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**From War Trajectory to Electoral Trajectory? The change of the strategy of the  
EZLN from 1994 to 2018**

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## Zadání diplomové práce

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### **Cíl, metody, literatura, předpoklady:**

This diploma thesis will aim to analyze how the informative and political strategy of the Mexican Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional changed from 1994 till 2018 as a reaction on inner actions of the government of Mexico. The main goal of this work will be to identify and analyze the switches in the strategy of Zapatistas during the escalated conflict in Chiapas and afterwards. Furthermore, this analysis will consider something crucial for any political or social movement: the "adversary selection" according to the political joint. The work will consider 4 episodes of the conflict in 1994, 2001, 2006 and 2018 and Zapatistas responses on actions of government and other political actors. The methodological strategy of this work will be the process tracking method. Using the starting point of 1994, and based in both, primary sources (basic documents of EZLN, press and deep interviews with key actors) and secondary sources (literature related), this research will describe and interpret the development and main informative and political changes of the EZLN from its appearing until 2018.

Collier, George A., and Quaratiello, Elizabeth Lowery. 2005. *Basta!: Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*. New York: Food First Books. Third Edition. Harvey, Neil. 1998. *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*. Duke University Press. Fox, Jonathan. 1994. *The Roots of Chiapas*. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 29, No. 19, pp. 1119-1122. Benitez-Manaut, Raul, Seleem, Andrew and Arnson, Cynthia J.. 2006. *Frozen Negotiations: The Peace Process in Chiapas*. *Mexican Studies Estudios Mexicanos* Vol. 22, Issue 1, pp 131-152. Pratkanis, Anthony, and Aronson, Elliot. 2001. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Santa Cruz. University of California. Lajous, Alejandra. 2003. *Donde se perdio el cambio?: tres episodios emblematicos del gobierno de Fox*. Planeta Mexico. Diaz, Carlos. 1995. *La rebelion de las canadas: Origen y ascenso del EZLN*. Mexico. Debolsillo. Bartolome, Herman Efrain. 1995. *Ocosingo. Diario de Guerra y algunas voces*. Mexico. Editorial Joaquin Mortiz; 1. ed edition. Araujo, Octavio Rodriguez. 2005. *Mi paso por el Zapatismo*. Mexico. Oceano. Yehya, Naief. 2004. *Guerra y Propaganda*. Paidós Mexicana Editorial. Froehling, Oliver. 1997. *The Cyberspace: War of Ink and Internet in Chiapas, Mexico*. *Geographical Review*, Vol. 87, No. 2, *Cyberspace and Geographical Space*, pp. 291-307.

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**Declaration**

I declare that I have written this Master's thesis independently (under the supervision of the head supervisor of the thesis) and stated all employed sources and literature.

In Hradec Králové 22.06.2021

.....

(Signature)



## **Acknowledgment**

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## **Annotation**

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Tato diplomová práce se zaměří na analýzu, jak se informativní a politická strategie mexického Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional změnila od roku 1994 do roku 2018 v reakci na vnitřní akce mexické vlády. Hlavním cílem této práce je identifikovat a analyzovat změny ve strategii Zapatistů během eskalovaného konfliktu v Chiapasu a později. Kromě toho tato analýza zahrnuje něco zásadního pro jakékoli politické nebo sociální hnutí: „výběr protivníka“ podle politické spojení. Práce se zabývá čtyřmi epizodami konfliktu v letech 1994, 2001, 2006 a 2018 a odpověďmi Zapatistů na kroky vlády a dalších politických aktérů. Metodickou strategií této práce je metoda sledování procesu. S využitím výchozího bodu z roku 1994 a na základě primárních zdrojů (základní dokumenty EZLN, tisk a rozhovory s klíčovými aktéry) a sekundárních zdrojů (související s literaturou) tento výzkum popisuje a interpretuje vývoj a hlavní informativní a politické změny EZLN od jeho vzniku až do roku 2018.

Keywords: EZLN, Mexico, Conflict in Chiapas, political strategy, social movement

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## **The list of used abbreviations**

CIG - Government of Indigenous Peoples

CNI – National Indigenous Congress

COCOPA - Harmony and Pacification Commission

EZLN - Zapatista Army of National Liberation

FLN - Forces for the National Liberation

FMLN - Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

FSLN - Sandinista National Liberation Front

MAREZ - Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities

MORENA - National Regeneration Movement

NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement

PAN - National Action Party

PRD - Democratic Revolution Party

PRI - Institutional Revolutionary Party

URNG - Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

USA/US – United States of America

USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## Introduction

The history of the Mexican socio-political movement Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) shows a unique experience of using political tools to achieve their ideological goals. The EZLN began as a complex guerrilla movement that was not significantly different from other guerrilla movements in Latin America.

However, over time, under the influence of internal abilities and, most importantly, external factors, it changed its strategy. Thus, the EZLN is an atypical example of a guerrilla movement. Based on leftists anticapitalistic ideologies, but also inspired by political thoughts grown in the specific Latin American context (such as Theology of liberation and the Mexican agrarianism of Emiliano Zapata during the Revolution of 1910), the Zapatistas are fundamentally different from other guerrilla movements in Latin America, at least for the reason that the actual fighting between the Mexican government and the Zapatistas lasted only twelve days in 1994, and not several years, as in other countries. Thus, quickly it changed to a different phenomenon, despite preserving their military organization.

The roots of Zapatistas started earlier –since any political movement or actor starts from *nothingness*-, but its armed irruption in public life was on January 1, 1994, when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force. Zapatistas occupied five cities, and San Cristobal in Mexico's southernmost state, Chiapas (Ronfeldt et al. 1998: 1). After the event in 1994 will receive the name "the first postmodern peasant uprising" (Weinber 2002: 189). On New Year Eve, the First Declaration from the Jungle of Lacandona was issued, which sets out the basic requirements of ELZN, which were "work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace" (EZLN Command 1993a). The Zapatistas have declared war on the Mexican government (led by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional and with Carlos Salinas de Gortari as president) and against the "politics of neoliberalism." This declaration was followed by twelve days of fighting before a truce is declared. As a result of the fierce battle that claimed 145 deaths and hundreds of injuries, both sides agree to a ceasefire (School for Chiapas). After the hostilities, the EZLN announced a truce with the government and a dialogue process, and the form of this truce was

the *San Andrés Agreements*. The ceasefire, however, never meant the end of the struggle. Since the declaration of war was preserved, but the truce is extended until nowadays.<sup>1</sup>

In 1994, the history of EZLN had an inflection point that still has been adapting of their political behavior to the Mexican historical conditions, where weapons haven't been any more the center of their strategy or political participation.

After the ceasefire, Zapatistas became another kind of political actor, and the government interpreted them as an entity that was out of the margin of electoral institutions. However, they were making visible social problems in the Southern part of the country and still facing repressive actions. Therefore, and after the events of 1994, Carlos Salinas's Government offered an "amnesty" and pretended to negotiate with them a peace process and political agreements to channel their demands and possibilities, known as the *San Andrés Agreements*. However, it didn't happen ultimately since the Harmony and Pacification Commission (COCOPA) was a mechanism from the government to try to create a solution to the movement's agenda. Still, also it was more a dialog than an institutional channel to solve the proclaims of Zapatistas. Institutionally and socially, their demands were still in the air. But, politically, EZLN had a change: move on from guerrilla to another objective, where they did not participate in electoral politics but tried to get institutional changes, such as State recognition of their autonomy and organization in small communities in Chiapas. Nevertheless, after this fundamental change, the shadows of repression from the paramilitary groups of the Mexican state (existing since the 40's decade but strengthened during the Cold War, due to the objective of combating the "armed socialism" in Mexico) remain in Chiapas. There is still a suspicion that paramilitary groups and enemies of EZLN have organized massacres in Acteal and Aguas Blancas in 1997.

After that, the next important episode for Zapatistas happened in 2000 when PRI lose the election for the first time in Mexican history, after ruling 70 years. Vicente Fox from the center-right National Action Party (PAN) wins. Vicente Fox promises to resolve the conflict in Chiapas. With the replacement of the ruling party comes hope for implementing the San Andrés Agreements and trying to make them an institutionalization of autonomy of EZLN communities to be ruled with different parameters than the rest of the country. The Zapatistas decide to enter into dialogue with Fox. Vicente Fox, in turn, orders the army to withdraw from several positions in the rebellious Chiapas region as a symbolic gesture of goodwill (School for Chiapas). It soon turns out that Vicente Fox is not so willing to fulfill the requirements.

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Luis Hernández Navarro. 25.05.2021

Part of the army remains in Chiapas. In response, the Zapatistas organize the *Earth-Color March in Mexico* (School for Chiapas).

The March was a symbolic success because, facing public opinion, Zapatistas were well received, but Congress didn't approve the San Andres Agreements despite the legitimization of several civil society sectors. This fact made Zapatistas even more skeptical about the political institutions. As a result, they distanced themselves from political parties, especially after the lack of compromise from the political left in Congress, the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). After the promising support of the *Agreements* (and some ideological coincidences with Zapatistas since 1994), they did not vote in favor of them. After that, EZLN pretended to play the role of outsiders of the political system, focusing on self-organization in small communities in Chiapas ("Caracoles").

After that, in another crucial year in Mexico, in 2006, during the year of the presidential election, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos –one of the main voices of EZLN- begins a six-month tour through the country to establish contact with all groups that take part in the *Otra Campaña* ("the *Other Campaign*") political strategy, parallel to the parties' campaigns, to make visible the demands of vulnerable groups and popular sectors (such as indigenous groups, LGBT community, peasants, sexual workers), generally abandoned by the main agenda of all political parties. It happened without compromising with any political party in the election and pretending to be a critical voice of the electoral competence. Various demonstrations linked to *Otra Campaña* take place in Mexico City and the rest of the country and supporters in other parts of the world. In July, Felipe Calderón (PAN) becomes President of Mexico. His opponent was the leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who disputes the result with massive street protests. The Zapatistas announced a national consultation and an upcoming meeting with European organizations. In December, the first phase of the "Other Campaign" was completed. It covered 45,000 kilometers in Mexico and mobilized hundreds of thousands of citizens, which was a symbolic attempt to make visible most of the public demands that were not on the agenda of all candidates in 2006 (School for Chiapas).

That was the main activity of Zapatistas after 2006: to show the disadvantages of poor sectors of society without participating in institutional competitions. However, after the long term of skepticism about political parties and electoral reform in 2009, which allowed independent candidates to run in elections without political party's support, the joint changed.

Finally, the last public calling from the EZLN episode happened recently, in 2018. It started in 2016 when the Zapatistas announced in December their plans to elect a female press

secretary to represent the indigenous population as their presidential candidate. Maria de Jesús Patricio Martínez, also known as Marichuy, a traditional medicine healer and human rights activist from the Nahua tribe in Mexico, was selected as an "indigenous representative" by the National Congress of Indigenous Peoples (CNI) as its nominee. She tried to run as an independent candidate for the presidency of Mexico in 2018 (Mandujano 2017). It was a decision not to try to win an election but to use an electoral joint to, again, try to make visible demands and problems from the margined social groups in Mexico. However, she failed to pass the electoral threshold in the elections, and the Zapatistas could not go after the registration attempt of María de Jesús Patricio. Still, this was not their primary objective, either disputing votes with the leftist candidate López Obrador (participating in its third attempt at winning the presidential election). But Marichuy made a splash in public, and the news about her was discussed for a very long time. She was able to put in the public sphere the main new problems that indigenous communities were facing in recent history, mainly related to territories and security after the so-called "War on Drugs" started in 2007.

If we compare EZLN with FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) from Nicaragua, FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional) from El Salvador, URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca) from Guatemala Demoda (Guatemala), we can interpretate whether the Zapatistas are a guerrilla movement or not.

In "The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America," Michael Allison (2006) answers the question of why some guerrilla groups have been successful in the political arena and others have not by analyzing these guerrilla groups. As a result, she concluded that those successful in direct hostilities, which had more military and human resources, became more successful in the political arena (FSLN, FMLN). Conversely, those groups that lacked power were less successful (URNG).

The EZLN can also fit into the same logic since the Zapatistas were not successful during the hostilities. The number of soldiers was relatively small. The geographical distribution was narrow - only in southern Mexico - and in the elections in 2018, their candidate did not even pass the electoral threshold. However, unlike the rest, only the Zapatistas needed support from the international mass media and NGOs. Moreover, unlike other groups, the Zapatistas have created an image of fighters for indigenous rights and against social injustice. Their impossibility of participating in elections is not connected with the low support of people and their radical left strategy. The elections were not the main objective of the plan. It was just a scenario to appear and show their agenda and struggles, besides



that the left sector of electors has already been occupied by the experienced politician Lopez Obrador. In addition, according to social polls, many people sympathized with *Marichuy*. Still, they would not choose her since there is already a leftist candidate who covers a broader representation sector.

Another factor that differs from other guerrilla movements is the overall purpose of the movement. The Zapatistas never intended to overthrow the government. Instead, their goal was to reform the system and eliminate social and economic unevenness.

An equally important difference was the historical context in which the creation of EZLN took place. The uprising of the Zapatistas began in 1994 when the Cold War had already ended, and the confrontation between the ideologies of West and East was no longer sharp. Mexico is a distinctive example of the US-USSR confrontation, as the US has never put as much pressure on Mexico as it has on other countries (Meyer 2004: 100-105).

Anti-NAFTA NGOs in the United States and Canada were among the first to support and sympathize with the Zapatistas. Also quickly mobilized were NGOs that belonged to growing, closely related human rights and indigenous peoples' rights movements (Ronfeldt et al. 1998: 39-41).

The dissemination of information and the Zapatista movement through the media continued to attract the attention of NGOs. The Zapatistas began to urge NGOs to come to Mexico. NGOs that were already in Mexico urged other NGOs to join the movement. This activity of NGOs and the growth of organizations supporting the Zapatistas put pressure on the Mexican government.

The goals and plans of the NGOs coincided with those of the Zapatistas. Both of them strove for democratization in a non-violent way, for dialogue with the government, and demanded respect for human rights (Ronfeldt et al. 1998: 2). NGOs also actively supported *La Otra Campaña* by helping to organize meetings with other social and political movements "from the bottom left" (School for Chiapas).

However, despite this support from outside and non-governmental actors, all this solidarity has created less progress than it possibly should have. In August 2003, the Zapatistas released *The Thirteenth Stele*, in which they publicly redefined their attitude towards all organizations wishing to build economic solidarity. *Subcomandante Marcos*, one of the leaders and main speaker of EZLN, criticized NGOs for distributing things that were unnecessary for movement

(like pink high-heeled shoes), for imposing aid, and for uneven distribution of resources (Tenuto Sanchez 2005).

All of the above has already been well studied both in political science and in sociology. However, the events of 2018 related to the activities of the Zapatistas have not yet been sufficiently studied. They, therefore, are one of the main elements of the analysis of this work. And the way to analyze it will be defined in the methodological strategy.

This topic is relevant because it analyzes the historical trajectory of an alternative ideological guerrilla war not associated with violent methods. In addition, it shows how the former partisan movement is slowly but surely social and then into a political movement. On the other hand, after the massive support that other leftist options received in the 2018 elections, there is still a gap about the role played by EZLN in that joint of contemporary Mexican history. This work will try to fulfill this gap.

According to what was said above, this work will be divided into five main parts: the first chapter will expose the methodological and theoretical framework used to approach this topic and its justification.

The second chapter will be the detailed historical background of the roots and adaptations of the EZLN movement. This division obeys a methodological key: the first part of the historical background will illustrate the origins and irruption on January 1 in 1994, of EZLN against the Mexican government. This contextualization will finish after the twelve days of armed conflict.

The third chapter will illustrate the turning point of the movement when Zapatistas changed their strategy from military to socio-political activity and continued to participate in politics as a social and political movement in 2001 and 2006.

Using this base, the next chapter will be the original contribution of this work, describing and explaining how and why EZLN decided to try and attempt to participate in the presidential election in 2018 in Mexico, after several years of skepticism of political parties and denying the electoral strategy as a solution to solve their demands. The last part will be dedicated to a conclusion and final verification reflection of the work. We will try to fulfill the knowledge about the political actor, which has been well studied in their origin but still has some contemporary edges that deserved to be academically approached. This work shows, by historical tracking, how this campaign did not come from nothingness and reconstructs its history using primary and direct sources.

Separately, I would like to thank Raul Romero Gallardo, Mexican sociologist and member of Marichuy's campaign in 2016-2018, and Luis Hernández Navarro, Mexican journalist, coordinator of the Editorial and Opinion section of the national newspaper in Mexico *La Jornada* (the Mexican newspaper which covered more systematically the EZLN trajectory since 1994 until nowadays). Both of them are two of the main experts of the phenomena of EZLN and know it from the inside. Both agreed to participate in the interview and answered all the questions, giving much more helpful information than expected. The discussion was more sociological than anthropological (focusing mainly not on what they *believe* but about specific data that they, as key actors or witnesses of the process, could *know* and offer). Nevertheless, their words enriched the analysis in many ways and helped draw attention to what is evident to the Mexican people but may be invisible to the Europeans.

## **PART I**

### **Methodological strategy and conceptual framework**

This research has as a starting point this central question of this analysis:

*After the appearance and specific participation of EZLN in the Mexican political scenario in 1994 as a guerrilla and socio-political movement, how and why and under what conditions this organization decided to try to participate in the 2018 presidential run? For what purpose has their strategy of struggle changed over almost 30 years, and how has this influenced their path as a social movement?*

In order to answer that question, this work will use process tracing methodology because we have a historiographical advantage: despite the roots of EZLN comes from behind, 1994 was a pivotal moment to analyze the phenomenon. For that reason, this chapter is divided into three parts: a conceptual part, theoretical part, in which we will briefly analyze the existing data on the Zapatistas movement and the theory of the influence of social context on activist movements; a part describing additional factors of social movements (parameters that must be mentioned when analyzing the movement of the Zapatistas) and a methodological part (with a detailed description of the forthcoming form of analysis and the importance of this method for our problems).

#### **1.1 Conceptual Theoretical Frameworks**

According to previous researches, EZLN has been defined using diverse concepts. We define EZLN as a social-political movement because our process tracing will show historical adaptations of this actor to the political context. This is not an attempt to “label” EZLN in a unique and definitive category since, by definition, social movements (focused more on making visible and solve social disadvantages inside the political system) can become political (trying to obtain institutional power by institutional mechanisms) and vice versa. The boundaries in this situation are never so clear, so the best approach is to think of EZLN, after its guerrilla period, as a social movement with also political attempt. Due to this, we highlight the most important sociological concepts that will guide our research. With this analysis, we will fill the problems in understanding the Zapatistas movement as a strategic movement,

whose strategy is studied not as isolated cases but as a gestalt and a set of solutions for the development of EZLN.

As part of the study of existing literature, most attention was paid to the situation around the emergence of the Zapatistas as a major player in the political arena of Mexico in 1994. A considerable number of books and articles focused their attention on the reasons for the emergence of this Zapatista phenomenon, in particular, the well-known NAFTA agreement and the poverty of the peripheral zones of Mexico, which is combined with the socio-economic development of the country and the de facto occupation of power by the PRI party. Some of the articles and books covered the events of 2001 and 2006. However, these articles either described events in chronological order as a case study or within the framework of the narrative of the Zapatistas history as a whole. Finally, there were not sufficient sources analyzing the events of 2018 when the Zapatistas decided to participate in political elections directly in the English-language literature. The book “La iniciativa política de un Concejo Indígena de Gobierno” (Yáñez 2020) is the most basic source of information on the 2018 elections and *Marichuy*'s participation in them.

Moreover, there are no sources that focus directly on the causal relationship of the development of EZLN and changes in the strategy of their complex behavior throughout the entire time, from the moment of their birth and life to the present moment. Based on this provision, this work should fill the gaps described above. Therefore, as part of the analysis of the cause-and-effect relationship of development and change in the strategy of the Zapatistas, we will use existing articles as sources of information and supplement them with primary sources, fundamentally deep interviews with Mexican key actors, witness, participators or sympathizers of this movement.

### *1.1.1 Historical context as a determinant*

We said earlier that the change in strategy is influenced by the historical context in which an event occurs. By understanding the entire atmosphere around and analyzing the past events, it is possible to establish a connection between the events of the past and current occasions, which with a high probability could affect the event of our interest.

Every political and social movement in existence does not appear out of nowhere. Such movements primarily consist of individuals who express their grievances, needs, and desires in collective behavior as a form of social mobilization. Human behavior results from the

influence of internal (needs) and external (the situation in which he is) factors together. Nothing happens from nothing; all human activity acts are interconnected with the context in which they are located. Likewise, social movements, political movements, political parties, and the rest of the collective elements of society, regardless of their goals and organization, are the product of the historical context and interact with what is given here and now.

The study of the relationship between humanity and history is a crucial aspect of analysis. Social science deals with biographies, history, and their intersections in social structures. These three dimensions - biography, history, and society - constitute a frame of reference for the objective study. The problems of our time cannot be adequately formulated if the idea that history is the core of social and political science is not consistently implemented in practice (Wright 1959: 6-7, 31-32, 143).

Following this logic, it is pretty realistic to assume that the historical context and socio-economic realities will affect a specific person and a group of people, or even an entire social movement or nation.

Social movements have a beginning, a moment of origin, a period of activity, and an end. Traditionally, social thinkers believed that movement emerges during a period of social unrest, persists at the stage of general excitement, moves to the stage of formal organization, and ends with institutionalization (Smelser 1988).

In this analysis, the process of origin of movement and its activity is vital for us. The beginning of the movement is associated with social unrest, economic problems, and so on.

Some theories explain the protest behavior of social movements. For example, the theory of collective behavior explains protest in terms of social tension and potential protest indicators. This approach focuses on the participants' reactions to a crisis. These crises are a product of the activity of the political system (and not only) and have been formed for quite a long time. The theory of relative deprivation represents the socio-psychological version of this approach by Tedd Gurr (2005), which, as a mechanism that triggers protest and violence, considers an increase in the gap between the rapid growth of expectations caused by social changes and the possibilities of their genuine satisfaction. This gap inevitably causes frustration - a psychological state that arises from some insurmountable obstacle that prevents the achievement of the goal. Frustration arises simultaneously in many people - and under appropriate conditions, it is the increase in relative deprivations that leads to political violence (Gurr 2005: 461).

According to the next theory - the theory of the dynamics of social tension - there are general patterns such as a low income and educational level that led to an increase in protest potential. American political scientist J. Griffin associated economic inequality with such variables as civil polarization and political protest (Griffin and Kiewiet 2014: 1).

According to the theory of "resource mobilization," protest arises with the emergence of opportunities for mobilization and the expression of discontent, that is, when economic, political, and organizational opportunities are created. Based on this, an important aspect of the theory has become the structure of political opportunities: those resources that determine the likelihood of the emergence of social movements and their effectiveness (Meyer 2004).

A critical element of the theory of "resource mobilization" for us is the focus on the role of social networks, the media, and the Internet. Political protest in competitive regimes has received the epithet "soft political protest." To analyze the "soft protest," a model was used to assess the effects of communication technologies, which are influenced by two main factors: the level of dissatisfaction with the regime and the availability of information about the upcoming protest actions (Dubrow et al. 2008: 36-51).

One of the reasons for revolutions is comparing the level of life among people of different strata, societies, and governments. Thus, when a group of people from the lower strata of society compares their lives and opportunities with the upper strata, it creates a sense of inequality. This feeling is due to factors controlled by the state (political regime, system, socio-economic security, and so on). In that case, there is an urge for a revolution to rebuild the system.

In addition to intrapersonal causes and determinants associated with the psychology and worldview of individuals and groups, many external, most global factors affect the behavior of movements. These include the historically established form of the state, the political regime and even society's mentality, and the nature of the state's territory.

From all of the above, a certain conclusion can be drawn on which the purpose of this analysis is based. We now turn to an analysis of the relationship between social movements and social change. This relationship manifests itself in two ways: not only do social movements lead to change, but social change also contributes to the emergence of new movements.

A wide variety of social movements arose under industrial capitalism, which was the main "historical context" of the 20th century. Many movements around us (for example, various forms of the environmental movement, feminism, LGBT movement, and so on) result from

global industrialization and deep fundamental democratization. Social shifts often give rise to social movements, which, in turn, lead to new shifts. Similarly, technological revolutions, information revolutions, etc., influence social movements in their way.

Most scholars of ideology and the history of ideas agree that ideologies do not come out of anywhere: the historical context, the given time frame, the period in which they originate and gain strength, are indispensable reference materials for explaining these ideas. Likewise, the historical context influences the strategy of social movements. How a social movement uses the situation in which it finds itself, combining it with its ideological goals, affects the success of the movement and the support that people and organizations provide them.

This is how the EZLN successfully combined a strict ideological direction and external historical factors to achieve what the rest of the guerrilla movement could not achieve. The Zapatistas, at certain points in their history and development, changed their political and informative strategy in order not only to adapt to reality but also with the reasonable goal of expanding their influence.

## **1.2 Social and Political movements**

We said above that the historical context is important for the formation of social or political movements and the strategy of actions of these movements. However, although the historical context determines the vector of movement, it is also necessary to consider the characteristics of social movements to understand the model of the Zapatistas' behavior as a mass movement in the case of our analysis.

### *1.2.1 Differences between Social and Political movements*

Social movements act to solve some social disadvantage or fight for a rightful idea while political movements try to participate in political competitions.

As soon as the mass of people, under the pressure of particular historical circumstances, unites into one movement, the realization of the goals of this movement begins. Political movements, social movements, and collective action are forms of political participation, but they must be distinguished. Pasquino defines a political movement as a social force that seeks to bring about permanent change in the social and political system through an endless series of imbalances



(Pasquino 1987: 1073). Political movement can be confused with a social movement, which, according to Harbele, is a wide range of collective actions (Harbele 1975: 263). The primary purpose is to transform certain social institutions or even create an entirely new order. According to Neil Smelser, social movement refers to organized collective efforts that promote or impede social change (Smelser 1988).

While social movements necessarily impact the political arena, they do not necessarily seek power, unlike a political movement.

According to Jorge Cadena Roa collective actions are those actions in which a social subject can be identified with greater or less precision. Sometimes they are created without influencing the historical movement of society and responding to certain social tensions (Roa 1991: 40-43).

As mentioned earlier, all social movements arise in connection with a feeling of dissatisfaction with the existing social structure - the routine of things. There are two reasons for this feeling. First, objective events and situations affect a part of the population that can undergo forced lifestyle changes. Secondly, the standards are formed by which people evaluate events or situations. These standards are shaped by cultural values or norms such as equality and justice. Thus, dissatisfaction always arises due to a mismatch between objective conditions and ideas about what they should be (Smelser 1988).

### *1.2.2 Concept of Guerilla*

Guerilla is an underground hierarchical organization that has as the main motivation a specific ideology that incumbents stand. This ideology often stands against the existing political regime of the country. The goals of the insurgents can vary from secessionism to more limited ones, such as extorting certain concessions (for example, socially, economically, or politically) through violence. Another important factor is control over given territories (Janků and Zelinka 2009). Guerrilla tactics are diverse and include the use of “foquismo”, sabotage and others.

EZLN started as a partisan group. They positioned themselves as left-wing activists who came together from various other left-wing guerrilla groups. However, they had a confrontation with the state only in 1994. They ceased to be typical partisans after just a few days, as they changed their strategy of struggle almost immediately. EZLN and Government declared a truce, which remains until nowadays. At the same time, Zapatistas still follow their declaration of war, military discipline, and formation, though there is no official breaking of that truce. EZLN has

a root in the armed movements, and in their rising, they were one. However, the conditions influenced them to change. It is difficult to ascribe the EZLN to the partisan movement, but one cannot exclude it from the roots of such a movement.

### *1.2.3 Ideology*

In the complete sense of this word, ideology takes on the characteristics and composition of the structure of the spirit of our time. Ideology can be defined as a common set of ideas, shared values, standard norms, etc. Ideology can represent the ideas of a class, nation, association, "movement," and others (Minar 1961: 317-331).

Ideology serves as a kind of bridge between discontent and action. It gives importance to a social problem, defines it and those who are responsible for it. Moreover, the concept of "ideology" implies that human groups have different ways of understanding reality, which, in turn, act as an engine of behavior and, ultimately, indicate the ideal way of organizing society.

If ideology can be defined as common values and norms, then within the psychology framework, we are already talking about the rooted attitudes of human behavior. In this sense, ideology, among other distinctive characteristics, is a collective thought and a thought that serves to exercise power (Reboul 1986).

Ideology is a hallmark of the struggle of political parties since each of them seeks to gain power, pursuing practical goals that are different from the practice of others, and the driving force behind this practice is the ideological aspect.

### *1.2.4 Political Adaptation*

An important factor in the viability of a social movement is its ability to adapt to reality. Here, as we can see, the historical context also plays an important role. Adaptation is the adaptation of the political system, political structures to the requirements of the environment, which is expressed in changing functions, setting new goals, and developing new approaches to solving problems. There are many examples of how this or that party could or could not adapt to the historical, social context. For instance, while maintaining its ideological perspective, the Workers' Party in Brazil was able to adjust to the international economic reality and adapt to voters' wishes (Hunter 2007). In Argentina, the Justicialista Party (PJ) adapted, leading to programmatic changes and electoral success. However, in Venezuela, where AD had neither

a solid incentive to adapt, nor the ability to adjust, it failed to adjust to the new system (Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 881-911). However, these are examples of political parties whose motivation is to win elections with the greatest public support. In the case of social movements, the ability to adapt is also related to survival and is also related to the support of the masses. The response from the wider community is critical to the success or failure of a movement. Several studies have shown that if a movement is perceived by the general public as a genuine protest, the chances of supporting it are increased. They are reduced if their participants are viewed only as a group of troublemakers (Smelser 1988).

### **1.3 Methodological Frameworks**

Process tracing, or the method of cause-effect relationships, is a major qualitative analysis tool in social and political sciences. It tries to find the link between current situations and their historical background. This method provides a powerful tool against the creation of atheoretical narratives based on the analysis of individual cases. Analyzing a separate case, a scientist can pursue two analytically different goals, one of which is associated with the description of the studied phenomenon and the other, explaining the reasons for its occurrence. With the answer to the question "how?" problems usually do not arise, but as soon as the goal of analysis turns out to be the answer to the question "why?", the scientist is faced with the need to isolate the causal mechanism of interest to him in a large amount of information. An in-depth analysis of an individual case is always associated with the danger of a semi-structured retelling of events, biographies, and other facts directly or indirectly related to this case. In other words, instead of a clear answer to the question posed, the result of the case study may be only a pile of facts. The process-tracing method can shield the researcher from these problems (Beach and Pedersen 2013).

The direct definition of process-tracing is a method of working with data within a case study strategy framework to obtain conclusions about the reasons for a particular political outcome. In this work, we will use the meaning of process-tracing as "a tool for studying causal mechanisms in a case study research." This definition, being simple, captures the main content of the method. There are some important keys of the process-tracing method within the framework of the case study strategy that can already be distinguished:

1. Selecting the starting point of the study. The starting point of the analysis should be carefully and reasonably selected. The choice of starting point should be clearly indicated and explained in the text of the work.

2. Modeling causal mechanisms. Before embarking on process tracing, the researcher must model the mechanism that, in his opinion, led to the emergence of the studied outcome.

3. Collecting evidence. Collecting evidence to test the primary and alternative mechanisms constitutes the third phase of the study. At this stage, it is necessary to obtain information from various, preferably independent from each other, sources to avoid a possible bias of data in favor of one or another version of the explanation. Data collection should be completed when information from one source begins to repeat itself systematically. Data sources in process tracing can be archival and official documents, transcripts of interviews, media materials, transcripts of public events, etc.

4. Verification of the put forward causal mechanisms. This check of the process-tracing method is carried out using empirical tests that assess the explanatory power of the elements (parts, hypotheses) that make up each of the put forward causal mechanisms.

Despite the main method of analyzing we will use different research techniques as analyze of primary sources, based fundamentally on the official documents of EZLN (to know the actor through its own words); bibliographic and journalistic materials to reconstruct the historical background, and deep interviews with key actors (members of the political campaign of EZLN in 2018 and other political actors) to describe and explain the political joint of the Mexican election of that year through this movement's perspective. The interviews used for this work will be both sociological and anthropological, looking forward to the things that those actors *know* and what those actors *believe* (Bertaux 1999: 1-22). With that, this work will make a historical reconstruction and explain the actors' ideological reasons to do what they did. As part of the scope of this work, we interviewed the following people:

- 1) Raul Romero Gallardo – sociologist, latinoamericanist, and disciple of Dr. Pablo González Casanova (sociologist, former dean of National Autonomous University of Mexico and named “Commander” of the EZLN by its comandante in 2019). Raul Romero is a sociologist who specialized in the Zapatistas' movement and took part in Marichuy's campaign in 2016.
- 2) Luis Hernández Navarro – writer and journalist, main coordinator of the *Opinion* pages of Mexican journal *La Jornada* and specialist in EZLN movement.

Among that, has been obtained permission to quote the words of Rafael Barajas Duran. Rafael Barajas is a writer and journalist, and cartoonist in several Mexican Publications, currently a director of the Political Formation Institute from MORENA political party and cartoonist of *La Jornada*.

To one degree or another, all of these people were directly involved in the development or witnessing of EZLN.

When using the primary sources, direct citations will be indicated in the text. In order to preserve intonation, direct quotes from the EZLN archives will be quoted in their original form, with original punctuations and letter sizes.

Using the starting point of 1994, and based on both primary sources (basic documents of EZLN, press and deep interviews with key actors) and secondary sources (literature related), this research will describe and interpret the development and main informative and political changes of the EZLN from its appearing until 2018.

#### **1.4 Final words**

The main point of this thesis is to reconstruct a historical actor based on its trajectory and the historical conditions that influenced that path. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have some starting points which could help us not to categorize absolutely this actor, but to think about it and, in that sense, be able to make an accurate historical description of the most important joints where this actor was visible and be able to explain its decision. This conceptual construction will guide the qualitative research of this objective. Also, the methodological approach will attempt to make a satisfactory politological explanation of the recent behavior and strategy of the historical actor of EZLN. It is essential to say that these concepts are not rigid and unchanging categories to define EZLN behavior. Actually, this work, describing the historical trajectory of this army in different joints, tries to explain how its changes came up under certain circumstances, including the particular attempt of this movement to have electoral participation in the 2018 Mexican election.

## **PART II**

### **Historical background: the twilight of armed movements in Mexico in XX Century and the EZLN**

To understand the processes associated with the development and transformation of the EZLN, we first need to understand the historical context that was relevant in the 20th century. Thus, EZLN is not only a product of the 90s decade but rather the result of the relationship between the left-wing and indigenous peasants' movements in Mexico and the ruling party during almost the whole XX Century (and even beyond, considering the "casta" racist organization during the colonial period), starting in the 30s and 40s, after the Mexican Revolution. Here also comes the EZLN's connection with one of the main representatives of the Mexican Revolution - Emiliano Zapata.

This part will describe how and from what context EZLN entered the arena. This issue will be considered both from a political perspective and from a social perspective.

#### **2.1 Political Aspect: armed movements in post-revolutionary Mexico in XX Century.**

It is not an exaggeration when it is said that the Mexican Revolution had a huge impact on modern Mexico. The Mexican Revolution began with massive discontent over the re-election of dictator Porfirio Diaz, who was opposed by both the poor and the middle class and the political elite. The agrarian reform became the very cause of the revolution and the link in the whole action. Under Porfirio Diaz, the land was divided catastrophically unevenly. There was a huge disparity between the territories and the peasants who owned them. All the land belonged to the rich.

The Mexican Revolution is complex. Over the many stages of Mexico's development within the revolution framework, many sides have come forward, representing different sectors of society and defending different goals. It was during the Mexican Revolution that the name Emiliano Zapata took on its weight. From the very beginning of the Revolution to the end, he, like Pancho Villa (who represented the social movement of peasants in the center-north of Mexico, while Zapata did the same but in the South), fought for the agricultural transformation of the country and the distribution of land to the

peasants. Zapata developed a draft agrarian reform known as the *Ayala Plan* (which provided the liquidation of large land property for the ransom and allotment of land to peasants).

As a result of the Mexican Revolution in 1917, a new Mexican Constitution was adopted, including agrarian reform. Since the bulk of the revolutionary peasants fought to return the lands lost in the 19th and early 20th centuries to communal ownership, the 1917 constitution legalized two forms of land ownership: communal and private. However next presidents of Mexico didn't hurry to apply new reform into reality. Lázaro Cárdenas was the first to begin the policy of actively encouraging communal farming from 1934 to 1940. Agrarianism as an organization of land property was a primary issue in the Mexican Revolution. In most of the fractions, mainly in the social sectors led by Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata, the main objective, more than obtain political power, was precisely to bring the agrarian reforms for peasants and land workers (Cordova 1978). After displacing the dictator Porfirio Diaz, the revolution became a fight between fractions. Armed risings among the revolutionary groups prolonged the instability in the country. It got worse because some social groups linked to conservatism and the Porfirian elite, such as the Catholic Church. They used violence to defend their claims, such as the "Cristera War" in the 20's decade, which was a reaction from religious groups against the laicism from the Revolutionary Constitution of 1917 (Figueiras 2008).

Lazaro Cardenas (PRI party) was the last representative of Mexico's post-revolutionary regime in the 1930s. This regime used the army to stabilize the situation in the country. The result of this regime was stability, which was expressed in three indicators: the development of social policy to address the problem of poverty; repression against critical sectors; cooptation of opposition according to the principle "do not criticize me, but join me." The progressive politics of Cárdenas meant a "social inclusion" in the country and meant the extension of rights to several sectors during an urbanizing and industrializing process in the country (Cordova 1981). Among several political characteristics of the regime, there is one important – Cárdenas could control the last post-revolutionary attempt of armed rising (from General Saturnino Cedillo in 1938). After a convulsive first half of the XX Century, the country found some forced pacification and political stability. That was the product not from electoral democracy but the selective repression and economic development of the country (Meyer 2004). Stability in the country, as a result of political control, political inclusion of popular sectors, cooptation of critical elites, and selective repression became an exceptional case in Latin America of an authoritarian

regime, but still not the dictatorial regime, which could take public issues under control and appear as stable to the international eye. The armed movements, inspired still by the claims of the revolution, by more radical and progressive causes, or from reactionary ideologies such as religious “cristeros”, were mainly contained. But this kind of armed actor never disappeared totally.

This situation persisted until the 60s decade, specifically after the revolution in Cuba in 1959. Cuba gave impetus to the creation of left-wing radical guerrilla groups in the whole Latin-American region. This also affected Mexico, but with its own exception, due to the fact that the leftist movements were or contained or repressed or included as part of the regime. Despite this, the Cuban Revolution, among other internal factors, also impacted Mexico in strengthening armed leftist movements, which were combated by the State using repressive and excessive methods. From 1964 to 1982, Mexico was in a so-called *Dirty war* between the government and leftist students and guerrilla groups. The Mexican Communist Party did not perceive the ruling PRI party as an absolute enemy due to its “revolutionary origin” and the progressive speech of “social justice” derived (Illades 2014: 133-158). The main left-wing radical groups in Mexico were formed on the periphery of the country and not in its center, as was the case in other countries or Cuba. The periphery of Mexico was very underdeveloped, as will be described in more detail below.

Why was the partisan movement not popular in the center of the country? Formally, the PRI had a conservative direction and occupied the right sector of the electorate. Still, informally, this political party attempted a flexible ideology of “third way,” trying to monopolize all the “revolutionary” and popular claims and deal and control the capital and business sectors. This party tried to present itself as a popular government that dealt with the problems of the majority. In contrast to Mexico in other countries where there was a popular guerrilla movement, the ruling party held only the right sector, especially during the 20’s decade, during the “Cristera” War, opposed to Laicism and public education, and with roots in catholic fanaticism.

For this reason, Mexico's guerrillas were neither stable nor popular. But despite this, the events in Cuba in 1959 (which were an “inspiratory” process for all Latin America to develop the attempt of organizing armed groups) and the events in 1968 in Mexico (clashes between left-leaning students and the police) shook the usual structure of politics, which led to some mobilization of the guerrilla movement in the periphery. The Mexican State strengthen a not open, strategic repression period, known as “Dirty war,” which



tried to eliminate the new “armed socialism” (Ovalle 2019: 359) (and all leftist people were suspected of belonging to it, such as students and peasants) in Mexico, represented by groups in poor peasant areas such as Guerrero, and some urban cases, like the “Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre”. The Dirty War period in Mexico is prolonged and showed that despite its “third way,” the nerve of the Cold War was also present in Mexico in repressive terms. The solution to this problem for the government was the 1976 electoral reform, which opened the door to other parties. Thanks to this electoral pluralism, the communist left-wing parties could take part in the elections.

In the 70s, student activists from the Mexican metropolitan areas in the north who survived the repression of 1968 were trying to build a Maoist Popular Front with the "working masses" on the periphery of Mexico. They also visited Las-Canadas. In the 80s, at least three different groups entered the region, of which the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional (Forces for the Liberation National - FLN). FLN can be named as the progenitor of EZLN (Barmeyer 2003: 124). The region of Chiapas had a strong influence on a specific branch of the catholic church: Theology of Liberation, by several factors, including the presence of one of the main expositors of that ideology, Samuel Ruiz, bishop of San Cristobal de las Casas, and claimer of the justice for peasants of the regions, in pauper conditions, and defenders of agrarian ideology.

In 1978, President Lopez Portillo announced an amnesty for the guerrillas, which "officially" ended the *Dirty War*, but in fact, the repression and attacks of the paramilitaries continued.

Founders of FLN drew their initial inspiration and ideology from the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua and various liberation movements in Latin America and from the Maoist forms of popular organizations, but especially from an agrarian vision and by the revolutionary Christianity of the leftist Catholic branch.

However, most of the lefts soon realized that their survival and success depended on adaptation to the political system. This led to the 1988 elections and the participation of the united opposition in them (Barmeyer 2003: 123). Armed movements were marginal.

The 1988 elections in Mexico played an important role. In many ways, this election became one of the main political aspects of creating the EZLN, precisely, the involvement of the independent left in politics. This election was the first competitive election since the beginning of the PRI rule. Up to this point, there was no real opposition in Mexico. The ruling party's candidates won at least 70% of the vote. However, in 1988, after the

electoral reform, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the PRI candidate, received 50.4% of the vote. His main opponents in the election were the PAN and the coalition of the left-wing FND, led by Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, who is the son of Lazaro Cardenas.

However, massive election fraud and another victory by the right-wing PRI destroyed the hopes of left-wing groups to participate in the country's politics, which forced young activists to radicalize.

In addition to a sharp deterioration in the quality of life of Mexicans in peripheral areas such as remote parts of eastern Chiapas, the reluctance of the ruling party to abandon its traditional mechanisms of political control, and the fragmentation of the left and their defeat in 1988 led to the fact that a large part of the population was identified with EZLN (Barmeyer 2003: 123). After the 1988 elections, the political left rallied, and Cardenas formed the PRD. However, the left remains in opposition until 2018, leaving substantial population sections, including indigenous people, without representation.

## **2.2 Social Aspect**

The EZLN problem did not appear with the entry into force of NAFTA. This agreement led to hostilities in 1994, but the history of the Zapatistas and the issues of Chiapas, in general, began long before the 90s.

The origins of the uprising go back to the Mexican Revolution and the Agrarian Law. Thus, the distribution of land and the refusal of the state to provide land to the Indigenous, as stipulated by Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, plays one of the most key agendas of indigenous peoples' grievances. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution reflected the agrarian law developed by Zapata in 1915 as part of the Mexican Revolution. And President Salinas wanted to change that Article. The second key driver of indigenous discontent is the repression of independent peasant and Indigenous organizations throughout the 1980s. The economic disruption in Indigenous communities resulted from the failed and unfavorable economic policies of previous presidents (Carrigan 1995: 76-77).

Chiapas was characterized by a massive gap between rich and poor, maintained by privileged landowners who ruled feudal estates with private armies, dictatorial local bosses, and the plight of poor indigenous who wanted their lives to be improved and their

culture respected. Mexico's neoliberal economic reforms, especially those initiated by the Salinas administration, significantly worsened many indigenous people's situation (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001: 173).

Nor should we forget about the destruction of the Lacandon rainforest due to a corrupt and discriminatory land distribution system (Carrigan 1995: 78).

The agricultural crisis of the 1970s and 1980s mainly affected marginalized areas as Selva Lacandona, where the government issued uninhabited state forests as ejido lands. In the 1950s and 1960s, the region was used for land distribution among landless peasants from mountain communities. However, in the 1970s, the area remained excluded from national development programs (Barmeyer 2003: 123-126).

However, the indigenous were not alone. Church monks of the Diocese of San Cristobal, led by Bishop Don Samuel Ruiz Garcia, were actively involved in the life of the Indigenous community (Carrigan 1995: 81). In 1974, Bishop Samuel organized the Congress of Indigenous People (Concejo Indigena) to discuss land issues and related problems. At this congress, three important points of the agenda were discussed, which will later appear more than once as the basis of the EZLN movement: legal fight for land, fighting to solve jungle problems, and armed struggle as the last option.<sup>2</sup>

### **2.3 Confluence**

We see two lines of development of different social and politically active groups. In 1983, Marcos and his followers arrived in the rainforest. The first contact of the urban left movement of activists from universities (with ideological roots in military-political guerrilla organizations) with peasant groups of the indigenous population from the periphery, which was supported only by the church, occurs.

Some of the Zapatistas were veterans of the peasant uprisings of the 1970s or workers and student groups. They were influenced by the rest of the military-political left-wing ideologies in Latin America of the last century. They listened to revolutionary messages from Nicaragua and El Salvador. They dreamed of the fate of Cuba and Nicaragua. However, the church did not share their enthusiasm (Carrigan 1995: 82).

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<sup>2</sup> Interview with Luis Hernández Navarro. 25.05.2011

Conditions in the villages encouraged the formation of a guerrilla movement: the government abandoned land claims, and the Campesino organizations sought a new way to defend their claims (Barmeyer 2003).

The guerrillas turned to the church that hosted the peasants. They wanted to persuade the bishop to sponsor their presence in the communities. However, the church refused them because it was inclined towards a position of pacifism and reform. In their opinion, the changes must take place peacefully through mass democratic mobilization (Carrigan 1995:82).

The Zapatistas were forced to surrender. But the state continued to strangle the Campesinos; as mentioned before, the repression continued. Peasants and indigenous people were forced to compromise and ask the Zapatistas for help. The Campesinos required military training, and the Zapatistas needed the support of a social base. Because of this collaboration, internal decision-making schemes were soon created. Thus, Marcos understood that without the support of the population, they could not do anything. The classic vertical structure of the revolutionary guerrilla movement was not effective. The Zapatistas could not effectively exist without the indigenous, and the indigenous could not survive without the military support of the Zapatistas. This collaboration has become a non-standard manifestation of "left radicalism". Over time, Marcos began to broaden the goals of the indigenous population and educate them in history, promoting Mexico's national heroes (Carrigan 1995:84).

He explained that the group taught the indigenous people the basics of culture and learned from the indigenous people too (Burgess 2016: 4).

Indigenous communities provided food (and other items) to revolutionaries who could not work in the fields due to their location in the mountains (Barmeyer 2003). In parallel, the army trained indigenous people, and, therefore, their army expanded. The outcome of the cooperation was the adoption of a dual agenda of the Zapatista uprising: on the one hand, the regional and local demands of the peasants and indigenous people; on the other hand, democracy, justice, and freedom in a pluralistic multi-ethnic society (Carrigan 1995: 84-85). As a result, the guerrilla's relationship with local communities began to grow and strengthen. In the end, Marcos explained, the line between military forces and civilian forces disappeared, and entire communities came under the banner of the Zapatistas (Burgess 2016: 9).

On October 12, 1992, during their first public appearance, the Zapatistas participated in demonstrations dedicated to the "Year of Indigenous Peoples, 500 Years of Resistance". In the same year, most of the indigenous people voted to prepare for war. In the same year, a majority of the indigenous communities voted to prepare for the war (Carrigan 1995: 85).

The decisive decision to continue the uprising in January 1994 was made at the urging of the core communities. Making decisions through consultation with the community is a practice used in rural assemblies of Zapatista communities, which indicates the internal level of organization of democratization. Small groups are one of the main elements of public democracy, in which weekly discussions are held (Barmeyer 2003).

## **2.4 Final Words**

Mexico is not famous for strong guerrilla groups like Colombia or El Salvador. However, for half a century, left-wing political forces had no chance of winning elections, leaving huge sections of the population without representation. The strict policy of the Mexican government against the rebels and the support of the United States prevents guerrilla groups from becoming a "real" threat to the country. As a result, guerrilla groups are created and destroyed, grow and reform into other groups, which indicates the lack of stability in the left sector, not only in the political arena but also in the jungle.

In parallel, the indigenous people continue to fight for their lands and rights and their lives, being subjected to repression and persecution. Being on the periphery of the state, the president and the government do not care about the Indigenous problems. The support of the church helps them but does not solve the problem.

In 1983, guerrillas and indigenous people found each other, adapting to cooperation for the common good, creating a movement that will no longer bear the name of a typical left-wing radical guerrilla movement but will become a new unprecedented phenomenon in modern history after 1994.

## PART III

### **EZLN historical path after its rising: four historical joints from 1994 to 2006.**

For our analysis, we selected four episodes of activity of EZLN. All of those episodes are characterized by their mass mobilization and activation of the social movement; in other words, those are episodes that are not selected randomly but because they made that Zapatistas acquired national impact and mobilization.

It is essential to state that the policy of mass mobilization is the root of the Zapatista strategy. It is a permanent part of the Zapatista movement that first emerged in 1994 and 1996 with the formation of the National Indigenous Congress in 2001, 2006, 2018, and now 2021 in the form of a tour of Europe.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the historical joints of this analysis are:

1994 - The beginning of the "history" of the Zapatistas, when they first appeared, entering into a military conflict against the federal government of the country;

2001 – *La Marcha del Color de la Tierra (The march of the color of the ground)*, also known as *Zapatur*, takes place when the EZLN delegation is sent to the capital for dialogue with the government, crossing many cities, in collective action, and meeting with many supporters; in order to influence to the Congress to legislate the *San Andrés agreements*.

2006 - *La Otra Campana*, announced in the Sixth Declaration, takes place, the purpose of which was to meet with the marginalized sectors of society all over the country and to show the social problems of the people from “down to up”, using as a political scenario –to gain visibility- the presidential election of that year, where a leftist candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, meant a competitive chance for the political left to win the elections for the first time in Mexican history.

2016- 2018 - The year of the general elections in Mexico, in which the Zapatistas decided to try to take part in the competition and pretended to nominate an independent Zapatista candidate.

With an understanding of the historical context of Mexico in the 20th century, relations with the left, and the formation of the EZLN before 1994, we can begin to analyze in detail the subsequent episodes of the history of Mexico and the Zapatistas.

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<sup>3</sup> Interview with Luis Hernández Navarro. 25.05.2011

### **3.1. The rising of EZLN in 1994: a reaction to NAFTA**

In the context of this work, we are not interested in the ongoing events of the Zapatistas' activity, but in the reasons influencing the change in their strategy of struggle. This part will describe the historical context in which these events took place and how this context could have influenced the further strategy. Thus, we are considering four main episodes of the Zapatistas. The first such event was the well-known "War" in 1994, about which a lot of literature has already been written.

When describing the events of January 1994, absolutely all sources, without exception, point to the free trade agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico - abbreviated as NAFTA. The NAFTA Agreement was signed on December 17, 1992. On January 1, 1994, this agreement entered into force, which marked the beginning of hostilities in Chiapas.

The idea of a trade and political unification of the United States, Canada, and Mexico began to be implemented in the 1970s. This agreement was considered an excellent neoliberal solution to economic problems. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many analysts argued that Mexico's economic liberalization policies and the emergence of NAFTA would lead or should lead to more progress and stability than ever before. However, not all segments of the population supported this idea. Given the economic and social situation in the periphery of Mexico, NAFTA has become the last straw in the patience of the disadvantaged people. What was the problem?

NAFTA directly influenced the producers of coffee and corn, the two staples of the ejido in and around communities called La Margarita, Altamirano, and Ocosingo. The direct impact of government-subsidized corn producers has created huge problems (Veltmeyer 2000: 92-94). Free market agreements imply competition in that market. Thus, impoverished rural farmers in Mexico faced competition from American farmers who could grow crops such as corn more efficiently (Burgess 2016: 4).

For farmers and peasants, these economic changes meant the destruction of their traditional way of life, as well as a betrayal of the legacy of the Mexican Revolution. Mexican businesspeople were directly dependent on the rapid growth of the domestic market. Because of this, the transformation of independent farmers into dependent consumers was a necessary sacrifice to achieve neoliberal goals. In this perspective, the

indigenous people would provide cheap labor that could attract foreign capital (Carrigan 1995: 89).

Despite all of the above, the government did not see any problems. More precisely, President Salinas and the rest of his administration ignored the voices of the disaffected. Detailed information about the seriousness of the situation in Chiapas was available to the government from the church, the press, and even from official sources. The existence of partisans in Chiapas was also known.

However, the image of Mexico in the international arena was of higher priority. The NAFTA debate in the United States, which decided the fate of the agreement itself, was the centerpiece of the Mexican government's story. Salinas was more worried about this than about local unrest and Chiapas. In addition, some argue that the governor of the state of Chiapas, Patrocinio González, became the Minister of the Interior precisely to hide the situation in the south of the country from international *eyes* as much as possible (Fox 1994: 1120).

This desire not to destroy the image of modern Mexico does not explain the government's refusal to solve the problems in Chiapas. Why did the government, guided by its interests, not foresee that the discontent of the indigenous people and the repressed masses could jeopardize its economic plan? Anna Carrigan replies that “poverty is not seen as a threat” (Carrigan 1995: 88) for Mexico's leaders. After so many years of PRI rule, the leaders did not believe in the prospect of a new revolution, believing that ordinary people could tolerate any grievances.

During the armed uprising, which led to the capture of seven strategically essential cities in Chiapas, on January 1, 1994, the EZLN emerged as a new liberation movement in the political arena of Mexico. In declaring war on the Mexican government and its army, the EZLN put forward a series of demands for “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace” (Barmeyer 2003: 123).

With the outbreak of hostilities, an ideological, social struggle began. This was signified by the First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, to which the Zapatistas called for the observance of the Constitution and declared illegal the Mexican government and President Salinas de Gortari:



*Therefore, in adherence to our Constitution, we issue this letter to the Mexican federal army, the basic pillar of the dictatorship that we suffer, monopolized by the party in power and headed by the federal executive that today Carlos Salinas de Gortari has, its illegitimate boss (Enlace Zapatista 1993).<sup>4</sup>*

From the very beginning, the Zapatistas emphasize adherence to the Constitutional Charter, which they repeatedly write about in their Declaration. This is also evidenced by the law of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which indicate the special treatment of prisoners:

*We reject in advance any attempt to distort the just cause of our struggle by accusing it of drug trafficking, narcoguerrilla, banditry, or any other term that our enemies may use. Our struggle adheres to constitutional law and is championed by justice and equality...[...]. Second. Respect the lives of prisoners and hand over the wounded to the International Red Cross for medical care. Third. Initiate summary trials against the soldiers of the Mexican federal army and the political police... [...]... and against all those who repress and mistreat the civilian population and steal or attack the property of the people (Enlace Zapatista 1993).<sup>5</sup>*

Also, in the First Declaration, the Zapatistas call on non-governmental organizations to monitor the course of the conflict and to protect civilians:

*We also ask international organizations and the International Red Cross to monitor and regulate the fighting that our forces endure protecting the civilian population, because we declare now and always that we are subject to the Laws on War of the Geneva Convention, shaping the EZLN as belligerent force of our liberation struggle (Enlace Zapatista 1993).<sup>6</sup>*

Many literary sources have already answered the question many times why a small and underdeveloped movement began an armed struggle against the Mexican government and its large professional army? From these sources, it can be concluded that the Zapatistas flared up and launched an attack under the influence of effect, like a cornered beast. Maybe, this was partly true, but it is important to understand that the Zapatistas perfectly understood what they were doing and that their actions cannot be called desperate. Instead, it was a revolutionary method to declare oneself to the government, which

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<sup>4</sup> English translation

<sup>5</sup> English translation

<sup>6</sup> English translation

nongovernmental organizations and the mass media cleverly supported. Confirming this, on January 4, 1994, in an interview to the newspaper *L'Unitá*, Subcomandante Marcos said the following: "We have been preparing on the mountain for the last ten years we are not an improvised movement. We have matured, thought, learned, and we have come to this decision" (Enlace Zapatista 1994).<sup>7</sup>

From this statement, the following thought can be derived that the subsequent events in 1994 were not spontaneous decisions. As it was said, the decision to start an armed struggle was made by voting. In the same interview, Marcos said that the Indigenous people have always lived in war conditions and that it is better "to die in battle, and not from dysentery, as the Chiapas Indigenous people usually die" (Enlace Zapatista 1994). Also, in the same interview, Marcos said that he did not trust a specific political party but the electoral system as a whole - a position that has not changed so far.

The main goal of EZLN was to draw attention to the crisis in Chiapas. Subcomandante Marcos accused NAFTA of being a *death sentence* for the indigenous peoples of Mexico. Some American experts noted that the attention of the Zapatistas, specifically on NAFTA, is quite interesting. If the rebels' main goal was to attack NAFTA, they would have launched an uprising a week before the vote in the US Congress. However, the armed conflict started precisely the day when the agreement had already entered into force (Fox 1994). This question can be answered: the NAFTA factor is not the determining factor for the entire Zapatista movement. NAFTA became the "last straw," and the armed struggle was the "last resort" thus, the Zapatistas reacted to the state's adoption of a new neoliberal policy, against which they have repeatedly acted peacefully.

After the events of 1994 began to spread rapidly in the media, the Zapatistas became a widespread phenomenon that people began to talk about. Someone even tried to take advantage of this phenomenon. Aguilar Talamantes, the presidential candidate from the Cardenist Front of National Liberation, has invited the Zapatistas to be their candidate in the upcoming elections. The proposal was politely rejected in the "Sobre el PFCRN y la ofensiva militar del gobierno":

*The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional did not raise in arms to support one of several candidates for the country's presidency. The EZLN is not aiming for one party or another to win, the EZLN is looking for justice, liberty, and democracy so the people can choose (a candidate) who better understands them and that this will, whatever it is, is*

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<sup>7</sup> English translation

*respected and understood by all Mexicans and other peoples. The EZL (long one NAME FIX IT) asks for the government, belonging to whichever party, to be a legitimate one, resulted from a truly free and democratic election, and that it addresses the most urgent needs of our Mexican people, especially of us, the indigenous (people). (CCRI – CG del EZLN 1994).*<sup>8</sup>

This treatment and the situation with the Talamantes are not any significant events in the history of the Zapatista movement, but it carries with it a fairly well-stated Zapatistas' idea of their position, which will stay with them till today. Perhaps cooperation with Talamantes would give the Zapatistas access to the country's political arena. Still, the EZLN confirmed their ideals, stating that they do not stand for or against candidates, but stand for a just democratic government, whatever it may be. By the way, in the end, the Zapatistas only won from rejection since Talamantes turned out to be a corporatist opportunist who tried to cash in on the prestige of the EZLN.

This rejection of one politician soon developed into a rejection of government policy altogether. In the rising, one thing came clear: the armed fight was among asymmetric fighters. Nevertheless, the rising was not a spur-of-the-moment decision.

### **3.2. The role of NGO during the rising.**

Another no less important factor influencing the formation of EZLN as a new phenomenon of social struggle was non-governmental organizations. Moreover, these nongovernmental organizations could fundamentally shape the strategy of the Zapatistas' struggle against the government. It is imperative to note that NGOs were present in Chiapas even before the Zapatistas.

During the 1980s, Chiapas became a crossroads for NGO activists, priests of Roman Catholic liberation theology (such as one of the main expositors of this ideology, Bishop of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Samuel Ruiz García), Protestant evangelicals, Guatemalan refugees, Central American guerrillas, and drug and gun traffickers. Therefore, Human rights NGOs have shown a much greater interest in the conditions in

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<sup>8</sup> English translation

Chiapas than in other regions (Ronfeldt et al. 1998: 20). Thus, EZLN was in an environment where international attention was already present.

In addition, many NGOs outside Mexico have questioned the usefulness of NAFTA. American and Canadian NGOs that opposed NAFTA were among the first to support their EZLN cause (Ronfeldt et al. 1998: 25-26).

Nongovernmental organizations across North America (mainly Canadian and American) had conferences and communicated via faxes and computer systems to oppose NAFTA. The goal of the activists was to fight the accelerated approval of NAFTA by the US Congress but not to oppose the agreement itself openly. This set the stage for the rapid mobilization of NGOs that followed the January 1994 EZLN uprising. Non-governmental organizations belonging to the growing, ramified network of human rights and indigenous peoples' rights movements were also quickly mobilized. In addition, a wide range of peaceful, trade, and other troubled NGOs soon joined the mobilization (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001: 180).

It is important to recall that although the Zapatistas called on international organizations to monitor the situation in Chiapas, they kept their distance from them and set obvious conditions on who and how could help them. Local, national, and international non-governmental organizations have played an important supporting role in the movement. However, this support also created some problems for the Zapatistas.

### *3.2.1 Internet and mass media*

The NGOs had more than just a support function for the Zapatistas. They also provided tremendous opportunities for them, which EZLN took advantage of very successfully. And this support is connected not only with the political and social side of the problem but also with the distribution of information around the world.

The Mass Media factor is of immense importance in the world. Thanks to television and the Internet, people get the latest news from all over the world. On the other hand, governments use the mass media in every possible way for its political advantage. Information flows can cause certain reactions of the population to this problem. Thus, the distribution of information is one of the most important aspects of electoral politics and the political system and life in general.

For our topic, it is essential to understand that the first step of the Zapatistas in 1994 took place in the reality of an informative boom, namely at the moment of the birth of the worldwide network.

The advent of the World Wide Web gave a powerful impetus to the popularization and development of the Internet. In 1990, the first text browser was introduced to the scientific community, allowing you to view hyperlinked text files online. Since 1994 the Internet has gained popularity among the general public. In 1995, NSF transferred responsibility for the Internet to the private sector. This helped to expand the range of commercial providers and consumers of Internet services, which soon connected millions of computers and hundreds of millions of people worldwide (РИА Новости 2019).

Thus, the entry into the political arena of the Zapatistas formally coincided with the creation of the Internet. The internet, along with television, has given a tremendous impetus to the Zapatistas.

After twelve days of fierce fighting, the media was chained to Chiapas. Television cameras and reporters broadcast images and statistics of violence in southern Mexico around the world. International media covered Mexico and NAFTA as the future for Mexico and for democracy in Latin America, began to cover events of a different kind in the periphery of the country. The democratic development of Mexico has become questionable in the eyes of the world community (Carrigan 1995: 74). In Mexico, for the first time in recent history, a movement such as Zapatistas was able to speak out their positions, using media, not only to Mexicans but to the world.

The question is, how did the poor peasants and indigent guerrillas, who previously fought with a machete against the professional army, were able to get a computer, the Internet, and access to Mass Media? The answer is the same NGOs that had the opportunity and could disseminate information both for the sake of the Zapatistas and for their own sake.

Without the NGOs, EZLN would probably have adopted a regime of organization and behavior that would be more reminiscent of a classic guerrilla movement (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001: 2). For modern NGOs, nonviolent yet persuasive action is critical. Given the scale of Mass Media's influence, information warfare has been the most effective way for NGOs to defend their principles.

Since rumors of a Zapatista uprising first spread through new media, NGOs have used the Internet and communications systems such as *Peacenet* and Mexico's nascent *La Neta*

(which went online in 1993) to spread information. By the end of 1994, the Internet was full of all kinds of Zapatistas resources available to everyone (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001: 2).

Luis Hernández spoke in detail about the media reaction to the events in Chiapas, both in his articles and in interviews. It is no secret that the leading media in Mexico, linked to president Carlos Salinas, have begun active propaganda against the Zapatistas.

The pro-government media wrote that the Zapatistas are “manipulators, not indigenous people since they wear masks and speak Spanish perfectly. They also wrote that drug cartels organized the uprising” (Hernández 2021). In general, the message was that there is no national movement of indigenous peoples, that they were a product of some sort of conspiracy, and that this is all manipulation by a local third party.

Unlike the pro-government media, independent sources (four of them: two national newspapers -*La Jornada* and *El Financiero*- the most important political magazine in Mexico -*Proceso*- and regional Chiapas newspaper *El Tiempo*) tried to cover the events as they were, since no one believed the state propaganda. *The La Jornada* Editor, the first newspaper that started to write about the Zapatistas, even specifically looked for experts who understand the essence of the movement EZLN and do not follow the state propaganda. The Zapatistas maintained their appearance in the news until 2006.<sup>9</sup>

The historical context described above gives us reason to assume that it was the situation in Mexico and in the world that gave impetus to the Zapatistas. In short, if it were not for the presence of NGOs in the region that had access to the Internet and the mass media, the Zapatistas would have remained some unknown remnants of the guerrilla movement in the jungle.

By chance or on purpose, Zapatistas were able to ideally use the existing reality of Mexico and the world, which formed their strategy of struggle since 1994. Beyond the asymmetric situation between them and the Mexican Army, the world attention to Chiapas in that year and the role played by factors like media and NGO's influenced the change of the EZLN from a traditional guerrilla movement into a movement that took a truce of their War declaration but did not stop the war. After that, weapons have not been the central strategy, and EZLN decided to prioritize other methods of a fight, organization, mobilizations, media, and non-armed politics.

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Luis Hernández Navarro. 25.05.2011

### 3.3. The San Andrés Agreements, the alternation in 2000, and the *Zapatour*.

The year 2000 heralded a fundamental global change in Mexico, which influenced the Zapatistas' strategy's change, giving them a new impetus to action. But two events that took place before 2000 should be mentioned as they can be of great importance to the analysis – signing an agreement of San Andres and the Acteal Massacre.

The armed uprising in Chiapas caught the Mexican government by surprise. This surprise, pressure from external forces, fear of losing the prestige of Mexico at the international level, and internal pressure within the country forced the government to start a dialogue.<sup>10</sup> The result of these negotiations was the “COCOPA law” (Pacification and concordance commission law) and the *San Andres agreements*. The *Acuerdos de San Andres Agreements* are agreements reached between the EZLN and the Mexican government (under Ernesto Zedillo) in 1996. Under this agreement, the government granted autonomy and rights to the indigenous population of Mexico. The agreements were based on five principles: respect for indigenous diversity, conservation of natural resources on indigenous lands, greater participation of indigenous communities in decision-making and control over public spending, participation of indigenous communities in determining their development plans, the autonomy of indigenous communities, and their rights self-determination within the state. However, President Zedillo and the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), backed by the Democratic Revolutionary Party and the National Action Party, ignored the agreements. The military presence in the region has only increased since the agreements were signed.

Despite the truce, the military presence remained in Chiapas, and no progress was observed on the issue in the region. Moreover, the right-wing paramilitaries continued to attack the villages and territories of the Zapatistas. One of the loudest attacks was the Acteal massacre. Forty-five indigenous townspeople who attended a Roman Catholic prayer meeting, including children and pregnant women (members of the Las Abejas pacifist group) in the small village of Acteal in one of the municipalities of Chiapas, were brutally killed. The massacre in Acteal occurred on December 22, 1997, by the right-wing paramilitary group "Red Mask." The first reaction of the Zapatistas to this was: “Brothers

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<sup>10</sup> Interview with Luis Hernández Navarro. 25.05.2011

and Sisters: Why? How much more? Until when?" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 1997).<sup>11</sup>

The next day, they blamed president Ernesto Zedillo and the PRI government based on their evidence (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 1997). The Zapatistas will refer to the Acteal massacre many times as an example of government violence against indigenous people.

The ending of the XX Century and after several institutional changes (such as the electoral reforms of 1976 or 1993, for instance), the democratization process in Mexico changed the correlation of the forces in the country, strengthen the opposition political parties, and reduced the presence of PRI in Congress. After that, 2000 finally meant an alternate in presidential power in Mexico after 70 years of PRI ruling (Garrido de Sierra 2012). For the first time in a very long time, a candidate who did not belong to PRI, Vicente Fox (of the right-wing National Action Party - PAN), won the presidential elections. Despite coming from a conservative party, Vicente Fox, figuratively speaking, became a breeze of hope for the Zapatistas, and not only because of his catchy and flamboyant promise "that within "15 minutes" he would be able to begin the "problem-solving process" of Chiapas, which has been going on for six years" (Venegas 2000).<sup>12</sup>

In addition to words, Vicente Fox also took action. During the first months of his government, the presence of the Mexican army in Chiapas declined. However, it is important to clarify that Vicente Fox never set out to remove federal troops from Chiapas completely:

*...his idea is to reduce "to 5,000" the number of Army troops in Chiapas, which is the average in the rest of the states. As the pacification process advances, "there will be a reasonable presence of the Army, at the normal levels that existed before the conflict."* (Venegas 2001).<sup>13</sup>

The Zapatistas, in their speeches and messages, also confirm the withdrawal of troops:

*The Triumph represented by the withdrawal of the army from this place (The Amador Hernández Community) belongs to those Indigenous Zapatistas and the national and international civil society that has never left them alone. On the other hand, this withdrawal of the one from seven positions demanded by the EZLN is a good sign and a*

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<sup>11</sup> English translation

<sup>12</sup> English translation

<sup>13</sup> English translation



*first and important step to renew the dialogue. The remaining six positions, the release of the prisoners, and the constitutional recognition of the indigenous rights and culture, are missing (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2000a).*<sup>14</sup>

More than that, Vicente Fox activated a new peace initiative by released many of the political prisoners from EZLN:

*... 17 political prisoners were released; the special visas for foreigners who came to visit Chiapas were suspended; there is total openness to visiting the country, and the Cocopa initiative was presented to Congress, "which we are going to promote" (Venegas 2001).*<sup>15</sup>

It is crucial to understand that one of the pillars of the previous government's strategy was abolishing free access to the conflict zone for observers and journalists. From the above text, we understand how important the mass media is for the Zapatistas. Thus, it was a severe blow to the EZLN. Vicente Fox reopened the area, allowing observers to analyze events directly from Chiapas. Mexican writer and journalist Carlos Montemayor, historian and specialist in indigenous topics, said the following:

*With the cancellation of free access to the conflict zone for observers and journalists, the last military steps do not exactly invite optimism. There is a war strategy that advances brutally. Something influenced by the actions of paramilitary groups or the military siege itself (La Jornada 2000).*<sup>16</sup>

Thus, we see from news headlines, newspapers, and interviews that Fox's position at the beginning was a sign of hope for the Zapatistas for a quick solution not only to the conflict but also to the main problems of peripheral (and not only) social strata of the population, including the poor and indigenous people.

It is worth mentioning that at the same time as Fox became president, the governor of Chiapas also changed. This is Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, candidate from the joint PAN-PRD coalition. Carlos Montemayor also noted that if Pablo Salazar loses the elections in Chiapas, the war will accelerate (La Jornada 2000). Pablo Salazar, like Vicente Fox, supported the idea of dialogue with the Zapatistas. When the Zapatistas issued their seven demands to the Mexican government, Salazar called them "acceptable" and also supported the withdrawal initiative:

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<sup>14</sup> English translation

<sup>15</sup> English translation

<sup>16</sup> English translation

*It has been one of the most heartfelt demands of the other party. You have known me for years, and you know that this has been my personal position. I have raised the convenience of reducing the density of the Army's presence in Chiapas, and I believe that President Fox's timely response to this speaks to what I described a while ago as sensitivity to this issue. We must not close our eyes to the new signals that we are receiving; I insist they are very hopeful for the future of Chiapas and Mexico (Balboa 2000).*<sup>17</sup>

The reaction of the Zapatistas to the beginning of the mandate of Pablo Salazar was quite positive. They accepted him as honest or deserving of trust even though there are doubts (the benefit of the doubt):

*... Mr. Salazar said that he intended to carry out several actions as part of his government program. Shall they become true, these measures would help the distension needed for dialogue. Although, when it comes to the freeing of Zapatistas imprisoned, it is necessary to remember that, besides the Chiapas one, there are some sympathizers of the EZLN in Tabasco and Queretaro prisons. (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2000b).*<sup>18</sup>

As it turned out later, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía could not solve the problems of Chiapas (or did not want to), and after that, he was arrested for corruption.

Conditions in the country with Fox's arrival became favorable for an attempt of dialogue for the Zapatistas. Several military checkpoints have been closed or relocated, and travel to Zapatista communities has become more accessible (Earle and Simonelli 2004: 121). Duncan Earl and Jeanne Simonelli write that "this sense of relative peace created a space for reflection, evolution, and change among the Zapatistas" (Earle and Simonelli 2004:121). Despite the lack of ideological convergence between Zapatistas and the new right-wing government, the apparent reduction of open repressive practices in the Chiapas region could open an opportunity to take advantage of institutions to generate legal changes in favor of the indigenous population. However, Vicente Fox was also the subject of criticism from both politicians and Zapatistas, which will be discussed in more detail later. One of the important arguments against it was that although Fox was withdrawing troops from some bases, they appeared in others. Also, there are hints that the paramilitaries worked with representatives of the political sector. However, the federal

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<sup>17</sup> English translation

<sup>18</sup> English translation

government turned a blind eye to what the paramilitaries were doing and did not diligently investigate the paramilitaries' crimes (Manaut et al. 2006: 143).

Subcomandante Marcos and EZLN responded to the political changes in Mexico by expressing hope for improving the quality of life of the indigenous people and implementing the San Andres agreements. The Zapatistas wanted to demonstrate their hope with a two-week march from Chiapas to Mexico City (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001: 195). In his appeal, Marcos clearly outlined the reasons and goals of the march:

*First: Call the National Indigenous Congress, national and international civil society, political and social organizations, and all people in general to a great mobilization to obtain from the Congress of the Mexican Union the constitutional recognition of rights and indigenous culture, following the initiative of the Cocopa. Second: That it has decided to send a delegation from the CCRI-CG of the EZLN to Mexico City to lead this mobilization to address the honorable Congress of the Union and to argue in front of the legislators the benefits of the so-called "initiative proposal of indigenous law of the Cocopa" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2000c).<sup>19</sup>*

This march was also a sign of goodwill and an indicator for the government that the Zapatista movement is supported by sections of society, which also hope to institutionalize the law on indigenous people. Thus, in response to a sign of goodwill from Vicente Fox, the Zapatistas decide to enter into dialogue with him. An important point of this march was that, according to Marcos' call, dialogue with the Foxes and his Administration is not the main goal:

*The trip of the Zapatista delegation to Mexico City will take place regardless of whether the dialogue with the federal government will be resumed or not. We are going to address the Legislative Branch, being sure that we will find sensitivity to be heard (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2000c).<sup>20</sup>*

The desire to be "heard" is the main goal of the Zapatistas. With Fox's arrival to power, the opportunity to be heard was given to the Zapatistas, which they immediately took advantage of.

But the direct purpose of this march was not to condemn the government with which they had feuded for decades but to welcome Vicente Fox as the new guarantor of the

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<sup>19</sup> English translation

<sup>20</sup> English translation

agreements on one side and "gently" pressure on Congress to pass the law on indigenous people.

The Fox administration agreed to guarantee safe passage to Mexico City, and Congress decided to welcome representatives from the EZLN and other indigenous organizations. The Zapatistas demanded the approval of the COCOPA agreements. If they refused, they threatened to return to the strategy of territorial resistance, silence, and retrenchment.

The march was hailed as a success by both EZLN members and the Mexican government regarding both sides' expectations (Solorzano 2004). In addition, the march also became a symbolic success because the Zapatistas were well received by society.

On February 24, 2001, the Zapatista caravan left the jungle and headed from Chiapas to Juchitán, Oaxaca. After the Zapatista, head to San Cristóbal, the city where it all began. La Jornada writes:

*Only now were they greeted by an illuminated central square full of people waiting for them without imagining that so many would arrive. The thousands of people gathered in front of the cathedral expected only 24 Zapatistas and not the largest mass mobilization San Cristóbal de la Casas has seen in all its history (Bellinghausen 2001).<sup>21</sup>*

It is important to emphasize that many people in San Cristóbal also had fears that history would repeat itself on January 1, 1994:

*After all, the memory of the early morning of January 1, 1994, when the armed rebels occupied the municipality, is still fresh. The lives and properties of the aforementioned were, for days, at the disposal of the rebels. They did not take them. Their nightmares came true. The memory of that -for them- the unfortunate moment is alive [...] Now, more than eight years into that history, and seven years after the start of the armed insurrection, a part of the Coleta society flinched upon learning of the Zapatista caravan. The state government's intervention was necessary to contain the bitterness and threats against them (Bellinghausen 2001).<sup>22</sup>*

On the way, the Zapatistas were supported by the indigenous people who joined the march. More than 15,000 people welcomed and accompanied the 24 EZLN delegates to the central square in Xuchitana. In the capital of Oaxaca, people also came out to support Marcos and his supporters:

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<sup>21</sup> English translation

<sup>22</sup> English translation

*Thousands of inhabitants of this capital (Oaxaca, Oax) welcomed the March for indigenous dignity. In the heart of the city, one of the largest citizen mobilizations that are remembered in these lands took place yesterday (Cuevas 2001).<sup>23</sup>*

The same situation was observed in other Mexican cities: in Orizaba, in Ishmikilpan, in Michoacan, in Nurio, in Anenecuilco, in San Pablo Oztotepec, in Zocalo, and other places in Mexico. In general, the Zapatistas were greeted positively. People came out and supported them, greeted them, and rejoiced at their arrival, as indicated above. However, some did not like Zapatour at all. For example, the governor of the state of Queretaro Ignacio Loyola Vera exponentially left the state when the Zapatistas arrived. Moreover, he ordered the police to remain in the barracks so as not to support the caravan:

*At nine in the morning, Governor Ignacio Loyola Vera left this city before the arrival of Subcomandante Marcos and the 23 commanders of the EZLN. Before leaving for an unknown destination, he ordered the municipal police to remain in their barracks to not give any help to the rebel caravan (Aviles 2001).<sup>24</sup>*

Ignacio Loyola Vera is a PAN member (like Fox), and by this behavior, he demonstrated his position and the position of some party members in Congress. This episode indicates that Fox's friendliness is not the generalized friendliness of the whole party, which in the future will affect the rejection of the San Andres agreement of the COCOPA version. From an ideological point of view, Loyola is far-right, and his methods of conflict resolution are directly opposite to those of Fox and the Zapatistas:

*And it is that Loyola, ..., former leader of the Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic (Coparmex) and an ally of Fernández de Cevallos, shares with the far-right PAN the view that brute force is the most effective remedy against political and social conflicts caused by extreme misery (Aviles 2001).<sup>25</sup>*

This March, apart from everything else, bears the character of the adaptability of the Zapatistas, not just as a partisan group, but already of a whole social sector with legitimacy in society that supported their cause. Coming out of the jungle, they marched peacefully through the country, participating in a kind of direct democratic process, a collective action to make visible their demands, setting themselves tasks of a democratic

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<sup>23</sup> English translation

<sup>24</sup> English translation

<sup>25</sup> English translation

nature. Not surprisingly, Zapatour became a popular event among urban populations throughout Mexico, as the march raised pressing democratic issues for the government.

Nevertheless, the institutional processing of the demands in Congress was conflictive. It is important to note here that if Fox openly went to meet the dialogue with the Zapatistas and Marcos, many Congress members did not share his enthusiasm. Interestingly, Fox's PAN party and the left-wing PRD party tried to hinder the negotiations in one way or another. PRD and PAN wanted to torpedo the negotiations. And the representatives of PRI, oddly enough, were judgmental about this:

*Because of the PRD insisting that together with Panista senator Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, “bombarding” the dialogue of the Zapatista leadership with the Congress of the Union, the priista Enrique Jackson Ramirez said that the PRI is willing to discuss and consider some counterproposal to the proposition made that the committees of the Political Coordination sent to the rebel group through the Cocopa conduct. (Becerril et al. 2001).<sup>26</sup>*

In addition, PAN did not want to give Subcomandante Marcos a parliamentary platform for negotiations, as they considered it inappropriate. By the way, PAN representatives suggested creating a commission to meet with the Zapatistas and not invite them directly to the Congress building: “The use of the highest platform in the country is not a reason for negotiation with Subcomandante Marcos” (Aponte y Saldiernal 2001).<sup>27</sup>

In the end, the Mexican Congress approved a version of the COCOPA proposal, but only after making several changes to the text that significantly changed the definition of territoriality and largely left the implementation of the law to the state governments. The required two-thirds of state legislatures approved the law, but it was rejected in almost all states with large indigenous populations. Voting in the Cámara de Diputados took place on 28 April 2001 with 386 votes in favor and 60 against. Legislatures in the States of Guerrero, Hidalgo, San Luis Potosi, Baja California Sur, Chiapas, Estado de Mexico, Morelos, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, and Sakate rejected the law (Manaut et al. 2006: 145). La Jornada reports the following:

*A few hours before the text of the law on indigenous rights and culture was submitted to the plenary for its approval in the Chamber of Deputies, the PRD legislators maintain*

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<sup>26</sup> English translation

<sup>27</sup> English translation

*the decision to vote against, although a group identified with the directive of this party advanced its vote in favor of the opinion (Perez Silva 2001).<sup>28</sup>*

It is also mentioned in the news summary that the PRI also votes against the law because “there are errors and omissions in the text that do not allow solving the problem of indigenous peoples in essence” (Perez Silva 2001)<sup>29</sup>. The PRD, however, said that this law on indigenous people can be improved.

Some researchers believe the law itself was a step forward in recognizing the indigenous peoples of Mexico. However, if the states and local congresses did not recognize him in the end, then nothing can be said about success. Why was the government unable or unwilling to pass this law in the form in which the Zapatistas demand it? There can be identified two main provisions of this law: firstly, the adoption of the COCOPA law means the consolidation of the plurinational state; secondly, this law gives indigenous peoples the right to territory. These provisions do not satisfy the Mexican elites since, according to their position, the adoption of this law will provide a privilege to a particular group of people (indigenous people) and destroy the concept of *equality* in society.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, that recognition of a plurinational state could affect agricultural interests in the south and recognize indigenous languages, among other questions.

Not recognizing the law of COCOPA and San Andres Agreements radically changed the attitude of the Zapatistas towards the government and the political system in general. EZLN and their allies saw this as a betrayal by the Fox administration and his party in Congress. Communication with the government was cut.

Subcomandante Marcos, literally the day after the rejection of the COCOPA law and the adoption of the amended law on indigenous people, spoke out sharply about what was happening:

*With this reform, the Federal Legislators and Fox’s government close the door of the dialogue and peace because they avoid resolving one of the causes that originated the Zapatistas’ rise... [...]... Therefore, the EZLN communicates the following: ... [...]... B). The EZLN will not return to the path of dialogue with the federal government until the*

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<sup>28</sup> English translation

<sup>29</sup> English translation

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Luis Hernández Navarro. 25.05.2011

*Indigenous rights and culture are constitutionally recognized according to the so-called "COCOPA Law Initiative" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2001d).<sup>31</sup>*

The massive changes in Mexico in 2000 resulted in the rise and fall of the hopes of the Zapatistas. Although the Zapatistas received tremendous support for the reform of the rights of indigenous peoples from the wider Mexican society, the main goal of the march was not achieved. That made the EZLN more skeptical of political-electoral institutions (they did not want to participate in the electoral arena or so). Still, they continued to try to obtain, through the Congress Institution, a State recognition of their claims.

The rejection of this in the Congress, and the betrayal even from the leftist party which agreed to support them (Partido de la Revolución Democrática), influenced EZLN to act in a pacific way but marginally to the institutions, with the creation of the *Caracoles Zapatistas* and *Juntas del Buen Gobierno*: small communities in Chiapas with a collective rule and a proto direct democracy procedure.

### **3.4. The post-Zapatour and "The Other campaign" of EZLN in 2005-2006**

After a high-profile betrayal in 2001, the Zapatistas entered a period of "silence" of public callings. They focused on the organization of their communities. "Silence" ended only in 2005 with the release of the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, known to all as *Sexta*, in which the Zapatistas affirm support for the indigenous peoples, who make about one-third of the population of the Chiapas and are also expanding the case to include *all exploited and disadvantaged Mexico*.

It's important to mention that the "silence" didn't mean inaction. Since 2003, Zapatistas dedicated themselves to create small communities with proto-direct democratic procedures, the so-called Caracoles (Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas, MAREZ). By the idea, Caracoles are *de facto* autonomous territories of Zapatistas. The Junta of the Good Government is based in Caracoles. It brings together autonomous rebel municipalities, which include representatives from the region's settlements, usually of the same language group. There may also be a regional hospital, a high school, a radio, a warehouse, and other important objects for settlement. However,

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<sup>31</sup> English translation



the existence of Caracoles is the attempt of Zapatistas to take the distance from institutional politics and political parties. Caracoles became a product of dissatisfaction with communication with the Mexican authorities in 2001, which betrayed the Zapatistas. With the creation of Caracoles, Zapatistas stopped having any links with and trust to political parties. Moreover, Caracoles appeared to be a protection against the action of paramilitaries, who never stopped attacking the rebels. Even during the Fox period, Zapatistas were dealing with paramilitaries. For example, in August 2001, “paramilitary activity is stepped up with attacks on the autonomous townships resulting in four dead, more than twenty wounded, and many displaced” (School for Chiapas).

After 2003, Mexico had intense politicization due to the conflict between Vicente Fox and Lopez Obrador, the Mexico City Mayor and member of the leftist PRD. Both of them were focusing on the presidential election of 2006, and their relationship was not institutional but conflictive due to that difference. Both of them were making ideological statements against each other. AMLO had strong popularity in Mexico City. The federal government of Fox started trial over Lopez Obrador, which later received the name “El Desafuero” (the impeachment). It was basically the solicitation from the Prosecutor Office to the Congress to take out legal immunity from the city mayor to be judged for the presumption of the crime of violating the Judge’s resolution.

Nevertheless, the case's evidence was weak. It didn’t aim directly at Lopez Obrador, so it seemed like an alibi from Fox Government to obstacle AMLO as a candidate in the future election as a non-democratic action. Nevertheless, Lopez Obrador protested with massive protests, which became one of the biggest mobilizations of the modern history of Mexico (Araujo 2005: 166).

Marcos condemned this process, calling this trial lawlessness (Cronica 2005). Zapatistas admitted in 2005 that repression against AMLO is not fair, but anyway, they said that electoral competition was not enough to change the country's structure. Furthermore, they remarked distance to Lopez Obrador and considered that he was not an ideological ally despite considering the impeachment as a great injustice.

In April 2005, the protest against the Desafuero and International Pressure against President Fox made him resign his objective, and the accusation against AMLO was canceled. With that, the previous electoral round of the companion between Fox and Lopez Obrador ended, and the formal process started, and most of the parties were in precampaign. In June of 2005, as a reaction to the electoral process, Zapatistas proclaimed

the Sexta Declaration of Selva Lacandona, which was an “emergency state” and a strong criticism against capitalism and a critical position against the reformism that political parties were offering. After the statements from EZLN about Lopez Obrador's impeachment, the declaration, which was critical against all parties, especially PRD members, seemed surprising.

The Sixth Declaration briefly describes the path of the Zapatistas from 1994 to the present moment (that is, until the release of the Sixth), namely the outbreak of hostilities in 1994, the San Andres agreements, Acteal massacre, and the 2001 "betrayal," about which Zapatistas again declare that “there is no sense to speak with politics.” However, the most important thing for us is the following words in this Declaration:

*And the first thing we saw is that our heart is no longer the same as before when we started our fight, but that it is bigger because we already touched the hearts of many good people. ... [...]... So, as Zapatistas that we are, we thought it was not enough to stop talking to the government, but instead that it was necessary to continue the struggle despite those lazy parasites of politicians. The EZLN then decided to comply, alone and on its side (that is, it is said "unilateral" because only one side), of the San Andrés Accords regarding indigenous rights and culture. For four years, from the middle of 2001 until the middle of 2005, we have dedicated ourselves to this... (Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena Comandancia General del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 2005).<sup>32</sup>*

Among other things, while analyzing the Sixth Declaration, it is important to understand the ideological and political development of the Zapatistas. Based on the text, one can make such a judgment that the Caracoles were created to conduct an "alternative" policy and re-form the network of communication within the Zapatistas and indigenous people. Before that, they re-concentrated the force within the movement as informed in *Finaliza reconcentración Zapatista* (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2005a) and *Finaliza reorganización político-militar del EZLN* (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2005b) documents. The important point was that the Zapatistas realized that there was no democracy within their municipalities, as decisions were made by the EZLN army and not by civilians:

*And we also saw that the EZLN, with its political-military side, was getting involved in the decisions that were up to the democratic authorities, "civilians." And here, the*

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<sup>32</sup> English translation

*problem is that the political-military part of the EZLN is not democratic because it is an army, and we saw that it is not right that the military is above and the democratic is below, because it should not be that what is democratic its is decided militarily, but it must be the other way around: that is, the democratic political upward commanding and the military downward obeying.... [...].... This is how the Good Government Boards were born, in August 2003 (Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena Comandancia General del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 2005).*<sup>33</sup>

Summing up the results, the Zapatistas are giving a huge influence to the fact that during their 12-year struggle, many people began to support them, and, roughly speaking, from now on, they continue to fight for and in honor of these very people.

The Sixth Declaration reaffirms the struggle against capitalism and neoliberalism:

*And capitalism also makes its wealth with plunder, that is, with theft, because it takes away from others what it wants, for example, land and natural wealth. In other words, capitalism is a system where robbers are free and are admired and set as an example .. [...]... And neoliberalism is the idea that capitalism is free to dominate the whole world.. (Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena Comandancia General del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 2005).*<sup>34</sup>

Another important point in the development of the Zapatistas' strategy, based on the text of the Sixth Declaration, is that the Zapatistas began to appeal not only to the people of Mexico but also to the world as a whole. So, they separately turn to Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, Oceania with a desire to learn from them how they are fighting against neoliberalism. The Zapatistas announced their entry to the world level. They identified three action points outside Mexico, including building new relationships and mutual support, mutual material support, and initiating new meetings between communities worldwide. Following the global goals, the Zapatistas set themselves new challenges in Mexico, a new version of the old agenda. So, the Zapatistas are now fighting not only for the indigenous people but also for "all the exploited and disadvantaged of Mexico, with all of them and throughout the country" (Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena Comandancia General del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 2005).

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<sup>33</sup> English translation

<sup>34</sup> English translation

The declaration ends with a call for the fight for social justice both in Mexico and abroad. It also announces the beginning of the departure of a delegation whose goal will be to fulfill the tasks set in the Sixth and the establishment of political alliances with indiscriminate leftist organizations and movements. In fact, the Zapatistas were taken distance from the election and declared that they were not going to speak against or in favor of any candidate. Instead, they were going to create their own project to include the marginalized minorities. That is how *la Otra Campaña* was born.

*La Otra Campaña* is a political program, which purpose is “to bring together leftist groups all over the country for radical social change” (School for Chiapas). The Other Campaign “the national part of the Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona” (The Sixth Committee of the EZLN, 2005). Subcomandante Marcos, in his address to all supporters of The Other Campaign, clarifies the following: “The main objective of this first tour of the Sixth Commission of the EZLN is to speak and listen with all the friends of the "Other" in each state (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2005c).<sup>35</sup>

In preparation for the start of the Other Campaign, the Zapatistas received meeting invitations replies from a variety of social groups in Mexico:

*... the following have expressed support and noted they would be participating in the meetings for preparations for «the other campaign» in Mexico: 30 political organizations which characterize themselves as being of the left; 32 indigenous and Indigenous People of Mexico organizations; 47 social organizations of the left; 210 non-governmental, artistic and cultural organizations, groups and collectives; 636 women, men, old ones, boys and girls, individually or from families, streets, barrios, neighborhoods, communities (The Sixth Committee of the EZLN 2005).*

In general, the Other Campaign, which took place during the presidential election campaign, resembled an ordinary election campaign. Still, it is essential to note that the goal was not to elect a candidate for public office but to create a political force of a new alternative type of political activity.

During the Other Campaign, Subcomandante Marcos, who at that moment took the name Delegado Zero, traveled for several months across the 31 states of Mexico. As in the time of Zapatour, the Zapatistas were successful. A lot of people who were not indifferent came to their meetings to support and greet them.

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<sup>35</sup> English translation

When Subcomandante Marcos and his men arrived in Mexico City, they immediately had to change their route. On 3 May, clashes broke out in the City of Atenco (a small location in the State of Mexico, 35 kilometers away from Mexico City) between the Texcoco municipal police and flower street vendors who are members of the *United Popular Front for the Land*, a movement organized in 2001 to reject the attempt of president Vicente Fox to construct in that part –where peasants had their lands- a new international airport. The clash echoed the 2002 protests against Fox's airport construction in Mexico State. When the Zapatistas heard of this, Subcomandante Marcos issued a "red warning" and immediately went to Atenco to support the protesters: "From north to south, from east to west, may the other campaign resound in Atenco and may there be justice for the fallen" (Bellinghausen and Duarte 2006).<sup>36</sup>

*As the Sixth Commission, we are declaring ourselves on alert. The troops of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation have already been declared on red alert. At that time, the Caracoles and the Zapatista Rebel Autonomous Municipalities will be closed. [...] As the Sixth Commission, we are canceling all our participation in the programmed activities, and we are awaiting the indication of the Front of Peoples in Defense of the Earth. If you need our presence there, we will go there. If not, we will participate directly in any of your scheduled actions for tomorrow from 8:00, eight in the morning (Enlace Zapatista 2006).*<sup>37</sup>

After the police repression against the flower vendors in Atenco, other members of the *United Popular Front for The Land* united to support them. The federal forces irrupted for an escalade of the conflict. As a result, two people died after the police actions, and there were sexual aggressions against women who were protesting or witnessing the facts. Nevertheless, EZLN remained there for several days. After that, the Zapatistas returned to their original route and continued their march. The final point was the capital of Mexico, which was on the eve of the elections.

On July 2, 2006, the presidential election sparked a wave of protests throughout Mexico known as the "Cactus Revolution." The election was run by the candidate from the PAN, the current ruling party - Felipe Calderón. His main opponent was Lopez Obrador from the leftist Party of the PRD, which at the beginning of the campaign led the preferences and polls even till 10 points above Calderón.

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<sup>36</sup> English translation

<sup>37</sup> English translation

Nevertheless, Calderón's electoral team decided to violate the Mexican electoral Law, which prohibited Campaigns against opponents and focused his speech and messages on attacking López Obrador. Furthermore, he used a *black* propaganda campaign. The Electoral authority did not stop it. In addition, Vicente Fox invested public money to generate 460 thousand promotional spots of his government achievements as illegal intromission of the president. That was also prohibited by law (Zamora and Barajas 2007: 47).

After those irregularities and several discrepancies in the official vote-counting founded during the election day, López Obrador declared an objection against the results. As a result, Calderon received 35.89% of the vote and Obrador 35.31%. Since the electoral legislation of Mexico does not provide for the possibility of a second-round, Calderon became the new president. Obrador's supporters, however, demanded that the election results be declared invalid. In particular, they pointed out that after counting 90% of the ballots, Obrador won over Calderon by more than one percent and suggested that during the counting of the last 10% of the votes, illegitimate methods of Calderon's victory in the elections were involved.

However, July 2 was not only election day. On this day, in addition to the people who came to vote, EZLN gathered 2,500 supporters and sympathizers and asked not to participate in the elections. The rally, led by Subcomandante Marcos, culminated in the "Other Campaign," which attempted to focus on poverty and indigenous peoples' rights while denouncing Mexico's "corrupt" political system (LADB Staff 2006). It was a kind of "anti-electoral crusade designed to weld the underclass struggle groups into a new left alliance" (John Ross in Burgess 2016: 10).

Marcos met with a wide range of people from various groups and organizations, including indigenous leaders, trade union organizers, intellectuals, feminists, human rights activists, women's rights activists, peasants, teachers, factory workers, sexual minorities, fishers, etc. That allowed the EZLN to continue to maintain the relevance of its struggle, fostering moral solidarity with all the oppressed people of the world. Moreover, the use of the Internet has never stopped (Mohamad 2015: 17).

It's important to clarify that the Other Campaign was not a reaction to the elections. It began with the election campaign, and the main goal was not to criticize any of the candidates but to criticize the entire political system. Subcommandante Insurgente Marcos begins a six-month tour of the country as a political strategy parallel to the

electoral campaign. They were going to call neither for voting nor not voting. The aim was to make visible the demands of vulnerable groups and popular strata while not supporting any of the parties (School for Chiapas). Moreover, during the Other Campaign, the Zapatistas criticized representatives of all parties, even the leftist Lopez Obrador. On election day, Marcos reiterated that La Otra Campaña has nothing to do with the ongoing elections in Mexico and has completely different goals:

*In the other campaign, "nothing should be done against the elections," said Subcomandante Marcos at the national assembly of adherents to the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon jungle. It is only a matter of saying to the people of Mexico: "I am here." (Bellinghausen 2006).<sup>38</sup>*

Why was this integration of the local movement from Chiapas needed into the broader national and international EZLN campaign? Some researchers believe that the national and international Zapatista campaign was necessary to collaborate with the vast masses (Harvey 1998). The launch of the Other Campaign did not mean a change in discourse but a change in the priorities of the Zapatistas. They changed their strategy; namely, they tried to move to the creation of a coalition *from below and from the left* in Mexican society, which is directly related to the Sixth Declaration and the call for resistance against the political system (Mohamad 2015: 17-18).

This brings us back to the relationship between the political left and the Zapatista from left and below. Many have criticized the Zapatistas for distancing themselves from the left-wing PRD candidate and rejecting Mexico's most progressive party. Thus, according to critics, the Zapatistas contributed to the defeat of Obrador (Brian 2010). The supporters of the PRD themselves spoke in the same way, and they believed that the call against the vote could be the reason for their defeat (LADB Staff 2006).

The Zapatistas themselves were very critical of the left-wing parties, not only of their goals and views but also of their actions. For example, parties such as the PRD once sabotaged the water supply to the EZLN communities in every possible way obstructed the implementation of the San Andres agreements (Mohamad 2015: 19). In 2006, the "Other Campaign" organizers opposed Lopez Obrador as much as they did against right-wing politicians.

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<sup>38</sup> English translation

*“Between leftist intellectuals close to the circle of the AMLO the interpretations of them of the Zapatistas behavior and Subcomandante Marcos’ critics against AMLO, was that Zapatistas believed that AMLO was going to win the 2006 election, and they wanted to position themselves as a social left, which was going to contrast the eventual leftist government” (Barajas 2006).*

The most important criticism, of course, was that the left-wing Zapatistas did not support the left-wing candidate, thereby letting him down. Marcos said that the Zapatistas are "not friends of AMLO" but enemies of the political system. On the other hand, Marcos agreed with Lopez Obrador that the PAN had rigged the election to win for Calderon. Marcos urged his supporters to join López Obrador's rallies to protest the election results, but he stressed that he is calling for this not to support Obrador but to support citizens in the fight against fraud (LADB Staff 2006).

In his interview with La Jornada, Marcos said the following statement:

*It is a fraud operated from Los Pinos and the central command of the PAN, which puts democracy, legality, and the supposed neutrality of the IFE in crisis. Although we do not look up there, we are in the same situation as when AMLO's lawlessness was attempted, regardless of the fact that we do not share his proposals ... [it is clear] that the one who won the election was AMLO and the "back-up money" that the IFE had, was useful for Calderón to surpass AMLO with that half a million votes when the PREP closed. (Bellinghausen 2006).<sup>39</sup>*

The important question is, what exactly influenced the Zapatista change in strategy in 2006? At the beginning of this chapter, it was mentioned that the Zapatistas remained "silent" from 2001 to 2005. So, of course, it is logical to assume that, given the 2001 episode, EZLN will actively act as simply political players. But this does not quite accurately answer the question posed since there is some discrepancy between reality and reality, namely: why did the Zapatistas, who live in the autonomous regions of Caracoles, decide to go out into the city?

The dilemma is that these autonomous regions created a kind of isolation. The Zapatista communities tried to develop self-sufficient production and exchange without dependence on external resources. This abstraction from the rest of Mexico was the solution to the EZLN's problems, but it was also their curse (Stahler-Sholk 2021: 48). The

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<sup>39</sup> English translation



Zapatistas broke a four-year silence with the issuance of the Sixth Declaration to hold a series of meetings with the participation of civil society, initiating the "Other Campaign" in which the Zapatistas reached the national level.

On July 3, the Mexican newspaper *La Jornada* published an article with an interview with Subcomandante Marcos, in which he says that "they (the Zapatistas) are happy, because for the first time in the history of this country, on election day, we who do not look up, finally have a place where we can search and organize ourselves at the bottom and left" (Bellinghausen y Olivares 2006)<sup>40</sup>. From this, we can conclude that the Zapatistas are pretty calm with the results of the elections and are very satisfied with the work that has been done. Moreover, according to the documentation in the archives of the Zapatista website, what happened in Atenco had more serious consequences for their agenda than the elections as a whole. EZLN commanders themselves, including Marcos, have repeatedly addressed the protesters in Atenco as their people.

*The Other Campaign* ended in December. The result was a massive mobilization of hundreds of thousands of citizens and corresponding support for the EZLN movement. At the level of politics, the Zapatistas raised issues of infringement of citizens, the problems of which none of the candidates presented while not participating in the political process. As a result of the not entirely successful functioning of the autonomous regions of the Caracoles, the Zapatistas recalled old grievances and changed their strategy of political-institutional isolation, which they threatened during the time of *Zapatour*, to a strategy of non-national and transnational mobilization of the disadvantaged and poor masses, while completely ignoring political processes.

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<sup>40</sup> English translation

## PART IV

### Towards an electoral attempt? EZLN political irruption for the presidential run in 2018

The official results from the presidential election of 2006 surprised several sectors in Mexican society, including EZLN, which, despite not participating in institutional processes, was the first voice in the country, even before PRD, to interpret what happened in the country election was a fraud. On July 6, just after three days of the voting day and before the official results, Marcos and other members of EZLN claimed that the real winner was Lopez Obrador and that they were going to validate and support, beyond political parties, an eventual resistance from the people against the fraud (Bellinghausen 2006).

Nevertheless, and despite the legal impugnation and political protests against results led by AMLO and the irregularities detected by the Electoral Court, this institution validated Calderon as a winner. EZLN did not take a protagonist role in the protests. After Calderon's validation, their *La Otra Campaña* lost visibility. Their *alter system* (altermundista) agenda could not be accomplished. It could be just heard in terms of State recognition by a government led by AMLO because that was the only candidate who made the compromise to achieve the San Andres Agreements.

After that, *La Otra Campaña* maintained some activities, but soon EZLN returned to their territory to organization duties, not recognizing the triumph of Calderon but not joining the political opposition led by Lopez Obrador. Zapatistas focused on their territory when the main distinctive decision of Felipe Calderon's government started: the "War on Drugs." It began almost immediately after Calderon became president and consisted mainly of consolidating the Mexican Army into Public Security duties, especially into an open confrontation against Drug Cartels.

The War on Drugs is an armed conflict between the Mexican government and the drug cartels. Although manifestations of violence between drug cartels took place long before the outbreak of the "war," right up to 2006, the government took a generally passive position concerning cartels. That all changed on December 11, 2006, when Felipe Calderon sent federal troops to the state of Michoacan until the violence ended there. This

action is considered the first major operation to combat organized crime and is generally seen as the starting point in the war between the government and drug cartels.

This war had several unexpected consequences which affected most of the population, and Zapatistas were not an exception. Due to organized crime and hostilities, peasant territories were in danger. Therefore, EZLN focused on their new main priority – security. In the archive of the EZLN, we can find a lot of messages about attacks and victims of that war. Also, Zapatistas were negatively addressing Calderon, basically saying that he is responsible for the victims (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 2011).

That was the primary concern of Zapatism in that period. During the Calderon government, EZLN had as a priority the security of their communities. But, on the other hand, they supported families of victims of the War who participated in protests (on the sideline from political parties, like the *Movimiento por la Paz con justicia y dignidad* on 2011). And last, they were mobilizing against that national strategy against crime. The ending of Calderon's regime was marked by this protest and some others also coming from the sidelines of political parties.

In 2012, the next presidential elections were held. Enrique Peña Nieto visited the Ibero-American University in Mexico City as part of his election campaign. At this meeting with students, he was asked a question about the 2006 riots in San Salvador Atenco. As governor of the city in those years, Peña Nieto called on the Mexican police to disperse the protesters. Peña Nieto replied that these were "drastic measures" designed to bring order within the law. This response was received with cries of discontent from the students. However, most of the national newspapers and television channels covering the event reported that the question and subsequent reactions were not provoked by students but by representatives of rival parties who attended the lecture. In response, 131 students posted a video on YouTube showing their student ID cards (131 Alumnos de la Ibero responden). Users who watched the video expressed their support for the students with the phrase "I am 132nd", which became the movement's name. Even though, in the end, Peña Nieto won the election (just slightly ahead of Lopez Obrador), this movement significantly worsened his statistics.

The EZLN did not officially express anything regarding the elections mentioned above and did not directly participate in the #YoSoy132 movement. There were students at the protests who positioned themselves as Zapatistas, but specifically Zapatistas, no. However, it cannot be said that they completely ignored the Peña Nieto administration.

In the paper "We don't know you yet?" (EZLN 2013) the Zapatistas have expressed their reaction to La Jornada's article "Todavía no nos conocen; no se adelanten". In that article, Osorio Chong -a member of Enrique Peña Nieto's campaign and after 2012 Minister of Interior- stated that the Zapatistas "do not know us yet" and he recommended them to "take your time because there are many commitments to indigenous peoples from the part of President Enrique Peña Nieto" (Vargas 2012)<sup>41</sup>. The reaction was mostly negative, and was accompanied by a mention of all the negative actions of Peña Nieto and members of his administration towards the Zapatistas and others. In particular, the Zapatistas, as well as #YoSoy132, admitted Nieto's administration's involvement in riots in San Salvador Atenco.

Throughout this time, the Zapatistas did not stop fighting the paramilitary and defending themselves against their attacks. The situation changed with a new electoral reform in 2014. According to that reform, rules were changed to allow independent presidential candidates to appear on the ballot, so it was unnecessary to postulate by a political party to participate in an election. An independent candidate must receive 866,593 supporting signatures to his candidature from citizens, which is 1% of the Mexican population (Ortiz 2015). However, there are some nuances of this reform, which will be discussed later.

In 2016, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the CNI (Congreso Nacional Indígena, the first nationwide congress of indigenous peoples of Mexico, founded on 12 October 1996), EZLN-CNI announced the convening of the 5th National Congress of Indigenous Peoples.

The main goals of the Congress were: discussion over the problematic of the capitalist war against the indigenous population; to place indigenous issues at the center of the national debate; to increase the resistance of indigenous people facing the face of state repression; to increase indigenous participation by inviting other indigenous groups to the congress; the struggle against capitalism "from the bottom left."<sup>42</sup>

The result of the consultations at this meeting was the Resolution "And the earth trembled! Report from Epicenter," (National Indigenous Congress and Zapatista Army for National Liberation 2017) which approved the creation of the Council of the Government of Indigenous Peoples and the intention to participate in elections with an indigenous woman CNI as the official representative and independent candidate for the

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<sup>41</sup> English translation

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Raul Romero Gallardo. 07.05.2021

presidency of Mexico in the 2018 elections. The chosen one to represent CNI and EZLN on elections became María de Jesús Patricio, known as *Marichuy*. The *Marichuy* campaign reflected the Zapatista policy of rejection of state power. In addition, *Marichuy* acted as a protector of indigenous people and women. As for the electoral spectrum, *Marichuy* occupied the left sector and was a representative of the indigenous people and all the poor, disadvantaged, and repressed. In general, the values of the Sixth Declaration still played a relevant role in the construction of the Zapatista agenda.

Based on the declaration from this congress, the decision to participate in the elections was collective. To understand the scale of the congress, representatives of more than 30 indigenous communities made this decision. The question is why the Zapatistas, who have distanced themselves so vehemently and denied the conduct of politics, choose to participate in politics now? The partial answer to this question lies in the following words:

*To all of them, we say that the earth indeed has trembled, and we along with her, and that we intend to shake the conscience of the entire nation, and that, in fact, we intend for indignation, resistance and rebellion to be present as an option on the electoral ballots of 2018. But we also say that it is not at all our intention to compete with the political parties or with the political class who still owe this country so much. They owe us for every death, disappearance, and imprisonment, and every dispossession, repression, and discrimination. Do not mistake our intentions. We do not plan to compete against them, because we are not the same as they are. Unlike them, we are not filled with lies and perverse words. We are instead the collective word of below and to the left, that which shakes the world and makes it tremble with epicenters of autonomy... (National Indigenous Congress and Zapatista Army for National Liberation 2017).*

During CNI, the issue of the War on Drugs was also discussed. As this war increased the number of killed defenders of the Zapatista territories, including indigenous people and peasants, this issue became central in the electoral agenda. Raul Romero clarifies that one of the goals of the *Marichuy* program was not only the war against capitalism but also the visualization of the War against Drugs and the problems and violence it generated to peasants and indigenous people related to the territorial organization. Another subject for discussion regarding the elections was the need to collect a sufficient number of signatures to register a candidate. As a result, it was decided to visualize the problem,

using the "election metaphor," that is, using the pre-election space for demonstrations and mobilizing people to put the indigenous agenda on the table.<sup>43</sup>

*Marichuy* and the Council began collecting the necessary 866,593 to run for the elections, but *Marichuy's* registration was ruled out due to insufficient support for her candidacy. *La Jornada* reports that *Marichuy* did not spend money on her campaign. Moreover, the people who worked for her were volunteers:

*Marichuy's* accessions were harvested by an army of volunteers who did not receive any payment or financial resources to buy the necessary telephone equipment to scan and transmit the rubrics to the National Electoral Institute (INE). While the rest of the applicants hired specialized firms or employees to obtain the signatures, *Marichuy's* team (many young students) cooperated with the task without pay and any other encouragement than to join a just cause (Hernández 2018).<sup>44</sup>

Despite *Marichuy's* inability to register as candidates, *La Jornada* still notes that the authenticity of signatures provided by a representative of the Council of the Government of Indigenous Peoples (CIG) is 94.48 percent, which was the highest percentage of all independent candidates (Hernández 2018). Interestingly, even though *Marichuy* became a fairly popular figure in the elections, she received two types of criticism. The first is criticism in the form of racism, and the second is that *Marichuy* is a product of the Zapatistas and their puppet to take away votes from their enemies. However, this was not the case at all.

"Defeat" of *Marichuy* can be explained by two factors. First, the format of the elections was somewhat non-traditional. It was necessary to authenticate votes through an application that required a mobile device and the Internet to collect signatures. And it is challenging to find an Internet connection in the jungle. The Zapatistas later condemned this, who argued that these innovations began to exist specifically to support professional politicians who have the means (Bassetti 2018). In this way, the political and electoral system denies access to the democratic process itself. Second, *Marichuy* represented the left sector, as indicated above, but this sector was already occupied by a strong coalition of leftist parties led by Lopez Obrador. Many who supported *Marichuy* ended up not voting for her, as they preferred to vote AMLO. Regarding relations with the left-wing sectors, particularly with Lopez Obrador, the circumstances have generally not changed.

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<sup>43</sup> Interview with Raul Romero Gallardo. 07.05.2021

<sup>44</sup> English translation

The Zapatistas again declare their innocence in the AMLO case and criticize him to one degree or another:

*As anybody with Mexican law knowledge knows, Mr. Andrés Manuel López Obrador is not Mexican president, is not even elected president... Fifth: If AMLO's team behaves like they were the current government, they have made feel like this to the business elite and Donald Trump and the biggest mass media. But they should not think in advance and feel that they will win a majority in Congress to violate laws, under the excuse of that majority, like PRI used to do during its long-ruling (Subcomandante Insurgente Moisés 2018).<sup>45</sup>*

A general election was held in Mexico on July 1, 2018. Ricardo Anaya Cortez of PAN, José Antonio Meade Kuribreña of PRI, and Lopez Obrador, candidate of his new party MORENA, representing the left-wing coalition "Together we will make history," competed in this election. That was his third election. The election results were significant for all of Mexico. For the first time, a leftist candidate Lopez Obrador became president after receiving a historic 53% of votes (30.1 million), a big difference over the second place, Ricardo Anaya, who received 12 million votes, about 22%.

Why did the Zapatistas decide to run for the presidency after a long period of skepticism and criticism of the political system? This initiative caused a lot of controversy and accusations by the Zapatistas due to the inconsistency of their actions. Many believe that the decision to participate in the elections was a "betrayal" of the ideological direction of the Zapatistas and that they, insisting on their abstinence and denial of politics, wholly changed themselves as they began to participate directly in politics. But the facts aim to another interpretation: Zapatistas have never denied or refrained from politics and, despite being consistently skeptical about electoral processes, they have claimed to influence Congress, Institutions, and political actors to receive recognition of the State and to defend themselves from other actors and repression. Accordingly, the Zapatistas did not betray their ideas, which is the "resistance and fight to have what is necessary." They changed the embodiment of these ideas because the Zapatistas have never been outside of politics. Thus, for example, the signing of the San Andres agreements is a political act. Based on this argument, it would be logical to assume that the Zapatistas can participate in the elections when it became possible. Not necessarily to win, since it was never the point of Marichuy's campaign, but to put in the table the collective problems they face and the agenda of marginalized sectors.

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<sup>45</sup> English translation

It is important to understand that the goal of the Zapatistas has always remained the same, namely, the call for alternative policymaking without capitalist tendencies (Yáñez 2020).

Discarding additional factors or details of the electoral process itself in 2018, all the same, winning the elections was not the very goal of the Zapatistas. The Marichuy campaign was of great importance to the Zapatistas as it once again raised the pressing issues of poverty and social inequality before Mexico. This is indicated by the fact that Marichuy refused federal funds to support the election campaign. "We're not going to ask for a vote," the council member explained. "The point of including a candidate on the ballot is to use the attention surrounding the electoral process for the grassroots organization across the country" (Bassetti 2018).

The strategy of the Zapatistas can be called successful since, in fact, all the tasks that they set for themselves were completed. Victory in the elections was not the goal. Even the official registration of candidates and the collection of signatures was not the goal. The goal was to use the electoral space to mobilize people around the problems of indigenous people. The Marichuy and Zapatista campaign posed "bottom left" questions to the government as usual and visualized their criticism of capitalism again, thus establishing new links with other anti-capitalist movements. This is especially evident with the coming to power of the left-wing AMLO, which many leftists criticize for its neoliberal policies. Mexico has a so-called post-neoliberal government right now. That is expressed in the fact that neoliberal projects, for which some specific companies were responsible, are now under the state's leadership. These innovations will not change the essence of the projects being neoliberal. Accordingly, neoliberalism still flourishes under Lopez Obrador.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the fact that AMLO has repeatedly promised to address the issue of Chiapas, no concrete action has yet been taken. In April 2021, the Zapatistas announced their tour of Europe to mobilize their supporters. How this strategy relates to the rule of López Obrador and to what extent AMLO's policies have influenced this strategist is a matter of the future.

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<sup>46</sup> Interview with Raul Romero Gallardo. 07.05.2021



## **PART V**

### **Verification**

At the last stage of implementing the process-tracing method, we have to verify our research. Verification is based on the Bayesian theory of evidence. Bayesian logic equips process tracing with the idea that some evidence carries more weight than others. Based on the provisions of Bayesian logic, tests are built that check the importance of a particular hypothesis within the framework of the mechanism under consideration. Van Evera first proposed test terminology. He identified four such tests: “straw in the wind,” “hoop,” “smoking gun,” and “doubly decisive.” The criteria for these tests have been rewritten several times, but we will be based on the version of D. Collier (Collier 2011: 825). (see Table 1: the criteria for validation tests; version of D. Collier.)

“Straw in the wind” is the weakest of the four tests. A hypothesis passes this test if there is evidence that indirectly can be associated with her. Passing the “straw in the wind” test for the hypothesis does not provide the necessary and sufficient grounds for its confirmation. A hypothesis does not pass this test if there is evidence that, at first glance, does not correspond to it.

A hypothesis passes the “hoop” test when evidence is necessary to be considered accurate. If the hypothesis does not pass this test, we can say that it is not confirmed. This test is often used to exclude alternative hypotheses from consideration. The “hoop” test is the main negative test.

The “smoking gun” test passes a hypothesis on sufficient evidence to be considered valid. It’s is the main positive test.

Finally, a hypothesis passes the “doubly decisive” test if the associated evidence is both a necessary and sufficient condition for its confirmation.

As part of the analysis, we studied the Zapatistas' strategies' changes, answering how and why they changed their strategy. That is, creating causal relationships.

In 1994, the Zapatistas launched military action against the Mexican government as a result not only of the signing of the NAFTA agreement and the terrible socio-economic conditions of the peasants and indigenous people in the periphery (often expressed as repression) but also as a consequence of the political system and the position of left-wing

political groups in it. The left guerrilla forces were never sufficiently developed and stable. Still, only after merging with the indigenous population in Chiapas did the EZLN stabilize and fight against the government. Also, thanks to the already existing presence of non-governmental human rights organizations in Chiapas and thanks to the support of independent mass media, the Zapatistas were able not to lose the fight in 1994, form a strong social movement, and force the government to enter into dialogue with them. All this is a sufficient and necessary condition for testing the hypothesis. Thus, this version passes the "doubly decisive" test.

In 2001, the Zapatistas organized Zapatour, going outside the Chiapas for the first time and public meeting with supporters. They no longer returned to military strategy but decided to move into the form of national protest. This became possible thanks to the victory of Vicente Fox in 2000, who from the very beginning declared his readiness to start a dialogue and solve the problems of Chiapas. In addition, in some way, such a decision could have been influenced by the incident in Acteal, the fault of which lies with the PRI government. The change of PRI and the coming to power of a different party for the first time in a long time, as well as the desire to sign the San Andres agreement, all the same, prompted the Zapatistas to change their strategy of action. And although the Zapatistas have said several times that even if there is no dialogue, they will still begin their march, it cannot be denied that without a change in power and atmosphere in the country, the EZLN would not have left Chiapas. Accordingly, this condition is sufficient and necessary and passes the "doubly decisive" test.

In 2006, the Zapatistas again marched across the country, this time expressing their protest against the electoral and political system as a whole. This march resulted from Vicente Fox's "betrayal," the government, and other parties, including the left, who did not pass the COSOPA law under the San Andres agreement. This situation prompted the Zapatistas to isolate themselves from politics, but this is not sufficient to mobilize people in 2006. However, based on the letters of the Zapatistas, one of their reasons for starting the Other Campaign was the support of people throughout Mexico, who, like the indigenous people, fell victim to neoliberalism. Thus, the Zapatistas declared themselves to be the mouthpiece of all the "disadvantaged" and set themselves the task of announcing the problems "from below left" throughout the country, in parallel with the election campaign. And even though in 2006 the leftist candidate Lopez Obrador took part in the elections, the Zapatistas, opposing politicians in general, did not support him. In sum,

these conditions are sufficient and necessary. Therefore, respectively, the hypothesis passes the "doubly decisive" test.

Finally, in 2018, the Zapatistas changed their strategy again, and, unlike in 2006, when they just stood against the political parties, they decided to participate in this election. This decision was made based on an electoral reform that allowed independent candidates to participate in the elections. Also, according to our interview with Raul Romero, we consider that party motivation to participate in elections comes from the factor of the War on Drugs, which affected Zapatistas and forced them to protect themselves. We also know that Marichuy, as a representative of the indigenous people and the Zapatistas, did not participate in the elections to win. As Raul Romero said, it was not an electoral program but a political program that carried the same goals as in 2006 - to raise the issue of problems "from below" before the Mexican government and the people. These conditions are necessary and sufficient for a hypothesis, which passes the "doubly decisive" test.

Based on the above, we can say that we were able to answer the central question of this work - how and why the Zapatistas have changed their strategy since 1994, proving in the historical perspective that some of the events in the history of Mexico influence EZLN to act the way they did in 1994, 2001, 2006 and 2018.

## Summary

EZLN have come a long way since their founding. Despite the fact that the Zapatistas began as a typical Latin American guerrilla movement, which emerged by the standards of any left-radical movement, that is, with a communist ideology, and to this day continue to use the symbols of the partisans (a red star on a black background as a flag, the presence of black masks all over the face as part of a uniform, and so on), it would be a mistake to call the EZLN a partisan group, so how they have long since grown into a socio-political movement.

Since the beginning of the Zapatista path, they have used mobilization as a permanent strategy of struggle and resistance, but the form of this strategy has constantly changed. If we talk about the global goal of the "existence" of the Zapatistas, then the mission of the EZLN, possibly, will be fulfilled with the adoption of the COCOPA law. So far, this development of events is not foreseen. However, if we talk about temporary goals during mass mobilizations, the Zapatistas have shown themselves to be very successful.

Perhaps this is due to their adaptability, or probably due to a reluctance to end up like some of the rest of the guerrilla groups in Latin America, perhaps due to the influence of the civilian population of the indigenous people, but the Zapatistas did not set themselves the goal of perpetual armed struggle against the government. Thanks to this and their luck (and perhaps strictly calculating the strategy), the Zapatistas had enough passed from war to dialogue with the government. But because the government was particularly unwilling to correct the situation in Chiapas, the Zapatistas were able to find another way out - mass mobilization. Discussing current common problems, about the political injustice of the capitalist world, and the ideals of democracy, the Zapatistas, partly with the help of the charisma of Subcomandante Marcos, and with the use of the Internet and the mass media, began a dialogue not with the government, but with the people. Aside from radicalism and protesting against the violence, the EZLN built a huge base of support that the Mexican government had to reckon with.

In 1994, due to the signing of an agreement with NAFTA, the repression of the indigenous population of Mexico, and the terrible socio-economic situation in the south of the country, the Zapatistas rebelled against the Mexican government. Then they first expressed their position and demands (autonomy and respect for the rights of indigenous people), which have not changed to this day. With massive support from NGOs, the

media, and the Internet, the Zapatistas have become a force to be reckoned with. In 1997, the Mexican government entered into a dialogue with the Zapatistas, and the San Andres agreement was signed on granting autonomy to the indigenous people, which subsequently remained on paper. In 2001, with the change of the political climate in the country associated with the coming to power of a candidate outside of the PRI, the Zapatistas changed their strategy. From the very beginning, Vicente Fox applied the "friend" policy towards the EZLN, which they took advantage of and marched across the country to meet with Fox and meet with those who support them. As a result of this mass mobilization, a law on indigenous people was passed, but not according to the agreement of San Andres, which once again convinced the Zapatistas not to trust the government and political parties, as this decision was taken in Congress with the support of all parties. However, the Zapatistas became convinced of the effectiveness of such marches, which they repeated in 2006 when they again left Chiapas and marched throughout Mexico as a delegation. Unlike in 2001, they expanded their agent and communicated with all the "disadvantaged and poor." Also, the purpose of the Other Campaign was not to support any of the candidates, but only a desire to put before the government (current and future) an urgent question "from left below" - about indigenous people, about the poor, about the repressed, about the disadvantaged, and so on. Although the situation did not change, the Zapatistas were once again able to mobilize huge masses of people around them. From 2006 to 2016, the Zapatistas did not participate actively in politics since their priority was self-defense against the paramilitaries and the threats of the war on drugs. However, with the electoral reform of 2014, allowing independent candidates to participate in the presidential elections, the Zapatistas "returned" to politics (in quotes, because they did not leave politics), but not as a march across the country, but as a candidate for presidents in the 2018 elections. Many criticized them for betraying their principles by allowing themselves to participate in elections, as they denied politics. However, this opinion is erroneous because they denied political parties and institutions and not politics in general. Their position as an alternative system is to reconstruct the existing political system on a democratic basis, based on human rights and justice, excluding repression and corruption. However, this principle has never forbidden them to participate in politics and, accordingly, in elections. EZLN, since this thesis remarked in the historical description, has been an organization that, after leaving behind the weapons, has used any political tool to achieve their goals, which are not specific to obtain political power or electoral charges but the influence in institutional framework to obtain recognition to their

organization and communities, and the incipient attempt of the legitimation of a Plurinational State.

Thus, the Zapatistas became the main social force in Mexico, leaving behind a guerrilla legacy. For now, the Zapatistas remain active. With the rise to power of leftist candidate Lopez Obrador in 2018, the Zapatistas have again changed their strategy, making their struggle international. In April 2021, the current Subcomandante Moises announced a tour to Europe, "Journey for a Life, Head of Europe." As the Zapatistas themselves assume, they will have to arrive in Europe by the end of June. The purpose of this delegation is "to transmit far our thoughts, that is, our hearts" (Subcomandante Insurgente Moisés and Sixth Commission of the EZLN 2021).

It is not yet known what the outcome of this round will be, and therefore it is difficult to say something about this. However, it can already be assumed that it was the arrival of the AMLO left government that could determine such a change in strategy.

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#### Interviews:

1. Luis Hernández Navarro – writer and journalist, main coordinator of the *Opinion* pages of Mexican journal *La Jornada* and specialist in EZLN movement. Date of Interview: 25.05.2021
2. Rafael Barajas Duran - writer and journalist, and cartoonist in several Mexican Publications, currently a director of the Political Formation Institute from MORENA political party and cartoonist of *La Jornada*. Gave a Permission to quote his words.

3. Raul Romero Gallardo – sociologist, latinoamericanist, and disciple of Dr. Pablo González Casanova (sociologist, former dean of National Autonomous University of Mexico and named “Commander” of the EZLN by its comandante in 2019). Raul Romero is a sociologist who specialized in the Zapatistas’ movement and took part in Marichuy’s campaign in 2016. Date of Interview: 7.05.2021

## Appendix 1

Table 1. The criteria for validation tests; version of D. Collier.

*Adapted from Bennett (2010, 210), who builds on categories formulated by Van Evera (1997, 31–32).*

		SUFFICIENT FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	
		No	Yes
NECESSARY FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	No	<b>1. Straw-in-the-Wind</b>	<b>3. Smoking-Gun</b>
		<b>a. Passing:</b> Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	<b>a. Passing:</b> Confirms hypothesis.
		<b>b. Failing:</b> Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened.	<b>b. Failing:</b> Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened.
		<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>slightly</i> weakens them. <b>Failing</b> <i>slightly</i> strengthens them.	<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>substantially</i> weakens them. <b>Failing</b> <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.
	Yes	<b>2. Hoop</b>	<b>4. Doubly Decisive</b>
		<b>a. Passing:</b> Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	<b>a. Passing:</b> Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.
<b>b. Failing:</b> Eliminates hypothesis.		<b>b. Failing:</b> Eliminates hypothesis.	
	<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>somewhat</i> weakens them. <b>Failing</b> <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.	<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>eliminates</i> them. <b>Failing</b> <i>substantially</i> strengthens them.	

## Apendix 2

### Questions for the interviews (in Spanish)

For Raul Romero Gallardo:

2. El EZLN y Marichuy tenían ya una trayectoria histórica y social amplia, pero separada de la política electoral ¿Por qué decidieron intentar participar en la elección de 2018 con una posible candidatura independiente?
3. Hubo apoyo urbano de firmas a favor de Marichuy provino de la Ciudad de México, e históricamente ha habido sectores que simpatizan o ven con buenos ojos a los zapatistas y a Marichuy, pero también participan en la política electoral y simpatizan por el lopezobradorismo. ¿Cuál es la interpretación desde el EZLN de este sector?
4. ¿Cómo hubiera sido un gobierno de Marichuy? ¿Cómo se habría integrado ese gobierno y qué papel jugaría ante fuerzas políticas y partidistas tradicionales?
5. Que es la direccion de el exquierda altermundista en el future en el situacion cuqndo el gobierno Mexicano alcual se proclama asi mismo como no neoliberal y de esquierda?
6. Cuales fueron los logros de esta estrategia de visibilizacion de la campana simbolica de marichuy?

For Luis Hernández Navarro:

1. En 1994, el EZLN irrumpió por la vía armada muy brevemente, sólo algunos días. Poco después, por diversas razones, su lucha se trasladó a otras formas: Resistencia, activismo, “guerra de tinta”, lucha simbólica. Con el tiempo que ha pasado, luego de 27 años, ¿Cómo se podría interpretar este cambio tan rápido? ¿Por qué el EZLN abandonó tan pronto el camino armado y se ciñó a la llamada “guerra de tinta”? En este proceso, el diario La Jornada jugó un papel importante porque fue un medio que abrió sus puertas desde un inicio al EZLN. ¿Cómo se inició esa relación entre el diario y el EZLN al inicio y cómo fue evolucionando?
2. En 2001, los partidos rechazaron en la cámara de diputados los acuerdos de San Andrés. En 2006, López Obrador los hizo promesa de campaña pero no llegó a la presidencia. Hoy, López Obrador es presidente pero los Acuerdos de San Andrés

- siguen siendo un pendiente. ¿Cómo se puede interpretar ese rechazo sistemático a esos acuerdos de parte de todos los partidos políticos? ¿Qué es lo que los partidos y la política “de arriba” quiere evitar al no aprobar los Acuerdos de San Andrés?
3. En 2001, durante el llamado “Zapatour” hubo una movilización notable en el país de parte del EZLN. Sin embargo, ese proceso de movilización también padeció momentos de conflicto, como las agresiones y amenazas de gobernadores como Ignacio Loyola. En 2006, durante La Otra Campaña, el EZLN padeció también el conflicto de Atenco. A la luz de esos hechos ¿Cómo se puede evaluar esa estrategia de movilización de los zapatistas? ¿Movilizarse no ha implicado que enfrenten el rechazo de sectores políticos y sociales conservadores?
  4. En 2001, tras el rechazo de los acuerdos de San Andrés, y la traición del PRD al EZLN, los integrantes de éste se centraron a la construcción de Caracoles y a la organización “desde abajo” y a rechazar la política electoral-partidista. Sin embargo, en la coyuntura del año electoral de 2006, decidieron iniciar La Otra Campaña. ¿Fue La Otra campaña una movilización con el objetivo de presionar a priori a un eventual gobierno izquierdista, como el de AMLO, a que cumpliera cuestiones como los Acuerdos de San Andrés, o solamente fue una vía para visibilizar sectores olvidados por la agenda de AMLO? ¿Cuál podría decirse que fue el principal logro de La Otra campaña?
  5. En 2016 el Consejo Nacional indígena tuvo como uno de sus resultados una intención de participar en el proceso electoral de 2018 con una eventual candidatura independiente de María de Jesús Patricio, Marichuy. A pesar de ese hecho, los zapatistas no llamaron eso una “campaña electoral” propiamente sino un aprovechamiento de la coyuntura para visibilizarse. Al final, usaron esa coyuntura electoral para exponer y hacer visible una agenda altermundista no electoral. Luego de mucho tiempo de rechazar por completo toda vínculo con lo institucional-electoral, ¿qué los llevó en 2016 a cambiar de opinión y plantear una eventual candidatura independiente, así fuera sólo testimonial?

### Apendix 3

Original text of direct citations:

- Page 37 - Por tanto, en apego a nuestra Constitución, emitimos la presente al ejército federal mexicano, pilar básico de la dictadura que padecemos, monopolizada por el partido en el poder y encabezada por el ejecutivo federal que hoy detenta su jefe máximo e ilegítimo, Carlos Salinas de Gortari.
- Page 37 - Rechazamos de antemano cualquier intento de desvirtuar la justa causa de nuestra lucha acusándola de narcotráfico, narcoguerrilla, bandidaje u otro calificativo que puedan usar nuestros enemigos. Nuestra lucha se apega al derecho constitucional y es abanderada por la justicia y la igualdad.. [...]. Segundo. Respetar la vida de los prisioneros y entregar a los heridos a la Cruz Roja Internacional para su atención médica. Tercero. Iniciar juicios sumarios contra los soldados del ejército federal mexicano y la policía política...[...]... y contra todos aquellos que repriman y maltraten a la población civil y roben o atenten contra los bienes del pueblo.
- Pages 37- También pedimos a los organismos Internacionales y a la Cruz Roja Internacional que vigilen y regulen los combates que nuestras fuerzas libran protegiendo a la población civil, pues nosotros declaramos ahora y siempre que estamos sujetos a lo estipulado por la Leyes sobre la Guerra de la Convención de Ginebra, formando el EZLN como fuerza beligerante de nuestra lucha de liberación.
- Page 38 - Nos hemos estado preparando en la montaña desde hace diez años- no somos un movimiento improvisado. Hemos madurado, pensado, aprendido, y hemos llegado a esta decisión.
- Page 38-39 - El Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional no se levantó en armas para apoyar a uno o a varios candidatos a la Presidencia de la República. El EZLN no busca que gane un partido o que gane otro, el EZLN busca que haya justicia, que haya libertad, y que haya democracia para que el pueblo elija a quien mejor le acomode su entender y que esta voluntad, cualquiera que sea, reciba respeto y entendimiento de los mexicanos todos y de otros pueblos. El Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional pide que el gobierno, de cualquier partido que sea, sea un gobierno legítimo, resultado de una elección verdaderamente libre y democrática,

y resuelva las necesidades más apremiantes de nuestro pueblo mexicano, especialmente de nosotros los indígenas.

- Page 43-44 - Hermanos y hermanas: ¿Por qué? ¿Cuántos más? ¿Hasta cuándo?
- Page 44 - ... en un plazo de "15 minutos", él estaría en posibilidades de iniciar "un proceso para solucionar el problema" chiapaneco que ya dura seis años.
- Page 44 - ... su idea es reducir "hasta 5 mil" el número de efectivos del Ejército en territorio chiapaneco, que es el promedio en el resto de los estados. Conforme avance el proceso de pacificación, "quedará una presencia razonable del Ejército, en los niveles normales que había antes del conflicto".
- Pages 44-45 - EL TRIUNFO QUE REPRESENTA EL RETIRO DEL EJÉRCITO DE ESTE LUGAR (LA COMUNIDAD DE AMADOR HERNÁNDEZ) ES DE ESOS INDÍGENAS ZAPATISTAS Y DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL NACIONAL E INTERNACIONAL QUE NUNCA LOS DEJÓ SOLOS. POR OTRA PARTE ESTE RETIRO DE UNA DE LAS SIETE POSICIONES DEMANDADAS POR EL EZLN, ES UNA BUENA SEÑAL Y UN PRIMER E IMPORTANTE PASO EN EL CAMINO DE LA REANUDACIÓN DEL DIÁLOGO. FALTARÍAN LAS 6 POSICIONES RESTANTES, LA LIBERACIÓN DE LOS PRESOS Y EL RECONOCIMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS Y LA CULTURA INDÍGENAS.
- Page 45 - ....se liberó a 17 presos políticos; se suspendieron las visas especiales para extranjeros que venían con el propósito de visitar Chiapas; hay apertura total a visitar el país, y se presentó al Congreso la iniciativa de la Cocopa, "que vamos a promover y vamos a impulsar".
- Page 45 - Los últimos pasos militares, con la cancelación del libre acceso a la zona conflictiva para los observadores y periodistas, no invitan precisamente al optimismo. Se vive una estrategia de guerra que avanza de manera brutal. Algo en lo que incide la actuación de los grupos paramilitares o el cerco militar en sí mismo.
- Page 46 - Ha sido una de las demandas más sentidas de la otra parte. Ustedes me conocen de hace años y saben que esa ha sido mi posición personal. He planteado la conveniencia de reducir la densidad de la presencia del Ejército en Chiapas, y creo que la respuesta oportuna del presidente Fox a esto habla lo que yo califique hace rato como sensibilidad a este tema. No debemos cerrar los ojos a la señales



nuevas que estamos recibiendo, insisto, son muy esperanzadoras para el futuro de Chiapas y de México.

- Pages 46 - .... EL SEÑOR SALAZAR DIJO TENER LA INTENCIÓN DE LLEVAR ADELANTE VARIAS ACCIONES COMO PARTE DE SU PROGRAMA DE GOBIERNO. DE HACERSE REALIDAD, ESTAS MEDIDAS AYUDARÍAN A LA DISTENSIÓN NECESARIA PARA EL DIÁLOGO, AUNQUE, EN LO QUE SE REFIERE A LA LIBERACIÓN DE ZAPATISTAS PRESOS, ES NECESARIO RECORDAR QUE, ADEMÁS DE LOS DE CHIAPAS, HAY SIMPATIZANTES DEL EZLN EN LAS CÁRCELES DE LOS ESTADOS DE TABASCO Y QUERÉTARO.
- Page 47 - Primero: Llamar al Congreso Nacional Indígena, a la sociedad civil nacional e internacional, a las organizaciones políticas y sociales y todas las personas en general a una gran movilización con el fin de conseguir del Congreso de la Unión mexicano el reconocimiento constitucional de los derechos y cultura indígenas, de acuerdo con la iniciativa de la Cocopa. Segundo: Que ha decidido enviar una delegación del CCRI-CG del EZLN a la ciudad de México con el fin de encabezar esta movilización para dirigirse al honorable Congreso de la Unión y para argumentar frente a los legisladores las bondades de la llamada «propuesta de iniciativa de ley indígena de la Cocopa».
- Page 47 - El viaje de una delegación zapatista al DF se realizará independientemente de que el diálogo con el gobierno federal se haya reanudado o no. Vamos a dirigirnos al Poder Legislativo, estando seguros de que encontraremos sensibilidad para ser escuchados.
- Page 48 - Sólo que ahora los recibía una plaza central iluminada y llena de gente esperándolos sin imaginar que llegarían tantos. Los miles de personas reunidas frente a la catedral esperaban solamente 24 zapatistas y no la movilización de masas más grande que ha visto San Cristóbal de la Casas en toda su historia.
- Page 48 - Después de todo, aún está fresco el recuerdo de la madrugada del 1o. de enero de 1994, cuando los rebeldes armados ocuparon el municipio. Las vidas y las propiedades de los arriba mencionados estuvieron, durante días, a disposición de los alzados. No las tomaron. Sus pesadillas se hicieron realidad. La memoria de ese -para ellos- aciago momento está viva [...] Ahora, a más de ocho años de esa historia, y a siete del inicio de la insurrección armada, una parte de la sociedad coleta respingó al enterarse de la caravana zapatista. Fue necesaria la intervención del gobierno estatal para contener los enconos y las amenazas en su contra.

- Page 49 - Miles de habitantes de esta capital (Oaxaca, Oax) dieron la bienvenida a la Marcha de la dignidad indígena. En el corazón de la urbe ocurrió ayer una de las movilizaciones ciudadanas más grandes que se recuerden en estas tierras.
- Page 49 - A las nueve de la mañana, el gobernador Ignacio Loyola Vera abandonó esta ciudad ante la llegada del subcomandante Marcos y los 23 comandantes del EZLN. Antes de partir con rumbo desconocido, ordenó que la policía municipal se mantuviera en sus cuarteles, a fin de no prestar ayuda alguna a la caravana de los rebeldes.
- Page 49 - Y es que Loyola, ... , ex dirigente de la Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana (Coparmex) y aliado de Fernández de Cevallos, comparte con la ultraderecha panista el criterio de que la fuerza bruta es el remedio más eficaz contra los conflictos políticos y sociales causados por la miseria extrema.
- Page 50 - Ante la insistencia del PRD de que junto con el senador panista Diego Fernández de Cevallos "torpedea" el diálogo de la comandancia zapatista con el Congreso de la Unión, el priísta Enrique Jackson Ramírez dijo que el PRI está dispuesto a discutir y considerar alguna contrapropuesta al planteamiento que las juntas de Coordinación Política enviaron al grupo rebelde por conducto de la Cocopa.
- Page 50 - La utilización de la tribuna más alta del país no es motivo de negociación con el subcomandante Marcos.
- Page 50-51 - A unas horas de que se ponga a consideración del pleno el texto de la ley de derechos y cultura indígenas para su aprobación en la Cámara de Diputados, los legisladores del PRD mantienen la decisión de votar en contra, aunque un grupo identificado con la directiva de este partido adelantó su voto a favor del dictamen.
- Page 51 - ...en el texto existen errores y omisiones, mismas que evitan resolver de fondo el problema de los pueblos indígenas.
- Page 51-52 - CON ESTA REFORMA, LOS LEGISLADORES FEDERALES Y EL GOBIERNO FOXISTA CIERRAN LA PUERTA DEL DIÁLOGO Y LA PAZ, PUES EVITAN RESOLVER UNA DE LAS CAUSAS QUE ORIGINARON EL ALZAMIENTO ZAPATISTA... [...]... EN CONSECUENCIA, EL EZLN COMUNICA LO SIGUIENTE: [...] B).- QUE EL EZLN NO RETOMARÁ EL CAMINO DEL DIÁLOGO CON EL GOBIERNO FEDERAL HASTA QUE SEAN RECONOCIDOS

## CONSTITUCIONALMENTE LOS DERECHOS Y LA CULTURA INDÍGENAS DE ACUERDO A LA LLAMADA «INICIATIVA DE LEY DE LA COCOPA.

- Page 54 - Y lo primero que vimos es que nuestro corazón ya no es igual que antes, cuando empezamos nuestra lucha, sino que es más grande porque ya tocamos el corazón de mucha gente buena. ...[...]... Entonces, como zapatistas que somos, pensamos que no bastaba con dejar de dialogar con el gobierno, sino que era necesario seguir adelante en la lucha a pesar de esos parásitos haraganes de los políticos. El EZLN decidió entonces el cumplimiento, solo y por su lado (o sea que se dice “unilateral” porque sólo un lado), de los Acuerdos de San Andrés en lo de los derechos y la cultura indígenas. Durante 4 años, desde mediando el 2001 hasta mediando el 2005, nos hemos dedicado a esto...
- Page 54-55 - Y también vimos que el EZLN con su parte político-militar se estaba metiendo en las decisiones que le tocaban a las autoridades democráticas, como quien dice “civiles”. Y aquí el problema es que la parte político-militar del EZLN no es democrática, porque es un ejército, y vimos que no está bien eso de que está arriba lo militar y abajo lo democrático, porque no debe de ser que lo que es democrático se decida militarmente, sino que debe ser al revés: o sea que arriba lo político democrático mandando y abajo lo militar obedeciendo....[...].... Así fue como se nacieron las Juntas de Buen Gobierno, en agosto de 2003.
- Page 55 - Y también el capitalismo hace su riqueza con despojo, o sea con robo, porque les quita a otros lo que ambiciona, por ejemplo tierras y riquezas naturales. O sea que el capitalismo es un sistema donde los robadores están libres y son admirados y puestos como ejemplo..[...]... Y el neoliberalismo pues es la idea de que el capitalismo está libre para dominar todo el mundo...
- Page 56 - El objetivo principal de este primer recorrido de la Comisión Sexta del EZLN es hablar y escuchar con todas las compas de la “Otra” en cada estado.
- Page 57 - De norte a sur, de este a oeste, que la otra campaña resuene en Atenco y que haya justicia para los caídos.
- Page 57 - Como Comisión Sexta nos estamos declarando en alerta. Han sido ya declaradas en alerta roja las tropas del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional y en punto de esa hora serán cerrados los Caracoles y los Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas. [...] Como Comisión Sexta estamos cancelando todas nuestras participaciones en las actividades programadas y estamos esperando la indicación del Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra. Si necesita nuestra

presencia allá, allá iremos. Si no, participaremos directamente en alguna de las acciones que ustedes programen para el día de mañana a partir de las 800, ocho de la mañana.

- Page 59 - En la otra campaña "no hay que hacer nada contra las elecciones", manifestó el subcomandante Marcos en la asamblea nacional de adherentes a la Sexta declaración de la selva Lacandona. Se trata solamente de decir al pueblo de México: "aquí estoy".
- Page 60 - Se trata de un fraude operado desde Los Pinos y el comando central del PAN, que pone en crisis la democracia, la legalidad y la supuesta neutralidad del IFE. Aunque nosotros no miramos allá arriba, estamos en la misma situación de cuando se intentó el desafuero de AMLO, independientemente de que no compartimos sus propuestas... [está claro] que el que ganó la elección fue AMLO y el guardadito que tenía el IFE sirvió para que Calderón empatara y le sacara el medio millón cuando se cerró el PREP.
- Page 61 - Estamos muy alegres porque por primera vez en la historia de este país, en un día de elecciones, nosotros que no estamos mirando allá arriba tenemos por fin un lugar a dónde mirar y organizarnos abajo y a la izquierda.
- Page 64 - ...todavía no nos conocen; que no se adelanten, pues hay muchos compromisos con los pueblos indígenas de parte del presidente Enrique Peña Nieto.
- Page 66 - Las adhesiones de Marichuy fueron cosechadas por un ejército de voluntarios que no recibieron pago alguno ni recursos económicos para comprar los equipos telefónicos necesarios para escanear y transmitir las rúbricas al Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE). Mientras el resto de los aspirantes contrataron firmas especializadas o empleados para conseguir las firmas, el equipo de Marichuy (muchos de ellos jóvenes estudiantes) cooperó con la tarea sin paga alguna y sin otro estímulo que el de sumarse a una causa justa.
- Page 67 - COMO DEBERÍA SABER CUALQUIERA QUE CONOZCA LAS LEYES MEXICANAS, EL SEÑOR ANDRÉS MANUEL LÓPEZ OBRADOR NO ES EL PRESIDENTE DE MÉXICO, NI SIQUIERA ES EL PRESIDENTE ELECTO....[...]... QUINTO: SI LOS DEL EQUIPO DEL SEÑOR ANDRÉS MANUEL LÓPEZ OBRADOR SE COMPORTAN COMO SI YA FUERAN GOBIERNO, PORQUE ASÍ SE LOS HAN HECHO CREER LOS GRANDES EMPRESARIOS (vía Youtube, lo que es una garantía de seriedad), LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DEL SEÑOR TRUMP (vía su visita faraónica), Y LOS

GRANDES MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN, SE ENTIENDE; PERO TAL VEZ NO ES CONVENIENTE ESO DE ADELANTAR YA SU DISPOSICIÓN DE VIOLAR LAS LEYES BAJO EL AMPARO DE UN SUPUESTO “CARRO COMPLETO” (QUE ES LO QUE HIZO EL PRI DURANTE SU LARGO REINADO).