Quechua *mit'a*. Mita in the Inca Empire was a labor system of mandatory public service to the government—a tribute in the form of labor (Savoy, 2011).

⁶ Ankersen & Ruppert (2006).

By 1492 the Catholic Monarchs with Christopher Columbus, claimed that any lands discovered by Columbus would become property of the sovereign rulers of Spain (Johansen & Pritzker, 2008). To extend its empire to to the New World, Spain needed to conquer the native people. This required a large number of *conquistadores* for the dangerous sea expedition. The Crown shared a contract with the *caudillos*⁷, leaders of conquests, specifying his revenues (usually 80 percent) and the geographical regions over which he had authority (Yeager, 1995). The typical *conquistador*⁸ came to the New World with the promise to obtain valuable minerals. According to Moreno & Ventosa (2010), the conquerors were soldiers; many of them had fought against the Moors. The leaders rose from the *hidalgos*⁹ and saw the conquest as a chance of making wealth. Merchants provided funds for the Conquest who previewed it as an economic investment to increase as much as possible their fortune.

Hernán Cortés discovered today's Mexico in 1519. By middle of the sixteenth century, the indigenous population was completely subordinated to the conquerors who named their new possession “New Spain” (Bowser, 1995). Based on utopian ideas of the Franciscans, Puebla de los Ángeles was founded by the *audiencia*¹⁰ as a “model of a Spanish town” in the newly discovered lands. Here they were supposedly “to create fields and farms as they do in Spain” where “Christians give an example to the Indians of Christianity and of work as in Spain” (Motolinía, 1971, 263). The expansion of Spanish landholdings where livestock was introduced threatened important crops such as maize and beans vital for the natives' diet (Prem, 1992). According to MacLeod (2008), in Central America, the Indian population declined more rapidly than the European did, while the livestock grew much faster, causing hunger and death.

⁷ The term *caudillo* can also be related in our days to different interpretations of authoritarianism in Latin America (Horowitz ed., 2005).

⁸ A conqueror, especially one of the 16th-century Spanish soldiers who defeated the Indian civilizations of Mexico, Central America, or Peru (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2003).

⁹ Hidalgo: a member of the lower nobility in Spain (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2003).

¹⁰ *Audiencia*, literally audience in Spanish, was originally a court of judicial review, but it soon acquired authority to govern colonies (Kirkwood, 2010).

With the European colonization¹¹, the Spaniards also brought a tribute system of forced labor called the *encomienda*¹². An *encomienda* “was a mean of giving to a Spaniard a restricted set of property rights over Indian labor by the Crown” (Yeager, 1995, 843). Tan (1987) explains that even if the *encomienda* was not a land grant¹³ *per se*, it was still, a system of land distribution¹⁴ that brought greater benefits to the colonizers and officials involved. The *encomendero* extracted tributes from the Indians in form of goods and labor (Yeager, 1995). Many Indian communities “were divided into territorial *doctrinas* or parishes¹⁵ with its own priest and church building where Indians were instructed about the Christian faith” (Calero, 1997, 67). However, within time the *encomienda* became “a subterfuge¹⁶ for slavery where abuses in its application contributed so much to the destruction of the native population” (Chamberlain, 1954, 240). The sixteenth century proverb, *sin indios no hay Indias*, “without Indians, there are no Indies”-in reference to the Spanish America, gives emphasis to the fact that without exploitation to the natives, the Indies would not be anymore a source of wealth and social status (Arora, 1995). The *encomenderos* saw themselves as the ones in charge almost to the point of nobility, because the position of *encomendero* had become a valued one due to the tributes the Indians paid (Calero, 1997).

The *conquistadores* colonized an area and created cities becoming city dwellers. After the founding of a city, the town council (*cabildo*¹⁷) continued to reward settlers with land grants (Mountain Research and Development, 1984). There were different kinds of land grants:

¹¹ The colonialism was divided in four Spanish American Viceroyalties of New Spain, Peru, New Granada (established in 1739), and the Rio de la Plata (1776), plus the loosely organized Portuguese American authority in Rio de Janeiro, with the various provincial captaincies (Hamnett, 1997).

¹² *Encomienda* originates from the Spanish verb *encomendar*, “to entrust”.

¹³ Land grant: A government grant of public land for a railroad, highway, or state college. (The American Heritage Dictionary, 2011).

¹⁴ Land distribution: is the division of the asset among individuals to fulfill different interests.

¹⁵ Parish: an administrative part of a diocese that has its own church in the Anglican, Roman Catholic, and some other churches (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2003).

¹⁶ Subterfuge: a trick or deception used in order to achieve one's goal (Wordreference.com, 2011).

¹⁷ *Cabildo*: the fundamental unit of local government in colonial Spanish America. Conforming to a tradition going back to the Romans, the Spaniards considered the city to be of paramount importance, with the surrounding countryside directly subordinate to it. In local affairs each municipality in Hispanic America was governed by its *cabildo*, or council, in a manner reminiscent of Castilian towns in the late Middle Ages (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc.Web , 2011).

“First, there were urban plots (*solar*¹⁸) which in the beginning were one-fourth of a city block. Second, there were grants for vegetable gardens and fruit orchards in areas surrounding the city (*chacaras* or *chacras*¹⁹), and finally there were land grants for farming and ranching that constituted very large tracts in areas away from the city and outside the irrigated areas that in the end developed into *latifundios*” (Mountain Research and Development, 1984, 140).

Agriculture and consequently land, symbolized a lot to the elites. However, there was a great amount of land idle. There were many types of land tenure, “as the *conquistadores* distributed rural lands to cavalry (*caballerías*) and foot soldiers (*peonías*, about twenty percent of the amount given to cavalry)” (Mabry, 2011, 106). Also existed “the *baldío*, a public vacant land and *realongo*, a vacant royal land and a *merced*, which was an endowment sometimes for use and occasionally for ownership” (Mabry, 2011, 106).

By the first century of the Spanish arrival, approximately three quarters of the Andean indigenous population died because of European diseases, the struggles of conquest, the expropriation of lands, labor and production, and the atrocious conditions of slavery (Mecham, 2001). Since the end of the sixteenth century, Spaniards started the process of expropriation of lands that previously belonged to the indigenous societies in Puna de Jujuy and in Raya del Tucumán, Argentina. These lands were allocated through “*mercedes reales*”, granted by local colonial authorities to the *conquistadores* as a reward (Albeck & Palomeque, 2009). In Guatemala, the indigenous groups were dispossessed of their land since the early colonialism. The land policies of the late 1800s pretended to decrease the land available to subsistence farming, expanding the availability of a low-wage labor force. The expropriation of indigenous communal lands helped to create rural unemployment by forcing families into marginal localities or leaving them without access to adequate land (Avivara, 2011). The colonial regime, was based in the indiscriminate expropriation of indigenous lands and incorporation of subordination and exploitation of indigenous populations as “as tribute-paying, laboring and Christian subjects” (Eiss, 2011). A good reflection of this is the *repartimiento* (distribution in English) *de indios*, which was the forced labor of indigenous people in the Spanish colonial system in which each Indian village paid a quota of its tributary population for specified periods and fixed wages (Lusk, 2011). The difference between

¹⁸ *Solar*: a noble house or a plot.

¹⁹ Slash-and-burn fields were called *chacras* or *chácaras* during the colonial period and are now referred to as *chacos* (Denevan, 1966).

encomienda and *repartimiento* is that the first is land given to individuals by the Spanish Crown while the latter means the distribution of the labor force, the Indians. These two terms were used interchangeably until the passing of the New Laws in 1542 (Lusk, 2011).

In general, any kind of *repartimiento* was often presented as a model of an extremely abusive institution. Chance (1989), stated that Indians were granted a credit to buy items they neither needed nor wanted, but this became a common practice and when the Indians were not able to pay, the merchant would take whichever personal property they wanted. It was more a “resemblance of robbery than commerce” (Chance, 1989, 97). Nevertheless, and according to some authors (Pietschmann, 1988 & Ouweneel, 1996), the *repartimiento* operated as a valuable system of trade integrating rural Mexicans into the market economy.

Undoubtedly, the Indians were maltreated during the Spanish colonialism. The Crown tried to intervene in the maltreatment of the Indians, but also others defended the Indians as Bishop Bartolomé de Las Casas²⁰ (Moses, 1898 cited by Busbin, 2011). His ideas and proposals were very revolutionary. He advocated the abolishment of the *encomiendas* and requested relief and liberation for the Indians (Moses, 1898 cited by Busbin, 2011). For many Spaniards the idea of trying to abolish the *encomienda* system was devastating because they were worried that their profits would be diminished and a decline in the value of their lands, both of which would be unfavorable to their substantial lifestyles (Simpson, 1950). Created to ensure a more equitable treatment for the Indians, the New Laws²¹ caused disapprobation and headed to several revolts against Crown rule. This was the Crown’s answer to the corrupt *encomienda* system and a way of keeping the labor force alive (Arora, 1995). The old *encomienda* system continued to exist in Spanish America even after the New Laws were instituted (Yeager

²⁰ “The Dominican bishop Antonio de Valdivieso of Nicaragua, who had tried to enforce the abolition of indigenous slavery by the New Laws, was assassinated in 1550 by a group of men led by the governor’s son. These and other courageous defenders of indigenas like Bishop Juan del Valle in Colombia and Fray Domingo de Santo Tomás in Peru, may be regarded as forerunners of today’s progressive current in the Catholic Church” (Keen & Haynes, 2009, 102).

²¹ The New Laws in 1542 were promulgated after long-continued efforts of Bartolomé de las Casas provided that “the natives were freed from personal service and the *encomenderos* were left in the enjoyment of a moderate tribute only” (Means, 1920, 512). Despite the New Laws were often transgressed -forbidding Indian slavery and the regulation of tribute-, they in general improved the manner of treating the Indians in the sense that the result of conquest of South America was not a demographic disaster as it happened in the Caribbean or in Central America (Newson, 1985). Under the *repartimiento* policies of the New Laws, the Indians were to earn a wage. The Laws of Burgos enacted in 1512-1513 failed to limit abuses of forced Indian labor. Encouraged by this failure, Las Casas and other reformers pushed for the enactment of the New Laws of the Indies for the Good Treatment and Preservation of the Indians in 1542 to abolish steadily the *encomienda* system (Arora, 1995).

1995). According to Prem (1992), the New Laws –or *Leyes Nuevas* enforced a long list of restrictions to the *encomenderos*, as it was forbidden to own pastures inside their *encomienda* territory; but ownership of agricultural land was not controlled and consequently possible. The *encomenderos*, as the most powerful persons of the early colonialism and as the beneficiaries of tribute, were the first to get smallholdings and practice agriculture (Lockhart 1969).

In Spanish America, the Crown monopolized the vast sources of unoccupied land and restricted the land market (Frankema, 2010). The corporatist²² structure of colonial governance intended to balance the interests of the church, the army and the land owning elites and raise the dependency of these parties on the supreme authority of the Crown (Frankema, 2010). The Spanish and Portuguese colonial administration intentionally redistributed land from indigenous small landowners to the *creole* elite (Frankema, 2010). The church was predominant in the cities and towns, serving the ruling class (e.g. in schools) and had the privilege to possess land (Hillar, 1993). Eventually, the church joined to the Crown against the movements for independence (Dussell, 1981).

As we could see during this chapter, land was distributed entirely according to the interests of the *conquistadores*. Different systems, especially the *encomienda* imposed subterfuge and the indigenous were the most affected as the indiscriminate expropriation extended as an unfair practice, in order to generate wealth for the newcomers, the Spaniards. The colonial administration and the land tenure system were the basis of the *hacienda*.

2.2 The origin of the *hacienda* during the colonialism

The evolution of the *encomienda* into the *hacienda* seems to be paradoxical, as some authors argue that there is no connection between both institutions. For example, Lockhart (1969) writes that at the beginning of the last century, some scholars assumed, quite logically, that *haciendas* emerged from *encomienda*. Although, some authors say that this statement is false. Lockhart (1969, 1), states that “the *encomienda* had no juridical connection with land, and as time passed, it grew weaker rather than stronger”.²³ Lockhart (1969), also explains that

²² Corporatism: the control of a state or organization by large interest groups (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2003).

²³ See: Silvio Zavala, *La encomienda indiana* (Madrid, 1935); Lesley B. Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain: The Beginning of Spanish Mexico* (Berkeley, 1966), and *Studies in the Administration of the Indians of New Spain* (4 vols., Berkeley, 1934-40).

scholastic opinion has tended to insist more on the separation than on the connection: men concerned with the degree of legal concepts and procedures perceive that little tendency to attempt for any connection between a governmental, tribute-collecting institution, the *encomienda*, and a private, land-owning institution like the *hacienda*.

On the other hand, contemporary authors like Savoy (2011) state that the *haciendas* developed from the sixteenth-century *encomienda* system by which conquerors-called *adelantados*²⁴ had the right to become governors and justices (*alcaldes*–mayor in English) of the specific regions they were in charge to conquer. Savoy continues, “The *encomienda* was fundamental to support the agricultural, industrial, mining, and public works activities of the conquerors, which were given the right to extract tribute from peasants”, but he remarks that they were not necessarily granted title of the land to which they were assigned. Not until 1720 did Spain legally ended the *encomienda* system, its successor was the *hacienda*, large landholdings originally granted by the Crown to the *conquistadores* (Savoy, 2011). As the number of natives declined because of disease and under the cruel conditions of the *encomiendas*, and as mining activities were replaced by agricultural activities in the seventeenth century, the *hacienda* arose because land possession became more profitable than acquisition of labor force (Tindall & Shi, 1984). “The *encomienda* serf became a peon and the *encomendero* a *hacienda* owner” (Galeano, 1973, 46).

Savoy (2011), explains that the coastal plantations within *haciendas* were more commercialized, producing commodities for urban markets or for export. In the *haciendas* were cultivated sugar, cacao, cochineal, and indigo, which as they increased their value greater demand for labor control appeared. Furthermore, in the nineteenth century the crop growing on a large scale required a continuous and cheap labor supply (Savoy, 2011). Even if the land was given to prominent citizens, by 1910 the policies largely displaced Indian-small holdings and were replaced by *haciendas* owned by European descendants (Prem, 1992). As

²⁴ *Adelantado*: Men who served in frontier regions and who were primarily military commanders. In the conquest of the Canaries and the New World, the crown granted certain men the title of *adelantado*. This title gave the authority to make *repartimientos* (divisions) of booty and offices and subsequently appointed some of them to the governorship of the islands they pacified. The *adelantado* not only held the military title of captain general; as governor and chief magistrate he exercised civil authority over his won men, and, when after a successful undertaking the expedition of conquest became an expedition of occupation, he assumed the governance of the indigenous population. His captains became his political subordinates, and when the conquerors founded towns they became *vecinos* and *ciudadanos*, that is, political persons (Texas A&M, 2011).

consequence, the *hacendado* system throughout all Latin America is a result of the different processes related with land since the conquest.

As the system spreaded its feudal character hardened. The personal power of the *encomendero* gradually became tied to the ownership of large estate and this created the *latifundio* (Lambert, 1967). Additionally, the discovery of mines and the progress of colonization, implied the necessity of counting with supplies that were produced in the Central region of Mexico, which in many cases led to the forced dispossession of the Indian's land either idle or cultivated, which also explains the origin of the *latifundios* (SRA, 2011).

As the *Creoles* permanently settled in America, they acquired estates for themselves and the *encomienda* increasingly turned into a form of feudal enslavement. Slavery and the *encomienda* had similar consequences and affected the status of agricultural workers in the same way. As a general rule, all those who worked on the land were subject to forced labor during the colonial era (Lambert, 1967). Even after independence *latifundios* continued to grow, until not long ago when work in the urban areas became available (Lambert, 1967). Ayala Mora (2008) explains that the crisis of the seventeenth century in Europe brought many historical transformations. One important was the recession of the textile industry, which allowed the agricultural farming to develop and consolidate the *latifundio* as the axis of the economic system at that time. Subsequently, the *haciendas* spread and integrated larger amounts of workers within their territories. The need of paying tribute, made the Indians to work more for the owners of the *haciendas* than they did in the *mita*, which was the stem for the *concertaje*²⁵.

The *latifundio* concept has important sociological implications. Giner & Sevilla (1977) defined *latifundios* as “a largely agrarian exploitation which, being a component of a peasant community produces upon it a local mode of class domination. . . ”. The *latifundios* and its characteristics changed through time. According to Mellafe (2004), there were four phases of the development of *latifundios*:

²⁵*Concertaje*: was a system of contracted debt held by Indian laborers (*conciertos*) to a landowner under threat of prison. The *conciertos* had access to a small piece of land in exchange for their labor, and their children inherited debt. The Indian laborers became property of the landlord and would be purchased and sold together with the *hacienda*. This system was banned in 1918, but continued in the *huasipungo* system (Becker, 2008; Zambrano, 2011). The *concertaje* was a way to guarantee the stay of the natives living in the *haciendas* (See Ankersen & Ruppert, 2006).

“*Prelatifundio* or agricultural frontier is described as the land given to the newcomers from Europe, which was worth little and indeed its “production accessories” like the cattle, Indians, slaves (except tribute) were more valuable. This stage lasted 50 years with an intense acculturation and agricultural trials along with a high control of the state over the possession of land; the technology used is rather primitive and tropical monocultures surged. The *ancient latifundio* became during the first half of the seventeenth century, where there is a notable scarcity of work force, because of the decline of the native population. The agricultural, commercial and mine sector became more clearly defined and many communities turned out to be self-sufficient. Resources used are more efficiently but still the markets work poorly. The connection of rationalization, technology and productivity become narrower in the second half of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, with the stage called *traditional latifundio*. During this stage, there is a higher access to credit, along with an accelerated increase of the population; larger markets bring new monopolies: winemakers, buyers, shippers and truckers. The church becomes truly usurious and the estates experienced a dull old struggle for labor with the miners. However, perhaps unique is the fight that took place between the mature estates and the state bureaucracy. The new concept of the rule of enlightened despotism implemented through a series of "reforms" militarily efficient and becomes attached to the state bureaucracy. It now wants to effectively exercise the power and, among other things, manage the countryside, as an alternative production potential and submissive colonial set. The traditional estates achieved full maturity and dominating the obstacles opposed to the control of the countryside in all its forms, we refer to the basis of the *modern latifundio*. The most important elements of this group of landowners, is the shaping of what will be afterwards the national aristocracy, as can be inferred from what we say, social class would be much more "younger" than traditionally believed. At this point in the evolution of land estates has a very different meaning than two centuries earlier. Now you can produce and has value in itself, it is fair to say that the possession of the land gives power and prestige. Historically, landlordism is a sole proprietorship, relatively large, which is an economic and social unit with some degree of rationalization of production and tends to be exclusive with respect to the distribution and use of productive agricultural resources. In these cases the group of landowners, as a class, show also a kind of internal stratification, which is expressed not only in their economic relations, but also its social and political behavior”.

Today, *latifundios* are only found in Latin America (Kuhnen & Muller, 1982). These authors also argue that the most extensive dispersion of the *latifundia* is the *hacienda* (or *fazenda* in portuguese), which originated during the Spanish Colonialism through land grants with a supply of forced labor for military services. The *hacienda* attempts to be self-sufficient, centered upon the “patron” or *hacendado*, where several forms of labour organization and land utilization coexist. Every unit of the *hacienda* is tied together to others. The patron gives employment and provides as well with schooling, medical aid and other benefits. The large landlords are part of the elite, which has a large influence on the government. A change in the government, in many countries of Latin America, means that another family takes over. It is hardly possible to break out of the system as there is nowhere else to find work. The coexistence of *latifundio* and *minifundio* (marginal farms), abundance and destitution, is hardly as marked in any agrarian system as this case (Kuhnen & Muller, 1982).

On the other hand, Edelman (1992, 1,2), sees the *latifundios* as a large nonproductive piece of land, which underutilization has harmful impacts on Latin America’s development. The author expresses that “few students of large estate systems consider contemporary *latifundismo* anything other than a vestige of an earlier age. Virtually all agree that large unproductive estates ought to have given way by now to modern capitalist farms”. The resulting land tenure structure in Latin America has been of landowners sitting on large extensions of land, while the majority of the rural population farms have very small parcels that are forced to use their labor to gain access to more land (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Melmed-Sanjak, 1999).

According to Nelson (2003), the familiar Latin American dual terms of *latifundio* and *minifundios*²⁶ have been rather modified recently. While the number of small parcels continues to expand as would be projected in the traditional *latifundio/minifundio* complex, the number of large holdings – those over 500 hectares – has been reduced (Thorpe 2002, 111 quoted by Nelson, 2003). However this does not necessarily suggest that land distribution is more egalitarian.

²⁶ While “*minifundio*” means exactly a very small or minimal agricultural unit (very often 0,5 – 1,0 ha or even less), “*surcofundio*” is a linguistic innovation made to explain what an extreme minifundio is; the word “surco”, means “furrow” (Slunge & Jaldin, 2007, 8).

Keen & Haynes (2009), state that many authors will agree that the colonial economy had a mix of feudal, capitalist and the Pre-Columbian systems of land tenure. These factors facilitated the Spanish Crown to maintain direct control over native labor and to keep their own landowning system, in order to allocate strategically the colonial elite according to its personal interests. The Spanish agricultural sector expanded, but the collective landowning system was affected negatively (Keen & Haynes, 2009).

As it was referred in this chapter, the origin of *haciendas* seems paradoxical. Some authors will say that it originated from the *encomiendas*. But certainly *hacienda* continued growing as the *latifundio/minifundio* complex reinforced, and with it, the large landholdings established monoculture plantations requiring large amounts of cheap labor. *Latifundios* were the foundation of the economy at that time, hence, the *haciendas* later spreaded and integrated larger amounts of cheap labor, and with it the exploitation and expropriation of the Indian's land. *Haciendas* did any good to its economy, their impact in the Latin American region was and still is harmful.

2.3 Land and independence movements in Latin America

The independence brought a dissolution of the Spanish imperial ties and established a neo-colonial oligarchy led by the *creole*²⁷ elites and their connection with European and American merchants (Barton, 1997). At the same time that *mita* and *encomienda* systems slowly weakened during the nineteenth century and new systems of social subjugation emerged (Barton, 1997). Even though the *cabildo* was considered an inefficient entity, it was the only political institution in which the *creoles* were largely represented and played an important role in the coming nineteenth-century struggles for independence (Keen & Haynes, 2009).

Creoles in the militia saw that *peninsulares*²⁸ had better advantages in general. That explains why the *creoles* were leaders of independence movements (Mabry, 2011). The men who led the independence of 1810 were “mainly part of the bourgeois social extraction and large landowners, wealthy merchants” (Sáenz, 1999, 142). “An intense republican rebellion

²⁷ *Creole*: a descendant of European settlers in the Caribbean or Central or South America (WordReference.com, 2011).

²⁸ *Peninsular*: Someone born on the Iberian Peninsula, generally originating in Spain and Portugal (Marquez & Ramos Navarro, 1998).

occurred in the main Venezuelan port, La Guaira, in 1797, led by Manuel Gual and Jose Maria Espafia, with considerable lower-class support. The leaders, inspired on the 1789 proclaim of Rights of Man on the French Revolutionary model, demanded the establishment of an independent state consisting of the four provinces of Caracas, Maracaibo, Cumaná and Guayana” (Hamnett, 1997, 289). Another crucial factor on the discontent was the independence of the British colonies, now United States (Kirkwood, 2010). In Central America, the fail of the political union led to the ultimate founding of separate, independent states after 1840, in disagreement to the traditional primacy of Guatemala City (Hamnett, 1997).

Padilla (1994), argues that even if Latin American independence movement of the nineteenth century tried to split up from colonialism, the new dominant European oligarchy had strong dominance over native and African communities through *latifundios* and other similar institutions. Throughout the twentieth century social struggles which intended to depose the traditional elite simply gave rise to a middle class with limited mobility that endured the subordination model. This middle class, later became mediator with the majority of people remaining in poverty as the foundation of the new world economic system (Furtado 1964, 1965, 1976, cited by Padilla, 1994). “Landowners and businessmen increased their fortunes while poverty grew among the masses” (Galeano, 1973, 115).

Much of the permanence of the Spanish rule was thanks to the Crown’s policy of making large concessions to maintain the loyalty of local elites (Keen & Haynes, 2009). The exploitative laws, the *composiciones* (settlements that legalized usurpation of native lands through payment of a fee to the king, also mentioned as the New World’s first attempt at land reform), the acceptance of exploitation by oligarchs are some examples of the policy (Keen & Haynes, 2009; Ankersen & Ruppert, 2006). Independence, after a long time was accomplished by 1825²⁹ and is seen as the most relevant episode of the nineteenth-century Latin American economic history (De la Escosura, 2009).

²⁹ Cuba and Puerto Rico remained Spanish colonies until 1898. De la Escosura (2009), recommends to see other related researches: Bulmer-Thomas, V. *The Economic History of Latin America since Independence* (Cambridge, 2003); Coatsworth, J.H., “Notes on the Comparative Economic History of Latin America and the United States”, in Walther L. Bernecker and Hans W. Tobler (eds.), *Development and Underdevelopment in America: Contrasts in Economic Growth in North America and Latin America in Historical Perspective* (New York, 1993).

By 1894, the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos in Mexico, stated that a parcel of land without legal title was vacant land, opening the door to expropriation of untitled lands cultivated by indigenous villages and other small landholders. If they offered armed resistance, troops were sent against them and sold the defeated rebels like slaves to labor on henequen plantations in Yucatán or sugar farms in Cuba (Keen & Haynes, 2009). “Coffee cultivation began at about the time of independence, but it did not expand rapidly until the 1860s. As elsewhere in Central America, the rise of coffee was marked by expropriation and usurpation of native lands-carried out in the name of private property and material progress-because most of the land best suited to coffee cultivation was held by indigenous communities” (Keen & Haynes, 2009, 267).

In contrast, in Paraguay, a rigid system of trade licenses and the state intervention prevented the growth of a native or foreign commercial class. After independence in 1811, José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia established a nationalist dictatorial government, largely removing the traditional elites and destroying nearly all of their economic and political foundation by nationalizing the estates of Paraguayans who were not capable to give a reasonable proof of land ownership³⁰. However, after 1883, the government began to sell enormous quantities of state-owned land in large parcels at ridiculous prices, which foreign investors and members of the small national elite bought (Kleinpenning & Zoomers, 2008).

With the independence, a new oligarchy emerged and the trade relations with the United States and Europe. Independence brought more power to the privileged strata and the landowners increased their wealth. Exploitation of the native population did not decrease and expropriation to indigenous villages continued. The *hacienda* system consolidated and the cultivation of coffee and other commodities continued to rise.

2.4 Post-independence land tenure in Latin America

According to Beezley (1969), the Colonial period left plenty of problems that the newly formed nations had to solve to continue as independent republics. The same author argues that the social division of society, economic situation and the already established laws were part of the general dilemma predominant in the newly founded countries. “Many participants of the change at that time played an important role: the military, which was not incorporated yet,

³⁰ Land ownership: Individual (or group) ownership of land, with rights to sell (WOCAT, 2011).

claimed feudal *fueros*³¹, which was out of law in many cases; the *hacendados* demanded respect within the society and the Catholic church's, which was divided internally by doctrinal controversy and by struggles among the monastic orders" (Beezley, 1969, 347).

Engerman & Sokoloff (2005) argue that the evidence from colonies in the Americas suggests that it was those who began with extreme inequality and population diversity, which formed over time institutions with limited economic opportunities. The same authors continue and affirm that differences in factor endowments (natural resources and labour) produced high concentrations of land ownership in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. The large plantations and the cattle *haciendas* with vast forced labour created unequal societies in which the elite property rights prevailed over inferior classes (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005).

Additionally, Engerman & Sokoloff (2005) say that, during the colonialism the United States and Canada continued to practice policies that were particularly favorable to immigration and in making public land accessible in small pieces of land at low cost to the newcomers willing to settle. The right to land when attracting migrants was completely understandable, and needed in an era of labor insufficiency. Similarly, Véliz (1994) makes an extended description between the Spanish and English Americas and expresses that England promoted diversity and change plus the creation of enterprises, coherent with their entrepreneur spirit. The Spaniards and Portuguese, in contrast, tried to counteract the changes that threatened their imperial influence (North, Summerhill, & Weingast, 2000). Both United States and Canada and Spanish America had a big patrimony of natural resources but after their respective independence, the former Spanish colonies fell into a series of conflicts ("*pronunciamientos*³²" and "*caudillismos*³³") (North, Summerhill, & Weingast, 2000). These

³¹ *Fuero*: Special laws by which the Church and later, the Army, reserved jurisdiction over all its officers; ecclesiastical and military immunity from civil jurisdiction (Marquez & Ramos Navarro, 1998).

³² According to Luttwak (1979) the *Pronunciamiento* -Pronouncement is a Spanish and Latin American type of coup d'état. The coup d'état (*golpe de estado* in Spanish) was more common in Spain and South America, while the *Pronunciamiento* was more common in Central America. The *Pronunciamiento* means to overthrow the dominant government and to vindicate the installation of the new government that was effected with the *golpe de estado*. In a coup, a military faction deposes the civilian government and assumes power and in a *pronunciamiento*, the military depose the civil government and install another civil government.

³³ Beezley (1969) makes a thorough description of the *Caudillismo* in his research "Caudillismo: An Interpretive Note":

The *caudillismo* developed as a legacy of the colonial period, where inconceivable authority was given to one person with a centralistic rule. The *caudillo* had a sort of magnetism to engender loyalty to their rule, it inspired confidence. Even if the *caudillo* drained the wealth of the nation and exploited its resources, or whether he fostered national material progress is unimportant to the essence of *caudillismo*.

continued through the first half of the nineteenth century. The United States, in contrast, “created a stable political democracy and was well on its way to become the richest economy in the world” (North, Summerhill, & Weingast, 2000, 2).

Despite the previous analysis, Coatsworth (2008) explains that Engerman and Sokoloff’s essay is based basically in the beneficial exploitation of natural resources, which makes their argument rely mainly on geography rather than policy. Because “resource endowments and wealth distribution varied as much within as between Latin America and North America. Sugar plantations tended to be large in Cuba and small in Brazil. Grain estates in central Mexico produced the same mix of crops and animals as the small farms of Pennsylvania. In the southern slave colonies of British North America, land ownership near the coast and along rivers tended to be high, in contrast to frontier zones everywhere and the New England colonies. In much of the interior of Latin America peasant agriculture persisted and even expanded well into the nineteenth century, while in other regions large cattle estates sometimes covered thousands or even millions of hectares” (Coatsworth, 2008, 8).

The use of public policy to give the right of use to land has been one of the most important and polemical matters in Latin American governance. This is because the post-colonial nations on that continent inherited a highly uneven pattern of land ownership dominated by *latifundios* that were established in most situations through expropriation of indigenous community lands in Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and Honduras (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2002). In most of Latin America, land tenure turned even more uneven subsequently after independence (Meade, 2010).

Voss (2002), analyses the period between 1750 and 1929 in Latin America, in which he states that the new nations were established on industrial capitalism (after the successful Industrial Revolution in England) and social relations shaped by economic and political interests. The same author divides this period in three phases. The first one, from 1750 to 1820, when the Bourbon administration tried to reform the political and economic system, in order to control more directly the colonies. At this point, resistance from *creoles* and natives came up, as they were searching for political and economic autonomy. The *creoles* controlled political power and they were the main receivers of privileges of independence. During the second stage,

from 1820 to 1880, the *creole gente alta*³⁴ transformed themselves into trade capitalists and patrons of the *gente decente*³⁵ and the *gente baja*³⁶. This is the period when the economic and political monopolies and large landholdings controlled by certain families begins. These families protected their interests by marriages with persons of the same kind of influence in society. Finally, the third stage, from 1880-1920, the last one of the formation of nation-states in Latin America, characterized by an expansion of the monopolies from the elites. They modernized their companies towards the industrial capitalism and alliances with foreign capitalists. In 1920, several political organizations and parties arose and carried out elections. However, the Great Depression brought challenges in which the new nations had to reestablish gradually the economic and political order (Voss, 2002).

The award-winning book by Uruguayan novelist Eduardo Galeano - *Open veins of Latin America*, which illustrates five centuries of exploitation by colonizers and American business and political interests, is necessary in the description of how land tenure was an essential matter in post-colonialism. This author describes the new nations resembled a “busy port, occupied by the mercantile and financial clientele of the British Empire, with *latifundios* and mines in the background” (Galeano, 1973, 116). The elite, in words of Galeano (Galeano, 1973, 116) “was composed by landlords, bug wheelers and frock-coated *políticos*, and intellectuals of borrowed cultures”. The molding elite was an instrument of international capitalism, who owned exclusively political power and who did not care about promoting local manufacturers (Galeano, 1973).

According to (Galeano, 1973), in 1824, Simón Bolívar released the Trujillo Decree, to protect Indians and reorganized land-ownership in Peru. But failed on stopping exploitation, in spite of the *Libertador's* aim. Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos were other leaders who spoke in favour of the dispossession of usurped lands. In Uruguay, Artiga's code in 1815, which included expropriation and distribution of lands of “bad Europeans and worse Americans” and lands were distributed on the ideal that “the most unfortunate will be the most privileged” (Galeano, 1973, 118). But by 1820 until the end of the century, the beneficiaries were brutally expropriated.

³⁴*Creole gente alta*: referring to the people from *creole* descendants but from the highest strata.

³⁵*Gente decente*: "Decent," reasonable or civilized people (Marquez & Ramos Navarro, 1998).

³⁶*Gente baja*: Was the subordinate class (Mojares, 2006, 469).

The attempt to redistribute land during the post-colonialism once more nourished the interests of the most privileged groups, meaning that elites and foreign companies have been always interested in the Latin American land assets, because of its high productivity and the allowance of the governments plus the lack of protection of property rights of the indigenous people and small farmers. Not even the good intentions of Simon Bolívar could stop the uneven distribution which reigned during this period.

2.5 Land Tenure during the end of the nineteenth century in Latin America: The relation between land expropriation and the emergence of capitalism

During the early independence times, the transition to private property brought uncertainty which postponed investment in land improvement. The troubled land institutions, like *haciendas*, *ejidos* and communal lands with weakly defined borders should be taken into account (De la Escosura, 2009, 285). The monopoly of land by *hacendados* made the newly independent states to carry out land reform (Ankersen & Ruppert, 2006). Bates, Coatsworth & Williamson (2007), describe that many things changed in Latin America after the 1860s: abolition of slavery, separation of the church from state, the suppression of antiquated property rights in land, privatization of public assets (particularly land) plus the elimination of public monopolies. Foreign companies and domestic groups made their way to major influence in society and the public investment in infrastructure increased. The foreign investment became as a response to government guarantees and subsidies (railroads, public works, banking). All this progress would not have been possible without the struggles during the so called by the authors “lost decades³⁷” (Bates, Coatsworth & Williamson, 2007).

As the countdown towards the twentieth century, Latin America had to deal with ease of conflicts related to the concentration of land, which began to fall before the social function doctrine was mentioned and its integration to land policy (Ankersen & Ruppert, 2006). The social function refers to the land as an agent to promote social and economic development instead of a market commodity (Hendrix, 1995). The expropriation of the *haciendas* and

³⁷ The authors refer to the lost decades as half-century of political instability, violent conflict and economic stagnation after independence. (Bates, Coatsworth, & Williamson, 2007).

redistribution of the *hacendado* land increased and left many peasants landless³⁸. If idle lands within *haciendas* brought no advantage to the society, the state had the obligation to intervene in property relations and “the emerging social function doctrine would justify the exercise of that obligation” (Ankersen & Ruppert, 2006, 88).

After independence, in Argentina, an expedition went to Alto Peru (today’s Bolivia), seeking to enforce authority in Potosi, but after defeated, it remained a very high royalist sentiment. Later, Alto Peru declared itself an independent republic, but then, the Potosi mines were already exhausted, which meant a seek of new markets for agricultural products of Southern Andes (Mountain Research and Development, 1984). Until the first half of the nineteenth century, agriculture and ranching were the main industries of Chile, emphasizing the importance of land (Mountain Research and Development, 1984). According to the authors Stearns, Adas, Schwartz & Gilbert (2007), for the early economy during post-colonialism, the social and political alliance of landowners, miners, export merchants, depended on commerce for prosperity and on the export of commodities to Europe. This phenomenon caused fluctuations on prices. Between 1870 and 1900, the growing economy, fascinated foreign investors and its capital and infrastructure were placed in foreign hands (Stearns, Adas, Schwartz & Gilbert (2007).

Politicians consented to exploit natural resources hoping that at least the capital cities would become the new metropolis of European culture (Burns, 1980). The expansion of the public press³⁹, the accelerated modernization of cities, and the innovative transformations in lifestyles brought along new technologies like railroads, electricity, tramways, etc., they revealed the adoption of North-Atlantic modernity (Salvatore, 2010). If we could see a map of landholdings in mid-nineteenth century Latin America exist, it would reveal little or no change from colonial period (Meade, 2010). Rich landowners well-established on Latin American landscape, controlling entire provinces thanks to their own personal armies, implementing their own laws, collecting taxes from rural peasants who were attached to the land, in debt, ignorant of any of their own rights. This, plus the fact that the population resided far from urban areas, benefited enormously the big landowners (Meade, 2010).

³⁸ Landless peasants: Owning or having no land (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2003).

³⁹ Public press: The print media responsible for gathering and publishing news in the form of newspapers or magazines (Dictionary.com, 2011).

The authors Przeworski & Curvale (2005, 31) argue that during the second half of the nineteenth century, were two main conflicts: “over land and over wages and working conditions in industry”⁴⁰; later several countries initiated land redistribution⁴¹ through reforms (Przeworski & Curvale, 2005). After independence, the liberal reforms initiated in almost all South American countries. These reforms turned indigenous lands to private ownership and several communities were expropriated (Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mesbah, 1991). Burns (1980) explains that the laws and political practices of the governing elites promoted the capitalism in Latin America. The landlords started to produce monocultures like wheat, coffee, cacao, sugarcane, etc., exported to external markets for which they received returns highly profitable (Burns, 1980). In words of Galeano, “economic, social, national frustration: a series of betrayals followed independence, and Latin America, split apart by its new frontiers, was destined as before to monoculture and dependence” (Galeano, 1973, 116). Consequently, land and labor were altered in the sense that exploitation of the many by the few was reflected on the lost of control of most of the lands once small farmers had worked (Burns, 1980). Additionally, they were required to undersell their labor to the *hacienda* and plantation owners. On the other hand, while land was concentrated in fewer hands, the population of Latin America grew on the double from approximately 30.5 million in 1850 to 61 million by 1900 (Burns, 1980).

The emergent central governments wanted to achieve power for their new affiliates at the expense of opponent groups at all political and socioeconomic points instead of advocate for popular class goals or ideologies (Singelmann, 1974). Throughout Latin America the “Liberal” versus “Conservative” parties have been distinguished. One could manage largely institutional resources to strip the competition of land, office and life as well. Even armed militias in order to provide incentives to the state and national governments for support that permitted the submission of local rivals (Singelmann, 1974). Many land was conferred as a compensation for service to powerful local bosses -*caudillos* (Meade, 2010). At this point, the *campesinos* have had less support to protect themselves against invading landholders, therefore

⁴⁰ See: Godio, Julio. 1972. *Historia del Movimiento Obrero Argentino: Inmigrantes Asalariados y Lucha de Clases, 1880-1910*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Tiempo Contemporáneo.

⁴¹ Land redistribution: is an attempt by governments to modify the distribution of land ownership. The government pretends to transform an agrarian structure composed mainly of large-estate farms into one where family farms are majority by taking land away from large landowners, or the state, and redistributing it to tenants and landless peasants (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

campesinos have traditionally composed the least political hierarchy as camp followers of one or the other party (Singelmann, 1974). Any increase of exports was more because of political than economic reasons and depended on a profitable export commodity, and abundance of land and labor, for its prosperity (Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1978). Since approximately the 1850s until the end of the nineteenth century, most of Latin America began economically at the same level as the mature economies of the North Atlantic (Coatsworth, 2008), but, at what cost?

Across the nineteenth century, the *latifundio* and *minifundio* system, kept big masses of rural inhabitants in conditions of continuous impoverishment and shaped a countryside in which large-scale landowners implemented near total control over rural resources, particularly water (Meade, 2010). The new technologies introduced and additionally the transport made the historic division of labor between estate and nonestate agriculture inefficient. The economy at that time favored the large *haciendas* (Coatsworth, 1978). Precedent of this was the first half of the nineteenth century in which agricultural productivity as estates expanded at expenses of the free villages and the small landowners⁴² (Coatsworth, 1978). Assies (2008) analyses the evolution of land tenure and tenure systems in Mexico in the context of dynamic power relations and accumulation regimes. He explains that since the colonial economy a *hacienda* system appeared and consolidated under liberal legislation of the second half of the nineteenth century in the context of an increasingly agricultural commodities-export oriented economy. The societies inherited the large landed estates as a pattern predominant until our days. Evidence of this is the 60 percent of rural Mexican landless households, the 66 percent of Columbians and 70 percent of Brazilians (Meade, 2010).

The large *hacienda* system is clearly reflected on how the agricultural systems changed gradually in different countries throughout the Latin American region. In Belize, for example, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Q'eqchi'⁴³ lost nearly all their communal lands, because of the "liberal" privatization reforms intended to support national economic development and modernization, but eventually the coffee investors benefitted (Grandia, 2006). On the same period, a railway was built from central Costa Rica to the Atlantic Coast

⁴² See Coatsworth., John H. 1976. Anotaciones sobre la producción de alimentos durante el porfiriato. *Historia Mexicana*, 26: 167-87.

⁴³ The Q'eqchi' which some of them lived in Guatemala, Belice, México. See: UNICEF & FUNPROEIB Andes. 2009. *Atlas Sociolingüístico de Pueblos de América Latina*. Cochabamba, Bolivia. 510 p.

to improve networks which facilitated the emerging coffee and sugar cane *haciendas*. Most of them were owned by English and German owners, supported by the Costa Rican government, hoping that this would promote international trade. In almost a 100% of foreign trade was based in coffee until 1900 (Halls, 1976). Also in Costa Rica, Edelman (1992) argues that at the same time the demand of livestock products rose as a consequence of the coffee export economy. In the same way, Nicaraguan government authorized the privatization of community lands and legislation against idle lands. These laws were similar to the already implemented reforms in Guatemala and El Salvador to create a more extensive land and labor markets that could serve as a base for coffee export economy (Edelman, 1992).

Even though the leaders of the independence struggle in 1810 tried to eliminate the *haciendas*, no important modifications in the agrarian structure were reached. The newly governing classes tried to attract Europeans to colonize the extensive northern region of the Mexico, threatened by US expansionism, but as a result of the political instability that predominated up to the late 1860s large number of colonizers did not arrive (Assies, 2008). Nonetheless, and with the upcoming years, United State economic and strategic interests in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean since the late nineteenth century resulted in new international migration patterns (Hamilton & Stoltz Chinchilla, 1991). Also the migration patterns within the independent states appeared, because the rural masses started to migrate to cities, which were totally unprepared to receive them (Burns, 1980). At the same time, with decreasing access to land and as a consequence of export-oriented agriculture, the rural population suffered from declining real wages and standards of nutrition (Burns, 1980).

“The emerging capitalism changed the agrarian class structures and their dynamics: the division of labor, significant changes in the world markets, intensified exploitation by landed property (including taxation) and the impact of devastating famines on entire regional peasantries when the mechanisms of colonial and quasi-colonial imperialism combined with moments of extreme climatic conditions; all this increased Latin America’s *haciendas* in later nineteenth century” (Bernstein, 2002, 436). As a result, in Mexico for example, under liberal laws, the agro-export oriented economy increased and the distribution of land became substantially part of a privileged private ownership (Assies, 2008).

The inefficiency of the *latifundistas* to use the land confirmed that land misuse contributed to the underdevelopment of the economically disadvantaged groups. Data ratifies that in

several cases, the utilization of land in small rural plots produced more per unit of input and equally provided more employment, than the typical large estate did (Burns, 1980). By 1906, in Panama, less than one percent of national lands were cultivated, but one-third of the cultivated land properties belonged to the United Fruit Company, which produced crops for export (Burns, 1980). The basis of the dynamics of capitalism/imperialism and its inequality in its different manifestations gave a boost to the current period of “globalization” (Bernstein, 2002).

The infrastructure that foreign companies brought as part of the “modernization” of the Latin American countries was attractive. However, at what cost? The large concessions of lands from the governments reinforced the unevenness of land distribution. The problematic basis of the *hacienda* and the search for wealth of the rich landowners plus the increasingly stronger land concentration made the indigenous landless. The capitalists systems of monoculture made *haciendas* stronger. Obviously, there were many interests on land that made the unfair redistribution of land and imposed inefficient *latifundios* and vast extension of lands favoring the powerful *latifundistas*.

3. Land tenure during the twentieth century: land reforms and its relation with land expropriation

After the Second World War, Latin American governments carried out national economic strategies based on an intense and interventionist state: the “import-substitution industrialization” (ISI) policies. These policies, based on the work of Raul Prebisch, head of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), established that underdeveloped countries must move from primary commodities exports to manufactures via an interventionist policy of industrial growth through state-led model of development (Dore & Weeks, 1996). The same authors explain: “import-substitution, is in consequence an ideological expression that serves well the neoliberal amendment of Latin American economic history by interpreting it as a period of "inward-looking" development”.

By 1930, the Great Depression in the United States and Europe affected Latin America as well. The crisis exposed the restrictions of the economic model of trade developed since the independence, the agro-export model, which was based on the production and exports of raw materials (Gascón, 2009). Moreover, during 1929-1940, many countries went through a period of dictatorial governments, from populist state-led governments to authoritarian military repression. For this governments, the implementation of land reforms was a way of securing their political authority (Dorner, 1992). Thus, land reforms done by authoritarian regimes, were a response to political insecurity formed by the contemporary elites (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2011). In the other hand, very interesting findings are noticeable by Albertus' (2010) research in which he explains with land reform data from 1951-1990 in Latin America how the autocratic governments tended to implement a more extensive land distribution than a democratic regime. If the privileged social strata relies in the the democratization to keep its power, then these processes are less likely to promote equality in society and consequently, elites could use their power to win favorable policies under democracy. The regimes that engaged in more redistribution early in their tenures remained longer in power. This is the case for Peru, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua and to a lesser degree to Ecuador, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Panama. Montgomery (1984), affirms that sometimes

foreign companies and authoritarian regimes are linked to large scale expropriative land reforms and this pattern has been identified in many parts of the world.

Protectionist laws applied in different countries pretended to reduce the dependence on the commodities market and to develop the internal markets (Gascón, 2009), plus an inward-looking economic policies were carried out by a strong, interventionist state (Dore & Weeks, 1996). The depression and its consequences became evident when the prices dropped and unemployment rose rapidly in the export sectors of Latin American economy, creating a new political phase in the civilization's political evolution (Adas, 1992). During the period of the 1930s and 1940s, there was certain autonomy from external control and pressures by foreign capital and national governing classes. The social mobilization were essential to create a programme of autonomous, state directed industrialization founded on the establishment and/or development of a national market (Hamilton, 1981). The different society strata supported these strategies, in accordance to restrain United State economic and political influence (Dore & Weeks, 1996). Even if economic accomplishments were in general acceptable, some nations stagnated or declined in profitable activities. Some of the problems went beyond the control of the authorities. As an example, in Honduras, banana exports collapsed after 1931 when spread of a disease affected banana crops (Bethell, 1998). With the decreasing exports, the best alternative for improving laid in the ISI, but the small size of the market complicated to compensate the decline in the export sector. The ISI model pushed the industrial sector and the internal demand was not determined mainly by the export sector in Brazil, Chile and Mexico, which had joined Argentina by the end of the 1930s (Bethell, 1998). The inward-looking development was still unclear, the export sector was still dominant and its supporters still politically powerful (Bethell, 1998). In Central America, where foreign capital was firmly established, it was left behind when the ISI programs began to be performed in other Latin American countries. The reason was that it stayed locked into a mono-export economy that would reduce the opportunity of modernization or improvement (Klar, 2008). Additionally, South America, no attention was given to the agricultural sector apart from its cheap surplus labor for the new factories (Klar, 2008). However, in the other hand, the ISI produced some positive results, as the regional economy enlarged from 1950 to 1980: the gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual average rate of 5.3 per cent (Bethell, 1998).

According to Alviar-García (2008), due to economic development, land reform became a fundamental part of ISI, for at least two reasons: firstly, by the redistribution of land and diminishing poverty, which promoted the foundation of a domestic market for the local industrial sector that was being protected; secondly, it reinforced the central national state, essential topic for protectionist policies. The social function of land can give the state the right to expropriate and is one of the blocks of state involvement in the economy. Consequently, the landowners should guarantee that their use of property provides a social function and if not, the state can expropriate the land not fulfilling this condition (Alviar García, 2008). The majority of agrarian reforms in Latin America happened after industrialization was solid established and were an alternative to revitalize the deteriorating industrialization process caused by what has been termed the 'exhaustion of the easy phase of ISI' (Kay, 2001). In his essay, Kay (2001) argues that the decisive choice of going through an agrarian reform for Taiwan and South Korea before industrialization was a comparative advantage to explain their superior economic performance. In different circumstances, the recipients received bad quality and marginal lands that had been de-capitalized in the process of expropriation. The beneficiaries were later forgotten by the governments, who were more worried about the commercial agricultural sector and urban ISI (De Janvry, Sadoulet, & Wolford, 1998). The lack of access to credit, technical assistance, modern inputs, or education that were necessary to enable them to sustain along with the private sector (De Janvry, Sadoulet, & Wolford, 1998). Land reform would enable small peasants to increase their production and diminish poverty as well as to contribute to national economic development by increasing productivity. Land reform was a particularly important part of the Alliance for Progress⁴⁴ agenda. However, in most countries, apart from Cuba and Nicaragua where there was a revolutionary change, agrarian reform was rather limited. A “new” land was given to farmers, rather than land that had been expropriated from large landholders (Willis, 2011). The core industrialized countries whose economic development was growing through exploitation of the non-industrialized countries have said that underdevelopment in Latin America was due to the existence of the capitalist system (Willis, 2011). Guner Frank (1967) explains that capitalist development Latin America throughout the global system of dependence, formed by relationships of

⁴⁴ “Alliance for Progress: Fearful of the spread of revolution to other countries in the region and the spectre of socialism, the United States Government launched the Alliance for Progress initiative, which encouraged governments throughout the region to implement agrarian reform programmes by providing economic aid” (Kay, 1998, 11).

exploitation from the global scale to the inter-personal. Consequently, small farmers were exploited by local land-owners who did not pay them the full price of the commodities they produced. These landholders later sold the commodities to merchants in the cities at a higher price than that paid to the farmers, generating profit. This cycle of exchange and exploitation continued until the surplus generated through these exchanges was taken out of the country to the core (Frank, 1967). Additionally to falling terms of trade, the export of land-intensive primary products exacerbates inequalities in those countries with unequal land distributions. According to Griffin (1989), in countries where land ownership is concentrated and the exports are land-or natural resource-intensive, an exported-oriented strategy of development will raise land rents and increase inequality in the distribution of income (Griffin, 1989, 74).

Governments threatened to expropriate the lands that were not used to promote productivity and modernization (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 1989). Land reform was meant to increase agricultural production, consequently easing inflationary and balance of payments pressures. Revenues would be distributed more equally, consequently increasing the domestic market for ISI enterprises, enabling to bring underused capacity into its broadest operation (Ward, 1997). Basically, the new type of farms pretended to substitute the “*latifundios*” into small owned plots of land (Alviar García, 2008). Later, revolution pressure came to different Latin American countries, but still owners were allowed to keep a land reserve up to a maximum legal size. The best lands and the safest access to water were concentrated in this farm sector (De Janvry, Sadoulet & Wolford, 1998). During the land reforms, across all Latin America (particularly in Chile and El Salvador), the biggest benefactors were resident workers of the traditional estate who opposed to incorporate landless workers mainly because they wanted to guarantee access to land for their own descendants (De Janvry, Sadoulet & Wolford, 1998). The expropriated lands, originally large and centralized estates, went from underused or over-sized estates to be assigned to the former workers of estates (Thiesenhusen, 1995). This type of ownership allowed the governments to delay the investments in infrastructure that would support small farmers and made possible to focus on training for former estate workers who had hands-on farming experience, but did not have administrative skills (Sadoulet, 1992).

For over eighty years, almost all Latin American governments have altered access to land. Wide land reforms were part of the outcome of revolutions in Mexico (1917), Bolivia (1952), and Nicaragua (1979). Dictatorial governments imposed land reforms in Peru (1969-75) and

Ecuador (1964). Democratically elected governments also pursued land reforms in Chile (1964-73), Colombia (1961-), Guatemala (1952-54), Honduras (1973-), El Salvador (1980-) and the Dominican Republic (1961-). Also in Brazil, where occupation of frontier lands was substituted for real land reforms until 1985, new proposals have been taken to support redistribution (De Janvry, Sadoulet, & Wolford, 1998). In some countries, such as Colombia, seizure of land properties was exceptionally modest: since 1961 and for 25 years of land reform just four per cent of the target population were given access to land. By 1952, in Guatemala, the land was distributed in individual tenures, although the reform was reversed by 1954 (De Janvry, Sadoulet, & Wolford, 1998). In the Dominican Republic, lands in large rice landholdings where centralized irrigation infrastructure were transformed in cooperatives, while other landholdings were distributed to small farmers (Meyer, 1989). In Honduras, two thirds of the land recipients were outside the cooperative sector, although, just nine percent of the rural households benefited (De Janvry, Sadoulet, & Wolford, 1998).

In some cases, the landed elites were pushed off the land, as it happened in Bolivia during the 1952 revolution or under the Peruvian military repression beginning in 1968. In some cases, landed elites were against the policy change. For instance, in Argentina became a destructive cycle of policies, which at the beginning favoured domestic, industrial producers but ended favoring commodity exports (Kingstone, 2011). The volatility of economic policy in Argentina is at least in part to blame for the country's impressive decline from being one of the wealthiest nations in the world in the 1920s. Finally in some countries, mainly in Central America (but also Bolivia and Paraguay), ISI either didn't was succesful and much more difficult with the already settled landed-elite power (Kingstone, 2011). At the end, for the small farmers working the land little changed in most of the region. Rural poverty continued, plus the ISI-oriented, nationalist governments required to organize the rural working class and make better their conditions, particularly through land reforms (Kingstone, 2011). The technological modernization of agriculture which was intended to eliminate the *hacienda* system, but in fact, this system was consolidated through the agrarian reforms and it transformed it into capitalist farms (Kay, 1998). Consequently this reaffirms the statement that the reforms accelerated the development of the agrarian capitalism and not the small farms (De Janvry, 1981; Kay, 1988). However, the subsequent puzzled agrarian reforms opened up the opportunity of a peasant path to agrarian capitalism, though one dependent on agro-industrial capital (Kay, 1998). By 1969 Agrarian Reform Law came into effect, Peru's

land tenure was based on the *latifundio-minifundio* pattern for centuries. Held as private property by landed gentry, absent property owners, or even companies, the *latifundios*, or *haciendas* (usually large landholdings of 500 hectares or more), were worked by an indentured⁴⁵ labor force formed of indigenous small farmers (Savoy, 2011).

If there is the accepted idea that the dynamic of industrial growth originates from the process of import substitution, it is necessary to delimit the exhaustion of this process in a specific period, which varies according the country (Collier, 1979). By exhaustion the author means that the ISI was not the principal stimulus for industrial growth, at least until the expansion of the internal market and changes in the balance of payments. The author Lewis (1977, 22) explains that “by the end of the 1960s. the early starters were already reaching the limits of import substitution and industrialization began to slow down...if 70 per cent of the labor force consists of low productivity food farmers, with only a tiny surplus, the market for domestic manufacturers is strictly limited. As the limits are approached the pace of industrialization can be maintained only by exporting manufactures, and this is what happened”.

In brief, the land reforms, according to Thiesenhusen (1989), should be analysed in its social, economic, environmental and political outcomes. These reforms, split the general land ownership of elites and freed a significant proportion of oppressed indigenous groups in Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru and Nicaragua. Also it provided temporal employment to landless peasants in Panama, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Venezuela and El Salvador. Economic results of land reforms are more complex to identify, but it is clear that more efficient programs in support services, land tenure and management systems were necessary. Additionally, the reform beneficiaries of marginal land or land at the agrarian frontier, have caused severe environmental problems and deforestation. Finally, the political focus has spread out to include market reforms for better effectiveness in the neoclassical sense, and therefore highlight the land tenure issues for small farmers (Thiesenhusen, 1989). If governments do not have an adequate process of land expropriation, redistribution or ownership, then they should consider to provide more opportunities to rural poor farmers with an approach on a progressive agriculture (Dorner & Saliba, 1981).

⁴⁵ Indentured: a contract by which a person agreed to work for a set period for a colonial landowner in exchange for passage to the colonialism (Wordreference.com, 2011).

The failed land reforms, the biggest deception for the governments and for the alleged beneficiaries. It seems like a dream that is far of becoming true. The apparent cycle of exploitation, redistribution, expropriation and uneven tenure is still prevailing until our days. The governments have to work effective and intensively in order to stop the power of elites that is taking roots and not developing societies. If this situation does not change in a positive and constructive way, it will underdevelop societies and not the other way around.

4. Neoliberalist influence on land

According to Herrera, Riddell & Toselli (1997) the neoliberal policies through the region during the decade of the 90s seemed to bring to its end the agrarian reforms. The influence of the neoliberal economic policies has given an impulse to capitalist farming while by marginalizing small farming systems (Kay, 1998). “These policies moved from expropriation on the way to privatization, land registry, titling and land tax issues” (Kay, 1998, 10). The most important example of the neoliberal spread in Latin America has been the change of the Article 27 of Mexico's Constitution of 1917, which led to the first agrarian reform and promoted the moto “land and liberty”. The influence of globalization and neoliberalism pushed the Mexican government to permit the sale of land of the reform sector and the establishment of agreements with private investors, many of them foreign companies, a proof of the compromise for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (See De Walt, Rees, & Murphy, 1994; De Janvry, Gordillo, & Sadoulet, 1997).

Why there is a general objection to neoliberalism? Since Latin America declared independence, the United States made several attempts to impose its power over it. As the President James Monroe wrote to the European powers on 2 December 1823: “We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” This statement did not have any other intention than enable American companies to transfer its wealth to the United States without ruling them directly (Barahona, 2006). Governments allowed the companies to commercialization of commodities and control the local infrastructure (Barahona, 2006). The USA arose in 1945 as the main point for commerce with Central and South America (Barton, 1997). Economic and military support to help US businesses in the region became very noticeable in the US fruit companies in Central America (Barton, 1997).

As mentioned before, the land reform in Guatemala was reversed in 1954, the reason? As a demand from the United Fruit Company “The CIA-backed coup in Guatemala in 1954 was an act in support of the United Fruit Company, which had been subject to land reform policies. The US-backed administration that followed the coup terminated the land reform measures” (Barton, 1997, 89; See also Barahona, 2006). “The history of United State’s support for

rightist forces and dictatorships in Latin America is long. The Alfredo Stroessner served as dictator of Paraguay from 1954 to 1989 with the blessing of the U.S. Washington backed coups in the Dominican Republic in 1962, Brazil and Bolivia in 1964, and Argentina in 1966” (Barahona, 2006). By 1916, in Dominican Republic, several attempts to land reform resulted in the land being cultivated as large, collectively managed holdings called “*terrenos comuneros*” (common lands). Expropriation of land from small landowners created sporadic conflicts between pesantry and large sugar companies. The US military occupation and its 1920 Land Registration Act was one such iteration. The Act challenged customary land rights using titles to surveyed private properties. Local proprietors took the initiative in first establishing use-rights as a discrete form of individual property and then selling those rights to foreign and Dominican entrepreneurs (Legrand, 1995). This expropriation of small-scale landholdings created bitter and intermittent conflicts between farmers and large sugar companies. The end of the First World War saw almost all Dominican commerce tied to North America. The Customs Tariff Act of 1919 favored the exclusive entrance of American manufactured goods; along with high post-war sugar prices, this had a striking effect on the Dominican economy (Singh, 1999).

Further than for economic reasons, land reform also represents the resistance of indigenous people to give their ancestral territories and the respect for their rights. The most representative land reforms in Latin America (Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala 1952-54) symbolize these efforts. Others, like Nicaragua, occurred in revolutionary contexts where political rights were a dominant issue (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2002). By the 1940s, in Mexico, the policy emphasized on the role of providing cheap food for an increasingly urbanizing and industrializing country. Simultaneously, policies tended to benefit the development of high value export goods, among other things through the creation of infrastructure (irrigation). Therefore, the differences intensified, between the “north” and the impoverished “south” (where also most of Mexico's indigenous peoples can be found) (Assies, 2008, 58-59). Violence often takes part of redistribution of property and sometimes hardly considers economic policy options. Today few programs involve authoritarian land redistribution and in some cases land is being bought from large landowners at what is thought to be the market price. It is then sold to landless peasants or smallholders with some kind of subsidized credit scheme (Bourguignon, 2004). But as we will see in the development

of this work it is still a problem in some parts of the world, where the law is still on the side of the oligarchies and land is not fairly distributed.

As a final point, the neoliberal perception on land reform supports the principle of the ineffective use of land in big estates and labor in small farms. However, the problem should be solved not only by giving land in general, but to improve the knowledge of farmers in financial issues, plus available credit, mutual aid from land owners and the proof that small peasants are able to develop project int their properties (Alviar García, 2008). If there are extractive institutions which power is in the hands of a small elite and create a high risk of expropriation for the majority of the population, are likely to discourage investment and economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2002).

The social function of land which the proper and traditional definition of expropriation of land requires does not match with the way in which land reforms were done by the governments. Again, if the land from large estates will be distributed in order that the small farmers will get an adequate piece of land and improve their livelihoods, with reiteration we should confirm that the adequate policies, accompanied with real productive rural programs will made land reform succesful. As long as this condition is not fulfilled, no adequate land tenure will ever become true.

5. Dictatorships and oligarchs: their role in land expropriation in Latin America

After the Great Depression, many countries went through a period of autocratic governments. They were either populist state-led regimes or authoritarian military dictatorships. It is during this period that many governments initiated extensive land reforms to expropriate the landed elites and to secure their political power (Dorner, 1992). Certainly, these reforms were not done for the poor, but as a response for the political insecurity, the traditional elites meant to these governments (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2011). The oligarchy is not only rich, but also politically influent and well-connected and plays a strategic role in governments. They have the power to expropriate the poor majority and to maintain a certain level of property rights protection. The oligarchy is not well organized though and they need a coordinator to solve the problem, for example, a president or a dictator to provide the desired level of property rights enforcement. In words of Albertus (2010, 12) “in particular, landed elites have recognized that low institutional constraints and high land pressure under democracy. The threat of democracy made them able to form coalitions with the military to overturn these regimes and return confiscated property to former owners. The remainder land reforms in Latin America were implemented by autocratic regimes”. The interaction between dictators and oligarchs are powerful economic factors with a big impact in economies and politics (Guriev & Sonin, 2007). Some of the examples in which the influence of the oligarchy and their ability to manipulate valuable assets such as land are the following.

According to the authors Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth & Cortés Conde (2006), the agrarian reform in Peru under a military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1971 executed the expropriation of lands in the inter-Andean valleys, where a combination of *haciendas* and *minifundios* emerged. Land conflicts were common, especially after 1968, when the first agrarian law was approved. The new law determined a maximum of one hundred fifty hectares for coastal irrigated properties and fifty to seventy hectares for highland estates. Many owners of *haciendas* were not expropriated and instead they divided their properties into smaller units, sold to family members and friends. The military government ordered to expropriate holdings than one hundred fifty hectares, especially in properties with

absentee ownership. The government intended to decrease the elite power, but instead, efficiency and productivity prevailed in the agriculture at that time. It is important to clarify that the problem was not the large *hacienda* prevalence, but the one of *minifundistas*, which owned insufficient land. Until today, the Peruvian reforms did nothing to solve completely the problem, indeed was one of the problems in the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) uprising in the 1980s (Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth, & Cortés Conde, 2006). The *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru was a resemblance of violence, which during the 1960s aligned hundreds of thousands of peasants and rural workers to pressurize the State to expropriate hundreds of thousands of hectares. Over 200,000 people have been displaced in consequence of these revolts by the 1990s (Degregori, 1992). With the time, the Shining Path succeeded in gaining control over large areas of rural Peru. According to (Kay, 2000, 15), the main reasons for this were:

“First, there was the unresolved land issue of peasant communities. Second, the continuing discrimination against and poverty of indigenous groups. Third, the social and political vacuum arising from the destruction of the oligarchical order and the weakness of social and political institutions, in short a weak civil society. Fourth, the large availability of a new type of young cadres composed largely of students, many of whom were sons and daughters of indigenous peasants, as well as of the more traditional type such as local teachers. Fifth, the initial organizational and ideological capacity of Shining Path's leadership. Sixth, the inappropriate action taken by the State to combat Shining Path which further aggravated the situation”.

In addition, Peru had uneven land tenure and labor systems in a population mainly rural and indigenous, controlled by small urban elite that defined the economic, political, and cultural life. Ayacucho, where the Shining Path emerged, was one of the poorest and remote indigenous parts of Peru. The dispossession of customary landholdings caused a migration from the highlands to plantations on the coast, and from rural areas into impoverished urban neighborhoods (*pueblos jóvenes* or new towns) surrounding the capital city of Lima. A majority of the population later became part of the process of assimilation the urban traditions and the Spanish-speaking dominant culture. The Shining Path caused the disinheritance of the urban and rural population (Becker, 2006). The aim of the Shining Path was to remove what

they saw as Peru's bourgeois democracy. The rebels' avowed aim was to establish a communist government, of Maoist inspiration (BBC News online, 2011).

In Nicaragua, before 1979, about four percent of the landowners controlled more than half the arable land. The Sandinista government started to confiscate Somoza's family properties, which led to the agrarian reform in 1981. For some time, the distribution from large landholdings to peasant collectives was efficient and productive. With the support of the United States, a guerrilla against the opposition powers arose and stayed in Nicaragua for over a decade. With the government of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the landlords whom Sandinistas had confiscated land, were now returning to reclaim it (Polis Schutz, 1998).

In El Salvador, the agrarian bourgeoisie created the single most efficient coffee production in the world at that time, fully on capitalist basis. The progressive agrarian capitalists that supported the bloodiest repression in the region during 1932 supported a repressive military dictatorship for almost fifty years. This happened because they needed repression against the revolutionaries from below as in Costa Rica (Paige, 1989). The oligarchy of wealthy families allied with the military to deny the country's majority basic freedoms and economic opportunity. The highly uneven distribution of land, wealth and power impulse also the landless peasants which numbers rose throughout the last century, reaching some 41 percent by 1975 (Cottam, 1994).

In Chile, during the agrarian reform from 1964-1973, half of the country's agricultural land was expropriated from large estates. After the coup that overthrew the President Allende, indigenous people, peasant activists, beneficiaries of the agrarian reform were the main victims of the repression set by the authoritarian government (Kay, 2000). In addition, torture, detention without trial, imprisonment and widespread terror became the ruling norm. The main objective was to destroy the peasant movement. All this happened under the direct command of President General Pinochet (Kay, 2000). The military government returned over a third of the expropriated land to their former owners, less than half was distributed to some of the agrarian reform beneficiaries and sold the remainder to capitalists (Jarvis, 1992).

Even though the labor confederations were very important, the political sector in Honduras, has been dominated by *caudillos* and military governance between 1960-1980 (Krieger, 2001). The peasant movements were powerful enough even during the 1960s to extract a

series of concessions of lands from a unwilling government (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). The executive branch has the command on decision making, but in practice, the military are still an important ally (Krieger, 2001). The economic base of the local elite came from cattle and commerce, meanwhile, the foreign interests were focused in bananas, mining and banking. The control of the government gave the oligarchy wealth and prestige. The politics in Honduras were weak and lacked of the sufficient instruments to achieve independence from fruit companies' influence. After 1920, there were recurrent changes in the presidency which produced civil wars (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987).

There are tight connections in Latin America between the state capture⁴⁶ and political elites. Corruption, state capture and weak legal systems undermine property and contract rights with significant consequences for investment and, eventually, growth (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, & Schankerman, 2000). The CPRC (2009) confirms that high initial inequality (especially in land ownership) delivered a pattern of growth with very few benefits, strengthening a landed elite skillful at controlling legislatures, consequently restricting the political and economic space of the impoverished rural population.

Additionally, it is important to mention the permanent influence of the American government. Specially during the decade of the 1950s. The US force in 1954, through manipulation of a military puppet to oust the reformist democratic government of Guatemala, was considered one of the great successes of the administration. During this decade, 13 of 20 Latin American states were ruled by dictators. This, with the time seemed a hazard for development and originated a series of policies to implement democracy in the region (Tulchin, 1988). Governments with strong ties to the oligarchies supported the Alliance publicly, but in secret, they ensure the reform would fail to alter the balance of economic and social power (Brands, 2010). Different governments used Alliance funds to expand commercial agriculture and light industry, a strategy that promised strong macroeconomic growth and benefited U.S. investors. The increasing mechanization that came along with commercial agriculture depressed employment opportunities for agrarian workers. Because of the unbalanced land reform, the concentration of holdings worsened the situation of the poor (Brands, 2010).

⁴⁶ State capture is defined by Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann & Schankerman (2000) as “the efforts of firms to shape and influence the underlying rules of the game (i.e. legislation, laws, rules, and decrees) through private payments to public officials”. The elite can also commit state capture.

Oligarchic power produce an imperfect rule of law through the structural support it provides to clientelistic politics. The pervasive presence of clientelism, in turn has tow major political effects (Smith, 2009).

The dictatorship-oligarchy complex is a curse for the development of societies. The elites control governments and use them as a tool for supremacy of the material wealth. If an expropriation of large *haciendas* will happen, then the privileged groups have the power to stop the process. Every single policy or strategy that will not benefit them will be then managed according to their control, and it seems as if even in democratic countries this is still prevalent.

6. Analysis of the causes and consequences of the expropriation of lands in rural and urban areas Latin America

Migration: Hispanic immigrants went to North America seeking an escape from a feudalism rejected in policy but continuing in practice (Padilla, 1994). High rural-urban migration combined with the inability of industry to absorb new entrants has resulted in exceptionally high urban under and unemployment, an explosion of crime and a deterioration in the quality of urban life (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2005). Every year thousands of rural families migrate because there are few opportunities to earn a living. They go to cities or to the jungle or to the mountainous territories. If they do not find employment in industry, then they continue to live in poverty as urban job opportunities increase at a very slow pace (Barraclough & Domike, 1966). One of the causes of migration is significantly the problems faced by the landless and small producers in the agricultural sector. Rural land reform, if implemented in an efficient way can therefore reduce migratory pressures on urban areas (FAO, 1999).

Lack of government's support: In Mexico, the constitution of 1917 aimed to redistribute land as grants called *ejidos* to communities. The intentions were good, but it seems that there was not enough land to give to all the landless laborers. More than a quarter of the national land (more than 55 million hectares) was expropriated and redistributed between 1924 and 1970. Although, there was not support for the *ejidos* in matters of technical assistance, marketing advantages, transportation, water resources and credits. Therefore, the *ejidos* could not compete with the private farms (Andelson & Dawsey, 1992).

Poverty: With world food supplies increasingly in shortage and compromising food security, the first Millennium Development Goal on poverty, is highly dependent on the performance of agriculture. The rising environmental costs associated with agriculture, the issue of access to land and property rights over land to guarantee its optimum use, has become a top issue of policy debate. In this sense, properly distributed access to land with complete property rights is widely recognized to be an important condition for efficient and fair use. Among beneficiaries of redistributive land reforms, very few complete titles have been given, with

land mainly held in usufruct and as a common property resource (CPR) (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2011).

Economic growth: As is the case of many indigenous people which were either left behind or incorporated into exploitative and disadvantageous agricultural export economies. Expropriation causes economic loss, social and psychological disruption for the affected persons and their families. As expected, the greater the number of people involved, the greater the disruption and loss. A government is responsible for the affected ones and it should ensure that their standard of living is restored to the level enjoyed before the beginning of the road project. The affected ones are often resettled, because they lost houses or businesses. Neighborhoods can be disrupted or broken up completely by large construction projects. In addition, business people may find loose their customers (Hoban & Tsunokawa, 1997).

Modernization: The redistributive policies did not have enough productivity was the differential rates of technology adoption between the large estates and the small farms. Most of the Green Revolution technology such as seeds and fertilizers were adopted more rapidly by larger farmers because this had easier access to credit and therefore made the necessary investment. Many had also an informational advantage and greater capacity to invest in human capital. The threat of expropriation under the land reforms made the land values increase and provoked the purchase of machines. This complemented the fact that Latin American land reforms did not lead to a redistribution of a substantial amounts of land to the poor (FAO, 1993). The use of machines caused also unemployment of the rural farmers

Services: Large landowners move to urban areas and often agriculture is a secondary interest for them. They live in the cities because they have better access to educational, medical and cultural facilities. Consequently they do not feel the need to duplicate them in rural communities (Barraclough & Domike, 1966).

The role of government: The governments can have indirect roles in the creation and support of segmented markets, but they can influence directly by expropriating land for social justice. But they also need to provide the capital subsidies for the survival of the production activities and businesses at the beginning of the reform or when necessary (Muñoz, 2001). Even if expropriation is feasible, the state prefers to negotiate a settlement rather than to use

expropriation in order to reduce the delays and costs related with expropriation. But expropriations then are needed if the negotiations fail to secure a reasonable price for the land acquisition. In Mexico, the *ejido* was strongly supported on the beginning by investment some irrigation infrastructure, special credit access and technical support. But with the time, this support fell behind the private sector, rising poverty in the *ejido* sector. Therefore, by 1992 constitutional reforms permitted the privatization of land in individual plots. Also in Chile, the agrarian debts of the beneficiaries made them sell their lands to entrepreneurs who could cope better in the fruits and vegetables activities. From 1951-1990, about 140 million hectares of land were expropriated and redistributed (Albertus, 2010). Complementarily, there are some factors relevant for the intrinsic association of land and individuals. The urbanization and the pressure of high population which causes the loss of valuable land is changing the general panorama of landscape (Gar-On Yeh & Lis, 1999). If governments will carry out these processes, they should be done in a transparent way. Additionally, property rights should be respected against random expropriation, meaning that these processes can be done if necessary, but respecting the integrity of the people involved (OECD, 2011). A fair expropriation is considered as a prerequisite for economic development.

Violence and conflict: Latin America's rural violence is largely rooted in its unequal and exclusionary agrarian system. Thus tackling the structural aspect of rural violence involves radically transforming the agrarian system so as to achieve greater equity and democratic participation. Conflicts that might emerge between the parties should be address and indeed, programs to resettle groups of beneficiaries need to include mechanisms to ensure smooth integration of the settlers with the adjacent community (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009). Throughout the region, an historic urban bias continues to direct to the abandonment of rural areas and its people. Today, “the number of rural poor is rising as they are joined by those displaced as the result of the privatization of common property, the expansion of commercial agriculture and the eruption of ethnic and other conflicts over land. Where there is conflict over land, there cannot be sustainable agriculture and rural development” (FAO, n.d., 3).

Infrastructure and chaotic urbanism: When countries obtain land via expropriation, the government should distribute the land, build adequate roads and settlement patterns, plus infrastructure, housing and services supply (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den

Brink, 2009). If the settlement patterns are not planned according to the newcomer's necessities, then a chaotic urbanism emerges. Another consequence of expropriation is to undersell lands in the informal market, which contributes to further expansion of unplanned and informal settlements. This increases the cost of providing infrastructure and services (World Bank, 2002). The infrastructure construction often requires the acquisition of privately owned land. This land should be obtained by the government from its current proprietors. Sometimes it is possible to negotiate a price for voluntary sale of a property, governments often have to expropriate the properties for public projects. The political and economic consequences of land expropriation across the region are broadly the same: enforced high population density, land degradation and a lack of resources to invest in adequate land management. A result of this are the massive urban slums (*barrios marginales* or *favelas*) under intense population pressure.

Granting land tenure to individuals is very efficient for urban development. Identity with a parcel or any piece of land must be recognized in every society. Land ownership in urban areas the poor are very likely to be housed in rental units rather than given the opportunity to someday be given access to a site on which to build. Rental tenure arrangements are frequently complex in low-income areas in developing countries. As cities become more dense, such arrangements will surely multiply (Doebele, 1987).

Additionally, the rights of the rural populations and in the surroundings of the emerging urban areas, were not respected. This is a contrast with the modern conception of expropriation of lands, in which the land was not used with a social function.

Environment: Additionally, environmental issues rise from the inadequate and the disordered settlements plus the population pressure, because of the intensive use of the natural resources and the massive emergence of residues. Expropriation and exploitation are a result of the capitalism. The families which settle in frontier forested areas without any kind of control, causes deforestation and the destruction of valuable soil (Barraclough & Domike, 1966).

Social movements: The social movements, are part of the resistance against the process of exclusion, the proletarianization and against capitalism and unfair expropriation. The peasant rebellion constituted the major social and political force in rural society. On the same path, the indigenous movements represented a threat to transnational companies, because they obstruct

access to land and natural resources under indigenous protection. The indigenous concept of the mother earth as something which can not be sold or privatized (Robinson, 2008). Indigenous groups are also displaced of their lands for the building of roads and the use of other assets as mines or tropical forests for conservation of these ecosystems.

Indigenous territorial rights were largely mistreated in the modalities of agrarian reform, which emerged later as a result of shifting patterns regarding forests and international demands by indigenous people related to their ancestral rights and territorial use of such resources. Land represents for societies the core of productive and political activities as well as a special cultural and emotional importance for communities and nations. Its effective management can bring environmental and economic stability, but in the other hand its abuse can cause different conflicts, from inheritance disputes to war (FAO, 2002). If the property rights are not well defined, invasion of land can lead to expropriation, which may transform in a violent process. The governments can use compulsory acquisition procedures, but they should give also adequate compensations and be a transparent process to increase efficiency and equity.

“Exiled in their own land, condemned to an eternal exodus, Latin America’s native peoples were pushed into the poorest areas— arid mountains, the middleof deserts— as the dominant civilization extended its frontiers. *The Indian shave suffered, and continue to suffer, the curse of their own wealth, that is the drama of all Latin America.* When gold was discovered in Nicaragua’s Rio Bluefields, the Carca Indians were quickly expelled far from their riparian lands” (Galeano, 1973, 47, 48).

Property rights: All societies should provide a secure basis for citizen rights, including protection from opportunism and expropriation. Credible commitments are necessary to provide asset owners a secure environment within which to invest, which is essential for economic growth. If institutions that protect groups from aggression and expropriation are constituted, the nations very likely will promote material progress. The political stability is important to avoid domestic expropriation of property, because national disturbs may undermine the economy by control of forced loans from merchants which may lead to State indebtedness and foreign debt obligations (North, Summerhill & Weingast, 1999). If individuals have access to private properties, it enables the owner to follow personal goals which will lead to long term benefits. In the case of land tenure and the property rights over it the landlord will have the opportunity to share these benefits with others in the society. To

conclude this part of the study, the International Property Rights affirms that “land rights provide empowerment through ownership, allowing citizens to make a profit from their investment. Economic growth occurs when property is protected and respected in all forms” (Jackson & De Soto, 2011). In societies it is important the fair distribution of property rights because these can adversely affect both inequality and growth. Overall the property rights of land should be done equally across social groups and geographic locations in both rural and urban areas (De Ferranti, Perry, & Ferreira, 2003). The model of agricultural development executed since the 1960s has strengthened the concentration of land ownership, entailing the expropriation and the expulsion of millions of families (Moyo & Yeros, 2005, 319).

Evolution of *latifundio* into *hacienda*: Even the modest land reforms in Latin America, however, helped to destroy parts of the system of labour control that kept the rural poor in their place. In addition, as an unintentional consequence, land reform, helped to transform many *latifundia* into capitalist, commercial farms (De Janvry, 1981; De Janvry, 1981). The reason for this is that priority for land expropriation in Latin America often focused on large farms owned by absent landowners, where cultivation was thought to be inefficient and where much of the land was in natural pasture or was left uncultivated. Large landowners consequently had an incentive to sell some of their land (usually the less fertile and marginal parts) or to subdivide the rest among members of their family in order to avoid forced redistribution (Griffin, Khan & Ickowitz, 2002). The land reform and the efficient control over productive resources, specifically land, is essential to overcome poverty, considering that in many developing countries the main way of sustenance is still agriculture. Without land there is no wealth, and therefore, nor food neither access to services, education or property. Effective control over productive resources, especially land, by the rural poor is crucial to their capacity to build a rural livelihood. International organizations, such as the World Bank are emphasizing on the importance of land access. Policies of the Millenium Development Goals are yet to include the issues of wealth and power redistribution in the rural areas, through land reforms (CPRC, 2005).

The land reforms have not been accompanied by institutional reforms to secure the competitiveness of the beneficiaries. The land reform through expropriation and distribution, the classical approach of land reform in Latin America is not the easiest one to follow, and still there is a range of instruments to be used according to the political feasibility and

budgetary capacity (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2002). Moreover, the redistributive reforms in Mexico, Bolivia and Chile focused on the transformation of *haciendas* into capitalist estates. By the end of the period of agrarian reforms, labour laws were introduced and this caused the evicting of tenants and dismissing labour. To many scholars, these reforms simply served to modernise labour contracts instead of redistributing land. Although, in Chile, during 1965-1970, land reform settlements formed from expropriated land showed considerable increases in output per hectare (Adams, 1995). Land reform helped to transform *latifundia* into commercial farms, because land expropriation in Latin America was focused on large farms where cultivation was inefficient. Large landowners consequently had an incentive to sell some of their land (usually the less fertile, marginal bits). They also had a motivation to use their land more intensively by reducing the amount of idle lands, bringing uncultivated areas under the plough and transforming natural pastures into managed grazing land. Since large landowners kept their capital equipment and most of their farm buildings after selling parts of their property, the capital–labour and capital–land ratios on the remaining properties tended to rise. Consequently, in a relatively short space of time, large landowners transformed themselves into ‘progressive farmers’ and the *latifundia* became modern ‘capitalist farms’. In this way, land reform in Latin America altered the agrarian organization, not by raising the economic conditions of the rural poor, but by putting the fear of expropriation into the minds of the rural rich (Griffin, Khan & Ickowitz, 2002).

Employment: The land tenure structure changed with the implementation of agrarian reforms. In order to avoid land expropriation, landlords reduced the size of their properties by dividing them among their family members and also reduced their number of tenants. Instead, seasonal wage labourers were hired. Additionally, mechanization allowed the landlords to restructure their labour force and reduce it dramatically. Farm efficiency was often judged by the presence of machinery and the use of wage labour rather than tenant labour, which allowed the large estates to evade expropriation and therefore distribution of their lands (Kay, 1998). In Peru, by 1968, large-scale expropriation of large companies and farms took place. Large commercial enterprises were turned into workers' self-managed cooperatives. But only those who were already permanent employees could benefit. The position of seasonal laborers worsened and they had to work longer hours for significantly lower salaries (Christodoulou, 1990). If rural tenants do not have land on their own, then they should work on someone else's land in order to earn their livelihood (Kuhnen & Muller, 1982).

Gender equality: The women also face a high risk of land loss or expropriation especially in societies with weak legislation on lands. Women are in high risk, because usually the expropriation of land is a high-cost process in which the persons involved invest a great part of their time. Many women are single mothers and they live on a subsistence basis which barely allows them to earn money for their families. They cannot allow themselves to go to manifestations or to the competent authorities or institutions. Besides, they have to look after their children and is in charge of the housework, are self-employed or the women combine their jobs with family life and there are even cases where the only person in the home that works is the woman. The unfavorable consequences of land expropriation for women's independence and citizenship are complex because most villages also treated the monetary compensation to which individual members were entitled as the patrimony of household heads. Consequently, fewer women than men personally received compensation when the land was expropriated, and many compensated women received less than men. Simultaneously, however, gender disparities in the distributive impacts of expropriation motivated women to demand more inclusive, comprehensive restitution. When community rules stipulating gender as a condition of citizenship and governments' predatory land-taking oppose national laws supporting gender equality and state obligation to promote rural development, women simultaneously face substantial obstacles to acting locally as citizens. Furthermore, as land expropriation in the urban frontier often involves a transformation in the property institutions and public goods of communities, it also provides opportunities for women denied compensation to confront state authorities and national law against village organizations and rules. The extent to which the citizenship privileges of expropriated people expanded depended, partly, on the resulting interactions among the authorities, village decision-makers and women denied compensation" (Sargeson & Song, 2010). The good land governance supports women's land rights. Perhaps, if the land reform transforms into a strategy for promoting land expropriation for economic development, women's land rights are threatened because they do not have resources to participate in such complicated programs that are both highly political and heavy financially demanding (Kairaba & Simons, 2010).

Economy: There is a correlation between diminished levels of long-term investment and the absence of clear property rights (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010). Unclear property rights and the threat of expropriation causes the discouragement of land rental transactions. In addition to this, in terms of environment, the unclear property rights are a key of deforestation in Latin

America, because of the tenure problems in agricultural lands. The insecurity of property rights prevents farmers from increasing their land use intensity. Therefore, investment and employment are lower than with full property rights. The risk of expropriation because of land reform makes labor hiring and tenancy contracts risky. These factors decrease the employment rates and causes migration into urban and frontier areas (Heath & Binswanger, 1996).

7. Brazil and land expropriation: an unsolved dilemma

The redistribution through expropriation is a very sensitive political issue. When land is redistributed via expropriation, the law often defines the attributes of the properties to be expropriated. As important it is who will get the land is also important the lands targeted for redistribution. When land is expropriated, governments have to monitor every existing property and establish a list of properties potentially subject to expropriation. More often, beneficiaries invade land that they perceive to be eligible for redistribution, or establish on its boundaries (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009). When landowners are reluctant to concede their property, they use the judicial system to delay the expropriation process, if not to escape it altogether. Nonetheless, it was almost 30 years before Brazil acquired the political will to implement land reform at scale and before it finished restructuring the expropriation process. Several other countries have attempted to use land expropriation at scale for the purpose of land redistribution, but they have done so with less success than Brazil (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

After the adoption of the 1988 constitution, when strong political pressures and a growing social demand developed the government wanted to ease access to land for the rural poor and the promotion of land redistribution (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009). As a result, by the mid-1990s (and for four successive mandates) a dynamic process of land expropriation was in progress. As the article 176 specified, that any land expropriation eventually signed by the government should pay a compensation (which reflect the fair market price) to the former landowner in cash before any eviction⁴⁷ (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

In Brazil, under the expropriation program, land is acquired by and belongs to the government agency in charge of the land reform (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária - INCRA). The INCRA provides beneficiaries with user rights, or *direitos de posse*, until they have paid back all the costs of expropriation. In reality, titles have scarcely been given, meaning that most families settled under the expropriation program have so far acquired only

⁴⁷ Eviction: To recover (property, for example) by a superior claim or legal process (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2003).

user rights. Brazil's market-assisted program allows the beneficiaries to form an association and right away get a "joint-property title" that gives private ownership in the name of the association. When they have paid back the loans, beneficiaries are free to keep the land as it is or subdivide it among the association's members. The size of the properties are imposed by law (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

According to Baranyi, Deere & Morales (2004), wherever capitalist land expropriation has occurred, some form of violence has emerged as a method to ensure the modification of the resource. Consequently, the landless movement *Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST), was officially established in 1984. In contrast to other Latin American countries, the agrarian reform has a strong support in urban areas and among the middle class. Given the fact that much of Brazil's land is infertile, agrarian reform has the potential to create more direct and indirect rural jobs at lower cost than comparable investments in industry. Thus, an agrarian reform of sufficient extent and depth, by raising rural incomes and reviving rural municipalities, is expected to reduce rural-urban migration and contribute to a more balanced and equitable growth. The main opposition to the agrarian reform came from the landlords. However, because of the social movements and the rural violence, during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) the pace of land expropriation and organization of agrarian reform settlements increased substantially. From the lands expropriated, many families benefited. Cardoso wanted to create viable family farmers and each beneficiary family received a financing package that included a settlement grant and three credit lines under the *Programa de Crédito Especial para la Reforma Agraria* (PROCERA) (the Agrarian Reform Credit Program) for working capital investments in social and productive infrastructure. Luis Inacio da Silva continued to implement the agrarian reform. By mid-2003, initiatives were announced to increase food production for the internal market, expand rural employment and income and end hunger (Baranyi, Deere & Morales, 2004).

As the example of Brazil illustrates, a key precondition for land reform to be feasible and effective in improving beneficiaries' livelihoods is that such programs fit into a broader policy aimed at reducing poverty and establishing a favorable environment for the development of productive smallholder agriculture. If these are in place, several instruments are likely to complement each other, for instance, expropriation with compensation, negotiated land

reform, devolution of government land, and regular land sales as well as rental markets, with different modalities being suitable for different target groups (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2002).

The Brazilian Land Law of 1964 put a low prices on rental rates and crop shares, and ordered permanent rights to tenants after a few years of tenancy by protecting them from dispossession. Complementarily, it executed a new land tax on underused lands. Some of these lands were subject to land reform through expropriation. However, the next two decades of military rule, limited many development programs. The most successful large land reform was in 1998, when as a consequence of powerful peasant movements. At the same time, many of the privileges of the large estate farms were eliminated, which made landownership less desirable as an inflation barrier (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

Between 1996 and 2007, Brazil transferred farms to between 700,000 and 800,000 families. The transfers of land occurred through the government's expropriation program, a demonstration that large-scale expropriation can be done without disrupting the agricultural and overall economies of a country. The *Credito Fundiario* program and its precursors transferred land to about 90,000 farms under the directly negotiated land reform, in which land is purchased and developed by beneficiary communities through a combination of loans and grants. The high compensation paid to the landowners by the government of Brazil may explain the peaceful outcome of the program (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

Leite, Heredia, Medeiros, Palmeira & Cinarão (2004) found that 90 percent of the expropriations were initiated by local landless households, and they use the acquired land intensively and derive more than 70 percent of their income from it. Similar positive findings come from beneficiaries of the directly negotiated model. Beneficiaries' leadership and involvement combined with state support clearly have been positive factors (Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay & McKinley 2007).

Even if the small farmers can do well even with insufficient support, the technology and their competitiveness in the markets is critical for land reform to increase effectiveness and to transform small farmers into rural entrepreneurs. Also, appropriate institutional arrangements are needed to ensure access to credit and markets. Such institutions are especially important

where land reform involves resettling beneficiaries. To earn the efficiency gains of family farming under those conditions seems to require increasing the density of family labor, and that may require resettling landless workers from outside. Land expropriation had to be legal, hence a legal framework was set up to boost further alienation⁴⁸ and to protect what the state already had acquired (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

Expropriation should be a credible commitment that can be used in a timely manner as a last resort. The overall land reform policy objective should be to have a ready set of complementary land acquisition methods that have been tested and are operational (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon & Van den Brink, 2009).

The majority of Latin American countries have adopted agrarian reform programmes to restore the high concentration of land and the duality of *latifundio–minifundio* land tenure formation. While in some cases reform programs have redistributed extensive land areas (e.g. in Cuba), in nearly all cases lack of political efficiency has limited the success of the agrarian reform (Lorenzo & Camilla, 2006). By 2007, Brazil’s land reform programme has settled nearly one million families on small farms. The credit available, technical education and assistance to small farmers were part of the policies implemented. In this country where 3.5 percent of the landowners hold 56 percent of the arable land and the poorest 40 percent owns barely one percent, the Landless Workers Movement (MST) calls for accelerating the land reforms. Nevertheless, conflicts over land remain a problem in Brazil. Still many families occupy properties that are seen as unproductive and subject to agrarian reform and violent clashes periodically occur against landowners and their private militias. The MST complains that families who have been living in the movement’s camps for years, waiting to be assigned land of their own, have not been given priority treatment, and that the rural productivity index has not been updated. The index is one of the tools used by the government to decide when land has been left idle and unproductive, and thus qualifies under Brazilian law for expropriation and redistribution within the framework of the agrarian reform process (Osava, 2007).

⁴⁸ Alienation: the transfer of the ownership of property rights (Wordreference.com, 2011).

In spite of the results until now, the Brazilian government has still much to do. They have to find out a way to redistribute the lands and decrease this asset in hands of few in order to develop and improve the farmers livelihoods.

8. The case of Bajo Aguán Valley in Honduras and the failure of land reform: the implication of land expropriation

Honduras land reform is just another example of the implication of land reforms through expropriation in Latin America. The land reform was neither peaceful nor successful. Once more, the expropriation of lands is the last resource proposed recently to end the conflict on the Bajo Aguán Valley in Honduras.

In spite to be a country rich in natural resources, Honduras has extremely high levels of poverty, especially among the rural population. Part of these poverty concerns are connected to unequal distribution of land, where large estates (national and international) own more than half of the cultivated lands. Many peasant families live with little or no land to provide livelihood. In the area of Bajo Aguán, Trujillo, conflicts over land are very intense. The Bajo Aguán Valley is located 600 km northeast of Tegucigalpa, the capital city. Miguel Facussé is one of the most politically influential businessmen in Honduras and is one of the main growers of African palms (grewed with the intention of been used for biofuels). Miguel Facussé is against the sale of his lands for relocating the small farmers and complementarily, he has brought militia to protect his lands (Jarnum, 2011). The lands in this sector of Trujillo belong to the Peasant Movement of Aguán (MUCA), since the state through the National Agrarian Institute (INA) paid Temístocles Ramírez⁴⁹ for them, nevertheless Mr. Miguel Facussé took them over without any legal support (FIAN & Cervantes, 2010). The violent campesino land struggle against one of the country's largest private landowners has turned into a mini-civil war (Lydersen, 2011).

Poor farmers were initially granted collective land rights by the Agrarian Reform Law, passed in 1962. But since that time, both Honduran and transnational companies have illegally repurchased the valuable farms resulting in the farmers once again becoming powerless, low-wage serfs. In response, the palm workers (the oil extracted is part of different cooking products worldwide) have peacefully but “permanently” occupied several plantations in the

⁴⁹ In 1977, Temístocles Ramírez, a United States citizen of Puerto Rican origin, purchased 5,700 hectares along the coast, paying 165 thousand Lempiras in a flagrant violation of the Constitution which prohibits foreigners from owning land on coastlines and borders (FIAN & Cervantes, 2010).

district. According to the Committee of Popular Organizations of Aguán (COPA), these pacifist actions have resulted in the death of many farmers so far, as private security forces have repeatedly attacked on the campesinos, in attempts to force them out from their land. These workers just receive a salary equivalent to 5USD a day, and they have occupied the plantations because of lack of drinking water and food (Kryt, 2011).

Honduras is predominantly agricultural and is dependent on subsistence farming. Many families have no access to land and thousands more own less than three hectares, whereas large concentrations of land are in the hands of a few private owners (International Fact Finding Mission Report Honduras, 2011). In accordance to the property rights and its relation to food security it is relevant to say that 76 percent of the rural population lived in households that are not able to provide the adequate nutritional requirements. In order to produce food, the peasants need land (Sánchez, 2007). During the 1980s and 1990s, the legislation authorized a legislation in which private lands that were not fulfilling their social function, could be expropriated and redistributed to peasants for cultivation (Nelson, 2003). However, “Honduras is once again experiencing a distorted land distribution pattern: in only three years over 15,000 hectares of fertile land on the Atlantic Coast has been bought again by both the banana plantation producers, Standard Fruit Company (Dole) and Tela Railroad Company (Chiquita), which at the turn of the last century had acquired thousands of hectares of land” (FIAN & La Vía Campesina, n.d., 2). The so-called “banana republic” was long controlled by U.S. interests. By 1917, United Fruit Company (today Chiquita) owned extensive lands in the Honduran countryside. The commercial agriculture, especially cattle and cotton have led to waves of peasant expropriation from their lands (Kerssen, 2011).

The controversy is around the use of arable land for fuels, as opposed to food production, has which has caused a the increase of global food prices. In October 2011, the United Nations Committee on Food Security issued a report citing biofuel production as one of the leading causes of food shortages worldwide. Although, the U.N. is still supporting the two biogas plants attached to African palm plantations in the Aguán Valley as part of its controversial Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) program. CDMs permits to do business in carbon credits⁵⁰ between governments and companies from the Western countries (Kryt, 2011).

⁵⁰ Carbon credit: Permit that allows an entity to emit a specified amount of greenhouse gases. Also called emission permit. (businessdictionary.com, 2011)

According to the International Statement written on June 7, 2011 by Cesar Ham, the current Minister-Director of the INA, stated to the Council of Ministers that the non-implementation of a pacific agreement between the parties was due to the lack land legalization. The INA described a “lack of political willingness on the part of the landowners, and specifically Mr. Miguel Facussé Barjum, who had not accepted the price for land purchase that was established by law.” This is why the INA proposed “for the resolution of this problem in Bajo Aguán, expropriating these lands for the public domain via a Legislative Decree.” There is more to see if the expropriation of the lands for a peaceful resolution will be declared in the upcoming days, as the conflict is still unsolved. Additionally to the inefficiency of the government, there are still different occurring different murders, threatening the lives of the farmers and their families. One of the main reason is the corruption, because the lands represent wealth for their tenants. As the organization Via Campesina (n.d., 8) states: “It cannot be denied that the application of programs of land reform based on expropriation and/or maximum limits of land ownership suffers from deep shortcomings, which range from the lack of an institutional capacity to slowness and open corruption”.

The lands for the *campesinos* of the Bajo Aguán Valley represents its major source of food. According to Mr. Omar Palacios B. Advisor of the Minister-Director of the INA (personal communication, March 16, 2010), are suffering of hunger. All this conflict is not doing any good, than murdering small farmers and reinforcing the power that Mr. Facusse represents. A woman affected by this conflict stated: “we just want to feed our families and not to keep fighting”. The Mr. Palacios continues: “The media has not been objective to what they communicate to the general public. They are blaming the MUCA movement for starting the conflicts. This is an example on how the media, owned by the elites, manipulates the information according to their own interests”.

Conclusions

Incomplete land reforms did not benefit those in the lowest strata. With the end of the *latifundio* system, agrarian reforms came as an effort of distributing somehow equally the lands within national territories. Along with these reforms came expropriations. The expropriation of lands has had a negative repercussion if it did not favor the landless. We can even say that expropriations of lands were often inflicting underdevelopment. If the expropriation of lands will be implemented in a certain country, it should be done in a transparent way, with equal opportunities for the persons involved, so called a win-win strategy (where both the governments and peasantry benefit) and it should overall show positive results of an effective procedure to overcome poverty and exclusion.

Expropriation and all its strategies are just partially guilty for the underdevelopment. Other factors of government policies such as corruption or clientelism should be taken in the account, which would ease the fair and stable acquisition of lands for the rural and urban populations. As it was demonstrated in the case of Brazil and Honduras, the strategies for land reform and expropriation should be effective and not to cause underdevelopment.

Land policies are of fundamental importance to sustainable growth, good governance, and the well-being of and the economic opportunities open to rural and urban dwellers-particularly poor people.

List of References

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117, 1231-1294.
- Adams, M. (1995). Land reform: new seeds on old ground? Retrieved November 15, 2011, from ODI (Overseas Development Institute): <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2979.pdf>
- Adas, M. (1992). *One-Half Century Of Crisis, 1914-1945*. Princeton: Princeton University.
- Akram-Lodhi, A. H., Borras Jr., S. M., Kay, C. & McKinley, K. (2007). "Neoliberal Globalization, Land and Poverty: Implications for Public Action." In A. H. Akram-Lodhi, & S. M. Borras (Edits.), *Land, Poverty and Livelihoods in an Era of Globalization: Perspectives from Developing and Transition Countries* (p. 383–98). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Albeck, M. E. & Palomeque, S. (2009). Ocupación española de las tierras indígenas de la Puna y "Raya del Tucumán" durante el temprano período colonial. *Memoria Americana*, 17 (2).
- Albertus, M. (2010). *Democracy and the threat of redistribution in Latin America*. Department of Political Science. Stanford University.
- Alviar García, H. (2008). La redistribución de la tierra en Latinoamérica: Atrapada entre el desarrollo económico y el positivismo. *Derecho y Propiedad*, Seminario En Latinoamérica De Teoría Constitucional y Política .
- Ambaye, D. W. (2009). Land Valuation for Expropriation in Ethiopia: Valuation Methods and Adequacy of Compensation. 7th. FIG Regional Conference: Spatial Data Serving People: Land Governance and the Environment – Building the Capacity, (p. 1-38). Hanoi, Vietnam.
- Andelson, R. V. & Dawsey, J. M. (1992). *From Wasteland to Promised Land: Liberation Theology for a Post-Marxist World*. Shephard-Walwyn .

- Ankersen, T. T. & Ruppert, T. (2006). Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America. *Tulane Environmental Law Journal*, 19, 68-120.
- Arora, S. L. (1995). Proverbs and Prejudice: El Indio in Hispanic Proverbial Speech. *De Proverbio*, 1(2).
- Asian Development Bank. (2007). Capacity Building for Resettlement Risk Management: People's Republic of China Thematic Reports. Thematic.
- Assies, W. (2008). Land Tenure and Tenure Regimes in Mexico: An Overview. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 8(1), 33-63.
- Avivara. (2011). Poverty in Guatemala. Washington, USA. Retrieved October 21, 2011, from <http://www.avivara.org/aboutguatemala/povertyinguatemala.html>
- Ayala Mora, E. (2008). Resumen de Historia del Ecuador (3 ed.). Quito, Ecuador: Corporación Editoria Nacional. Retrieved from: <http://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/836/1/AYALAE-CON0001-RESUMEN.pdf>
- Barahona, D. (2006). The Move towards Independence in Latin America. Retrieved November 15, 2011, from *State of Nature Online Journal*: <http://www.stateofnature.org/latinAmerica.html>
- Baranyi, S., Deere, C. D. & Morales, M. (2004). Land and Development in Latin America: Openings for Policy Research. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre/The North-South Institute.
- Barraclough, S. (Ed.). (1973). Agrarian Structure in Latin America. Lexington: D.C. Heath.
- Barraclough, S. L. & Domike, A. L. (1966). Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries. *Land Economics*, 42 (4), 391-424.
- Barton, J. R. (1997). A Political Geography of Latin America. London: Routledge.
- Bates, R. H., Coatsworth, J. H. & Williamson, J. G. (2007). Lost Decades: Post-independence Performance in Latin America and Africa. *Journal of Economic History*, 67, 917-943.

- BBC News online. (2011). Peru's Shining Path defeated, rebel leader admits. London. Retrieved October 12, 2011, from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16066029>
- BBC News online. (August 13, 2003). Brazil's land reform dilemma. Retrieved on December 23 of 2011, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/3146937.stm
- Becker, M. (2006). Peruvian Shining Path. In J. V. DeFronzo (Ed.), *Revolutionary Movements in World History, From 1750 to the Present* (650-59). Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
- Becker, M. (2008). Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements. Durham, NC & London: Duke University Press.
- Beezley, W. H. (1969). Caudillismo: An Interpretive Note. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, 11 (3), 345-352 .
- Bernstein, H. (2002). Land Reform: Taking a Long(er) View. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 2(4), 433-463.
- Bethell, L. (1998). *Latin America Economy and Society since 1930*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P., Bourguignon, C. & Van den Brink, R. (Eds.). (2009). *Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus*. Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.
- Birdsall, N. & Londoño, J. L. (1997). Asset Inequality Matters: An Assessment of the World Bank's Approach to Poverty Reduction. Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. 87 No. 2, p. 7. *The American Economic Review*.
- Borras, S. M. Jr., Kay, C. & Akram Lodhi, A. H. (2007). *Agrarian Reform and Rural Development: Historical Overview and Current Issues*. Institute of Social Studies of The Hague and United Nations Development Program, Rural Development, Environment and Populations Studies Group. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies (ISS).

- Bourguignon, F. (2004). *The Poverty-Growth-Inequality Triangle*. Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (p. 32). New Delhi: The World Bank.
- Bowser, B. P. (Ed.). (1995). *Racism and Anti-Racism in World Perspective* (Vol. 13). California, U.S.A.: Sage Publications.
- Brands, H. (2010). *Latin America's Cold War*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Bulmer-Thomas, V. (1987). *The Political Economy of Central America since 1920*. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
- Bulmer-Thomas, V., Coatsworth, J. H. & Cortés Conde, R. (Eds.). (2006). *The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America* (Vol. 1). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Burns, E. B. (1980). *The poverty of progress*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Burns, T. (2007). *Land Administration Reform: Indicators of Success and Future Challenges*. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
- Busbin, M. (2011). Historical Search Archive. Retrieved November 5, 2011, from *Encomienda System and the New World Indians*: <http://historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?action=read&artid=633>
- Businessdictionary.com. (2011). Carbon credit. Retrieved December 26, 2011, from <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/carbon-credit.html>
- Calero, L. F. (1997). *Chiefdoms Under Siege: Spain's Rule and Native Adaptation in the Southern Columbian Andes, 1535- 1700*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Chamberlain, R. S. (1954). Simpson's the *Encomienda* in New Spain and Recent *Encomienda* Studies. *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 34(2), 238-250.
- Chance, J. K. (1989). *Conquest of the Sierra: Spaniards and Indians in Colonial Oaxaca*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Christodoulou, D. (1990). *The Unpromised Land: Agrarian Reform and Conflict Worldwide*. London: Zedbooks.
- Chronic Poverty Research Center (CPRC). (2009). *The Chronic Poverty Report 2008-2009: Escaping poverty traps*. Manchester, UK: The Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC).
- Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC). (2005). *The Chronic Poverty Report 2005-05*. Manchester: University of Manchester.
- Coatsworth, J. H. (1978). Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-Century Mexico. *The American Historical Review*, 83(1), 80-10.
- Coatsworth, J. H. (2008). Inequality, Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 40, 545–569.
- Collier, D. (Ed.). (1979). *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Cottam, M. (1994). *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Cotula, L. (2010). Why it makes more sense to invest in farmers than in farmland. Retrieved on 10, March of 2011, from International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED): <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17082IIED.pdf>
- De Ferranti, D., Perry, G. E., & Ferreira, F. H. (2003). *Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History? Advance Conference Edition*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
- De Janvry, A. (1981). *The agrarian question and reformism in Latin America*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- De Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (1989). A Study in Resistance to Institutional Change: The Lost Game of Latin American Land Reform. *World Development*, 17 (9), 1397-1409.
- De Janvry, A. & Sadoulet, E. (2002). *Comments on Political and Equity Aspects of Land Rights*. Pachuca, Mexico: Paper presented at the World Bank Land Workshop.

- De Janvry, A. & Sadoulet, E. (2002). Land reform in Latin America: Ten Lessons Toward A Contemporary Agenda. World Bank's Latin American Land Policy Workshop. Pachuca, Mexico.
- De Janvry, A. & Sadoulet, E. (2011). The Three Puzzles of Land Reform. Fondation Pour Les Etudes et Recherches Sur le Developpement International. Berkeley: University of California.
- De Janvry, A., Gordillo, G. & Sadoulet, E. (1997). Mexico's second agrarian reform: household and community responses, 1990. Center for US-Mexican Studies. La Jolla, California: University of California, San Diego.
- De Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E. & Wolford, W. (1998). From state-led to grassroots led land reform in Latin America. WIDER-FAO workshop on "Access to land". Santiago, Chile: University of California at Berkeley.
- De la Escosura, L. P. (2009). Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America. *Journal of Latin American Studies* , 41(2), 279-307.
- De Walt, B., Rees, M. & Murphy, A. (1994). The end of agrarian reform in Mexico: past lessons and future prospects. Center for US-Mexican Studies. La Jolla, California: University of California.
- Degregori, C. (1992). Campesinado andino y violencia: balance de una década de estudios. En C. Degregori, J. Escobar, & B. Marticorena (Edits.), Perú: el Problema Agrario en Debate (413-439). Seminario Permanente de Investigaciones Agrarias (SEPIA).
- Denevan, W. M. (1966). The aboriginal cultural geography of the Llanos de Mojos of Bolivia,. *Ibero-Americana* , 48.
- Dobado González, R., & García Montero, H. (2010). Colonial Origins of Inequality in Hispanic America? Some Evidence on Wages and Heights. *Revista de Historia Económica/Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 28 (2), 253-277.
- Doebele, W. A. (1987). The Evolution of Concepts of Urban Land Tenure in Developing Countries. *Habitat International* , 11 (1), 7-22.

- Dollar, D., & Kraay, A. (2000). Growth Is Good for the Poor. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 7 (3), 195-225.
- Dore, L., & Weeks, J. (1996). The Changing Faces of Imperialism. Retrieved December 17, 2011, from United States imperialism in the Americas: <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/40/014.html>
- Dorner, P. (1992). Latin American Land Reforms. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Dorner, P., & Saliba, B. (1981). Interventions in Land Markets to Benefit the Rural Poor. Land Tenure Center. Madison: University of Wisconsin.
- Dussell, E. (1981). A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation 1492 - 1979. (A. Neely, Ed., & A. Neely, Trans.) Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
- Economy Watch. (2010). Agrarian Reform. Retrieved December 24, 2011, from <http://www.economywatch.com/agrarian/>
- Edelman, M. (1992). The logic of the *latifundio*: the large estates of northwestern Costa Rica. Stanford, California, U.S.A.: Stanford University Press.
- Eiss, P. K. (2011). Indigenous Sovereignty under and after Spanish Rule. *William and Mary Quarterly* , 68 (4), 713-719.
- Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. Web . (2011). Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Retrieved on November 22, 2011, from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/87535/cabildo>
- Engerman, S. L. & Sokoloff, K. L. (2005). Colonialism, inequality, and long-run paths of development . Working Paper 11057, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Farley, K. A. (1995). A study of nontraditional exports and sustainable development in Guatemala. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest/The American University.

- Ferraro, V. (1996). *Dependency Theory: An Introduction*. (M. H. College, Producer)
Retrieved November 15, 2011, from <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm>
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (1993). *Rural Poverty Alleviation: Policies and Trends*. Rome: FAO.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2002). *Land tenure and rural development*. Rome: FAO.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2002). *Law and Sustainable Development since Rio - Legal Trends in Agriculture* (Vol. FAO Legislative Study No. 73). Rome: FAO.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (n.d.). *The Land Poor: Essential Partners for the Sustainable Management of Land Resources*. Rome: FAO.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (1999). *The Continuing Need for Land Reform: making the case for civil society* (Vol. 1). Rome.
- Food First and Information and Action Network (FIAN); Victoria Cervantes. (2010). *Massacre of members of Peasant Movement of Aguán, Tocoa, Honduras*. Retrieved December 20, 2011, from http://hondurasresists.blogspot.com/2010_11_01_archive.html#
- Food First Information and Network (FIAN); La Vía Campesina. (n.d.). *Agrarian Reform in Honduras*. Retrieved December 18, from <http://www.fao.org/righttofood/KC/downloads/vl/docs/AH265.pdf>
- Frank, A. (1967). *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. London: Monthly Review Press.
- Frankema, E. (2010). The colonial roots of land inequality: geography, factor endowments, or institutions. *The Economic History Review*, 63 (2), pages 418–451.
- Furtado, C. (1964). *Development and Underdevelopment*. (R. W. De Agruar, & E. C. Drysdale, Eds.) Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Furtado, C. (1965). *Development and Stagnation in Latin America: A Structuralist Approach*. St. Louis: Social Science Institute, Washington U.
- Furtado, C. (1976). *Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to 1973*. (2 ed.). (T. S. Macedo, Ed.) New York: Cambridge UP.
- Galeano, E. H. (1973). *Open veins of Latin America: five centuries or the pillage of a continent*. (C. Belfrage, Trans.) New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Galiani, S., & Schargrotsky, E. (2010). *Resource Allocation, Transaction Costs and Land Property Rights*.
- Gar-On Yeh, A., & Lis, X. (1999). Economic Development and Agricultural Land Loss in the Pearl River Delta, China. *Habitat International* , 23 (3), 373-390.
- Gascón, J. (2009). *¿Del paradigma de la industrialización al de la Soberanía Alimentaria?* Barcelona: Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament.
- Giner, S., & Sevilla, E. (1977). The *latifundio* as a local mode of class domination: the Spanish case. *Iberian Studies*, 6, 47–58.
- Gomez, P. (1985). The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants. *Natural Resources Journal*, 25 (1), 1039-80.
- Goñi, E., López, J. H., & Servén, L. (2008). *Fiscal Redistribution and Income Inequality in Latin America*. Policy Research Working Paper 4487, The World Bank, Development Research Group; Macroeconomics and Growth Team.
- Grandia, L. (2006). *Land Dispossession and Enduring Inequity for the Q'eqchi' Maya in the Guatemalan and Belizean Frontier Colonization Process*. University of California-Berkeley.
- Griffin, K. (1989). *Alternative Strategies for Economic Development*. London: MacMillan Press.
- Griffin, K., Khan, A. R., & Ickowitz, A. (2002). Poverty and the Distribution of Land. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 2 (3), 279-330.

- Guriev, S., & Sonin, K. (2007). Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested. Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School.
- Halls, C. (1976). El Café y el Desarrollo Histórico-geográfico de Costa Rica. San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia.
- Hamilton, N. (1981). State Autonomy and Dependent Capitalism in Latin America. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 32 (3), 305-329.
- Hamilton, N., & Stoltz Chinchilla, N. (1991). Central American Migration: A Framework for Analysis. *Latin American Research Review*, 26 (1), 75-110.
- Hamnett, B. R. (1997). Process and Pattern: A Re-Examination of the Ibero-American Independence Movements, 1808-1826. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 29 (2), 279-328.
- Heath, J., & Binswanger, H. (1996). Natural Resource Degradation Effects of Poverty and Population Growth are Largely Policy-Induced: The Case of Colombia. *Environment and Development Economics*, 1, 65-83.
- Heitger, B. (2003). Property Rights and their Impact on the Wealth of Nations - A Cross-Country Study. Kiel Working Paper No. 1163, Kiel Institute for World Economics, Kiel, Germany.
- Hellman, J., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D., & Schankerman, M. (2000). Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies. Governance, Regulation and Finance, The World Bank Institute, and European Bank for Reconstruction and the Development Chief Economist's Office. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Hendrix, S. E. (1995). Property Law Innovation in Latin America with Recommendations. *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 18 (1), 58.
- Herrera, A., Riddell, J. & Toselli, P. (1997). Recent FAO experiences in land reform and land tenure. Land Tenure Service, FAO.

- Hillar, M. (1993). Liberation Theology: Religious response to social problems, a survey. (M. Hillar, & H. Leuchtag, Eds.) *Humanism and Social Issues. Anthology of Essays.* , 35-52.
- Hoban, C., & Tsunokawa, K. (1997). *Roads and the environment: a handbook.* Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
- Horowitz, M. (Ed.). (2005). *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- International Fact Finding Mission Report Honduras: Human Rights violations in Bajo Aguán. (July 2011).
- International Statement: Honduras. (2011, June 7). International Statement: Honduras – Bajo Aguán: International Networks Denounce Ongoing Killings and Severe Human Rights Violation. Retrieved December 24, 2011, from <http://www.fian.org/news/press-releases/honduras-2013-bajo-aguan-international-networks-denounce-ongoing-killings-and-severe-human-rights-violations/pdf>
- Jackson, K. A., & De Soto, H. (2011). *International Property Rights Index Report.* Property Rights Alliance. Washington, DC: Americans for Tax Reform Foundation and Property Rights Alliance.
- Jaramillo, C. F., & Kelly, T. (1997). *Deforestation and Property Rights in Latin America.* Inter-American Development Bank (IADB): Washington, D.C.
- Jarnum, K. M. (2011). *Stolen Land, Stolen Future: A Report on Land Grabbing in Cambodia and Honduras.* (M. Haakansson, Ed.) Copenhagen: DanChurchAid (Folkekirkens Nødhjælp).
- Jarvis, L. (1992). The unravelling of the agrarian reform. En C. Kay, & P. Silva (Edits.), *Development and Social Change in the Chilean Countryside (189-213).* Amsterdam: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA).
- Johansen, B. E., & Pritzker, B. M. (Eds.). (2008). *Encyclopedia of American Indian History* (Vol. 1). Lybrary of Congress Cataloging-in-publication Dta.

- Kairaba, A., & Simons, J. D. (2010). Impact of the Land Reform on the Land Rights and Economic Poverty Reduction of the Majority Rural Economic especially Women who Depend on Land for their Livelihood. Kigali, Rwanda: Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development.
- Kay, C. (1988). The landlord road and the subordinate peasant road to capitalism in Latin America. *Etudes Rurales* , 77, 5-20.
- Kay, C. (1998). Latin America's agrarian reform: lights and shadows. *Land Reform Journal* , 2, 8-32.
- Kay, C. (2000). Conflict and Violence in Rural Latin America. Annual Congress of ADLAF (Asociación Alemana de Investigación sobre América Latina). Hamburg.
- Kay, C. (2001). Asia's and Latin America's Development in Comparative Perspective: Landlords, Peasants and Industrialization. Working Paper Series No. 336, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
- Keen, B., & Haynes, K. (2009). A History of Latin America (8 ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.
- Kerssen, T. (2011). Selling Honduras Off to the Highest Bidder Repression and Backroom Deals in Honduras. Retrieved December 25, 2011, from <http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/3427>
- Kingstone, P. (2011). The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development. New York: Taylor & Francis/Routledge.
- Kirk, M., Löffler, U. & Zimmermann, W. (2005). Land Tenure in Development Cooperation: Guiding principles. Retrieved March 10, 2011, from Global Donor Platform for Rural Development: <http://www.donorplatform.org/component/resource/items/6-donor-platform.html?filter18%5B0%5D=RmVkJXJhbCBNaW5pc3RyeSBmb3IgdW50ICVp&start=10>
- Kirkwood, B. (2010). The history of Mexico (2 ed.). Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A.: Greenwood Publishing Group.

- Klar, N. (2008). The Klar Books Site. Retrieved November 23, 2011, from Land Reform in Latin America: <http://klarbooks.com/academic/ldreform.html>
- Kleinpenning, J. M., & Zoomers, E. (2008). Elites, the Rural Masses and Land in Paraguay: The Subordination of the Rural Masses to the Ruling Class. *Development and Change*, 22 (2), 279-295.
- Krieger, J. (2001). *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* (2 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kryt, J. (2011). Carbon Credits in the 'Valley of Death'. Retrieved December 24, 2011, from: http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/12285/carbon_credits_in_the_valley_of_death
- Kuhnen, F., & Muller, K. (1982). *Man and Land: An introduction into the problems of agrarian structure and agrarian reform*. Saarbrücken, Germany: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe.
- La Vía Campesina. (n.d.). Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform Working document: Commentary on land and rural development policies of the World Bank. Retrieved December 10, 2011, from: http://viacampesina.net/downloads/PDF/Global_Campaign_WB_policies_factsheet.en.pdf
- Lambert, J. (1967). *Latin America Social Structure and Political Institutions*. (H. Katel, Trans.) Berkeley and Los Angeles, California U.S.A.; London, England: University of California Press.
- Landesa. (2011). *The Global Land Rush: A Fact Sheet on Commercial Land Acquisitions in Developing Countries*.
- Larson, A., Cronkleton, P., Barry, D., & Pacheco, P. (2008). *Tenure Rights and Beyond: Community access to forest resources in Latin America*. Occasional Paper no. 50, CIFOR (Center for International Forestry Research), Bogor, Indonesia.
- Lastarria-Cornhiel, S., & Melmed-Sanjak, J. (1999). *Land Tenancy in Asia, Africa and Latin America: A look at the past and a view to the future*. Land Tenure Center of Wisconsin-Madison. Wisconsin, U.S.A: University of Wisconsin-Madison.

- Legrand, C. C. (1995). Informal resistance on a Dominican sugar plantation during the Trujillo dictatorship. *Hispanic American Historical Review* , 75 (4), 555-59.
- Leite, S., Heredia, B., Medeiros, L., Palmeira, M., & Cinarão, R. (2004). Impactos dos Assentamentos: Um Estudo sobre o Meio Rural Brasileir. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora UNESP.
- León, M. & Deere, C. D. (2001). ¿De quién es la tierra? Género y programas de titulación de tierra en América Latina. Cuaderno del CENDES , 43-69.
- Levine, R. (2005). Law, Endowments, and Property Rights. NBER Working Paper No. 11502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Lewis, W. (1977). The Evolution of the Internationl Economic Order. Princeton: Janeway Lectures.
- Ling, D., & Archer, W. (2005). Real Estate Principles: a value approach. Irwin: McGrawHill .
- Lockhart, J. (1969). *Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies*. *The Hispanic American Historical Review* , 49 (3), 411-429.
- López, R., & Valdés, A. (Edits.). (2000). Rural Poverty in Latin America. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Lorenzo, C., & Camilla, T. &. (2006). Better land access for the rural poor, lessons from experience and challenges ahead. Food and Agriculture Organization.
- Lusk, D. (2011). Historical Text Archive: *Repartimiento*. Retrieved November 11, 2011, from <http://historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?action=read&artid=637>
- Luttwak, E. (1979). Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lydersen, K. (2011). More Assassinations and Bloodshed in Honduras Land Occupation. Retrieved December 24, 2011, from http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/11860/more_assassinations_and_bloodshed_in_honduras_land_occupation/

- Mabry, D. J. (2011). Colonial Latin America. Mississippi State University; The Historical Text Archive.
- MacLeod, M. J. (2008). Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720. Austin, Texas, United States of America: First University of Texas Press Edition.
- Marquez, O. & Ramos Navarro, L. (1998). Compilation of Colonial Spanish Terms and Document Related Phrases (2 ed.). Midway City, California: SHHAR (Society of Hispanic Historical and Ancestral Research) Press.
- Meade, T. A. (2010). A history of modern Latin America: 1800 to the present. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Means, P. A. (1920). Indian Legislation in Peru. *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 3 (4), 509-534.
- Mecham, J. (2001). Causes and consequences of deforestation in Ecuador. Retrieved October 21, 2011, from <http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/projects/jefferson.htm>
- Mellafe, R. (2004). Latifundio y poder rural en Chile de los siglos XVII y XVIII. *Revista de Estudios Históricos*, 1 (1).
- Meyer, C. (1989). Agrarian Reform in the Dominican Republic: An Associative Solution to the Collective/Individual Dilemma. *World Development*, 17 (8), 1255-67.
- Mojares, R. B. (2006). Brains of the nation: Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Isabelo de los Reyes and the production of modern knowledge. Quezón City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Montgomery, J. (1984). International Dimensions of Land Reform. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Moses, B. (1898). The Establishment of Spanish Rule in America: An Introduction to the History and Politics of Spanish America. New York: The Knickerbocker Press.
- Motolinía, T. D. (1971). Memoriales; o, Libro de las cosas de la Nueva España y de los naturales de ella . (E. O'Gorman, Ed.) México D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas.

- Mountain Research and Development. (1984). Evolution of Land-Use Patterns. State of Knowledge Report on Andean Ecosystems: The Southern Andes and Sierras Pampeanas, 4 (2), 134-149.
- Moyo, S., & Yeros, P. (Edits.). (2005). Reclaiming the land: the Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. London: Zedbooks.
- Muñoz, L. (2001). The Search for Equity in Access to Land in Latin America: Which are the Main Characteristics that Define a Sustainable Land Reform Model? Retrieved December 20, 2011, from <http://www.cebem.org/centdocum/documentos/docpdf/theseach.pdf>
- Nelson, R. T. (2003). Honduras Country Brief: Property rights and land markets. 44. Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin–Madison.
- Newson, L. A. (1985). Indian Population Patterns in Colonial Spanish America. *Latin American Research Review*, 41-74.
- North, D. C., Summerhill, W. & Weingast, B. R. (1999). Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin America vs. North America. (B. B. De Mesquita, & H. L. Root, Eds.) *Governing for Prosperity* .
- North, D. C., Summerhill, W. & Weingast, B. R. (2000). Order, Disorder and Economic exchange in Latin America vs. North America. (B. B. Root, Ed.) (*Governing for Prosperity*).
- Öberg, S. (2007). Changing land tenure: Evaluating the effects of Egypt's law 96 of 1992. School of Economics and Commercial Law , Department of Economic History. Göteborg University.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2011). Expropriation laws and reviews. Retrieved December 20, 2011, from http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3746,en_39048427_39049329_39634121_1_1_1_1,00.html
- Osava, M. (2007). No Consensus on Success of Land Reform. Retrieved October 28, 2011, from <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37053>

- Ouweneel, A. (1996). *Shadows over Anahuac: An Ecological Interpretation of Crisis and Development in Central Mexico, 1730–1800* (1st. ed.). Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Padilla, F. (1994). *Handbook of Hispanic Cultures in the United States: Sociology*. (N. Kadellos, & C. Esteva-Fabregat, Eds.) Houston, Texas: Arte Público Press; Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana.
- Paige, J. M. (1989). *The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in Central America*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, . San Francisco: University of Michigan.
- Pietschmann, H. (1988). “Agricultura e Industria Rural Indígena en el México de la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII.” In *Empresarios, Indios Y Estado: Perfil de la Economía Mexicana, (Siglo XVIII)*. (A. O. Torales, Ed.) Amsterdam: CEDLA (Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation).
- Polis Schutz, J. (1998). *The Impact of the Sandinistas on Nicaragua*. Retrieved December 4, 2011, from <http://www.jorian.com/san.html>
- Prem, H. J. (1992). Spanish Colonization and Indian Property in Central Mexico, 1521-1620. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* , Vol. 82 (3), 444-459.
- Przeworski, A., & Curvale, C. (2005). Does politics explain the economic gap between the United States and Latin America? In F. Fukuyama, *Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States*. Oxford University Press; Department of Politics, New York University.
- Robinson, W. I. (2008). *Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sadoulet, E. (1992). Labor-Service Tenancy in a Latin American Context. *American Economic Review* , 82 (4), 1031-42.
- Sáenz, M. (1999). *Identity of Liberation in Latin American Thought: Latin American historicism and the phenomenology of Leopold Zea*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.

- Salvatore, R. D. (2010). The Post-colonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality: A Historian's Point of View. *A Contracorriente*, 8(1), 332-348.
- Sánchez, S. M. (2007). Pursuing a Dream. Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) ; ACTIONAID, Tegucigalpa; Heidelberg.
- Sargeson, S. & Song, Y. (2010). Land expropriation and the gender politics of citizenship in the urban frontier. *The China Journal*, 64, 19-45.
- Savoy, S. (2011). Law's Labor's Lost: Failure of Peru's 1969 Agrarian Reform Law to Stimulate Agricultural Production. (E. Sepúlveda, & D. B. Lockhart, Eds.) *Journal of the Latino Research Center: Conference Food Security and International Migration Perspective from the Americas*, 5.
- Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria (SRA). (2011). Retrieved November 11, 2011, from Origen de los latifundios: <http://www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/conoce-la-sra/historia/origen-de-loslatifundios/>
- Shearer, E. B., Lastarria-Cornhiel, S. & Mesbah, D. (1991). The Reform of Rural Land Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean: Research, theory, and policy implications. Land Tenure Center. University of Wisconsin–Madison.
- Simpson, L. B. (1950). The *encomienda* in New Spain; the beginning of Spanish Mexico. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Singelmann, P. (1974). Campesino Movements and Class Conflict in Latin America: The Functions of Exchange and Power. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 16 (1), 39-72.
- Singh, A. (1999). From Cane to Coca-Cola: Sugar and Trade in the Dominican Republic. ESPM 165 Term Research Paper, International Rural Development Policy.
- Slunge, D. & Jaldin, R. (2007). Bolivia Environmental Policy Brief: Environmental Sustainability, Poverty and the National Development Plan. Göteborg University , Environmental Economics Unit, Department of Economics.
- Smith, W. C. (Ed.). (2009). Latin American Democratic Transformations: Institutions, Actors and Processes. Malden: University of Miami/Blackwell Publishing.

- Stearns, P. N., Adas, M. B., Schwartz, S. B., & Gilbert, M. J. (2007). *World Civilizations: The Global Experience, Combined Volume, Atlas Edition (5 ed.)*. Pearson.
- Tan, S. K. (1987). *A History of the Philippines*. Quezón City, Philippines: The University of the Philippines Press.
- Tannenbaum, F. (1929). *The Mexican agrarian revolution*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Texas A&M. (2011). Colonial Terms. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.tamut.edu/academics/mperry/ColAm/Spanish%20Terms.htm>
- The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (2003). (4). Retrieved November 7, 2011, from <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/>
- Thiesenhusen, W. (1989). Introduction: Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America in *Searching*. (W. C. Thiesenhusen, Ed.) Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Thiesenhusen, W. (1995). *Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Tindall, G. B., & Shi, D. E. (1984). *America: A Narrative History*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Tulchin, J. S. (1988). The United States and Latin America in the 1960s. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 30(1), 1-36.
- Valenzuela, J. S., & Valenzuela, A. (1978). Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment. *Comparative Politics*, 10(4), 535-557.
- Véliz, C. (1994). *The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press.
- Voss, S. F. (2002). *Latin America in the Middle Period 1750-1929*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Ward, J. (1997). *Latin America: Development and Conflict since 1945*. New York: Routledge.

- Warriner, D. (1969). *Land reform in principle and practice*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Willis, K. (2011). *Theories and Practices of Development* (2 ed.). New York: Routledge.
- Wordreference.com. (2011). *Wordreference English Dictionary Online*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved November 6, 2011, from <http://www.wordreference.com/>
- World Bank. (2002). *Mexico-Urban Development: A Contribution to a National Urban Strategy*. Washington D.C.: Latin America and Caribbean Department.
- World Bank; IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) & UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). (2010). *Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources*. Retrieved December 21, 2011, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/214574-1111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf
- World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies (WOCAT). (2011). *Glossary*. Retrieved December 21, 2011, from http://www.wocat.net/en/knowledge-base/documentation-analysis/glossary.html?tx_a21glossaryadvancedoutput_pi1%5Bchar%5D=all&tx_a21glossaryadvancedoutput_pi1%5Bpointer%5D=3&cHash=474f42e912a00fd45d49b0f262a1d628
- Yeager, T. J. (1995). *Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown's Choice of Labor Organization in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America*. *The Journal of Economic History*, 55(4), 842-859.
- Zambrano, M. A. (2011). *Temas*, 65, 30-37.