

## **Euroculture**



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## **War in Ukraine as a catalyst for inclusive education?**

### **A comparative case study of Poland and Germany.**

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "AMcL", written in a cursive style.

## Declaration

I, Annabelle McLeod hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “War in Ukraine as a catalyst for Inclusive education? A comparative case study of Poland and Germany”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g., ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

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## **Abstract**

Inclusive education and intercultural competencies are vital to ensure all children can thrive in the globalised world, and to foster more cohesive, equitable, democratic societies. This paper unpacks the discursive environment in which educational practitioners must navigate within EU Member States. The paper critically analyses key EU policy recommendations for the “inclusion” of migrant and refugee children in schools, discussing the changes in approach guided by a narrative of “solidarity” in response to the “humanitarian crisis” following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. By means of a comparative case study (Poland and Germany), this paper illustrates some of the challenges Member States face in implementing EU regulations and recommendations. It demonstrates how unique experiences and histories shape the demographic and cultural landscape of countries, and how national narratives influence approaches to education and integration. The study aims to unpack how authorities address the holistic needs (learning, social and emotional) of displaced children, and critically analyse the commonalities and tensions between EU and national policies. As such, this paper reveals some of the complexities of EU efforts to harmonise policies and foster cooperation among member states, in particular, to develop a cohesive and sustainable approach to migration and asylum in Europe.

### ***Keywords:***

immigrant integration, inclusive education, refugee crisis, war in Ukraine, EU and national policies,

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## **Introduction**

### **Context**

The Russian Federation's full scale invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 has forced the largest (and fastest) displacement of people in Europe since the Second World War. 11.6 million Ukrainians have been forced to leave their homes in the period since the invasion, resulting in a dramatic influx of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in the European Union [EU].<sup>1</sup> In response, the Council of the EU triggered the Temporary Protection Directive [TPD]<sup>2</sup> for the first time in March 2022<sup>3</sup>. This offers those fleeing war in Ukraine a clear legal status, granting them unprecedented protection without asylum procedures, facilitating immediate, comprehensive and efficient assistance across the EU. Since then, EU+ countries (EU27, Norway and Switzerland) have agreed to welcome refugees from Ukraine quickly, and have adopted the necessary national legislation to ensure adequate implementation.

Immigration has been at the forefront of EU politics and public discourse for several decades. It gained significant attention and prominence in the early 2000s, and the year 2015-16 marked a turning point, with the so-called "refugee crisis", when around 1.3 million refugees arrived in countries across the EU from politically-unstable and unsafe regions including Syria, Afghanistan, and Turkey. This led to immense pressure on certain countries' welfare systems, and created a "crisis of solidarity", where highly polarised debates and disagreements about border control, asylum procedures, integration policies and the overall management of migration within the EU took place. Fears of repeating the crisis have been central to more recent crises, such as the Taliban takeover of Kabul in Afghanistan in Summer 2021, the state-sponsored smuggling of migrants at the border with Belarus in 2021, or the earthquake in Syria and Turkey 2023.<sup>4</sup> These migration movements were considerably smaller (only a few thousand migrants) than the

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<sup>1</sup> [Data based on UNHCR's Operational Data Portal. See: 'Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation', accessed 22 March 2023, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>]

<sup>2</sup> 'Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof', 212 OJ L § (2001), accessed 18 January 2023, <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/55/oj/eng>.

<sup>3</sup> [The 2001 TPD was not activated into earlier humanitarian emergencies such as the refugee crisis of 2015, or Afghanistan in 2021]

<sup>4</sup> Eleni Stamatoukos Eleni, 'EU Agrees Stricter Migration Measures After Quakes in Turkey, Syria', Balkan Insight (blog), 10 February 2023, Accessed 12 June 2023, <https://balkaninsight.com/2023/02/10/eu-agrees-stricter-migration-measures-after-quakes-in-turkey-syria/#>

exodus from Ukraine but the response has been one of deterrence, extraordinary security measures and the strengthening or closing of external borders to physically prevent irregular migrants from entering EU territory, effectively curtailing the rights of migrants and people in need of protection.<sup>5</sup>

Ukrainian refugees have been accepted across Member States in the spirit of unanimous “European Solidarity”. Over 8 million Ukrainians have been registered as refugees across Europe.<sup>6</sup> Although many have since then returned to Ukraine, around 5,9 million have remained and are benefiting from TP or similar national schemes.<sup>7</sup> The TPD grants Ukrainians a clear legal status, reducing bureaucratic obstacles and slow asylum procedures. They have been granted immediate access to rights, services and facilities such as housing, means of subsistence, social systems, labour market. The freedom of movement also grants TPD beneficiaries treatment in any Member States after registration. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) identifies that integration policies as being “one of the strongest factors shaping not only the public’s willingness to accept and interact with immigrants, but also immigrants’ own attitudes, belonging, participation and even health in their new home country.”<sup>8</sup> In other words, the way the government treats immigrants strongly influences how well the public and immigrants interact with and think of each other. Citizens and governments alike have been welcoming Ukrainian refugees with reception centres, fast tracking residency, civil society offering food, donating goods and housing refugees in their homes. A large majority of Europeans (81%) showed support for accepting Ukrainian refugees in their country.<sup>9</sup> Even though this number is slightly decreasing, public opinion has remained remarkably stable towards supporting Ukraine despite the worsening economic situation and concerns over the rising cost of living since the outbreak of War.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> [such as increased surveillance, building fences, pushbacks]

<sup>6</sup> ‘Ukrainian Crisis Situational Analysis’, ReliefWeb, (20.06.2023) accessed, 23 June 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukrainian-crisis-situational-analysis-20-june-2023>.

<sup>7</sup> [5,985,800 refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe (last updated 19 June, 2023) Source: UNHCR ‘Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation’, accessed 22 June 2023, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.]

<sup>8</sup> MIPEX, “Main Findings”, EU Migration Integration Policy Index 2020, accessed 16 April 2023, <https://www.mipex.eu/key-findings>.

<sup>9</sup> ‘Under Pressure - The War in Ukraine and European Public Opinion’, accessed 26 April 2023, <https://eupinions.eu/de/text/under-pressure>.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

A combination of factors has made it easier for European countries to empathise and connect to the current crisis. For example, the geographic proximity of Ukraine, the fact that the situation has unfolded “on European soil” where Ukrainians are presented as our “European neighbours”. Europe has enjoyed peace for over 70 years and Russia is presented as the clear aggressor, which means there is a political imperative for Europeans to defend Ukraine. The geopolitical situation of Russia against the West also reminds us of the Cold War, with the fear that the conflict could spread to EU territory if Russia tries to expand its political and military control over Eastern Europe. Ukraine also has status as an EU accession candidate country, with its membership discussed shortly after the War commenced.<sup>11</sup> It is also vital to consider the socio-demographic profile of the refugees from Ukraine. One could argue that refugees fleeing Ukraine fit the archetype image of a “genuine” refugee. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality.”<sup>12</sup> Ukrainians, therefore, conform to the post-WWII definition of a “normal” refugee, depicted as a white, anti-communist, vulnerable victim in need of protection.<sup>13</sup> Public discourse has also focused on how Ukrainians look “civilised” and “like us”, focusing on Ukraine’s cultural, religious and ethnic proximity.<sup>14</sup> This contrasts with the negative coverage of “Other” migrant groups, for example, portraying crowds of Middle Eastern or African men.<sup>15</sup> Mass media has depicted Ukrainian refugees and pre-war migrants as highly skilled and well educated.<sup>16</sup> Indeed a high percentage of Ukrainians have attained

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<sup>11</sup> European Council, "Enlargement: Ukraine," accessed 10 February 2023 ,

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/>.

European Commission, "Ukraine," European Neighbourhood Policy, European Commission, accessed 13 June 2023 [https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine\\_en](https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine_en).

[Germany is least in favour of Ukraine’s EU membership whilst Poland is at the top end with (84%). See: ‘Under Pressure - The War in Ukraine and European Public Opinion’, accessed 26 April 2023, <https://eupinions.eu/de/text/under-pressure.>]

<sup>12</sup> Article 1 A(2), United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), p48.

<sup>13</sup> Linda Morrice, “Will the war in Ukraine be a pivotal moment for refugee education in Europe?”, *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 41, no. 3 (2022): p251.

<sup>14</sup> Moustafa Bayoumi, “They Are “Civilised” and “Look like Us”: The Racist Coverage of Ukraine’, *The Guardian*, 2 March 2022, Accessed January 2023

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/civilised-european-look-like-us-racist-coverage-ukraine>.

<sup>15</sup> Morrice, “pivotal moment for refugee education?”, 2022, p.252.

<sup>16</sup> Clara Albrecht and Tetyana Panchenko, "Refugee Flow from Ukraine: Origins, Effects, Scales and Consequences," CESifo Forum 23, no. 4 (2022): p15.



a high level of education.<sup>17</sup> According to the data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 75.7% of those employed in 2018 had completed higher education.<sup>18</sup> Ukrainian refugees, therefore, represent a highly skilled labour force compared to refugees from other countries of origin, who often experience gaps in education, are missing qualifications, or are even illiterate.<sup>19</sup> Ukrainian citizens already benefited from relatively liberal immigration policies, even before the war. The Association Agreement signed between Ukraine and the EU in 2014, granted Ukrainian citizens visa-free access to the EU for up to 90 days at a time from 2017. This strengthened their bilateral relationship, not only in terms of mobility, increased travel and cultural exchange, but also enhanced economic cooperation by facilitating cross-border trade since pre-war labour migration from Ukraine was common, and many EU Member States had experience in hosting Ukrainians.<sup>20</sup>

Almost all those seeking refuge and registered under the TPD are women and children, as able-bodied men of Ukraine between the ages of 18 to 60 are forbidden to leave the territory and are required to support war efforts.<sup>21</sup> Childcare and schooling were thus recognised as an immediate priority for integration and well-being. One aspect of the TPD includes the right for all Ukrainians under the age of 18 to attend local schools under the same conditions as nationals.<sup>22</sup> Though migrant children and children with a migration background are not a new feature in European classrooms, the recent arrival of Ukrainian children across schools in Europe has triggered a response with emphasis on “inclusion” but also to protect the language and culture of origin.<sup>23</sup> Inclusive education and schooling

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<sup>17</sup> [Master or Doctorate 29%, Specialisation 26%, Technical or Vocational 19%, Bachelor 13%] “Regional Intentions Survey Result (3rd Round) see: UNHCR, Operational Data Portal (ODP), accessed 22 June 2023, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/304?geo=0&sv=54.>]

<sup>18</sup> Albrecht and Tetyana Panchenko, "Refugee Flow from Ukraine: Origins, Effects, Scales and Consequences," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 23(04), p 8-16, 2022 [see also: Guichard 2020; Aksoy and Poutvaara 2021]

<sup>19</sup> Albrecht and Panchenko, "Refugee Flow from Ukraine", p.8-16

<sup>20</sup> MEDAM (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration), “Refugee protection in the EU: Building resilience to geopolitical conflict” *Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe*, Kiel, 2022, p.72-73 [https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/MEDAM\\_Assessment\\_Report\\_2022.pdf](https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/MEDAM_Assessment_Report_2022.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> [89 % women, with 47% of households including school-aged children (5-17 years old).] “Regional Intentions Survey Result (3rd Round)”, UNHCR, ODP, 2023

<sup>22</sup> [Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 states that "The Member States shall grant to persons under 18 years of age enjoying temporary protection access to the education system under the same conditions as nationals of the host Member State. The Member States may stipulate that such access must be confined to the state education system." (Article 14(1))]

<sup>23</sup> [20% of Ukrainians noted Russian as their native language in March 2022. See: ‘Is Russian Spoken in Ukraine?’, War in Ukraine, 19 August 2022, Accessed 05 March 2023. [https://war.ukraine.ua/articles/do-ukrainians-speak-russian/.](https://war.ukraine.ua/articles/do-ukrainians-speak-russian/)]

is vital for long-term socio-economic integration. Beyond academic attainment, schools are key for socio-emotional development and building interpersonal skills. To avoid long-term segregation and stigmatisation of immigrant groups, schools must adapt to diversity. Structures must facilitate dialogue between diverse groups in order to improve mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence. This puts the question of multiculturalism and diversity to the fore and thus the need to practise intercultural competencies is key.

### **Research neich**

This paper will focus on the efforts to include refugee children into education systems in Poland and Germany. The European Commission has provided a practical manual with information and resources for EU Member States regarding the successful inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education with the encouragement to support academic, social and emotional needs, but also stresses that children and adolescents are permitted to retain a strong link to Ukraine.<sup>24</sup> In the past, the EU (Brussels) has been heavily criticised for poorly managing migration and imposing policies which infringe on the sovereignty of its Member States. Since the EU Member States have sovereign rights concerning education and integration policy, the second part of the paper looks at how the EU recommendations are implemented on a national level. This paper will focus on Poland and Germany, which are of interest because they are the two top destinations with the largest intake of refugees from Ukraine. Furthermore, they have two very different histories concerning migration and integration. This is revealed in the contextualisation chapter. The final analysis consists of a comparative case study which considers how the different national education systems provide for the needs of migrant and refugee children and if there have been changes since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By looking at top-level policy frames and measures, the paper will discuss the communalities and tensions between EU policies and national policies.

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<sup>24</sup> European Commission, European Education and Culture Executive Agency, *Supporting refugee learners from Ukraine in schools in Europe*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2797/066388>

[written in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), representatives of ministries of education, stakeholder organisations, and experts from the Network working on the social dimension of education and training (NESET).]

To answer the question, “War in Ukraine as a catalyst for inclusive education?” the following sub questions are reflected upon in the thesis:

**Research questions:**

- What are the key strategies proposed at EU level concerning the inclusion of migrant children in schools, and specifically the inclusion of Ukrainian children?
- What are the narratives concerning immigrant integration in Poland and Germany?
- What are the national approaches aiming to facilitate the integration of migrant children in schools?
- Have there been advancements for the inclusion of displaced children and youth from Ukraine in either country?

## **Methodology**

This study investigates to what extent the war in Ukraine has influenced inclusive, intercultural education in Europe. In order to answer the proposed research questions, the literature review draws on key academic discussions on some of the most common and controversial definitions and approaches to diversity management as well as inclusive education. This will identify themes and consider key concepts.

The methodological approach of this paper consists of a qualitative content analysis of strategic top-level documents and recommendations issued by the European Union (EU). The textual analysis is used to identify the main goals, priorities and methods of implementation, defined by the EU, concerning inclusive education. To consider the changes of approach since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, two key documents issued by the European Commission have been chosen for analysis. The first, “The Action Plan Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027” is compared and contrasted to a document issued following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, entitled “Supporting the inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education: Considerations, key principles and practices for the school year 2022-2023”. The second part of the paper looks at how the EU recommendations are implemented on a national level. This entails a comparative case study of Poland and Germany’s implementation of the policies. The first part of the analysis compares the pre-war policies in place for managing the integration and inclusion of children with migrant backgrounds, particularly refugees, in schools, and subsequently the measures, policies and approaches following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Education and integration policies are often “bound up with ideologies of nationalism and constructions of belonging and inclusion.”<sup>25</sup> and are closely linked to national identity and cultural values. It is, therefore, interesting to compare and contrast the approaches and specific features of the national integration policies and education systems. Welply indicates comparing national policies “can help understand one system in relation to the other and shed light on aspects that would go unnoticed otherwise”<sup>26</sup>. For this, Bartlett and Vavrus comparative case study approach (CCS) will be used. They argue that

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<sup>25</sup> Sarah Spencer and Katharine Charsley, “Reframing ‘Integration’: Acknowledging and Addressing Five Core Critiques”, *Comparative Migration Studies* 9, no. 1 (2021): p. 3, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-021-00226-4>.

<sup>26</sup> Oakleigh Welply, *Immigration, Integration and Education*, 2021, p28. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429444371>

comparing and contrasting allows us “to discover” and come to “unexpected conclusions”.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, comparison allows us to consider how Germany and Poland address intercultural education in their policy recommendations which are based on similar (yet different) visions, values and ideologies.<sup>28</sup> Penninx and Blanca, also explain;

Cross-national comparisons that examine the same immigrant group in different national and local contexts enable researchers to assess the role of contextual factors (e.g., citizenship and welfare policies, integration policies, and labour market arrangements), adding further explanatory power for differences in immigrants’ integration outcomes.<sup>29</sup>

The aim is to illuminate the key values and rationales which underpin the documents by taking a closer look at the main goals, priorities and methods of implementation, defined by the governing bodies, regarding intercultural, inclusive education in schools. Keywords, phrases and potential themes will be discussed to consider the similarities and particularities in each national narrative. The objective is not to devise a universally applicable approach or seek to “flatten the cases by ignoring valuable contextual information, such as historical circumstances, or imposing concepts or categories taken from one site onto another.”<sup>30</sup> Integration policies and education systems differ not only between EU countries but also over time.<sup>31</sup> Every country has its own historical, cultural, political and social context, which influences the debates on integration and implementation of inclusive, intercultural education. For this reason, this paper will provide a brief contextualisation of the Case Studies (in chapter 2) in order to take into account key historical moments and socio-political developments.

The framework proposed by Penninx and Blanca in “The Concept of Integration as an Analytical Tool and as a Policy Concept” will be used for the analysis of the policy documents.<sup>32</sup> Policy documents usually include an explicit statement of the perceived problem and the desired outcome of the policy: the policy frame. The policy acts as the

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<sup>27</sup> Lesley Bartlett and Frances Vavrus, “Comparative Case Studies: An Innovative Approach”, *Nordic Journal of Comparative and International Education* 1 (November 2017), p. 6, <https://doi.org/10.7577/njcie.1929>.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p6.

<sup>29</sup> Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Rinus Penninx, *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors* (Cham: Springer Open, 2016), p4.

<sup>30</sup> Bartlett and Vavrus, “Comparative Case Studies”, 2017, p10.

<sup>31</sup> Penninx and Blanca, *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe*, p3

<sup>32</sup> Rinus Penninx and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, ‘The Concept of Integration as an Analytical Tool and as a Policy Concept’, in *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors*, ed. Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Rinus Penninx, IMISCOE Research Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 11–29, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_2).

proposed remedy or solution to the specific social problem: the policy measure. When this is combined with the examination of the political debate around the policy document, one can identify the underlying beliefs and assumptions that shape policy decisions: governance.<sup>33</sup> When approaching immigrant integration, the following should be considered: three dimensions (legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural-religious), two parties (immigrant and receiving society)<sup>34</sup>, and three levels (individuals, organisations, and institutions).<sup>35</sup>

Key questions when studying integration policies include; “*how are immigrants perceived?*”<sup>36</sup> “*what is the response to that problem?*”<sup>37</sup> “*for whom are integration policies meant?*”<sup>38</sup> Finally, Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas consider three different policy approaches:<sup>39</sup>

- a) Non-policy: ignore the presence of immigrants and thus avoid any responsibility for them.
- b) New policy: Catering for certain immigrants needs but under specific conditions due to the alleged temporary nature of their stay.
- c) Inclusive policy: immigrants perceived as permanent residents and included into structures/ institutions of host society.

The research will consider the contextual relevance and meaning of the document and goes beyond a mere description of the content of the documents. Besides the official documents and announcements issued by governing authorities, surveys, reports, statistical data, media coverage, and academic discussions are used to gain a more comprehensive understanding about the context. This approach is highly suitable for addressing the research question as it facilitates interpretation and insights to the significant elements related to immigrant integration and intercultural, inclusive education.

The paper will use a combination of Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas framework for policy analysis as well as Bartlett and Vavrus's approach to comparative case studies as summarised in the following tables.

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<sup>33</sup> Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas, “Integration as an Analytical Tool” 2016, p21

<sup>34</sup> [In this case, I will include three parties (the country of origin) in order to consider the role of Ukraine.]

<sup>35</sup> Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas, “Integration as an Analytical Tool”, 2016.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p20.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

	<b>What</b>	<b>Key Question</b>	<b>Sub Questions</b>
<b>Policy Frame<sup>40</sup></b>	The reconstruction of a problem definition of a policy issue, including the underlying assumptions of the problem's causes and possible remedies for it.	<p>Perception: How is the problem actually defined?</p> <p>Response: What are the possible remedies for this problem?</p>	<p>What are the overarching and underlying assumptions of the problem's causes?</p> <p>What values and beliefs shape how policymakers approach a particular issue or problem?</p> <p>What could/ should be done to resolve the problem?</p>
<b>Policy Measure<sup>41</sup></b>	Policy measures are concrete steps that policymakers take to implement the discourse (ideas, values, and beliefs) reflected in policy frames.	What are the specific actions taken by policymakers to address a particular problem or issue?	<p>What concrete programmes are in place?</p> <p>Do they respond to the legal-political/ socio-economic or cultural-religious dimensions of integration?</p> <p>What are their main goals?</p>

<sup>40</sup> [Example: policy frames include a focus on individual freedom, social justice, economic growth, or environmental sustainability...]

<sup>41</sup> [Example: Measures can include laws, regulations, programs, or funding initiatives]

			Who do they target?
<b>Governance</b>	Policy in practice: How policies are organised and implemented.	Who is responsible for initiating and coordinating immigrant integration within governmental administration?	Who is in charge of integration policies?  How are the different levels coordinated?  Do they respond to different political and social imperatives?  Do they complement or contradict one another?

*Resource: Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas, "Integration as an Analytical Tool" 2016.*

<b>Content Analysis</b>	<b>Key questions</b>
Priorities	What are the general assumptions and underlying beliefs about the causes of the problem? What are the proposed remedies to that problem? What is the general aim of the policy?
Principles	What are the key enlisted motivations for implementing intercultural/ inclusive education? What are the main "action-guiding" values, beliefs, attitudes and norms being drawn on to frame intercultural/ inclusive education? How does history and culture shine through the text? What concepts are used (or explicitly rejected)?



Implementation	What is the general aim of the policy? What is the suggested method of implementation?
Stakeholders	How are the target group (beneficiaries) defined, addressed or positioned in the document?  [consider; students, parents, teachers, and the wider community]

*Resource: Bartlett and Vavrus, "Comparative Case Studies", 2017.*

### **Choice of case studies**

To examine the implementation of EU recommendations and integration efforts on a nation-state level, Poland and Germany have been chosen as case studies as they have welcomed the largest number of refugees from Ukraine in Europe. Germany is a country with a long history of immigration but has denied it for a long time. Today, Germany is internationally renowned for its "open door" policy. Germany is considered a key player in advancing EU migration law and policy and has been ranked the most popular destination for migrants and refugees within Europe for several years. One could therefore assume that Germany is "experienced" in the inclusion of immigrants in schools as it has several existing structures in place. Poland has traditionally been depicted as a country of emigration and known for its hostile approaches towards immigrants. Whilst German society is characterised as "super diverse", Poland is traditionally characterised as relatively homogenous in terms of ethnicity and religion. Within the mono-cultural context, one can presume that schools were not equipped to address intercultural education and the specific needs of immigrant children.<sup>42</sup> Undoubtedly, Poland will have introduced the most drastic changes concerning intercultural or inclusive education strategies. The choice two dissimilar case studies will allow a more comprehensive understanding of the national approaches and challenges for implementing EU policy recommendations.

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<sup>42</sup> MIPEX "Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020: Poland," accessed 15 March 2023. , <https://www.mipex.eu/poland>.

## Key Documents

EU Key Documents	
<b>European Commission</b>	Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 (2020)
	Supporting the inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education: Considerations, key principles and practices for the school year 2022-2023 (2022)
Case Studies: Key documents	
<b>Germany</b>  KMK (Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intercultural Education and Upbringing in Schools (Resolution of the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany, 25th October 1996, as amended on 05.12. 2013).</li> <li>• Declaration on the Integration of Young Refugees through Education" (Resolution, 06.10.2016)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Handling of (compulsory school-age) refugee children and adolescents from Ukraine" (Resolution of 10.05.2022)</li> <li>• Schooling of the protection-seeking children and adolescents from Ukraine in the school year 2022/2023 (Resolution of 23.06.2022)</li> </ul>
<b>Poland</b>  MEiN (Minister of Education and Science)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 23 August 2017 on the education of persons who are not Polish citizens and persons who are Polish citizens who have received education in schools operating in the educational systems of other countries</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulation of the Minister of Education and Science of 21 March 2022 on the organisation of education, upbringing and care for children and youth who are citizens of Ukraine.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Ordinance of 21 March 2022 (for the 2021/2022 academic year)</li> <li>○ Ordinance of 11 August 2022 (for the 2022/2023 academic year)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## Limitations

This is a punctual analysis of key policy documents on immigrant integration in schools following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The outcome, whether the approach to the inclusion of Ukrainians in schools has long-term success, or even if there are changes to EU migration and asylum management, is yet to be observed.

The European Commission has acknowledged: “The local level plays a key role in welcoming and guiding newcomers when they first arrive in their new country”<sup>43</sup> since “integration happens in every village, city and region where migrants live, work and go to school or to a sports club.”<sup>44</sup> At the same time, “If a society is to be welcoming of migrants, then less diverse areas must also adapt to their presence of migrants and, accordingly, local measures must be complemented with national policies that create space for migrants within the national story.”<sup>45</sup> Due to the practical constraints of this research paper, the analysis has been limited to the content of top-level regulations and recommendations and considers foremost the vertical dimension of governance; top-level EU and national policies and approaches. There is limited reflection on the extent to which these policies are implemented at the regional, local or school level. Data from secondary sources has been used to improve the quality of the overall analysis. Though I regret not being able to fulfil this research myself, the originality entails using this data effectively to reach overall conclusions. In sum, although it is undeniable that local and regional authorities play a crucial role in integration processes, this paper has focused above all on the national and supranational programmes and policies.

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<sup>43</sup> European Commission, “Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027,” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, 2020, p7. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0758>.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Stephanie E. Berry and Isilay Taban, ‘The EU Migration Pact and Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion: A Progressive Step or Half Measure?’, *European Yearbook of Minority Issues* 19, no. 1 (29 June 2022): p19. [https://doi.org/10.1163/22116117\\_002](https://doi.org/10.1163/22116117_002).

## **Theoretical Background, Literature Review**

### **Approaches to Diversity Management: Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Interculturalism**

*“I see integration as an imperative of justice: as a matter of relational equality, integration promotes more equal relations between people. It is concerned with social standing, and hence with the equal moral worth of people.”<sup>46</sup>*

European societies have become increasingly complex as a result of globalisation and international migration flows. Since around the 2000s European societies have been described as “superdiverse” in academic and public discourse. Urban spaces, in particular, are home to a multiplicity of ethnic, national, religious and linguistic backgrounds.<sup>47</sup>

This chapter will consider different approaches to diversity management. It will look at the shift from integration as uni-directional, to a two-way process and discuss three key terms at the centre of scholarly (academic) and political debate: Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and Interculturalism.

#### **Assimilation**

Discourse on integration has predominantly been conceptualised as a one-way assimilation process in which the immigrant is responsible for their own integration success.<sup>48</sup> This vision presents a homogenous understanding of national belonging whereby society is an already integrated ‘harmonious whole’, consisting of moral, acculturated and patriotic nationals.<sup>49</sup> ‘Outsiders’ are considered defective or deviant and need to conform to the prescribed norms and values of the host society and culture in order to be considered legitimate members.<sup>50</sup> Successful integration is thus portrayed as something which happens once the immigrant has sufficiently adapted and requires immigrants to abandon aspects of their own identity (language, tradition, culture...) in order to belong.<sup>51</sup> This can have undesirable stigmatising and marginalising consequences, as some groups are considered ‘more’ or ‘less’ integrated, particularly

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<sup>46</sup> Klarenbeek, “Integration as a Two-Way Process,” 2019, p903-904

<sup>47</sup> Abdou and Geddes, “Managing Superdiversity”, 2020.

<sup>48</sup> Klarenbeek, “Integration as a Two-Way Process”, 2019.

<sup>49</sup> Sarah Spencer and Katharine Charsley, ‘Reframing “Integration”’: Acknowledging and Addressing Five Core Critiques’, *Comparative Migration Studies* 9, no. 1 (2021) <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-021-00226-4>.

<sup>50</sup> Klarenbeek, “Integration as a Two-Way Process,” 2019, p912

<sup>51</sup> Rinus Penninx and Blanca Garcés-Masareñas, “Introduction: Integration as a Three-Way Process Approach?”, in: *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe Contexts, Levels and Actors*, ed. Eadem (Springer Open, Cham, 2015): p3.

migrant groups and their descendents who are perceived to have not fully adopted the host culture.<sup>52</sup>

### **Multiculturalism**

Integration as a one-way process denies the diversity of individuals who make up modern societies which are, in fact, themselves largely internally heterogeneous and have no clear majority group. Lähdesmäki et al. have identified that integration and inclusion are both concepts “related to discussions about how to approach cultural backgrounds or heritages that differ from those of a majority that forms a norm in the society.”<sup>53</sup> When speaking of diversity management it is essential to consider the scholarly debates on multiculturalism and interculturalism. The concepts first appeared around in the 1960/70s and considered how to deal with different religions and cultural groups, in order to provide equal opportunities, individual freedom and group recognition. Multiculturalism acknowledges “the right of non-dominant groups to preserve, practice and protect their cultures.”<sup>54</sup> It accepts the coexistence of different cultures within a defined space, stating that “by adjusting and adapting laws, rules, and regulations, societies should enable minorities to adhere to their own cultural practices”<sup>55</sup>, thus, rejecting “the idea that minorities should abandon their distinctive cultural beliefs and practices and assimilate into the dominant majority culture.”<sup>56</sup>

### **The failure of multiculturalism**

Since the 9/11 terror attacks, multiculturalism has been increasingly considered a problem and accused of “prioritising diversity above communality and, in so doing, of leading to segregation and division.”<sup>57</sup> At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe experienced a “backlash against multiculturalism” which was blamed for the perceived failures of immigrant integration.<sup>58</sup> Leading European politicians accused

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<sup>52</sup> Spencer and Charsley, “Integration”: Five Core Critiques”, 2021, p3,

<sup>53</sup> Tuuli Lähdesmäki, Aino-Kaisa Koistinen, and Susanne Ylönen, *Intercultural Dialogue in the European Education Policies a Conceptual Approach* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020). p51, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41517-4\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41517-4_3). [See also: Barrett, 2013, p16]

<sup>54</sup> Stephanie E Berry, ‘Aligning Interculturalism with International Human Rights Law: “Living Together” without Assimilation’, *Human Rights Law Review* 18, no. 3 (1 September 2018), p4, <https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngy022>

<sup>55</sup> Lähdesmäki, *Intercultural Dialogue in European Education*, 2020, p.9 [See also: Barrett, 2013, p16]

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Berry, “Living Together”, p1.

<sup>58</sup> Leila Hadj Abdou and Andrew Geddes, “Managing Superdiversity? Examining the Intercultural Policy Turn in Europe,” *Superdiversity, Policy and Governance in Europe*, 2020, p.494, <https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447352051.003.0002>.

multiculturalism for exasperating social divisions, tensions and the isolation and ghettoisation of immigrant communities.<sup>59</sup> The German Chancellor Angela Merkel (2010) for example, made a statement declaring that multiculturalism had “failed”.<sup>60</sup> Lähdesmäki, et al. explain that:

“multiculturalism was criticised for encouraging members of different cultures to live separately in parallel communities without deeper interaction with and trust in one another, for emphasising instead of blurring boundaries, and for focusing mainly on ethnic and national issues instead of the intersectional diversity in societies.”<sup>61</sup>

In sum, the focus was placed on respecting and preserving individual and group characteristics with the result of emphasising differentiation, and encouraging separatism. Separation can be understood as the lowest level of inclusion as the immigrant denies the dominant culture and avoids contact with domestic society to preserve its own.<sup>62</sup> This understanding resulted in the belief that increased interaction and dialogue among diverse groups was necessary, to strengthen social cohesion and avoid the emergence of parallel societies. This formed the central aspect of the intercultural policy framework.<sup>63</sup>

### **What is interculturalism?**

Interculturalism follows the principles of “contact theory”, which stipulates that increased contact between members of different groups can, under favourable conditions, reduce prejudice to those considered different to oneself.<sup>64</sup> This can be on an individual or interpersonal level, and subsequently is extended to a more positive perception on a more general or larger scale of an outgroup.<sup>65</sup> Interculturalism thus encourages direct contact to build a sense of a shared humanity.<sup>66</sup> According to Barrett, interculturalism:

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<sup>59</sup> Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism?”, *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 33, no. 2 (April 2012), 228. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2011.618266>.

<sup>60</sup> [Merkel claimed multiculturalism had “utterly failed” and Sarkozy that “French public policies were heavily concentrated on the culture of those who arrived and insufficiently focused on the host culture”. See: Carlos Alberto Torres, *Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Critical Global Citizenship Education* (New York: Routledge, 2019), p70 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315452579>

<sup>61</sup> Lähdesmäki, et al., “What Is Intercultural Dialogue?”, 2020, p9.

<sup>62</sup> Adela Zubikova, ‘Assessment of the Immigrants Integration Level in the New Member States of the EU in 2009–2018’, *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 22, no. 2 (1 June 2021): 637, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00759-0>.

<sup>63</sup> Abdou and Geddes, “Managing Superdiversity”, 2020, p487

<sup>64</sup> Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1954).

<sup>65</sup> Oliver Christ and Mathias Kauff, ‘Intergroup Contact Theory’, in *Social Psychology in Action: Evidence-Based Interventions from Theory to Practice*, ed. Kai Sassenberg and Michael L. W. Vliek, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2019, p. 145–161, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13788-5\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13788-5_10).

<sup>66</sup> Oliver Christ and Mathias Kauff, ‘Intergroup Contact Theory’, in *Social Psychology in Action: Evidence-Based Interventions from Theory to Practice*, ed. Kai Sassenberg and Michael L. W. Vliek (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 145–61, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13788-5\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13788-5_10).

[I]s seen as helping people to develop an understanding of different cultural beliefs and practices; fostering mutual understanding; increasing interpersonal trust, tolerance, and mutual respect; reducing prejudice and stereotypes; facilitating relationships between different communities; and fostering integration.<sup>67</sup>

Abdou and Geddes, explain:

Interculturalism aims to create relationships between people in order to tackle exclusionary processes of ‘Othering’. Its vision is to establish mixed communities that share common places, collaborate with each other, and learn from one another.”<sup>68</sup>

In sum, the focus is on interpersonal relationships to reduce prejudices and conflicts amongst people and strengthen social cohesion.<sup>69</sup>

### **Interculturalism and multiculturalism; are they the same?**

Though several scholars argue that the concepts and policy goals of multiculturalism and interculturalism overlap, multiculturalism is considered more in terms of tolerance or passive coexistence than interculturalism.<sup>70</sup> Multiculturalism (like diversity) can be used as a noun describing a state, whereas interculturalism (or inclusion) is a process and something which requires action.<sup>71</sup> Zilliacus and Holm identify that “multicultural” is employed to describe a position or nature whereas “intercultural” refers to a dynamic or interactive process involving exchange, dialogue and negotiations between diverse cultural groups.<sup>72</sup> Banks similarly explains; that “the prefix *multi* describes the multiplicity of different cultures which live on the same territory” whilst the “prefix *inter* underlines the interactive aspect.”<sup>73</sup>

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[Certain argue, however, that increased intergroup contact will in fact have a negative impact, exacerbating prejudice and may result in increased conflict between groups.]

<sup>67</sup> Martin Barrett, "Introduction: Interculturalism and Multiculturalism: Concepts and Controversies," in *Interculturalism and Multiculturalism: Similarities and Differences*, edited by M. Barrett (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2013), p26.

<sup>68</sup> Abdou and Geddes, “Managing Superdiversity?”, 2020, p497.

<sup>69</sup> Torres, *Foundations Global Citizenship Education*, 2017, p21

<sup>70</sup> Lähdesmäki, et Al., “What Is Intercultural Dialogue?”, 2020, p9 [See also Barrett 2013; Meer and Modood 2012]

<sup>71</sup> Mary-Frances Winters, ‘From Diversity to Inclusion: An Inclusion Equation’, in *Diversity at Work: The Practice of Inclusion* (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2013), p206, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118764282.ch7>.

<sup>72</sup> Gunilla Holm and Harriet Zilliacus, “Multicultural Education and Intercultural Education: Is There a Difference?” In: M. Talib, J. Loima, H. Paavola & S Patrikainen (Eds.)(2009), *Dialogues on Diversity and Global Education*, pp. 11-28. Berlin: Peter Lang.

<sup>73</sup> James A. Banks, *The Routledge International Companion to Multicultural Education* (Routledge, 2009) p135

## **Criticism of interculturalism**

Certain scholars criticise interculturalism for “reducing cultural groups to separate and clearly identifiable units, although in super-diversified societies differences are intersectional and do not follow any clear demarcations”<sup>74</sup> The focus on interaction between groups once again places emphasis on getting to know the “Other” rather than acknowledging the complex nature of identities, often plural, overlapping with different domains of belonging.<sup>75</sup> What's more, interactions are not considered enough to overcome prevailing social and structural inequalities in super-diversified societies.<sup>76</sup> Interculturalism can reinforce a hierarchy of power between those who facilitate dialogue and those who participate; “We Europeans” in opposition to non-European, non-white, non-Christian, non-educated migrants and ethnic groups.”<sup>77</sup> Since societal norms and values are defined by the culturally dominant group, it is essential to protect the rights of people belonging to minorities.<sup>78</sup>

## **Integration as a two-way process**

The success of integration relies on the institutional structure and openness of the receiving community.<sup>79</sup> The Council of Europe presented immigrant integration as “an integrative process based upon mutual willingness to adapt by both migrants and the receiving society”<sup>80</sup>. As Anderson states:

Integration does not view disadvantaged communities as the only ones that need to change. Integration aims to transform the habits of dominant groups. It is a tool for breaking down stigmatisation, stereotypes, and discrimination.<sup>81</sup>

When we understand integration as a two-way process, both insiders and outsiders take part (albeit in different roles).<sup>82</sup> All individuals (immigrants and non-immigrants) need to adapt to allow for social change and participation in society.<sup>83</sup> Therefore one can speak

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<sup>74</sup> Barrett, “Interculturalism and Multiculturalism”, 2013, p30

<sup>75</sup> Torres, *Foundations Global Citizenship Education*, 2017, p77

<sup>76</sup> Barrett, “Interculturalism and Multiculturalism”, 2013, p30

<sup>77</sup> Lähdesmäki, et al., “What Is Intercultural Dialogue?”, 2020, p15 [See also: Lähdesmäki and Wagener (2015) who criticise the policy discourses in the EU and CoE which poorly recognizing the societal or historical differences between societies]

<sup>78</sup> Berry, “Living Together”, 2018, p4.

<sup>79</sup> Klarenbeek, “Integration as a Two-Way Process,” 2019, p902

<sup>80</sup> Council of Europe, ““Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on strengthening the integration of children of migrants and of immigrant background”, accessed 23 March 2023

[https://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/ressources/recommendations-resolutions\\_en.asp](https://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/ressources/recommendations-resolutions_en.asp).

<sup>81</sup> Elizabeth Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), p2015-16.

<sup>82</sup> Klarenbeek, “Integration as a Two-Way Process”, 2019, p916

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, p907 [see also: Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas, p12)



of the “integration between migrants and non-migrants” rather than just the “integration of migrants”<sup>84</sup> Whilst academic literature focuses almost exclusively on the interplay between the immigrant and the receiving society, since 2011 the European Commission has introduced integration as a three-way process. This framework incorporates the role of sending countries (country of origin) in the immigrants’ integration.<sup>85</sup>

Societies change as a consequence of migration in terms of the size and composition of the population. Policies and institutions subsequently adapt to respond to the political, social, and cultural needs of immigrants.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, both the immigrant population and the pre-existing population are impacted by immigration. Integration can therefore be described as “the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration”.<sup>87</sup>

This chapter has discussed critical debates around diversity management and developments in immigrant integration, including the shift from one-way assimilation of the immigrant into the host society to a more dynamic, two-way process of exchange between the immigrant and the host society. The way governing authorities respond to the needs of diverse populations through immigrant integration measures can either reinforce or alleviate socio-economic disparities.<sup>88</sup> Difference can be seen as a deficit, and thus assimilation is the solution or an opportunity through which intercultural exchange can empower individuals and society to mutually evolve. Successful integration means valuing diversity and accepting a more fluid, constantly evolving, multi-faceted way of doing things.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p916.

<sup>85</sup> [See: "European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals," Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, 2011, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A52011DC0455>.]

<sup>86</sup> Penninx and Blanca, “Integration as an Analytical Tool”, 2016, p11.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Abdou and Geddes, “Managing Superdiversity?”, 2020, p493

This table is used to sum up some of the key concepts discussed in this chapter.

<p><b>One-way</b></p>	<p><b>Assimilation:</b> linear process of (cultural and linguistic) adaptation of the immigrant minority into the host society. Difference as deficit.</p>
	<p><b>Multiculturalism:</b> the right for immigrant minorities to retain their own culture and identity of origin. Can lead to separation or marginalisation. The circumstances or presence of plurilingualism and cultural diversity.</p>
<p><b>Two-way</b></p>	<p><b>Interculturalism:</b> emphasis on the interaction (process) between individuals across different ethno-cultural communities. Mutual adaptation: both minority and broader society make concessions/ reciprocal (ex)changes.</p>
<p><b>Three-way</b></p>	<p>Immigrant, host society, and country of origin play a role in the integration process.</p>

## **Chapter 1) EU integration and inclusion**

Having spoken about the different forms of diversity management, this section will consider the implications of intercultural education and inclusion in schools. Classrooms mirroring society means that they are becoming increasingly diverse in terms of culture, ethnicity, language, religion... Intercultural education means moving away from the concept of educating the “foreign Other” to a vision which understands that all members of society are different to each “Other”. Therefore, integration, through intercultural education, includes all citizens.

In accordance with International and EU law, education is a fundamental human right, regardless of origin (nationality) and legal status.<sup>89</sup> All children, regardless of individual differences, have the right (and obligation) to quality education and non-discrimination. Inclusive education no longer solely refers to the inclusion (and provision of specialised services for the needs) of students with disabilities into regular classrooms. It refers to the inclusion of all learners.<sup>90</sup> According to UNESCO, inclusion is “a process that helps to overcome barriers limiting the presence, participation, and achievement of learners.”<sup>91</sup>

Winters defines inclusion as:

[...] creating an environment that acknowledges, welcomes, and accepts different approaches, styles, perspectives, and experiences, so as to allow all to reach their potential and result in enhanced organisational success.<sup>92</sup>

Inclusive education means building safe and equal conditions for learners from all backgrounds to attend and complete education. It means facilitating learning opportunities, regardless of diverse needs.

The importance of education for successful integration of immigrants and their children cannot be understated. Giancola and Salmieri state “Education stands out as the most

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<sup>89</sup> [Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 7 and 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 13; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Article 28; United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), Goal 4; European Pillar of Social Rights, Principle 1; Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Global Framework for Refugee Education]

<sup>90</sup> Ane Qvortrup and Lars Qvortrup, ‘Inclusion: Dimensions of Inclusion in Education’, *International Journal of Inclusive Education* 22, no. 7 (3 July 2018): p805  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13603116.2017.1412506>.

<sup>91</sup> UNESCO, *A guide for ensuring inclusion and equity in education*, UNESCO, 2017, p7.  
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000248254>

<sup>92</sup> Winters, “Diversity to Inclusion”, 2013, p206.

important means by which an immigrant person can succeed into the society and thus increase opportunities to get full inclusion.”<sup>93</sup> Likewise Ham et Al. indicate:

Ensuring that immigrant youth are well integrated into an educational system is of paramount societal significance because the educational pathways of these youth will determine not only their own futures as capable adults but also the future of society as an integrated whole.<sup>94</sup>

Research shows to what extent disadvantages and exclusion which children face at an early age impact their future success since an early school dropout means reduced chances of participation in the labour market and career advancement.<sup>95</sup> Foreign born persons, especially those born outside the EU, have particularly high risks of poverty and social exclusion.<sup>96</sup> The Programme for International Student Assessment [PISA] surveys indicate that educational inequalities are linked to socioeconomic backgrounds of students, and that students of migrant background are more than twice as likely to underperform academically and express a lower sense of well-being in schools compared to native-born students.<sup>97</sup> Second generation students show improved results, though inequalities are passed on from one generation to the next. The EU Commission has identified two key issues: over qualification and under-qualification. On the one hand, a quarter of migrants are highly educated and yet 40% occupy a job below their qualifications.<sup>98</sup> In other words, their skills and potential are being wasted. At the same time, the share of young people dropping out of education (without upper secondary education) is considerably higher among young migrants than their native peers and need further support.<sup>99</sup> Lower educational levels explain the difference of employment

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<sup>93</sup> Orazio Giancola and Luca Salmieri, ‘Education and the Inclusion of Immigrants. A Cross-National Analysis among Five European Countries’, *Scuola Democratica*, 1 August 2018, p317 <https://doi.org/10.12828/90564>.

<sup>94</sup> Seung-Hwan Ham, Hyojune Song, and Kyung-Eun Yang, "Towards a balanced multiculturalism? Immigrant integration policies and immigrant children's educational performance," *Social Policy & Administration* 54 (2020): p642, <https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12561>.

<sup>95</sup> European Commission, “The EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child and the European Child Guarantee”, 2021, [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/rights-child/eu-strategy-rights-child-and-european-child-guarantee\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/rights-child/eu-strategy-rights-child-and-european-child-guarantee_en).

<sup>96</sup> [According to Eurostat 2021, 48.4% of non-EU citizens and 27.5% of citizens of other EU Member States living in the EU faced the risk of poverty and social exclusion, compared to 19.5% of nationals.] Eurostat, “Migrant Integration Statistics - at Risk of Poverty and Social Exclusion”, accessed 4 July 2023, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant\\_integration\\_statistics\\_-\\_at\\_risk\\_of\\_poverty\\_and\\_social\\_exclusion](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_at_risk_of_poverty_and_social_exclusion).

<sup>97</sup> PISA ‘Publications - PISA’, 2018 <https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/pisa-2018-results.htm>. [See, also 1. “ICCS 2016 Results,” IEA, accessed 12 June 2023, <https://www.iea.nl/studies/iea/iccs/2016/results>.]

<sup>98</sup> European Commission, “Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027,” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, 2020, p4. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0758>.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p4

outcomes, poverty and social exclusion. In sum, people with a migrant background are much more likely to be “neither employed nor in education and training” than their native peers.<sup>100</sup>

The following table summarises some of the key issues identified in the Commission's 2020 Action Plan Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027:

<b>Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 Education and Training<sup>101</sup></b>		
<b>Problem</b>	Employment: Highly educated migrants who are overqualified for the job they do	Education: Migrants who have low(er) education attainment
<b>Need</b>	Put skills to use/ not waste potential	increase support to enhance their education outcomes
<b>Call to action</b>	Invest both socially and economically to ensure successful integration and inclusion	
<b>Desired outcome</b>	Improve the long-term well-being of societies; more “cohesive, resilient and prosperous” with stable and thriving economies	

### **The Action Plan Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027**

The following section will focus on the supranational, European level, firstly discussing approaches to inclusion and immigrant integration within the educational context. The European Council has stated “To prevent the marginalisation of young people, it is vital to have inclusive and equitable education systems that foster cohesive societies and lay the foundations for active citizenship and enhance employability.”<sup>102</sup> The aim of inclusive education is therefore to support disadvantaged groups to reach their full potential and have access to opportunities to prevent this cycle from reproducing. The Commission has also encouraged Member States that the economic and social investment for effective integration and inclusion are essential for both the immigrants and local communities, to

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid, p5

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> European Council, “Council Recommendation of 22 May 2018 on Promoting Common Values, Inclusive Education, and the European Dimension of Teaching” (2018), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018H0607%2801%29>.

secure the long-term well-being of societies, which, in turn, become more “cohesive, resilient and prosperous.”<sup>103</sup>

Since the terrorist attacks and manifestations of violent extremism across Europe in 2015, education has been a key strategy to prevent young people from radicalisation. The EU adopted the Paris Declaration on ‘promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination through education’ focuses on “how education and training can best meet the challenges of social inclusion, radicalization and citizenship.”<sup>104</sup> Schools and educators were seen as the key to promoting cooperation, intercultural understanding, and social cohesion, where teachers were expected to be better equipped to identify and respond to early warnings signs of radicalisation, and students were to be empowered on fundamental democratic values and become responsible, open-minded and active members of diverse, inclusive societies. The declaration endorses the main objectives;

- 1) *Ensuring that children and young people acquire social, civic and intercultural competences*, by promoting democratic values and fundamental rights, social inclusion and nondiscrimination, as well as active citizenship;
- 2) *Enhancing critical thinking and media literacy, particularly in the use of the Internet and social media*, so as to develop resistance to all forms of discrimination and indoctrination;
- 3) *Fostering the education of disadvantaged children and young people*, by ensuring that our education and training systems address their needs;
- 4) *Promoting intercultural dialogue* through all forms of learning in cooperation with other relevant policies and stakeholders.<sup>105</sup>

Similarly, education was seen as a “vector for social cohesion and integration” in the 2018 Council Recommendation ‘on promoting common values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of teaching’ highlights the importance of ensuring equal access to quality inclusive education and the necessary support for all learners, including those from a migrant background.<sup>106</sup> The document states that education is vital to respond to “populism, xenophobia, divisive nationalism, discrimination, the spreading of fake news and misinformation, as well as the challenge of radicalisation leading to violent extremism.”<sup>107</sup> The European cooperation in Education and Training (ET 2020) is

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<sup>103</sup> European Commission, ‘Action Plan’, 2020, p1

<sup>104</sup> ‘European Education Area’, EU Policy Cooperation, Accessed 9 June 2023.

[https://education.ec.europa.eu/policies/european-policy-cooperation/et2020-working-groups\\_en](https://education.ec.europa.eu/policies/european-policy-cooperation/et2020-working-groups_en).

<sup>105</sup> [*emphasis added*]

<sup>106</sup> European Council, “Recommendation Inclusive Education” (2018)

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

dedicated to “Promoting Common Values through Inclusive Education” supporting policy making and exchanging best practices on a national and EU level, endorsing that:

[...] education should promote intercultural competences, democratic values and respect for fundamental rights, prevent and combat all forms of discrimination and racism, and equip children, young people and adults to interact positively with their peers from diverse backgrounds.<sup>108</sup>

Education should thus be underpinned by the following four principles:

1. Common values and intercultural competences, including citizenship education and digital citizenship.
2. Inclusive education for all learners
3. A European dimension of education and training
4. Supporting education staff in encouraging diversity and creating an open learning environment.<sup>109</sup>

As part of the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum, successful integration and inclusion are considered “an essential part of a well-managed and effective migration and asylum policy.”<sup>110</sup> This is stressed in the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 sets out a framework and practical steps to support Member States in their efforts to integrate and include third-country nationals who legally reside in the EU.<sup>111</sup> The Action Plan includes recommendations for targeted support for specific challenges people with migrant backgrounds face in education, employment, health and housing. For the purpose of this research paper, the section on “inclusive education and training”<sup>112</sup> will be the focus, to answer the proposed research question of; did war in Ukraine acted as a catalyst for more inclusive, intercultural education. The Action Plan 2021-27 will be used to compare and contrast the narrative and discourse of the Commission 2022 approach in the document; “Supporting refugee learners from Ukraine in schools in Europe”.

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<sup>108</sup> ET2020, “Joint Report of the Council and the Commission on the implementation of the strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training: New priorities for European cooperation in education and training” (OJ C 417) 2015, p. 25.

ET2020, ‘Promoting Common Values and Inclusive Education’, European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education, accessed 22 February 2023, <https://www.european-agency.org/news/et-2020-working-group-promoting-common-values-and-inclusive-education-peer-learning-activity>.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> European Commission, “Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027” COM2020 758 (final), 24 November 2020 [hereinafter “Action Plan”] [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/integration/action-plan-integration-and-inclusion\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/integration/action-plan-integration-and-inclusion_en).

<sup>111</sup> [this builds on the ‘2016 Action Plan on Integration of Third Country Nationals’, Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agendamigration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication\\_action\\_plan\\_integration\\_thirdcountry\\_nationals\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agendamigration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_action_plan_integration_thirdcountry_nationals_en.pdf)]

<sup>112</sup> “Action Plan,” 2020

The Action Plan presents the European way of life as “an inclusive one”, stressing that the “essential premise that everybody matters, that no one should be left behind, and that all should be able to effectively exercise their rights and have access to opportunities and security.”<sup>113</sup> According to the Commission, the vision of the Action Plan is not solely dedicated to the inclusion of immigrants, but to promote greater inclusion for all.

Inclusion for all is about ensuring that all policies are accessible to and work for everyone, including migrants and EU citizens with migrant background. This means adapting and transforming mainstream policies to the needs of a diverse society, taking into account the specific challenges and needs of different groups. Actions to help migrants integrate need not, and should not, be at the expense of measures to benefit other vulnerable or disadvantaged groups or minorities. On the contrary, they contribute to make policies more inclusive overall.<sup>114</sup>

In other words, policies which target the inclusion of immigrants are beneficial for all members of society as they perpetuate a more inclusive environment, foster equality and social cohesion, and ensure that everyone is able to participate.<sup>115</sup> Inclusion is presented as a “leitmotif” which seeks “ensure that all children, regardless of origin, ability, socio-economic background, legal and residence status have equal access to the same set of rights and protection.”<sup>116</sup>

To briefly summarise some of the key aspects, in terms of education, the recommendation stresses the need for migrant children and children with migrant background to be included in education as early as possible, to provide high quality and inclusive early childhood education and care (ECEC), so that culturally and linguistically diverse children can learn the language and adapt to the culture of the host country more quickly and have better outcomes in the future.<sup>117</sup> Integration programs should start upon arrival and accompany immigrants along their integration journey meaning a long-term approach to language and civic orientation courses, including intermediate and advanced levels, that go beyond the initial integration period. This is coupled with improving the recognition of foreign qualifications (from non-EU countries) in a quick, fair, transparent and affordable manner. Another aspect is the need for teachers to develop the skills and

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<sup>113</sup>“Action Plan,” 2020, p1

<sup>114</sup> “Action Plan”, 2020, p5

<sup>115</sup> Ane Qvortrup and Lars Qvortrup, ‘Inclusion: Dimensions of Inclusion in Education’, *International Journal of Inclusive Education* 22, no. 7 (3 July 2018): p810  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13603116.2017.1412506>.

<sup>116</sup> “Action Plan”, 2020, p9

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p8



resources so that they are equipped to teach in multicultural and multilingual classrooms, and thus have the ability to support children with migrant backgrounds throughout their education.<sup>118</sup> The key words are “inclusive”, “qualitative”, “comprehensive”, “accessible”.<sup>119</sup>

Some scholars have deemed the Action Plan insufficient for managing diversity as the approach proposed could undermine the creation and sustaining of cohesive and integrated European societies.<sup>120</sup> Berry and Isilay have criticised how the Action Plan replicates old narratives of a security based approach to diversity management, and is framed around broader European anxieties surrounding Islam, which justifies the securitisation of muslim migrants and their descendents as threats to the State and social cohesion.<sup>121</sup> For example, the Action Plan mentions using education to combat “violent extremist ideologies, organisations and movements”<sup>122</sup> which promotes the perception that migrants have inherent extremist ideologies and undemocratic tendencies and are more vulnerable to radicalisation.<sup>123</sup> Though the Action plan voices “A more cohesive and inclusive society for all can also help prevent the spread of all forms of extremist ideologies that can lead to terrorism and violent extremism.”<sup>124</sup> This suggests that immigrants could become dangerous and are thus a threat to social security. This rhetoric can increase tensions, intolerance and societal divisions rather than “foster integration and peaceful coexistence among communities and individuals.”<sup>125</sup>

The Action Plan has made some progress in recognising the importance of intercultural dialogue for social cohesion:

[P]roviding places and opportunities for migrants and local communities to meet and interact is a strong means for inclusion and more cohesive societies. Moreover, the promotion of intercultural dialogue, including interreligious dialogue between faith communities, is essential.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid, p8-9

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Stephanie E. Berry and Isilay Taban, “The EU Migration Pact and Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion: A progressive step or half measure?” *European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online* 19, no. 1 (2022), p20, [https://doi.org/10.1163/22116117\\_002](https://doi.org/10.1163/22116117_002).

<sup>121</sup> Berry and Taban, “A progressive step or half measure?”, 2022, p14

<sup>122</sup> “Action Plan”, 2020, p9

<sup>123</sup> Berry and Taban, “A progressive step or half measure?”, 2022, p14

<sup>124</sup> Action Plan, 2020, p6

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, p6

<sup>126</sup> Ibid, p20

Concerning schools, the statement, “Fighting segregation in schools and fostering interactions between migrant and native children is also crucial to making our education system more inclusive.”<sup>127</sup> also follows the narrative that an intercultural approach, to strengthening contact and exchange between pupils of different communities. The Action Plan does not, however, encourage measures which facilitate integration as a two-way process of mutual adaptation. In contrast to what the Council of the EU announced in 2004: “Full respect for the immigrants’ and their descendants’ own language and culture should be also an important element of integration policy.”<sup>128</sup> The Action Plan encourages providing long term courses in the host language and culture as “crucial aspects for migrants to fully participate in the receiving society.”<sup>129</sup> but there is no mention of the immigrant being able to maintain their own cultural or linguistic identity. One could thus argue that this is an assimilationist approach to integration. Berry and Taban state:

The Action Plan focuses on adapting migrants to their host States whilst imposing no corresponding obligation on the host society to adapt to the presence of migrants. Thus, its interpretation of integration overlooks the fact that this term refers to a two-way process. Moreover, when promoting participation, it only pays attention to the culture of the host society and does not advocate for the protection of migrants’ identities and accordingly nurture multicultural societies. Consequently, the Action Plan has adopted a thin conception of integration as compared to minority rights bodies.<sup>130</sup>

So, although the Action Plan advocates a two-way process, that “Developing welcoming, diverse and inclusive societies is a process that needs the engagement of both migrants and the receiving society.”<sup>131</sup> There are no concrete recommendations for the side of the receiving society.

Berry and Taban make multiple suggestions for improving the approach to immigrant integration:

the EU must: make a positive case for integration rather than one rooted in security concerns; interpret integration as a genuinely two-way process of mutual adaptation requiring that both migrants and the host community make concessions; recognise migrants’ diverse needs and aspirations, including their

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid, p9

<sup>128</sup> The Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, "Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union," 20, accessed 19 February 2023 , <https://ec.europa.eu/migrantintegration/?action=media.download&uuid=29C7FD4E-BA62-D4EA-18A8C8B34E873190>.

<sup>129</sup> Action Plan, 2020, p9

<sup>130</sup> Berry and Taban, “A progressive step or half measure?”, 2022, p12

<sup>131</sup> Action Plan, 2020, p20

right to preserve their cultural identity; and seek to remove barriers to successful integration, including intolerance and exclusionary national identities.<sup>132</sup>

These suggestions will be considered when comparing the document to the one of inclusion of Ukrainians.

In sum, education and training is considered one of the most powerful tools for integration. Ensuring that children and young people from migrant backgrounds are well-integrated into education is the best means for long term integration into society. Therefore, it is essential that immigrants are supported through all stages from early childhood right through to adult education (lifelong learning) in formal, non-formal and informal contexts. When it comes to immigration policy developments on a European level, the principal focus is on fostering social cohesion through incorporating migrant students.<sup>133</sup> Though concepts such as inclusive education, intercultural dialogue, citizenship education, anti-discrimination and fundamental values are incorporated in the documents, there is a clear emphasis placed on responding to terrorism and security threats and that education be a tool to prevent violent radicalisation.

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<sup>132</sup> Berry and Taban, “A progressive step or half measure?”, 2022, p20

<sup>133</sup> Daniel Faas, Christina Hajisoteriou, and Panayiotis Angelides, “Intercultural Education in Europe: Policies, Practices and Trends”, *British Educational Research Journal* 40 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3080>. [European level; including the European Commission, European Council, Council of Ministers, Council of Europe]

## **Supporting the inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education: Considerations, key principles and practices for the school year 2022-2023** <sup>134</sup>

This section will discuss key elements in the Commissions “Supporting the inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education: Considerations, key principles and practices for the school year 2022-2023” in contrast to “The Action Plan Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027”

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, The European Commission published a working document entitled “Supporting the inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education: Considerations, key principles and practices for the school year 2022-2023” [Inclusion Ukraine] to help inform and provide resources for for EU Member States regarding the successful inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine.<sup>135</sup> Though the Commission claims that “Many of these measures build on the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion for 2021-27 , which includes a specific focus on education,”<sup>136</sup> the ‘Inclusion Ukraine’ is far more elaborated. Firstly, the disparities in the length and depth of the two documents is noteworthy. The ‘Action Plan’ is composed of 24 pages with the section focusing on Education and Training covering solely three pages. Some relevant information can be found throughout the document (in the introduction and conclusion) which includes more overarching comments on EU integration and inclusion, as well as some background information, key facts, figures, principles and values. In comparison, ‘Inclusion Ukraine’ is 51 pages long and the focus is on education and inclusion throughout. The document focuses on the following key areas; <sup>137</sup>

- 1) **provision of school places** for all displaced children, regardless of the length of intended stay;
- 2) **preparation of schools and teachers** to be able to meet the psychosocial, educational and linguistic needs of displaced children;
- 3) **targeted activities for displaced children** to encourage feelings of belonging, such as sport and cultural activities;
- 4) **engagement with displaced families and communities** and support for children to maintain their links with Ukraine;

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<sup>134</sup> European Commission, “Supporting the inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education: Considerations, key principles and practices for the school year 2022-2023”, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, SWD (2022) 185 final

<sup>135</sup> [written in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), representatives of ministries of education, stakeholder organisations, and experts from the Network working on the social dimension of education and training (NESET).]

<sup>136</sup> Inclusion Ukraine, p2

<sup>137</sup> “Supporting the Inclusion of Displaced Children from Ukraine in Education” European Website on Integration’, 12 June 2023, [https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/supporting-inclusion-displaced-children-ukraine-education\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/supporting-inclusion-displaced-children-ukraine-education_en).

- 5) **long-term measures** to promote inclusive education and prevent discrimination and segregation;
- 6) **measures for early childhood education and care**, such as waiving fees, extra training for staff and liaising with families.

The final part of the document also provides many examples of projects and practices that focus on supporting the inclusion of displaced children in education, which serve as inspiration and “provide practical tools, resources, and approaches which can be further adapted to local realities.”<sup>138</sup> The Commission considers that the immediate and urgent measures for including displaced children in schools will “lay the foundations”<sup>139</sup> but should ultimately inspire “lasting positive change and an inclusive and innovative school education for all”<sup>140</sup>.

First and foremost, access to quality education is presented as a way for displaced children and adolescents to “regain a sense of normality”<sup>141</sup>. Schools are meant to provide a “safe, nurturing, and welcoming environment” to enhance “displaced children’s sense of belonging in a community. Schools are experienced as zones of peace to mitigate the impact of trauma.”<sup>142</sup> Whilst the ‘Action Plan’ frames migrants as a potential threat the ‘Inclusion Ukraine’ document considers the traumatic experiences encountered by displaced children and focuses on the provision of additional support and strategies to ensure their safety and needs. For this, the Commission endorses the three dimensions outlined in the OECD Report on refugee education integration models (2019)<sup>143</sup> in which quality education not only focuses on academic outcomes but also promotes social and emotional wellbeing of displaced learners.

**Figure: Holistic model for the educational integration of migrant and refugee children**<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Inclusion Ukraine, p29

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, p23


<sup>140</sup> Ibid, p3

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, p1

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, p16

<sup>143</sup> Lucie Cerna, “Refugee education: Integration models and practices in OECD countries”, OECD Education Working Papers, No 203, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/a3251a00-en>

<sup>144</sup> Inclusion Ukrain, 2022, p5



*Resource: OECD*

From the diagram, and throughout the document, one can observe a more holistic model for integration in education which considers the ‘whole’ child with its diverse needs as well as a whole-school and outreach approach.

The Commission recognises “All Member States face the challenge to adjust their education systems to enable all displaced children and adolescents from Ukraine to be included in the host-country schools, while also enabling them to maintain a link to Ukraine.”<sup>145</sup> “Maintaining a link to Ukraine” is mentioned on multiple occasions throughout the document. “While the priority is the inclusion of children in the schools of the host country as quickly and smoothly as feasible, it is also necessary to run activities that enable children to keep in touch with their home, the Ukrainian culture and language.”<sup>146</sup> The principle argument is that this approach will “help prepare children for all possible future developments – to return to Ukraine after a temporary period at an EU school, or to develop long-term plans to stay in the EU, if needed.”<sup>147</sup> The ‘Action Plan’, on the other hand, does not mention the protection or preservation of immigrants' own cultural or linguistic identity, the ‘Ukraine Inclusion’ puts this premise to the fore. Inclusive pedagogical policies and approaches should “consider the cultural and social identities of displaced children as assets rather than as deficits or limitations.”<sup>148</sup> Furthermore, encouraging a multicultural and multilingual approach allows students to “rebuild their self-identity in a positive way, as their own language(s) and culture(s) are

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, p5

<sup>146</sup> Ibid, p2

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, p6

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, p24

valued alongside those of the host country.”<sup>149</sup> This approach can also “reinforce a sense of belonging and bonding and bridge the gap between home and school, in addition to improving academic achievement.”<sup>150</sup> Ensuring communication, cooperation and collaboration with families, caregivers, and communities of displaced children is also encouraged for effective inclusion in schools, to address the needs of children and to boost their academic and wellbeing outcomes, but it also enables displaced children to maintain a link with Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education is considered a key player in providing support, resources and Ukrainian learning materials. Therefore, integration follows the three-way-process, in which the immigrant, host society, and country of origin play a role. Ukrainians have the option to continue full-time remote learning, following the Ukrainian curriculum. However, this has been discouraged for the sake of students' well-being, observing the impact of the Covid19 pandemic, online lessons cannot replace face-to-face learning, especially in terms of social contact and interactions with the host country.<sup>151</sup>

The Commission suggests introducing competency assessments to provide differentiated learning for displaced learners who “may have acquired an uneven pattern of linguistic and other skills in different languages.”<sup>152</sup> Setting up temporary reception classes should be seen as a tool to “actively prepare displaced children to enter mainstream education as soon as possible.”<sup>153</sup> This is to prevent parallel education systems “which can be detrimental to the social and linguistic inclusion of displaced children and their future educational success.”<sup>154</sup> Parallel systems are difficult to sustain over an extended period of time, can lead to tensions and discrimination with native communities, and are often lower quality or uncertified. In contrast, a non-segregated model “makes it easier for children to interact with their peers”<sup>155</sup> effectively endorsing the intercultural approach whereby “the importance of play, free time and socialisation with other children must be acknowledged at all educational levels.”<sup>156</sup> Finally, there is an encouragement to facilitate learning experiences outside the classroom, in non-formal and informal context, “to enrich experience and personalise learning as appropriate to the age, abilities and

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid, p24

<sup>150</sup> Ibid, p21

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, p9

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p15

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, p8

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, p6

<sup>155</sup> Ibid, p6

<sup>156</sup> Ibid, p15

circumstances of the learner.”<sup>157</sup> Non-formal learning (such as extra-curricular, sport and cultural activities), can also be beneficial for wider social inclusion as it helps build bridges with the wider community and civil society partners.<sup>158</sup>

Non-formal settings offer opportunities for displaced learners to interact with their host country peers and develop friendships, facilitate language learning, express and cope with emotions in a non-stressful way. They benefit both displaced and host-country children and young people and help them understand each other’s culture and experience.<sup>159</sup>

In sum, the need for displaced children to interact with their native peers is frequently mentioned throughout the document, which essentially presents the intercultural approach.

Both documents stress that children and adolescents must be included in education to prevent them from leaving education and training early. Both documents pay specific attention to measures for early childhood education and care (ECEC) for successful integration, particularly in the case of children and parents who have experienced war and trauma.<sup>160</sup> It is argued that it would be highly advantageous to include children in education as early as possible to mitigate potential risk factors such as “Poverty, physical and emotional stress, trauma and lacking language skills” which “can hinder their future educational prospects and successful integration into a new society.”<sup>161</sup> Whilst the ‘Action Plan’ states the importance of making education more accessible, the ‘Ukraine Inclusion’ identifies and encourages removing the barriers to accessing education including financial, legal, administrative and practical barriers.<sup>162</sup> Further barriers include “a preference to keep the children in the Ukrainian education system, lack of knowledge about or trust in the local education system, and concerns about how integrating the host-country education system may affect a family’s possibility to return soon to Ukraine.”<sup>163</sup> In order to reduce these issues, Member states are expected to provide clear, accessible, trustworthy and reliable information and practical guidance to support children in

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<sup>157</sup> Council of the European Union “Council Recommendation of 29 November 2021 on blended learning approaches for high-quality and inclusive primary and secondary education” (2021/C 504/03) accessed 12 March 2023, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021H1214%2>

<sup>158</sup> Inclusion Ukraine, 2022, p15

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, p20

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, p25

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, p25

<sup>162</sup> Ibid, p7

<sup>163</sup> Ibid, p21



different age groups about the host-country education system and accessing their rights (in Ukrainian and Russian).<sup>164</sup>

The sections discussing educational practitioners are fairly similar in both documents. However, ‘Ukraine Inclusion’ elaborates on the need to ensure that teaching staff are equipped with necessary skills, teaching and learning methods for newly arrived displaced children and adolescents. Training courses should be provided to ensure teachers have the competencies and resources to support the psycho-social and emotional wellbeing of displaced children, to be able to teach in multilingual and multicultural settings; ensure safety by managing conflicts, preventing bullying and discrimination, and promoting intercultural learning environments.<sup>165</sup> There is also the encouragement to recruit additional staff for extra support, and even mobilise or fast-track displaced Ukrainian educational professionals.<sup>166</sup>

When we consider the suggestions Berry and Taban made in the previous chapter, for improving the approaches to immigrant integration, one can see that the EU has moved away from integration as a principle “rooted in security concerns”.<sup>167</sup> The document recognises “migrants’ diverse needs and aspirations, including their right to preserve their cultural identity” and has also sought “to remove barriers to successful integration, including intolerance and exclusionary national identities.”<sup>168</sup> In sum, one can view the progress on EU level as one that fosters more consideration towards the diverse needs of displaced children.

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid, p27

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, p9

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, p10

<sup>167</sup> Berry and Taban, “A progressive step or half measure?”, 2022, p20

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<b>Supporting the inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in education: Considerations, key principles and practices for the school year 2022-2023</b>	
<b>Problem</b>	Millions of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine arriving in the EU
<b>Need</b>	Support the needs of children and youth who have suffered the trauma of war and displacement; Including quick access to education and training
<b>Call to action</b>	Activities promoting inclusion (regardless of intended stay) to help displaced children “regain a sense of normality” and prevent early school leaving. Provide appropriate support (academic, social, and emotional needs). Allow displaced children and youth to keep in touch with their home language and culture.
<b>Desired outcome</b>	Prepare children and young people from Ukraine for all possible future developments. (return or permanent residence)

*Resource : Inclusion Ukraine 2022-2023*

## **Chapter 2) Poland and Germany: Contextualisation**

This section serves as a contextualisation of the chosen case studies; Poland and Germany. It includes a brief outline of their migration history and critically discusses the political and public narratives and responses to immigrant integration. This will be broken down into three time frames; Post-WW2; 2015-16 Migration Crisis in Europe; 2022 Refugees from Ukraine.

### **Post-WW2**

#### **Poland**

Migration in Poland has significantly transformed over the past three decades. Following the Second World War, unlike Western European countries, the 'Eastern Bloc' lived in relative isolation with strict barriers to the in-and-out flow of migrants. The lack of immigration prevented social and demographic changes, which made it one of the most homogenous regions in Europe.<sup>169</sup> The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 alleviated restrictions on movement, opening Poland to international migration flow, in accordance with EU and international regulations.<sup>170</sup> Despite the signing of bi-lateral agreements, "Socialist brotherhood ties", and permission of visa-free movement, Poland's immigration was still very low.<sup>171</sup> In the 1990s, less than 1% of the total population was "foreign", meaning that Polish society remained largely homogenous in terms of ethnicity and religion.<sup>172</sup> This was a paradoxical situation as Poland was establishing migrant policies in line with EU standards without actual immigrants settling in Poland.<sup>173</sup> 2000's European Social Survey (ESS) data suggests that Poles held some of the most positive attitudes in Europe towards immigration.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Stefan Lehne, "Europe's East-West Divide: Myth Or Reality?" (Carnegie Europe, 2019) <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/04/11/europe-s-east-west-divide-myth-or-reality-pub-78847>.

<sup>170</sup> [UN 1951 Refugee Convention, Visa-Free Schengen Zone Agreement and the 1997 Act on Aliens; The law sets out regulations and procedures for entry, stay, residence and expulsion of non-Polish nationals in Poland but also affirmed the freedom to leave the country which had not been the case under communism]

<sup>171</sup> [Requirements for Ukraine, Belarus and Russia: Agreement between Poland and the USSR of 13.12.1979 (in force since 22.03.1980) See also: Anna Kicingier, "Between Polish interests and the EU influence: Polish migration policy developments 1989-2004", CEFMR Working Paper 9, Warsaw, 2005]

<sup>172</sup> Karen Hargrave, with Kseniya Homel and Lenka Dražanová, *Public Narratives and Attitudes towards Refugees and Other Migrants: Poland Country Profile* (London: ODI, 2022), p2.

<sup>173</sup> Marek Okólski and Dominik Wach, "Immigration and Integration Policies in the Absence of Immigrants: A Case Study of Poland," in *Relations between Immigration and Integration Policies in Europe: Challenges, Opportunities and Perspectives in Selected EU Member States*, edited by Maciej Duszczyk, Marta Pachocka, and Dominika Pszczółkowska (London: Routledge, 2020), p156 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429263736>.

<sup>174</sup> Dominika Pszczółkowska, "Poland: What Does It Take for a Public Opinion Coup to Be Reversed?", *International Migration* 60, no. 4 (2022): 221–25, <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13041>.

In the period 2004-16, following the EU accession, Poland, like other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, saw net emigration flow towards other EU countries. Free movement in the Schengen Area and access to labour markets resulted in the massive outflow of millions of young, skilled Polish citizens, leaving to seek employment mainly in Germany and the UK. Poland was also a transit country, and a step towards the more affluent Western-European countries. For this reason, security and border management were prioritised over immigrant integration policies. The main political concern was the demographic shifts of this so-called “brain drain” combined with low fertility rates and an ageing population. Policy makers were foremost occupied with how to attract workers to fill gaps in the Polish labour market, rather than Polish emigration or controlling irregular foreigners from entering the country.”<sup>175</sup>

The first seasonal migration scheme was launched in 2007 to respond to the growing labour shortages. The citizens of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine became eligible for entry and employment in Poland without applying for a work permit.<sup>176</sup> Following Russia's annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas region in 2014, Poland already saw an increase of Ukrainians arriving. However, despite fleeing armed conflict, the majority arrived through temporary labour migration pathways rather than opting for international protection.<sup>177</sup>

## **Germany**

Germany is a country with a long history of immigration but has denied it for a long time.<sup>178</sup> Until the late 1950s, overseas emigration exceeded immigration.<sup>179</sup> Germany experienced high growth in migrant populations during the so-called “economic miracle” (*Wirtschaftswunder*) during the post-World War 2 reconstruction and development period. This was through the signing of the first bilateral labour recruitment agreements from Southern Europe and the Mediterranean for so-called “guest workers”

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<sup>175</sup> Okólski and Wach, “policies in the absence of immigrants”, 2020, p154.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid, p151. [Later Moldova (from 2009), Georgia (from 2010) and Armenia (from 2014)]

<sup>177</sup> Witold Klaus, “Between Closing Borders to Refugees and Welcoming Ukrainian Workers: Polish Migration Law at the Crossroads,” in *Europe and the Refugee Response*, edited by Elżbieta M. Goździak, Izabella Main, and Brigitte Suter (Routledge, 2020).

<sup>178</sup> Franzke Jochen, “Germany: From Denied Immigration to Integration of Migrants”, in: Jochen Franzke, José M. Ruano de la Fuente, *Local Integration of Migrants Policy: European Experiences and Challenges*, 2021, pp.107–21, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_7).

<sup>179</sup> Ibid, p107,

(*Gastarbeiter*), to temporarily fill labour shortages.<sup>180</sup> This continued until 1973 when the government decided to stop recruiting work from outside the European Economic Community (*Anwerbestopp*).<sup>181</sup> The intention of the 1960s and 1970s labour mobility was that the workers would only stay in Germany for a limited time and then return to their home countries. Since their residence status was temporary, integration efforts were not considered important. West Germany became a de facto immigration country when the labour migrants settled permanently and saw a large-scale increase in family reunifications. This led to the 1978 establishment of the Commissioner for integration of foreign workers and their family members.

Germany also saw a rise in immigration after the fall of the Iron Curtain and 1990s reunification, with the subsequent return of many ethnic Germans who had been expelled during the war, so-called “late-re-settlers” (*Spätaussiedler*), from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Under article 116 of the Basic law ethnic Germans were granted automatic citizenship by virtue of their descent (*Ius sanguinis*).<sup>182</sup> The 1993 civil wars in Yugoslavia also contributed to Germany's immigration quotas. It was not until the turn of the millennium that the German federal governments changed their official paradigm “Germany is no immigration country” to declaring itself a “a nation of immigration”.<sup>183</sup> This marked a political recognition to accept that “foreigners” from diverse backgrounds make up a significant proportion of society, reflecting Germany's multicultural profile.<sup>184</sup>

This changed approaches to immigrant integration, including the Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) which entered into force in 2005, proposing new policies and measures for foreigners who wish to reside in Germany. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) was established in 2005, a governing agency responsible for integration policies, including language courses and, since 2009, additional orientation classes which provide basic knowledge of German law and social and cultural norms.

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<sup>180</sup> [Recruitment agreements signed with: Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968).]

<sup>181</sup> Jochen, “Denied to Integration”, 2021, p110

<sup>182</sup> [Bundesvertriebenengesetz of 1953]

<sup>183</sup> [“*Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland*” to “*Migrationsgesellschaft*”]

<sup>184</sup> Jochen, ‘Denied to Integration,’ 2021, p107

Since 2006 the federal chancellery has been holding annual Integration Summits (*Integrationsgipfel*) involving multiple stakeholders (including media, trade unions, migrant associations...) declaring that the integration of immigrant populations is a “central task for all society.”<sup>185</sup> The German government also developed a series of National Integration Plans. The first National Integration Plan of 2007 had its focus on education, training, employment, and cultural integration, while the National Action Plan on Integration of 2012 strived to implement monitoring and evaluation methods to measure the implementation of integration policies.<sup>186</sup> The 2012 Recognition Act also permitted faster recognition of qualifications and skills of TCN.

### **2015-16 Migration Crisis**

The year 2015-16 marked a turning point, with the so-called “refugee crisis”. European countries saw a significant influx of refugees and migrants fleeing conflict and instability in North Africa and the Middle East, via Greece and the Balkan route. Under the Dublin Regulations, immigrants seeking asylum who enter the EU irregularly (without necessary documentation) must lodge their claim at the first EU country of entrance, which is then responsible for processing their claim.<sup>187</sup> The European Council triggered a relocation scheme as an ‘emergency response’ to redistribute 120,000 asylum seekers amongst the Member States to alleviate pressure from frontline countries (Italy and Greece). This proposal was highly divisive at EU level, and posed an institutional crisis between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States. Whilst most West European States agreed to “share the burden”, the majority of the Central European countries radically opposed the proposal.<sup>188</sup> Germany, under the former German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, encouraged more solidarity whereas Poland strongly opposed the relocation scheme.<sup>189</sup> The Polish Deputy

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<sup>185</sup> Joyce Marie Mushaben, “Angela Merkel’s Leadership in the Refugee Crisis” *Current History* 116, no. 788 (2017) p.95 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48614239>.

<sup>186</sup> European Commission, “Governance of Migrant Integration in Germany” European Website on Integration, 3 July 2023. [https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country-governance/governance-migrant-integration-germany\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/country-governance/governance-migrant-integration-germany_en).

<sup>187</sup> “Dublin Regulation III (EU) No 604/2013” (2013), <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/604/2013-06-29/eng>.

<sup>188</sup> European Council, “Special Meeting Of The European Council, 23 April 2015 - Statement”, (*Consilium.Europa.Eu*, 2015), accessed 4 April 2023 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement/>.

<sup>189</sup> CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre), *Polacy o uchodźcach w Internecie i w “realu” [Poles About Refugees on the Internet and in the “Real World”]: A Report on the Research Conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), November 2015, Warszawa: CBOS.*

Minister of Internal Affairs, announced “In our opinion the ideological approach, based on the vision of multicultural and broad migration absorption, is flawed.”<sup>190</sup>

Poland’s labelling of the “mismanagement” and poor handling of the migration crisis was directed towards the EU, particularly Brussels and Germany.<sup>191</sup> In return, Poland was presented as uncompromising and illiberal and the anti-immigrant stance was used to reinforce old stereotypes of the East being backwards compared to the supposedly superior West. Germany became internationally renowned for its pro-immigration policy, welcoming more than 1,2 million refugees and asylum-seekers mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland was neither a transit country, nor destination for asylum seekers.<sup>192</sup> Whilst Germany accepted the equivalent of 59% of the Syrian refugees, most other European countries hosted below 2%,<sup>193</sup> and Poland refused to relocate a single refugee from its allocated quota.<sup>194</sup> In 2020 the European Court of Justice ruled Poland had violated its obligations under EU law due to non-compliance with the relocation scheme.<sup>195</sup>

### **Germany: welcome culture**

In Germany, Merkel famously announced “we can do it!” promoting integration efforts into society, and driving the so-called German “welcome culture”, used to describe the large-scale civic activism and willingness of civil society to help support the arrival of refugees.<sup>196</sup> The concept of “welcome culture” gained prominence in public debate and was at the core of society, media, and political actors promoting a positive perception of

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<sup>190</sup> Hargrave et al. “Public Narratives: Poland”, 2022, p79-80

<sup>191</sup> Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti, “The Illiberal Turn Or Swerve In Central Europe?”, (*Politics And Governance*, 5 (4) 166-176, 2017) [doi:10.17645/pag.v5i4.1156](https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i4.1156)

<sup>192</sup> Maciej Duszczyk and Paweł Kaczmarczyk, “War and Migration: The Recent Influx from Ukraine into Poland and Possible Scenarios for the Future” *CMR Spotlight* 4 (39), 2022, p.3 <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Spotlight-APRIL-2022.pdf>.

<sup>193</sup> Gülru Gezer, “Europe: The Continent of Differing Values: Syria vs. Ukraine”, 5 July 2022, accessed 15 June 2023, <https://www.harmoon.org/en/reports/europe-the-continent-of-differing-values/>.

<sup>194</sup> European Commission, ‘European Agenda on Migration: Good Progress in Managing Migration Flows Needs to Be Sustained’, accessed 2022, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_17\\_3081](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3081).

<sup>195</sup> [Poland as well as Hungary were the only two Member States who entirely refused] EU Court of Justice “Judgement in Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17: Commission v. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,” Press release no. 40/20, Luxembourg (April 2, 2020), <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-04/cp200040en.pdf>; [InfoMigrants](https://www.info-migrants.org/).

<sup>196</sup> Kerrie Holloway et al., “Public Narratives and Attitudes towards Refugees and Other Migrants: Germany Country Profile”, ODI: Think change, 2021, p7 [“wir schaffen das!”, “Willkommenskultur”] <https://odi.org/en/publications/public-narratives-and-attitudes-towards-refugees-and-other-migrants-germany-country-profile/>.

immigrants.<sup>197</sup> In 2016, 69% of respondents said Germany should accept people seeking refuge, with only 8% rejecting this view.<sup>198</sup> Certain claim the first-hand experience of the National Socialism regime has enforced a moral responsibility to protect Germany against xenophobia, racial bigotry, religious intolerance, and nationalism. It is guilt which created a legacy of an open asylum law, making Germany one of the world's major asylum-granting countries. Catherine Perron discusses the way in which Germany's collective memory of family members and relatives who were refugees themselves, who also experienced being homeless (Heimatlos), uprooted, displaced and expelled during and after WWII was used to frame and legitimise Germany's response during the 2015-2016 refugee crisis.<sup>199</sup> The “we will manage” was used to recall “we have already managed” which normalised the challenges of admitting refugees and encouraged the capacity to do so, and also framed welcoming refugees as a moral obligation.

### **Poland: radical opposition**

In Poland, the “refugee crisis” set the stage for radical anti-immigrant rhetoric that was largely present in the political agenda.<sup>200</sup> The right-wing Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [PiS]) effectively campaigned an “us” versus “them” narrative in the 2015 parliamentary election.<sup>201</sup> They presented themselves as enforcers of the will of the people, relied on calls for security and freedom to choose who to welcome, in opposition to “them” composed of threatening refugee “Others” and European elites. For many Poles, the EU became increasingly associated with a lack of control over external borders and imposition of rules infringing national sovereignty.<sup>202</sup> For example, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of PiS, claimed that Poland would be “forced to resettle more than 100,000 Muslims” and warned against “Muslim migrants who would seek to impose Sharia religious laws on Europe and who use churches as ‘toilets’”.<sup>203</sup> The Polish Defence

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<sup>197</sup> Holloway et al., “Narratives Germany”, 2021, p10

<sup>198</sup> Marc Helbling, Alexandra Schoen, Armgard Zindler. et al, Attitudes towards national identity, immigration, and refugees in Germany, London: More in Common (2017)  
[www.moreincommon.com/media/r4dd05ba/more-in-common-germany-report-english.pdf](http://www.moreincommon.com/media/r4dd05ba/more-in-common-germany-report-english.pdf)

<sup>199</sup> Catherine Perron, “Reimagining German Identity through the Politics of History: Changing Interpretations of German Past Migrations during the “Refugee Crisis”, 2015/2016”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47, no. 18 (14 December 2021): 4172–88,  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1812276>.

<sup>200</sup> Natalia Krzyżanowska, Michał Krzyżanowski, ““Crisis” and migration in Poland: discursive shifts, anti-pluralism and the politicisation of exclusion’ *Sociology* 52(3): 612–618  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038518757952>.

<sup>201</sup> Hargrave et al. “Narratives Poland”, 2022, p37

<sup>202</sup> Pszczołkowska, “Poland: public opinion reversed?”, 2022.

<sup>203</sup> Jan Cienski ‘Migrants Carry “Parasites and Protozoa,” Warns Polish Opposition Leader’, POLITICO, 14 October 2015, <https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-asylum-poland-kaczynski-election/>.



Minister Mariusz Blaszczak also claimed “The open-door policy led to terrorist attacks in Western Europe.”<sup>204</sup> Poland thus positioned itself as protecting “Christian Europe” from an “Islamic invasion”.<sup>205</sup> Catholic religion is an integral part of the Polish national identity<sup>206</sup> and rejecting (Muslim) refugees was linked to protecting the “Polish way of life” concerning cultural and religious differences and to national security.<sup>207</sup> It is not surprising that a large percentage of Polish society held negative attitudes towards cultural and ethnic “Others”, with 80% opposing immigration from non-EU countries and around 73% of Poles viewing refugees from Iraq and Syria as a major threat, increasing the likelihood of violence, crime and terrorism in Poland.

### **Germany: Not all open arms**

Not everyone welcomed refugees in Germany. Many question the legitimacy of those seeking protection, and portray refugees as “illegal immigrants” or “economic migrants”. The negative media reports following the around 500 sexual assaults on women and thefts in Cologne, Hamburg and other cities across Germany were ascribed to “North African-looking men”, often labelled “Muslim.”<sup>208</sup> Fears also grew following the terrorist attacks in Berlin 2016.<sup>209</sup> This led to an increase of anti-immigrant marches and more hostile, violent reactions towards foreigners, like activities organised by the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA), who call for a total ban on Muslim immigrants. There was a rise in both physical and verbal abuse towards refugees, with a total of 2,035 attacks recorded targeting asylum shelters and centres, allegedly

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<sup>204</sup> Magdalena Gwozdz-Palokat, ‘In U-Turn on Migrant Policy, Poland rolls out welcome mat for Ukrainians’ 04.03.2022, DW.com, 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/in-u-turn-on-migrant-policy-poland-rolls-out-welcome-mat-for-ukrainians/a-61019601>.

<sup>205</sup> Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk, “From politics of fear to securitisation policies? Poland in the face of migration crisis,” in *Phantom Menace: The Politics and Policies of Migration in Central Europe*, edited by Jacek Kucharczyk and Grigorij Meseznikov, 185-202. Heinrich Boll Stiftung Prague. Institute for Public Affairs, 2018, p197

<sup>206</sup> Brian Porter, “The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History.” *The Slavic and East European Journal* 45, no. 2 (2001): 289–99. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3086330>.

<sup>207</sup> Susanne Fengler and Marcus Kreutler, “Migration Coverage in Europe’s Media: A Comparative Analysis of Coverage in 17 Countries”, European Website on Integration’, (2020) accessed 8 June 2023. P194. [https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/migration-coverage-europes-media-comparative-analysis-coverage-17-countries\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/migration-coverage-europes-media-comparative-analysis-coverage-17-countries_en).

<sup>208</sup> Arun Frey, “Getting under the Skin: The Impact of Terrorist Attacks on Native and Immigrant Sentiment”, *Social Forces* 101, no. 2 (1 December 2022): 943–73, <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soab135>.

<sup>209</sup> Iris Wigger, Alexander Yendell, and David Herbert, “The End of ‘Welcome Culture’? How the Cologne Assaults Reframed Germany’s Immigration Discourse”, *European Journal of Communication* 37, no. 1 (1 February 2022): 21–47, <https://doi.org/10.1177/026732312111012173>.

perpetrated by right wing extremists.<sup>210</sup> The radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD) gained increasing support, and won 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 federal election making it the third biggest party in the Bundestag.<sup>211</sup> The party is known for its national-conservative, anti-immigrant, islamophobic discourse rallying slogans like “Islam does not belong in Germany”<sup>212</sup> justifying immigrant restrictions due to their incompatibility with the Basic Law (liberal-democratic constitution) and danger to the state, society and value system. This put pressure on the government to tighten immigration laws, increase deportation, and enforce greater protection and monitoring at the borders.<sup>213</sup> Chancellor Merkel vowed that “a situation like the one in late summer 2015 cannot, should not, and must not be repeated”, accepting the perception that the situation was out of control.

### **Germany: skilled workers**

Despite some negative media coverage, Germany did report the successful integration of refugees into its labour market.<sup>214</sup> Around 35% of the asylum-seekers who came to Germany in 2015 had been employed by 2018.<sup>215</sup> The majority over two thirds are paying social security contributions.<sup>216</sup> This was thanks to the Act on the Acceleration of Asylum Procedures (2015) which sought to make the use of the skills of refugees and other migrants to fill labour gaps. More than 50% of refugees in Germany were working in skilled jobs, despite the fact that only 20% of the refugee population have the required qualifications.<sup>217</sup> Most refugees are stuck in low-paid jobs in precarious situations as around 17% of refugees in integration courses are illiterate.<sup>218</sup> The 2016 Meseberg Declaration on Integration introduced the concept of “support and demand” (*Fördern und*

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<sup>210</sup> Thomas Wieder “Attacks against Asylum Seekers on the Rise Again in Germany”, *Le Monde.Fr*, 16 November 2022, [https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/16/attacks-against-asylum-seekers-on-the-rise-again-in-germany\\_6004524\\_4.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/16/attacks-against-asylum-seekers-on-the-rise-again-in-germany_6004524_4.html).

<sup>211</sup> [Support for the AfD has diminished, in 2021 elections they were the 5th largest party in the Bundestag]

<sup>212</sup> [„Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland.“]

<sup>213</sup> Thomas Escritt and Matthieu Protard, “France, Germany Push for Tighter EU Borders after Attacks”, *Reuters*, 10 November 2020, sec. Internet News, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-security-idUSKBN27Q24R>.

<sup>214</sup> Volker Witting, Lisa Hänel, ‘Germans Less Sceptical of Immigration’, *DW.de* (02/16/2022) accessed 5 July 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/germans-less-skeptical-of-immigration/a-60801783>.

<sup>215</sup> Kate Ferguson, ‘Can Germany Age Gracefully?’, *DW.com*, 2019, accessed 7 July 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/german-economy-not-aging-gracefully/a-47499524>.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>217</sup> Siobhan Dowling, “Germany welcomed refugees. Now it’s reaping the economic benefits”, *Al Jazeera*, 2019, accessed 7 July 2023, [www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/germany-welcomed-refugees-reaping-economicbenefits-190617194147334.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/germany-welcomed-refugees-reaping-economicbenefits-190617194147334.html)

<sup>218</sup> “Germany Looks to Southern Europe for Labor”, *DW.com* (02.01.2020) Accessed 26 June 2023. <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-bamf-looks-to-southern-europe-for-skilled-labor/a-52225546>.

*Fordern*), the first integration legislation at a federal level which sought to support training and job opportunities, but also expecting duties in return. Furthermore, in order to receive a residence permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis), refugees and immigrants must prove integration progress (for example language skills and employment).

Skilled labour shortage (Fachkräftemangel) has been a key concern for advancing immigration. Germany's ageing population and low birth rates represent a major challenge, with estimations that 1 in 3 Germans will be over 65 by 2060.<sup>219</sup> The Federal Labor Office has estimated that Germany needs as many as 400,000 immigrant workers a year to relieve labour shortages. Reforms such as the Highly Skilled Immigration Act<sup>220</sup> (*Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz*) from 2020 made it easier for highly qualified non-EU workers to be employed by accelerating recruitment procedures and expanded the definition of "skilled worker" to include persons with vocational training qualifications. However, the Government's intentions were clear, as announced by the Minister of the Interior; "We do not want immigration into the social security system, but into employment; that is our goal. Furthermore, we will thus be able to push back illegal migration."<sup>221</sup>

### **Poland: skilled workers**

Poland also saw growing numbers of foreign migrant workers in the period of 2014-2017, usually for short-term and seasonal labour. In 2017, Poland issued the largest number of residence permits to citizens of non-EU countries, most from post-Soviet countries, making it the largest migrant-worker receiving economies in the EU.<sup>222</sup> In the period of 2018-2021, Ukrainians immigrants gained a majority of entries into the Polish labour market (declarations 88%, work permits 71%, seasonal work permits 98%).<sup>223</sup> However, most of the residency permits are issued to immigrants for less than one year, when in fact, according to the EU definition, an immigrant is a person arriving in a country for

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<sup>219</sup> Ferguson, "Can Germany Age Gracefully?", 2019.

<sup>220</sup> BAMF, 'Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz', Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, accessed 7 July 2023, <https://www.BAMF.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2021/210301-am-fachkraefteeinwanderungsgesetz.html?nn=282772>.

<sup>221</sup> Bundesregierung, "Mehr Fachkräfte für Deutschland", 1 March 2020. Accessed; 18 May 2023 <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/archiv/fachkraefteeinwanderungsgesetz-1563122>.

<sup>222</sup> Okólski and Wach, "policies in the absence of immigrants", 2020, [See also: Eurostat 2018]

<sup>223</sup> Maciej Duszczyk and Paweł Kaczmarek, "War and Migration: The Recent Influx from Ukraine into Poland and Possible Scenarios for the Future." CMR Spotlight 4 (39), (2022), p. 3-4 <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Spotlight-APRIL-2022.pdf>.

residence of longer than one year.<sup>224</sup> For European standards, this form of migration is characterised as circular mobility, in which many people go and come back in a constant flow. Poland therefore did not develop any strategies to integrate these migrants.

### **Germany: a change of strategy**

Germany on the other hand, developed and introduced a strategic change of approach. The 2018 “Masterplan Migration” sought to introduce more restrictive policies, especially a more rigid EU external border regime to control and limit immigration. Concerning integration, the Master Plan laid the obligation to participate in language and orientation courses which focus on Germany's political system, culture and society. With the argument “Successful integration is a prerequisite for social cohesion. From all immigrants, we expect identification with our country and recognition of our values and way of life.”<sup>225</sup> Non-attendance of non-EU immigrants is even sanctioned. Chemin and Nagel suggest “While the Asylum Packages and the [2016] Integration Act have mainly focused on structural integration through labour market inclusion, the Masterplan Migration has emphasised sociocultural aspects, such as identification and acculturation.”<sup>226</sup> As such, the more recent integration policies encourage assimilation, presenting a narrative in which immigrants are primarily responsible for their integration success.<sup>227</sup>

The ‘New Integration Plan 2020’, with the subtitle “Enabling immigrants to participate equally” established a “roadmap” to improve the integration of immigrants into society, education system and job market for the coming decade.<sup>228</sup> A key focus is also on tackling discrimination to promote a safe and inclusive environment. Merkel introduced the plan at her final integration summit in 2020 before her chancellorship came to an end, with the

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<sup>224</sup> Okólski and Wach, “policies in the absence of immigrants”, 2020.

<sup>225</sup> BMI, ‘Masterplan Migration: Maßnahmen zur Ordnung, Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung’, Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, 2018, p19 [Masterplan Migration \(bund.de\)](https://www.bund.de/Content/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2018/07/18_07_19_masterplan_migration_bund.de.html) [In June 2023, the Bundestag also passed a new immigration law, which simplified the legal regulations and lowered the threshold of labour migration, to encourage more people from third countries to work in Germany.]

<sup>226</sup> Respond Horizon 2020, “Integration Policies, Practices and Experiences – Germany Country Report”, *Respond Working Paper Series*, 1 January 2020, p16 [https://www.academia.edu/43243737/Integration\\_Policies\\_Practices\\_and\\_Experiences\\_Germany\\_Country\\_Report](https://www.academia.edu/43243737/Integration_Policies_Practices_and_Experiences_Germany_Country_Report).

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> Bundesregierung, “Nationaler Aktionsplan Stärkt Die Integration”, Website of the Federal Government, Bundesregierung, 29 July 2020, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/archive/aktionsplan-integration-1772728>.

encouragement “Real social cohesion takes more than just the absence of hate and violence. It requires tolerance and openness for one another.”<sup>229</sup> The plan represents the first nationwide strategy which includes 100 measures for integration addressing 5 key phases, from pre-migration guidance in migrants' countries of origin to full integration and active participation in German society.

1. Phase I – Before migration: "Managing expectations – providing guidance"
2. Phase II – Initial integration: "Facilitating arrival – communicating values"
3. Phase III - Integration: "Enabling participation – encouraging and requiring active involvement"
4. Phase IV – Growing together: "Managing diversity – ensuring unity "
5. Phase V - Cohesion: "Strengthening cohesion – shaping the future "

The plan therefore covers the entire integration process in a comprehensive and systematic way. It was designed as a process involving the whole society, which strives to improve cooperation between the German government, the states, local authorities, non-governmental actors, civil, society and migrants' organisations.

### **Poland:- Belarusian border crisis**

Polish authorities took another anti-immigrant stance in 2021, in response to the migrants arriving at the Poland Belarusian border, mainly from the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Yemen) and Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo). Poland announced a “State of Emergency”, in response to the “state-sponsored humanitarian crisis” orchestrated by the Belarusian regime in Minsk, who were accused of instrumentalising human beings (by facilitating visas) and pushing them towards Europe's borders.<sup>230</sup> Even the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen announced “this is a hybrid attack to destabilise Europe.”<sup>231</sup> The Polish government framed those trying to cross the border as a threat to the country's security, but also to the EU's external border and passed an amendment to the Act on Foreigners which allowed the immediate removal of any

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<sup>229</sup> Kathleen Schuster, “Germany Rolls out Integration Plan for 2020s”, dw.com, accessed 29 June 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-maps-the-road-to-integration-in-100-steps/a-56814627>

<sup>230</sup> Anna Iasmi Vallianatou, “The Poland-Belarus Border Crisis Is What Happens When Humans Are Treated as Weapons”, *The Guardian*, 16 November 2021, accessed 12 May 2023 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/16/poland-belarus-border-crisis-eu-refugees>.

<sup>231</sup> European Commission, “State of the Union Address by President von Der Leyen”, Text, European Commission - European Commission, 2022, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH\\_21\\_4701](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_4701).

individual crossing irregularly into Poland, without the ability to claim asylum.<sup>232</sup> The majority of Poles were in favour of the government's response at the border with two-thirds supporting the plans to build a wall.<sup>233</sup>

On the one hand Poland's highly restrictive, militarised response, to tighten security and erect razor-wire fences along large parts of the border with Belarus, was largely met with approval from other EU Member States, who wanted to stop another wave of migration.<sup>234</sup> On the other hand, the deployment of illegal, increasingly violent “pushback” practices and arbitrary detention at the so-called three-kilometre-long “closed zone” completely restricted access to all, including the media, activists, organisations and people assisting them at the border, effectively criminalising humanitarian aid and framing them as traitors, whilst the military and security officials were framed as heroic protectors.<sup>235</sup> The neglect of basic rights of individuals abandoned in the dense forest region between the two borders, was highly criticised for violating humanitarian law, breaching the principle of non-refoulement of the Geneva Conventions and preventing and restricting the right to claim asylum.<sup>236</sup>

### **Germany: full integration?**

Despite being one of the highest immigrant-receiving countries, Germany's integration regulations remain one of the most restrictive in the EU. Naturalisation, the process for a first-generation migrant to gain German citizenship, requires living in Germany for at least eight years, having adequate German-language skills (B1 level), secure income to meet living expenses, no criminal records, passing a citizenship test with 33 questions on Germany's customs, society and law (costs €255), and declaring loyalty to the German

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<sup>232</sup> GovPl, “Changes in the Act on Foreigners - Office for Foreigners - Gov.Pl Website”, Office for Foreigners, accessed 19 June 2023, <https://www.gov.pl/web/udsc-en/changes-in-the-act-on-foreigners>.

<sup>233</sup> CBOS, “Polish public opinion 7-8/2022”, Warsaw: CBOS (2022) [www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public\\_opinion/2022/07\\_08\\_2022.pdf](http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2022/07_08_2022.pdf)

<sup>234</sup> Amnesty International, “Poland: cruelty not compassion at Poland’s other borders”. Amnesty International Public Statement, 2022, [www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur37/5460/2022/en](http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur37/5460/2022/en) OR Amnesty International, “Poland: state of emergency risks worsening already dire situation for 32 asylum-seekers at border”. 2021 [www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/poland-state-of-emergency-risks-worsening-already-dire-situation-for-32-asylum-seekers-atborder](http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/poland-state-of-emergency-risks-worsening-already-dire-situation-for-32-asylum-seekers-atborder).

<sup>235</sup> Government of Poland, ‘Wystąpienie podczas obchodów Święta Wojska Polskiego’. 2022, [www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/wystapienie-podczas-obchodow-swiet-wojska-polskiego,57649](http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/wystapienie-podczas-obchodow-swiet-wojska-polskiego,57649).

<sup>236</sup> Vallianatou, “The Poland-Belarus Border Crisis”, 2021

constitution (Basic Law).<sup>237</sup> Comparably, in Poland naturalisation only requires 3 years of legal residence (or 2 for EU citizens). Official statistics suggest over 9 million foreign citizens have lived and worked in Germany long enough to apply for citizenship, but remain reluctant to do so, because of the strict regulations and bureaucratic procedures.<sup>238</sup> Since 2021, the government has discussed plans to simplify citizenship law to make naturalisation easier for non-EU citizens by reducing the required residence to 5 years, even 3, if the applicant shows special integration achievements such as educational or professional performance, voluntary civic engagement, and command of the German language.<sup>239</sup> There are also discussions of accepting prohibited double nationality of non-EU immigrants and emigrants. This would significantly impact Germany's immigrant minorities, especially the biggest single group of 1.34 million Turkish citizens, of whom only 10% have dual citizenship.<sup>240</sup> The wish to protect Germany's ethnic national identity, and fear that this will result in a massive increase of naturalisation applications, fear of conflicting loyalties and that immigrants should successfully integrate before becoming German nationals are the counter arguments to this proposal.<sup>241</sup>

### **Germany: more inclusive language**

Debates around the politically “correct” or right use of language to describe phenomena or different social groups is extremely revealing and powerful: negative rhetoric fosters hate towards the migrant “Other” compared to a more accepting narrative which promotes full integration and inclusion.<sup>242</sup> Since 2005, the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) has tracked so-called “people with an immigration background”, which includes people not born as German citizens, and German citizens with at least one non-ethnic German

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<sup>237</sup> [Law on Nationality - Federal Foreign Office (auswaertiges-amt.de)] Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, ‘Becoming a German Citizen by Naturalization’, accessed 5 July 2023, [https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/EN/topics/migration/staatsang/Erwerb\\_der\\_deutschen\\_Staatsbuergerschaft\\_durch\\_Eingbuengerung\\_en.html;jsessionid=B71671A1258A1A0BF7A7D6E93856DC27.1\\_cid322?nn=9386226](https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/EN/topics/migration/staatsang/Erwerb_der_deutschen_Staatsbuergerschaft_durch_Eingbuengerung_en.html;jsessionid=B71671A1258A1A0BF7A7D6E93856DC27.1_cid322?nn=9386226)].

<sup>238</sup> Ayhan Simsek, “Germany Pushes for Citizenship Reforms to Tackle Labor Crunch”, 16.06.2023, accessed 11 July 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/germany-pushes-for-citizenship-reforms-to-tackle-labor-crunch/2917488>.

<sup>239</sup> Elliot Douglas, ‘Post-Merkel Government to Ease Migration, Citizenship Rules – DW – 11/25/2021’, dw.com, accessed 5 July 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-post-merkel-government-set-to-ease-migration-citizenship-rules/a-59935900>.

<sup>240</sup> [there are around 1,3 million Turks living in Germany, See: Federal Statistical Office (DESTATIS), [https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/11/PE22\\_N069\\_12\\_13.html](https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/11/PE22_N069_12_13.html).]

<sup>241</sup> Ben Knight, ‘Germany and Immigration: Plans for Reform’, (11.29.2022) dw.com, accessed 5 July 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-and-immigration-plans-for-reform/a-63925044>.

<sup>242</sup> Inken Bartels et al., *Umkämpfte Begriffe der Migration: Ein Inventar* (transcript Verlag, 2023).

parent.<sup>243</sup> The term is often used to devalue or exclude people based on the characteristics such as skin colour, religion, and ethnic affiliation.<sup>244</sup> It has been criticised for being discriminatory as the label connotes that descendants of immigrants (second, third generation...) will never fully belong.<sup>245</sup> Recent academic and political discussions have considered that since Germany is a “country of immigration” with around 28.7%<sup>246</sup> of the population having the status of “migration background”, it would be worth changing the language, that they should “simply be German”.<sup>247</sup> Germany has also encouraged a shift in language from the label “Flüchtling” (refugee) to “ein Geflüchteter“ (a person who has fled). This subtle shift is significant as it recognises that this is above all a person with other attributes than his/her status of refugee. The same goes for the discussion on “Einwanderung/ Eingewanderte/ Immigrant” (immigration/immigrant) which has more negative connotations to someone who has come in, not necessarily needed, almost invasive, instead of “Zuwanderung/Zugewanderte“ with which the prefix “zu”, has more positive connotations, suggesting an additional element, someone who can contribute something to society. These subtle changes in the language reflect a shift in attitude. Germany’s aim to be a more just, fair, and inclusive society toward non-Germans is exemplary in striving towards social cohesion in multicultural societies.

## **2022 Refugees from Ukraine**

### **Poland's welcome culture**

In contrast to its policies towards other migrants, Poland has been commended for its generosity, hospitality, and solidarity for welcoming Ukrainian refugees following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022.<sup>248</sup> In the first ten months of the crisis, more than 8.8 million people crossed the border to Poland. As of June 2023,

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<sup>243</sup> Federal Statistical Office, ‘Migration und Integration’, Statistisches Bundesamt, accessed 29 June 2023, [https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/\\_inhalt.html](https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/_inhalt.html).

<sup>244</sup> Aladin El-Mafaalani, “Diskriminierung von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund”, in *Handbuch Diskriminierung*, ed. Albert Scherr, Aladin El-Mafaalani, and Gökçen Yüksel, Springer Reference Sozialwissenschaften (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2017), 465–78, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-10976-9\\_26](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-10976-9_26).

<sup>245</sup> Bartels et al., *Begriffe der Migration*, 2023

<sup>246</sup> [See: Federal Statistical Office]

<sup>247</sup> Peter Hille, “Germany Debates Immigration, Integration – DW – 01/21/2021”, dw.com, accessed 29 June 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/immigration-and-integration-germany-debates-terminology/a-56301275>.

<sup>248</sup> Jan Cienski, “Poland Goes from Zero to Hero in EU Thanks to Ukraine Effort”, POLITICO, (03.03.2022), Accessed, 15 January 2023, <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-goes-from-zero-to-hero-in-eu-thanks-to-ukraine-effort/>.



1,6 million Ukrainians registered for temporary protection in Poland, by far the highest figure in European countries.<sup>249</sup> Poland is a popular destination due to geographic and cultural proximity, as well as the presence of pre-war Ukrainian migrant networks; with the ability to join resident family friends and other contacts.<sup>250</sup> The pre-war Ukrainian migrant population residing in Poland was estimated at around 1.35 million.<sup>251</sup> Most were working-age, economically active men (95%) travelling between the two countries.<sup>252</sup> The two countries are therefore connected through well-developed transportation routes making mobility or hopes for return easier. Surveys suggest that Poles share overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards Ukrainians. “Ukrainian refugees have been met with a uniformly positive welcome across Polish public life, from all levels of government, the media and public figures to Polish society at large.”<sup>253</sup> In March 2022 well over nine in ten Poles (94%) supported accepting Ukrainian refugees. Although this figure has dropped in recent months it has remained at 83%.<sup>254</sup>

The initial response to the Ukrainian diaspora was very much bottom-up, led by civil society, volunteer-based, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) providing private transport, shelter and food<sup>255</sup>. International actors, such as the IOM, the UNHCR and the EU, also play(ed) a vital role in expanding the capacities of local authorities, in coordination, supporting activities and provisions in Poland for Ukrainians.<sup>256</sup> In line with the TPD, the Polish government established a national framework, passing the 12 March 2022 Law on assisting Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict.<sup>257</sup> Under this legislation, Ukrainian citizens and their families who came directly to Poland following the Russian aggression, have the right to declare their intended stay in Poland

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<sup>249</sup> UNHCR, “Ukraine refugee situation”, 2023

<sup>250</sup> MEDAM, “Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”, 2022, p.33

<sup>251</sup> [Based on CSO, ‘Statistics Poland’, accessed 16 June 2023, <https://stat.gov.pl/en/>.]

<sup>252</sup> Maciej Duszczyk and Paweł Kaczmarczyk, “War and Migration: The Recent Influx from Ukraine into Poland and Possible Scenarios for the Future.” CMR Spotlight 4 (39), (2022), p. 3-4 <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Spotlight-APRIL-2022.pdf>.

<sup>253</sup> Hargrave et al. “Public Narratives: Poland”, 2022, p32

<sup>254</sup> Ibid, p24

[See: CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 2022, [www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public\\_opinion/2022/11\\_2022.pdf](http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2022/11_2022.pdf)]

<sup>255</sup> Marta Jaroszewicz et al., “Russian Aggression on Ukraine and Forced Migrations: The Role of Poland in the First Days of the Crisis”, CMR Spotlight 3 (37), Special Issue, March. 2022 <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Spotlight-Wydanie-Specjalne-2022-ENG.pdf>.

<sup>256</sup> MEDAM, “Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”, 2022, p.37

<sup>257</sup> [Law of 12 March 2022 on assistance to citizens of Ukraine in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of that country (Journal of Laws No 583) (also referred to as the “Special Law”).]

and apply for (18 month) temporary residence. The Polish ID number (PESEL) grants Ukrainians full legal access to the Polish labour market, health care, education and welfare systems and cash benefits.<sup>258</sup> However, unlike other Member States, the Polish framework has de facto excluded non-Ukrainians fleeing the country from applying for the TPD; it does not include stateless persons or nationals from other non-EU countries who were legally residing in Ukraine before the war.<sup>259</sup>

### **Poland: Our Ukrainian brothers**

In comparison to other refugees, Ukrainians have been framed as “genuine” and deserving of support, part of “us” who have been standing against the Russian aggressor for centuries.<sup>260</sup> When analysing the discourse of Polish decision makers, the narrative of solidarity stems from shared experiences, including the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the struggle against communism.<sup>261</sup> Over the past decade the increasing presence of Ukrainians is accepted, as Ukrainians perceived as highly skilled and hardworking, and share a similar ethnicity, culture and religion, thus “able to assimilate and integrate.”<sup>262</sup> Though Religion plays an important role in both cultures, the majority of Poles are Roman Catholic, while Ukrainians have a diverse religious landscape, including Eastern Orthodoxy, Greek Catholic and Protestant denominations. Despite cultural and linguistic similarities, it would be wrong to overemphasise/oversimplify this. A survey conducted by the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM) identified that only 5% of respondents had a good command of the Polish language, with 50% having none at all.<sup>263</sup>

### **Germany: Ukraine, and the Others**

In 2022, over one million Ukrainians registered for TP in Germany, more than people seeking refuge in 2015-16 combined.<sup>264</sup> Germans have warmly welcomed them, with

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<sup>258</sup> MEDAM, “Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”, 2022, p38

<sup>259</sup> Ibid, p.28

<sup>260</sup> Hargrave et al. “Public Narratives: Poland”, 2022, p37

<sup>261</sup> Melchior Szczepanik, ‘Between a Romantic “Mission in the East” and Minimalism: Polish Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood’, *Perspectives* 19, no. 2 (2011): 45–66.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid, 165

<sup>263</sup> MEDAM, “Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”, 2022, p.35

<sup>264</sup> [It is not easy to estimate the actual number of refugees in Ukraine is hard to determine, since those leaving are not registered.]

Chancellor Olaf Scholz saying it will help Ukraine for “as long as it takes.”<sup>265</sup> However, already in April 2022, the Federal Minister of Interior advised refugees from Ukraine to avoid bigger cities as they had already reached their capacity, and encouraged that it would be easier to find accommodation and support services in medium and smaller cities.<sup>266</sup>

On top of refugees from Ukraine, Germany is still experiencing an increasing number of migrants from the Middle East and Africa. As in previous years, the main countries of origin are Syria, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq.<sup>267</sup> These refugees are spread among German states via the so-called “EASY” system, who, after an initial period in regional reception centres, migrants are distributed among municipalities across the country.<sup>268</sup> This is based on the Königstein formula, an algorithm that takes into account the federal state's tax revenue (accounting for 2/3 of the quota) and number of inhabitants ( $\frac{1}{3}$ ).<sup>269</sup> They are therefore not able to choose their location of residence. Initially, law imposed a maximum 3 month stay in ‘reception centres’, however, this has been extended to 6 months in 2015, and in 2019 German legislature, so-called Asylum Packages, extended the maximum period for another year.<sup>270</sup> As such, asylum seekers can spend up to 18 months in initial reception centres and long-term stays are a frequent occurrence. The ‘reception centres’ are predominantly located on the outskirts of bigger cities. Their remote location renders contact with society and native speakers difficult, which has been heavily criticised for promoting isolation, and hindering social and structural integration of refugees.<sup>271</sup> Furthermore, during the first 9 months of arrival (in reception centres)

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<sup>265</sup> Hannah Ward-Glenton, ‘Refugees Could Help Germany’s Labor Market, but Ukraine’s Skilled Workers Are Needed at Home’, CNBC, 24 February 2023, <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/24/ukrainian-refugees-could-help-germanys-labor-market-but-not-for-long-theyre-ready-to-go-home.html>.

<sup>266</sup> BAMF, ‘We Can and Will Help You!’, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, accessed 17 July 2023, <https://www.BAMF.de/SharedDocs/Videos/EN/AsylFluechtlingsschutz/nancy-feser-zu-ukraine-gefuechtete-en.html?nn=285460>.

<sup>267</sup> Destatis, ‘Über 3 Millionen Schutzsuchende zum Jahresende 2022 in Deutschland’, Statistisches Bundesamt, accessed 29 June 2023, [https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/03/PD23\\_125\\_125.html](https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/03/PD23_125_125.html).

<sup>268</sup> [“Erstverteilung der Asylbegehrenden,” “Ankunftscentren; AnKER”] Bib, “Refugees from Ukraine in Germany”, Federal Institute for Population Research: IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP Survey, accessed 7 July 2023, <https://www.bib.bund.de/EN/Research/Migration/Projects/Refugees-from-Ukraine-in-Germany.html>.

<sup>269</sup> ECRE, ‘Freedom of Movement’, *Asylum Information Database | European Council on Refugees and Exiles*, accessed 16 July 2023, <https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/reception-conditions/access-and-forms-reception-conditions/freedom-movement/>.

<sup>270</sup> ECRE, ‘Freedom of Movement’, *Asylum Information Database | European Council on Refugees and Exiles*, accessed 16 July 2023, <https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/reception-conditions/access-and-forms-reception-conditions/freedom-movement/>.

<sup>271</sup> Horizon 2020 Respond “Germany Country Report”, 2020, p14

refugees and asylum seekers are prohibited to work. In comparison almost three-quarters of refugees from Ukraine live in private apartments, of whom around 25% live with relatives or friends in Germany.<sup>272</sup> Germany's Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) claims the situation of Ukrainians is not comparable to refugees from other countries, and that there is no preferential treatment, Ukrainians just have the benefits of temporary protection status.<sup>273</sup>

Initially, most refugees from Ukraine hoped to return as soon as possible, but more recent surveys indicate that many want to stay beyond the three year period, with more than a third (37%) intending to stay in Germany permanently.<sup>274</sup> The initial support from civil society seems to be dwindling and the German Federal Ministry of the Interior has indicated a sharp rise in these targeted attacks on refugees and asylum seekers since 2022.<sup>275</sup> What's more, the majority of German states are "at their breaking point", reporting challenges of insufficient infrastructure for providing long term accommodation and providing adequate education and health care.<sup>276</sup> 12 out of 16 Federal States have announced blocking further intake of refugees, with no capacity left to absorb newcomers.<sup>277</sup>

## Summary

To conclude, this chapter has discussed some key contextual elements concerning Poland's and Germany's migration histories. Since 1989, Polish decision-makers have failed to develop comprehensive and strategic solutions in the field of immigration and integration policies.<sup>278</sup> From 2004, Poland has traditionally been depicted as a country of net emigration to the West but has a tradition of an open migration policy towards their

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<sup>272</sup> BIB, "Refugees from Ukraine in Germany", Federal Institute for Population Research: IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP Survey, accessed 7 July 2023, <https://www.bib.bund.de/EN/Research/Migration/Projects/Refugees-from-Ukraine-in-Germany.html>.

<sup>273</sup> <https://www.harmoon.org/en/reports/europe-the-continent-of-differing-values/>

<sup>274</sup> [while 34% intend to stay until the end of the war, 27% of respondents have not yet decided how long they will stay in Germany and 2% intend to leave the country within the next year See : <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2022-12-21/ukrainian-refugees-will-stay-germany-longer>

<sup>275</sup> Thomas Wieder "Attacks against Asylum Seekers on the Rise Again in Germany", *Le Monde.Fr*, 16 November 2022, [https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/16/attacks-against-asylum-seekers-on-the-rise-again-in-germany\\_6004524\\_4.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/16/attacks-against-asylum-seekers-on-the-rise-again-in-germany_6004524_4.html).

<sup>276</sup> William Noah Glucroft 'Ukrainian Refugees Push German Cities to Their Limits', *dw.com*, 10/29/2022, accessed 7 July 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainian-refugees-push-german-cities-to-their-limits/a-63582661>.

<sup>277</sup> John Cody, 'Germany Overwhelmed by Migrants, 12 out of 16 Federal States Begin Blocking Refugees', *Remix News*, (30 September 2022), accessed 15 May 2023 <https://rmx.news/article/germany-overwhelmed-by-migrants-12-out-of-16-federal-states-begin-blocking-refugees/>.

<sup>278</sup> Okólski and Wach, "policies in the absence of immigrants", 2020, p154,

eastern “neighbours”.<sup>279</sup> One could characterise Polish migration as high long-term net outflows and temporary short-term inflows.<sup>280</sup> Low immigration and virtually no long term settlement of foreign citizens living in Poland meant integration strategies were not a governmental priority.<sup>281</sup> The government's focus was to fill the gaps in the labour market with short term or seasonal workers rather than a vision of integration programs.<sup>282</sup> Okólski and Wach describe the Polish migration policy framework as inconsistent; without any clearly defined goals; “The whole process mostly appears to be chaotic - composed of scattered ideas and activities and rarely evaluated.”<sup>283</sup>

Germany was also driven by short-term economic needs and favoured a non-policy approach until the 1970s, with its symbolic shift to accept its status as a “country of immigration”. Germany's “guest worker” legacy has a significant impact on the characteristics of society, particularly the descendants of Turkish origin. Germany’s strict citizenship laws and naturalisation process hinder the integration as equal members of society, since it excludes immigrants from participating fully in the legal-political sphere. Nevertheless, recent reforms introduced to attract skilled workers could enhance political participation of millions of immigrants in Germany.<sup>284</sup>

Like all across Europe, one can observe a similar narrative in Poland and Germany, who both framed immigrants as criminals which gave rise to sentiments of xenophobia, islamophobia and prejudices against refugees and asylum seekers. However, whilst this stance was adopted by radical or right wing parties in Western Europe, xenophobia took centre stage in mainstream parties across CEE. The case of Poland shows how a dominant anti-immigrant rhetoric shapes responses to migrant arrivals and how politics of fear are used to justify the neglect of fundamental human rights.<sup>285</sup> The focus from 2015, in

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<sup>279</sup> Szczepanik, “Polish Policy Towards Eastern Neighbourhood”, 2011

<sup>280</sup> Okólski and Wach, “policies in the absence of immigrants”, 2020, p147,

<sup>281</sup> Ibid, p59

<sup>282</sup> Ibid, p163

<sup>283</sup> Ibid, p167

<sup>284</sup> Ayhan Simsek, “Germany Pushes for Citizenship Reforms to Tackle Labor Crunch”, 16.06.2023, accessed 11 July 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/germany-pushes-for-citizenship-reforms-to-tackle-labor-crunch/2917488>.

<sup>285</sup> Fengler and Kreutler, “Migration coverage”, 2020, p187.

particular, has been on implementing restrictive, deterrence and securitisation based approaches, even deliberately dismantling its national asylum system.<sup>286</sup>

While the “welcome culture” may have been exaggerated, Germany has, for the most part, remained one of the most positive countries towards immigration, with a moralising narrative about supporting refugees. However, the refugee-related social problems and increasingly negative public opinion towards migrants has forced the German government to seek a balance between humanitarianism and national interests. Though there have been some concerns about the cultural impact of immigration, the dominant narrative has encouraged people to view the potential “economic benefits”, tailoring policy towards its significant labour shortages.

Up until 2022, Poland was one of the EU countries, with the smallest shares of immigrants in their total population. The outbreak of war in Ukraine drastically changed Poland's migratory situation and approach. The response has largely been driven by the Polish public who have made remarkable efforts to support Ukrainians. This could ironically be entitled Polish “welcome culture”. Even before the war Ukrainians were the largest immigrant population in Poland, filling gaps in the labour market. However, due to Poland's non-policy approach, it has had to make radical changes to support the arrival and inclusion of Ukrainian refugees.<sup>287</sup> Effective coordination and a clearly defined long-term plan or framework from the central-government for migration and integration is still missing.<sup>288</sup>

Today, Germany is considered a key player in advancing EU migration law and policy. Since 2012 it has been the largest refugee-hosting country in the EU, with 2,1 million refugees, 6% of all refugees globally at the end of 2022.<sup>289</sup> One could therefore assume that Germany is “experienced” in the integration of immigrants since many structures and policies are in place.

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<sup>286</sup> ECRE, “AIDA 2021 Update: Poland” European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), accessed 19 June 2023, <https://ecre.org/aida-2021-update-poland/>.

<sup>287</sup> Okólski and Wach, “policies in the absence of immigrants”, 2020, p59

<sup>288</sup> MEDAM, “Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”, 2022, p43

<sup>289</sup> [Germany is the second largest refugee-hosting country in Europe, after Turkey which remained the largest refugee-hosting country in the world in 2022, with more than 3.6 million refugees at the end-2022, or 10 % of all people displaced across borders globally. See: UNHCR, “Global Trends Report 2022”, accessed 29 June 2023, <https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends-report-2022/>.]

In sum, this chapter illustrates the complexities of diversity management. It illustrates that the narratives, shaped by political and media discourse, which frame immigration influences public perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants. It shows that approaches to migration governance change over time and depend on the migrant group. Finally, the comparison of the case studies show how unique experiences and migration histories shape the demographic and cultural landscape of countries.

### **Chapter 3) Integration and Inclusion in Poland and Germany**

#### **(Pre-war) approaches to the inclusion of refugee children and youth in school**

In order to reflect on the implementation of the EU policy recommendations, this section will focus on governance and school systems in Germany and Poland. The focus is on the educational policies, measures and approaches that were in place for the inclusion of migrant children before Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

*This table gives an indication of the population size and % of foreign born individuals in the years 2021 and 2022.*

<b>Overview of Migration stock</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Poland</b>
Population size 2022 <sup>290</sup>	83, 237, 124	37, 654, 247
Foreign born (%)	18.4	2,5
Population size 2021	83,155,031	37,840,001
Foreign-Born %	15.4	1.7
Immigration 2021	847,367	241,116
Main country of origin (top three) (Statistica: 2021)	Romania, Poland and Bulgaria <sup>291</sup>	Ukraine, Belarus, Germany <sup>292</sup>
Number of asylum seekers granted Asylum (2021) <sup>293</sup>	132, 680	3, 610
Number of displaced persons hosted in country <sup>294</sup>	79,700	N/A

*Resorce: Staistica, UNHCR, Eurobarometer*

<sup>290</sup> Eurobarometer “Integration of Immigrants in the European Union”, European Website on Integration, 2022, [https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-european-union\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-european-union_en).

<sup>291</sup> Statistica, “Immigrants in Germany by Country 2021”, accessed 27 March 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/894238/immigrant-numbers-by-country-of-origin-germany/>.

<sup>292</sup> Statistica, ‘Poland: Immigration by Country of Origin 2021’, accessed 27 March 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/957381/poland-immigration-by-country-of-origin/>.

<sup>293</sup> Statistica, “Asylum Grants in Europe 2021”, accessed 27 March 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/293350/asylum-grants-in-europe/>.

<sup>294</sup> UNHCR, “Global Trends Report 2021”, accessed 28 June 2023. <https://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/62a9d1494/global-trends-report-2021.html>.



## **Migration Governance**

In Germany, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees [BAMF] of the Interior Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community is in charge of asylum procedures, migration and the promotion and coordination of integration issues on a national level. The Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration assists the federal government developing integration policy, while local actors are usually responsible for implementing the measures.

In Poland, the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy (Department Social Assistance and Integration) is in charge of the governance of integration issues on a national level, but there is not a specific top-level dedicated body for coordinating integration policies. The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration and the Office of Foreigners are also key governing entities which shape integration policies for immigrants and refugees in Poland.

## **Education Governance**

In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research [BMBF] is responsible for providing guidelines and funding for education at national level. Bettina Stark-Watzinger is the current Federal Minister of Education. However, due to Germany's federal structure, the 16 individual states (*Länder*) are primarily responsible for setting their own education policy and standards. This means that the school system and curriculum vary depending on the region. The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs in Germany [KMK], is a body made up of representatives from each state's education ministry, which aims to coordinate education policy, streamline rules and requirements, and promote cooperation among the states. Germany's top-level authorities have adopted a specific strategic action plan on the integration of migrant students into the education system – this covers primary, general secondary education and IVET. The KMK specifically addresses the integration of refugees and asylum seekers.

In Poland the national education system is centrally governed by the Ministry of Education and Science [MEiN]. Currently the Minister is Przemysław Czarnek. Despite the growing number of children coming from abroad, the MEiN has not planned or organised actions for the coordination or implementation of the state educational

policy.<sup>295</sup> Poland was defined as having “slightly unfavourable” integration policies, scoring a mere 40/100 in the Migration Integration Policy Index [MIPEX] 2020. Like most Central European Countries with relatively small immigrant communities, educational policies for the integration of migrants are weak.<sup>296</sup> As Pacek sums up the situation in Poland:

Due to the fact that Poland lacks a migration policy, the existence of one coordinating centre and the migration experiences of Polish society, the tasks related to the adaptation of migrant children rest mainly with non-governmental organisations and local communities.<sup>297</sup>

In other words, there is no top-level strategy or action plan, no regulations or recommendations or even information concerning orientation for the integration of children into schools. Funds are also part of the overall budget allocated to education, so local governments are not obliged to allocate them to support foreign students.<sup>298</sup>

### **Compulsory education**

In Poland and Germany, compulsory education begins for all children, including migrants and asylum seekers, in the year in which they turn six, and involves nine years of full-time schooling. In Poland, compulsory education involves one year of pre-school (zerówka), followed by 8 years of primary school (age 7-15).<sup>299</sup> Children are obliged to continue education in some form till the age of 18 but this can be implemented in formal settings (secondary school) or non-formal settings (vocational training with an employer).<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> Supreme Audit Office, ‘NIK on the Education of Children of Foreigners and Polish Citizens Returning to Poland’, National Chamber of Statutory Auditors (NIK), (8.09.2020) accessed 20 July 2023, <https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/ksztalcenie-dzieci-cudzoziemcow-i-powracajacych-do-kraju.html>.

<sup>296</sup> MIPEX, “Poland: MIPEX 2020”, Migration Integration Policy Index, [www.mipex.eu](http://www.mipex.eu), accessed 28 March, 2023, <https://www.mipex.eu/poland>.

<sup>297</sup> Małgorzata Pacek, “Integration Policy of Immigrants with Particular Emphasis on Ukrainian Children in Poland,” *Studia Europejskie - Studies in European Affairs* 26, no. 2 (2022): p35 <https://doi.org/10.33067/se.2.2022.3>.

<sup>298</sup> Katarzyna Potoniec, “Comparative analysis of instruments supporting the integration of pupils under international protection in the educational systems of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary”, CIDOB, 2021, p13-14. <https://bit.ly/3sHaxVq>

<sup>299</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Art. 70, sections 1 and 2), Law on Education: Ustawa z dnia 14 grudnia 2016 r. – Prawo oświatowe (t.j. Dz.U. z 2020 r. poz. 910). (Education Law Act, Art. 165, sections 1 and 2). ‘Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z Dnia 23 Sierpnia 2017 r. w Sprawie Kształcenia Osób Niebędących Obywatelami Polskimi Oraz Osób Będących Obywatelami Polskimi, Które Pobierały Naukę w Szkołach Funkcjonujących w Systemach Oświaty Innych Państw’, accessed 23 July 2023, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20170001655>.

<sup>300</sup> [For a more detailed overview of the Polish education system see: Eurydice, “National Education Systems - Poland: Overview,” European Commission, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, <https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-education-systems/poland/overview>]

Similarly, in Germany, young people who do not continue general or vocational education to upper secondary level, must attend compulsory part-time schooling (*Berufsschulpflicht*) for a further three years.<sup>301</sup> The KMK stresses “Access to education is the key to successful integration, and integration should be fostered from the very beginning.”<sup>302</sup> and that “No child or young person with a refugee background should be left behind.”<sup>303</sup> In several Federal States, however, compulsory education ends at the age of 16, which means that “access to education services is severely limited for asylum seekers above the age of 16, many of whom have not finished school in their countries of origin and therefore need access to the school system in order to gain a degree.”<sup>304</sup> Another issue is limited access to education in the initial reception centres which provide only basic schooling and lack sufficient materials and digital infrastructure. In Germany, asylum-seeking children are exempt from compulsory education until they have been assigned to a municipality, with many experiencing long delays, and until then many children have no access to regular schools. Since the 2019 Asylum Act, the maximum stay for families with minor children is 6 months, with the aim to speed up school integration. However, under EU law,<sup>305</sup> minors must have access and be enrolled in education within 3 months of the submission of their asylum request.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> [For a more detailed overview of the German education system see: Eurydice, “National Education Systems - Germany: Overview,” European Commission, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, <https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-education-systems/germany/overview/>.]

<sup>302</sup> KMK, *Integration von jungen Geflüchteten durch Bildung*, 2016, p4

<sup>303</sup> *Ibid*, p2

<sup>304</sup> Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Marlene Stiller, “Access to Education”, *Asylum Information Database / European Council on Refugees and Exiles* (blog), accessed 14 July 2023, <https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/reception-conditions/employment-and-education/access-education/>.

<sup>305</sup> [European Reception Directive; Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers, Art. 10]

<sup>306</sup> [Article 14 of the EU Directive 2013/33]

<b>Compulsory Education<sup>307</sup></b>			
<b>Germany<sup>308</sup> &amp; Poland</b>	<b>Age</b>		<b>Years</b>
	Full-time	6-15	9
	Part-time	15-18	3

In Poland, children are enrolled in schools located in or close to the area of their domicile. “Poland does not have typical migration districts in cities, most children with a migration background are dispersed between many schools. They do not build visible school communities as their presence is usually below 5% of overall school communities. In such circumstances, the integration of the child in the classroom is dependent on the teacher’s ability to notice such a child and engage it in classroom activities.”<sup>309</sup> In Germany, the 2021 ‘ReGES’ study found there are significant regional differences for accessing education which highly impacts the participation opportunities of children.<sup>310</sup> There are disparities between schools located in wealthier, more affluent neighbourhoods who have more funds for resources and facilities, than certain socially deprived areas, which contain a higher number of disadvantaged students, with a high proportion of migration background. Funding, teacher shortages and lack of materials are also considerably higher in these areas.<sup>311</sup>

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

Despite the significant increase in foreign pupils in Polish schools in recent years, the MEiN does not consider the situation of foreigners in schools.<sup>312</sup> The NIK audit indicates;

<sup>307</sup> European Commission, European Education and Culture Executive Agency, *Compulsory education in Europe – 2022/2023*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2797/235076>

<sup>308</sup> [this can vary depending on the Bundesland]

<sup>309</sup> Jakub Kościółek, “Children with Migration Backgrounds in Polish Schools: Problems and Challenges”, *Annales for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies. Series Historia et Sociologia*, no. 30–4 (2020), p603 <https://doi.org/10.19233/ASHS.2020.40>.

<sup>310</sup> Gisela Will et al., ‘Integration of Recently Arrived Underage Refugees: Research Potential of the Study ReGES—Refugees in the German Educational System’, *European Sociological Review* 37, no. 6 (1 December 2021): 1027–43, <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcab033>.

<sup>311</sup> Robert Bosch Stiftung (RBS), “Das Deutsche Schulbarometer: Aktuelle Herausforderungen aus Sicht von Schulleitungen. Ergebnisse einer Befragung von Schulleitungen allgemein- und berufsbildender Schulen”, Stuttgart, 2023.

<sup>312</sup> Potoniec, “pupils under international protection”, 2021, p14

There are also no mechanisms to monitor the educational policies, legislation, programmes and educational practices aimed at children under international protection and asylum seekers. There are no activities monitoring the educational results of this group of pupils.<sup>313</sup>

This non-policy approach is detrimental as it prevents modification to curricula, approaches or allows for tailored support for specific needs.<sup>314</sup> Germany on the other hand has introduced specific tools which allows for the continuous assessment of migrants' educational performance and progress; however, there is no focus on students' monitoring of social and emotional needs.<sup>315</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> Ibid, p13

<sup>314</sup> Supreme Audit Office, "Education of Children of Foreigners", 2020.

<sup>315</sup> European Commission, EACEA, Eurydice, *Integrating Students from Migrant Backgrounds into Schools in Europe: National Policies and Measures*, Eurydice Report, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, p22

Education and Training Monitor 2022 <sup>316</sup>					
		Germany	Poland	EU average	Target 2030
Participation in <b>Early childhood education.</b> <i>(From age 3- starting age of compulsory ed)</i>		93.7	90.8	93.0	96
<b>Early leavers</b> from education and training <i>(age 18-24)</i>	Average	11.8	5.9	9.7	>9
	Native	9.2		11.9	8.5
	EU	31.6		25.3	21.4
	Non-EU	27.6		31.4	21.6
<b>VET/ work-based learning</b>		96.2	11.6	60.7	60
Upper <b>secondary attainment</b>		77.1	90.6	84.6	/
<b>Equity</b>		20.1	10.6	19.30	/
<b>Tertiary</b>	Native	36.2	40.4	42.1	≥ 45
	EU	36.5	/	40.7	
	Non-EU	33.5	63.5	34.7	
<b>Education Investment</b>	% of public expenditure on education of GDP	4.3	5.2	5.0	

	Public expenditure on education as a share of the total general government expenditure	9.5	10.7	9.4	/
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Resource: *Education and training monitor 2022*<sup>317</sup>

### Education Outcomes

Since 2013 every child in Germany has a legal right to a place in ECEC however reports indicate the quality is poor due to shortage in places and staff, high child-carer ratios and lack of materials. What's more, the participation in ECEC for 3-6 year olds significantly lags behind nationals, with 16% lower attendance for children with a migrant background. ECEC attendance is below EU average in Poland; however, new support schemes, such as the 'family care programme', have been introduced to improve the affordability and accessibility.<sup>318</sup> In Poland, the overall early school leaving remains considerably low at 5,9%, in comparison to the EU average (9.7%). In Germany, on the other hand, early school leaving is high, at 9.2% for nationals, at around 29.6% for foreign born students.<sup>319</sup>

Whilst in Poland full data is missing, in Germany education outcomes remain heavily influenced by socio-economic and ethnic background. Germany is among EU countries with the largest disparities between nationals and non-native children. In 2022, around 38% of all children in elementary schools in Germany have a background in migration.<sup>320</sup> The German education report indicates that around 48% of children with migrant

<sup>317</sup> European Commission, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, *Education and training monitor 2022 : comparative report*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/117416>

<sup>318</sup> [in line with the Council Recommendation on High Quality ECEC Systems (2019/C 189/02)19]

<sup>319</sup> European Commission, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, *Education and training monitor 2022 : Germany*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/851643>

<sup>320</sup> Bildungsberichterstattung, *Bildung in Deutschland 2022*. <https://www.bildungsbericht.de/de/bildungsberichte-seit2006/bildungsbericht-2022/pdf-dateien2022/bildungsbericht-2022.pd>.

backgrounds are affected by one of the three socio-economic risk factors, hindering educational success: low-skilled parents, unemployment, and family poverty.<sup>321</sup> Children from privileged family backgrounds tend to have significantly better chances of educational success than children from poorer social backgrounds who are significantly low-performing.<sup>322</sup> Children from families with migrant backgrounds are more likely to live in poverty, leave education and training early (up to three times) and less likely to acquire higher qualifications than non-migrant peers.<sup>323</sup>

Despite history and experience of different types of migration, Podar et al. argue that institutional discrimination is at fault, stating that the;

[Structural gaps are rooted into historical segregation and discrimination in the German educational system and left unaddressed, can increase stigma and intergenerational social inequalities.<sup>324</sup>

Understanding the school system is not easy, since regulations on schooling vary from State to State, and is composed of a complex track system. At the age of 10, children are placed into different tracks for secondary level into lower/intermediate vocational training (*Hauptschule und Realschule*) and the more academic higher education track (*Gymnasium*). The type of secondary school a child attends has a significant impact on their future life. Children can only access higher education with a school-leaving exam (*Abitur*) making it harder to enrol into tertiary education. Adolescents with migrant backgrounds are significantly overrepresented in the lower-level vocation tracks.<sup>325</sup> This is especially the case for the majority of refugees, with only one-fifth (22%) attending Gymnasiums.<sup>326</sup>

In other words, the German education system hinders upward social mobility and perpetuates social inequalities. However, recent reforms strive to make the system more flexible, allowing students to transit between the different tracks or even combine all three tracks (*Gesamtschulen or Gemeinschaftsschulen*). Furthermore, the Federal Government intends launching the so-called Start Chances Program (*Startchancenprogramm*) in the

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<sup>321</sup> European Commission, “*Education and training monitor 2022 : Germany*”, 2022, p5  
<https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/851643>

<sup>322</sup> Ibid, p5

<sup>323</sup> Monica-Diana Podar et al., “How Schools in Germany Shape and Impact the Lives of Adolescent Refugees in Terms of Mental Health and Social Mobility”, *SSM - Population Health* 19 (1 September 2022): p2 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2022.101169>.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid, p1

<sup>325</sup> Podar et al., “How schools shape lives” 2022.

<sup>326</sup> Jeannette Goddar, “Mehr als ein Jahr ohne Schule”, GEW - Die Bildungsgewerkschaft, (14 Februar 2023), accessed: 21 July 2023. <https://www.gew.de/aktuelles/detailseite/mehr-als-ein-jahr-ohne-schule>.



2024/2025 school year.<sup>327</sup> This will provide financial resources to general and vocational schools to reduce educational disparities. The initiative aims to improve educational opportunities for students from diverse backgrounds and help address the challenges of integration to create a more equitable and cohesive society in Germany.

### **Preparatory - Mainstream Classes**

In Germany, the intention in top-level recommendations is that migrant students follow mainstream classes for all lessons; however, there are also formats including partially separate, as well as fully separate preparatory classes.<sup>328</sup> The KMK suggests:

[T]he successful integration of these children and adolescents largely depends on how quickly and well they acquire the German language and how swiftly they can be integrated into the regular offerings of our education system.<sup>329</sup>

Children with little or no German language skills are placed into “Willkommensklassen”, “Vorbereitungsklassen” or “Übergangsklassen” (Ü-Klassen), in which they learn German language and are familiarised with the culture and basic facts about Germany “Orientierungskurs” before entering regular schools. These classes are also intended to “lay the foundation for societal participation based on the Basic Law and democratic principles.”<sup>330</sup> In general, Germany considers prior school documentation but also factors including age, level of host country language competences, and test results for student placement.<sup>331</sup> Regulations on time frames vary between the *Länder*, but usually students transfer from separate preparatory classes and integrate into mainstream education within a period of six months to two years.<sup>332</sup> A recent study conducted by RWI concluded that newly arrived children who had attended “welcome class” during their primary school years achieved much lower scores in the 5th grade standardised tests compared to those who had been directly integrated into regular classes.<sup>333</sup> Study suggests that the direct

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<sup>327</sup> Götz Hausding, “Deutscher Bundestag - Keine Mehrheit für Oppositionsantrag zur Schulpolitik”, Deutscher Bundestag, accessed 20 July 2023, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw11-de-startchancenprogramm-936482>.

<sup>328</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p83

<sup>329</sup> KMK, Integration, 2016, p2

<sup>330</sup> KMK, Integration, 2016, p3

<sup>331</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p82

<sup>332</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p85

<sup>333</sup> Leonard Knollenborg, “Integration: Geflüchtete Kinder aus Vorbereitungsklassen schneiden schlechter ab”, Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 7 November 2022, accessed, 12 January 2023 <https://www.rwi-essen.de/presse/wissenschaftskommunikation/pressemitteilungen/detail/integration-gefluechtete-kinder-aus-vorbereitungsklassen-schneiden-schlechter-ab>.

integration of newly arrived primary school children into regular classes, supported with additional German lessons, promotes their academic performance.

In Poland, newcomer students are usually integrated into mainstream classes with native children. Students coming from abroad are placed into classes on the basis of their school documentation (certificates and number of years in education abroad).<sup>334</sup> In the absence of these documents, migrant students are admitted to the school, and appropriate class, on the basis of an interview. Schools have the possibility of setting up entirely separate “preparatory” classes should there be a high number of foreign students who do not have sufficient knowledge of Polish.<sup>335</sup> These classes can have up to 15 students, and run for no longer than 12 months, but there is no support for the transition into mainstream classes. Students are often placed into lower classes following a language placement test as factors such as age are not considered. What's more, the test is not standardised, and determined by teaching authorities, it therefore differs across the country.<sup>336</sup> Preparatory classes are not specifically designed as “welcome classes” for foreign students, but instead, follow the same core curriculum as regular classes. However, teaching methods can be adapted for foreign students' needs.

Should a child attend full compensatory classes (20-26 hours a week for 1 year), they are not obliged to attend regular classes. To make up for curriculum differences, compensatory lessons for each subject can be organised, for a maximum of 5 lessons per week per child, which include the additional hours of Polish language. In addition, the classes usually combine different groups of migrant children, of varying ages, language proficiency and cultural experiences, making it difficult for teachers to adapt to the individual needs of migrant pupils.<sup>337</sup> Every child is entitled to at least two lessons (45 minutes per lesson) of additional free Polish language lessons and compensatory classes, which may be organised by the school they attend. However, this may not exceed five

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<sup>334</sup> [Ordinance of 23 August 2017 outlines the procedure by which students coming from abroad may enrol in public schools. <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20170001655>]

<sup>335</sup> [Act of 14 December 2016. Education Law (articles 165 and 166); Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 23 August 2017 on the education of persons who are not Polish citizens and persons who are Polish citizens who have received education in schools operating in the educational systems of other countries]

<sup>336</sup> Kościółek, “Migration Backgrounds in Polish Schools”, 2020, p607

<sup>337</sup> Kościółek, “Migration Backgrounds in Polish Schools”, 2020, p607

lessons per week per child.<sup>338</sup> The Ordinance also states that students who receive Polish language training may benefit from additional support in academic subjects.

Even though legislation allows schools to open preparatory classes, it is a rarely used integrational tool. Reports indicate a lack of funding has resulted in inadequate implementation of these classes.<sup>339</sup> Due to the relatively low number of foreign students, these classes are foremost opened in cities with a big number of migrants. However, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Warsaw, the city with the highest number of foreign pupils, had only set up 13 preparatory units, 17 in Wrocław, 4 in Gdańsk, and 14 in Poznań.<sup>340</sup>

## Parents

Germany has introduced specific top-level recommendations to strengthen links with migrant students' parents, promoting effort to keep parents involved, as well as actively engaging them in the education process.<sup>341</sup> Schools are obliged to welcome parents of new students, regularly conduct targeted information sessions, and ensure that communication channels are accessible for all patients.<sup>342</sup> The KMK claim:

In all states, initiatives are launched to foster cooperation between schools and parents, particularly parents with a migration background, as well as to engage with the local community surrounding the schools.<sup>343</sup>

Targeted measures to facilitate contact and cooperation, including low-threshold options with consideration for linguistic and cultural heterogeneity, as well as diverse prior experiences of the German education system, strive to involve parents in school life, in the classroom, and in decision-making bodies.<sup>344</sup> Poland does not. The lack of communication between parents of a migrant background, and native teachers, due to language barriers, has been identified as a significant issue in migrant children's progress in Poland.<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> Eurydice, "Migrant background in schools," 2019, p134

<sup>339</sup> Konrad Pedziwiatr et al., 'Integration Policies, Practices and Experiences: Poland Country Report', *Global Migration: Consequences and Responses*, 1 January 2020, p135  
[https://www.academia.edu/43983097/Integration\\_Policies\\_Practices\\_and\\_Experiences\\_Poland\\_Country\\_Report](https://www.academia.edu/43983097/Integration_Policies_Practices_and_Experiences_Poland_Country_Report).

<sup>340</sup> Marta Jadwiga Pietrusińska, Michał Nowosielski, "Ukrainian forced migrants and the (in)equalities of the Polish educational system", *CMR Spotlight* 7 (42), 2022, p5

<sup>341</sup> Eurydice, "Migrant background in schools," 2019, p26

<sup>342</sup> KMK, 'Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule', 2013, p9

<sup>343</sup> KMK, 'Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule', 2013, p6

<sup>344</sup> Ibid, p5

<sup>345</sup> Kościółek, "Migration Backgrounds in Polish Schools", 2020, p604

### **‘Whole child’ approach**

Both Poland and Germany have top-level regulations and recommendations on psycho-social support for migrant students and unaccompanied minors.<sup>346</sup> However, according to the 2020 NIK inspection, most schools in Poland fail:

to provide pupils coming from abroad with psychological and pedagogical support appropriate to their needs in the form of educational and specialist classes. This was due to the lack of diagnosis at the beginning of the education process, which makes it impossible to plan appropriate activities to support students.<sup>347</sup>

More than 50% of schools assessed in Poland did not undertake any activities related to the integration of foreign students, taking into account their specific cultural needs.<sup>348</sup> Furthermore, although authorities identify between newly arrived migrants, as well as “Polish citizens who have attended schools in other countries, and then have returned to Poland”, children under international and humanitarian protection do not constitute a separate group of pupils in Polish legislation; they are treated like all foreign children.<sup>349</sup> This means there are no specific solutions taking into account their specific needs, such as the psychological impact of trauma following persecution or war.

### **Teachers**

In Germany, both Initial Teacher Education (ITE) and Continuing Professional Development (CPD), include activities focused on the competencies related to the integration of migrant students.<sup>350</sup> Concerning CPD, Germany organises specialised “in-service training activities to raise teachers’ awareness of both the academic and the social-emotional needs of students from migrant backgrounds.”<sup>351</sup> The KMK emphasises the need for developing and enhancing initial and continuing education in intercultural competencies for all educational staff.<sup>352</sup> Teachers also receive training on the complex factors impacting the mental health of refugee adolescents.

Poland has no such competencies included in the top-level teacher competence framework for ITE or CPD.<sup>353</sup> Pedziwiatr et al. conclude that the biggest shortcoming for

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<sup>346</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p111

<sup>347</sup> Supreme Audit Office, “Education of Children of Foreigners”, 2020

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

<sup>349</sup> Potoniec, “pupils under international protection”, 2021, p11.

<sup>350</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p118

<sup>351</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p24

<sup>352</sup> KMK, “Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule”, 2013, p6

<sup>353</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p21

the inclusion of migrant children in schools is the lack of training and methodological support for teachers who work with them.<sup>354</sup> School inspections indicate that schools and teaching staff do not have the (intercultural) competences, skills and adequate funds to effectively teach in diverse classrooms, support children with migration experience, or teach Polish as a second language.<sup>355</sup> Headmasters, teachers, and educational staff also voice feeling significantly unprepared for the inclusion of foreign students in the classroom and school setting.<sup>356</sup> Around 44% of the teachers surveyed by the Supreme Audit Office indicated problems working with students coming from abroad, especially conducting classes with students of diverse levels of knowledge of the Polish language, lacking appropriate teaching materials and textbooks for learning Polish as a foreign language, and receiving poor institutional support.<sup>357</sup>

### **Classroom assistance**

Poland and Germany have top-level recommendations for providing intercultural mediators to promote the integration of migrant students. These assistants can help support migrant students' holistic needs during the initial integration in academic and social spheres.<sup>358</sup> In Poland, the school head can employ (inter)cultural assistants to help migrant children in the adaptation process in the classroom and school environment. Their main tasks are to support foreign students during the integration process, and translate between Polish language and the foreign mother tongue. Their knowledge of the students' "foreign" culture and language is seen as an asset to help teachers, and facilitate contact between teachers and the parents or legal guardians of children. Cultural assistants are also expected to mediate "in the situation of cultural, national, racial, ethnic or religious conflicts."<sup>359</sup> In general, their presence is very positively assessed; however, a lack of funding makes it hard for schools to employ cultural assistants.<sup>360</sup> Potoniec explains,

Practice shows that intercultural assistants are one of the most effective ways of supporting children with migration experience. Despite the fact that legal regulations have allowed schools to employ people in this role since 2010, it is

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<sup>354</sup> Pedziwiatr et al., "Poland Country Report", 2020

<sup>355</sup> Supreme Audit Office, "Education of Children of Foreigners", 2020

<sup>356</sup> Jarosław Bąbka and Marta Nowicka, "Educational policy towards children of immigrants in Poland," *Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Jana Wyżykowskiego. Studia z Nauk Społecznych* 10 (2017), p131-132

<sup>357</sup> Supreme Audit Office, "Education of Children of Foreigners", 2020

<sup>358</sup> Eurydice, "Migrant background in schools," 2019, p24

<sup>359</sup> Marta Jadwiga Pietrusińska, Michał Nowosielski, "Ukrainian forced migrants and the (in)equalities of the Polish educational system", *CMR Spotlight* 7 (42), 2022, p5

<sup>360</sup> Bąbka and Nowicka, "children of immigrants in Poland", 2017, p134

still not a widely used solution. This is due both to ignorance of the guidelines in this area and insufficient financial resources for this purpose.<sup>361</sup>

Assistants are limited for a maximum of 12 months, for 5 hours per week per child which is not considered enough. Furthermore, there are no clear requirements set for cultural assistance and the only governmental requirements are basic education and fluency in the language of the student's country of origin. In such, assistants often lack pedagogical training. Cultural assistants are also hired on short-term contracts with very low remuneration. The profession is thus not stable as it lacks a clear standardised status.<sup>362</sup> In 2021, there were only around 60-70 teachers' assistants hired in schools to support foreign children, including asylum-seekers, across the whole of Poland.<sup>363</sup> The vast majority are employed by NGOs or co-financed by the EU and or other funds, and not through the school budget. However, since 2015 the PiS government has largely suspended AMIF funding for NGOs and limited EU funding opportunities for implementing integration projects.<sup>364</sup>

### **Intercultural education**

In Germany, KMK first formulated the 'Recommendations for Intercultural Education and Upbringing in Schools' in 1996 which defined intercultural education as a framework and "cross-cutting task" of schools. In 2013, Against the background of growing cultural pluralization and socio-cultural diversity, the KMK acknowledged the recommendations needed to be "revised and reworded", "updated and continued", to allow "for equal participation of all individuals in every aspect of societal life."<sup>365</sup>

To promote a discrimination-free approach to diversity, topics related to integration and migration should be contextualised historically, economically, and socially, and they should be presented and handled with sensitivity to diversity. This includes presenting different and controversial positions or societal discussions in teaching materials in a differentiated manner and providing didactic guidance in the classroom.<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>361</sup> Potoniec, "pupils under international protection", 2021, p15

<sup>362</sup> Kościółek, "Migration Backgrounds in Polish Schools", 2020, p607

<sup>363</sup> Potoniec, "pupils under international protection", 2021, p12

<sup>364</sup> Pedziwiatr et al., "Poland Country Report", 2020

<sup>365</sup> KMK, 'Intercultural Education in School', 2013, p16

<sup>366</sup> KMK, "Presenting diversity in School" (Beschluss der Kultusministerkonferenz vom 08.10.2015) 2015, p3

Whilst the 2019 Eurydice report concludes “It is very rarely a right for migrant students to study their home language at school”<sup>367</sup>. Germany's official documents encourage the promotion, preservation and expansion of multilingual competences among students. Germany has introduced regulations and recommendations to provide home language tuition in school, although this is rarely a right, and when it is, it is subject to certain conditions.<sup>368</sup> The inclusion of migrant students' language and culture of origin is seen as a means to develop intercultural competencies and allow the students to build their (multicultural) identity.<sup>369</sup> KMK states:

The school recognizes the linguistic and cultural diversity of its students and parents as an opportunity for intercultural learning, consciously incorporating it into its programmatic work. This includes acknowledging and promoting the language skills of students who grow up in multilingual environments.<sup>370</sup>

There is a lack of intercultural education incorporated in the regular curricula and as a principle in Polish schools.<sup>371</sup> The Migration Policy Index 2020 (MIPEX) indicates that in Poland “Schools are not equipped to address intercultural education and the specific needs of immigrant children.”<sup>372</sup> Instead, priority is given to a culture of assimilation, in which foreign children are expected to fully adapt and adhere to the Polish realities and culture, whilst the cultural and religious needs of children with the refugee or immigrant status are ignored.<sup>373</sup>

The 2015 change of government has been accused of politicising the Polish education system, with the introduction of a series of education reforms, implemented from the 2017-18 school year.<sup>374</sup> PiS abolished the national obligation to implement anti-discrimination measures and activities in schools.<sup>375</sup> Furthermore, the shift to more centralised governance, with limited flexibility and strict regulations for an overcharged curriculum, prevents teachers from introducing intercultural education independently.<sup>376</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p19

<sup>368</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p19

<sup>369</sup> Eurydice, “Migrant background in schools,” 2019, p19, 138

<sup>370</sup> KMK, “Intercultural Education in School”, 2013, p3

<sup>371</sup> Pedziwiatr et al., “Poland Country Report”, 2020

<sup>372</sup> MIPEX, “Poland MIPEX”, 2020

<sup>373</sup> Bąbka and Nowicka, “children of immigrants in Poland,” 2017, p135

<sup>374</sup> Daniel Tilles, ‘Christian Teaching Needed to “Save Latin Civilisation”, Says Polish Education Minister’, *Notes From Poland*, (9 June 2021), accessed: 20 May 2023.

<https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/06/09/christian-teaching-needed-to-save-latin-civilisation-says-polish-education-minister/>

<sup>375</sup> [Regulations concerning anti-discrimination measures were only implemented between 2014-17 under the Ordinance of the Minister of National Education, 2013]

<sup>376</sup> Pedziwiatr et al., “Poland Country Report”, 2020, p605

Reforms include changes in the structure (elimination of the gymnasia) but also in terms of the core curriculum (CC) such as to focus more on domestic history, heroes and literature. Within Poland's mono-cultural context, the focus of intercultural education is “strongly embedded locally, regionally, and nationally in the context of national, ethnic, and cultural borderland transformations.”<sup>377</sup> Reforms also include compulsory religion and ethics classes which focus on the “traditional family” and parenthood roles.

Education experts warn that the education reforms have been used to restructure the education system along “ideological lines”, to instil patriotism and respect for national heritage and traditions, cultural identity, conservative values, and Catholicism to the younger generations.<sup>378</sup> Kościółek has warned that, “any attempt to awaken national pride in Polish people may forge an acceptance of discrimination towards migrant children as Polish children have started to feel superior over their peers from different nations and are building their exceptionalism on exclusion.”<sup>379</sup> Żuk similarly suggests that the reforms have had a detrimental impact as they have been used to promote an idealised vision of a homogenous national past instead of celebrating a diverse future. “This combination of nationalism, conservatism, and religious fundamentalism that prevails in Polish schools can produce individuals who will be fearful of new ideas, reluctant to cultural differences and, above all, will cope poorly with the challenges of modernity.”<sup>380</sup> This education model, and teaching of ideology, hinders ideas of equality or multicultural projects.<sup>381</sup>

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<sup>377</sup> Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska and Urszula Markowska-Manista, ‘Intercultural Education in a Monocultural Context: Global and Local Dimensions of Sensitive Topics’, *Society Register* 6, no. 1 (8 March 2022): p15, <https://doi.org/10.14746/sr.2022.6.1.01>.

<sup>378</sup> Piotr Żuk, ‘Nation, National Remembrance, and Education – Polish Schools as Factories of Nationalism and Prejudice’, *Nationalities Papers* 46, no. 6 (2 November 2018): p13 <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1381079>.

<sup>379</sup> Kościółek, “Migration Backgrounds in Polish Schools”, 2020, p605

<sup>380</sup> Żuk, “Polish Schools as Factories of Nationalism and Prejudice”, 2018

<sup>381</sup> Ibid.



## **Inclusive education for refugee children and youth from Ukraine**

This section will illustrate some of the changes in policy and approaches in response to the influx of refugee children and youth from Ukraine. It will also discuss some of the challenges identified for implementing the policies.

The governing authorities in both countries estimate around 35% of refugees registered in their country are children and young people under the age of 18, in need of schooling: most of them are of elementary school age.<sup>382</sup>

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<sup>382</sup> [Central Register of Foreigners (AZR)/ Data from the Ministry of Education and Sports (information on registration for PESL; Polish ID), ‘Detailed Statistics on Persons Registered in the Register of Citizens of Ukraine and Members of Their Families. - Otwarte Dane’, accessed 22 June 2023, <https://dane.gov.pl/en/dataset/2715,zarejestrowane-wnioski-o-nadanie-statusu-ukr/resource/48462/table.>]

*This table gives an overview of the numbers of refugees from Ukraine in Poland and Germany*

<b>Ukraine Refugee Situation (as of July 2023) <sup>383</sup></b>		
	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Poland</b>
Refugees recorded in country	1 079 815	968 390
Refugees from Ukraine who applied for Asylum, TP or similar national protection scheme <sup>384</sup>	961 725	1 639 725
% of total (7,891,977) Ukrainians across Europe (Nov. 2022) <sup>385</sup>	12,9%	19,3%
Number of school-aged children and young people from UA Estimated percentage [May 2023]	290,000	528,110
Number of school-aged children and young people from UA enrolled in schools. <sup>386</sup> [May 2023]	213.600 <sup>387</sup>	194,000 <sup>388</sup>

*Resoucre: UNHCR*

<sup>383</sup> UNHCR, ‘Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation’, ODP.

<sup>384</sup> [The exact number of refugees from Ukraine who have arrived or left cannot be determined with certainty as Some individuals may have continued their journey or returned to Ukraine.]

<sup>385</sup> UNHCR, ‘Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation’, ODP.

<sup>386</sup> UNESCO, ‘Poland’s Education Responses to the Influx of Ukrainian Refugees’, accessed 22 June 2023, <https://www.unesco.org/en/ukraine-war/education/poland-support>

<sup>387</sup> Statistica, ‘Geflüchtete Kinder aus der Ukraine an deutschen Schulen 2023’, Statista, accessed 24 July 2023, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1308090/umfrage/gefluechtete-kinder-und-jugendliche-aus-der-ukraine-an-deutschen-schulen/>.

<sup>388</sup> [Polish Education Information System (SIO)]

## Governance

In 2022, the KMK set up a “Task Force Ukraine”, in which the ministers of education formulated the general goals for the school year. Their announcement in March concluded:

“The federal states will utilise existing state-specific support programs for the education of newly arrived and refugee children and adolescents. The acquisition of the language of instruction will be facilitated through systematic offers in German as a second language. This is an essential prerequisite for the students' academic success and their swift integration into regular classes.”<sup>389</sup>

Currently, there are no nationwide guidelines on the schooling of refugee children from Ukraine. The approaches for their integration depend on the State they live in. German authorities encouraged drawing and building on prior experiences gained, especially reactivating structures and materials developed during the 2015/16 influx of Syrian refugees. The German School Barometer indicated that 61% of schools confirmed being “pedagogically and conceptually prepared to accommodate newly arrived students.”<sup>390</sup> However, the KMK recommendations for integrating refugee children and youth from Ukraine in schools are vague.<sup>391</sup>

The Act of 12 March 2022 reaffirms that Ukrainians granted temporary protection are entitled to access the Polish education system<sup>392</sup>. Additionally, MEiN has issued Ordinances which provide further guidance on access to education for Ukrainian citizens.<sup>393</sup> The MEiN also established the ‘Council for Refugee Education’, for experts to help welcome refugees from Ukraine, monitor the situation and respond to challenges arising in schools.<sup>394</sup> UNICEF Poland has been a key actor in supporting the MEiN and Science to facilitate the integration of Ukrainian students, and improve access to quality learning for children in Poland.<sup>395</sup> However, the CEO report indicates that the process of

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<sup>389</sup> KMK, “Education Ukraine”, 2022, p2

<sup>390</sup> RBS, “Das deutsche Schulbarometer”, 2023, p22

<sup>391</sup> Elsa Lehrer, “The Integration of Ukrainian Refugees into the Education System in Germany and Poland”, *Brown Political Review*, (15 November 2022) accessed; 18 July 2023, <https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2022/11/ukrainian-students-in-europe/>.

<sup>392</sup> Office for Foreigners, “Amendment to the Law on Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with the Armed Conflict on the Territory of the Country,” Gov.Pl, accessed 2 May 2023, <https://www.gov.pl/web/udsc-en/the-law-on-assistance-to-ukrainian-citizens-in-connection-with-the-armed-conflict-on-the-territory-of-the-country-has-entered-into-force>.

<sup>393</sup> [Ordinance of 21 March 2022 (for the 2021/2022 academic year), Ordinance of 11 August 2022 (for the 2022/2023 academic year)]

<sup>394</sup> OpenLEX, ‘Zarządzenie Ministra Edukacji i Nauki: z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. w sprawie powołania Rady do spraw edukacji uchodźców’, Internetowa baza tekstów prawnych, accessed 20 July 2023, <https://sip.lex.pl>.

<sup>395</sup> Gov.pl. “Portal Gov.Pl.” Gov.pl. Accessed 20 May, 2023. <https://www.gov.pl/web/edukacja-i-nauka/ministerprzemyslaw-czarnek-i-unicef-podpisali-memorandum-oporozumieniu-ws-przeciwdzialania-wykluczeniu edukacyjnemu-dzieci-i-mlodziezy-z-ukrainy>.

taking on new students in schools which had no prior experience in working with foreign students was “spontaneous and largely depended on the competences and motivations of individual teachers.”<sup>396</sup> In Poland, there has been no top-level systematic approach introduced for the inclusion of Ukrainian children and youth in schools. Czarnek (MiEN) claims this as a “flexible system” that allows school heads and teachers to come up with, and decide the final solution; for assessment and evaluation of children, and decisions about the admission into Polish classes or preparatory classes.<sup>397</sup> Czarnek praised the system's success in allowing students from Ukraine to be educated in Poland so legal regulations, such as creation of preparatory classes and possibility of employing Ukrainian teachers, continue to apply in the school year 2022-23.<sup>398</sup>

### **Compulsory education**

In Poland, school-age refugees from Ukraine are not obliged to attend local compulsory education if they are following the Ukrainian system via online learning.<sup>399</sup> The following options are possible :

- Following the Ukrainian system online
- Attending regular classes
  - with additional Polish language lessons
  - Or additional support classes
- Attending preparatory classes
  - based on the general education curricula but adapted to the needs of learners in terms of content, methods, and forms of teaching
- Teaching assistant
  - Assisted by a person speaking home language<sup>400</sup>

The school head determines the form of support, in accordance with the choice of the family and the needs of the individual child. To accommodate the influx of Ukrainians, the maximum number of students per classroom has been raised to 29. What's more, the number of students per preparatory class has been raised to 25 (from 15). Polish language

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<sup>396</sup> Magdalena Tędziągolska, Bartłomiej Walczak, Anna Żelazowska-Kosiorek. “Culturally diverse school: Challenges and needs stemming from the arrival of Ukrainian students”, Center for Citizenship Education (CEO), 2022, p2

<sup>397</sup> Głos Nauczycielski, “Jak oceniać ukraińskich uczniów w polskich szkołach? Szef MEiN: „Ja nie uczę. Proszę pytać nauczycieli””, (24 May 2022), accessed 18 July 2023 <https://glos.pl/jak-oceniac-ukrainskich-uczniow-w-polskich-szkolach-szef-mein-ja-nie-ucze-prosze-pytac-nauczycieli>.

<sup>398</sup> Ibid.

<sup>399</sup> [Ordinance of 21 March 2022 (for the 2021/2022 academic year) and the Ordinance of 11 August 2022 (for the 2022/2023 academic year)]

<sup>400</sup> European Commission, EACEA, Eurydice, *Supporting Refugee Learners from Ukraine in Schools in Europe*. LU: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, p16-17  
<https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2797/066388>

classes were also increased to no less than 6 lessons (from 2) per week per child and from September 2022, the preparatory classes may be organised for a maximum period of 24 months (instead of 12). Ukrainian learners may sit the Matura (8th grade, final exam) and vocational qualifications under special conditions such as extended time and the ability to use a dictionary for translations. However, many believe that Ukrainian students do not have sufficient command of Polish, or grasp of the basic curriculum, required for passing. This poses problems for Ukrainians' continued education as the Matura is a requirement for admission to higher education.

Whereas before, virtually no monitoring or data on foreign students was collected and provided, the MEiN now publishes weekly updates on the enrolment of Ukrainian learners, by school type, grade and district as well as number of Ukrainian students benefiting from free Polish language classes on the Open Data Portal.<sup>401</sup> Initially, most parents decided to put education “on hold” until deciding whether they would stay in Poland, return to Ukraine, or relocate to another EU country.<sup>402</sup> However, by the end of the 2021/22 academic year, there were only 182,245 Ukrainian children enrolled in the Polish educational system, with only 92,375 receiving free Polish language classes in parallel.<sup>403</sup> This means that nearly half of Ukrainian children living in Poland are not enrolled in Polish schools, with only one in 5 students (22%) attending Polish secondary school at the end of the academic year 2021/2022.<sup>404</sup> The low schooling registration rates have been attributed to factors such as frequent travel between Poland and Ukraine. Most are assumed to be continuing learning online, many have returned to Ukraine, and some may simply not be attending school.<sup>405</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> Ministry of Education and Science (MEiN), ‘Open Data Portal’, accessed 20 July 2023, <https://dane.gov.pl/en/dataset/2711,uczniowie-uchodzcy-z-ukrainy>.

<sup>402</sup> “Rzymkowski: od 1 września naukę w polskich szkołach może rozpocząć nawet 400 tys. dzieci z Ukrainy”, *Głos Nauczycielski*, 30 May 2022, accessed, 18 July 2023 <https://glos.pl/rzymkowski-od-1-wrzesnia-nauke-w-polskich-szkolach-moze-rozpoczac-400-tys-dzieci-z-ukrainy>

<sup>403</sup> UNESCO, ‘Poland’s Education Responses to the Influx of Ukrainian Refugees’, accessed 22 June 2023, <https://www.unesco.org/en/ukraine-war/education/poland-support>

<sup>404</sup> ANSA, ‘Half of Ukrainian Refugee Children in Poland Not Enrolled in Polish Schools’, InfoMigrants, 13 July 2023, <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/50330/half-of-ukrainian-refugee-children-in-poland-not-enrolled-in-polish-schools>.

<sup>405</sup> Ibid.

<b>Border crossings since 24 February 2022<sup>406</sup></b>	
Ukraine to Poland	Poland to Ukraine
13 386 665	11 072 395

Of the Ukrainian refugee learners enrolled in schools around 80% have been included in regular classes. Czarnek (MEiN), announced that children and youth from Ukraine who had joined the Polish education system, did not disrupt the educational process of Polish students.<sup>407</sup> He assured that in the possibility of a new wave of refugee migration to Poland, the Polish education system had the capacity to accommodate up to 400,000 children in the school year 2022/23, explaining Poland is experiencing a demographic collapse so there are a lot of places in Polish schools.<sup>408</sup> However, in January 2023, the National Teachers' Union indicated the Polish school system is experiencing around 20,000 teacher shortages and a lack of spaces in school.<sup>409</sup> This has led to increasing concerns in Polish society, as voiced by the former Minister of Education, Anna Zalewska, that “Polish parents would not forgive us if we destroyed their children’s education system.”<sup>410</sup>

In Germany, even if refugees attend Ukrainian school online, they are obliged, by law, to attend compulsory education in local schools. Reports suggest this is not being fully enforced for around 24% of Ukrainian children.<sup>411</sup> Often newly arrived migrant and refugee learners are placed into these separate classes, however, the KMK have

<sup>406</sup> UNHCR, ‘Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation’, ODP.

<sup>407</sup> [Czarnek announced at a conference in May 2022] ‘Rzymkowski: od 1 września naukę w polskich szkołach może rozpocząć nawet 400 tys. dzieci z Ukrainy’, *Głos Nauczycielski*, 30 May 2022, [accessed, 18 July 2023] <https://glos.pl/rzymkowski-od-1-wrzesnia-nauke-w-polskich-szkolach-moze-rozpozacz-400-tys-dzieci-z-ukrainy>.

<sup>408</sup> ‘Rzymkowski: od 1 września naukę w polskich szkołach może rozpocząć nawet 400 tys. dzieci z Ukrainy’, *Głos Nauczycielski*, 30 May 2022, [accessed, 18 July 2023] <https://glos.pl/rzymkowski-od-1-wrzesnia-nauke-w-polskich-szkolach-moze-rozpozacz-400-tys-dzieci-z-ukrainy>.

<sup>409</sup> UNESCO, ‘Poland’s Education Responses to the Influx of Ukrainian Refugees’, accessed 22 June 2023, <https://www.unesco.org/en/ukraine-war/education/poland-support>

<sup>410</sup> Justyna Suchecka, “Anna Zalewska: polscy rodzice nie wybaczyliby nam, gdybyśmy rozwalili system edukacji ich dzieci, TVN24, (17.032022), accessed 12 March 2023, Available at: <https://tvn24.pl/premium/anna-zalewska-o-zmianach-w-edukacji-i-przyjmowaniu-do-szkol-ukrainskich-dzieci-5639349>

<sup>411</sup> Lea Schulze, ‘Geflüchtete ukrainische Kinder an Schulen: Ausnahmezustand für das überlastete deutsche Bildungssystem’, *Der Tagesspiegel Online*, (10.01.2023) ccessed 10 July 2023, [approximatey 3,000 out of 12,700 Ukrainian children are not attending local schools in Germany] <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/gefluchtete-ukrainische-kinder-an-schulen-ausnahmezustand-fur-das-uberlastete-deutsche-bildungssystem-9139692.html>.

encouraged the rapid integration of learners into regular classes, particularly for primary and lower secondary school.<sup>412</sup> As of February 2023, there are around 200,000 refugee children from Ukraine attending schools. However, around 4,000 refugee children and teenagers from Ukraine are unable to attend local public schools due to a lack of available spots in Germany, particularly in the city state Berlin (approx. 1,700 waiting) and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) (approx. 1,800 waiting).<sup>413</sup>

Refugees and adolescents from Ukraine make up around 2.7% share of the total number of students in schools in Germany.<sup>414</sup> At the same period, almost the same number of students from other countries have joined schools. This means preparatory classes are mixed with children from diverse nationalities. Newly immigrated students, from Ukraine and especially other countries, are more frequently enrolled in schools located in socially disadvantaged areas (Ukraine: 3.7%, Other Countries: 5.3% / share of total number of students).<sup>415</sup> Unlike the refugee children and adolescents from Ukraine, the KMK has not published any data on this group yet.<sup>416</sup>

## Teachers

In Poland, the lack of systemic solutions with clear guidelines, procedures, educational objectives, and long-term planning for the integration and education of children from Ukraine has been heavily criticised.<sup>417</sup> “Teachers frequently state they expect the Ministry to specify the grading rules further and to provide more information on how to work with foreign students.”<sup>418</sup> The report indicates that teachers in Poland felt unprepared, as many were used to working in a culturally and nationally homogenous environment and thus lacked experience or training working with culturally diverse groups.<sup>419</sup> Another study indicated that before the outbreak of the war, 41,4% of the teachers currently teaching children from Ukraine had never experienced working with children from other countries

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<sup>412</sup> KMK, “Education Ukraine”, 2022, p2

<sup>413</sup> Benjamin Bathke “Germany: Thousands of Refugee Children Unable to Attend School”, InfoMigrants, (31.05. 2023), accessed, 12 July 2023  
<https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/49293/germany-thousands-of-refugee-children-unable-to-attend-school>.

<sup>414</sup> RBS “Das Deutsche Schulbarometer”, 2023.

<sup>415</sup> Ibid.

<sup>416</sup> Ibid.

<sup>417</sup> Tędziągolska, et al., “Culturally diverse school”, 2022, p11, 24, 56, 77

<sup>418</sup> Ibid, p5

<sup>419</sup> Ibid, p77

or cultures.<sup>420</sup> According to the CEO, there is a lack of professional preparation in the fields of teaching Polish as a foreign language, intercultural education, anti-discrimination, conflict resolution, and working with foreign students, especially with respect to diagnosing students' emotional states (trauma) fleeing a war zone.<sup>421</sup> “They need to increase their competencies in the area of diagnosing and responding to difficult emotions of the children, and their ability to recognize situations that are potentially endangering the emotional safety of students (i.e. avoiding exercises that could make children feel threatened or actions that may create a conflict in the classroom).”<sup>422</sup> Most teachers in Poland also voiced their concern that the Ministry had not provided guidelines on what criteria should be used for grading, and, as a result, many teachers avoid or even use more preferential grading for Ukrainian students.<sup>423</sup> This has led to tensions in their relations with Polish students.

Even before the arrival of refugees from Ukraine, German schools have reported being at their limits for several years due to lack of teachers. All federal states report that they are searching for teachers due to the increasing number of students. The German Teachers' Association estimates that there is currently a shortage of around 40,000 teachers in Germany, which results in class cancellations, teachers feeling overwhelmed, the inability to cover course content, and excessive substitute teaching.<sup>424</sup> A survey conducted in November 2022 concluded that  $\frac{2}{3}$  of school principals (67%) consider the lack of pedagogical staff to be the biggest challenge facing schools in Germany.<sup>425</sup> In contrast, integration and inclusion was not considered a significant issue, with only 8% indicating concern.<sup>426</sup> Reports suggest the arrival of additional refugee children and young people in need of schooling has left educational institutions overburdened, as they require recruiting teachers or interpreters to communicate in Ukrainian or Russian, as well as

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<sup>420</sup> Jacek Pyżalski et Al. “Together in the Classroom: Children from Ukraine in Polish Schools. Potentials and Challenges in Building a Multicultural School in the Context of the War in Ukraine, Teachers’ Perspective,” Research Report, School with Class Foundation, 2022, p12.

<sup>421</sup> Tędziągolska, et al., “Culturally diverse school”, 2022, p63, 77

<sup>422</sup> Tędziągolska, et al., “Culturally diverse school”, 2022, p56

<sup>423</sup> Ibid, p5

<sup>424</sup> Lea Schulze, ‘Geflüchtete ukrainische Kinder an Schulen: Ausnahmezustand für das überlastete deutsche Bildungssystem’, *Der Tagesspiegel Online*, (10.01.2023) accessed 10 July 2023, <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/gefluechtete-ukrainische-kinder-an-schulen-ausnahmezustand-fur-das-uberlastete-deutsche-bildungssystem-9139692.html>.

<sup>425</sup> RBS, ‘Das Deutsche Schulbarometer’ (2023) [In socially disadvantaged areas, this figure is at 80 %.]

<sup>426</sup> Ibid.



child psychologists that specialise in trauma.<sup>427</sup> This has resulted in hiring teachers without full teaching qualifications such as substitute, retired, trainees, interns, even volunteer teachers.<sup>428</sup> 53% of schools see no possibility of accepting more refugee children as they currently have no more capacity to admit additional students, especially in socially disadvantaged areas.<sup>429</sup> Grassroot organisations have helped alleviate the burden on schools by providing support to Ukrainian refugees, including the setting up of supplementary classes to assist Ukrainian children with language acquisition and homework for German schools.<sup>430</sup>

### **Ukrainian teachers**

Both Poland and Germany have passed legislation which facilitates employment procedures for Ukrainian teachers. In Poland, the requirements (Polish citizenship and language certificates) for teacher assistance providing support for refugees have been reduced. It is sufficient to have knowledge of the Polish language. There are no qualification requirements for the employment of Ukrainian citizens in schools, but they should be prepared and assessed by the school director. Ukrainians have predominantly been employed as (inter) cultural assistants, if their level of Polish language (spoken and written) is sufficient to support students without knowledge of the Polish language. Schools also gained additional funds to hire such teachers and have introduced special ‘intensive’ training programmes in order to promote Ukrainian education professionals’ acquisition of the language of schooling. Similarly, the Federal Education Minister, Bettina Stark-Watzinger, has also suggested hiring Ukrainian teachers to work at schools and day-care centres in Germany as a quick solution to alleviate staffing pressures.<sup>431</sup> The KMK has also looked to train Ukrainian teachers through intensive language courses. The Federal States agreed on key points regarding the employment of Ukrainian teaching staff to recognise their foreign teaching qualifications and enable their long-term employment. However, in Ukraine, a Bachelor's degree is enough to work as a teacher, whilst in

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<sup>427</sup> Val Stutz, “Educating Ukrainians in German Schools - Addressing Key Challenges”, *Centre for Humanitarian Action*, (2 June 2023) accessed 10 July 2023, <https://www.chaberlin.org/en/blog/educating-ukrainians-in-german-schools-addressing-key-challenges-2/>.

<sup>428</sup> Joe Bauer, “Bundesländer richten Willkommensklassen ein”, *Mediendienst Integration*, (24 March 2022), accessed 21 July 2023, <https://mediendienst-integration.de/artikel/bundeslaender-richten-willkommensklassen-ein.html>.

<sup>429</sup> RBS, ‘Das Deutsche Schulbarometer’ (2023)

<sup>430</sup> Stutz, “Educating Ukrainians in German Schools”, 2023.

<sup>431</sup> Sabine Kinkartz, ‘Ukrainian Refugee Kids Face a Challenge in German Schools,’ (15 Dec 2022), *Dw.com*, accessed 14 July 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainian-refugee-kids-face-a-challenge-in-german-schools/a-64109244>.

Germany, teachers are required to have a Master's degree in education followed by an 18-month traineeship. Currently there are around 3,000 Ukrainian teachers employed by German schools, mainly as “additional educational staff” whose salaries are significantly lower.<sup>432</sup> The Federal government has acknowledged the need to improve the framework and conditions in the education sector, to provide more funding and hire more specialised staff to help integrate Ukrainian pupils more effectively.

### **‘Whole child’ approach**

Poland and Germany have both introduced top-level policies and measures promoting learners’ social, emotional and mental well-being through psychosocial services operating within schools and external psychosocial services collaborating with schools.<sup>433</sup> The KMK encourages counselling, mentoring and academic assistance through the existing capacities for the purpose of psychological and social support “and if necessary, expanded.”<sup>434</sup> The KMK have also encouraged making use of helplines, and psychoeducational (online) resources in the Ukrainian language. In Poland, school directors have been able to employ specialists to provide Ukrainian learners with psychosocial and pedagogical support during both the 2021/2022 and 2022/2023 school years, although funding is not specifically allocated for this purpose, and services are provided by municipal authorities. Psychological-pedagogical counselling centres have been opened to provide assistance and improve the recognition of the educational needs of Ukrainian refugee learners. Poland has also introduced specific teacher training addressing the mental health experiences and needs of refugee learners from Ukraine, including understanding the sources and impact of stress and trauma on the children and young people and their capacity to support them. Also, webinars have been organised on how to address the emotional dimension of the war in Ukraine.<sup>435</sup>

### **Assimilation vs preservation of Ukrainian cultural identity**

The Ukrainian Consul General, Iryna Tybinka, has recommended that “Ukrainian students continue to focus on the Ukrainian curriculum to ensure continuity of their education and the retention of their national identity.”<sup>436</sup>

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<sup>432</sup> Ibid.

<sup>433</sup> Eurydice, “Supporting learners from Ukraine”, 2022, p25

<sup>434</sup> KMK, “Education Ukraine”, 2022, p2

<sup>435</sup> Eurydice, “Supporting learners from Ukraine”, 2022, p24

<sup>436</sup> Lehrer, “Integration of Ukrainian Refugees”, 2022

In Poland, The Act of 12 March 2022 provides for additional funding to be allocated to local authorities to support the delivery of educational tasks related to the education of Ukrainian citizens. An amendment to the Act<sup>437</sup> in January 2023 extended additional funding for schools supporting Ukrainian students, including funding for the purchase of textbooks, educational materials, and other learning supplies. In addition to integration into regular schools, it is possible for schools to establish groups or classes specifically for learners from Ukraine. Some schools have been set up in which Ukrainian teachers teach the Ukrainian curriculum, allowing students to continue their education.<sup>438</sup> However these run through private funding and are located in larger cities, such as Warsaw, and there is high demand but limited spaces.<sup>439</sup> Poland has also established schools with bilingual (Polish-Ukrainian) classes.<sup>440</sup> They follow the Polish curriculum but hold an equal number of students, allowing Ukrainian students to learn Polish, and Polish students to learn Ukrainian. However, this is the exception, rather than the norm. A study conducted by the Centre of Citizenship Education revealed that in Poland:

Nearly all of the actions intended to sustain the culture of the country of origin are taking place out of school. The Polish educational system, like many others in the world, is assimilative in its character, despite the existence of solutions for preserving the identity of the migrant's country of origin.<sup>441</sup>

The study also concluded that; “The predominant belief in the schools participating in the study is that the Ukrainian and Polish cultures are very much alike”<sup>442</sup>, warning that “This can lead to the overlooking of differences that are relevant to the integration process (including planning effective action).”<sup>443</sup> Polish authorities have been accused of taking an assimilation approach, and seeking to “Polonise” young Ukrainians, placing them directly into regular Polish classes and depriving them of their language and culture.<sup>444</sup> However, Czarnek (MEiN) refused these accusations, stating; “There is no denationalisation of Ukrainian children happening in Poland. Our aim is to take care of them while they are in our country by force.”<sup>445</sup> Similar concerns have been raised in Germany. The KMK expressed:

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<sup>437</sup> [Act of January 13, 2023 on the amendment of the Act on aid to Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict in the territory of that state and certain other acts. Available at: [http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie9.nsf/nazwa/2845\\_u/\\$file/2845\\_u.pdf](http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie9.nsf/nazwa/2845_u/$file/2845_u.pdf)]

<sup>438</sup> Lehrer, “Integration of Ukrainian Refugees”, 2022

<sup>439</sup> [such as the Unbreakable Ukraine Foundation]

<sup>440</sup> [There are five bilingual schools across Poland. The first opened in Warsaw in September 2022; Primary School No. 361 in Białołęka district, Warsaw]

<sup>441</sup> Tędziągolska, et al., “Culturally diverse school”, 2022, p52

<sup>442</sup> Ibid, p44

<sup>443</sup> Ibid, p44

<sup>444</sup> Alicja Ptak, ‘200,000 Ukrainian Refugee Children Face a Steep Learning Curve at Polish Schools’, Notes From Poland, 18 May 2022, accessed 18 July 2023 <https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/05/18/200000-ukrainian-refugee-children-face-a-steep-learning-curve-at-polish-schools/>.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

A particular challenge is to accommodate both the Ukrainian government's desire to enable the acquisition of Ukrainian educational content and the acquisition of the German language and integration into the German education system.<sup>446</sup> KMK announced: “Where possible, voluntary offers in the Ukrainian language should also be included in the curriculum.” and “The integration of Ukrainian online materials can be used as a supplementary and complementary tool in regular classroom instruction.”<sup>447</sup> The Robert Bosch Stiftung found that  $\frac{3}{4}$  of refugee children from Ukraine are in regular classes (at least partially) with students from Germany, whilst the instruction of Ukrainian language or Ukrainian subject classes were not being conducted in schools, with only 1% of schools indicating the presence of in-person teaching by Ukrainian staff or online classes.<sup>448</sup>

Both Stark-Watzinger and Czarnek, have indicated the need to establish long-term perspectives should Ukrainian children and young people not return. Reports from both countries suggest Ukrainian students are not being offered sufficient lessons to learn the language of instruction to facilitate integration, with classes often being set up exclusively taught in Ukrainian.<sup>449</sup> Though the KMK have encouraged that:

Efforts should be made to promote cultural exchange and understanding between Ukrainian refugee students and the local student population. This can be achieved through activities that foster dialogue, respect, and appreciation for each other's backgrounds and cultures.<sup>450</sup>

Critics warn that the segregated classes may become the permanent solution which will significantly hinder integration as Ukrainians and ‘natives’ do not have the opportunity to interact with each other.<sup>451</sup> This has also been observed when placing a large number of students from Ukraine into one class.

### **Online learning**

Even though distance learning has been discouraged, Poland has also funded large-scale provision of equipment (such as computers), infrastructure, and technical support. Poland’s official online educational platform<sup>452</sup> has also added a Ukrainian section.

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<sup>446</sup> KMK, “Education Ukraine”, 2022, p2

<sup>447</sup> KMK, “Education Ukraine”, 2022

<sup>448</sup> RBS, “Das Deutsche Schulbarometer”, 2023

<sup>449</sup> Stutz, “Education Ukraine”, 2023.

<sup>450</sup> KMK, “Education Ukraine”, 2022, p3

<sup>451</sup> Stutz, “Educating Ukrainians in German Schools”, 2023.

<sup>452</sup> Gov.pl, ‘Portal Gov.pl’, accessed 20 May 2023, <https://www.gov.pl>.

Germany has also established the website “Germany4Ukraine.de”<sup>453</sup> which provides information in Ukrainian, Russian, German and English, including about the access, rights and obligations for attending schools in the different federal states. KMK has encouraged the use of Ukrainian online materials as a supplementary and complementary tool in regular classroom instruction. Support for synchronous distance learning also enables Ukrainian learners in secondary education to participate in schooling and final examinations.<sup>454</sup>

### **Hybrid learning**

Many Ukrainians are following two education systems simultaneously. This form of hybrid learning allows Ukrainian children to navigate their new environment and integrate into their host societies whilst maintaining a sense of national Ukrainian identity, and facilitates reintegration should they decide to return to Ukraine. However, there are concerns for managing the workload between host schools and Ukrainian lessons. This means that students have little free time to participate in after-school or extracurricular activities, a factor hindering socialisation or facilitating social connections between Ukrainian children and adolescents with those already residing in the country.<sup>455</sup>

In sum, this chapter illustrates some of the communalities in Poland and Germany, but also their unique governance and policy approaches, as well as some of the discrepancies between political statements and actual implementation of the policies. Above all, this chapter demonstrates some of the challenges and obstacles for implementing EU regulations and recommendations.

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<sup>453</sup> Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), ‘Germany4ukraine’, accessed 18 July 2023, <https://www.germany4ukraine.de/hilfeportal-en>.

<sup>454</sup> Eurydice, ‘Supporting learners from Ukraine’, 2022, p.18

<sup>455</sup> Tędziągolska, et al., “Culturally diverse school”, 2022, p62

## Discussion

### **EU Level**

One has to note the drastically different responses between refugees from Ukraine and other migrant movements. The study has also shown how “migration is not simply the influx of people (refugees or economic migrants), it is among many other things an influx of images and emotions and arguments.”<sup>456</sup> A “crisis” is effectively a rhetorical construct negotiated through public and political discourse. The comparison shows us how official discourse can mobilise “solidarity” instead of “politics of fear”. A “humanitarian crisis” triggers a human rights-based approach, which focuses on the well-being of migrants and refugees; a “migration crisis”, on the other hand, instrumentalises sentiments of fear. Portraying migrants as “illegal”, an “invasion”, or a “threat to security” is used to justify extraordinary measures such as increasing security measures, the militarisation of borders, policies of deterrence, detention, incarceration and deportation of migrants. Criminalising and dehumanising migrants allows for the disregard of their treatment, which can and has led to the depoliticisation of human rights issues.<sup>457</sup> The official response to immigration has a clear impact on how the public interacts with immigrants. The case for Ukraine has shown what is possible with more positive narratives and the political will to implement humanitarian based policies and measures which focus on inclusion and the holistic needs of refugees.

The 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum is still under negotiation, with unresolved issues and disagreements among Member States and many criticising its inadequacies and structural deficiencies.<sup>458</sup> We can observe unprecedented unity at EU level, and the ad hoc capacity of Member States to welcome refugees. It has also shown that a solid “framework for responsibility sharing and deeper, EU-level cooperation is necessary for developing a resilient and robust asylum system.”<sup>459</sup> As such, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the EU’s “ability to rapidly mobilise and increase its reception capacity in light

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<sup>456</sup> Ivan Krastev, “The Refugee Crisis And The Return Of The East-West Divide In Europe”, (*Slavic Review* 76 (2), 2017) 292

<sup>457</sup> Weronika Grzebalskaa and Andrea Petóbb, “The gendered modus operandi of the illiberal transformation in Hungary and Poland” (Women’s Studies International Forum 2017), p4  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2017.12.001>

<sup>458</sup> Christian Kvorning Lassen, ‘Policy paper: The New Pact on Migration and Asylum and the War in Ukraine: Time for a Paradigm Shift?’, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, (2023) , p3  
<https://europeum.org/en/articles/detail/5470/policy-paper-the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-and-the-war-in-ukraine-time-for-a-paradigm-shift>.

<sup>459</sup> Ibid, p14

of events leading to sudden influxes in immigration”<sup>460</sup> but also the shortcomings of the current system, that there is at present, no universal framework for migration and asylum.

The unique response to refugees coming from Ukraine reminds us of the privileges granted to white, European subjects over others.<sup>461</sup> Nevertheless, the aim of this paper is to discuss what can be achieved when there is political will and public support to welcome migrants and refugees. This could be considered a pivotal moment in Europe’s response to immigrant integration, moving away from security-based paradigms and national narratives around migration to a genuine humanitarian based response. The hope is that the original crisis response will be transformed into a medium- and long-term migration integration framework or even be transposed to include other migrant groups.<sup>462</sup> Diversity, when well-managed, is an opportunity. Immigration can enrich society.

### **National level**

The focus on the case studies exposes some of the challenges of implementing EU policy recommendations. The background on the case studies illustrates how countries across Europe have very different experiences in terms of migration stock and the origins and status of immigrants, which shapes the country's demographics. The contextualisation chapter also reveals how every Member State has a unique history, culture, vision, and values which influence their institutional systems and approaches and principles for immigration and education. The findings illustrate how the perception of public and political narratives towards immigrants changes over time (be it the need for skilled workers, restrictions to unwanted criminals, or the moral obligation to help those in need), and how the reaction of host societies and governing authorities influence integration. It is, therefore, difficult to come up with a cohesive EU migration and asylum system, since the individual member states have their own trajectories and national interests and thus implement the recommendations according to their own interpretation, which will depend on their current situation.

This paper has shown how Poland and Germany have made amendments to promote the integration and inclusion of refugee learners from Ukraine into schools. Whilst Germany

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<sup>460</sup> Ibid, p6

<sup>461</sup> Linda Morrice, “Will the war in Ukraine be a pivotal moment for refugee education in Europe?”, *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 41, no. 3, (2022), p254, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02601370.2022.2079260>.

<sup>462</sup> MEDAM, “Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”, 2022, p43

stood out prior to the war as the EU country with the most comprehensive policy approach, Poland's policies were virtually non-existent. To understand the comparatively limited provision Poland had before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is important to note that only 1,7% of the population were foreign-born, compared to 15,4% in Germany. The starting points were thus a relative “mono-culture” to a comparative “super diverse”. Germany was, therefore, able to build on existing policies and legislations for the inclusion of migrant children as well as prior experiences, including teacher training, materials, and infrastructure. Poland, on the other hand, had to introduce a series of new, ad hoc, policies and measures to accommodate the influx of Ukrainians. In other words, both Poland and Germany introduced “new policies” specifically for the case of Ukraine; however, Poland moved from a “non-policy” approach, largely ignoring responsibility for immigrant integration, whereas Germany came from an “inclusive policy” approach with structures already in place for governing diverse societies.

Along with the official documents and political statements issued by the governing authorities, the paper has incorporated surveys, interviews and statistics. The decision to not only look at raw data but incorporate academic and media discussions helps to gain a broader understanding of the discrepancies between political statements and the actual implementation of policies in their context.

Despite the fact that Poland had formulated only a few measures prior to the war, what stood out was that Polish documents are very concise and matter-of-fact, with little description, whereas the German documents are far more wordy and persuasive, including vision statements. Whilst Germany had already introduced specific policies for intercultural education, ensuring an inclusive school climate, and addressing the segregation of children and young people from migrant backgrounds in schools. Poland on the other hand, had abolished anti-discrimination education and official recommendations for the core curricula focus on national-conservatism and domestic issues. In Poland the response was particularly surprising, as even politicians known for their anti-immigrant stance made a remarkable shift towards promoting the acceptance of refugees. What's more, since 2015, the PiS have systematically defunded asylum processes and focused on prevention at the borders.<sup>463</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> MEDAM, “Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”, 2022, p37



It is clear that the new integration policies are solely intended for the specific case of Ukrainians. Poland has, from the offset, excluded non-Ukrainian nationals from receiving TP benefits. Though there was a large pre-war presence of Ukrainians in Poland, policymakers have had to establish adequate reforms for inclusion of Ukrainian women and children, which entailed many changes in schools. German authorities have argued that there is no preferential treatment towards Ukrainian refugees; the situation is just unique. A significant challenge in Germany is the inclusion of other migrant and refugee groups. Since Germany is still hosting many refugees from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, it is essential for authorities to establish a fair system, and ensure equal treatment towards the needs of other refugee groups, without compromising the needs of Ukrainian refugees. This adds additional challenges, as teachers of preparatory classes also have to support students with a diverse range of backgrounds (mainly Turkish and Arabic speakers) on top of Ukrainian students.

Neither Poland nor Germany have introduced a nationwide strategy on the schooling of refugee children and youth from Ukraine. In Germany, the complex federal structure means the approaches for education and integration depend on the State, which leads to incoherent policies and practices. Poland equally lacks a cohesive national strategy as the MEiN has passed responsibility to local authorities and international organisations. Though this allows for flexibility and more context specific measures, the absence of clear instructions or fixed curriculum means that approaches to inclusion and integration depend on the schools, even individual teachers. A lack of systematic procedures can lead to unfair treatment, inequalities and disparities.

We can question what level of integration is expected from Ukrainians since they assume the position of victim, have the status of refugee, are dependent on charity and support of the host country, and their stay is considered provisional. As Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas explain, “From the perspective of the receiving society, exclusionary policies are an expression of a general perception of immigrants as outsiders, which inevitably adversely affects immigrants’ integration.”<sup>464</sup> If full integration is “the process of becoming an accepted part of society”<sup>465</sup> Ukrainians are not truly considered equal or “normal” members of society as they have been targeted with special or specific policies

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<sup>464</sup> Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, “Integration as an Analytical Tool” 2016

<sup>465</sup> Ibid, p14

as an emergency response. As “Temporary Protection” suggests their rights to protection are temporary and have been granted on a limited basis, at most for three years, their stay is considered “short term”, a period of hosting until the end of the war where they are expected to return to Ukraine. Indeed, a UN survey published in September 2022 found that the majority of Ukrainians (81%) intend to return back to Ukraine, and reunite with their families as soon as possible.<sup>466</sup>

The Case Studies show that a key issue concerning the inclusion of Ukrainian children in the host education systems is the uncertainty regarding the length of their stay. Both Polish and German authorities have reported high turnover rates or “rotation” of Ukrainian students, because many decide to go back to Ukraine, move to a different school or even a different country. The “temporariness” has clearly hindered integration efforts, as teachers do not (or do so minimally) include Ukrainian students into educational processes, there is a lack of motivation to learn the host language, and willingness to build relationships from both sides, as the majority still hope to return to Ukraine as soon as possible.<sup>467</sup>

However, depending on the duration and outcome of the war, the efforts to reconstruct and rebuild a peaceful and thriving post-war Ukraine will undoubtedly take time. The World Bank has estimated the minimum cost of £380 billion over the next 10 years to recover and rebuild Russia's destruction.<sup>468</sup> Research shows that displacement is becoming increasingly protracted, and usually lasts around 20 years for refugees.<sup>469</sup> Despite the rising numbers of returns to Ukraine, more recent surveys show that the number of Ukrainians who wish to stay has risen, and many will presumably settle and seek permanent residency after the TPD expires in March 2025.<sup>470</sup>

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<sup>466</sup> Matthew Saltmarsh, “Refugees from Ukraine Eager to Work but Need Sustained Support to Ensure Inclusion”, UNHCR Survey, (September 2022) accessed 3 June 2023, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-survey-refugees-ukraine-eager-work-need-sustained-support-ensure>.

<sup>467</sup> CEO. “Culturally diverse school”, 2022, p 59,74; RBS ‘Das Deutsche Schulbarometer’, 2023.

<sup>468</sup> Al Jazeera ‘World Bank Says \$411bn Cost to Rebuild War-Torn Ukraine’, accessed 10 June 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/23/cost-of-rebuilding-ukraine-due-to-russian-war-411bn-world-bank>.

<sup>469</sup> ‘Forced Displacement: Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)’, accessed 19 June 2023, [https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/humanitarian-aid/forced-displacement-refugees-asylum-seekers-and-internally-displaced-persons-idps\\_en](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/humanitarian-aid/forced-displacement-refugees-asylum-seekers-and-internally-displaced-persons-idps_en).

<sup>470</sup> [13,941,200 border crossings to Ukraine recorded by UNHCR] ‘Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation’, accessed 22 June 2023, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

Providing quality education and care to children from Ukraine has proven to be a big challenge, but is essential as it allows mothers and family members to take up employment.<sup>471</sup> Poland and Germany struggle both with a demographic deficit and an ageing population and thus have a need for immigrant workers to fill severe labour shortages. Therefore, investing in inclusive education will be essential for sustainable integration into labour markets in order to profit from the long-term economic benefits.<sup>472</sup>

In terms of diversity management, in comparison to more assimilative approaches towards other migrants and refugees, the multicultural approach has been considered essential, with special efforts to preserve, practice and protect Ukrainian culture and identity. This is undoubtedly because the Russian state is denying the Ukrainian identity and because there is the vision that refugees from Ukraine will only stay temporarily and will return to their home country. However, this can also be labelled separation, the lowest level of inclusion, as many Ukrainians have denied the “host” culture, and there is minimal contact with domestic society to preserve their own culture. For example, despite TP guaranteeing the right to access national school systems, most children and young people (2 of 3)<sup>473</sup> have decided to follow the Ukrainian curriculum in the Ukrainian language.

UN agencies, such as UNICEF, have encouraged Ukrainian parents and caregivers to enrol their children as schools are not only places of learning but also provide safety, stability, routine, and space to build friendships which can facilitate integration into their host communities.<sup>474</sup> Schools also offer access to services to support the mental health and well-being of children who have suffered loss, displacement, and violence. In accordance with the OECD model, we can observe how Poland and Germany have made considerable positive amendments which take into account holistic approaches to supporting refugees, since, in addition to academic integration, they have introduced more social, emotional, and health services, and thus have advanced the ‘whole child’ approach.<sup>475</sup>

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<sup>471</sup> Maciej Duszczyk and Paweł Kaczmarczyk, “War and Migration: The Recent Influx from Ukraine into Poland and Possible Scenarios for the Future.” *CMR Spotlight* 4 (39). 2022, p.10  
<https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Spotlight-APRIL-2022.pdf>.

<sup>472</sup> Lehrer, “Integration of Ukrainian Refugees”, 2022

<sup>473</sup> UNICEF, ‘Ukraine War Response: Ensuring Access to Learning’, accessed 21 July 2023,  
<https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/ukraine-war-response-ensuring-access-learning>.

<sup>474</sup> UNICEF, ‘Ukraine War Response: Ensuring Access to Learning’, accessed 21 July 2023,  
<https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/ukraine-war-response-ensuring-access-learning>.

<sup>475</sup> Stutz, “Educating Ukrainians in German Schools”, 2023.

However, Poland and Germany both report that their education systems are overburdened by the influx of Ukrainian school children which has limited levels of implementation. This is due to severe teacher shortages and lack of spaces even prior to the arrival of refugees. Though many displaced Ukrainian children have opted for online learning, many are still waiting to enter local school systems. Both in Poland and Germany many schools report not having the capacity to offer special classes to learn the language of instruction and prepare for the integration into the system. As a result, Ukrainians have been directly integrated into mainstream classes without sufficient support or language proficiency to participate fully. “Maintaining a link with Ukraine” has also been neglected by host authorities; in other words, students are forced to assimilate into the majority culture.

The provisions made by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education shows how integration can be facilitated as a three-way process, involving the immigrant, host society, and country of origin. This allows students to adapt to the host country whilst “maintaining a link with Ukraine”, however participating in education systems simultaneously has left students overburdened, with little free time for extracurricular activities to facilitate social contact.

If successful integration is a dynamic, two-way process, which involves active participation of both immigrant and host society, mutual recognition and space are essential for evolving and adapting. This has not been the approach towards the presence of refugees from Ukraine. Instead, the multicultural approach has been taken, understood in terms of tolerance or passive coexistence. Though refugee children and youth from Ukraine have been welcomed as “guests”, one needs to develop more long-term approaches to include them as equals and strengthen their sense of belonging. It is essential to overcome the vision of their temporary status to encourage sufficient integration efforts so that both “sides” can mutually learn about each other's culture and have space to coexist and grow peacefully. To ensure integration is achieved as a two-way process, intercultural activities should be put to the fore, which entails facilitating exchanges, dialogue, and negotiations between the students.

The case studies show that some issues concerning preferential treatment, financial expenditures, and deterioration of the already overburdened national education system could cause tensions, and lead to the rise of xenophobic sentiments. It will be important to reassure native students, and their parents, that the inflow of migrants to their

classrooms will not have a negative impact on education quality but instead encourage this diversity to be seen as an opportunity to learn and share new skills, knowledge, language, perspectives.

To facilitate integration, it would also be essential to prepare teachers and other school staff to work in multicultural surroundings, with traumatised minors. Since teachers are responsible for implementing and transmitting a culture of peaceful cohabitation and eliminating xenophobia and prejudice in the classroom, and further into society, they must have the competencies to manage diversity and to include students from different backgrounds.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, on a societal level, education policy requires a vision; on an institutional level, education requires a philosophy; and at the classroom level, education requires principles for adequate methods of teaching and learning.<sup>476</sup> The EU motto goes “United in Diversity” which underlines the importance of coming together to work for peace and prosperity and the enrichment of different cultures, traditions and languages. In light of the challenges that currently threaten the stability of Europe, education can be a tool for “learning to live together”, to uphold democratic values and human rights, and to promote inclusive societies, characterised by mutual respect, independence of thought and tolerance of differing perspectives.<sup>477</sup> Schools have the role of orientating children and young people by transmitting knowledge, skills, competencies, norms and values. Simultaneously, schools are places of exchange and interaction between diverse groups and can thus be a powerful way to integrate newcomers. Schools also play a vital role in preparing the next generation to become economically active citizens who contribute through active participation in democratic processes. In such, education is key to achieving sustainable and inclusive development for all members of society.

The arrival of displaced children from Ukraine has shown what schools are capable of, and how positive attitudes, on an official level, influence the approaches of teachers, students, parents and the wider society. However, due to the uncertainty of the current situation, policies are driven by “temporary” inclusion with no intention of full integration. A multicultural approach has been favoured to allow Ukrainians to retain their own culture and identity. The intention is to prepare displaced children for any possible future; helping them integrate into the host societies but also preparing them to reintegrate back home. However, the vision of full societal inclusion through a two-way process of mutual adaptation has not been encouraged, implemented or advanced. In order to prevent separation, segregation, tensions, or conflict from arising, it would be worth facilitating exchanges between students. In all, the situation has been perceived as a challenge rather than as a threat. The next step would be to transform these challenges

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<sup>476</sup> Josef Huber, “Intercultural competence for all: Preparation for living in a heterogeneous world”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, No.2 (2012), p12. ISBN 978-92-871-7356-0

<sup>477</sup> Council of Europe, “Learning to Live Together - Council of Europe Report on the State of Citizenship and Human Rights Education in Europe”, Bookshop, accessed 30 November 2022, <https://book.coe.int/en/human-rights-democratic-citizenship-and-interculturalism/7927-learning-to-live-together-council-of-europe-report-on-the-state-of-citizenship-and-human-rights-education-in-europe.html>.

into opportunities. The hope is that we, as nations and members of the EU, learn from this to “inspire future efforts in including and supporting newly arrived migrants and refugee learners in European schools and societies.”<sup>478</sup> We can and should learn from this particular situation, to develop a system and educational policies tailored to develop the competencies (knowledge, skills, attitudes, behaviours) of all children to be able to interact in culturally diverse societies, strengthen peaceful coexistence, and promote sustainable social cohesion, essential for our globalised world.

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<sup>478</sup> Eurydice, 2022, p27

### **Further Research: Recommendations**

Despite the fact that the focus of this paper is on top-level policy recommendations, it would be important to further investigate policy at a regional and local level for a more complete understanding of the approaches to integration, as well the discrepancies between governance, politics, policy, implementation and practice. The next step would thus be to consider the horizontal dimension.<sup>479</sup> Based on the literature review, and the analysis of the policy documents, one could conduct open-ended, semi-structured interviews to incorporate the individual perspectives and experiences of stakeholders and main actors involved (policymakers, educational practitioners, professionals, teachers, students, parents, wider community, NGOs). The qualitative interview-based indicators can be complemented with a survey to have more quantitative-based analyses and widespread results. Another valuable approach would be to conduct extensive ethnographic fieldwork within classroom settings. This would provide rich and authentic contextual data, to observe how theory is put into practice and an understanding of the complex social issues to address and adapt policy concerns.

It would also be worth comparing the situation and approaches in other EU Member states, but also considering the treatment and experience of different immigrant groups within the same local or national contexts, to see how the individual characteristics of the immigrant influences the integration process. It would be necessary to broaden the geographical scope, and look beyond the European context to avoid an understanding based solely on a Western or Eurocentric approach.

In sum, it is clear that further research in this field is essential; nonetheless, the value of this document analysis study is a vital step in unpacking the discourse and intentions of governing authorities and understanding the discursive environment in which educational practitioners must navigate within the Member States.

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<sup>479</sup> Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas, “Integration as an Analytical Tool” 2016, p22



## Annex

### **Key definitions**

- Natives: *insiders, nationals*
  - Individuals born on national territory with native born parents
- Immigrants: *Non-natives, foreigners, outsiders, person with a migrant background*
  - First generation: newly arrived individuals born outside the country
  - Second generation: individuals born inside the country but with at least one foreign born parent
- Third Country Nationals [TCN]:
  - Non-EU migrant
- Length of stay in host country:
  - Short/long term,
  - Temporary/ permanent residence,
- Seasonal or circular migration:
  - Mobility between the host country and place of origin for work or other purposes
- Economic immigrants:
  - Voluntary migration
  - Coming for job prospects/improving standard of living
- Irregular immigrant:
  - Arriving without official documents
  - Often referred to as “illegal” immigrants in the media
- Asylum seeker/ displaced person:
  - Forced migration
  - Person who has left their country of origin because of war or well-founded fear of persecution, armed conflict or natural disaster, but whose status has not formally been determined.
- Refugee
  - The official recognition and entitlement to international protection

## **Abbreviations**

TP: Temporary protection

TPD: Temporary protection directive

TNC: Third Country National

EU: European Union

CoE: Council of Europe

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PISA: The Programme for International Student Assessment

NGO: Non-governmental organisation

## **Poland**

PiS: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)

MEiN: Ministerstwo Edukacji i Nauki (Ministry of Education and Science)

Minister of Education and Science is Przemysław Czarnek

## **Germany**

KMK: Kultusministerkonferenz (The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs)

BAMF: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)

BMBF: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Federal Ministry of Education and Research)

Federal Minister of Education: Bettina Stark-Watzinger

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