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**Corruption and its impact on political participation in Latin
America**

Dissertation thesis

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Research on the impact of corruption on political participation is one of the largest political science and sociological debates on the topic of the effects of corruption on society. While the debates on the impact of corruption on trust or on the economy are dominated by the view that it is a negative phenomenon and that corruption works in one direction, the debate on the impact of corruption on political participation has so far produced mixed results. Moreover, most of the research has focused on countries in Europe and regions such as Latin America, while having major problems with corruption according to a number of indicators, have not yet been represented as much in the literature. Research on this topic has also so far tended to be limited to aggregated data from Transparency International on the one hand, and data on voter turnout on the other. For this reason, the ambition of this dissertation will be to take into account as many types of corruption as possible, as well as as many types of political participation in the Latin American region. It is precisely a certain variety of both independent and dependent variables that will offer the most comprehensive view of how corruption can affect political participation, whether corruption has a deterrent effect on some types of participation or, on the contrary, a mobilizing effect, or whether there is no relationship between the variables. The dissertation will focus on as many Latin American countries as possible and will not look at the region as a whole, which again tends to be the case in the literature, which usually includes all countries in a hierarchical statistical analysis, but the differences between countries then disappear. The objectives of the dissertation will be met using statistical methods such as linear or logistic regression analysis (depending on the type of dependent variable). The dissertation will use secondary data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (AmericasBarometer) and Latinobarómetro polling databases. The dissertation will build on previous research, for this reason it will work with data from 2018/2019 and 2020, which are the most recent in terms of the diverse types of corruption or political participation.

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Declaration

I declare that I have carried out the dissertation thesis on my own under the supervision of doc. Mgr. Karel Kouba, Ph.D., M.A. and have presented all the sources and literature utilized.

In Hradec Králové 31st May 2022

Milan Školník

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Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this dissertation are openly available in the AmericasBarometer database at www.LapopSurveys.org and Latibarómetro database at www.latinobarometro.org

Publication statement

This dissertation is the cumulative output of the author's long-term research on the topic of the effects of corruption and, in accordance with the relevant law, includes original and published results or results accepted for publication (*Act No. 111/1998 Coll. on Higher Education and on Amendments and Additions to Other Acts, 1998*). The dissertation is a direct follow-up to the author's published articles on the impact of perceived and experienced corruption on various forms of political participation, using data from the AmericasBarometer public opinion survey (the Latin American Public Opinion Project). However, these previously published articles worked with older data from the aforementioned database (2016 and 2017) and focused only on selected countries such as Chile and Venezuela (Školník, 2019) or Colombia (Školník, 2020c). The dissertation extends this research to all Latin American countries for which data is available, while working with more recent results from the AmericasBarometer (2018 and 2019) and Latinobarómetro (2020) opinion polls. The dissertation also directly includes two already published articles. The first is a literature review on corruption and political participation that offers a comprehensive overview of what has already been written on the topic (Školník, 2020d), and the second is an article on vote-buying and its impact on voter turnout in Latin American countries, which also works with individual-level data from the AmericasBarometer database (Školník, 2021a). The dissertation also contains parts

of articles already published by the author, which are not directly related to the Latin American region, but are related to the topic of corruption and political participation. This is the theoretical part of the article, in which the author examined how perceived corruption affects opinion on protest rallies and demonstrations in post-communist countries in Europe (Školník, 2022). The theoretical part of the dissertation also includes a part of an article in which the effect of attendance-buying on participation in political rallies in the Czech Republic was examined (Školník et al., 2021). In the theoretical part of the dissertation there are also fragments of the author's other already published articles on the topic of corruption. These are some typologies of corruption from a review article that mapped the current state of research on corruption in the Czech Republic (Školník, 2021b). In the theoretical and methodological parts of the dissertation, fragments of articles dealing with the impact of corruption on institutional (political) trust also found their place (Školník, 2020a, 2020b).

Annotation

ŠKOLNÍK, Milan, 2022. *Corruption and its impact on political participation in Latin America*. Hradec Králové: University of Hradec Králové, Philosophical Faculty, Department of Political Science, 242 pp. Dissertation Thesis.

Corruption is a very frequent term in the scientific literature. While negative corruption effects on the economic development of the country or market in general, as well as on people's or institutional trust of the citizen have been noted, the relationship between corruption and political participation remains unclear. On the one hand, the theoretical argument that corruption discourages political participation by its nature excludes citizens from the political process. On the other hand, the theoretical assertion that, on the contrary, leads to political participation, where a voter has the opportunity to replace a corrupt politician in the elections. In most cases, research on corruption and political participation is limited to the perception of corruption on the one hand, and voter turnout on the other. However, corruption, as well as political participation, can take many forms. The dissertation therefore distinguishes between many forms of corruption and examines their impact not only on participation in elections, but also on many types of political participation such as political meetings, community meetings or demonstrations. The research is focused on Latin American countries. The research is conducted with individual-level data from the AmericasBarometer database from 2018–2019 and Latinobarómetro 2020. In order to meet the research objectives, statistical methods such as logistic regression and ordinary least squares were used.

Keywords: corruption, demonstrations, elections, Latin America, political participation

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Introduction

Corruption is a phenomenon with quite fundamental implications for society. Corruption makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. Corrupt governments have less money for schools, hospitals and road construction. When governments cannot provide their basic services, people lose trust in their leaders and are less willing to trust them with their taxes, resulting in even less money for basic public services. For the rich, there is always the alternative of securing services in the private sector. The poor may be forced to pay bribes to public officials to access limited basic services, but often not even that. Corruption is therefore a phenomenon that leads societies into a trap (Uslaner, 2008).

Because of the effects of corruption on society, this phenomenon has been at the forefront of global academic interest for decades. The opening paragraph essentially encapsulates two major debates on the effects of corruption. The first big debate is about the impact of corruption on the economy. Within this debate, there is a discussion about how corruption relates to the international economic system, how undermines national economies and public finances, as well as how it can hinder economic development. The second major debate deals with the impact of corruption on trust. A distinction can be made between the impact of corruption on institutional (political) trust and the impact of corruption on interpersonal trust, in other words, trust between people.

Both of these major debates get space in this dissertation as they point to the direction of the effects of corruption in the literature. In the case of both the effects of corruption on the economy and the effects of corruption on trust, the vast majority of experts agree that it is a negative phenomenon that works in the same direction. In practice, this means that corruption undermines the economy and reduces citizens' trust in institutions and those who work in them. However, in addition to these two major debates and a number of smaller ones that are not as well represented in the literature¹, there is another major debate. This debate

¹ There are several debates in the existing literature on how corruption affects society (Jain 2001). There is also a debate that revolves around the question of how corruption can affect the quality of democracy in a country (M. Morales, 2009; Schneider, 2003; Seligson, 2002). Another debate considers the relationship between corruption and electoral systems. In other words, this debate looks at which electoral rules and systems are generally beneficial for corrupt candidates and vice versa (Buben & Kouba, 2017; Chang & Golgden, 2007; Myerson, 1993; T. Persson et al., 2003).

concerns the effects of corruption on voter turnout, or more generally on political participation, since voter turnout is only one of many types of political participation.²

Unlike the big debates on the effects of corruption on the economy or on trust, where there is a majority consensus on the direction of the effects of corruption, this is not the case with this debate. Not only does corruption discourage political participation in many studies while in other studies it mobilizes it. If corruption discourages political participation, it can lead to civic apathy and resignation to public affairs. Conversely, if corruption leads to political participation, it can have a positive effect on voter turnout and voting itself, as voters may vote against corrupt politicians. After all, „the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is“ (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 1). However, if corruption mobilises citizens to take to the streets and squares to demonstrate, this can in turn pose a security threat. Conversely, if corruption does indeed have the potential to get people out on the streets and in the squares, it can put social pressure on the politicians involved in corruption, which can result in their resignation or removal. This can be effective in such cases where the next election is a long time away. Another positive effect of the mobilising effect of corruption is that it can increase participation in types of political participation that do not have such a high turnout, such as political rallies, community meetings or town meetings. Ultimately, the mobilisation effect of corruption can increase interest in public affairs, as these types of meetings discuss various issues that affect people's lives. Although corruption is undoubtedly a negative phenomenon, the question of whether it can also have positive side effects in relation to political participation needs to be addressed. For these reasons, it is necessary to try to solve this research puzzle and find out how corruption actually manifests itself in relation to political participation. However, a much greater challenge is that corruption can be operationalized in many different ways and thus take many forms, just as political participation can be broken down into many different types. It is the different operationalisation of

² Political participation provides fertile ground for research. Previous work has focused primarily on participation in elections. Now, however, the term political participation encompasses a range of activities that can be examined in the context of other phenomena and the findings compared across space (Salisbury, 1975).

corruption that can lead to different effects on different forms of political participation.

These and not only these issues the dissertation seeks to reflect. It should be noted that most of the research on the impact of corruption on political participation has focused on European countries and only a minimum of studies have addressed this topic in other regions of the world, such as Latin America (see the literature review chapter). Yet in this region, forms of political participation are relatively common and diverse, both institutionalised and non-institutionalised. In a number of countries, presidential elections have seen turnouts in excess of 50 per cent. This may be due to a number of factors, such as the fact that presidential elections are the most important in Latin America, given the presidential political systems that exist in the region, which are modelled on the political system of the United States. The president, who is not only the head of state but also the head of the executive, thus sets the direction of the country, and the citizens may be interested in having a say in who will hold that office. Similarly, in most Latin American countries, there is a compulsory vote, which may also have some weight, but it remains rather on paper and is not enforced in practice by the states.³ Nevertheless, this in itself is indicative of the importance that is attached to the institution of elections in Latin American countries. Of course, various protest activities such as demonstrations are common in the region. Latin Americans have no problem taking to the streets and protesting against political issues that are of fundamental importance to the country or region where they live. At these demonstrations, Latinos have a space to define themselves against the political elites. It is, of course, a question that needs to be explored as to how corruption affects these and other forms of political participation in the region.

Just as political participation is quite natural and present in the region, so is the phenomenon of corruption.

³ Latin America contains the highest number of countries of any region that institute compulsory voting, with only four countries—Colombia, Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—where voting is not mandatory. For example, in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, voters must participate in elections and risk being punished if they fail to do so. In Mexico, Panama, and Bolivia voting is also mandatory, but non-participation is not punishable. In Chile, the mandatory voting system was replaced by a voluntary vote in 2009, regulated and then put into practice in the elections held in 2012. In Venezuela the obligation to vote was removed from the constitution in 1993. Colombia and Nicaragua are the only Latin American countries where voters have never been required to go to the polls.

Corruption scandals affecting even the highest levels of politics are not uncommon in this region. A number of corruption cases led to the resignation or impeachment of heads of state in the past (Balán, 2011; Hochstetler, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2007; K. G. Weyland, 1998). So it is not only the phenomenon, which has quite a large impact on politics, as it affected even the highest levels, but it is mainly a phenomenon that is still relevant and has recently reverberated strongly across the Latin American region. Many Latin American countries were recently affected by the corruption scandal known as Operation Car Wash (Chavez de Paz, 2020, p. 74).⁴ This is an ongoing criminal investigation by the federal police in Brazil (Connors & Magalhaes, 2015). It began in 2014. More than a thousand people have been charged or convicted. They were mainly administrative members of the state oil company Petrobras, Brazilian politicians, including political leaders, and businessmen from large Brazilian companies (Long, 2019). Originally, the money-laundering investigation resulted in a bribery affair at Petrobras, where the oil company's representatives received bribes in exchange for contracts to construction companies at overvalued prices. The Brazilian construction giant called Odebrecht has been involved in these practices in a number of Latin American countries (GIS editorial staff, 2019; Luis Mario, 2020, p. 170; S. Morales & Morales, 2019). Political leaders have been accused in Brazil, including former presidents such as Fernando Collor de Mello, Michel Temer, and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Four Peruvian presidents have been involved in corruption as well. Ollanta Humala received millions of dollars from a construction company for his presidential campaign at the request of Brazilian President Lula da Silva. Another Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski covered up illegal payments from Odebrecht to his company Westfield Group Capital. His presidential challenger, Keiko Fujimori, who sought his impeachment, was herself involved in the scandal because of contributions to her campaign. Alan García even committed suicide when Peruvian police tried to detain him because of his involvement in a corruption case. Alejandro Toledo was also implicated due to accepting a bribe in connection with a highway construction contract (Aquino, 2017; BBC News, 2019; Perry, 2019). Venezuela is one of the most corrupt countries in the world and the most corrupt country in Latin

⁴ It should be noted that corruption scandals reflect negatively on the perception of politicians in general. Indeed, politicians tend to be stereotyped with negative moral traits, as revealed by a survey of a sample of 1,250 Latinos from nine countries (Ramos & Moriconi, 2018).

America (Chevalier, 2018). It is therefore not surprising that this country did not avoid such corruption scandal. Maduro's 2013 presidential campaign received millions of dollars in exchange for a priority for projects realized by Odebrecht (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018). This corruption scandal is, of course, just one example, albeit undoubtedly an extraordinary one, of the problem of corruption in Latin America.

The dissertation will therefore focus on corruption and its effects on political participation in the Latin American region. The ambition will be to find out whether there is a relationship between the two phenomena and also to reveal in which direction corruption affects political participation.

The added value of the research is that it is not limited to electoral participation, but combines other forms of political participation, which have not been much considered in the literature so far. In addition to the effects of corruption on turnout and whether corruption leads to voting for the opposition or the government, it will also examine how corruption affects participation in community meetings, political meetings and town meetings. It will also be examined whether this phenomenon affects working for a politician or party. The dissertation will also reveal whether corruption has an effect on persuading others of political thoughts, which is not necessarily a form of political participation, but is an activity that takes place in a range of forms of political participation. Last but not least, the dissertation will aim to find out how corruption affects the willingness to demonstrate against corruption and the participation in demonstrations. Another added value of the dissertation is that it distinguishes between several forms of corruption. This phenomenon will be operationalized as the perception of corruption, the experience of corruption (both police and clerk corruption), and the awareness of corruption. Since the public opinion databases that will be worked with offer a battery of questions on corruption, a question on the likelihood of eradicating corruption and on the opinion on the progress of corruption in the country will also be included, which may be another example of perceptions of corruption. Vote-buying can be considered as electoral corruption and for this reason this phenomenon will also find its place in the dissertation as it will be examined how it affects participation in elections.

The research question is formulated as follows: *How do different forms of corruption affect different types of political participation?*

The comparative research focuses on all Latin American countries for which polling results are available from the AmericasBarometer (Latin American Public Opinion Project) and Latinobarómetro databases. The research is therefore conducted at the individual level, where the unit of analysis will be the respondents who participated in the survey.⁵

The dissertation is divided into four main chapters and several subchapters.

The theoretical chapter defines corruption, introduces its typologies, and focuses on the conceptualisation and measurement of the phenomenon. Major debates on corruption such as corruption in relation to the economy and corruption in relation to trust are also presented. However, the main part of this chapter lies in the debate on corruption in relation to political participation. Hence, political participation is defined and its types are introduced. Not only is the theoretical relationship between corruption and forms of political participation explained, but also a literature review is offered on what has been written so far on corruption and political participation. The specifics of political participation and corruption in Latin America will of course find their place in the theoretical part.

In the methodology chapter, the data with which the dissertation has worked are presented. These are primarily the results of opinion polls from the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro databases. Next, the variables are operationalized. The methods by which the objectives will be achieved are also presented. These are statistical methods such as logistic regression analysis and ordinary least squares regression. Most dependent variables take only two values or will be recoded to take only two values. For dichotomous variables it is appropriate to use logistic regression analysis. However, in one case, the values of the dependent variable will form a Likert scale, and for this reason it is more appropriate to use ordinary least squares regression.

⁵ Public opinion, in general terms „a society-wide set of judgments made by a population or group about various phenomena and facts,“ is measured through surveys (Hartl, 2004, p. 290). Specifically, these are „the attitudes and opinions of citizens which, in quantitative aggregate, constitute the overall public opinion“ and, crucially, „represent a certain subjective projection of objective reality“ (Červenka, 2006, p. 197). This is a specific type of sociological research that does not examine social phenomena, relationships and processes in their full breadth and depth, but is limited to capturing the content of a population's consciousness, or to aggregating the aforementioned individual opinions and attitudes (Gregor & Hrbková, 2013, p. 92). It is thanks to this that, as a result of sophisticated sampling methods, the conclusions from an otherwise limited research (in terms of the number of respondents) can be generalized to a wider spectrum, even to the whole society/population.

The third chapter of the dissertation presents and interprets the results. First, the results of the opinion polls are presented in the form of illustrative graphs. And then regression models are built and their results are interpreted.

The fourth chapter of the dissertation is an independent research on the impact of vote-buying, as electoral corruption, on political participation. However, the findings of this chapter are part of the conclusions of the dissertation.

Finally, the main outcomes of the dissertation are summarized and possible further research is recommended.

The results of statistical analyses based on data from the Latinobarómetro database revealed that awareness of corruption has a mobilizing effect on voter turnout, persuading others of political thoughts, and working for politicians. Awareness of corruption also increases the willingness to demonstrate against corruption and leads to voting for the ruling party. Positive opinion about whether corruption can be eradicated has a mobilizing effect on voter turnout, persuading others of political thoughts, working for politicians and increases the willingness to demonstrate against corruption, and also leads in some countries to vote for the ruling party, while in other countries to vote for the opposition party. The perception of a worsening corruption situation in a country has a mobilizing effect on voter turnout, persuading others of political thoughts and increases the willingness to demonstrate against corruption. In some countries, the worsening of the corruption situation in a country leads to voting for the ruling party, while in other countries it leads to voting for the opposition party; likewise, in some countries it leads to working for politicians, while in others it discourages citizens from this type of political participation.

The results of statistical analyses based on data from the AmericasBarometer database revealed that perceptions of corruption among politicians have a deterrent effect on voter turnout, participation in political meetings, community meetings and town meetings, and a mobilizing effect on participation in demonstrations. The experience of police corruption has a mobilizing effect on participation in political meeting, community meeting, town meeting and demonstration. However, in terms of the effects of police bribery on voter turnout, the results yielded mixed results, as some states experienced a mobilizing effect, while others experienced a deterrent effect of corruption. The experience of clerk corruption has a mobilizing effect on voter turnout, on participation in political meetings, town meetings and

demonstrations. However, the effects of clerk corruption on participation in community meetings were not statistically significant in any state. The results also revealed that vote-buying has the potential to increase turnout.

Theory

The theoretical part introduces concepts and their types, which form the basis of the whole dissertation. The first concept that will be introduced in the theoretical part is corruption. Attention will be focused on the problematic nature of defining the concept of corruption. It will be explained how corruption can be conceptualised and what theoretical underpinnings exist to explain this phenomenon. Furthermore, the different typologies of corruption found in the literature will be presented. Attention will also be focused on how corruption can be measured and what pitfalls exist in measuring corruption, with an emphasis on the distinction between perceptions of corruption, corruption awareness and experiences of corruption. This section will also discuss the corruption profile of Latin America and ways to combat this phenomenon. The theoretical section will introduce the three main debates on the effects of corruption, demonstrating that while there is majority agreement on the direction of corruption's effects on trust or the economy, this is not the case for the effects of corruption on political participation, which presents the scope and outright necessity for further exploration and contribution to this debate. Therefore, it will be defined what political participation is and what its characteristics are. It will also explain how political participation differs from civic engagement. Next, the different types of political participation that are found in the literature will be introduced. The theoretical part also focuses on the determinants of political participation in Latin America. Finally, the assumed relationship between corruption and political participation will be explained. The theoretical part will conclude with a review of the literature on the topic.

Corruption

Definitions of corruption

At the outset of this chapter, it should be said that there is no general and universally accepted definition of corruption. In their research, researchers usually choose the definition that suits them best. Some may prefer a more comprehensive definition, others a more concise definition of corruption. Another researcher chooses a definition based on the type of corruption they want to study. For some authors, the desire not to be out of line may prevail, where they look at a sample of articles and see what definition other researchers most often work with. Others may go against

the tide and use lesser-known definitions. Some authors make no secret of the fact that contemporary concepts of corruption need to be rethought and new definitions offered, or at least look at the existing ones more critically (Beetham, 2013; Jin, 2016, p. 307; Kurer, 2015, p. 30; Rose, 2018; Sparling, 2018).

One of the earliest definitions of corruption refers to the phenomenon as: ‘the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal’ (Brooks, 1909, p. 4).

In a similar vein is another classic and quite used definition, which sees corruption as „behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close, family, private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967, p. 419). The world’s largest organization dealing with corruption, Transparency International, uses a shorter definition of corruption: “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2020b). Although these two definitions are the most commonly used, there are many others. However, they are similar in nature and are characterized by type of illegal and profit-seeking behavior that can have serious implications for society.

The problem of such definitions of corruption is their relativity. For example, it is not specified what kind of entrusted power is abused. De facto, it is not known what moral norms, legal rules or ethical standards are abused by corrupt acts. For this reason, something may count as corruption in Germany and something completely different in Uruguay, South America. Given such a general definition, it is then problematic to come up with what causes corruption; the concept of „abuse“ may differ. Therefore, the authors come up with a more specific specification of the abuse of entrusted power for private purposes in the form of different types of corruption (Rothstein & Teorell, 2015, pp. 80–81).

Another problem in defining corruption seems to be that most research on corruption is based on subjective impressions. Interviewers and authors assume that respondents, whether experts or citizens, know what corruption means (a misuse of power for private purposes). The counter-argument is, because corruption is first and foremost a sociological phenomenon, there may be significant cultural differences between societies in how they understand corruption (Kurer, 2015, p. 36). Only a few studies have tried to address this. They conclude that a general

awareness of what corruption is and what is unacceptable (such as outright bribery to speed up a procedure, influencing tax officials to reduce taxes, bribery in government contracts, and nepotism in public service) exists for most respondents (Beck & Lee, 2002; Truex, 2011). However, other research demonstrates that there may be differences. In particular, what was considered a corrupt activity in China was not considered corrupt in the West (Sun, 2001). This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following subsection.

Conceptualization of corruption

Corruption research faces several conceptual issues that often go unaddressed. The first conceptual issue is whether to operate with a universal understanding of corruption or to see corruption as a problem that is culturally and geographically specific. This is also related to what to understand as the opposite of corruption. Because if there are efforts to minimize or completely suppress corruption in the state, one also has to think about what kind of alternative state one can imagine and whether there can perhaps be more than one type of corruption-clean state. The second problem of conceptualizing corruption is its structural vs intentional explanations (macro and micro levels of analysis or structural and individual). This can be illustrated with examples. The question is whether the level of corruption can be explained only by economically structural variables such as the level of GDP and social inequality in society, or whether it is necessary to work with individual perceptions and experiences that may or may not be related to structural factors. The third conceptual issue is human behaviour itself. Whether to rely on rationality and self-interest as the basis for explaining behaviour or, conversely, to explain approaches to corruption on the basis of historical and cultural norms. The question is whether people who live in corrupt societies and are themselves involved in corruption, either actively or passively, have a different understanding than people from countries where they hardly encounter corruption. These conceptual considerations also have political connotations. Efforts to change a society from highly corrupt to one with little or no corruption may find that it is not enough to change the structural conditions for corruption, but also the moral code of the people living in that society. This is also related to understanding what it means to be involved in corruption at all, because it is necessary to distinguish between who demands a bribe, who has to pay the bribe, but also who offers the bribe. This leads

to the question of whether some people are more or less prone to corrupt practices than others, depending for example on the level of corruption in the society in which they live. In other words, it is also necessary to look at individual characteristics using political, socio-economic and demographic variables (Rothstein & Teorell, 2015, pp. 79–80).

Explanation of corruption

There are several theoretical approaches that try to explain corruption. The first to mention is the theory of public administration ethics. This theory is based on the idea that there are agents who are primarily motivated by social norms. However, if these agents are motivated by the wrong norms, this leads to corruption. The solution, therefore, is to increase the education of agents so that they follow the right norms (Richter & Burke, 2007; D. F. Thompson, 2005). However, the problem can arise in highly corrupt societies, such as those in Latin America, where poor norms may prevail and the training of agents (officials, police officers and others) may be inadequate, depending on the quality and funding of government. However, it cannot be entirely concluded that systemic corruption is caused by bad norms alone. It should also be noted that even in highly corrupt countries, agents understand what counts as corruption and are aware that corrupt acts are morally indefensible.

The second theoretical approach to explain corruption is based on principal-agent theory. Thus, agents play a role in this approach as well, but unlike the first approach, agents' motives are self-interested and rationally profit-maximizing (Rose-Ackerman, 2011). This theoretical approach assumes that there is a kind of honest principal who must confront self-interested opportunists (agents). Instead of following an honest principal, agents pursue only their own self-interest and, if there is an opportunity to abuse the power entrusted to them for their purposes, they will take advantage of it (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). The problem is that in very corrupt societies it is difficult to identify the honest principal or in other words Mr. Clean. Often the fish stinks from the head and, especially in Latin America, corruption even affects presidents. Moreover, if corruption were really to operate on the basis of the principal-agent model, this would mean that it would be relatively easy to eradicate the phenomenon. Indeed, it would be enough to reduce the space of corruption opportunities through anti-corruption strategies. Honest

principals, for example, would increase penalties for corruption, which would also have a deterrent potential. If fear prevailed over greed in society, the issue of corruption would be solved. However, it seems that corruption in systematically corrupt countries cannot be so easily eradicated, as many such anti-corruption strategies are already in practice (A. Persson et al., 2013).

The third theoretical approach to explain corruption is based on collective action theory. Under this approach, it is assumed that what agents do depends on what they think other agents will do. The idea is that if people think that corruption, or specifically bribery, is widespread and common, they are unlikely to have a problem engaging in these activities as well (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005). This theory thus explains why people in highly corrupt countries engage in corruption even when they know it is morally wrong. They basically don't see a reason, or can't afford to see one, why they shouldn't act as they think others act (Karklins, 2005). This theoretical approach to explaining corruption is perhaps the most problematic to combat the phenomenon. For it would have to change the individual mindset of agents to assume that other agents do not engage in corruption, for whatever reasons. At that point, collective action would indeed manifest itself, but negatively in relation to corruption.

Typology of corruption

Corruption can be categorised on the basis of its size, impact, developmental stages and actors (Vymětal, 2006).

In terms of the magnitude of corruption, a distinction is made between grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand corruption includes big money, the awarding of lucrative contracts by political elites on the basis of clientelistic ties, or even bribery if it is systematic and extends over a wider area. Petty corruption, on the other hand, is characterised more by small donations. It can be an informal reward to a doctor for skipping other patients in the queue, a gift to a civil servant for issuing a citizen with the necessary certificate within a shortened deadline, or a bribe to a police officer to waive a speeding ticket (Heidenheimer, 2017, pp. 150–152). Petty corruption becomes stale over time and often becomes part of the country's culture of corruption. Often people don't even think they are committing corrupt acts because they are used to it, others are doing it and no one has punished

them for it. On the other hand, the grand corruption committed by the political elites is no longer tolerated and people are sensitive to it. It comes from human rationality, people may not have a problem with petty corruption because it has often made their lives easier. However, when politicians commit corrupt acts, people do not benefit from it, on the contrary, it is de facto theft of their money that they have paid in taxes (Uslaner, 2014, p. 200).⁶

In terms of the developmental stages of corruption, it is possible to work with three types - from random phenomena of corruption, through organized corruption, to the form that is referred to as systematic (Frič, 1999, pp. 32–34).

Rasma Karklins' typology offers three types of corruption.⁷ The first type is low-level administrative corruption. This type is most characterised by bribery, i.e. a situation where an official demands a bribe from a citizen in order to circumvent the law, either to speed it up or to directly overstep it.⁸ Of course, it can also involve deliberate confusion and overregulation of regulations, or the purposeful creation of a corrupt environment in which the official has the space to carry out inspections and issue various licences, often beyond the law, and to profit from them. The other two types, according to Rasma Karklins, belong to higher corruption. These are self-serving asset stripping by officials. But it also includes brokering various state contracts, direct links to the private sphere, and clientelism. The last type of already very advanced corruption is state capture by corrupt networks, in which personal interests of individual political or official actors dominate due to the weakness of

⁶ The typology that divides corruption into petty and grand is similar to the typology that divides the phenomenon into large-scale and small-scale. Small-scale corruption produces resources that provide income for one or a handful of individuals. This type of corruption is usually controlled by either victims or supervisors. Large-scale corruption generates significant amounts of resources and involves sets of corrupt individuals who are connected and support each other through networks (Carvajal, 1999, p. 340).

⁷ Rasma Karklins typology is most often applied to the post-communist space. The impact of corruption on post-communist societies has been examined from different perspectives (Holmes, 1997; Kostadinova, 2012; Ledeneva, 2009). It is possible to mention research on the topic of corruption and the economy, especially in the context of transformation (Bašná, 2019; Bayar et al., 2018; Ciešlik & Goczek, 2018a, 2018b; Fazekas & King, 2019; Ficeac, 2013; Holmes, 2013). Equally, anti-corruption research of post-communist corruption is at the forefront of academic interest (Grødeland & Aasland, 2011; Holmes, 2017; Popova & Post, 2018; Schmidt, 2007). The issue of conceptualization and measuring corruption in these countries, has also been examined (Baboš, 2015; Baldock, 2016; Ficeac, 2013; Sajó, 2003).

⁸ Some types of corruption, such as bribery, can be further broken down within research designs. For example, research on the effects of corruption on firm financial performance in transition economies has worked with several types of bribery (bribe intensity, bribe for public services, bribe for licences and permits, bribe for tax and tax collectors, bribe for government contract, bribe for dealing with customs, and bribe for other reasons) (Van Vu et al., 2018).

state institutions. Higher corruption in general has the potential to become long-term and systematic if not addressed consistently (Karklins, 2002).⁹

Other typologies relate to institutional or group corruption and individual corruption. Institutional corruption is a situation where the institutional setting generates a conflict of interest that promotes behavior by those who perform duties within the institution that systematically compromises the purposes of the institution. Institutional corruption does not have to be limited to a specific organisation, but can also involve corruption within a sub-system or system, such as the healthcare system. In contrast, individual corruption is the result of personal misconduct (Sommersguter-Reichmann et al., 2018; D. Thompson, 1995).

A distinction is also made between individual corruption as an isolated event and group corruption, which is already organised and to some extent systemic (Bac, 1998). Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between an organization of corrupt individuals and a corrupt organization. In the first case, it is the elevation of personal beneficial corrupt behaviour to the organisational level. In the second case, it is a situation where a group of employees develops corrupt behaviour for the benefit of the organisation (Pinto et al., 2008).

Some authors who study the effects of corruption on foreign direct investment in transit countries distinguish between pervasive corruption and arbitrary corruption. The first type is widely present and has a deterrent effect on foreign direct investment, because it increases the known costs of investing. The second type is uncertain and does not have as pronounced a deterrent effect because it becomes part of the uncertainty of operating in transition economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Of course, there are many other typologies of corruption. This subchapter has presented only a few examples, as it is not the intention to provide an exhaustive overview of all typologies. For the purposes of this dissertation, a division between petty corruption and grand corruption will suffice. The subject of the analysis will be the respondents' experience of bribery by police officers and officials, which can be more accurately classified as petty corruption, and the perception of corruption

⁹ Although the first type is also common in other countries, higher corruption in particular stems from the institutional set-up of former communist regimes, as the transition from a state-led to a market economy entailed the risk of illegal enrichment of officials, i.e. people in the right places. This was a major opportunity for corruption that Western democracies had not experienced, or at least not to the same extent.

among politicians, which is often influenced by grand corruption scandals that affect the political scene.

Measuring corruption

When measuring corruption, it is important to remember that these are attempts to measure something that is inherently illegal and hidden. Of course, it is worth considering whether it makes sense to measure a phenomenon that is of such a nature and, moreover, difficult to define. However, there are several reasons why it makes sense to measure corruption. Firstly, it is necessary to try to assess the scale of the issue in terms of the extent, location and trends of corruption. This is important in order to know what one is dealing with. Then, it is necessary to measure corruption to see if there are any clear patterns in order. Last but not least, measuring corruption will help to identify explanatory variables that will help with understanding why and where corruption is developing. In other words, by measuring corruption it is possible to decide what actions should be taken and whether or not those actions already taken have worked.

Although in the early debates on the impact of corruption, researchers struggled to find ways to measure this phenomenon that is difficult to detect, illegal and, by its nature, based on the human desire for profit, albeit at the expense of society. Over time, however, several approaches to measuring corruption have been developed.¹⁰ Corruption variables are divided mainly into perceptions of corruption (either public or experts), experiences with corruption (or participation in corruption), and corruption scandals. While the first two variables are generally based on global and regional opinion polls and data gathered by specialized organizations such as Transparency International, the element of scandals remains difficult to evaluate.

Perception

The perception of corruption measures the degree of corruption that an individual believes exists. The Corruption Perceptions Index, ranging from the highest level of corruption to the lowest on a scale from 0 to 100, is compiled by the largest

¹⁰ There are also efforts to compile synthetic corruption indicators that incorporate most statistical information on corruption. Such an indicator has also been compiled for Latin America, however, countries that are not part of the Latinobarometer are absent, and the authors themselves add that even so, the overall figure is 86% of the available statistical information and not 100%. Yet, of course, the predictive value of such a synthetic indicator can be high (Cardenas Cardenas et al., 2018).

organization dealing with corruption issues, Transparency International, and has been the most widely used indicator for measuring corruption since 1995. It is a composite index that uses data from multiple sources.¹¹ The index measures, as the name suggests, perceptions of corruption and not, for example, reported cases of corruption or the number of convictions for corruption. As such, perceptions are important as they can influence behaviour. For example, if people think that everyone in their neighbourhood is involved in corrupt activities, the more likely they are to engage in corrupt activities as well, because they will perceive corruption as something normal and common (Heywood, 2014, pp. 137–138).

The Control of Corruption Index managed by the World Bank is composed of expert surveys. However, some of its subcomponents include Gallup surveys of non-experts, which contrasts with the Corruption Perceptions Index (Roca, 2010). The World Bank, in collaboration with other organizations, also conducts the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys. These are elite surveys, as more than 150,000 companies operating in different countries are surveyed. Representatives of companies are mainly asked whether a bribe was expected or explicitly required when arranging a business contract or license with the government (The Enterprise Surveys, 2019). There is also the International Country Risk Guide compiled by the PRS Group, an aggregate that includes the degree of corruption in the country. V-Democracies works with more than 3,000 experts. Although V-Democracies focuses on the conceptualization and measurement of democracy, its components include the Political Corruption Index, Executive Corruption Index, and Public Sector Corruption Index. The Electoral Integrity Project assesses the quality of elections in different countries based on expert surveys. The databases of this project, which is conducted under the leadership of Pippa Norris, contain questions about electoral fraud (The Electoral Integrity Project, 2019). Electoral fraud can be considered a form of corruption (Dočekalová, 2012).

An alternative to the CPI is the Global Corruption Barometer from the same organization. It does not include expert surveys, but household surveys. Individual data based on citizens' opinions on corruption and political participation are provided by a number of other organizations specializing in conducting polls. These

¹¹ The index is mainly made up of aggregated data that reflects the perception of corruption among businessmen and experts.

include the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which both conduct thematic surveys at regular intervals. Furthermore, there are several organizations providing more specific regional surveys: in Latin America, there are the AmericasBarometer and the Latinobarómetro; in Africa, data are gathered by the Afrobarometer; and in Europe, there is the Eurobarometer. Samples and questions vary depending on the organization that collects the data. Interviewers generally ask questions such as “Thinking of the politicians in your country, how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption?” or “How much corruption do you think there is in National Government” (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2019; Latinobarómetro, 2020). Furthermore, these polls include not only general questions but also very direct questions about the specific actors involved in the institutional organization of the state. The surveys often enquire about the perceived level of involvement in the corruption of judges, state officials, the police, and the military.

Experience

Experience with corruption is generally evaluated through questions about the most common form of corruption – bribery (Amundsen, 2019). Questions about individuals’ experience with corruption are not straightforward in terms of whether the interviewee has experience with corruption, in this case with bribery. This experience can take a number of different forms. Respondents can, for example, merely be aware of the fact that a civil servant (a clerk, a police officer, or even a soldier) has demanded a bribe; they can also play a more active role by having paid a bribe themselves or been a direct witness to a bribe payment (Morris, 2008). In the current research, however, these different experiences are uniformly classed as experience of or participation in corruption, regardless of the specific situation. Public opinion databases such as ISSP, AmericasBarometer and others include specific questions on the experience of corruption.

Scandals

The data on corruption scandals is most often based on reports from investigating authorities (e.g. Parliament’s Ethics Committee, Supervisory Authority etc.) and media (e.g. the Latin American Weekly Report on the progress of corruption scandals) that report on corruption among politicians, especially when they are

seeking re-election (Balán, 2011; Karahan et al., 2006; Luis Raúl Cámara-Fuertes Gustavo J. Bobonis, 2015; Praino et al., 2013). Targeted questions on corruption scandals can also be found in specialized polls (e.g. the American National Elections Study). Furthermore, there is useful information in local databases dealing with corruption scandals that compile data from media reports, such as those managed by Spanish and Italian local administrations (Costas-Pérez et al., 2012; Fernández-Vázquez et al., 2016; Giommoni, 2017). Combining these databases with the results of polls, as demonstrated in follow-up research at the level of Spanish municipalities, can also yield interesting results (Riera et al., 2013). Panel surveys conducted before and after the outbreak of scandals represent another valuable source (Vivyan et al., 2012).

Corruption awareness

Corruption awareness is an indicator of whether the respondent or a family member is aware of an act of corruption. There are a number of experiments testing the impact of corruption awareness on voter turnout and election protests. In one, a leaflet is distributed to a constituency informing the citizens about their candidate's corruption before the elections, while no such information is delivered to a second constituency. This test is designed to evaluate how voter awareness of corruption affects election results (Chong et al., 2015; De Figueiredo et al., 2011). In other studies, participants are divided into two groups, with one group being provided with information about corruption, while the other is not; both groups are then asked questions about their interest in political participation (Inman & Andrews, 2015; Muñoz et al., 2016).

Problems with measuring corruption

When measuring corruption, it is important to remember that these are attempts to measure something that is inherently illegal and hidden. Distinguishing between the aggregated and individual data about the perception of corruption is essential but often neglected. Some studies have shown that the degree of corruption perceived by the experts and businessmen interviewed by Transparency International may differ significantly from the views of citizens (Roca, 2010; Treisman, 2007; Weber Abramo, 2008). There may be several reasons why aggregate and individual data differ across countries and hence the final research results as well. The views of

international experts may differ due to personal ideology, cultural bias, or the echo-chamber problem. The problem is that experts may have certain subjective ideas about which countries are more or less prone to corruption. Moreover, perceptions can be influenced by a number of factors, such as the frequent mention of the topic of corruption in the media, and can be susceptible to current corruption cases. Then, when the experts indicate the level of corruption in a given country, they can base their assessment on these perceptions.¹² It can then be assumed that in countries where the government is authoritarian, hostile to the media, rich in natural resources, protectionist and misogynistic, the experts believe that there will also be a high level of corruption compared to countries where there is no such government. Thus, some countries may be treated more negatively based on certain criteria than others. If only because they cannot imagine themselves doing business in such a country, for example.

As for the data at the individual or company level that tell us about the respondents' experience with corruption, there is another problem. The experience of corruption is measured either at the individual level or at the firm level. In virtually every country, bribery is illegal. Such surveys run the risk of respondents being dishonest in their answers. In fact, respondents may be concerned that they may be in trouble with the law for not reporting corrupt behaviour. Survey organisers naturally try to counter this and assure respondents that their answers will remain completely anonymous. In some surveys, questions are worded carefully, for example whether the respondent was expected to pay a bribe in a certain situation rather than whether the respondent actually paid a bribe. Similarly, when companies are surveyed, for example, the question is asked in terms of whether a company like yours was forced to pay a bribe for something. A question asked in this way can ascertain experience of corruption without incriminating the firm. However, even so, getting truthful answers from respondents can be complicated in surveys dealing with experience of corruption (Treisman, 2015, p. 98). Furthermore, the data may reflect a high

¹² The Corruption Perception Index is associated with certain risks. This index for measuring corruption can contribute to the creation of so-called "corruption traps". These are common in countries where corruption is deeply rooted. In order to tackle corruption effectively, these countries need to implement a number of structural measures to strengthen the public administration and the national economy. Often, however, this cannot be done without financial support from abroad. But foreign assistance may be conditional on a better Corruption Perceptions Index score, which countries without major structural changes can hardly influence (Andersson & Heywood, 2009, pp. 747–748).

threshold for corruption tolerance, especially in countries where corruption is a common phenomenon (Lin & Yu, 2014, p. 153).¹³

It is important to distinguish between perceptions of corruption at the aggregate level and experiences of corruption at the individual level for a number of other reasons. First of all, most variables such as the level of economic development, the level of democracy in a country, press freedom and others that correlate with aggregate data on perceptions of corruption do not correlate much with actual experience of corruption (Treisman, 2007). Furthermore, in most cases, the level of perception of corruption is significantly higher than the actual experience of corruption on the part of the respondents. This may be related to the fact that the perception of corruption is overestimated by experts, especially for some countries, and, on the contrary, respondents are afraid to admit their experience with corruption. Moreover, experience of corruption itself is a weak predictor of perceptions of corruption (Weber Abramo, 2008). In addition, perceptions and experiences of corruption may offer different results in research. Mention should be made of research on the impact of corruption on willingness to pay taxes conducted using Latinobarómetro data on a sample of eighteen countries. The authors concluded that while perceptions of corruption affect tax morale, the experience of corruption is irrelevant in this context (Castañeda Rodríguez, 2015). Another problem with Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is that, as a composite index, it is based primarily on the responses of Western businessmen and experts, so in practice they are answering questions about business transactions, such as the need to pay a bribe to get a contract in a given country. Thus, perceptions of corruption mainly reflect bribery and no longer, for example, grand corruption or perhaps the impact of corruption. Moreover, the questions focus on the necessity of paying a bribe and do not consider any proactive approach (i.e. voluntarily offering a bribe) to obtain a contract. A significant problem is also that each survey included in the composite index operates with its own perception of corruption, which may focus on different aspects such as bribery of public officials,

¹³ The issue of tolerance of corruption is also highly debated. Research on tolerance of corruption has the potential to significantly improve understanding of the determinants of corruption in developing countries, such as in Latin America (Alvarez, 2015). The determinants of tolerance of corruption in Latin America are examined, for example, using data from the World Values Survey. Such research concludes that tolerance varies across countries depending on age, education, ethnicity, cultural values or trust in public organizations (Lavena, 2013).

embezzlement and others. Thus, the ambition of these surveys is to determine the extent of corruption, using expert ratings on a scale from least to most corrupt. However, it is impossible to know how the experts subjectively set it, because what one expert may perceive as a low level of corruption, for another expert it may on the contrary be a high level of corruption.

The problem with measuring corruption is also translating the findings into actual anti-corruption measures. If the data on corruption based on the measurements are too general and basically just state a kind of status quo, the more difficult it is to develop anti-corruption initiatives based on the data. Some corruption indicators, such as the CPI, incorporate data that are, for example, two years old and their usefulness decreases in the context of current corruption scandals or the immediate implementation of anti-corruption activities. Activities related to artificially lowering the perception of corruption are also problematic. A high corruption index is uncomfortable for governments, whether for political, economic or other reasons. Of course, political elites can try to reduce the level of corruption by developing anti-corruption activities, in which they have to invest time, effort and often considerable funds, or they can just pretend to fight corruption, for example by inviting foreign anti-corruption experts and providing them with a lot of media attention, which can then be reflected in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as assessors see that governments are doing some activities.

Corruption profile of Latin America

Authors working on Latin America have long sought to explain the causes of corruption in the region (Alza Barco & Salazar Morales, 2017; Cabrera, 2008; Castañeda Rodríguez, 2016; De Orellana Sánchez & Velasco Pedraza, 2019; Parker et al., 2004; Rosenmüller & Ruderer, 2016). Apart from the fact that there are personal factors, i.e. the abuse of public power for private purposes as a failure of an individual or group of individuals, there are also a number of structural factors that are characteristic of the region.

Economic factors of corruption

Corrupt relations affect the links between political and economic life in Latin America. However, until recently, political scientists considered corruption in developing countries to be harmless. It is possible to mention the phrase: „the only

thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized honest bureaucracy“ (Huntington, 1968, p. 386). This idea of corruption as a necessary evil and a mechanism for the functioning of dysfunctional bureaucracies in developing societies persisted into the late twentieth century. Since the emergence of neoliberal reforms¹⁴ and the market economy, this view has been reconsidered and social scientists have begun to view the persistence of corruption more critically (Faughnan & Seligson, 2014).

Corruption is also something that has significantly hampered exports in the Latin American region. Exports are important for a country's economic growth and, ultimately, for the quality of life of its citizens. It therefore appears that in order for Latin American countries to grow economically, corruption needs to be effectively reduced (Charoensukmongkol & Sexton, 2011). Indeed, this argument is underscored by a study on the victimization of police corruption in Latin America, which revealed that citizens in economically weaker countries are much more likely to be exposed to police corruption than those in richer countries (Orces, 2008).

This phenomenon also increases income inequality, as demonstrated by an analysis carried out between 1996 and 2012 on a sample of eighteen Latin American countries. Corruption thus creates a gap between social classes in Latin America (Pedauga et al., 2017). The point is that during the budget process, politicians and bureaucrats may tend to abuse power for their own purposes and thus concentrate public resources in the hands of elites. These acts exacerbate inequality (Wong, 2017).¹⁵¹⁶

¹⁴ Latin American countries have undergone diverse forms of economic development. They have experienced economic growth as well as poverty, inequality, and high unemployment over the past decades. Until the early 1980s, the so-called import substitution industrialization model was applied, which was characterized by the protection of national economies. However, the model failed, and debt crisis struck. In order to stabilize their economies, neoliberal reforms were introduced according to the so-called Washington Consensus. These economic reforms have created dramatic inequality between the rich and the poor. Extensive privatization has created room for corruption. International trading companies have been given support to the detriment of small and medium-sized domestic businesses and has led Latin American governments to prioritize debt repayment over social spending. However, even neoliberal reforms have not led to economic welfare. An example of the negative impact of these reforms is Argentina, which went bankrupt at the turn of 2001 and 2002 (Grugel & Ruggirozzi, 2012; Remmer, 1998; K. Weyland, 2004).

¹⁵ However, it depends on the type of corruption. If the phenomenon takes the form of embezzlement, inequality increases. If it is vote-buying, then inequality may decrease, because in this case it is about the distribution of resources and the building of clientelistic ties (Wong, 2017).

¹⁶ Nevertheless, some studies show that lower corruption is associated with higher income inequality, which goes against the trend of most research where the result is the opposite (Andres & Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011; Dobson & Ramlogan-Dobson, 2010). The authors explain that the

Among the sectors affected by corruption in Latin America is, for instance, agriculture, where farmers and landowners can obtain subsidies from politicians in exchange for bribes (Bulte et al., 2007). Water and transport services are also affected by corruption. Research that worked with a sample of more than three hundred concession contracts from Latin America from 1989 to 2000 revealed that corruption at the country level is a significant factor in renegotiations of these contracts (Guasch & Straub, 2009). Corruption also affects the health sector. Researchers who collected original data from ten Latin American countries found that corruption is a key predictor of poor quality medicines (Bate & Mathur, 2018). However, it cannot be said that other sectors are spared from corruption, as this phenomenon has the potential to permeate the entire society and economy.

Most often there are two structural factors that are paradoxically in contrast. The first is state interventionism, which gives bureaucrats and politicians broad powers over a large number of resources. Indeed, studies from Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela demonstrate that if the discretionary powers of the executive are increased, the space for corruption opportunities is also created (Manzetti & Blake, 1996). The second structural factor was the wave of neoliberal reforms, during which bureaucrats and politicians privatised a significant part of public assets. Yet it was precisely the market-oriented reforms that were supposed to help combat corruption in emerging Latin American democracies with state-led economies. Indeed, privatisation and market deregulation should curb politicians' use of state-owned enterprises and regulations for private gain. However, if reforms are not carried out in a transparent manner, this can only lead to the continuation of corruption. Privatisation processes in many cases have essentially meant that public companies have been handed over to wealthy domestic investors (Cárdenas & Mora, 2010).

Although these two structural factors are in contrast in their implementation, they are united by one thing - the politicians and bureaucrats who have implemented state interventionism or neoliberal reforms.

relationship between corruption and inequality may be different where there is a large informal sector, as is the case in the Latin American region (Dobson & Ramlogan-Dobson, 2012).

Political factors of corruption

Nevertheless, other explanations for the flourishing of corruption in Latin America are emerging. Some authors have speculated that the process of democratization in Latin American countries may have made corruption even more acute. Latin American democracy after the transition was more formal than substantive (Little, 1996). In principle, democratisation was intended to strengthen transparency in policy making and the accountability of politicians and bureaucrats, i.e. to limit the spread of corruption. Several studies that test the relationship between democratization and transparency in Latin America confirm the argument that democratization brings with it an anti-corruption agenda (Lee, 2010). In Latin American practice, however, while this meant that power was distributed and the necessary consent of multiple institutions in decision-making, it also expanded the range of actors that could be involved in corruption. Moreover, the democratisation process cannot explain the flourishing of corruption in authoritarian Mexico under the PRI or the long-lasting democracy in Venezuela before the rise of President Chávez.

This brings up another structural factor in the flourishing of corruption, and that is neopopulism. That is, the rise of politicians who try to appeal to the masses. Neopopulist presidents such as Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil and Alana García in Peru have had in common that they have defined themselves against the traditional political parties and the interest groups linked to them. In particular, they used the mass media, such as television, to reach out to the people and build a broad base of supporters. However, mass election campaigns and television advertisements are very costly, which opens up opportunities for corruption. In fact, politicians have to turn to business groups to support them in their campaigns and pay for the costly advertising. However, they expect politicians to pay them in return, which can take various forms of corruption (K. G. Weyland, 1998).

Problems of strong executive

Although today the vast majority of countries in Latin America have democratic governments, this was not the case in the past, as there was an alternation between

military and civilian governments characterised by a strong executive and often control of the judiciary and the legislature. In such an environment, political corruption had room to grow. A case in point is Mexico, where one party dominated the political system for decades, controlling all levels, from local to central, creating space for corruption and an intricate and extensive network of clientelistic ties. The absence of a consistent opposition that had the space within the political system to define itself against the ruling party and alternate it in the next election was one of the reasons why corruption developed and persisted.

The problem of a strong and uncontrolled executive can be illustrated by two different examples from the early 1990s. Whereas in Argentina President Carlos Menem gave domestic conglomerates that supported him in the campaign exclusive access to privatised companies, further strengthening their monopoly position, Brazil's head of state Color de Melo cut off traditional business groups and demanded bribes from anyone who wanted benefits from the government.¹⁷

Independent legislation

Active legislation can curb corruption in the executive if it includes credible opposition parties that are not themselves involved in corrupt practices and have access to the media. In Latin America, with highly centralised presidential systems, legislators hardly have a control function vis-à-vis the executive, especially if the president's party also has a legislative majority in parliament. However, when the legislature is completely controlled by the opposition, many Latin American presidents have circumvented the legislature by issuing decrees with the force of law. Thus, institutional settings and political practices in Latin America contribute to creating a space for corruption opportunities at the executive level. Indeed, the theoretical arguments that the concentration of both executive and legislative power affects corruption rates are supported by research based on panel data from 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1970 to 2014 (de Viteri Vázquez & Bjørnskov, 2020).

¹⁷ Moreover, the rigidity of a strong executive also generates paradoxical cases, as exemplified by former Peruvian President Martín Vizcarra Cornejo, who held a number of executive positions during his career in which he proclaimed to fight corruption, although he himself faced a number of corruption charges (Lovón Cueva et al., 2020).

However, since the early 1990s, Latin American countries have taken several steps forward, as national legislatures have in a number of cases used the institution of impeachment to remove presidents involved in corruption from office. However, this has not always been done quietly, often after some time when the political situation in the country was becoming unbearable (Colazingari & Rose-Ackerman, 1998, pp. 464–465).

Independent justice

Policy proposals to address corruption are not enough on their own; corruption must be punished consistently so that the punishment sets a deterrent example for other individuals who would corrupt. This requires effective prosecution and an independent judiciary in Latin America (Rincón Angarita, 2019; Sieder et al., 2019).

Brazil was the first country in Latin America where a sitting president was accused of corruption and subsequently removed from office. At the time, the Supreme Court played an important role in the impeachment process in relation to Congress, but the lack of an independent prosecutorial system limited the court's ability. The institutional setup of an independent judicial system is important for the fight against corruption, but so is the prestige of the judiciary itself. Although judges and prosecutors are inherently seen as overseeing the other branches of government, when unchecked they can also be sources of corruption. The point is that any judicial system in which its actors are uncontrollable at various levels can create a space of corruption opportunities that leads them to abuse their position. Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary to monitor both the internal set-up of the judiciary, its independence and accountability principles, and whether it achieves anti-corruption results (Rios-Figueroa, 2012). Chile, for example, has a fully autonomous judicial system where all appointments and promotions are made within the system. Brazilian prosecutors have launched an investigation into the biggest ever corruption case to hit most of Latin America, codenamed Operation Car Wash. Several former presidents and other high-ranking officials and businessmen have been indicted as part of this corruption investigation. There has been some progress in Latin America, but there is still a problem in the institutional set-up, for example, as regards the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court. Argentina and Peru have been characterised by the fact that Supreme Court judges

have been either friends and extended arms of presidents or congress (Colazingari & Rose-Ackerman, 1998, pp. 465–466). Low salaries for judicial and auxiliary justice officials, social acceptance of corruption, an inoperative judicial system and, especially, the intervention of power groups, can also be counted as causes of corruption in the judiciary (Carvajal Martínez et al., 2020). Of course, the length of the judicial process in Latin America and any attempts at judicial reform in general, which are often politicised, are also a major problem. Thus, in many Latin American countries, there is no fully independent judiciary to adjudicate corruption cases fairly (Buscaglia, 1996).¹⁸

Security

Of course, effective and organised security forces with a clear structure and competences are important for curbing corruption. This means, in particular, the police and, in extreme cases, specialised units of the army if, for example, an intervention requires it. However, the dismal criminal situation is detracting from the fight against corruption. Most countries in Latin America face high crime rates, including serious ones such as homicide.¹⁹

The problem, of course, is that state and non-state security forces in Latin America are themselves often involved in corrupt activities, whether it is individual police failures or organised groups. Fighting corruption at the level of the security forces in particular is very problematic because, unlike politicians or civil servants, they are repressive forces with weapons. If a citizen refuses to pay a bribe to these forces, it can put his life at risk (Ungar, 2013).

Media scrutiny

The media, and investigative journalists in particular, play an important role in the fight against corruption, firstly by exposing corruption among politicians in situations where police investigators fail or are directly linked to politicians, and secondly by writing about corruption cases to influence public opinion about the need to fight corruption and also to deter other politicians from engaging in corrupt

¹⁸ Moreover, it is necessary to combat corruption because of trust in the institutions themselves, since the more widespread the corruption, the less trust in independent courts, as research on trust in the Colombian courts demonstrates (Botero, 2020).


¹⁹ In addition, some research concludes that in addition to socioeconomic variables and government effectiveness, it is also corruption that affects homicide rates (Chainey et al., 2021).

practices. However, in a number of Latin American countries, investigative journalists' efforts to link business with governments based on funding politicians and their election campaigns in exchange for contracts and other favours are more likely to be indirect corruption than direct bribery in which someone is exposed. Moreover, in some Latin American countries, journalists are silenced, for example through public ethics laws (Argentina), television lynching laws (Colombia), or direct attacks on journalists in an attempt to intimidate them (Panama in the past and Venezuela currently). Freedom of the media, and in particular the work of investigative journalists, is therefore an important factor in the fight against corruption (Colazingari & Rose-Ackerman, 1998, p. 467).

Public administration reforms

An autonomous and, above all, politically independent public administration, where there is a clearly defined career path for civil servants and structures and rules within which official decisions are made, is also important in the fight against corruption. A politically placed and uncontrollable official with decision-making powers is much more vulnerable to corruption than one who occupies an official position on the basis of his or her qualifications and whose decisions are subject to the control of higher structures. In Latin American countries, however, public administration reforms tend to fail to bring transparency and professionalisation. An example is Argentina, where reform has led to the elimination of administrative control agencies and the creation of new executive structures staffed by political appointees (Colazingari & Rose-Ackerman, 1998, pp. 467–468).

Figure 1. Perceptions of Corruption in Latin American Countries



This figure shows the Corruption Perceptions Index scores for each Latin American country over a three-year period. Values on a scale of 0 to 100 indicate the higher the corruption, the lower the score for an individual country. The data were collected in 2018–2020. The data are from Transparency International (Transparency International, 2018, 2019, 2020a). Processing: author.

The Corruption Perceptions Index, compiled annually by the world's largest anti-corruption organisation, ranks countries according to their perceived level of corruption in the public sector, based on expert assessments and opinion polls. It is therefore aggregate data, not purely individual data. While the analytical part of the dissertation will be based on individual data from the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro polling databases, it is necessary to compare different types of corruption data, both in a comparative perspective and in order to offer a more comprehensive view of the state of corruption in Latin America. And that view of the level of corruption in Latin America is not very favorable, as the values in the graph demonstrate. Only three countries - Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay - scored above a CPI score of fifty in the period under review (Costa Rica, however, fell below even that figure for 2020) and can be classified as having only minor corruption problems. Alarming, the vast majority of Latin American countries fall within the fifty mark on the Corruption Perceptions Index, and it is therefore possible to conclude that the Latin American region is very much affected by this

phenomenon. There are also countries in Latin America where the Corruption Perceptions Index scores indicate that there is enormous corruption in the country, such as Venezuela, which has a CPI score of only fifteen. Right after South American Venezuela in terms of the highest level of corruption is Central American Nicaragua, which earned Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index score of twenty-two for 2020. Countries such as Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay also rank very negatively in terms of corruption problems, with CPI scores at or around thirty. It cannot be said that there has been a significant decrease or increase in corruption in Latin American countries over the three years under review, with one exception, which is Costa Rica, whose CPI score fell by a full fourteen points between 2019 and 2020. It may be of some interest to note that although over the last decade it was Brazil and Peru that were most affected by the massive corruption scandal under the investigative name "Operation Car Wash", which also led to the resignation of their presidents, nevertheless these two South American countries are not among the most corrupt countries in Latin America, as not only the not entirely democratic Nicaragua and Venezuela are worse off according to the CPI, but also many other Latin American countries.

Ways to fight corruption in Latin America

There are, of course, many tools and initiatives in Latin America to fight corruption. This part of the dissertation will offer a literature review on ways to fight and reduce corruption in the Latin American region. The means of combating corruption can be of various kinds, whether through institutions, laws or just information.²⁰

Institutional ways of fighting corruption

The fight against corruption can be seen from an institutional perspective. For instance, issues of state capacity in relation to corruption are debated. This was addressed in research from 1996 to 2015, which included Transparency International's CPI index and the World Bank's CCI. State capacity was measured using tax collection as a percentage of GDP, military spending as a percentage of

²⁰ The fight against corruption is, after all, something that can contribute to the legitimacy of the regime, especially in a period of democratic consolidation (Andreev, 2008).

GDP, and the ICRG's Quality of Bureaucracy Index. The analysis showed that the higher the state capacity, the lower the corruption in the country (Nascimento, 2018).

Then there are the various anti-corruption agencies that several Latin American countries run as part of their public policies. However, even with these, the basic principles of their functioning are confronted with how they are institutionalised in terms of their independence or, on the contrary, their accountability to whoever is currently in political power (Vivanco, 2013).

Within the private sector, independent regulatory authorities can be an effective tool against corruption. Research that examined 153 electricity distribution firms across eighteen Latin American countries concluded that firm productivity decreases with higher corruption, but this association is reduced when there is an independent regulatory authority (Wren-Lewis, 2015).

Another institution in the fight against corruption that deserves attention is the Office of the Ombudsman. Although the Ombudsman belongs to the nonsanctioning bodies, it can nevertheless have various levers against state actors in the context of preventing or exposing their corruption. This is due to its position as a link between the public and public authorities. However, the strength of the ombudsman's office in the fight against corruption is based on the institutional set-up and the actors who establish and elect it (Moreno, 2016).

Fighting corruption through laws, norms and agreements

Other tools to fight corruption include passing laws to increase transparency (Finol-Romero, 2019). Firstly, anti-corruption laws are being adopted, which not only bring a number of measures against this phenomenon, but can also increase investors' confidence to do business in the country. Research that worked with a unique database of 492 projects implemented between 2013 and 2017 in Chile, Brazil and Mexico concluded that Mexico's new anti-corruption law increased the likelihood of investment in the Central American country. The introduction of an anti-corruption framework can thus increase investor confidence (Battaglia et al., 2021). Laws are also being passed to regulate lobbying. Lobbyists can represent a range of interest and power groups that seek to influence policy in their favour. They can do so either by directly bribing politicians or by offering various other

benefits in return for, for example, getting their legislation passed or obtaining favourable government contracts or subsidies. Attempts to regulate lobbying have been made in the past in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, but these regulations alone cannot eliminate political corruption. However, regulation of these activities can contribute to transparency and the development of anti-corruption activities, especially if lobbying laws take inspiration from Western democracies (dos Santos & da Costa, 2014).

Some authors propose to integrate the so-called public ethics agenda into the government agenda. The promotion of this governmental public ethics should include reminding, instructing and affirming responsibility for the best performance of the tasks entrusted to them in addressing the problems of the political community, such as the fight against corruption. In doing so, it should take inspiration from abroad and form government ethics councils that operate in candidate states, government codes of ethics, autonomous public ethics bodies or employ experts in public ethics. The purpose would be to create a comprehensive ethics system that would formulate various tools with procedures for its operation and set out phases or procedures for the implementation of anti-corruption policies that would apply not only to officials but also to politicians. This is also related to the demands for higher qualifications of politicians and civil servants and in general to the view of seeing public office as an honour and service to states and society, not as a means to power and profit. After all, politicians and their officials look after the living standards of citizens, provide them with employment, education, security, ensure that citizens' behaviour is in line with legal frameworks and social values, and should therefore set an example themselves (Bautista, 2012).

In addition to national initiatives and laws, there is also international assistance and various agreements in the fight against corruption (Vargas, 2004). As regards international assistance to Latin America in the fight with this phenomenon, various agreements are being developed at OECD and OAS level (Husted, 2002). However, international anti-corruption initiatives are often far from being implemented and mostly remain on paper. The question is the effectiveness of such international anti-corruption initiatives. Mention can be made of The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which was launched in 2002 as an international anti-corruption instrument. Using a synthetic control methodology, the study examined the impact of the EITI on several measures of corruption for

the first five countries that joined the initiative (Colombia, Honduras, Peru, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago). The results indicated that participation in the scheme had no statistically significant effect and thus that joining the EITI did not lead to a significant reduction in corruption in any of the countries included in the study (López-Cazar et al., 2021).

Information systems as tools in the fight against corruption

Since the introduction of computers and the emergence of e-government,²¹ initiatives in Latin America have been moving towards the creation of Internet communication channels where society can help fight corruption by sending information about criminal activities. This has led to the creation of various anti-corruption websites, where it is possible not only to read about corruption, its forms and specific cases, but also to report experiences of corruption directly. The operators of the website evaluate the anti-corruption information from citizens and pass it on to law enforcement authorities (Matheus & Ribeiro, 2009). The internet and its spread seems to be a very effective tool against corruption in general. A study in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa concluded that for every fifteen Internet users per hundred inhabitants, there is approximately a thirty-five per cent reduction in government corruption, mediated by an increase in voice and accountability (Kock & Gaskins, 2014). Specific tools in the fight against especially minor corruption such as street bribery in Latin American cities are surveillance systems (Barreneche, 2019).

This part of the dissertation presented only some of the ways of fighting corruption in Latin America. However, there may also be some that are not institutionally or legally embedded, but are simply based on human society, principles of trust and emulation of the successful, such as examples of good practice. For instance, Bogotá, which is said to be one of the best governed cities in Latin America, is cited as a model. Indeed, the Colombian capital introduced new anti-corruption procedures in the awarding of public contracts in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, even this did not prevent corruption between 2008 and 2010, when

²¹ In fact, some research suggests that Latin American countries that promote digital government more vigorously also have lower levels of perceived corruption (Trapero et al., 2020).

Mayor Manuel Moreno Rojas offered major contracts to dubious firms on substandard terms. The mayor, along with other local politicians and contractors, was jailed for these corrupt activities. While on the one hand, there was a failure of preventive anti-corruption mechanisms at the local level, on the other hand, it demonstrated a functioning police and judicial system capable of effectively cracking down on corruption, which was something that other Latin American agglomerations had a problem with, as corruption often went unpunished (Gilbert, 2019).

Table 1. Determinants Reducing Corruption

Determinants	Literature
Higher economic development	(Ades & Di Tella, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000)
More democratic government	(Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Treisman, 2000)
More press freedom	(Adserà et al., 2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003)
Parliamentary constitutions	(Gerring & Thacker, 2004; Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman et al., 2005; Panizza, 2001)
Plurality electoral systems	(Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; T. Persson et al., 2003)
Centralization	(Gerring & Thacker, 2004; A. A. Goldsmith, 1999; Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Treisman, 2000)
Openness to international trade	(Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Gerring & Thacker, 2005; Sandholtz & Gray, 2003; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Treisman, 2000)
Greater representation of women in the legislature and government	(Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001)
Note: The table shows the variables that reduce the level of corruption in a country as measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.	

Processing: author; based on literature.

The table shows that the determinants of corruption reduction found in the literature have somewhat missed their effect in Latin America, making it all the more difficult to fight corruption in the region. This is because, as already mentioned, the Latin American states do not have parliamentary but presidential systems. Too much concentration of power in the hands of Latin American politicians then leads to abuse of power for private purposes. Nor can it be said that there is higher economic development in the Latin American region. Although there are large economies such as Brazil or economically advanced countries such as Chile,²² there are nevertheless high levels of poverty and related crime in the region, which, combined with poor governance, hinder economic development. Moreover, Ortega's Nicaragua or Maduro's Venezuela have problems with democracy and freedom of the press. The question is also to what extent the determinant of reducing corruption in Latin America is relevant in the form of greater representation of women in politics, given that two Latin American female presidents (Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina) have been accused of involvement in corrupt activities.

The corruption profile of Latin America is of course very negative. Essentially all structural factors of corruption point to the role of the state and its (in)ability to fulfil its functions (Dvořáková, 2008a).²³ While there have been some advances in the fight against corruption using various instruments, it always comes up against the will of political elites who may themselves be involved in corruption. Corruption is entrenched in Latin America because of its history, culture and socio-economic conditions. However, it cannot simply be stated that corruption is endemic to Latin America. If only for the reason that corruption is simply an international phenomenon (Martynov, 2018).

Three main debates on the impact of corruption on society

The following subsections present three major debates on the impact of corruption on society. The first debate is on the impact of corruption on the economy. The

²² Although Chile has long been considered the least corrupt country in Latin America, at least according to Transparency International data and public opinion polls, some authors justify this on the grounds that corruption there may simply be hidden and does not erupt in major corruption scandals as in other Latin American countries. In other words, that data should be perceived and interpreted with some caution and be critical of it (Orellana Vergas, 2007).

²³ The weakness of the state creates opportunities and space for corruption (Dvořáková, 2019, p. 120)

second debate revolves around the effects of corruption on trust, especially institutional trust. And the last major debate is on the impact of corruption on political participation. The purpose of these subsections is to demonstrate that while the first debates in the academic literature are dominated by the view of a unidirectional negative effect of corruption, this is not the case for the third debate, as it yields mixed results. This is one of the other reasons why it is necessary to pay attention to further research on the third debate and to try to fill the research gaps, to synthesize those existing researches and, above all, to offer a comprehensive view of the issue in order to move knowledge forward.

Corruption and economic development

Research on corruption and economic development has been on the rise, especially in recent years (Blackburn et al., 2010; Breen & Gillanders, 2015; Cooray & Schneider, 2018; Enweremadu, 2013; Haque & Kneller, 2005; Lobont, 2013; Neudorfer, 2014; Pook, 2008; Požega et al., 2011; Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Seyf, 2001; Zouaoui et al., 2018).²⁴ There has also been similar research on the relationship between corruption and human development (Qizilbash, 2001; Rontos et al., 2019; Wisitsuwan & Chintrakarn, 2012).

The prevailing opinion in the scientific literature is that corruption has a negative impact on development in general (Blackburn et al., 2006; Igiebor, 2019; Tsaturyan & Bryson, 2010; Wisitsuwan & Chintrakarn, 2012). More specifically, corruption has been found to have a negative impact on economic growth, financial development, income inequality, and research and technical progress (Adams & Klobodu, 2016; Kunieda et al., 2016; Rocha et al., 2019). The prevailing argument is that corruption has the potential to undermine economic development for several reasons. Corruption reduces domestic investment, discourages foreign direct investment, disrupts the free market, and generally reduces a nation's productivity. Corruption also promotes overspending at the government level and distracts the government from fruitful investments, such as in education, the environment, and health; instead government investment ends up in less efficient but more manipulative public projects (Rady, 2016; Wei, 1999). From a statistical

²⁴ However, this is already a classic debate on the impact of corruption, which began in the past (Beenstock, 1979; Leff, 1964; Olson et al., 1997; Robinson, 1998; Rutledge, 1997; Theobald, 1990).

perspective, some researchers say that a one percent increase in the level of corruption reduces the economic growth rate by as much as 0.72 percent. This is mainly due to political instability. Furthermore, corruption not only reduces private investment, but also reduces the level of human capital (Mo, 2001).

It is admitted some positive that in the short or medium term corruption can foster development because can occur in the process of development as the form in which a class of developers gathers wealth (MacWilliam & Rafferty, 2017). Some studies, however, refute the claim that there are positive impacts from corruption or record only a weak impact. Instead, these studies have generally found a strong negative correlation between genuine wealth per capita and corruption. Although there may be a small average effect of corruption on the growth rate of GDP per capita, in the long run it can only lead to unsustainable development (T. S. Aidt, 2009). There have also been studies that do not find any impact from corruption on the economy or only find a limited impact. One example is an article that used cross-section data on a sample of more than a hundred countries from the period from 1982-1997. While corruption was found to have no significant effect on economic development in democracies, in countries that cannot be described as fully democratic, corruption was found to negatively impact the economy (Drury et al., 2006). In transition countries, corruption has a negative and significant impact on investment growth at the firm level.²⁵ Corruption also significantly reduces revenue growth and therefore the competitiveness of firms. It was also found that bribes reduce bureaucratic interference. While companies make it easier for themselves to do business by bribing officials, this means additional costs for them, not to mention that it only widens the corruption space (Gaviria, 2002).

The impact of corruption on foreign inflows is also discussed, as in the paper where the authors examined this in a panel of forty-two countries representing three world regions between 1984 and 2012. The analysis reveals that while corruption has a positive impact on foreign investment inflows in Africa and Asia, the opposite is true in Latin America (Jalil et al., 2016). However, when the so-called corruption distance is added into the mix, the situation regarding the impact of corruption on foreign investment becomes more complicated. Indeed, some studies demonstrate

²⁵ However, in Latin America, firm-level investment growth does not seem to be otherwise affected by corruption (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009).

that firms in home countries with high levels of corruption are not deterred from investing in host countries that also have corruption problems. This creates something of a corruption trap. It should be a priority of the government to reduce the level of corruption in the country if corruption is what discourages foreign investment, as foreign investment is important to the national economy. However, if there is tolerance of corruption among similarly corrupt countries in terms of foreign investment, the government may not have an incentive to fight corruption as foreign investment will flow into the country anyway. The host countries in the study were twelve Latin American countries (Godinez & Liu, 2015).

While various economic measures have been proposed to reduce corruption in addition to measures for strengthening the law and combat embezzlement and discretionary rent-seeking, which have the potential to reduce economic growth (Nwabuzor, 2005; Y. Wang, 2020), reducing corruption nevertheless faces structural problems – poverty in many developing countries. Research on the relationship between corruption and globalization also speaks about poverty in the context of corruption. Using cross-section data for 127 countries, the conclusion is that, although globalization can suppress corruption in middle and high-income countries, in poor countries, globalization has a negligible impact on corruption. In order to combat this phenomenon, it is therefore necessary to first reduce poverty (Lalountas et al., 2011). However, reducing poverty is not the only condition for reducing corruption. The quality of governance as well as institutional, environmental, financial, and social attributes are also important (Lameira et al., 2013). The structural conditions of economically more advanced and educated countries have also been suggested by other studies as reasons for lower corruption (Glaeser & Saks, 2006).

Clearly, reducing or completely suppressing corruption is not enough for economic development. It is also important to implement policies that increase human development and the effectiveness of governance. Nevertheless, corruption remains an important variable affecting economic development (Salvati et al., 2018).

Corruption and trust

Corruption and trust are inherently opposed (Papakostas, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; You, 2017). While corruption is selfish “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close, family,

private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967, p. 419), trust is an essential element of social capital (Putnam, 2000) that expresses the human belief that all people are part of a moral community (Uslaner, 2004). Specifically, trust is “an expectancy held by an individual that the behavior (verbal or nonverbal) of another individual or group of individuals would be altruistic and personally beneficial to himself” (Frost et al., 1978, p. 104).

Trust is viewed from a number of perspectives (Blomqvist, 1997). Most often, however, trust is divided into trust between people (interpersonal trust) and trust in institutions or people working within them (political trust). In a broader context, trust can also include trust in private institutions and trust between companies. The logic of the definition of political trust is similar to the general definition of trust, but it is more focused because political trust “reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with the normative expectations held by the public” (Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 358). Political/institutional trust is essential for any state regardless of the nature of the regime. In fact, low political trust means that the government and politicians are doing something wrong. High confidence, by contrast, is a sign that a country is being managed effectively, efficiently, and democratically (Lenard, 2008). Too much confidence in political representation, however, can lead to a lack of control (Kim, 2005; Van De Walle & Six, 2014).²⁶ A significant erosion of institutional

²⁶ It also depends on the character of the regime, because in democratic states, a high degree of institutional trust has the potential to facilitate the functioning of democratic institutions, while in non-democratic set-ups this trust paradoxically reflects how strongly these regimes hold on to power.

trust, or a sustained decline in it, thus has the potential to undermine the stability of the political system (Parry, 1976).²⁷²⁸

The following section presents three tables. Studies were divided according to how corruption as an independent variable affects trust as a dependent variable. The first table shows research where corruption negatively affects the dependent variable (reduces trust). In the second table, corruption has a positive effect on the dependent variable (increases confidence). The third table shows studies where no relationship was recorded between the two phenomena.

Attention is placed on how corruption was operationalized and what type of trust was studied.

Table 2. Corruption Negatively Affects Trust

Study	Corruption	Trust
(Mishler and Rose, 2001)	Perceived corruption by citizens CPI	Interpersonal Trust Trust in institutions
(Seligson, 2002)	Experience with corruption	Interpersonal trust and belief in political system
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003)	CPI	Trust in civil servants
(Schneider, 2003)	Perceived corruption by citizens CPI	Trust in state institutions
(Bowler and Karp, 2004)	Corruption scandals	Approve or respect to institutions and politicians
(Wallace and Latcheva, 2006)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in state institutions

²⁷ The hypothesis of the negative connotations of low institutional trust on the stability of the political system has been thoroughly tested. The assumption is that citizens with low levels of trust in institutions will find it more acceptable to break the law than those who find state and political institutions, as the bearers of legal will, trustworthy. As a result, such low institutional trust will have the potential to undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of government actions, as well as the government's ability to implement legislation. Testing this hypothesis on a sample of data from thirty-three European countries revealed that respondents with low institutional trust are much more likely to engage in illegal behaviour (such as tax fraud) than respondents with high trust in government institutions. Given that people who are more tolerant of law-breaking behaviour are more likely to commit such acts themselves, it can be concluded that low levels of institutional trust will also be associated with less compliance with the law within society (Marien & Hooghe, 2011). In other words, low trust in state institutions is a serious problem for both the political system and its civil society.

²⁸ Corruption while diminishing the political confidence of citizens can also simultaneously increase people's propensity to vote for far-right parties that have anti-systemic tendencies within the political system (Ziller & Schübel, 2015).

(Chang and Chu, 2006)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in state institutions
(Catterberg and Moreno, 2006)	Index of corruption permissiveness	Trust in state institutions
(Torgler, 2008)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in United Nations
(Punyaratabandhu, 2008)	Corruption attitudes	Trust in the government performance and trust in public servants
(Rothstein and Eek, 2009)	Bribe as part of modeled situation	Interpersonal trust and trust in authority
(Caillier, 2010a)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in the government
(Tankebe, 2010)	Vicarious corruption and evaluations of police corruption reforms	Trust in police
(Richey, 2010)	Justice Department reports (number of convictions) Perceived corruption by citizens	Interpersonal trust
(Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri, 2011)	Experience with corruption Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in institutions
(Grönlund and Setälä, 2012)	CPI	Trust in institutions
(Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012)	CPI	Trust in institutions
(Villoria, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2013)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Interpersonal trust Trust in institutions
(Kubbe, 2013)	CPI CC	Trust in institutions
(Radin, 2013)	Experience with corruption Salience of corruption	Trust in public health care
(McAllister, 2014)	Experience with corruption Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in institutions
(Semukhina and Reynolds, 2014)	Experience with corruption	Trust in police
(Breen and Gillanders, 2015)	Experience with corruption	Trust in performance of IMF and World Bank
(Weng, Woo, Cheng, Ho, and Horowitz, 2015)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in aid delivery after earthquakes
(Choi and Woo, 2015)	Perceived corruption by government officials	Trust in government
(Jang, Lee, and Gibbs, 2015)	CC	Trust in police

(Pellegata and Memoli, 2016)	CPI CC CEB (Perceived corruption by citizens)	Trust in institutions
(Houston, Aitalieva, Morelock, and Shults, 2016)	Perceived corruption by citizens CPI	Trust in civil servants
(C.-H. Wang, 2016)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in government
(Montes and Almeida, 2017)	CPI ICRG Corruption index	Business confidence
(Habibov, Afandi, and Cheung, 2017)	Experience with corruption	Trust in institutions
(Ares and Hernández, 2017)	Corruption scandal	Trust in politicians
(Nunkoo, Ribeiro, Sunnassee, and Gursoy, 2018)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in institutions
(Gillanders and Neselevska, 2018)	Experience with corruption	Trust in private sector institutions
(Obydenkova and Arpino, 2018)	CPI	Trust in national parliament
(Baniamin and Jamil, 2018)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in anti-corruption agencies
(Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2018)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in politicians
(Ciziceno and Travaglino, 2019)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in institutions
(Peerthum and Luckho, 2020)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in government and anti-corruption commission

Processing: author

Table shows that the independent variable representing corruption is most often operationalized either as a perception or experience with corruption. From the point of view of the nature of the data, two types are most often used.

First, research often includes the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which is provided by Transparency International. It is an aggregate index where experts and businesspersons are interviewed regarding the level of corruption in various countries. Another index used was the Control of Corruption (CC) index, which is one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by the World Bank.

Second, research also includes the results of public opinion polls covering perceptions and experiences of corruption. International surveys (such as the International Social Survey Program or World Values Survey), regional surveys

(European Social Survey or Eurobarometer), and national surveys are represented. Analyses using national surveys used data at the individual level from only one state.

The dependent variable trust is based on opinion polls, and questions regarding this variable are available from international, regional, and national surveys. The table shows that interpersonal trust is only minimally represented in research addressing the effects of corruption and that, in the vast majority of cases, the effects of corruption on institutional (i.e., political trust) were tested. Most often, institutional trust is presented as respondents' trust in key state institutions such as government or parliament. This dependent variable is also operationalized as trust in persons operating within state institutions, such as politicians or civil servants. Finally, it can also refer to trust in specific areas such as trust in the healthcare system or in state aid for natural disasters.

Table 3. Corruption Positively Affects Trust

Study	Corruption	Trust
(Torgler, 2008)	Perceived corruption by citizens	Trust in United Nations
(Bauhr and Grimes, 2014)	CC	Trust in institutions
(Denisova-Schmidt and Prytula, 2017)	Personal experience with informal practices	Trust among firms
(Obydenkova and Arpino, 2018)	CPI	Trust in European Parliament
(Zhang and Kim, 2018)	Corruption convictions	Trust in government
(Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020)	Absence of corruption (perceptions and experience)	Trust in public administration

Processing: author

Table demonstrates there is research where corruption has a positive effect on trust. However, this finding is mainly due to the operationalization of the variable representing corruption. When corruption is operationalized as informal practices that are beneficial to companies, corruption increases mutual trust between companies (Denisova-Schmidt and Prytula, 2017). The case is similar when the independent variable operationalized is corruption convictions. Citizens do not seem to realize that more convictions do not lead to greater distrust of institutions

or politicians but rather signal that the government can tackle corruption. Ultimately, this increases confidence in the government (Zhang and Kim, 2018). Research on what kind of corruption has a positive effect on trust in the European Parliament also needs to be placed in a broader context. Distrust in national parliaments grows in countries that are highly affected by corruption (e.g., Greece, Romania), but paradoxically, due to corruption at the national level and distrust in domestic institutions, confidence in supranational institutions is growing (Obydenkova and Arpino, 2018). In a similar vein, perceptions of corruption affect trust in the United Nations. While a high perception of corruption in developed countries leads to distrust in the United Nations, in developing and transition countries, the opposite is true (Torgler, 2008). Furthermore, if the independent variable operationalized is the absence of corruption, it can be expected that it will increase institutional confidence (Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020).

Table 4. Corruption Does Not Affect Trust

Study	Corruption	Trust
(Tankebe, 2010)	Experience with corruption	Trust in police

Processing: author

There was only one study included in the review where the independent variable (in this case the experience of corruption) did not affect institutional trust. However, in 90% of cases, a relationship between the two variables was found.

How to reduce corruption and increase trust

Although this analysis of individual studies revealed that corruption negatively affects trust – especially trust in institutions and politicians – in the vast majority of cases, this analysis has not addressed how to solve the problem of corruption. There are several possibilities. Anti-corruption agencies are proving to be quite effective. Other countries can draw inspiration from the countries where these agencies operate, effectively fight corruption, and thus increase the confidence of citizens (Cheung, 2008). However, it should be noted that formal anti-corruption institutions are more effective in countries with high social confidence (Bjørnskov, 2011) and that it is not enough to leave anti-corruption initiatives to the government; support

from donors, international organizations, and businesses is also needed (Adelopo & Rufai, 2020).

It is also important not to underestimate networks of trust within the public administration, which are characterized by friendship, marital relations, and sibling relations. Such networks are highly susceptible to corruption, especially in the context of awarding public contracts (Uribe, 2014). Reporting public administration corruption by citizens is one of the most effective ways of combating corruption. It turns out that, although people with higher institutional confidence have a greater tendency to report corruption, higher education is an even stronger determinant of the willingness to report corruption. More educated people tend to report corruption even if they do not trust state institutions very much (Walton & Peiffer, 2017). Another solution, as some research demonstrates, is to increase the wages of politicians. Increasing politicians' wages leads to a reduction in their interest in participating in corruption and in increasing citizens' trust in them (Schumacher, 2013). The ability to spatially locate corruption is also important. Large cities in particular are prone to corruption. However, capital cities are usually exceptions to this finding due to the greater accountability of the government and media attention (Korosteleva et al., 2020).

To increase trust, especially institutional trust, it is not enough to merely contain corruption. Institutional trust also depends on how successful the government is at delivering outcomes to citizens (Van Ryzin, 2011) and on individual (officials' responsibility, respect to the client principles) and institutional (institutional self-regulation and integrity and principles of objectivity and fairness) factors (Novelskaitė & Pučėtaitė, 2018). The fairness of state institutions is important not only for political trust but also for social (interpersonal) trust (Rothstein, 2013).

Political participation

The classic work defines political participation as „activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take“ (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 2). This definition is quite narrow, as it only includes electoral participation or other activities that may influence politicians' decision-making, such as contacting them or being a member of a political party. Political participation can also be defined as „term for citizen

power“ (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). In other words, political participation can include essentially all civic activities that influence the political process (Milbrath, 1965). This is something that should distinguish political participation from civic engagement. While political participation should, for example, influence government policies or the selection of public officials, civic engagement should be about achieving the public good and should be carried out, for example, within community and non-governmental organisations. Civic engagement, unlike political participation, should rarely ever touch on politics. However, in practice, the boundaries of what is civic engagement and what can be considered political participation are not always clear. Although civic engagement should take place outside the realm of elected officials, it can have real impacts on issues that directly affect politics and in which, for example, government or politicians intervene, such as education, public safety, homelessness, etc. In addition, the government can act as an arbiter, enforcer or supporter in relation to civic engagement, as many of the activities arising from civic engagement take place within certain boundaries of the state and its offices (Zukin et al., 2006, pp. 51–52).

It should also be noted that political participation also has a number of other characteristics. Political participation implies some kind of activity, so passively watching TV is simply not enough. Political participation is based on voluntariness and should not be mandated or enforced by the state. This criterion, however, runs up against compulsory voting in many Latin American countries. However, in practice, this compulsory voting is not enforced, as this would mean penalizing several million citizens who do not vote. Another characteristic is that these are the activities of people in their roles as non-professionals or amateurs and not as politicians, lobbyists, officials or electoral managers. Political participation also refers to government, politics and the state in a broader sense and is not limited to specific bodies such as parliament or specific levels such as national elections. In other words, any voluntary non-professional activity related to governance, politics or the state can be considered political participation.

Types of political participation

The most widespread and well-known form of political participation is voting in elections. Other civic ways of getting involved include demonstrations, contacting public officials, boycotting, attending party rallies, guerilla gardening, posting

blogs, volunteering for political party, joining flash mobs, signing petitions, buying fair-trade products and even suicide protests (van Deth, 2016). There may be other forms of political participation, and new forms of online participation are likely to gain much traction in the digital age.

The list of these forms of political participation can be divided into conventional (institutionalised) forms or unconventional (non-institutionalised, extreme or alternative) forms.

In terms of conventional forms, institutionalised forms of political participation include activities such as voting and party membership (Stolle & Hooghe, 2011), as well as working for a candidate in an election campaign or contacting a public official (Dalton, 2008). Non-conventional forms are more varied and include unofficial strikes, public demonstrations or mass forwarding of political emails (Dalton, 2008). Extreme or unorthodox activities include barricading a community or shooting policemen (Bourne, 2010). The list is rounded off by alternative or, in other words, informal forms of participation such as electronic dance music (Riley et al., 2010). Of course, this division is only one of many (Demetriou, 2013, p. 27). However, not all of these types of political participation have been explored from the beginning. In the beginning, scholarly attention was focused only on some types, and only with the influence of time and the expansion of political participation did other types find their way into the literature. With the rise of representative democracy and the struggle for universal suffrage, attention was focused exclusively on elections. Over time, other election-related activities such as campaigning and party membership have added (Berelson et al., 1954). However, the professional community has begun to realise that political participation does not have to be limited to electoral activities and that other forms of political participation can also have an impact on the political process. For these reasons, attention has also been refocused on activities between elections, such as contacts between citizens and government officials (Campbell et al., 1960). Given the growing importance of community activities, the strong focus on elections was eventually abandoned and the repertoire of political participation, in addition to electoral activities and contacts between citizens and public officials, now included community politics (Verba et al., 1978). However, in this case we were talking about institutionalised forms of political participation. With the rapid social and political development in the 1960s and 1970s, characterised by dissent,

disagreement and refusal, attention shifted to new forms of political participation. In particular, these were new social movements based on ideas of pacifism, the protection of nature and the planet, the phenomenon of squatting and feminism, which were not afraid to take to the streets and make their voices heard. These protest activities can be characterized as elite-challenging modes of participation, as they rejected existing social and political arrangements and demanded changes (Inglehart, 1990). It is only later that non-institutionalised forms of political participation, their manifestations and possible impacts are being explored.

Elections

Free and transparent elections are considered the foundation of democracy (Birch & Carlson, 2012; Dahl, 1973; James, 2021; Przeworski, 2018). The importance of the study of voting behaviour, or its significance, lies in the elections themselves, since elections, like referendums, represent a specific procedure of decision-making in the democratic process (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, pp. 10–11). The concept of electoral behaviour is directly related to the electoral decisions of voters, their participation in elections, referendums, etc. The processes of democratisation in Latin America have shown that civil society is capable not only of mobilising itself but also of actively entering the political arena in the form of anti-regime movements and making demands. This experience has added significantly to the importance of civil society and its participation in the twenty-first century.

Meetings

As it was already explained, political participation can be divided into institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms. These forms are divided according to whether or not some form of political participation is organized by the political elite (Dalton, 2004). A political meeting can be considered an institutionalized form of political participation, as it is organized by politicians to address citizens.

Political meetings are probably the most common form of political participation after elections. They represent an opportunity to obtain direct information about the candidates, their program, ideology, and opinions. Based on meetings with candidates, voters can make informed electoral decisions. This information-seeking behavior is one of the main reasons for attending political meetings (Sanders &

Kaid, 1981). At political meetings, social distance decreases, and thus, the expectation of reciprocity increases (Barton et al., 2014). In other words, the possibility of direct contact increases candidates' chances of influencing voters to vote for them in the election.

Interest in participating is based in human rationality. For example, in an election, people are much more likely to vote if the benefits of participating outweigh the costs (Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1983). At a political meeting, a candidate can attract voters via two types of benefits – programmatic and material. Simultaneously, by organizing a meeting in a certain locality, a candidate can give the impression to voters that the area in which they live is decisive in an election and thus motivate them to participate not only in the meeting but also in the election (Kamenica & Gentzkow, 2011).

In addition to political meetings, there are also community meetings, where citizens of a particular community come together to discuss issues that affect life in their area, such as the environment, education or local security.

A very common type of institutional participation includes participation in official meetings of the city or the city council, where citizens can make suggestions about the work of local politicians or officials or make suggestions about what could be improved in the city.

Demonstrations

The theoretical argument in relation to corruption and demonstrations is that participation on such public events in which people can express their opinion is mainly caused by grievances with the government and dissatisfaction with its policy. That is, if political representation cannot effectively fight corruption, people will protest, remind it or directly make demands on how to fight corruption. Potentially even stronger motives for participating or approving of protest meetings and demonstrations include anger and dissatisfaction with the politicians involved in corruption activities or their responses to corruption scandals (Machado et al., 2011, p. 345).

Concept of demonstrations was defined by Charles Tilly. Although demonstrations are supposed to be non-violent, they have the hidden potential for outbreaks of violence.

Typical features of demonstrations are: 1) an organized meeting in a visible, public, and ideally symbolic place; 2) participants join some politically relevant part of the population, while expressing sympathy for certain claims, opinions, program, etc.; and 3) The last sign is a collective commitment to make demands and a disciplined form of expression.

Tilly further divides demonstrations into raising the existence of claims (the participant demonstrates his or her right to exist / identity and ability to act in his or her favor) and the program claims (sympathy or resistance from the participants to any proposal or program) (Tilly, 2003, p. 201). This dissertation uses the second type of demonstration because anti-corruption demonstrations or public meetings carry primarily program claims. People demand the resignation of corrupt politicians or offer solutions on how to stop corruption within the country.

Demonstrations can take the form of peaceful public gatherings, boycotts, various challenges or petitions, road blockages, to those that promote interests most loudly, such as violent actions and riots.²⁹ Violence in demonstrations is linked to the resistance to unpopular proposals and measures by the public authorities (in this case, resistance to political corruption in the country. Although most demonstrations are peaceful, a significant minority still produces violent clashes (Tilly, 2003, pp. 204–205). Demonstrations also have the potential to contribute to the resignation of heads of state.

Determinants of political participation in Latin America

For the Latin American region, civic participation is seen as something that can and improve the quality of democracy and help fight corruption (Briceño-León, 1998). Because it is civil society that makes demands and can put pressure on the political elite through its mobilisation and engagement (Cano Blandón, 2008; Dvořáková, 2008b). However, civil society must realise and overcome the notion that citizens' participation in democracy equates only to participation in elections (Vera Martínez et al., 2015, p. 100).

This subchapter will reveal what the determinants of different forms of political participation in the Latin American area may be. Understandably, political participation in Latin America can be influenced by a number of other variables

²⁹ According to Tilly, demonstrations are a way of drawing "forbidden or divisive issues, demands, grievances, and actors into public politics" (Tilly, 2003, p. 204).

(Ribeiro et al., 2011). However, it is not the aim of this dissertation to identify what all variables may influence political participation, as the ambition is to primarily focus on the relationship between corruption and political participation, while the other variables will only act as controls.

Social capital, understood as the social networks, norms and trust that enable citizens to act more successfully in pursuit of common goals, is important for political participation. Social capital should lead to greater political participation and a more robust democratic experience. Research working with World Values Survey data from 1999-2001 using Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Peru as examples confirms this. Greater involvement in non-political organizations as well as greater interpersonal trust lead to greater political participation. However, the author of this study concludes that the level of civic engagement as well as the level of interpersonal trust in Latin America are moderate compared to developed democracies (Klesner, 2007). The importance of social capital for political participation in Latin America is discussed in other studies. In particular, this phenomenon leads to greater involvement in conventional forms of political participation such as voting or contacting elected representatives (Carreras & Bowler, 2019).

Men are generally more involved in political activities in Latin America compared to women. The only exception is turnout in elections, where it is mostly even.³⁰ However, when it comes to specific forms of political participation, women prefer rallies, which speaks to the fact that Latin American women have strong community ties through various organizations (Espinal & Zhao, 2015). In terms of gender determinants of political participation, for example, occupation, income and marital status are associated with higher political participation among women, while trust in male leaders and living in an urban region increase male-only political participation (Pachón et al., 2012).

Some studies show that international cooperation between municipalities is also important for the development of political participation and civic engagement, especially at the local level. Such research has focused on the Chilean city of Ovalle,

³⁰ Of course, this refers to the active right to vote. In the case of the right to stand for election, men dominate the lists of candidates and parliaments, although in many Latin American countries there are quotas for women. The under-representation of women may be related to discrimination, harassment or perhaps violence during campaigning and subsequent parliamentary service (Cerva Cerna, 2014).

which has a linking project with the Canadian-sponsored city of Quebec. These innovations have greatly increased citizen participation in local government. However, such initiatives must be considered in the broader Latin American political-administrative context and the associated factors that constrain the creation of a broader democratic culture at the local level, such as corruption (Hewitt, 2004). Some research has looked at what drives people to take to the streets in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela to protest. They see the problem as poor quality institutions that push Latin Americans towards more radical forms of political participation. If governments lived up to expectations, people would have no reason to protest. Based on international opinion polls, the author of such research concludes that there is a relationship between ineffective political institutions and social engagement in the form of participation in protests (Moseley, 2015).³¹

In the context of protest activities in Latin America, the role of social media is also discussed. Firstly, it is examined whether social media leads to greater participation in protest activities at the individual level, as is the case in developed democracies. Then, whether social media reduce political and socioeconomic inequalities among people in terms of their participation in protests. Regression analysis using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer revealed that social media use significantly increases the odds of protest. In addition, social media reduces protest gaps (Valenzuela et al., 2016).

A number of institutional variables also affect voter turnout in Latin America. Using data from an expanded dataset on turnout from 1980-2016, the paper concludes that when presidential elections are held concurrently with parliamentary elections, turnout is affected primarily by presidential institutions (length of term, presidential powers and electoral rules) as well as electoral context (effective number of presidential candidates) (Carreras, 2018).

Other variables that influence political participation include institutional trust. Earlier studies using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer found that trust affects different types of political participation differently. While individuals who trust

³¹ There are several scientific articles dealing with corruption and public protests not only in Latin America, but also in Asia (Avenburg, 2017; Gingerich, 2009; Khandekar & Reddy, 2015; Machado et al., 2011; Sun, 1991).

their institutions more tend to engage in more conventional types of participation, conversely, those who distrust institutions seek out unconventional ways to engage, such as protests (Rivera, 2018).

Other determinants that may increase participation in multipolitical activities in Latin America include conditional cash transfers through resource effects (Schober, 2019).

Table 5. Examples of Demonstrations/Protest Activities in Latin America

Country	Demonstration/protect activities
Argentina	Thousands of people in Argentina pour out on to the streets to protest President Mauricio Macri's economic policies. Macri is widely expected to introduce austerity measures to prop up state economy (Ramírez, 2019)
Bolivia	Demonstrators close streets of Bolivia in protest against Evo Morales' re-election (Danny & Sequera, 2019)
Brasil	Thousands of anti-corruption protesters rally in Brazil in support of justice minister Sergio Moro in wake of 'Car Wash' probe (PB, 2019)
Chile	Civil protests took place throughout Chile in response to a raise in the Santiago Metro's subway fare, the increased corruption, cost of living, privatisation and inequality prevalent in the country (Urrejola, 2019)
Colombia	The protests were initiated by Santos for failing to manage corruption, stagnating the Colombian economy and signing an unpopular peace treaty with the country's main guerrilla group (Redacción BBC News Mundo, 2019a)
República Dominicana	The social movement Marcha Verde clearly pointed out President Danilo Medina, as well as former President Leonel Fernández and the leadership of the PLD as the 'main responsible' for the current corruption régime (Redacción Listin Diario, 2018)
Ecuador	Series of protests and riots against austerity measures including the cancellation of fuel subsidies, adopted by President of Ecuador Lenin Moreno and his administration (Redacción Human Rights Watch, 2020)
Guatemala	Protest activities against the government's decision to shut down an international anti-corruption commission in the country (Menchu, 2018)
Haiti	Hundreds of people demonstrated in Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital, to reject the alleged corruption scheme through the Venezuelan government's Petrocaribe oil program (Arciniegas, 2018)
Honduras	These protests first were against the privatisation of health and education then soon turned into anti-corruption and an anti-government revolt (Redacción BBC News Mundo, 2019b)
Mexico	Protests began because of the fact that governors are currently under investigation for corruption, some of them for colluding with the organized crime groups that are largely responsible for Mexico's rising violence (González, 2019)
Nicaragua	Nicaraguan protests began on 18 April 2018 when demonstrators in several cities of Nicaragua began protests against the social security reforms decreed by President Daniel Ortega that increased taxes and decreased benefits (Hurtado, 2020)
Panama	Protests against plans to regenerate the city turned violent - Odebrecht case: Politicians worldwide suspected in bribery scandal (Pupiales, 2018)
Paraguay	Demonstrations began to denounce government corruption and a recent agreement with Argentina that involves a large Paraguayan debt (Marín, 2019)
Peru	The protests began after the release of a recording that compromised many judges, businessmen, voters and legislators exchanging favors, sometimes for money (Cervantes, 2018)
Venezuela	People of Venezuela demonstrate against corruption and to come forward to bring about a change of government and the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro (Redacción Infobae, 2018)
Note: The table shows examples of protest activities with corruption themes or directed against the government in the 2018-2019 reporting period. Only three countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador and Uruguay) did not have examples of protest activities with these themes. Processed by the author based on a Google search with a time limit of 2018 and 2019, using keywords such as corruption, protest or demonstration.	

Processing: author

The purpose of the table is to show that in Latin America, in addition to participation in elections, which is compulsory (though not enforced) in many countries, there are also unconventional forms of political participation, such as demonstrations and protests. The table only includes examples of demonstrations that were directed against the government or where the issue of corruption was raised. The table shows that the corruption scandals linked to the Brazilian oil company Petrobras or the construction company Odebrecht, which were investigated under Operation Car Wash, still resonate in a number of countries. People also took to the streets when governments were planning or had already directly implemented some unpopular measures that could have economic repercussions and thus threaten living standards. Demonstrations against corruption do not necessarily have to be directed against a corruption case, but corruption can be just one of the accompanying themes that are heard at a demonstration, as is evident in the Colombian example, where the protest rally included, in addition to corruption, topics such as the stagnant economy or the problematic peace agreements with guerrilla groups, among others. Of course, these unconventional forms of political participation do not have to be directed only against corrupt politicians, but instead people can rally in support of those politicians who are trying to fight corruption in the country, as the example from Brazil demonstrates, where a demonstration was called in support of the Minister of Justice in his fight against a large-scale bribery scandal as part of Operation Car Wash, or the example of Guatemala, where people demonstrated to preserve the country's anti-corruption commission, which the government there wanted to abolish.

The Relationship Between Corruption and Political Participation

The theoretical argument is that corruption undermines inclusivity in political processes, tarnishing the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives (Warren, 2004). Basically, corruption weakens the voice of citizens by transferring power and resources from the public to the private sphere, in which individualism and a desire for profit thrive. As a result, democratic legitimacy is weakened as citizens are excluded from political decision-making. Moreover, as corruption spreads, citizens gradually lose confidence in the political process that they no longer perceive as publicly accessible, and, as a result, they become more

and more cynical and withdraw from participating in such an exclusive environment. The horizon of collective action within the political system is thus significantly reduced as a result of corruption (Warren, 2015). An example of this can be seen in the electoral process. Within a democratic system, elections represent an important decision-making procedure in which citizens select the ruling elite and essentially participate in the administration of their country (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007). The general premise is that high turnout requires elected officials who are credible and act in accordance with the desires of their constituency (Putnam, 1993). If citizens perceive political leaders as corrupt, they often prefer not to vote, because they believe that their voices cannot change the corrupt environment. They therefore remove themselves from the political process. In this way, the political discontent associated with corruption can result in political apathy through a process of indignation (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Corruption thus represents a deterrent to voter turnout (De Vries & Solaz, 2017; Ecker et al., 2016).

Conversely, a number of studies suggest a very different theoretical argument: corruption can provoke political mobilization, which can act in two ways. Firstly, elections represent a unique opportunity for voters to punish the politicians involved in corruption by supporting alternative candidates. In this way, the citizen is targeted in the political process. This type of mobilization represents a possible effect of corruption that contrasts with the political apathy previously described (Welch & Hibbing, 2006; Xezonakis et al., 2016). Furthermore, voters can also choose to intentionally vote for corrupt candidates. This is often the case in systems with a high degree of electoral clientelism in which politicians exchange votes for public goods. Certain voters benefit from this exchange, which leads them to have greater confidence in these politicians and re-elect them, allowing their corrupt practices to continue (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007). These contrasting theoretical arguments are a source of constant academic debate.³²

³² Some studies demonstrate that the ability to harness public concerns about political corruption for electoral mobilization is primarily in ideologically polarized party systems, rather than in hegemonic or two-party party systems (Davis et al., 2004).

Figure 2. Effects of Corruption on Political Participation




Figure shows the possible effects of corruption on political participation. Processing: author.

A limitation of much prior research is that it focuses primarily on voter turnout, neglecting other forms of political participation. Just because citizens choose not to vote due to corruption does not necessarily mean that they are not engaging in other forms of political participation, such as protest rallies, which allow them to express their opinions in another way. There are, in fact, many different types of political participation, from voting to more radical forms such as demonstrations. In the scholarly literature, they are most often divided into the categories of institutionalized and non-institutionalized. The difference is that the forms of political participation in the first group are usually regulated by the political elite, while those in the latter are organized by citizens (Kaase, 1999). The institutionalized framework includes, for example, elections, participation in political party meetings, political party membership, and the practice of contacting politicians. The non-institutionalized forms of political participation are characterized by acts such as signing petitions, boycotting certain products and services for political reasons, and participating in protest rallies. Their purpose is to challenge the political elite or to gain access to the political agenda (Hooghe & Marien, 2013, pp. 138–139; Inglehart, 1997). Elections are undoubtedly the most widespread form of political participation, so it is not surprising that they are the most frequently represented in academic research examining the relationship between corruption and political participation. However, unlike the other forms, the frequency of participation in elections is limited: one vote per person per election.

Focusing on voter turnout thus provides an incomplete picture of the true level of political participation.

Corruption and political participation – A review

The aim of this review is to offer an evaluation of the existing research in this area and present the forms of corruption and political participation that are currently being studied, as well as the trends and conclusions of previous research.³³

This review not only summarizes the results to date in this area but also takes into account different kinds of research. It includes aggregate and individual-level data, as well as experiments. Another contribution of this subchapter is that it explores forms of political participation not limited to voter turnout and also monitors the impact of corruption on participation in, for example, demonstrations and political meetings. The subchapter also differentiates between perceptions of corruption, experience with corruption, and the impact of corruption scandals on political participation. The results reveal that corruption generally discourages political participation. However, there are also a number of studies indicating that, on the contrary, it can lead to political mobilization.

The Deterrent Effect of Corruption

Several existing empirical studies find a correlation between corruption and voter turnout. Both Hellman et al. (2000) and Tucker (2007) argue that the widespread perception of government corruption leads to fewer citizens making the journey to the polling stations (Hellman et al., 2000; Tucker, 2007). Stockemer (2013) uses three indicators to measure corruption, namely the International Country Risk Guide and the data compiled by Transparency International and the World Bank. Across a large sample of presidential regimes, he finds that only the International Country Risk Guide, in particular its corruption component, reveals a negative impact on voter turnout. The other two indicators of corruption do not appear on the macro-level (Stockemer, 2013). An analysis of data between 1984 and 2009 based on a sample of 72 electoral democracies finds that countries with greater corruption control also have higher voter turnout. Conversely, as corruption rises in

³³ The current review also expands the most recent review article dealing with the electoral consequences of corruption (De Vries & Solaz, 2017).

the eyes of citizens, the percentage of voters participating in elections decreases. In this study, corruption is measured using the International Country Risk Guide Index (Stockemer et al., 2013). After examining corruption and voter turnout across 172 regions in Europe, Sundström and Stockemer (2015) reaffirm the argument that political corruption leads to low voter turnout in regional elections (Sundström & Stockemer, 2015). Simpson (2004) also discusses the negative impact of electoral corruption. His extensive N-study research, covering mainly the 1990s, focuses on both autocracies and democracies (Simpson, 2004).

Using individual-level research, McCann and Dominguez (1998) and Birch (2010) likewise demonstrate that the perception of electoral fraud negatively affects voter turnout. The first study is based on a national opinion poll conducted in Mexico and indicates that respondents who believe that corruption is widespread are much less likely to vote than those who believe that their elected representatives are clean (McCann & Domínguez, 1998). The second study uses CSES data to determine that voters who perceive elections as fair are more likely to participate in them than those who perceive them as manipulated. This research focused on both new and established democracies. It is not only corruption that reduces voter turnout but also the inability and inefficiency of the government (Birch, 2010).

Two Brazilian surveys demonstrate that awareness of corruption has a negative impact on voter turnout, despite the fact that Brazil has enforceable compulsory voting (De Figueiredo et al., 2011; Ferraz & Finan, 2008). Another study in the US state of Louisiana using data collected through telephone surveys confirms the finding that voter turnout decreases when the perception of corruption is high (Caillier, 2010b). Tatiana Kostadinova (2003, 2009) reports mixed results using CSES data for eight post-communist countries in Eastern Europe. Although she finds a weak positive effect of political corruption on voter turnout, it is counterbalanced by the negative effect of corruption perception on political efficiency, which in turn reduces voter turnout. In the long term, Kostadinova's results indicate that the deterrent effect of corruption prevails, as its mobilizing effect proves to be much weaker (Kostadinova, 2003, 2009). Another experimental study based in Mexico explores the relationship between corruption, specifically awareness of corruption, and voter turnout in 12 municipalities. It concludes that corruption indeed reduces voter turnout in these constituencies (Chong et al., 2015). Similarly, research by Spanish municipalities refutes the mobilization impact of

corruption at the local level, finding that politically unreached voters tend to withdraw from the electoral process rather than mobilize against corruption (Costas-Perez, 2014). The same conclusions are reached in a study of Italian municipalities (Giommoni, 2017).

Research combining individual CSES data with National Quality of Government data from a sample of 26 countries reveals that corruption reduces voter turnout in systems with low to medium levels of corruption. In countries where corruption has truly permeated the political system, it has no effect on voter turnout (Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016). The most recent study concerning Colombia proves that voters with credible information about a candidate's corruption are less likely to participate in elections than those that are uninformed. Furthermore, this article rebuts the theory of clientelistic ties leading voters to willingly support corrupt politicians in exchange for personal gain. Carreras and Vera (2018) also emphasize that "electoral participation is just one of the many ways citizens can participate in politics. It is entirely possible for citizens to resist corruption by engaging in non-institutionalized political actions such as joining anti-corruption demonstrations" (Carreras & Vera, 2018, p. 13). Elections are indeed not the only decisive mechanism for combating political corruption from a citizen's perspective (Xezonakis et al., 2016). The most recent research on Spanish municipalities tested how corruption cases manifested themselves in relation to voter turnout between 1999 and 2011. The authors found that corruption at the local level reduces turnout, and that right-wing voters are more loyal to their parties and more tolerant of corruption (Jiménez & García, 2018).

Mobilization Effect of Corruption

Research into US local and gubernatorial elections, however, suggests that corruption has a mobilizing effect, encouraging citizens to vote (Escaleras et al., 2012; Karahan et al., 2006). Using data from 1979 to 2005 on the number of public officials convicted of corruption-related crimes compared with voter turnout, Escaleras et al. (2012) demonstrate that voter turnout is higher in states with more allegations of corruption. Stockemer and Calca (2013) argue that while high corruption at the national level leads to lower turnout, the effect on the subnational level is often the opposite. This is revealed in their research into Portuguese districts (Stockemer & Calca, 2013). Also, of note is a study examining the electoral

behaviour in Senegal. Using an experimental research design and Afrobarometer data, Inman and Andrews (2015) find support for allegations that more widespread perception of government corruption leads to higher turnout. Controlling for party affiliation, they conclude that only non-partisans have a greater interest in politics in response to corruption. Corruption does not appear to affect members of Senegal's political parties in this way (Inman & Andrews, 2015). A field study involving 298 Israeli participants indicates that the perception of corruption leads to political participation, but this relationship is influenced by the way in which citizens perceive corruption. The conclusions are that both the perception of corruption and the public's conception of corruption should be seen as important indicators of participation (Navot & Beerli, 2017).

Little evidence supports the theory that one effect of corruption is that it mobilizes citizens to vote against corrupt politicians by instead voting for another candidate. Only a minute proportion of corrupt politicians are successfully punished in this way, which in the long term significantly weakens the mobilization effect of corruption (Costas-Pérez et al., 2012; Dimock & Jacobson, 1995; Pattie & Johnston, 2012).

A number of recent studies on corruption and political participation that use data at the aggregate, individual, and experimental levels demonstrate that corruption reduces voter turnout. However, there are also many studies that use the same types of data yet reach the conclusion that corruption increases turnout.

One way to explain this difference is by the size of the samples examined. Research at the aggregate and at the individual levels involving multiple countries tends to agree that corruption reduces voter turnout (Stockemer, 2013; Sundström & Stockemer, 2015). The opposite conclusion is mainly reached in local research.

No Correlation Between Corruption and Voter Turnout

Several studies examine the relationship between corruption and political participation and conclude that there is no correlation between these variables; two such studies demonstrate this with US data (Peters & Welch, 1980; Shaffer, 1981). Both these studies argue that corruption and the likelihood of voter turnout are unrelated. Extensive research involving 115 developing countries adds that the perception of corruption is not one of the factors influencing election results, because the economy is generally more important to citizens (Choi & Woo, 2010).

Influence of Corruption on Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Forms of Political Participation

Regarding more radical and unconventional forms of political participation, several studies have highlighted that corruption can lead to increased participation in demonstrations against the abuse of power and the use of public money for private purposes. Research into this question has focused mainly on the Latin American region, where corruption is widespread (Gingerich, 2009; Machado et al., 2011). Sofia A. Olsson (2014) is a scientific pioneer who has worked with both non-institutionalized and institutionalized forms of political participation. Although Olsson's conclusions confirm the negative impact of corruption on electoral turnout, her hypotheses about the relationship between corruption and institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation have yet to be validated, and further research is therefore required in this field (Olsson, 2014). Hooghe and Quintelier (2014) also divide political participation into the categories of institutionalized and non-institutionalized; they use European Social Survey data to monitor the impact of a number of variables, including corruption, on these forms of participation. They find that corruption has a negative impact on political participation, with the level of participation being lowest in countries with the highest levels of corruption (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014).

For a broader picture of how corruption affects political participation, it is important to have a better understanding of corruption. The authors of a study focused on Latin American countries using the AmericasBarometer distinguish between the perception, experience, and tolerance of corruption (Bonifácio & Paulino, 2015). These elements are evaluated at the individual level, based on respondents' answers to the survey. The authors examine the effects of three forms of corruption on five kinds of political participation: contact with political and governmental actors, community activism, partisan and electoral activism, voter turnout, and protest activism. Their findings reveal that both the experience of corruption and the tolerance of corruption increase the likelihood of political participation. The results concerning the perception of corruption are too variable to deduce any sort of trend. Their research is unique in its complexity and is one of the few studies that takes into account both various forms of corruption and different forms of political participation. The perception of corruption and experience with corruption is also

discussed in another article on the Latin American region, which focuses on the local level and uses AmericasBarometer data. This database provides survey answers not only on various forms of corruption, but also on various forms of political participation, such as whether the respondent attended city council meetings in the last 12 months. The results of the analysis reveal that experience with bribery of public officials mobilizes local political participation, whereas the perception of corruption tends to discourage political participation (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019). These conclusions are in line with similar research focusing on three South American countries, Chile and Venezuela (Školník 2019) and Colombia (Školník 2020), which also use the AmericasBarometer data (Školník, 2019, 2020c).

One of the latest studies, which works with individual ISSP data in a sample of 34 countries, also addresses the impact of corruption on non-electoral forms of political participation. However, this research combines different forms of political participation, including taking part in a demonstration, signing a petition, participating in a boycott, attending a political meeting or rally, contacting a politician, contacting the media, and donating money or raising funds for a political cause in the past year, into one dependent variable. Corruption, according to this research, has a positive impact on non-electoral forms of political participation, but the effect is primarily among people with lower levels of education and less political interest who hold anti-elitist views and tend to engage in non-institutionalized forms of political participation (Bazurli & Portos, 2019).

The effects of corruption on multiple forms of political participation are also tested in an article that uses data from the Hungarian post-election survey from 2014. Corruption in this research takes three forms (experience with bribery, perceptions of widespread corruption, and concerns about increasing corruption). The perception of corruption has a deterrent effect on voter turnout. Concerns about the increase in corruption, by contrast, may lead to participation in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms. Experience with bribery leads to involvement in various forms of political participation, but it is not a reason for voting in elections (Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019).

Perceptions of corruption at the individual level also negatively affect approval of participation in protest rallies and demonstrations, as demonstrated by research on

post-communist countries using data from the International Social Research Programme (Školník, 2022).

Table 6. Literature Review Summary

The Deterrent Effect of Corruption	Mobilization Effect of Corruption
<p>McCann & Domínguez 1998 Hellman et al. 2000 Kostadinova 2003; 2009 Simpser 2004 Tucker 2007 Ferraz & Finan 2008 Birch 2010 Caillier 2010 De Figueiredo et al. 2011 Stockemer 2013 Stockemer et al. 2013 Costas-Perez 2014 Chong et al. 2015 Sundström & Stockemer 2015 Dahlberg & Solevid 2016 Xezonakis et al. 2016 Giommoni 2017 Carreras & Vera 2018 Jiménez & García 2018</p>	<p>Dimock & Jacobson 1995 Karahan et al. 2006 Costas-Pérez et al. 2012 Escaleras et al. 2012 Pattie & Johnston 2012 Stockemer & Calca 2013 Stockemer et al. 2013 Inman & Andrews 2015 Navot & Beerli 2017</p>
No Correlation Between Corruption and Voter Turnout	Influence of Corruption on Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Forms of Political Participation
<p>Peters & Welch 1980 Shaffer 1981 Choi & Woo 2010</p>	<p>Gingerich 2009 Machado et al. 2011 Hooghe & Quintelier 2014 Olsson 2014 Bonifácio & Paulino 2015 Bazurli & Portos 2019 Neshkova & Kalesnikaite 2019 Kostadinova & Kmetty 2019 Školník 2019 Školník 2020 Školník 2022</p>

Processing: author

Although corruption is an important topic in many fields, research into the relationship between corruption and political participation has only begun to grow in intensity in the last five to ten years, as demonstrated by the literature review. Most studies use the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index data as an independent variable and voter turnout as a dependent variable. However, there are also some articles that address corruption on an individual level or opt for experimental design, reflecting the diversity of this academic debate.

Research at the national level in the vast majority of cases seems to confirm the deterrent effect of corruption, while at the regional and local levels the results are rather more ambiguous, suggesting not only a deterrent but also a mobilizing effect of this phenomenon. To explain this discrepancy, it is important to highlight the different ways that these studies measure corruption. All transnational studies work with statistics on the perception of corruption, while regional studies are based on data about the number of politicians accused as a result of corrupt practices, namely the awareness of corruption (Escaleras et al., 2012; Stockemer & Calca, 2013). Perceived corruption indicates how much respondents view corruption in their country as being widespread. With regard to the latter, it is often difficult to interpret the significance of the number of officials convicted as a result of corruption: whether a high number signals that the political system is very corrupt, or that it is effective at tackling corruption.

What is significant for the purposes of this dissertation, however, is that only a minimal number of studies have focused exclusively on the Latin American region (Bonifácio & Paulino, 2015; Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019; Školník, 2019, 2020c). Comparisons between Latin American countries are also absent. More diverse forms of corruption and political participation are also absent from the existing studies. For these reasons, this dissertation fills the gaps in research and reflects all of these shortcomings by including more diverse questions on corruption and political participation and also mapping differences between countries.

Four rather general hypotheses are formulated for greater clarity. The formulation of the hypotheses was based on existing theoretical knowledge, but also on the logic of the formulation of the questions included in the survey. Within the academic literature, the prevailing view is that perceptions of corruption have the potential to have a deterrent effect on political participation, while experiences of corruption

have the potential to have a mobilising effect (Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019; Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019; Školník, 2019, 2020c). In terms of awareness of corruption, there have not been many studies on this topic to date and they have produced rather mixed results (Chong et al., 2015; De Figueiredo et al., 2011; Inman & Andrews, 2015; Muñoz et al., 2016). However, the dissertation hypothesizes that awareness of corruption is certainly a stronger predictor of political participation than perceived corruption, but not as strong a predictor as personal experience with corruption.³⁴ Hence, the deterrent effect of corruption awareness will be assumed. Finally, the question of whether it is possible to eradicate corruption from politics. For this question arising from opinion polls, the hypothesis was formulated in the sense that if people are convinced about something, they will have at least a minimal interest in doing something about it and will perceive political participation as a means, hence the expected mobilising effect in this case.

Given the theoretical framework and the prevailing literature, the hypotheses are stated as follows:

H1: The greater the perception of corruption, the less interest in political participation.

H2: Awareness of corruption leads to less interest in political participation.

H3: Experience with corruption leads to greater interest in political participation.

H4: A positive view of the possibility of eradicating corruption from politics leads to a greater interest in political participation.

³⁴ Examining the impact of corruption on political participation in Latin America, Neshkova and Kalesnikaite (2019) suggest that the experience of corruption is a much stronger predictor of involvement in local government activities, such as participation in city councils, than the perception of corruption (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019). This is because petty corruption is more prevalent at the local level and respondents are more likely to have encountered it.

Methodology

The methodological part explains the analysis procedure and presents the data used in the analytical part of the dissertation. These are two databases of opinion polls, AmericasBarometer and Latinóbarometro. The methodological part also operationalises the variables used in the analysis, namely the dependent variables, the independent variables as well as the control variables. Finally, the statistical methods through which the models will be built are presented.

Data

LAPOP (AmericasBarometer)

One half of the analysis is based on data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, known as LAPOP (AmericasBarometer). Regular questionnaire surveys are conducted and subsequently processed by a team of Professor Mitchell Seligson of Vanderbilt University in Tennessee, with the help of local interviewers from across the Americas. There are several reasons for using the data from this project. First of all, these are well-processed data files that are already adapted for work with statistical software. In addition, the samples of individual opinion polls conducted in each country are calculated in such a way that it is possible to generate representative data reflecting the entire population of selected countries. And finally, AmericasBarometer offers questions not only on the issues of corruption but also on political participation, such as turnout in the future presidential election.

Latinobarómetro

The second half of the analysis used data from Latinobárometro, a private non-profit organization based in Santiago, Chile. One advantage of using these data is that Latinobárometro is a stable opinion polling company that has been processing data since 1995. Surveys are conducted in 18 Latin American countries. In Latin America, only the AmericasBarometer can compete with Latinobárometro in terms of the size of the survey, interviewers, and number of respondents. Similar organizations on other continents include Eurobarometer or Afrobarometer. Latinobárometro's surveyors are interested in respondents' opinions on questions concerning issues such as democracy, economy, society, and so forth. The opinions, attitudes, and behavior of respondents on various topics are monitored. Another indisputable advantage of the complexity of the questionnaires is that they contain

specific questions about trust in individual institutions and perceptions of corruption in public administration. Finally, the readiness of the data is an advantage. The formulation of the choice of possible answers, as well as the method of data processing, allows the researcher to work with the data directly. Public opinion polls are usually carried out every two years. This dissertation used the most recent data from the last questionnaire survey, which was conducted in 2020 (Latinobarómetro, 2020).

Analysis procedure

As part of the transparency of the research process, the analysis procedure will be described in detail. After conducting the literature review, the ambition was to include as many types of corruption and political participation as possible in the research in order to offer the most comprehensive view of the issue under study and to build on previous scholarly articles that were limited to only certain types of political participation or corruption. For this reason, the Latibarómetro and AmericasBarometer questionnaires were examined in the initial phase and questions on corruption and political participation were identified so that different types were represented. The most up-to-date databases at the time of the dissertation were the 2020 Latibarómetro database and the 2021 AmericasBarometer database. However, the 2021 AmericasBarometer database does not offer questions on participation in rallies or demonstrations, hence the use of the older 2019 database, which offers a full battery of questions on different forms of political participation. While the Latinobarómetro dataset included all Latin American countries and could therefore be worked with immediately, the AmericasBarometer data had separate datasets for each country and it was necessary to create a merged dataset that also included all countries. However, the AmericasBarometer datasets from 2019 and 2021 do not include Venezuela, presumably due to the unstable situation in this South American country, the organization no longer conducts surveys there. The last questionnaire survey from the project of the same name was conducted there between 2016 and 2017. For the datasets, only the IBM SPSS Statistics (Statistical Product and Service Solutions) software was used, which is suitable for survey data analysis. After weighing the datasets with the relevant variables, data for each question representing types of corruption and political participation were generated and graphs were produced. The graphs will serve for the first part of the analysis,

as they will offer insights into the levels of corruption and political participation in each Latin American country. Subsequently, regression models were constructed for each country separately, where within a single model there is always one independent variable that represents the type of corruption, a dependent variable that represents the type of political participation, and a number of socioeconomic and political variables that both databases offer that serve as controls. After generating the full regression models in the form of tables in SPSS Statistics, they were then worked with in Microsoft Excel, where they were graphically edited and subsequently inserted into the dissertation in such a way that substantive significance can be calculated and statistical significance is also evident. Finally, all graphs and regression models were interpreted by the author of the dissertation.

Dependent variables

Five dependent variables are included in the models based on data from AmericasBarometer. For the first variable, it will be observed whether corruption affects the interest to go to the presidential elections in the future. The focus is on presidential elections only. Firstly, because of data availability (AmericasBarometer dataset does not provide a question on the interest to participate in future parliamentary elections), but also because Latin America has presidential systems modeled on the United States, so the president is the head of state and the executive (Kouba, 2014). His or her election should arouse the greatest interest of voters to participate politically. At the same time, the large-scale corruption cases in Latin America particularly affect the executive, as state contracts are distributed at the level of governments, ministries and, consequently, their officials. The second variable is participation in the rallies of a political party or movement. Political parties offer prescriptions on how to tackle corruption, just as they themselves are often involved in corrupt practices. One has to ask what prevails among respondents in the context of their possible participation in these meetings. The third variable relates to official community meetings, or community meetings where, for example, civic demands within a particular area are discussed. It will be tested whether participation in these meetings may also be affected by corruption. The fourth variable represents attendance at town/city council meetings where issues related to, among other things, city police and city officials may be discussed. Police officers and officials are the ones who may be susceptible to

corruption and these town/city meetings may be an opportunity for citizens to raise concerns about their work or to complain about them for their actions. For the fifth and final variable, under which are the demonstrations, it will be examined whether corruption is what makes people take to the streets or, on the contrary, remain resigned in their homes.

As with the models from the AmericasBarometer data, five dependent variables are included in the models from the Latinobarómetro data. The first one is also related to voter turnout, but the question does not specify the type of election, so it could be parliamentary or regional elections. At the same time, it will be possible to compare a similar question from two datasets. The second dependent variable concerns whether the respondent voted for an opposition political party or for the ruling party. Here the argument is whether corruption leads to the replacement of incumbent politicians by the respondent giving his or her vote to the opposition. The third dependent variable represents the willingness of the respondent to go to demonstrate against corruption. Again, it may be possible to compare a similar question from the two datasets. The fourth dependent variable represents convincing others of political thoughts. Although it is not explicitly a form of political participation, it can be either indirect political participation or an activity that can take place during several forms of political participation such as political meetings, community meetings, demonstrations, canvassing and others. The last dependent variable is working for politicians. Although it is not specified what kind of work it is, it can range from handing out his election leaflets, sending out emails in support of him, to organizing events where he or she is presented.

Thus, the effect of the independent variables on ten dependent variables that represent different types of political participation will be examined.

Independent variables

Corruption, which will be monitored for how it affects different types of political participation, is operationalized in the form of six independent variables (three based on Latinobarómetro data and three based on AmericasBarometer data). Perception, where the respondent answered how many politicians he/she believes are involved in corruption. And the experience, which incorporates the bribery of police officers and civil servants (also referred to as officials or clerks) to which the

respondent was exposed.³⁵ Other independent variables include awareness of corruption, which may not be as strong as personal experience of corruption but should be stronger than perceptions of corruption. Furthermore, the questionnaires include a question on whether corruption can be eradicated, and this question has also been operationalized as an independent variable. And the last variable is also perception of corruption, but formulated differently than in the AmericasBarometer survey. Namely, the Latinobarómetro asks respondents to assess whether the level of corruption in the country has decreased, stagnated or increased.

Control variables

Socioeconomic control variables include gender. The tendency is that men are more likely to be interested in public affairs, and therefore participate politically, compared to women (Burns et al., 1997). Then age. Greater interest in voting and in participating in various forms of political participation, excluding demonstrations, is evident with increasing age (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). The same can be said for education, the more educated, the more interest in public affairs and political participation (Verba et al., 1995). While in less populous municipalities there was more interest in institutionalised forms of political participation, such as voting in elections, residents of larger municipalities preferred to participate in rallies (Martins, 1995). Therefore, the control variable related to the size of the area in which the respondent lives. Another variable is the economic situation of the respondent. In general, people without financial difficulties are more interested in participating in public events. Those who have problems making ends meet may be so busy with their personal economic situation that they have no time for various forms of political participation - they simply have other priorities (Blake, 2009). Freedom of political participation, as another control variable, is also an important factor for political participation. This variable relates to democracy (it is redundant to deal with freedom of political

³⁵ Some research looks at the socioeconomic profile of Latinos who have experienced corruption. This was investigated, for example, using a field experiment that looked at the way police officers treat drivers who commit traffic violations. In the experiment, four automobile drivers commit the same traffic violations at a randomly selected sequence of intersections. These intersections are monitored by the traffic police. The experiment, supplemented by qualitative interviews with police officers, revealed that police officers most often approach lower-class drivers with requests for bribes and deal with wealthy drivers only by warning them. This is because police officers assume the wealthy have a greater ability to exact retribution, and therefore are more likely to demand bribes from the poorer segments of the population (Fried et al., 2010).

participation in non-democratic regimes). However, its operation is more complicated. The more freedom of political participation is, the greater the interest in political participation. Recent research has also found the opposite, i.e. the greater the dissatisfaction with democracy, the greater the interest to vote and replace the politicians responsible for the state of democracy and freedom, or to take to the streets directly to demonstrate against the (in)quality of democracy in the country, which does not guarantee freedom of political participation (Ezrow & Xezonakis, 2014). Interpersonal trust at the community level is another control variable. People who trust each other are more likely to undertake group meetings, in this case with a political motive, than those who do not trust each other (Kaase, 1999). The final variable that will be looked at to see how it affects political participation is trust in political institutions. Like satisfaction with democracy, this variable can work both ways. On the one hand, the argument that trust in political institutions is an important precondition for activism within the political system (Verba & Almond, 1989). On the other hand, the claim that distrust leads to political participation, as citizens want to define themselves in relation to institutions they distrust or those who work in them (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001). For more detailed information on how the questions in the questionnaire were formulated for each variable and how they were recoded for the purposes of the dissertation thesis, see following tables.

Table 7. Number of Respondents in Each Country (Latinobarómetro)

Country	Latinobarómetro		AmericasBarometer	
	N	Valid Percent	N	Valid Percent
Argentina	1200	5.9	1528	5.8
Bolivia	1200	5.9	1682	6.3
Brasil	1204	6.0	1498	5.6
Chile	1200	5.9	1638	6.2
Colombia	1199	5.9	1663	6.3
Costa Rica	1000	4.9	1501	5.7
Rep. Dominicana	1000	4.9	1516	5.7
Ecuador	1200	5.9	1533	5.8
El Salvador	1000	4.9	1511	5.7
Guatemala	1000	4.9	1596	6
Honduras	998	4.9	1560	5.9
México	1202	5.9	1580	6
Nicaragua	1004	5.0	1547	5.8
Panamá	1000	4.9	1559	5.9
Paraguay	1200	5.9	1515	5.7
Perú	1200	5.9	1521	5.7
Uruguay	1200	5.9	1581	6
Venezuela	1198	5.9	Missing	
Total	20205	100.0	26529	100.0

Table shows number of respondents in each country. Source: Latinobarómetro 2020 and AmericasBarometer 2018/2019. Processing: author

Table 8. Description of Variables (Latinobarómetro)

Variable	Description
Dependent Variables	
Voter Turnout	If elections were this Sunday. Which party would you vote for? Vote Nul/blank; Does Not vote/none; Not registered; Specific political parties for each country <i>The values for Does not vote/none and Not registered were merged into "Wouldn't vote" (0) and the values for Vote Nul/blank and Respondent's choice of a political party were merged into "Would vote" (1)</i>
Voting for Government/Opposition Party	Voted Government Party (1), Voted Opposition Party (2) <i>Variables were recoded to Opposition (0) and Government (1)</i>
Willingness to Demonstrate Against Corruption	On a scale from 1 to 10 where "1" means "not at all willing" and "10" means "Completely willing". How willing would you be to demonstrate and protest for Fight against corruption and abuse?
Convincing Others of Political Thoughts	How frequently do you do each of the following things? Very frequently (1), frequently (2), almost never (3) or never (4)? Try to convince others of our political thoughts. <i>The values for very frequently, frequently and almost never were merged into "Do" (1) and the value never was recoded to "Don't do" (0)</i>
Working for Politicians	How frequently do you do each of the following things? Very frequently, frequently, almost never or never? Work for a political party or candidate. <i>The values for very frequently, frequently and almost never were merged into "Do" (1) and the value never was recoded to "Don't do" (0)</i>
Independent Variables	
Corruption Awareness	Have you or a member of your family known about an act of corruption in the last 12 months? Yes (1), No (2) <i>Variables were recoded to No (0) and Yes (1)</i>
Eradication of Corruption	Do you strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3) or strongly disagree (4) with the following statements. It is possible to eradicate corruption from politics. <i>Variables were recoded to strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3) or strongly agree (4)</i>
Corruption Progress	In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased a lot (1), increased some (2), stayed the same (3), decreased some (4), decreased a lot (5)? <i>Variables were recoded to decreased a lot (1), decreased some (2), stayed the same (3), increased some (4), increased a lot (5)?</i>
Control Variables	
Gender	Respondent's gender Male (1) Female (2) <i>Variables were recoded to Male (0) and Female (1)</i>
Age	Respondent's age 16 - 100
Education	What level of education do you have? What was the last year you completed? No studies, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6 years, 7 years, 8 years, 9 years, 10 years, 11 years, 12 years, Incomplete university studies, Complete university studies, Superior institute/ academy/ incomplete technical studies, Superior institute/ academy/ complete technical studies
Salary	Does the salary you receive and your total family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the following statements describes better your situation? It's enough, we can save (1), It's just enough, we don't have major problems (2), It's not enough, we have problems (3), It's not enough, we have major problems (4)

	<i>Variables were recoded to It's not enough, we have major problems (1), It's not enough, we have problems (2), It's just enough, we don't have major problems (3), It's enough, we can save (4)</i>
Freedom of political participation	To what extent do you think the following freedoms, rights, are guaranteed in (country)? Fully guaranteed (1), Somewhat guaranteed (2), Not guaranteed (3), Not at all guaranteed (4) Freedom of political participation. <i>Variables were recoded to Not at all guaranteed (1), Not guaranteed (2), Somewhat guaranteed (3), Fully guaranteed (4)</i>
Interpersonal trust	Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful in dealing with others? One can trust most people (1) One can never be too careful in dealing with others (2) <i>Variables were recoded to One can never be too careful in dealing with others (0) and One can trust most people (1)</i>
Institutional trust	Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), a little (3) or no trust (4) in The National Government? <i>Variables were recoded to no trust (1), a little trust (2), some trust (3), a lot trust (4)</i>

Table shows description of variables. Source: Latinobarometro 2020 – questionnaire. Processing: author

Table 9. Description of Variables (AmericasBarometer)

Variable	Description
Dependent Variables	
Voter Turnout	If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? (1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the current (incumbent) candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot/vote/ticket blank or would purposely cancel my vote <i>The values for Would vote for the current (incumbent) candidate or party, Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration and Would go to vote but would leave the ballot/vote/ticket blank or would purposely cancel my vote were merged into "Would vote" (1) and the value Wouldn't vote was recoded to (0)</i>
Attending a Political Meeting	I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them <i>The values for at least once a week, once or twice a month and once or twice a year were merged into "Attend" (1) and the value never was recoded to "Do not attend" (0)</i>
Attending a Community Meeting	Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them <i>The values for at least once a week, once or twice a month and once or twice a year were merged into "Attend" (1) and the value never was recoded to "Do not attend" (0)</i>
Attending a Town/City Council Meeting	Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No <i>Variables were recoded to No (0) and Yes (1)</i>

Participation in a Demonstration	In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? (1) Yes (2) No <i>Variables were recoded to No (0) and Yes (1)</i>
Independent Variables	
Perception of Corruption	Thinking of the politicians of [country] how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption? None (1) Less than half of them (2) Half of them (3) More than half of them (4) All (5)
Experience with Police Corruption	Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? No (0) Yes (1)
Experience with Clerk Corruption	In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? No (0) Yes (1)
Control Variables	
Gender	Male (1), Female (2) <i>Variables were recoded to Male (0) and Female (1)</i>
Age	How old are you? Range between 18–88
Education	How many years of schooling have you completed? Range between None (0), University (18+)
Place of living	National Capital (Metropolitan area) (1) Large City (2) Medium City (3) Small City (4) Rural Area (5) <i>Variables were recoded to Rural Area (1) Small City (2) Medium City (3) Large City (4) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (5)</i>
Salary	Over the past two years, has the income of your household: Increased? (1) Remained the same (2)? Decreased (3)? <i>Variables were recoded to Decreased (1), Remained the same (2) and Increased (3)</i>
Interpersonal trust	And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are Very trustworthy (1), Somewhat trustworthy (2), Not very trustworthy (3) or Untrustworthy (4)? <i>Variables were recoded to Untrustworthy (1), Not very trustworthy (2), Somewhat trustworthy (3), Very trustworthy (4)</i>
Institutional trust	To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means Not at all and 7 the highest and means A lot

Table shows description of variables. Source: AmericasBarometer 2019 – questionnaire. Processing: author.

Models

Statistical methods always need to be adapted for research purposes to suit the nature of the data (Fernandes et al., 2020). The least squares linear model (OLS) would be appropriate for using the variables that make up the scale. On the other hand, logistic regression analysis is applicable when the dependent variable is dichotomous, it means that has only two categories. Most often, the presence of a phenomenon is coded as 1, while the absence of a phenomenon is coded as 0. Examples of the two categories might be voted for Clinton or voted for Trump (Knuckey, 2019), started a war or did not start a war (Henderson & Singer, 2000), adhered to the policy or not (Furlong, 1998), as well as the presence of democracy or non-democracy in the country (B. E. Goldsmith et al., 2008).³⁶ In the vast majority of cases, the dependent variables used in the analysis will have only two values, so logistic regression analysis will be used. However, in one case the dependent variable will be a scale, so ordinary least squares will be more appropriate for building the models.


Using these regression methods, models are constructed in which each regression model represents one country. This is because the aim is to capture the specific situations in each Latin American country. Due to the nature of the data at the individual level, a hierarchical (multilevel) model was not constructed. Hierarchical models can be methodologically problematic, especially in terms of the number of cases. Some authors therefore propose a 30/30 rule, i.e. at least 30 cases per level (Kreft, 1996). This view is shared by other authors (Haman & Školník, 2021; Hox, 2010; Maas & Hox, 2005; Snijders & Bosker, 1996). This condition could not be fulfilled in the case of the hierarchical model, because fewer countries are included in the research. The datasets were weighted to build the models.

³⁶ Logistic regression analysis is also very often used in social science research that worked with survey data (Achia et al., 2010; Archer & Lemeshow, 2006; Gao & Hui, 1997; Graubard & Korn, 2011; Li et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 1987; Sánchez-Hernández et al., 2021; Yang et al., 2020), which is also the case in this dissertation.

Results

This chapter will present several figures and tables. First, graphs will be presented from all Latin American countries for which data are available from the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro polling databases. Within these graphs, results will be presented for those questions that represent independent variables and dependent variables in the next part of the analysis. The next part of the analysis will already include regression models. First, a summary table will be presented that shows the statistical significance and direction of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable in all Latin American countries included in the dissertation. This will be followed by a series of tables for each dependent variable separately, which include the control variables and from which, in addition to statistical significance, substantive significance can be calculated. Finally, this part of the dissertation will offer a final summary table that offers an overview of the effects of different forms of corruption on different types of political participation.

Figure 3. Voter Turnout




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'If elections were this Sunday. Which party would you vote for'. In addition to the given answers such as Does not vote/none, Not registered and Vote Nul/blank, the question also offered an open answer option where the respondent said explicitly which political party he/she would vote for and this information was then noted down. The values for Does not vote/none and Not registered were merged into "Wouldn't vote" and the values for Vote Nul/blank and Respondent's choice of a political party were merged into "Would vote" for clarity. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The graph basically shows the preferences of political parties rather than individual candidates. The way the question is phrased, it is not clear whether it explicitly refers to presidential, parliamentary or regional elections. However, if we focus only on the interest in participating in such hypothetical elections, it is clear at first glance from the graph that the public is divided into two camps in Latin American countries, as in most countries the interest in participating as well as not participating is around fifty percent of respondents. This is evident, for example, in Brazil, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. Exceptions where one or the other answer dominates include Uruguay. In this South American country, ninety-four per cent of respondents said they would go to the polls if they voted, whether they voted invalidly or for a political party. Some eighty per cent of Bolivians and Paraguayans are also very interested in taking part in any elections this Sunday. On the other

hand, in countries such as Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras, the majority of respondents are not registered to vote or are registered but would simply not vote. In Guatemala, more than seventy percent of respondents said they would not participate in any election held on the last day of the week in which they were interviewed. This low level of interest in taking part in elections is of course striking in light of the fact that in the vast majority of Latin American countries voter turnout is compulsory, although in practice it is almost unenforceable. Even so, if a citizen takes part in an official inquiry, even an anonymous one, he or she is essentially making a statement that he or she is not interested in acting in accordance with the law. Such a low level of interest in taking part in elections would be more expected in countries such as Colombia or Chile, where there is no compulsory voter turnout enshrined in law. However, in these two South American countries, a narrow majority of respondents said they would participate if elections were held on the following Sunday.

Figure 4. Voting for Opposition/Government Party




This figure shows whether respondents chose opposition party or a government party. It was noted only for coding purposes within the question 'If elections were this Sunday. Which party would you vote for'. There were two possible answers. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

This graph basically tells us whether citizens are satisfied with the current government or whether they are dissatisfied for whatever reason and therefore prefer to replace it with the opposition. There can be a number of reasons why people may be dissatisfied with the current government, be it structural reasons such as the deterioration of the economic level, or some random event such as the outbreak of a corruption case in government circles and minimal or no self-reflection by the government in an attempt to address it. The fact remains that alternation of power is something that belongs to a democratic society, i.e. if citizens are dissatisfied with the politicians in power, they have a chance to replace them in the next elections. In fact, as the graph shows, such a replacement is preferred by most Latin American countries, as more than fifty percent of respondents in most of the countries included in the survey chose the opposition political party and not the ruling party. In Costa Rica or Peru, even more than eighty percent of respondents are committed to voting for the opposition. More than sixty percent of respondents will also vote for opposition forces in Colombia or Guatemala. However, there are also countries where citizens are behind the current government and are committed to voting for it in any elections. More than eighty

percent of respondents are committed to voting for the government in El Salvador. Around eighty per cent of respondents to the survey are also committed to voting for the ruling political party in other Central American countries, such as the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, where one of the leaders of the Sandinista revolution, Daniel Ortega, has ruled again since 2007 and, according to the graph, looks set to continue to rule.

Figure 5. Willingness to Demonstrate Against Corruption




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'On a scale from 1 to 10 where "1" means "not at all willing" and "10" means "Completely willing". How willing would you be to demonstrate and protest for Fight against corruption and abuse'. There were ten possible answers. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

At first glance, the figure shows that across all Latin American countries, respondents most frequently indicated the highest value, i.e., a complete commitment to go out to protest corruption. Of course, in the case of corruption scandals, it always depends on how quickly and how effectively the problem is resolved. For example, if corruption hits a head of state and the president does not want to abdicate, while at the same time there is not enough power at the parliamentary level to trigger impeachment, this has the potential to create a lot of tension in society and it is really just a question of whether they will tolerate the corruption or take action against the corrupt politician. Of course, the option is to vote for another candidate in the next presidential election, but that may be some time away and the politician may continue to engage in corrupt practices in the meantime. Another solution is to choose an unconventional form of political participation such as a demonstration. People in the streets can put pressure on both the president and other politicians and ultimately bring about his abdication or removal. Completely willing to demonstrate against corruption is the majority of

respondents in three Central American countries - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Honduras. In contrast, Mexicans are the least likely to demonstrate to fight corruption. Nearly thirty percent of respondents in Nicaragua said they were not at all willing to demonstrate against corruption. In countries that have problems with democracy such as Nicaragua and Venezuela, some citizens may be afraid to take to the streets, as both the government of Nicolas Maduro (Moleiro, 2019) and the government of Daniel Ortega (Castillo, 2022) have been able to crack down hard on demonstrators with the help of repressive forces resulting in tens to hundreds of deaths.


Figure 6. Convincing Others of Political Thoughts



This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'How frequently do you do each of the following things? Try to convince others of our political thoughts'. There were four possible answers, but the values for very frequently, frequently and almost never were merged into "Do" and the value never was recoded to "Don't do" for clarity. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

Of course, convincing others of political views is not in itself a type of political participation. It becomes so when such persuasion takes the form of, for example, an election campaign in favour of a politician or political party. It is possible to persuade about political views both at an institutionalised political meeting and at an unconventional demonstration. However, the figure shows that such activity is actually sometimes undertaken by a minority of respondents, across all Latin American countries, with only the opposite being true in the South American country of Peru, albeit by only two per cent in terms of responses. A closer look at the values in the graph shows that even in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, a significant proportion of the population is still able to persuade others of their political views. However, this certain passivity across countries does not necessarily mean that the majority of people in Latin America are not interested in politics, although opinion polls also ask such questions. Persuasion of political views can be seen as another level of interest in politics, where some participation is already required, and it can therefore be concluded that the majority of the Latin American public does not want to engage politically in this way and takes a more passive approach.


Figure 7. Working for Politicians



This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'How frequently do you do each of the following things? Work for a political party or candidate'. There were four possible answers, but the values for very frequently, frequently and almost never were merged into "Do" and the value never was recoded to "Don't do" for clarity. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

Collaboration on an election campaign is something that is quite familiar in the United States. It involves all sorts of volunteer activities from putting up posters and handing out promotional materials, to hosting fundraiser dinners, to canvassing, where people involved in the campaign knock on people's doors and persuade them to vote for their candidate or party. It doesn't have to be volunteer activities, but it can be done for money. However, the graph shows that in all Latin American countries only a minimal number of respondents do such activities. In fact, seventy percent or more of respondents have never worked for any candidate or political party. In Central America's Costa Rica and Guatemala, even ninety percent of respondents indicated the possibility of never having done such a thing. However, there are also countries where at least a non-negligible proportion of respondents have ever undertaken such activity. These are Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Brazil, where almost thirty percent of respondents have ever worked for a political party or candidate.

Figure 8. Corruption Progress




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased a lot, increased some, stayed the same, decreased some, decreased a lot?'. There were five possible answers, but the values for 'increased a lot' and 'increased some' have been merged into 'increased' and the values for 'decreased a lot' and 'decreased some' have been merged into 'decreased' for clarity. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The figure shows one trend across the Latin American region, but with the exception of three countries. Latin Americans believe that there has been an increase in the level of corruption in their country over the past year. The first exception is El Salvador, where, on the contrary, respondents participating in the opinion poll believe that the level of corruption in their country has decreased over the last year. It is also worth mentioning Uruguay, where almost fifty percent of respondents indicated that the level of corruption in their country has neither decreased nor increased over the last year. However, apart from these two countries, the situation in the rest of Latin America is alarming. In countries such as Chile and Venezuela, as many as eighty percent of respondents believe that the corruption situation in the country has worsened. In Chile, this may be due to the wave of protests known as the Estallido Social, which were against corruption, cost of living and privatization (Morales Quiroga, 2020). The negative view of the evolution of corruption in Venezuela may be due to the country's long-standing instability,

where the harsh regime of Nicolas Maduro, backed by the military, rules and basic state services are failing, creating a huge space for corruption (Briceño-Ruiz & Lehmann, 2021). However, the figures are also high in Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru, where more than 70 percent of respondents also have a negative view of the development of corruption in the country. When dividing the Latin American region into Central America and South America, it is clear that a higher percentage of respondents who believe that the corruption situation in the country has worsened are located in South American countries. However, the values in Central American countries are still high.³⁷

³⁷ However, it should be added that some caution is needed in interpreting perceptions of corruption at the individual level, particularly in Latin America. The perception of corruption in Latin America at the individual level is very problematic. An analysis of ten Latin American countries with varying levels of corruption concluded that better informed individuals have more accurate perceptions of corruption. However, like their less informed neighbours, they still tend to underestimate the level of corruption in their society (Arnold, 2012). The evolution of perceptions of corruption in Latin America can also be fairly predictable. Research that addressed this issue when examining eighteen Latin American democracies between 1996 and 2010 found that there is a fluctuation in the level of perceived corruption depending on turnover elections (when the president changes). This is due to the elimination of corrupt administrations, public enthusiasm over a change of government, and a minimum of corruption scandals in the early period of government. However, if the incumbent president or a candidate from the same party as the incumbent president is elected, there is no turnover in perceptions of corruption (J. W. Johnson, 2015).


Figure 9. Corruption Awareness



This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'Have you or a member of your family known about an act of corruption in the last 12 months?'. There were two possible answers. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The figure demonstrates that in all Latin American countries, the vast majority of respondents, including their family members, do not know of an act of corruption that has taken place in the last year. These figures tell us that the perception of corruption at the individual level may be quite different from the awareness of corruption at the individual level. While in almost all Latin American countries the majority of respondents believe that the corruption situation has worsened in the last year, only a few percent of respondents in each country actually know of an act of corruption. This is because perceptions of corruption can be influenced by a number of factors that may overestimate the perceived corruption rather than the actual corruption in the country. Conversely, the awareness of corruption may be underestimated, as respondents may be afraid to tell the truth about their knowledge of an act of corruption in order to avoid getting into trouble with the law themselves. The Figure shows that in the vast majority of Latin American countries, between ten and twenty percent of respondents, or their family members, in each country know of a corrupt act. Only Argentina is an exception. In this South American country, almost forty percent of respondents said that either they or their family members knew of an act of corruption that had taken place in the last twelve months.


Figure 10. Eradication of Corruption



This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements. It is possible to eradicate corruption from politics'. There were four possible answers, but the values for 'strongly agree' and 'agree' have been merged into 'agree' and the values for 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree' have been merged into 'disagree' for clarity. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The question formulated as to whether corruption can be eradicated from politics implies a certain idealistic notion because, as already discussed in the theoretical section, corruption is a social phenomenon based on human nature and human thinking would have to be completely changed to the extent that there is no individual or collective failure to abuse the power entrusted to them for private ends. In essence, all the measures being implemented against this phenomenon serve to reduce the scope for corruption, but it is not envisaged that corruption can be completely eradicated. In this light, it is interesting to gauge the views of the Latin American public, as this region, for example, has major problems with corruption compared to Western Europe. Looking at the graph, it is clear that in most Latin American countries, society is divided on the possibility of eradicating corruption. However, in some countries there is considerable optimism that corruption can be eradicated, for example in El Salvador up to seventy-five percent of respondents think so, and in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru the figures for a positive response are above sixty percent.

Figure 11. Freedom of Political Participation




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'To what extent do you think the following freedoms, rights, are guaranteed in (country)? Freedom of political participation'. There were four possible answers, but the values for 'Fully guaranteed' and 'Guaranteed' have been merged into 'Guaranteed' and the values for 'Not at all guaranteed' and 'guaranteed' have been merged into 'Not guaranteed' for clarity. The data were collected in 2020. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

It is important for political participation whether people have the space to vote in elections where they choose from a range of politicians or political parties, whether they have the opportunity to attend and organize political meetings, organize in community meetings, have access to city council meetings, or do not have to be afraid to take to the streets to demonstrate for issues that are important to them. If these rights are not guaranteed, either directly in the constitution or by ordinary laws and regulations, people risk being afraid to participate politically because of possible reprisals from whoever they are demonstrating against. Equally, people may be afraid to participate politically if, although on paper the rights of citizens are guaranteed, in reality the government does not guarantee them or intervenes directly against demonstrators, as has been the case in Venezuela or Nicaragua in recent years. Looking at the graph, it is clear that guaranteeing freedom of political participation is not a given in Latin American countries from the public's point of view, as in ten countries the majority of respondents believe that this is not the case. Over sixty percent of respondents believe that freedom of political participation is

not guaranteed in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru. In the Central American country of Paraguay, the figure is exactly fifty-fifty in terms of opinion on the guarantee of freedom of political participation in the country. Only in a minority of countries do a majority of respondents believe that freedom of political participation is guaranteed. A certain anomaly in the values in the figure is the South American country of Uruguay, where seventy-five per cent of respondents gave a positive answer and can therefore be considered as the country within all Latin American countries where, from the point of view of its citizens, political participation has the best conditions for flourishing.

Figure 12. Voter Turnout




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do?' There were four possible answers, but the values for 'Would vote for the current (incumbent) candidate or party,' 'Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration' and 'Would go to vote but would leave the ballot/vote/ticket blank or would purposely cancel my vote' have been merged into 'Would vote' for clarity. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The AmericasBarometer surveys, unlike Latinobarómetro, have the question explicitly worded in the case of interest in voting in a hypothetical election that it is a presidential election. Thus, there is no doubt that perhaps it would be a parliamentary, regional or municipal election. Moreover, presidential elections are the most important ones in Latin America, since, as already mentioned, Latin American countries have presidential forms of government, where the president is not only the head of state but also heads the executive branch of government and thus has a range of powers by which to influence people's lives. This figure shows that seventy percent or more of respondents would go to the polls if elections were held this weekend, whether they voted for the government, the opposition or purposely invalidated. The greatest commitment to going to the polls is in South American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay, where ninety-five per cent or more of respondents indicated one of three answers that express an intention to participate in a possible election. Conversely, countries where there is

less interest in participating in the most common form of political participation include Chile, Honduras and Nicaragua, where around thirty percent of respondents answered that they would not participate in hypothetical elections. In the case of Chile, where voter participation is not compulsory, this is still a relatively small proportion of the population, with seventy percent of Chileans included in the survey interested in going to the polls. In general, Latinos are interested in active suffrage, although compulsory, but not enforced, turnout may enter into this interest, although there is a strong interest in voting even in countries where there is no obligation to participate in the electoral process.

Figure 13. Attending a Political Meeting




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them.' There were four possible answers, but the values for 'at least once a week,' 'once or twice a month' and 'once or twice a year' have been merged into 'Attend' for clarity and the value 'never' was recoded to 'Do not attend'. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

As can be seen from the figure, not all Latin American countries are included, which are found within the other figures. This is due to the fact that the pollsters conducting the AmericasBarometer survey did not ask a question in some Latin American countries that relates to citizen participation in political rallies. However, even from the few countries in which respondents were asked this question, it is possible to interpret certain conclusions. After all, these are countries in both Central America and South America. Geographically large and populous countries such as Brazil and Mexico are also represented, as well as small countries such as Honduras and Paraguay. The values from the graph within each country indicate that the vast majority of respondents have never attended a political rally. In fact, around seventy percent or more of Latinos participating in the survey in nine countries do not prefer this form of political participation. Yet political rallies offer direct voter contact with politicians. At these meetings, citizens can learn about

their elected representatives' views on various issues, but they can also confront them with issues that concern them and provide feedback to politicians. In addition, political rallies may also not only offer the participation of politicians, but also promotional items or refreshments, which can be an additional attraction, especially for low-income groups, to attend a political rally. However, even so, as the graph shows, all these attractions are insufficient to get people to attend rallies in Latin America. While there are countries such as Paraguay, where thirty percent of respondents attend political rallies, or Brazil and Colombia, where around twenty percent of respondents sometimes attend political rallies, even so, these are low figures in terms of participation compared to those who never participate in these types of political participation.

Figure 14. Attending a Community Meeting




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them.' There were four possible answers, but the values for 'at least once a week,' 'once or twice a month' and 'once or twice a year' have been merged into 'Attend' for clarity and the value 'never' was recoded to 'Do not attend'. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

Community meetings do not necessarily address a political agenda and make proclamations as political meetings do, but if people who live in a locality raise issues such as the maintenance of the green space in their locality, the quality of education in the local school, the level of local taxes, the security provided by the municipal police, all of these can be considered political issues. These issues that are discussed at community meetings can then be taken to politicians at both local and higher levels by the participants and thus become part of the political process. The graph shows that the interest in attending community meetings is higher in Latin American countries than in attending political meetings, which may be related to the fact that community meetings do not necessarily have a political focus. Even so, the vast majority of respondents across Latin American countries do not attend community meetings. The only exception is Bolivia, where nearly fifty-two percent of respondents said they participate in this institutionalized form of political

participation. This may be due to the fact that Bolivia is rich in indigenous populations, such as Quechua and Aymara, who may be more receptive to community organizing, as it stems from their history and traditions, than people in other Latin American countries. This is also evident in Peru or Guatemala, where indigenous peoples are also significantly represented in the population and where forty percent of respondents said they participate in community meetings. However, this does not explain much of the forty percent of respondents in Paraguay, where indigenous peoples are only marginally represented in the population (Davis-Castro, 2020; Mato, 2016; Merino, 2018; Orces, 2008). The least interest in participating in this type of political participation is in two South American countries, Argentina and Uruguay, where only around ten percent of respondents to the survey said they participate in community meetings.

Figure 15. Attending a Town/City Council Meeting




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?' There were two possible answers. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

As with political rallies, questions on town meeting attendance were only found in some Latin American countries in the AmericasBarometer database. However, as with the graph that asked about political rally participation, this graph offers a diversity of countries in terms of size and population, with both Central America and South America represented, and it is therefore possible to draw at least some conclusions. Municipal meetings are very important because, in essence, municipal politics directly affects people's lives, as whether people have basic infrastructure such as sewage systems, sidewalks, and local roads, as well as what school their children go to, how the school is equipped, or how the local police keep order on the streets is decided at the local level and not at the national level. People should therefore be interested in participating politically in the local issues that are closest to their hearts, and town meetings should provide the ideal platform for such political participation. However, the figure shows that there is only minimal interest from respondents in participating in town meetings over the past year. The vast majority of Latinos participating in the cross-country survey do not attend such institutionalized meetings. Moreover, the values within this figure are comparable

to those in terms of participation in political rallies. The greatest interest in attending town meetings is in Central American countries such as Guatemala and Honduras, but even so, the positive values only reach fifteen percent of respondents. Respondents from El Salvador were the least likely to have attended a town meeting in the last twelve months, with only eight percent of those who participated in the survey. More than ninety percent of respondents from El Salvador have not attended a town meeting or city council meeting in the past year.

Figure 16. Participation in a Demonstration



This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?' There were two possible answers. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

Demonstrations are one of the most unconventional forms of political participation. They are essentially mass assemblies that have the potential to turn violent, and the impetus can come either from the demonstrators or from the security forces that are trying to control or suppress the demonstration. Of course, there can also be clashes between demonstrations, with one group in support of the government and the other against the ruling politicians. Demonstrations immediately after an election are perhaps among the most effective forms of political participation, since just as elections have the potential to change the composition of the government, parliament or city hall, similarly demonstrations can be so intense and/or long-lasting that they can ultimately achieve the same result as elections, i.e. a change of politicians. However, the figure shows that across all Latin American countries, only about ten percent of respondents on average have participated in this unconventional type of political participation over the past year. The greatest interest in demonstrating is evident in countries with significant indigenous representation in the population, such as Bolivia and Peru, where around fifteen percent of respondents have participated in a demonstration or protest march in the past twelve months. Even so, this is very low compared to other types of political

participation such as elections or community meetings. Conversely, where respondents have barely participated in a demonstration in the past year is the Central American state of El Salvador, where only three percent expressed a positive opinion, the most marginal figure in the figure. Thus, in general, it can be concluded that Latinos have only minimal interest in types of political participation such as political rallies, town meetings, and dismantling, preferring rather to participate in elections and, to a lesser extent, in community meetings.

Figure 17. Perception of Corruption




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'Thinking of the politicians of [country] how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption?' There were five possible answers. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

Political corruption is a major problem for the state and society because if elected representatives who are supposed to serve the people and act in the public interest and not abuse power for their own private purposes betray the people, then how can the state ask ordinary citizens to obey the law, behave responsibly and not engage in corrupt practices in any situation or at any level. Politicians, in short, should set an example. Failure to do so has the potential, among other things, to reduce citizens' trust in the state and its institutions and to have various implications for political participation, which will be tested further. The figure shows that only marginal percentages of respondents across all Latin American countries believe that no politician is involved in corruption. Thus, almost no one thinks that politicians are clean and completely untainted by corruption; such an essentially idealistic notion is not found among Latin Americans, which may be due to either past experience with political corruption or it may be based on the rationality that corruption simply cannot be completely eradicated, as there is always a chance that a politician will not resist the temptation of corruption. The graph also shows that only a small proportion of respondents involved in the survey believe that less than

half of politicians are involved in corruption, and can also be interpreted to mean that these are random individual phenomena of corruption rather than systemic and organised corruption. It is noteworthy that this response was marked by the highest number of respondents in Costa Rica and Uruguay compared to other countries; these two countries, along with Chile, are also among the least corrupt countries in Latin America according to the Corruption Perceptions Index, and thus a proportion of the population in these countries think so. In general, however, the prevailing view within the figure is that more than half or all politicians in a country are involved in corruption. This situation is obviously alarming for Latin American societies, as it shows that a significant part of the population has a negative view of their elected representatives in terms of their lack of transparency and moral credibility. Half of the respondents in Brazil indicated the answer that most politicians are involved in corruption, which may be related to the then ongoing investigation of a large-scale and media-known corruption case called Operation Car Wash, which consisted of large-scale bribery and affected not only Brazil but basically the entire region. Fifty percent for this answer is also reached in Peru, where several Peruvian heads of state have been implicated in corruption related to the Brazilian bribery scandal. These events clearly had the potential to affect public opinion. The graph also shows that, in terms of the number of politicians involved in corruption, the three Central American republics most affected are Guatemala, Honduras and Panama, where more than forty percent of respondents believe that all politicians are corrupt without exception.

Figure 18. Experience with Police Corruption




This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?' There were two possible answers. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

Corruption, as something illegal that is against the law by nature, is fought by authorities such as the police, prosecutors and courts. If those whose duty it is to uphold the law and fight against corruption are involved in corrupt practices, then this, of course, only undermines the capacity of the state and the trust of citizens in its institutions and institutions. Not to mention the fact that the corruption problem is exacerbated by the absence or outright corruption of the forces that are fighting this phenomenon, and corruption thus permeates further into society and the economy. The figure shows that seventy percent or more of Latinos have not encountered a situation where a police officer demanded a bribe in the past year. However, the figures in Bolivia and Mexico are not entirely insignificant, as roughly a quarter of Bolivians and Mexicans have encountered police corruption in the past twelve months. Fifteen per cent of respondents in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Peru had also experienced this type of corruption. In contrast, only a marginal number of respondents in Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay had been asked by a police officer for a bribe. This trio of countries with the least experience of political corruption based on the survey data also has the best Transparency

International Corruption Perceptions Index values of any Latin American country, and here too it is evident that individual-level data can correspond with aggregate national-level data.

Figure 19. Experience with Clerk Corruption



This figure shows respondents' answers to the question 'Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?' There were two possible answers. The data were collected in 2018–2019. The data are given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

Of course, government officials do not actively fight corruption as police officers do, although they can of course prepare anti-corruption legislation and various preventive measures against this phenomenon. However, the role of a politically independent, transparent, autonomous civil service with a clear career structure and competences is to effectively resist corruption and set an example, and the fight is therefore more passive. While a police officer can forgive, for example, a speeding ticket in return for a bribe, a civil servant can speed up an official act, accommodate some people while not accommodating others, but it always depends on the type of official and the workplace in question and, more importantly, how much power he or she has and therefore how much scope for corruption there is. Bribes, as the most common form of corruption, are an illegal tool in these interactions between government officials and citizens as clients of the government. The figure shows that bribery at the level of civil servants has not been as common in Latin America in the last twelve months since the date of the opinion poll as in the case of bribery at the level of police officers. However, the differences are only on the order of one percent of respondents. In general, however, it should first be noted that eighty-five

percent or more of the Latinos represented in the survey have not come into contact with this type of official corruption in the past year. Only in Central American Mexico and South American Bolivia is there a greater experience of bribery at the level of officials compared to other countries. Thus, both Bolivians and Mexicans not only have the highest experience of police corruption, but also of official corruption, of all the Latin American countries included in the survey. In contrast, almost no one had experience of bribery at the level of government officials in the least corrupt countries in Latin America according to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, such as Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay. This trio of countries thus stands out as the least susceptible to both police bribery and bribery by government officials.

Table 10. Country-by-country Logistic and Linear Regression Results

Countries	A R G	B O L	B R A	C H I	C O L	C R I	D O M	E C U	E L S	G U A	H O N	M E X	N I C	P A N	P A R	P E R	U R U	V E N
Dependent variable: Voter Turnout																		
Awareness																		
Eradication																		
Progress																		
Dependent variable: Voting for Opposition/Government Party																		
Awareness																		
Eradication																		
Progress																		
Dependent variable: Willingness to Demonstrate Against Corruption																		
Awareness																		
Eradication																		
Progress																		
Dependent variable: Convincing Others of Political Thoughts																		
Awareness																		
Eradication																		
Progress																		
Dependent variable: Working for Politicians																		
Awareness																		
Eradication																		
Progress																		
Countries	A R G	B O L	B R A	C H I	C O L	C R I	D O M	E C U	E L S	G U A	H O N	M E X	N I C	P A N	P A R	P E R	U R U	V E N

Notes: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically insignificant in the regression models are marked in grey (Coefficients $p < 0.05$). Variables that are statistically significant in the positive direction are marked in blue. The red colour indicates statistically significant variables that are in the negative direction. Missing variables are marked in black. Datasets are weighted by WT provided by Latinobarómetro, 2020. Source: Author's calculations, based on Latinobarómetro (2020).

The results of the regression analyses, which worked with the Latinobarómetro polling database, revealed that essentially all independent variables were statistically significant in relation to the selected dependent variables, making it relevant to investigate whether and how different types of corruption affect different forms of political participation. The situation only varied state by state. In some states the relationship between the variables was statistically significant, in others it was not. Moreover, the main premise was confirmed, namely that corruption, depending on the type, has the potential to act in both negative and positive directions in relation to different types of political participation.

The results of the logistic regression models, in which the dependent variable was interest in participating in elections, revealed that in eight Latin American countries, awareness of corruption had a positive impact on electoral participation. In other words, if a Bolivian, Colombian, or Peruvian (and other nations in the table) became aware of an act of corruption in the past twelve months, the more likely they were to be interested in going to the next election. As for the view on eradicating corruption, it was statistically significant in relation to turnout only in Argentina and Panama. The more Argentines or Panamanians believe that it is possible to eradicate corruption from politics, the more likely they are to be interested in participating in elections. Finally, the independent variable representing the opinion on the evolution of corruption in a country was statistically significant only in Chile, and in a positive direction. If Chileans believe that there has been a deterioration in the corruption situation in the country, this is an incentive for them to go to the next election. All three corruption variables examined have a mobilizing effect in relation to voter turnout, where respondents may perceive elections as a means to express or directly address corruption in the country, for example by voting for candidates and parties that offer to address corruption or directly vote against corrupt politicians. However, this is the case in only a few countries, with awareness of corruption being the most frequent predictor of voter turnout.

As for the logistic regression models in which the dependent variable was the choice for the opposition or the ruling party, these already offer different results. Awareness of corruption was statistically significant only in Argentina. If Argentines were aware of an act of corruption, the more likely they were to vote for the ruling party and not for the opposition. However, in terms of regression models with the second independent variable, the more Argentines believe that corruption

can be eradicated from politics, the more likely they are to vote for the opposition party. A possible interpretation could be that while the corruption that the respondent has learned about in the last year should, in his or her opinion, be addressed by the current government, since it has the executive experience and the tools, while in the longer term corruption can only be eradicated by an alternation of power and it is not good if the same party remains in power for several terms. In Bolivia, on the other hand, a positive view of the possibility of eradicating corruption from politics leads to the election of a ruling party, which can be interpreted as meaning that the opposition may not be credible to Bolivians to eradicate corruption, while the government may have enough executive experience to do so. However, the view of corruption eradication in relation to the choice of opposition/government party was statistically significant in only two countries, and thus it is not possible to offer relevant conclusions in the rest of Latin America. The variable representing opinion on the evolution of corruption in a country was the most statistically significant in the regression models in relation to the election of an opposition/ruling party in eight Latin American countries. This independent variable also acts in a different direction. While in Bolivia and Ecuador the perception of the deterioration of the corruption situation in the country leads to the election of the ruling party, in countries such as Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay it leads to the election of the opposition party. Rather, it can be concluded that respondents blame the ruling party for the worsening corruption situation in the country and a vote for the opposition is a vote for someone who will address corruption better than the current politicians in power. However, in Bolivia, even from previous regression model results, trust in the ruling party is already evident, and despite the worsening corruption situation in the country, a vote for the opposition is not an alternative for them.

The results of the linear regression models revealed that in twelve Latin American countries, awareness of corruption is an impetus to demonstrate against corruption. In the remaining six countries in the Latin American region, this corruption variable was statistically insignificant in relation to the willingness to demonstrate against corruption. Similarly, if respondents believe that it is possible to eradicate political corruption, they are all the more likely to take to the streets against this phenomenon, at least in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. In the remaining countries, the relationship between these two variables

was statistically insignificant. As for the variable representing the opinion about the corruption situation in the country, it was statistically significant in relation to the willingness to demonstrate against corruption, even in seven Latin American countries, in a positive direction. The more Chileans, Colombians, Nicaraguans (and other nations in the table) believe that the corruption situation in the country has worsened, the more likely they are to be willing to take to the streets and squares against this phenomenon.

Awareness of corruption is also something that positively influences citizens of some Latin American countries to persuade others of their political views. The logistic regression models showed that the relationship between these two variables was statistically significant and positive in fourteen Latin American countries and only failed to reach statistical significance in Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela. Although convincing others of political thoughts is not directly a form of political participation, this activity has the potential to become a form of political participation or to take place directly within a form of political participation (for example, in canvassing). If this activity is positively influenced by corruption awareness, it may have the potential that those who are aware of this negative phenomenon will convince others of its negative effects. Those Chileans, Mexicans, Peruvians, or Venezuelans who believe that political corruption can be eradicated are also more likely to persuade others about political corruption (in other countries, the relationship between these two variables was not statistically significant). The variable representing the opinion on the evolution of corruption in the country was statistically significant only in Paraguay, where it acts in the direction of the more the respondent believes that the corruption situation in the country has worsened, the more likely he/she is to convince others of his/her political ideas. Interpreting the situation in all other countries in terms of the effects of corruption developments on the frequency of persuading others of political ideas is irrelevant given the lack of statistical significance.

In the logistic regression models, awareness of corruption also had a positive impact on working for a candidate or political party in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay. Corruption awareness is thus something that leads citizens in five Latin American countries to engage with politicians or political parties that can promote an anti-corruption agenda. Corruption can thus lead to political participation, which can ultimately be directed against corruption.

It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that respondents who believe that corruption can be eradicated are more likely to work for a politician or party than those who do not (this applies only to Argentines, Chileans, Nicaraguans and Uruguayans, however, given the statistical significance). Finally, regarding perceptions of corruption in the country, while in Chile corruption has a disincentive effect on this type of political participation, in Paraguay, on the contrary, the perceived worsening of the corruption situation in the country leads to work for a candidate or a political party.

Table 11. Country-by-country Logistic Regression Results

Countries	A R G	B O L	B R A	C H I	C O L	C R I	D O M	E C U	E L S	G U A	H O N	M E X	N I C	P A N	P A R	P E R	U R U	V E N	
Dependent variable: Voter Turnout																			
Perception																			
Experience 1																			
Experience 2																			
Dependent variable: Attending a Political Meeting																			
Perception																			
Experience 1																			
Experience 2																			
Dependent variable: Attending a Community Meeting																			
Perception																			
Experience 1																			
Experience 2																			
Dependent variable: Attending a Town/City Council Meeting																			
Perception																			
Experience 1																			
Experience 2																			
Dependent variable: Participation in a Demonstration																			
Perception																			
Experience 1																			
Experience 2																			
Countries	A R G	B O L	B R A	C H I	C O L	C R I	D O M	E C U	E L S	G U A	H O N	M E X	N I C	P A N	P A R	P E R	U R U	V E N	

Notes: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically insignificant in the regression models are marked in grey (Coefficients $p < 0.05$). Variables that are statistically significant in the positive direction are marked in blue. The red colour indicates statistically significant variables that are in the negative direction. Missing variables are marked in black. Datasets are weighted by WT provided by LAPOP, 2019. Source: Author's calculations, based on LAPOP (2019).

While the Latinobarómetro database offers diverse questions on corruption, the AmericasBarometer questionnaires are limited to perceptions and experiences of corruption. The survey included a question on how many politicians respondents believe are involved in corruption, as a variable representing perception of corruption, and questions on whether a police officer or official demanded a bribe from the respondent, as variables representing experience with corruption. In terms of corruption typologies, the question on politicians' perceptions of corruption can be distinguished between random, sectoral or directly systemic corruption, depending on how many politicians are involved in corruption. Similarly, corruption typologies can be applied to the experience of bribery by a police officer or a civil servant. Although bribery is categorised as petty corruption and starts randomly, it can develop into sectoral and organised corruption within a city or region where an increasing number of officials or police officers are involved, and eventually bribery can develop into systemic corruption, as demonstrated by the investigation into the 'Operation Car Wash' scandal.

The results of the logistic regression analysis revealed that perceptions of corruption in Argentina and Costa Rica have a negative impact on voter turnout. The more politicians involved in corruption, the more likely Argentines and Costa Ricans will not participate in the next election. However, this discouraging effect of perceived corruption on turnout at the individual level can only be confirmed for two countries, as the relationship between the two variables was not statistically significant in other Latin American countries. Regarding the experience of police corruption, while in Argentina it has a deterrent effect similar to perceived corruption, in contrast, in Panama a bribe demanded by a police officer will lead the respondent to be interested in participating in the presidential election. Again, however, this only applies to two countries and it is not possible to generalize to the rest of Latin America due to the lack of statistical significance. The experience of official corruption was statistically significant in only one country, namely Mexico, and in this case it has a mobilizing effect on voter turnout. If a Mexican official demanded a bribe in the last twelve months, the more likely he or she was to head to the next presidential election.

Examining the effects of corruption on participation in political rallies in Latin America using AmericasBarometer data is problematic in that only some countries have been surveyed on this question. However, the sample of states is sufficient at

least in terms of size, population or location (Central and South America included). Here again, the regression models captured the deterrent effect of perceived corruption, but it was statistically significant only in El Salvador. The more Salvadoran politicians involved in corruption, the more likely Salvadorans are not to attend political gatherings, yet at such gatherings they have the opportunity to share experiences of corruption with politicians, propose solutions, or directly confront corrupt politicians. Conversely, the experience of police corruption has a mobilizing effect in Guatemala and Peru, with no statistical significance evident in the other countries. Thus, personal experience of corruption is something that, in at least two Latin American countries, has the potential to get people into political meetings where they can report on this experience to their elected representatives. In Peru, not only was experience with police corruption statistically significant in relation to attendance at a political rally, but experience with official corruption was also statistically significant in a positive direction. Also, in Colombia, a situation where an official demanded a bribe from a respondent could result in the respondent attending a political rally. Interestingly, in El Salvador, the perception of political corruption discourages participation in a political meeting, while the experience of official corruption, on the contrary, mobilizes citizens to attend such a meeting with a political motive.

The results of the logistic regression analysis revealed that perceptions of corruption also seem to affect participation in community meetings. In the case of Bolivians and Mexicans, resignation to community gatherings is evident the more politicians are involved in corruption. Of course, it may also be the case that politicians at the city or community level whose visible involvement in corruption simply has a deterrent effect on citizens who may believe that their community involvement will not make a difference anyway. Paradoxically, however, in Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the experience of police corruption is something that is likely to lead to participation in community meetings. While perceptions of corruption are discouraging in Bolivia, experience with this phenomenon is, on the contrary, mobilizing. Indeed, citizens' experiences of police corruption may be something that can be discussed at community meetings. In this way, citizens can make organized complaints about police corruption to politicians or invite politicians directly to community meetings and confront them with their experiences. However, the experience of clerk corruption was the most pronounced,

and was statistically significant in almost all Latin American countries. If a respondent was asked to pay a bribe by a clerk, the more likely he or she was to attend a community meeting. Thus, these meetings can also provide a space for citizens to report and discuss experiences of clerk corruption.

Similar to participation in political rallies, participation in town hall meetings was unfortunately not surveyed by AmericasBarometer in all Latin American countries, as it was for the other dependent variables (except Venezuela). However, even in this case, at least a diversity of countries in terms of size, population and geographic location are represented (both Central and South American countries are represented). A regression model where the independent variable was politicians' perceptions of corruption shows that Nicaragua is a country where the more politicians are involved in corruption, the less likely people are to attend town hall meetings. However, the other countries included in the survey did not capture a deterrent or mobilizing effect of perceived corruption on political participation at the local level. Much more pronounced in terms of the number of states is the experience of police corruption in relation to town meeting participation, in five of the eight states included in the survey. If a respondent from El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay or Peru was asked by a police officer to pay a bribe, the more likely he or she would be to attend a town meeting. In the same countries (with El Salvador replaced by Colombia), a variable representing experience with official corruption also has a mobilizing effect on attendance at town meetings. If a respondent in any of these five countries was exposed to a situation where an official demanded a bribe, the more likely he or she was to attend an official meeting at the city level. Experience with bribery is likely to be a strong predictor of political participation at the local level, as people are most likely to come into contact with city police officers or city officials, and if they demand bribes, official city meetings may be an appropriate venue for reporting on corruption and adopting anti-corruption solutions.

While in all other regression models, politicians' perceptions of corruption had a discouraging effect on political participation, in the case of participation in demonstrations, it had a mobilizing effect, in four countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Paraguay). Although these results cannot apply to the whole of Latin America due to the absence of statistical significance in other countries, at the very least they may indicate that perceived corruption leads to

resignation to institutional forms of political participation, as people may believe that elections or political rallies are controlled by corrupt political elites and participation will not make a difference. In contrast, demonstrations are one of the unconventional forms of political participation, which are more often convened by the opposition or civil society directly than by government politicians with executive power that opens up a space of corrupt opportunities, and for these reasons people may perceive demonstrations as a more meaningful and effective form of political participation in which to make a stand against corruption. Moreover, personal experience of police bribery is a predictor of participation in demonstrations in ten Latin American countries. Thus, in most countries in the region, people may perceive police corruption as something to take to the streets or plazas to oppose. After all, the police are the ones who should be on the front line in the fight against corruption, and if they themselves are involved in corruption, then this is, of course, completely unacceptable, even scandalous, as it undermines the very foundations of the rule of law. Personal experience of bribery among officials was statistically significant only in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru, and even in these latter regression models this independent corruption variable has a positive effect on participation.

Table 12. The Impact of Corruption Awareness on Voter Turnout

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Awareness	0.002 (0.245)	0.588 (0.251)	-0.018 (0.184)	0.469 (0.228)	0.424 (0.19)	0.433 (0.201)	-0.154 (0.207)	0.061 (0.199)	0.652 (0.293)	-0.015 (0.248)	0.594 (0.244)	0.15 (0.187)	0.526 (0.283)	0.234 (0.218)	-0.181 (0.26)	0.414 (0.202)	0.735 (0.485)	0.616 (0.22)
Gender	-0.674 (0.237)	-0.422 (0.183)	-0.363 (0.153)	-0.218 (0.176)	-0.435 (0.14)	-0.142 (0.164)	-0.187 (0.182)	-0.529 (0.147)	-0.333 (0.185)	-0.686 (0.205)	-0.037 (0.154)	-0.07 (0.147)	-0.365 (0.191)	-0.163 (0.151)	-0.16 (0.184)	-0.126 (0.156)	0.184 (0.288)	-0.243 (0.153)
Age	0.011 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.013 (0.005)	0.016 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.012 (0.005)	0.02 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.013 (0.005)	0 (0.005)	0.019 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.03 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.009 (0.009)	0.024 (0.005)
Education	0.083 (0.034)	0.003 (0.023)	0.03 (0.021)	0.123 (0.033)	0.037 (0.017)	0.032 (0.025)	-0.059 (0.023)	0.044 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	-0.05 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.02)	-0.031 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.056 (0.02)	0.06 (0.027)	0.005 (0.019)	0.032 (0.046)	-0.018 (0.026)
Salary	0.069 (0.136)	0.035 (0.114)	0.155 (0.077)	0.135 (0.127)	0.144 (0.082)	0.288 (0.096)	-0.043 (0.099)	0.175 (0.084)	-0.123 (0.102)	0.099 (0.115)	0.028 (0.081)	-0.159 (0.093)	0.07 (0.111)	0.014 (0.081)	0.394 (0.119)	0.118 (0.094)	-0.121 (0.191)	-0.056 (0.105)
Participation Freedom	0.248 (0.132)	0.19 (0.107)	0.239 (0.083)	0.252 (0.1)	0.298 (0.083)	0.332 (0.089)	0.287 (0.093)	0.053 (0.081)	0.127 (0.108)	0.128 (0.106)	0.319 (0.081)	0.194 (0.087)	0.377 (0.102)	0.322 (0.079)	0.258 (0.104)	0.169 (0.091)	0.301 (0.15)	0.276 (0.078)
Interpersonal Trust	0.182 (0.339)	-0.374 (0.266)	0.134 (0.367)	0.012 (0.266)	0.438 (0.211)	0.081 (0.274)	-0.251 (0.243)	0.315 (0.269)	0.225 (0.282)	-0.186 (0.268)	0.238 (0.209)	0.388 (0.196)	0.092 (0.333)	0.027 (0.232)	0.694 (0.393)	0.138 (0.265)	0.545 (0.425)	0.201 (0.371)
Institutional Trust	0.608 (0.151)	0.266 (0.106)	0.183 (0.085)	0.239 (0.115)	0.267 (0.083)	0.326 (0.109)	0.566 (0.089)	0.095 (0.105)	0.681 (0.095)	0.227 (0.114)	0.474 (0.102)	0.521 (0.088)	0.787 (0.093)	0.262 (0.091)	0.177 (0.126)	0.2 (0.102)	0.135 (0.139)	0.721 (0.096)
Constant	-1.841 (0.662)	0.798 (0.576)	-1.111 (0.44)	-3.509 (0.541)	-2.442 (0.423)	-3.642 (0.482)	0.136 (0.498)	-1.155 (0.496)	-2.081 (0.593)	-0.904 (0.539)	-2.258 (0.416)	-0.533 (0.468)	-3.332 (0.472)	-0.51 (0.442)	-2.249 (0.618)	-1.031 (0.473)	0.936 (0.803)	-2.524 (0.491)
Nagelkerke R²	0.178	0.048	0.070	0.128	0.107	0.125	0.148	0.053	0.173	0.056	0.116	0.091	0.361	0.071	0.094	0.038	0.041	0.243
N	484	892	758	580	930	691	781	809	687	520	789	839	629	764	803	697	964	860

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

For example, the Peruvian model predicts that a respondent with knowledge of corruption would be up to one percentage point more likely to vote than a respondent without knowledge of corruption. In the case of a respondent from El Salvador with awareness of corruption, the probability of participating in the election is as high as ninety-one percent.

As for the control variables, they were statistically significant in the regression models only in some countries. For example, for the gender variable, the regression models revealed that men in Latin America are more likely to participate in elections than women. The likelihood of a respondent being interested in

participating in an election also increases with increasing age. For the control variable representing education, the picture is more complicated. In some states, more educated respondents are more likely to participate in the next election, while in other states, less educated respondents are more likely to turn out to vote (a negative predictor in the table). People with higher incomes are also more likely to vote than those who are struggling to make ends meet. Guaranteed freedom of political participation in a country is important for the vast majority of peoples in Latin America to participate in elections. Trust among the people, but especially trust in government, are also variables that have the potential to positively influence voter turnout in Latin American countries.

Table 13. The Impact of Eradication of Corruption on Voter Turnout

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Eradicate Corruption	0.221 (0.096)	0.01 (0.11)	0.035 (0.06)	0.14 (0.109)	0.121 (0.077)	0.012 (0.09)	-0.122 (0.121)	-0.091 (0.09)	0.193 (0.112)	0.209 (0.132)	0.147 (0.086)	0.172 (0.098)	-0.036 (0.136)	0.23 (0.089)	0.089 (0.128)	0.031 (0.088)	0.231 (0.187)	0.01 (0.085)
Gender	-0.28 (0.21)	-0.435 (0.182)	-0.4 (0.153)	-0.219 (0.182)	-0.427 (0.14)	-0.178 (0.165)	-0.212 (0.181)	-0.538 (0.148)	-0.259 (0.185)	-0.723 (0.211)	0.029 (0.155)	-0.101 (0.146)	-0.339 (0.198)	-0.26 (0.152)	-0.131 (0.188)	-0.114 (0.156)	0.241 (0.296)	-0.293 (0.154)
Age	0.005 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.014 (0.005)	0.016 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.012 (0.005)	0.018 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.012 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.022 (0.007)	0 (0.005)	0.033 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.009)	0.025 (0.005)
Education	0.126 (0.031)	0.009 (0.023)	0.027 (0.021)	0.04 (0.033)	0.047 (0.017)	0.037 (0.024)	-0.052 (0.023)	0.045 (0.024)	0.025 (0.025)	-0.047 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.02)	-0.047 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.023)	-0.059 (0.021)	0.055 (0.029)	0.009 (0.019)	0.035 (0.047)	-0.018 (0.026)
Salary	0.129 (0.124)	0.01 (0.113)	0.179 (0.077)	0.139 (0.131)	0.148 (0.083)	0.297 (0.1)	-0.036 (0.095)	0.193 (0.085)	-0.116 (0.104)	0.101 (0.117)	0.03 (0.081)	-0.114 (0.092)	-0.017 (0.114)	0.025 (0.083)	0.374 (0.124)	0.108 (0.094)	-0.079 (0.194)	-0.077 (0.105)
Participation Freedom	0.353 (0.115)	0.195 (0.107)	0.242 (0.083)	0.106 (0.103)	0.31 (0.084)	0.354 (0.09)	0.313 (0.094)	0.083 (0.082)	0.127 (0.111)	0.164 (0.11)	0.296 (0.081)	0.151 (0.086)	0.365 (0.108)	0.34 (0.08)	0.265 (0.108)	0.173 (0.09)	0.318 (0.154)	0.276 (0.078)
Interpersonal Trust	0.275 (0.291)	-0.33 (0.258)	0.17 (0.365)	-0.082 (0.269)	0.4 (0.214)	0 (0.272)	-0.2 (0.241)	0.299 (0.271)	0.153 (0.282)	-0.262 (0.271)	0.264 (0.193)	0.391 (0.352)	0.287 (0.237)	-0.085 (0.237)	0.667 (0.395)	0.051 (0.264)	0.481 (0.427)	0.14 (0.373)
Institutional Trust	0.506 (0.134)	0.23 (0.104)	0.162 (0.085)	0.248 (0.12)	0.285 (0.083)	0.319 (0.109)	0.548 (0.089)	0.092 (0.105)	0.627 (0.096)	0.208 (0.116)	0.44 (0.103)	0.465 (0.088)	0.801 (0.099)	0.223 (0.092)	0.21 (0.132)	0.191 (0.101)	0.098 (0.144)	0.716 (0.095)
Constant	-3.065 (0.642)	0.903 (0.626)	-1.153 (0.455)	-1.817 (0.602)	-2.888 (0.462)	-3.651 (0.537)	0.281 (0.582)	-1.024 (0.535)	-2.421 (0.655)	-1.525 (0.652)	-2.446 (0.456)	-0.549 (0.514)	-2.997 (0.562)	-1.014 (0.495)	-2.597 (0.691)	-1.103 (0.518)	0.593 (0.942)	-2.476 (0.51)
Nagelkerke R²	0.202	0.035	0.074	0.051	0.115	0.125	0.142	0.057	0.163	0.071	0.110	0.085	0.365	0.086	0.098	0.026	0.036	0.247
N	609	885	763	542	926	682	783	801	678	501	770	846	586	750	771	696	950	863

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05)

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The Argentine model predicts that a one-degree increase in the value of the independent variable (e.g., from “agree” to “strongly agree”) is associated with an increase of up to twenty-four percent in the probability that a respondent would vote. In the case of the Panama model, the value of the increase in probability is twenty-five percent.

Table 14. The Impact of Corruption Progress on Voter Turnout

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Progress	-0.116 (0.126)	0.066 (0.077)	0.083 (0.061)	0.262 (0.11)	0.031 (0.065)	-0.073 (0.082)	-0.077 (0.073)	0.026 (0.069)	-0.02 (0.083)	-0.073 (0.086)	0.051 (0.06)	-0.119 (0.078)	-0.049 (0.081)	-0.079 (0.071)	0.016 (0.097)	0.069 (0.075)	0.066 (0.178)	0.09 (0.079)
Gender	-0.41 (0.205)	-0.362 (0.184)	-0.382 (0.156)	-0.217 (0.173)	-0.395 (0.141)	-0.158 (0.165)	-0.195 (0.181)	-0.522 (0.147)	-0.362 (0.185)	-0.71 (0.207)	0.008 (0.157)	-0.039 (0.146)	-0.353 (0.198)	-0.203 (0.151)	-0.126 (0.187)	-0.14 (0.156)	0.408 (0.32)	-0.319 (0.154)
Age	0.009 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.013 (0.005)	0.015 (0.005)	0.016 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.012 (0.005)	0.017 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.012 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.025 (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)	0.029 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.01)	0.026 (0.005)
Education	0.137 (0.03)	0.005 (0.024)	0.029 (0.021)	0.09 (0.031)	0.055 (0.017)	0.042 (0.025)	-0.054 (0.023)	0.045 (0.024)	0.024 (0.024)	-0.051 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.036 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.023)	-0.05 (0.021)	0.058 (0.029)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.05)	-0.011 (0.027)
Salary	0.15 (0.121)	0.046 (0.114)	0.187 (0.078)	0.215 (0.125)	0.163 (0.083)	0.28 (0.1)	-0.034 (0.095)	0.17 (0.085)	-0.14 (0.102)	0.138 (0.117)	0.045 (0.091)	-0.123 (0.113)	-0.028 (0.113)	0.02 (0.082)	0.415 (0.124)	0.137 (0.094)	-0.059 (0.211)	-0.065 (0.106)
Participation Freedom	0.376 (0.113)	0.211 (0.109)	0.265 (0.084)	0.198 (0.098)	0.312 (0.084)	0.324 (0.09)	0.323 (0.093)	0.057 (0.081)	0.178 (0.11)	0.145 (0.109)	0.296 (0.082)	0.186 (0.086)	0.384 (0.107)	0.344 (0.08)	0.281 (0.107)	0.165 (0.091)	0.485 (0.165)	0.257 (0.078)
Interpersonal Trust	0.393 (0.294)	-0.286 (0.267)	0.294 (0.374)	0.019 (0.262)	0.433 (0.215)	-0.074 (0.278)	-0.214 (0.242)	0.315 (0.274)	0.092 (0.278)	-0.27 (0.271)	0.331 (0.215)	0.341 (0.193)	0.249 (0.349)	0.002 (0.232)	0.809 (0.414)	0.119 (0.264)	0.479 (0.463)	0.098 (0.375)
Institutional Trust	0.472 (0.139)	0.206 (0.105)	0.192 (0.088)	0.218 (0.115)	0.283 (0.085)	0.272 (0.113)	0.531 (0.089)	0.119 (0.105)	0.612 (0.097)	0.172 (0.118)	0.464 (0.103)	0.48 (0.089)	0.777 (0.097)	0.254 (0.093)	0.233 (0.132)	0.217 (0.102)	0.215 (0.162)	0.722 (0.098)
Constant	-2.372 (0.891)	0.588 (0.633)	-1.608 (0.529)	-4.285 (0.816)	-2.87 (0.519)	-3.213 (0.591)	0.177 (0.544)	-1.286 (0.563)	-1.74 (0.637)	-0.594 (0.633)	-2.292 (0.472)	0.047 (0.57)	-3.019 (0.58)	-0.32 (0.532)	-2.481 (0.796)	-1.311 (0.529)	0.645 (1.147)	-2.903 (0.621)
Nagelkerke R²	0.210	0.031	0.074	0.109	0.111	0.114	0.149	0.054	0.152	0.061	0.106	0.085	0.370	0.074	0.097	0.032	0.058	0.234
N	616	881	749	595	922	683	791	808	679	500	761	849	599	756	801	698	901	849

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The Chilean model predicts that a one degree increase in the value of the independent variable (e.g. from “increased some” to “increased a lot”) is associated with an increase of up to thirty percent in the probability that the respondent would vote.

Table 15. The Impact of Corruption Awareness on Voting for Opposition/Government Party

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Awareness	0.772 (0.316)	0.108 (0.212)	0.157 (0.284)	-0.062 (0.422)	-0.43 (0.344)	-0.921 (0.742)	0.067 (0.25)	0.608 (0.361)	-0.106 (0.36)	-0.323 (0.662)	-0.83 (0.462)	0.001 (0.246)	-0.681 (0.611)	0.348 (0.303)	0.094 (0.247)	-0.49 (0.542)	-0.049 (0.24)	-0.379 (0.473)
Gender	0.456 (0.285)	-0.092 (0.175)	-0.369 (0.238)	0.048 (0.318)	0.271 (0.245)	-0.586 (0.537)	0.199 (0.214)	0.142 (0.299)	0.216 (0.266)	0.279 (0.504)	0.812 (0.285)	-0.262 (0.196)	0.778 (0.488)	0.659 (0.231)	0.032 (0.169)	0.131 (0.433)	0.174 (0.176)	0.787 (0.315)
Age	0.009 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.041 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.01)	0 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.012 (0.009)	0.026 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.016)	0.013 (0.007)	0.013 (0.006)	-0.034 (0.017)	0.015 (0.005)	0.002 (0.01)
Education	0.064 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.033)	0.135 (0.065)	0 (0.033)	0.1 (0.083)	-0.011 (0.026)	0.001 (0.048)	0.009 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.066)	0.049 (0.036)	0.075 (0.03)	-0.129 (0.06)	-0.018 (0.03)	0.004 (0.026)	0.084 (0.064)	-0.018 (0.028)	-0.136 (0.053)
Salary	0.328 (0.161)	-0.372 (0.11)	0.363 (0.12)	0.607 (0.222)	-0.128 (0.144)	-0.164 (0.329)	-0.069 (0.113)	0.034 (0.16)	-0.037 (0.153)	0.26 (0.297)	-0.164 (0.149)	-0.094 (0.122)	0.146 (0.265)	0.118 (0.126)	0.061 (0.12)	0.172 (0.271)	-0.198 (0.121)	0.235 (0.226)
Participation Freedom	0.344 (0.177)	0.113 (0.105)	0.35 (0.132)	-0.094 (0.175)	0.124 (0.144)	0.369 (0.342)	-0.007 (0.116)	-0.409 (0.157)	-0.269 (0.156)	-0.183 (0.256)	0.219 (0.154)	-0.129 (0.114)	1.041 (0.27)	-0.037 (0.126)	0.125 (0.101)	0.268 (0.243)	0.062 (0.102)	0.61 (0.164)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.091 (0.354)	-0.469 (0.276)	-0.667 (0.484)	-0.543 (0.426)	-0.023 (0.32)	0.553 (0.753)	-0.144 (0.282)	0.03 (0.449)	0.091 (0.378)	1.471 (0.626)	0.275 (0.348)	-0.25 (0.241)	0.664 (0.882)	-0.025 (0.328)	-0.444 (0.272)	-0.724 (0.821)	-0.46 (0.218)	-0.681 (0.676)
Institutional Trust	-0.228 (0.135)	0.822 (0.106)	0.398 (0.124)	1.181 (0.199)	0.446 (0.14)	1.828 (0.37)	0.701 (0.104)	-0.518 (0.225)	0.856 (0.143)	0.539 (0.237)	1.368 (0.189)	0.413 (0.11)	1.67 (0.286)	0.755 (0.13)	0.367 (0.119)	-0.121 (0.283)	1.396 (0.103)	1.59 (0.183)
Constant	-2.748 (0.884)	0.033 (0.563)	-2.746 (0.749)	-5.074 (1.234)	-1.627 (0.76)	-6.241 (1.93)	-0.077 (0.588)	1.144 (0.915)	-0.524 (0.856)	-2.254 (1.392)	-3.972 (0.811)	-1.97 (0.681)	-3.618 (1.262)	-2.894 (0.668)	-1.038 (0.601)	-2.113 (1.375)	-3.991 (0.555)	-3.905 (1.034)
Nagelkerke R²	0.143	0.190	0.145	0.362	0.084	0.441	0.140	0.113	0.138	0.165	0.390	0.093	0.680	0.192	0.044	0.130	0.443	0.636
N	286	662	350	262	339	229	572	226	469	98	307	469	282	389	646	169	816	413

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The Argentine model predicts that a respondent with knowledge of corruption would be up to one hundred and sixty-five percent more likely to vote for the ruling party than a respondent without knowledge of corruption.

As for the control variables, in some Latin American countries, women are more likely than men to give their vote to the ruling party. These regression models also show that while in Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay older people are more likely to prefer the ruling party, in contrast, older voters in Costa Rica and Peru would give their vote to the opposition. The control variable representing education comes with

similar results. In some states, more educated respondents would be more likely to vote for the government parties, while in other Latin American republics, more educated voters would prefer the opposition if given the opportunity. Satisfaction with the family financial situation is likely to lead to voting for government parties, but the exception is Bolivia, where, on the contrary, people who are financially secure are more likely to vote for the opposition. In some Latin American countries, if the rights to free political participation are not guaranteed, people would be more likely to vote for opposition parties, but the Ecuadorian model, for example, demonstrates that the opposite is the case. These models also show that Guatemalans who are mutually trusting towards each other are more likely to vote for government parties, while mutually trusting Uruguayans are more likely to vote for the opposition. Of course, in the vast majority of Latin American countries, trust towards the government also means a vote for the ruling party. However, a certain paradox within these models is Ecuador, where, on the contrary, higher institutional trust means a vote for the opposition.

Table 16. The Impact of Eradication of Corruption on Voting for Opposition/Government Party

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Eradicate Corruption	-0.305 (0.129)	0.371 (0.106)	-0.066 (0.093)	0.171 (0.181)	0.037 (0.142)	0.285 (0.282)	0.014 (0.145)	-0.062 (0.164)	0.147 (0.168)	0.27 (0.326)	0.229 (0.169)	0.159 (0.125)	-0.206 (0.328)	-0.119 (0.139)	0.096 (0.123)	0.317 (0.264)	0.068 (0.116)	0.017 (0.171)
Gender	0.452 (0.265)	-0.067 (0.178)	-0.363 (0.237)	0.273 (0.336)	0.287 (0.245)	-0.394 (0.543)	0.29 (0.214)	0.083 (0.294)	0.254 (0.267)	0.418 (0.513)	0.806 (0.286)	-0.261 (0.194)	1.035 (0.511)	0.599 (0.231)	0.033 (0.174)	0.233 (0.436)	0.197 (0.178)	0.873 (0.316)
Age	0.02 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.01)	0 (0.008)	-0.04 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.018)	0.014 (0.009)	0.028 (0.007)	-0.026 (0.017)	0.012 (0.007)	0.011 (0.006)	-0.03 (0.017)	0.016 (0.005)	0 (0.01)
Education	0.122 (0.043)	-0.037 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.032)	0.143 (0.065)	-0.004 (0.032)	0.086 (0.081)	-0.012 (0.026)	0.043 (0.049)	0.01 (0.035)	0.008 (0.067)	0.054 (0.036)	0.072 (0.03)	-0.115 (0.063)	-0.013 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.027)	0.084 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.028)	-0.135 (0.053)
Salary	0.318 (0.156)	-0.385 (0.112)	0.358 (0.12)	0.652 (0.24)	-0.145 (0.143)	-0.138 (0.326)	-0.074 (0.114)	0.027 (0.157)	-0.035 (0.156)	0.315 (0.298)	-0.169 (0.15)	-0.047 (0.121)	0.121 (0.274)	0.118 (0.126)	0.047 (0.123)	0.114 (0.272)	-0.169 (0.121)	0.181 (0.222)
Participation Freedom	0.369 (0.16)	0.083 (0.106)	0.347 (0.131)	0.044 (0.184)	0.118 (0.145)	0.347 (0.338)	0.007 (0.116)	-0.351 (0.154)	-0.324 (0.158)	-0.292 (0.272)	0.239 (0.156)	-0.09 (0.114)	1.123 (0.288)	-0.043 (0.129)	0.114 (0.103)	0.284 (0.245)	0.037 (0.103)	0.582 (0.166)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.144 (0.317)	-0.529 (0.274)	-0.581 (0.47)	-0.761 (0.451)	-0.028 (0.32)	0.534 (0.754)	-0.129 (0.283)	-0.001 (0.458)	0.034 (0.38)	1.7 (0.657)	0.265 (0.348)	-0.206 (0.239)	0.883 (0.915)	-0.022 (0.339)	-0.402 (0.28)	-0.766 (0.829)	-0.489 (0.219)	-0.212 (0.681)
Institutional Trust	-0.19 (0.125)	0.808 (0.107)	0.422 (0.124)	1.307 (0.216)	0.465 (0.138)	1.809 (0.359)	0.697 (0.104)	-0.538 (0.218)	0.87 (0.147)	0.584 (0.247)	1.284 (0.185)	0.389 (0.109)	1.749 (0.3)	0.78 (0.131)	0.366 (0.122)	-0.081 (0.283)	1.399 (0.105)	1.59 (0.182)
Constant	-3.03 (0.919)	-0.793 (0.613)	-2.673 (0.787)	-6.107 (1.298)	-1.789 (0.829)	-7.067 (2.101)	-0.134 (0.689)	0.665 (0.949)	-0.828 (0.938)	-3.139 (1.678)	-4.703 (0.898)	-2.62 (0.723)	-3.358 (1.429)	-2.531 (0.776)	-1.001 (0.669)	-3.304 (1.704)	-4.251 (0.629)	-3.826 (1.061)
Nagelkerke R²	0.164	0.214	0.147	0.416	0.080	0.435	0.143	0.093	0.150	0.196	0.379	0.101	0.698	0.188	0.041	0.132	0.443	0.631
N	343	653	353	255	339	226	572	227	467	96	302	476	268	380	621	169	804	415

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panama, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Peru, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The Argentine model predicts that a one-degree increase in the value of the independent variable (e.g., from “agree” to “strongly agree”) is associated with a decrease of up to twenty-six percent in the probability that the respondent would vote for the government party. In contrast, the Bolivian model predicts that a one-degree increase in the value of the independent variable is associated with an increase in the probability that the respondent would vote for the government party by up to forty-four percent.

Table 17. The Impact of Corruption Progress on Voting for Opposition/Government Party

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Progress	-0.242 (0.141)	0.27 (0.075)	-0.126 (0.093)	-0.105 (0.202)	-0.308 (0.116)	-0.319 (0.256)	-0.179 (0.085)	0.439 (0.165)	-0.149 (0.113)	-0.194 (0.185)	-0.032 (0.111)	-0.414 (0.102)	-0.479 (0.218)	-0.295 (0.104)	0.108 (0.092)	0.297 (0.225)	-0.468 (0.109)	-0.165 (0.156)
Gender	0.475 (0.262)	-0.139 (0.178)	-0.305 (0.244)	0.114 (0.313)	0.343 (0.251)	-0.577 (0.556)	0.273 (0.213)	0.077 (0.297)	0.205 (0.266)	0.327 (0.511)	0.716 (0.289)	-0.217 (0.197)	1.073 (0.54)	0.639 (0.233)	-0.002 (0.169)	0.158 (0.43)	0.32 (0.186)	0.783 (0.318)
Age	0.011 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.041 (0.02)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.01)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.013 (0.01)	0.026 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.018)	0.014 (0.007)	0.015 (0.006)	-0.037 (0.017)	0.014 (0.005)	0.003 (0.01)
Education	0.088 (0.044)	-0.04 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.033)	0.151 (0.064)	0.001 (0.033)	0.062 (0.084)	-0.008 (0.026)	0.012 (0.047)	0.019 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.066)	0.063 (0.038)	0.06 (0.031)	-0.14 (0.068)	-0.006 (0.032)	0.002 (0.026)	0.068 (0.065)	-0.005 (0.029)	-0.126 (0.055)
Salary	0.336 (0.152)	-0.371 (0.111)	0.357 (0.122)	0.528 (0.218)	-0.166 (0.148)	0.109 (0.35)	-0.079 (0.113)	0.021 (0.158)	-0.047 (0.153)	0.256 (0.293)	-0.207 (0.152)	-0.076 (0.123)	0.116 (0.283)	0.16 (0.128)	0.076 (0.122)	0.124 (0.271)	-0.195 (0.125)	0.169 (0.227)
Participation Freedom	0.305 (0.159)	0.113 (0.106)	0.346 (0.134)	-0.02 (0.176)	0.181 (0.15)	0.099 (0.368)	-0.008 (0.115)	-0.349 (0.152)	-0.288 (0.156)	-0.234 (0.258)	0.185 (0.159)	-0.129 (0.116)	1.119 (0.305)	0.019 (0.13)	0.126 (0.102)	0.224 (0.241)	-0.001 (0.107)	0.62 (0.166)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.315 (0.309)	-0.471 (0.277)	-0.66 (0.479)	-0.42 (0.416)	0.082 (0.327)	0.409 (0.803)	-0.122 (0.283)	-0.059 (0.45)	0.106 (0.382)	1.332 (0.653)	0.399 (0.348)	-0.227 (0.242)	0.713 (1.013)	-0.02 (0.336)	-0.54 (0.266)	-0.602 (0.816)	-0.561 (0.228)	-0.537 (0.68)
Institutional Trust	-0.362 (0.152)	0.87 (0.109)	0.398 (0.127)	1.251 (0.208)	0.377 (0.145)	1.667 (0.37)	0.7 (0.104)	-0.524 (0.226)	0.822 (0.147)	0.536 (0.247)	1.317 (0.186)	0.332 (0.111)	1.813 (0.326)	0.694 (0.133)	0.416 (0.121)	-0.127 (0.284)	1.329 (0.109)	1.583 (0.185)
Constant	-1.446 (1.269)	-0.988 (0.626)	-2.35 (0.878)	-4.828 (1.568)	-0.44 (0.906)	-4.313 (2.45)	0.511 (0.639)	-0.903 (1.179)	-0.15 (0.921)	-1.542 (1.534)	-3.896 (0.923)	-0.307 (0.824)	-2.372 (1.619)	-2.062 (0.796)	-1.587 (0.758)	-2.935 (1.589)	-2.207 (0.722)	-3.342 (1.284)
Nagelkerke R²	0.134	0.213	0.160	0.384	0.112	0.419	0.152	0.141	0.146	0.170	0.377	0.140	0.726	0.219	0.054	0.138	0.467	0.639
N	342	653	348	281	338	222	579	229	466	97	299	479	275	387	648	169	766	407

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

For example, the Ecuadorian model predicts that an increase of one degree in the value of the independent variable (e.g., from “increased some” to “increased a lot”) is associated with an increase of up to fifty-five percent in the probability that the respondent voted for the government party. In contrast, the Uruguayan model predicts that a one-degree increase in the value of the independent variable is associated with a decrease in the probability that the respondent voted for the government party by up to thirty-seven percent.

Table 18. The Impact of Corruption Awareness on Willingness to Demonstrate Against Corruption

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Constant	8.005 (0.672)	7.244 (0.554)	7.294 (0.557)	11.783 (0.595)	8.985 (0.514)	9.375 (0.554)	9.436 (0.58)	8.468 (0.649)	6.526 (0.777)	5.562 (0.691)	7.449 (0.613)	7.99 (0.629)	6.562 (0.663)	7.178 (0.694)	9.671 (0.493)	9.832 (0.55)	9.299 (0.643)	7.491 (0.671)
Corruption Awareness	0.696 (0.248)	0.542 (0.217)	0.548 (0.245)	1.016 (0.266)	0.586 (0.238)	0.882 (0.25)	0.338 (0.244)	0.086 (0.267)	0.377 (0.361)	0.299 (0.314)	0.872 (0.37)	0.558 (0.25)	0.984 (0.433)	0.353 (0.338)	0.519 (0.204)	0.526 (0.233)	0.562 (0.296)	0.751 (0.331)
Gender	0.088 (0.237)	-0.069 (0.174)	-0.336 (0.193)	0.393 (0.195)	-0.853 (0.175)	-0.223 (0.203)	-0.557 (0.208)	-0.916 (0.196)	-0.736 (0.245)	-0.714 (0.255)	-0.152 (0.236)	-0.428 (0.195)	-0.576 (0.284)	-1.179 (0.234)	0.004 (0.144)	-0.559 (0.181)	-0.804 (0.22)	-0.881 (0.219)
Age	-0.01 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.054 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.027 (0.006)	-0.01 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.007)	-0.01 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.027 (0.007)	-0.019 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.022 (0.005)	-0.029 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.007)	-0.029 (0.007)
Education	-0.014 (0.035)	0.061 (0.022)	0.047 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.031)	-0.02 (0.021)	0.036 (0.03)	0.039 (0.025)	0.019 (0.031)	-0.081 (0.032)	0.091 (0.031)	0.069 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.028)	0 (0.033)	0.108 (0.031)	0.004 (0.022)	0.034 (0.022)	0.057 (0.034)	0.062 (0.037)
Salary	-0.091 (0.141)	-0.234 (0.108)	-0.219 (0.098)	-0.485 (0.143)	-0.019 (0.101)	-0.372 (0.125)	-0.203 (0.111)	-0.252 (0.113)	-0.153 (0.139)	0.22 (0.15)	-0.21 (0.123)	-0.411 (0.125)	0.283 (0.165)	-0.233 (0.125)	-0.304 (0.101)	-0.294 (0.107)	-0.075 (0.146)	-0.086 (0.15)
Participation Freedom	0.184 (0.142)	0.303 (0.101)	0.21 (0.106)	-0.25 (0.11)	0.147 (0.105)	0.195 (0.11)	-0.222 (0.109)	0.036 (0.108)	0.4 (0.146)	0.081 (0.137)	0.26 (0.124)	0.058 (0.114)	0.316 (0.157)	-0.069 (0.121)	0.121 (0.083)	-0.031 (0.107)	-0.274 (0.123)	-0.057 (0.112)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.693 (0.326)	0.402 (0.27)	-0.425 (0.449)	0.32 (0.259)	-0.142 (0.255)	0.163 (0.343)	-0.683 (0.281)	-0.105 (0.331)	-0.567 (0.346)	-0.233 (0.349)	0.262 (0.32)	-0.263 (0.254)	-0.154 (0.498)	-0.459 (0.352)	-0.608 (0.25)	-0.465 (0.296)	0.466 (0.274)	-0.827 (0.499)
Institutional Trust	-0.257 (0.126)	-0.064 (0.097)	0.07 (0.105)	-0.656 (0.129)	-0.241 (0.103)	-0.247 (0.136)	0.005 (0.1)	0.064 (0.139)	0.341 (0.125)	0.063 (0.143)	-0.247 (0.148)	0.264 (0.112)	-0.174 (0.143)	0.272 (0.135)	-0.071 (0.097)	-0.189 (0.113)	-0.537 (0.107)	0.089 (0.126)
R²	0.033	0.032	0.022	0.207	0.039	0.053	0.033	0.029	0.046	0.037	0.026	0.039	0.030	0.051	0.042	0.048	0.069	0.046
N	641	1033	1087	898	1054	909	841	1067	829	728	836	1084	735	856	1082	1033	1057	1078
Highest measured VIF	1.230	1.294	1.242	1.208	1.410	1.303	1.230	1.174	1.303	1.231	1.128	1.389	1.529	1.029	1.327	1.139	1.241	1.288

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panama, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Peru, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

For example, in the Peruvian model, the value of the dependent variable increases by 0.519 for respondents with knowledge of corruption, while the other variables are held constant. In the case of the Chilean model, the value increases by 1.016. As for the control variables, while in Chile it is more likely that women would demonstrate against corruption, in all other Latin American countries that were statistically significant it is, on the contrary, men who would be willing to protest against this phenomenon. The results of the logistic regressions also demonstrate

that younger respondents are more likely to be willing to protest against corruption than older people. More educated respondents are more likely to come out to protest against this phenomenon in many Latin American countries, although there is an exception in the form of the El Salvador model where, on the contrary, less educated respondents are more likely to demonstrate against corruption. Those on lower incomes who are struggling to make ends meet are more likely to take to the streets to protest against corruption than those who are financially secure. In many Latin American countries, the guarantee of freedom to participate politically is an important variable for people to come out to demonstrate against corruption. Conversely, in some countries, the absence of a guarantee of freedom of political participation may increase the willingness to go out to demonstrate against corruption. It is a certain paradox that interpersonal distrust in the three countries is what may increase the willingness to protest against corruption. The control variable representing trust in the government also offers different results with respect to the dependent variable. While in some countries high institutional trust is what increases the willingness to demonstrate against corruption, in other Latin American countries it is, on the contrary, what discourages unconventional action against the phenomenon.

Table 19. The Impact of Eradication of Corruption on Willingness to Demonstrate Against Corruption

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Constant	7.856 (0.615)	6.876 (0.602)	6.792 (0.572)	11.781 (0.732)	8.783 (0.553)	8.36 (0.628)	8.976 (0.678)	7.854 (0.698)	6.18 (0.848)	5.184 (0.825)	7.29 (0.681)	7.745 (0.689)	6.719 (0.815)	6.707 (0.767)	9.462 (0.546)	8.762 (0.592)	9.013 (0.733)	6.277 (0.705)
Eradicate Corruption	0.315 (0.098)	0.197 (0.108)	0.196 (0.077)	0.154 (0.125)	0.023 (0.095)	0.403 (0.113)	0.111 (0.138)	0.273 (0.12)	0.251 (0.151)	0.274 (0.168)	0.15 (0.132)	0.22 (0.129)	0.175 (0.202)	0.168 (0.137)	0.161 (0.102)	0.469 (0.102)	0.155 (0.143)	0.554 (0.121)
Gender	0.344 (0.206)	-0.055 (0.175)	-0.376 (0.191)	0.184 (0.211)	-0.822 (0.175)	-0.177 (0.203)	-0.452 (0.208)	-0.88 (0.196)	-0.703 (0.243)	-0.632 (0.26)	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.428 (0.194)	-0.61 (0.294)	-1.165 (0.234)	0.053 (0.147)	-0.513 (0.18)	-0.787 (0.222)	-0.857 (0.219)
Age	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.05 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.025 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.019 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.031 (0.007)	-0.023 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.023 (0.005)	-0.028 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.007)	-0.026 (0.007)
Education	-0.036 (0.031)	0.061 (0.022)	0.07 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.059 (0.03)	0.042 (0.025)	0.021 (0.031)	-0.093 (0.032)	0.082 (0.032)	0.074 (0.032)	-0.037 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.034)	0.11 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.023 (0.021)	0.058 (0.034)	0.062 (0.037)
Salary	-0.121 (0.124)	-0.221 (0.108)	-0.224 (0.097)	-0.413 (0.155)	-0.068 (0.101)	-0.361 (0.125)	-0.173 (0.111)	-0.23 (0.113)	-0.143 (0.14)	0.178 (0.151)	-0.236 (0.125)	-0.387 (0.123)	0.239 (0.169)	-0.225 (0.127)	-0.359 (0.103)	-0.275 (0.106)	-0.038 (0.145)	-0.05 (0.148)
Participation Freedom	0.121 (0.121)	0.31 (0.102)	0.213 (0.105)	-0.35 (0.117)	0.189 (0.105)	0.147 (0.111)	-0.216 (0.109)	0.024 (0.108)	0.393 (0.146)	0.047 (0.141)	0.29 (0.127)	0.109 (0.113)	0.223 (0.165)	-0.051 (0.122)	0.171 (0.086)	-0.043 (0.106)	-0.241 (0.123)	-0.107 (0.113)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.392 (0.277)	0.338 (0.266)	-0.461 (0.443)	-0.01 (0.271)	-0.239 (0.256)	0.174 (0.335)	-0.737 (0.279)	-0.194 (0.331)	-0.499 (0.346)	-0.056 (0.348)	0.152 (0.327)	-0.292 (0.253)	0.008 (0.512)	-0.414 (0.357)	-0.632 (0.254)	-0.517 (0.293)	0.497 (0.274)	-0.645 (0.497)
Institutional Trust	-0.333 (0.113)	-0.087 (0.097)	0.017 (0.105)	-0.644 (0.136)	-0.198 (0.102)	-0.268 (0.135)	0.026 (0.1)	0.009 (0.139)	0.286 (0.128)	0.006 (0.146)	-0.287 (0.154)	0.151 (0.112)	-0.154 (0.15)	0.255 (0.136)	-0.072 (0.099)	-0.204 (0.112)	-0.588 (0.109)	-0.009 (0.126)
R²	0.029	0.029	0.026	0.145	0.031	0.051	0.027	0.033	0.050	0.030	0.025	0.038	0.022	0.049	0.043	0.060	0.067	0.057
N	820	1029	1100	804	1048	904	844	1055	816	705	812	1088	689	839	1043	1035	1042	1078
Highest measured VIF	1.227	1.291	1.201	1.134	1.350	1.275	1.224	1.143	1.287	1.203	1.176	1.394	1.575	1.092	1.325	1.138	1.241	1.302

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients $p < 0.05$).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

For example, in the Brazilian model, for every one degree shift in value (e.g., from “agree” to “strongly agree”), the value of the dependent variable changes by 0.196. In the Venezuelan model, for every one degree shift in the value, the value of the dependent variable changes by up to 0.554.

Table 20. The Impact of Corruption Progress on Willingness to Demonstrate Against Corruption

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Constant	7.139 (0.861)	6.643 (0.604)	6.904 (0.656)	11.088 (0.882)	8.318 (0.623)	9.002 (0.709)	9.074 (0.635)	8.276 (0.731)	6.622 (0.841)	5.364 (0.825)	7.512 (0.71)	8.258 (0.755)	5.314 (0.847)	6.72 (0.836)	9.035 (0.608)	9.306 (0.613)	7.644 (0.864)	6.524 (0.837)
Corruption Progress	0.201 (0.111)	0.138 (0.074)	0.114 (0.078)	0.288 (0.12)	0.169 (0.081)	0.081 (0.101)	0.098 (0.082)	0.031 (0.089)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.178 (0.112)	0.045 (0.093)	-0.002 (0.102)	0.364 (0.122)	0.123 (0.11)	0.169 (0.076)	0.214 (0.085)	0.391 (0.13)	0.269 (0.107)
Gender	0.283 (0.202)	-0.093 (0.173)	-0.416 (0.193)	0.313 (0.194)	-0.853 (0.175)	-0.219 (0.202)	-0.539 (0.208)	-0.905 (0.195)	-0.751 (0.244)	-0.771 (0.258)	-0.253 (0.243)	-0.442 (0.192)	-0.693 (0.294)	-1.215 (0.232)	-0.047 (0.143)	-0.583 (0.18)	-0.972 (0.228)	-0.942 (0.218)
Age	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.05 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.025 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.032 (0.007)	-0.021 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.023 (0.005)	-0.032 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.03 (0.007)
Education	-0.008 (0.031)	0.067 (0.022)	0.06 (0.026)	-0.028 (0.031)	-0.014 (0.021)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.025)	0.013 (0.031)	-0.075 (0.032)	0.088 (0.032)	0.067 (0.032)	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.033)	0.1 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.016 (0.022)	0.064 (0.035)	0.039 (0.037)
Salary	-0.1 (0.122)	-0.208 (0.108)	-0.236 (0.097)	-0.362 (0.143)	-0.044 (0.101)	-0.398 (0.126)	-0.186 (0.11)	-0.211 (0.113)	-0.162 (0.139)	0.14 (0.151)	-0.218 (0.126)	-0.331 (0.122)	0.29 (0.167)	-0.218 (0.126)	-0.287 (0.101)	-0.288 (0.106)	-0.122 (0.151)	-0.013 (0.148)
Participation Freedom	0.167 (0.118)	0.309 (0.101)	0.222 (0.106)	-0.313 (0.109)	0.185 (0.104)	0.239 (0.111)	-0.227 (0.109)	0.049 (0.108)	0.438 (0.146)	0.038 (0.14)	0.293 (0.127)	0.084 (0.112)	0.335 (0.161)	-0.034 (0.122)	0.118 (0.083)	-0.024 (0.106)	-0.18 (0.128)	-0.061 (0.112)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.545 (0.274)	0.445 (0.265)	-0.525 (0.443)	0.048 (0.258)	-0.078 (0.256)	0.254 (0.339)	-0.64 (0.279)	-0.04 (0.331)	-0.534 (0.345)	-0.001 (0.347)	0.312 (0.334)	-0.329 (0.249)	-0.119 (0.501)	-0.447 (0.35)	-0.676 (0.245)	-0.352 (0.295)	0.54 (0.283)	-0.828 (0.505)
Institutional Trust	-0.196 (0.124)	-0.047 (0.096)	0.067 (0.108)	-0.79 (0.132)	-0.256 (0.103)	-0.252 (0.139)	0.03 (0.1)	0.067 (0.139)	0.29 (0.13)	0.005 (0.147)	-0.26 (0.152)	0.215 (0.112)	-0.095 (0.147)	0.284 (0.138)	0.012 (0.097)	-0.149 (0.113)	-0.455 (0.116)	0.194 (0.129)
R²	0.023	0.031	0.019	0.202	0.040	0.039	0.029	0.028	0.045	0.035	0.023	0.036	0.034	0.050	0.040	0.047	0.073	0.046
N	850	1026	1081	899	1040	906	851	1068	822	706	803	1089	699	846	1078	1034	987	1071
Highest measured VIF	1.421	1.312	1.197	1.208	1.341	1.281	1.230	1.167	1.304	1.216	1.201	1.324	1.579	1.098	1.333	1.115	1.220	1.331

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients $p < 0.05$).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

For example, in the Colombian and Paraguayan models, for every one degree shift in value (e.g. from “increased some” to “increased a lot”), the value of the dependent variable changes by 0.169. In the Uruguayan model, for every one degree shift in the value, the value of the dependent variable changes by up to 0.391.

Table 21. The Impact of Corruption Awareness on Convincing Others of Political Thoughts

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Awareness	0.497 (0.177)	0.519 (0.164)	0.53 (0.164)	0.848 (0.184)	0.808 (0.178)	0.519 (0.17)	0.789 (0.179)	0.27 (0.174)	0.48 (0.214)	-0.046 (0.203)	1.132 (0.23)	0.184 (0.173)	1.155 (0.247)	0.554 (0.204)	0.597 (0.179)	0.556 (0.175)	0.423 (0.177)	0.014 (0.196)
Gender	-0.45 (0.167)	-0.505 (0.129)	-0.219 (0.133)	0.018 (0.144)	-0.377 (0.13)	-0.273 (0.143)	-0.878 (0.152)	-0.494 (0.13)	-0.316 (0.146)	-0.863 (0.165)	-0.39 (0.153)	-0.494 (0.136)	-0.446 (0.172)	-0.737 (0.144)	-0.371 (0.131)	-0.515 (0.132)	-0.29 (0.14)	-0.597 (0.128)
Age	0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.01 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.011 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.004)
Education	0.076 (0.026)	0.02 (0.016)	0.073 (0.019)	0.104 (0.026)	0.055 (0.016)	0.038 (0.021)	0.025 (0.018)	0.023 (0.021)	0.031 (0.019)	0.027 (0.02)	0.054 (0.02)	0.051 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	0.006 (0.019)	0.055 (0.02)	0.086 (0.016)	0.071 (0.022)	0.051 (0.022)
Salary	0.009 (0.1)	-0.129 (0.08)	-0.092 (0.068)	0.023 (0.104)	0.044 (0.075)	-0.032 (0.089)	-0.181 (0.081)	0.019 (0.075)	-0.094 (0.083)	-0.061 (0.096)	-0.145 (0.081)	0.022 (0.088)	0.084 (0.099)	-0.004 (0.078)	-0.053 (0.093)	0 (0.078)	0.034 (0.093)	0.067 (0.087)
Participation Freedom	0.202 (0.1)	0.08 (0.075)	0.241 (0.073)	-0.11 (0.081)	0.29 (0.078)	0.307 (0.08)	0.325 (0.08)	0.21 (0.072)	0.246 (0.088)	0.17 (0.087)	0.254 (0.08)	0.175 (0.079)	0.354 (0.093)	0.109 (0.074)	0.171 (0.077)	0.188 (0.078)	0.073 (0.08)	0.242 (0.066)
Interpersonal Trust	0.221 (0.225)	0.183 (0.2)	0.664 (0.302)	-0.002 (0.189)	0.391 (0.189)	0.364 (0.236)	-0.053 (0.206)	-0.067 (0.218)	0.147 (0.208)	0.129 (0.218)	0.411 (0.202)	0.078 (0.175)	-0.304 (0.302)	-0.043 (0.218)	0.702 (0.219)	-0.208 (0.218)	0.387 (0.168)	0.11 (0.288)
Institutional Trust	0.371 (0.09)	0.196 (0.072)	0.351 (0.073)	0.172 (0.093)	0.05 (0.076)	0.227 (0.094)	0.278 (0.072)	0.1 (0.091)	0.065 (0.076)	0.142 (0.09)	0.32 (0.093)	0.13 (0.078)	0.325 (0.084)	0.197 (0.083)	0.229 (0.087)	0.086 (0.083)	-0.158 (0.069)	0.116 (0.073)
Constant	-2.526 (0.494)	-0.097 (0.409)	-2.044 (0.393)	-2.385 (0.46)	-1.391 (0.383)	-1.898 (0.398)	-1.453 (0.425)	-1.392 (0.434)	-1.472 (0.473)	-0.94 (0.443)	-2.001 (0.404)	-2.154 (0.451)	-2.879 (0.416)	-0.561 (0.423)	-2.07 (0.458)	-0.931 (0.399)	-1.148 (0.412)	-1.194 (0.396)
Nagelkerke R²	0.119	0.054	0.125	0.067	0.114	0.081	0.163	0.042	0.046	0.070	0.109	0.045	0.167	0.071	0.074	0.108	0.073	0.078
N	702	1042	1086	974	1085	916	846	1076	842	756	869	1080	747	863	1095	1038	1061	1088

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

For example, the Nicaraguan model predicts that a respondent with corruption awareness is up to two hundred and seventeen percent more likely to convince others of his or her political ideas than a respondent without corruption awareness. In the case of the Uruguayan model, the respondent with awareness of corruption is only fifty-two percent more likely to convince others of his political ideas. The logistic regression models also show that men across almost all Latin American countries are more likely to be the ones who are more likely to persuade others of their political ideas. In only one model was the control variable representing age

statistically significant, operating in the direction that the younger the Uruguayan male, the more likely he is to persuade others of his political views. The regression models also show that more educated respondents are more likely to persuade others of their political views than less educated ones. In the Dominican Republic model, the variable representing family economic situation was statistically significant. The model demonstrates that Dominicans who are struggling to make ends meet are more likely to persuade others of their political views than those who are financially secure. The perceived guarantee of freedoms of political participation in the vast majority of Latin American countries is what positively influences the respondent's persuasion of others about their political views. The control variable re-presenting interpersonal trust also acts in the expected direction. If people trust each other, the more likely they are to discuss political issues with others and to persuade them of their views. In many Latin American countries, institutional trust is also what leads respondents to persuade others of their political views. However, in the Uruguayan model, it is instead distrust of the government that may be the impetus for people to persuade others of their political ideas.

Table 22. The Impact of Eradication of Corruption on Convincing Others of Political Thoughts

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Eradicate Corruption	-0.068 (0.07)	0.028 (0.079)	0.096 (0.053)	0.436 (0.09)	0.047 (0.07)	0.117 (0.08)	0.148 (0.1)	0.125 (0.08)	-0.068 (0.092)	0.172 (0.108)	0.127 (0.085)	0.19 (0.091)	0.104 (0.124)	0.108 (0.084)	-0.019 (0.092)	0.247 (0.075)	0.098 (0.09)	0.207 (0.071)
Gender	-0.364 (0.147)	-0.521 (0.129)	-0.207 (0.131)	0.029 (0.15)	-0.39 (0.129)	-0.301 (0.143)	-0.831 (0.15)	-0.476 (0.131)	-0.292 (0.147)	-0.876 (0.169)	-0.388 (0.153)	-0.543 (0.135)	-0.399 (0.175)	-0.794 (0.145)	-0.335 (0.133)	-0.512 (0.132)	-0.272 (0.141)	-0.561 (0.128)
Age	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.012 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.004)
Education	0.091 (0.023)	0.019 (0.016)	0.077 (0.019)	0.065 (0.026)	0.066 (0.015)	0.044 (0.021)	0.032 (0.018)	0.029 (0.021)	0.035 (0.019)	0.023 (0.02)	0.054 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)	0.001 (0.019)	0.044 (0.02)	0.075 (0.016)	0.068 (0.022)	0.042 (0.022)
Salary	0.041 (0.089)	-0.103 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.067)	0.098 (0.11)	0.073 (0.074)	-0.035 (0.089)	-0.157 (0.08)	0.047 (0.075)	-0.101 (0.085)	-0.034 (0.097)	-0.145 (0.08)	0.001 (0.086)	0.044 (0.1)	0.017 (0.078)	-0.086 (0.094)	0.014 (0.078)	0.076 (0.093)	0.09 (0.086)
Participation Freedom	0.204 (0.085)	0.061 (0.074)	0.245 (0.072)	-0.061 (0.083)	0.275 (0.077)	0.323 (0.08)	0.284 (0.079)	0.225 (0.072)	0.243 (0.089)	0.175 (0.09)	0.224 (0.08)	0.151 (0.078)	0.396 (0.095)	0.097 (0.075)	0.196 (0.078)	0.193 (0.078)	0.084 (0.08)	0.259 (0.067)
Interpersonal Trust	0.34 (0.194)	0.213 (0.195)	0.612 (0.298)	-0.278 (0.196)	0.34 (0.189)	0.359 (0.231)	-0.124 (0.202)	-0.066 (0.218)	0.17 (0.209)	0.139 (0.218)	0.388 (0.202)	0.216 (0.171)	-0.473 (0.312)	-0.072 (0.22)	0.646 (0.222)	-0.224 (0.217)	0.325 (0.168)	0.082 (0.29)
Institutional Trust	0.31 (0.08)	0.18 (0.071)	0.341 (0.072)	0.145 (0.096)	0.012 (0.075)	0.204 (0.093)	0.26 (0.071)	0.056 (0.091)	0.078 (0.078)	0.137 (0.092)	0.286 (0.094)	0.067 (0.078)	0.305 (0.085)	0.183 (0.083)	0.238 (0.088)	0.091 (0.083)	-0.165 (0.07)	0.062 (0.074)
Constant	-2.349 (0.46)	-0.021 (0.442)	-2.038 (0.403)	-2.678 (0.527)	-1.438 (0.41)	-2.141 (0.451)	-1.677 (0.49)	-1.751 (0.473)	-1.262 (0.517)	-1.477 (0.536)	-1.967 (0.44)	-2.109 (0.489)	-2.839 (0.508)	-0.669 (0.468)	-1.733 (0.497)	-1.391 (0.436)	-1.37 (0.469)	-1.615 (0.42)
Nagelkerke R²	0.077	0.040	0.115	0.071	0.091	0.075	0.132	0.044	0.037	0.079	0.072	0.047	0.157	0.063	0.052	0.103	0.059	0.090
N	904	1038	1099	906	1081	909	849	1067	826	722	845	1086	698	843	1053	1037	1045	1091

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients $p < 0.05$).

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The Mexican model predicts that an increase of one degree in the value of the independent variable (e.g., from “agree” to “strongly agree”) is associated with an increase of up to 20 percent in the probability that the respondent would persuade others of his or her political ideas. For the Chilean model, the increase in value is up to fifty-four percent.

Table 23. The Impact of Corruption Progress on Convincing Others of Political Thoughts

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Progress	-0.094 (0.08)	0.004 (0.055)	0.003 (0.054)	-0.16 (0.085)	-0.054 (0.059)	-0.022 (0.071)	0.04 (0.059)	0.03 (0.06)	0.019 (0.066)	0.11 (0.072)	0.043 (0.059)	-0.063 (0.071)	-0.072 (0.072)	-0.01 (0.068)	0.153 (0.07)	0.021 (0.062)	0.005 (0.084)	0.075 (0.064)
Gender	-0.325 (0.145)	-0.501 (0.129)	-0.203 (0.133)	0.068 (0.14)	-0.396 (0.129)	-0.331 (0.143)	-0.869 (0.149)	-0.463 (0.13)	-0.311 (0.147)	-0.829 (0.167)	-0.404 (0.154)	-0.514 (0.135)	-0.401 (0.177)	-0.758 (0.144)	-0.334 (0.13)	-0.537 (0.131)	-0.283 (0.144)	-0.564 (0.128)
Age	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.01 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.004)	-0.012 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.004)
Education	0.114 (0.023)	0.017 (0.017)	0.075 (0.019)	0.099 (0.024)	0.059 (0.015)	0.046 (0.021)	0.031 (0.018)	0.028 (0.021)	0.031 (0.019)	0.018 (0.02)	0.053 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.013 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.052 (0.02)	0.082 (0.016)	0.064 (0.023)	0.043 (0.023)
Salary	-0.004 (0.088)	-0.106 (0.08)	-0.117 (0.068)	-0.024 (0.102)	0.068 (0.074)	-0.04 (0.089)	-0.167 (0.08)	0.012 (0.075)	-0.078 (0.083)	-0.054 (0.097)	-0.159 (0.081)	0.016 (0.086)	0.012 (0.1)	0.008 (0.078)	-0.059 (0.093)	-0.003 (0.077)	0.019 (0.096)	0.102 (0.087)
Participation Freedom	0.212 (0.085)	0.075 (0.075)	0.243 (0.073)	-0.185 (0.079)	0.263 (0.077)	0.312 (0.08)	0.302 (0.078)	0.212 (0.071)	0.253 (0.089)	0.187 (0.089)	0.261 (0.08)	0.183 (0.078)	0.371 (0.095)	0.096 (0.075)	0.158 (0.076)	0.196 (0.078)	0.123 (0.083)	0.257 (0.066)
Interpersonal Trust	0.27 (0.193)	0.181 (0.197)	0.556 (0.299)	-0.039 (0.184)	0.381 (0.189)	0.426 (0.234)	-0.092 (0.201)	-0.058 (0.217)	0.175 (0.208)	0.198 (0.218)	0.461 (0.206)	0.126 (0.171)	-0.382 (0.306)	-0.049 (0.217)	0.561 (0.216)	-0.178 (0.217)	0.376 (0.172)	0.242 (0.292)
Institutional Trust	0.27 (0.088)	0.178 (0.072)	0.342 (0.074)	0.153 (0.094)	-0.013 (0.076)	0.243 (0.096)	0.272 (0.071)	0.086 (0.091)	0.043 (0.078)	0.173 (0.093)	0.326 (0.094)	0.106 (0.078)	0.281 (0.085)	0.201 (0.084)	0.284 (0.087)	0.11 (0.083)	-0.176 (0.073)	0.127 (0.075)
Constant	-2.2 (0.637)	-0.004 (0.449)	-1.8 (0.461)	-0.915 (0.632)	-0.984 (0.457)	-1.81 (0.506)	-1.456 (0.46)	-1.546 (0.491)	-1.456 (0.511)	-1.355 (0.527)	-1.93 (0.458)	-1.679 (0.533)	-2.331 (0.516)	-0.453 (0.513)	-2.583 (0.566)	-0.894 (0.444)	-0.98 (0.555)	-1.548 (0.501)
Nagelkerke R²	0.118	0.036	0.102	0.043	0.078	0.076	0.133	0.036	0.038	0.071	0.079	0.045	0.145	0.056	0.058	0.091	0.061	0.078
N	916	1031	1080	993	1077	911	856	1076	834	725	834	1088	708	850	1090	1038	986	1077

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The Paraguayan model predicts that a one-degree increase in the value of the independent variable (e.g., from “increased some” to “increased a lot”) is associated with an increase of up to sixteen percent in the probability that the respondent persuaded others of his or her political ideas.

Table 24. The Impact of Corruption Awareness on Working for Politicians

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Awareness	0.04 (0.259)	0.621 (0.211)	0.327 (0.173)	0.466 (0.247)	0.274 (0.233)	-0.011 (0.268)	0.512 (0.185)	0.149 (0.268)	0.54 (0.292)	-0.423 (0.364)	0.975 (0.26)	-0.041 (0.23)	0.449 (0.318)	0.598 (0.248)	0.515 (0.186)	0.09 (0.236)	0.194 (0.234)	0.379 (0.241)
Gender	0.208 (0.244)	-0.309 (0.189)	-0.137 (0.144)	-0.026 (0.19)	-0.332 (0.179)	-0.134 (0.217)	-0.422 (0.165)	-0.347 (0.2)	-0.138 (0.222)	-0.433 (0.262)	0.265 (0.196)	0.062 (0.173)	-0.567 (0.218)	-0.417 (0.199)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.361 (0.192)	-0.291 (0.182)	-0.112 (0.162)
Age	0.002 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.017 (0.007)	0.01 (0.005)	0 (0.007)	0.019 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	0.017 (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	0.018 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0 (0.005)	0.011 (0.005)
Education	0.017 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.023)	0.026 (0.021)	0.067 (0.033)	0.016 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.031)	0 (0.02)	-0.082 (0.03)	0.029 (0.028)	-0.055 (0.032)	0.041 (0.025)	0.025 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.052 (0.025)	0.089 (0.021)	0.005 (0.023)	0.034 (0.028)	0.001 (0.027)
Salary	0.223 (0.15)	0.045 (0.117)	-0.142 (0.074)	0.3 (0.143)	-0.036 (0.103)	-0.087 (0.13)	-0.164 (0.09)	0.219 (0.114)	-0.127 (0.126)	0.034 (0.151)	-0.085 (0.102)	-0.017 (0.111)	0.079 (0.123)	-0.15 (0.107)	-0.051 (0.099)	0.034 (0.111)	-0.086 (0.12)	0.36 (0.108)
Participation Freedom	0.104 (0.149)	0.144 (0.108)	0.373 (0.078)	0.106 (0.11)	0.463 (0.104)	0.418 (0.121)	0.386 (0.089)	0.146 (0.109)	0.16 (0.13)	0.12 (0.137)	0.296 (0.101)	0.304 (0.1)	0.276 (0.118)	0.173 (0.101)	0.065 (0.081)	0.07 (0.111)	0.457 (0.117)	0.316 (0.083)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.034 (0.326)	-0.269 (0.301)	0.375 (0.303)	0.024 (0.248)	0.097 (0.245)	0.074 (0.352)	0.389 (0.21)	-0.038 (0.323)	-0.175 (0.322)	0.328 (0.317)	0.408 (0.244)	0.171 (0.216)	0.525 (0.33)	-0.7 (0.344)	0.53 (0.225)	0.549 (0.263)	0.38 (0.21)	-0.182 (0.347)
Institutional Trust	0.216 (0.121)	0.153 (0.101)	0.229 (0.077)	0.357 (0.115)	0.308 (0.1)	0.002 (0.139)	0.176 (0.079)	0.279 (0.13)	0.189 (0.118)	0.196 (0.133)	0.331 (0.108)	0.01 (0.099)	0.434 (0.107)	0.069 (0.11)	0.331 (0.091)	0.228 (0.112)	-0.027 (0.089)	0.39 (0.083)
Constant	-3.636 (0.724)	-2.605 (0.596)	-1.876 (0.418)	-4.797 (0.657)	-3.593 (0.533)	-3.672 (0.603)	-2.511 (0.468)	-2.278 (0.646)	-3.749 (0.717)	-2.728 (0.683)	-3.968 (0.535)	-3.034 (0.572)	-3.611 (0.521)	-1.583 (0.56)	-3.197 (0.494)	-2.614 (0.566)	-3.368 (0.574)	-4.041 (0.507)
Nagelkerke R²	0.028	0.030	0.085	0.061	0.073	0.051	0.109	0.038	0.042	0.051	0.090	0.020	0.151	0.060	0.075	0.028	0.048	0.130
N	699	1045	1080	971	1083	916	842	1072	837	750	870	1072	740	854	1094	1042	1060	1083

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The Dominican Republic model predicts that a respondent with corruption awareness is up to sixty-six percent more likely to work for the police than a respondent without corruption awareness. In the case of the Uruguayan model, a respondent with awareness of corruption is up to one hundred and sixty-five percent more likely to work for politicians than a respondent without awareness of corruption.

As for the control variables, the table shows that men are more likely to work for politicians than women. In a number of countries, the interest in working for a politician or political party increases as the age of the respondent increases,

although the Brazilian model suggests that the opposite is true. In terms of education, more educated respondents are more likely to work for politicians or political parties in some countries, while in others the less educated are more likely to work for politicians or political parties, but in most Latin American countries this control variable was not statistically significant. The control variable income was statistically significant as was the education variable in only three models. While two regression models suggest that more financially secure people are more likely to work for politicians or political parties, the opposite was true in the Honduran model. In a number of Latin American countries, a control variable representing perceived freedom of political participation was also statistically significant and acted positively on the dependent variable. In some contrast, the control variable representing interpersonal trust is also significant. While in Paraguay and Peru people who trust each other are more likely to work for politicians or parties, the opposite is true in Panama. Finally, institutional trust is what may lead citizen respondents to participate politically through working for candidates and politicians in most Latin American countries.

Table 25. The Impact of Eradication of Corruption on Working for Politicians

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Eradicate Corruption	0.229 (0.106)	0.069 (0.115)	0.015 (0.057)	0.224 (0.113)	-0.077 (0.098)	0.103 (0.121)	0.191 (0.112)	0.088 (0.122)	0.111 (0.139)	0.2 (0.176)	-0.075 (0.108)	0.081 (0.114)	0.44 (0.169)	0.116 (0.112)	0.05 (0.098)	0.128 (0.11)	0.306 (0.121)	0.177 (0.092)
Gender	0.283 (0.22)	-0.306 (0.187)	-0.13 (0.142)	-0.053 (0.191)	-0.363 (0.181)	-0.175 (0.215)	-0.347 (0.163)	-0.402 (0.2)	-0.084 (0.22)	-0.447 (0.269)	0.258 (0.195)	-0.07 (0.169)	-0.529 (0.224)	-0.455 (0.197)	-0.112 (0.142)	-0.34 (0.192)	-0.256 (0.185)	-0.114 (0.163)
Age	-0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.015 (0.007)	0.012 (0.005)	0.002 (0.007)	0.019 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	0.013 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)	0.017 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.012 (0.005)
Education	0.047 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.023)	0.028 (0.02)	0.043 (0.032)	0.028 (0.022)	-0.022 (0.03)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.069 (0.029)	0.043 (0.029)	-0.061 (0.032)	0.035 (0.025)	0.008 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.055 (0.025)	0.083 (0.022)	0.004 (0.022)	0.032 (0.028)	0.009 (0.027)
Salary	0.154 (0.135)	0.024 (0.115)	-0.163 (0.073)	0.305 (0.145)	-0.055 (0.104)	-0.057 (0.129)	-0.124 (0.089)	0.232 (0.114)	-0.172 (0.127)	0.063 (0.15)	-0.084 (0.102)	-0.055 (0.107)	0.066 (0.125)	-0.168 (0.107)	-0.093 (0.1)	0.016 (0.111)	-0.05 (0.122)	0.368 (0.107)
Participation Freedom	0.092 (0.129)	0.13 (0.106)	0.38 (0.077)	0.059 (0.108)	0.476 (0.104)	0.42 (0.121)	0.362 (0.088)	0.16 (0.109)	0.114 (0.131)	0.146 (0.143)	0.318 (0.101)	0.278 (0.098)	0.306 (0.123)	0.162 (0.101)	0.104 (0.083)	0.066 (0.111)	0.488 (0.119)	0.302 (0.085)
Interpersonal Trust	0.294 (0.267)	-0.032 (0.277)	0.342 (0.301)	-0.136 (0.248)	0.064 (0.25)	0.182 (0.33)	0.312 (0.209)	0.044 (0.314)	-0.199 (0.322)	0.249 (0.316)	0.358 (0.243)	0.316 (0.207)	0.381 (0.343)	-0.7 (0.343)	0.555 (0.227)	0.455 (0.268)	0.434 (0.211)	-0.24 (0.352)
Institutional Trust	0.23 (0.111)	0.142 (0.099)	0.218 (0.077)	0.285 (0.115)	0.297 (0.1)	0.056 (0.135)	0.14 (0.078)	0.251 (0.13)	0.18 (0.12)	0.22 (0.135)	0.355 (0.108)	-0.056 (0.098)	0.387 (0.111)	0.079 (0.109)	0.36 (0.093)	0.223 (0.112)	-0.041 (0.092)	0.38 (0.084)
Constant	-4.34 (0.704)	-2.404 (0.636)	-1.768 (0.43)	-4.326 (0.689)	-3.482 (0.579)	-3.853 (0.676)	-2.908 (0.554)	-2.68 (0.7)	-3.895 (0.786)	-3.44 (0.84)	-3.493 (0.574)	-2.581 (0.61)	-4.743 (0.692)	-1.671 (0.613)	-3.17 (0.54)	-2.828 (0.623)	-4.233 (0.67)	-4.495 (0.539)
Nagelkerke R²	0.051	0.016	0.078	0.052	0.072	0.054	0.095	0.039	0.039	0.059	0.070	0.020	0.171	0.052	0.067	0.027	0.061	0.143
N	896	1040	1093	905	1080	909	845	1060	822	716	846	1077	690	836	1052	1041	1043	1086

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

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The Chilean model predicts that an increase in the value of the independent variable by one degree (e.g., from “agree” to “strongly agree”) is associated with an increase in the probability that the respondent would work for politicians by up to twenty-five percent. In the Nicaraguan model, a one-degree increase in value is associated with an increase in probability of up to fifty-five percent.

Table 26. The Impact of Corruption Progress on Working for Politicians

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Corruption Progress	-0.065 (0.118)	0.015 (0.079)	0.036 (0.058)	-0.5 (0.11)	-0.102 (0.081)	0.071 (0.108)	0.004 (0.064)	-0.051 (0.089)	0.004 (0.098)	-0.129 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.073)	0.002 (0.091)	-0.164 (0.09)	0.124 (0.093)	0.184 (0.076)	-0.002 (0.087)	0.211 (0.108)	0.109 (0.08)
Gender	0.274 (0.222)	-0.292 (0.187)	-0.181 (0.144)	-0.119 (0.191)	-0.327 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.217)	-0.418 (0.164)	-0.374 (0.2)	-0.069 (0.22)	-0.312 (0.265)	0.288 (0.198)	-0.03 (0.169)	-0.422 (0.223)	-0.447 (0.197)	-0.126 (0.138)	-0.37 (0.191)	-0.254 (0.187)	-0.146 (0.162)
Age	0.005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.013 (0.007)	0.012 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	0.019 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	0.016 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	0.017 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.013 (0.005)
Education	0.074 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.024)	0.025 (0.02)	0.071 (0.033)	0.023 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.031)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.066 (0.03)	0.038 (0.028)	-0.061 (0.032)	0.042 (0.026)	0.016 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.025)	-0.063 (0.025)	0.084 (0.021)	0.001 (0.023)	0.023 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.028)
Salary	0.073 (0.136)	0.03 (0.115)	-0.176 (0.074)	0.223 (0.144)	-0.036 (0.103)	-0.079 (0.132)	-0.141 (0.089)	0.234 (0.115)	-0.146 (0.124)	0.077 (0.152)	-0.046 (0.102)	-0.047 (0.108)	0.033 (0.124)	-0.13 (0.107)	-0.044 (0.1)	0.017 (0.11)	-0.078 (0.123)	0.399 (0.107)
Participation Freedom	0.146 (0.132)	0.148 (0.107)	0.397 (0.079)	0.057 (0.11)	0.444 (0.104)	0.428 (0.123)	0.376 (0.088)	0.156 (0.109)	0.167 (0.13)	0.129 (0.141)	0.282 (0.102)	0.301 (0.098)	0.27 (0.12)	0.172 (0.102)	0.057 (0.081)	0.08 (0.111)	0.528 (0.122)	0.315 (0.084)
Interpersonal Trust	0.259 (0.272)	-0.066 (0.283)	0.306 (0.306)	-0.029 (0.248)	0.11 (0.245)	0.184 (0.34)	0.383 (0.207)	0.071 (0.315)	-0.202 (0.322)	0.3 (0.315)	0.393 (0.246)	0.227 (0.208)	0.418 (0.336)	-0.759 (0.353)	0.453 (0.222)	0.544 (0.263)	0.384 (0.215)	-0.159 (0.353)
Institutional Trust	0.155 (0.13)	0.135 (0.1)	0.218 (0.08)	0.246 (0.12)	0.271 (0.101)	0.104 (0.141)	0.149 (0.078)	0.27 (0.131)	0.196 (0.122)	0.231 (0.135)	0.319 (0.108)	-0.013 (0.098)	0.357 (0.109)	0.104 (0.111)	0.375 (0.092)	0.22 (0.112)	0.043 (0.094)	0.42 (0.086)
Constant	-3.963 (0.986)	-2.388 (0.645)	-1.817 (0.5)	-1.86 (0.858)	-3.171 (0.629)	-3.84 (0.779)	-2.419 (0.508)	-2.396 (0.728)	-3.785 (0.769)	-2.501 (0.795)	-3.565 (0.592)	-2.663 (0.674)	-2.774 (0.641)	-1.915 (0.693)	-3.843 (0.614)	-2.47 (0.635)	-4.217 (0.765)	-4.591 (0.644)
Nagelkerke R²	0.038	0.015	0.077	0.090	0.072	0.051	0.095	0.038	0.038	0.056	0.071	0.019	0.152	0.056	0.069	0.027	0.056	0.139
N	911	1034	1073	991	1075	911	852	1071	829	719	835	1081	697	841	1089	1041	986	1072

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay, VEN - Venezuela; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The Paraguayan model predicts that an increase in the value of the independent variable by one degree (e.g. from “increased some” to “increased a lot”) is associated with an increase in the probability that the respondent worked for politicians by up to twenty percent. In contrast, the Chilean model predicts that a one-degree increase in the value of the independent variable is associated with a decrease of up to thirty-nine percent in the probability that the respondent worked for politicians.

Table 27. The Impact of Perception of Corruption on Voter Turnout

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Corruption Perception	-0.785 (0.209)	0.358 (0.224)	-0.217 (0.182)	-0.173 (0.091)	-0.096 (0.12)	-0.242 (0.106)	-0.075 (0.098)	0.238 (0.224)	-0.154 (0.11)	-0.155 (0.11)	-0.102 (0.095)	-0.221 (0.159)	-0.055 (0.08)	-0.042 (0.111)	-0.04 (0.098)	-0.226 (0.186)	-0.133 (0.204)
Gender	-0.209 (0.297)	0.12 (0.474)	-1.009 (0.309)	0.163 (0.167)	-0.148 (0.21)	0.125 (0.213)	-0.339 (0.207)	-0.07 (0.49)	-0.169 (0.227)	-0.392 (0.217)	-0.206 (0.186)	-0.013 (0.281)	-0.243 (0.181)	0.105 (0.199)	-0.391 (0.19)	0.754 (0.315)	-0.155 (0.412)
Age	-0.035 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.011 (0.01)	0.011 (0.006)	0 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.019 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.015)	0.021 (0.008)	0.026 (0.009)	0.006 (0.006)	0.027 (0.01)	0.011 (0.007)	0.02 (0.007)	0.016 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.009)	0.017 (0.012)
Education	0.07 (0.044)	0 (0.054)	0.101 (0.043)	0.043 (0.026)	0.111 (0.029)	0.067 (0.029)	-0.071 (0.029)	0.055 (0.065)	0.069 (0.029)	0.097 (0.029)	0.035 (0.025)	0.054 (0.038)	0.054 (0.023)	0.043 (0.028)	0.026 (0.025)	0.053 (0.041)	0.056 (0.057)
Place of Living	0.284 (0.163)	-0.204 (0.15)	-0.219 (0.15)	0.172 (0.058)	-0.382 (0.092)	0.049 (0.08)	-0.028 (0.064)	-0.152 (0.166)	0.053 (0.073)	-0.071 (0.066)	0.01 (0.069)	0.051 (0.13)	-0.029 (0.062)	-0.289 (0.067)	0.117 (0.07)	-0.047 (0.095)	-0.29 (0.174)
Salary	-0.037 (0.198)	0.065 (0.325)	-0.012 (0.203)	0.111 (0.116)	0.021 (0.152)	0.081 (0.146)	0.154 (0.133)	-0.18 (0.375)	0.056 (0.179)	0.146 (0.163)	0.052 (0.132)	0.16 (0.215)	-0.047 (0.139)	-0.124 (0.14)	-0.234 (0.139)	-0.196 (0.226)	-0.429 (0.281)
Interpersonal Trust	0.09 (0.158)	0.214 (0.267)	-0.144 (0.146)	0.139 (0.109)	0.089 (0.09)	0.265 (0.109)	0.053 (0.112)	-0.149 (0.275)	0.048 (0.116)	-0.125 (0.111)	0.049 (0.087)	0.073 (0.15)	-0.118 (0.091)	-0.01 (0.104)	0.178 (0.099)	0.187 (0.177)	0.09 (0.242)
Institutional Trust	0.123 (0.072)	0.038 (0.138)	0.099 (0.072)	0.101 (0.045)	0.192 (0.057)	0.128 (0.059)	0.129 (0.052)	-0.017 (0.143)	0.002 (0.063)	0.118 (0.058)	0.033 (0.045)	0.259 (0.076)	0.038 (0.046)	-0.061 (0.052)	0.121 (0.052)	-0.147 (0.089)	0.059 (0.11)
Constant	5.312 (1.401)	2.506 (1.712)	3.194 (1.244)	-1.19 (0.735)	1.286 (0.852)	-0.122 (0.799)	0.885 (0.775)	3.966 (1.924)	0.473 (0.844)	0.452 (0.821)	0.713 (0.697)	-0.288 (1.176)	0.646 (0.62)	1.84 (0.808)	0.858 (0.721)	3.938 (1.341)	4.007 (1.789)
Nagelkerke R²	0.191	0.040	0.068	0.069	0.098	0.085	0.083	0.030	0.043	0.069	0.016	0.087	0.023	0.071	0.044	0.060	0.052
N	675	688	659	720	764	657	609	712	587	677	622	626	618	689	1286	703	691

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The Argentine model predicts that an increase in the value of the independent variable by one degree (e.g., from “half of them” to “more than half of them”) is associated with a decrease of up to fifty-four percent in the probability that the respondent would participate in the presidential election. The Costa Rican model then predicts that a one-degree increase in the value of the independent variable is associated with a decrease in the probability of participating in the election by up to twenty-one percent.

As for the control variables, while in Brazil and Paraguay it is more likely to be men who participate in elections, in Peru it is women. In the other models, this variable was not statistically significant. As for the age variable, while in many countries a higher age is more likely to lead to a respondent's participation in elections, an exception can be found in Argentina, since in this South American country younger respondents are more likely to participate in elections. Education is another control variable that was statistically significant in several countries. Higher education leads to more likely participation in elections. As for the place of living variable, while in Colombia and Panama people from rural areas are more likely to go to the polls, in Chile respondents from urban areas are more likely to vote. However, in the other countries this control variable was not statistically significant. Interpersonal trust has a positive effect on voter turnout in Costa Rica. Institutional trust is also important in many Latin American countries. The more people have trust in institutions, the more likely they are to turn out for the next presidential election.

Table 28. The Impact of Experience with Police Corruption on Voter Turnout

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Experience with Police Corruption	-0.644 (0.284)	0.353 (0.405)	-0.529 (0.341)	0.086 (0.389)	0.504 (0.279)	-0.309 (0.349)	0.108 (0.189)	17.352 (3193.727)	0.272 (0.355)	0.397 (0.237)	0.189 (0.21)	0.06 (0.238)	0.235 (0.209)	0.607 (0.253)	0.144 (0.278)	0.342 (0.356)	0.277 (1.034)
Gender	-0.083 (0.196)	-0.009 (0.34)	-0.465 (0.2)	0.038 (0.119)	-0.041 (0.143)	-0.08 (0.147)	-0.251 (0.144)	-0.295 (0.38)	-0.51 (0.163)	-0.27 (0.15)	-0.178 (0.126)	0.056 (0.213)	-0.408 (0.122)	0.12 (0.136)	-0.382 (0.192)	0.778 (0.252)	-0.458 (0.265)
Age	-0.024 (0.006)	0.001 (0.011)	0.007 (0.007)	0.013 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.02 (0.005)	-0.015 (0.011)	0.019 (0.006)	0.023 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	0.022 (0.007)	0.019 (0.004)	0.028 (0.005)	0.015 (0.007)	-0.01 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)
Education	0.091 (0.027)	0.042 (0.039)	0.077 (0.03)	0.072 (0.019)	0.102 (0.02)	0.084 (0.02)	-0.031 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.05)	0.031 (0.021)	0.073 (0.02)	0.033 (0.017)	0.049 (0.028)	0.047 (0.015)	0.032 (0.02)	0.024 (0.025)	0.07 (0.032)	0.058 (0.036)
Place of Living	0.015 (0.094)	-0.073 (0.1)	-0.17 (0.099)	0.158 (0.042)	-0.223 (0.058)	0.047 (0.055)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.055 (0.125)	0.054 (0.052)	0.001 (0.047)	0.035 (0.047)	-0.013 (0.094)	0.012 (0.041)	-0.267 (0.046)	0.099 (0.069)	0.044 (0.074)	-0.064 (0.1)
Salary	0.016 (0.128)	0.306 (0.236)	-0.034 (0.139)	0.212 (0.084)	0.211 (0.105)	0.185 (0.102)	0.068 (0.088)	-0.274 (0.285)	0.039 (0.127)	0.122 (0.11)	0.062 (0.09)	0.287 (0.158)	-0.095 (0.09)	-0.099 (0.094)	-0.217 (0.137)	-0.069 (0.18)	-0.167 (0.174)
Interpersonal Trust	0.019 (0.108)	0.339 (0.197)	-0.037 (0.102)	0.138 (0.065)	0.072 (0.076)	0.272 (0.075)	0.028 (0.073)	-0.25 (0.211)	0.052 (0.084)	0.079 (0.077)	0.005 (0.059)	0.111 (0.11)	-0.053 (0.06)	0.03 (0.071)	0.171 (0.098)	0.185 (0.141)	0.096 (0.15)
Institutional Trust	0.133 (0.047)	0.007 (0.094)	0.105 (0.048)	0.141 (0.032)	0.12 (0.039)	0.149 (0.04)	0.125 (0.035)	-0.103 (0.109)	-0.006 (0.044)	0.053 (0.04)	0.057 (0.03)	0.202 (0.055)	0.033 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.034)	0.133 (0.051)	-0.005 (0.068)	0.103 (0.066)
Constant	1.84 (0.575)	1.863 (1.126)	1.931 (0.644)	-2.443 (0.408)	0.084 (0.446)	-1.352 (0.425)	0.278 (0.446)	6.597 (1.375)	0.549 (0.509)	-0.461 (0.431)	0.141 (0.34)	-0.663 (0.727)	0.017 (0.335)	0.846 (0.431)	0.709 (0.586)	1.654 (0.812)	2.084 (0.781)
Nagelkerke R²	0.093	0.028	0.030	0.078	0.067	0.081	0.055	0.046	0.041	0.051	0.014	0.051	0.043	0.081	0.042	0.045	0.028
N	1353	1439	1370	1467	1521	1356	1291	1439	1198	1365	1308	1283	1346	1420	1296	1408	1394

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The Argentine model predicts that a respondent with experience of police corruption would be up to forty-seven percent more likely to not vote than a respondent without such experience. In contrast, in Panama, a respondent with experience of police corruption would be up to eighty-three percent more likely to participate in an election than a respondent without such experience.

Table 29. The Impact of Experience with Clerk Corruption on Voter Turnout

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Experience with Clerk Corruption	0.047 (0.448)	0.394 (0.547)	0.185 (0.577)	1.105 (0.638)	0.577 (0.416)	-0.339 (0.399)	0.161 (0.285)	17.373 (3871.686)	0.089 (0.495)	0.417 (0.348)	0.489 (0.299)	0.819 (0.35)	0.036 (0.327)	0.232 (0.306)	0.19 (0.39)	0.499 (0.479)	18.082 (7643.024)
Gender	-0.013 (0.194)	-0.037 (0.336)	-0.416 (0.197)	0.049 (0.119)	-0.067 (0.142)	-0.085 (0.147)	-0.253 (0.14)	-0.254 (0.372)	-0.523 (0.162)	-0.304 (0.148)	-0.173 (0.125)	0.117 (0.209)	-0.425 (0.121)	0.073 (0.135)	-0.391 (0.191)	0.766 (0.25)	-0.443 (0.264)
Age	-0.023 (0.006)	0 (0.011)	0.007 (0.007)	0.013 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.02 (0.005)	-0.016 (0.011)	0.019 (0.006)	0.023 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	0.023 (0.007)	0.019 (0.004)	0.027 (0.005)	0.015 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)
Education	0.087 (0.027)	0.042 (0.039)	0.076 (0.03)	0.069 (0.019)	0.102 (0.02)	0.084 (0.02)	-0.032 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.049)	0.031 (0.021)	0.072 (0.02)	0.032 (0.017)	0.044 (0.028)	0.048 (0.015)	0.034 (0.02)	0.025 (0.025)	0.068 (0.033)	0.054 (0.036)
Place of Living	0.018 (0.094)	-0.07 (0.1)	-0.167 (0.098)	0.16 (0.042)	-0.219 (0.058)	0.044 (0.056)	-0.032 (0.044)	-0.072 (0.123)	0.056 (0.052)	0.001 (0.046)	0.032 (0.047)	-0.024 (0.095)	0.01 (0.041)	-0.256 (0.046)	0.099 (0.069)	0.045 (0.074)	-0.07 (0.1)
Salary	0.04 (0.127)	0.296 (0.235)	-0.021 (0.139)	0.219 (0.084)	0.207 (0.105)	0.187 (0.102)	0.072 (0.088)	-0.206 (0.279)	0.03 (0.127)	0.122 (0.11)	0.065 (0.09)	0.288 (0.16)	-0.097 (0.09)	-0.109 (0.094)	-0.217 (0.137)	-0.067 (0.181)	-0.158 (0.174)
Interpersonal Trust	0.04 (0.108)	0.336 (0.196)	-0.022 (0.103)	0.142 (0.065)	0.074 (0.076)	0.273 (0.075)	0.035 (0.073)	-0.238 (0.207)	0.049 (0.084)	0.079 (0.077)	0.004 (0.059)	0.129 (0.111)	-0.058 (0.059)	0.031 (0.071)	0.172 (0.098)	0.187 (0.142)	0.101 (0.15)
Institutional Trust	0.136 (0.047)	0.007 (0.094)	0.109 (0.048)	0.143 (0.032)	0.117 (0.038)	0.147 (0.04)	0.121 (0.035)	-0.061 (0.106)	-0.008 (0.044)	0.049 (0.04)	0.056 (0.03)	0.214 (0.055)	0.028 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.034)	0.131 (0.051)	-0.008 (0.068)	0.106 (0.066)
Constant	1.596 (0.561)	1.976 (1.114)	1.782 (0.636)	-2.47 (0.407)	0.143 (0.444)	-1.319 (0.428)	0.308 (0.442)	6.352 (1.327)	0.597 (0.506)	-0.385 (0.429)	0.143 (0.338)	-0.826 (0.722)	0.063 (0.333)	0.899 (0.432)	0.729 (0.581)	1.719 (0.804)	2.076 (0.778)
Nagelkerke R²	0.086	0.027	0.027	0.081	0.065	0.082	0.054	0.035	0.040	0.050	0.016	0.063	0.041	0.076	0.042	0.046	0.033
N	1353	1442	1370	1468	1523	1357	1294	1447	1199	1365	1310	1284	1348	1418	1294	1408	1395

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The Mexican model predicts that a respondent with experience of official corruption would be up to one hundred and twenty-six percent more likely to vote than a respondent who had not been exposed to official corruption.

Table 30. The Impact of Perception of Corruption on Attending a Political Meeting

	BRA	COL	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAR	PER
Corruption Perception	-0.032 (0.115)	-0.178 (0.093)	-0.196 (0.098)	-0.138 (0.112)	-0.007 (0.106)	-0.088 (0.11)	-0.135 (0.083)	-0.1 (0.062)	0.034 (0.12)
Gender	-0.129 (0.193)	-0.302 (0.171)	-0.061 (0.217)	-0.505 (0.243)	-0.183 (0.215)	-0.136 (0.215)	-0.184 (0.196)	-0.407 (0.119)	-0.312 (0.214)
Age	-0.011 (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.007)
Education	-0.018 (0.028)	0.029 (0.023)	0.022 (0.027)	0.017 (0.03)	0.02 (0.028)	-0.067 (0.028)	0.031 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.029)
Place of Living	-0.123 (0.096)	-0.201 (0.065)	-0.339 (0.076)	-0.471 (0.103)	0.1 (0.077)	-0.214 (0.099)	-0.042 (0.068)	-0.11 (0.044)	-0.413 (0.067)
Salary	-0.188 (0.136)	0.002 (0.124)	-0.105 (0.173)	0.139 (0.178)	-0.128 (0.153)	-0.141 (0.162)	0.38 (0.144)	-0.049 (0.088)	0.147 (0.16)
Interpersonal Trust	0.012 (0.101)	0.088 (0.093)	0.116 (0.112)	0.035 (0.124)	0.119 (0.103)	-0.042 (0.112)	0.124 (0.099)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.103 (0.126)
Institutional Trust	0.07 (0.049)	0.037 (0.049)	0.037 (0.063)	0.053 (0.068)	0.109 (0.052)	-0.009 (0.061)	0.202 (0.056)	0.035 (0.033)	0.179 (0.066)
Constant	-0.143 (0.793)	-0.583 (0.665)	-0.69 (0.767)	-0.841 (0.891)	-2.259 (0.796)	0.395 (0.853)	-3.116 (0.684)	0.072 (0.453)	-1.049 (0.891)
Nagelkerke R²	0.023	0.040	0.087	0.104	0.026	0.046	0.100	0.028	0.127
N	667	782	633	695	659	702	657	1356	717

Note: BRA - Brazil, COL - Colombia, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The El Salvador model predicts that an increase in the value of the independent variable by one degree (e.g., from “half of them” to “more than half of them”) is associated with a decrease in the probability that the respondent attended a political rally by up to seventeen percent.

The regression models show that in two states, men are more likely than women to attend political rallies. In Mexico, more educated respondents are more likely to participate in this form of political participation. In a number of Latin American countries, people living in villages and smaller towns are more likely to participate in political meetings. The control variable representing the respondent's economic situation was statistically significant only in Nicaragua. In this Central American country, people whose family income is increasing are more likely to attend political rallies. Trust in institutions was also statistically significant in the three Latin American countries, acting in a positive direction on this form of political participation.

Table 31. The Impact of Experience with Police Corruption on Attending a Political Meeting

	BRA	COL	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAR	PER
Experience with Police Corruption	-0.091 (0.265)	0.384 (0.201)	0.366 (0.304)	0.663 (0.211)	0.291 (0.22)	0.24 (0.167)	0.233 (0.219)	-0.051 (0.166)	0.599 (0.187)
Gender	-0.333 (0.136)	-0.374 (0.124)	-0.233 (0.154)	-0.399 (0.172)	-0.316 (0.148)	-0.006 (0.147)	-0.146 (0.136)	-0.437 (0.12)	-0.417 (0.153)
Age	-0.018 (0.005)	0.011 (0.004)	0.011 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.014 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)
Education	-0.02 (0.02)	0.033 (0.016)	0.008 (0.019)	0.007 (0.021)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.048 (0.019)	0.022 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.015 (0.021)
Place of Living	-0.092 (0.065)	-0.23 (0.046)	-0.295 (0.053)	-0.359 (0.066)	-0.039 (0.054)	-0.113 (0.066)	0.017 (0.046)	-0.118 (0.043)	-0.374 (0.047)
Salary	-0.024 (0.096)	-0.016 (0.088)	-0.049 (0.123)	0.024 (0.123)	0.009 (0.103)	-0.077 (0.107)	0.333 (0.098)	-0.03 (0.086)	0.102 (0.112)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.053 (0.071)	0.085 (0.068)	0.126 (0.079)	0.049 (0.085)	-0.002 (0.069)	0.075 (0.075)	0.135 (0.067)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.103 (0.088)
Institutional Trust	0.09 (0.034)	0.078 (0.035)	0.044 (0.043)	0.062 (0.047)	0.126 (0.035)	0.017 (0.04)	0.183 (0.036)	0.042 (0.033)	0.136 (0.044)
Constant	-0.259 (0.447)	-1.677 (0.39)	-1.697 (0.482)	-1.534 (0.501)	-1.969 (0.395)	-1.142 (0.509)	-3.912 (0.39)	-0.324 (0.368)	-1.297 (0.516)
Nagelkerke R²	0.037	0.053	0.064	0.080	0.024	0.023	0.069	0.028	0.112
N	1407	1570	1307	1420	1388	1443	1462	1373	1432

Note: BRA - Brazil, COL - Colombia, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients $p < 0.05$).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The Guatemalan model predicts that a respondent with experience of police corruption is up to ninety-four percent more likely to attend political rallies than a respondent without such experience. The Peruvian model then predicts that a respondent with experience of police corruption is up to eighty-two percent more likely to attend political rallies.

Table 32. The Impact of Experience with Clerk Corruption on Attending a Political Meeting

	BRA	COL	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAR	PER
Experience with Clerk Corruption	0.022 (0.342)	0.841 (0.269)	0.818 (0.388)	0.377 (0.297)	0.373 (0.279)	0.358 (0.194)	0.313 (0.347)	0.284 (0.208)	0.962 (0.214)
Gender	-0.314 (0.135)	-0.383 (0.123)	-0.235 (0.153)	-0.472 (0.169)	-0.327 (0.146)	-0.016 (0.145)	-0.151 (0.135)	-0.404 (0.119)	-0.435 (0.153)
Age	-0.018 (0.005)	0.011 (0.004)	0.011 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.014 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)
Education	-0.024 (0.02)	0.031 (0.016)	0.007 (0.019)	0.006 (0.021)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.049 (0.019)	0.022 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.015)	0.008 (0.021)
Place of Living	-0.084 (0.065)	-0.232 (0.046)	-0.298 (0.053)	-0.352 (0.066)	-0.041 (0.054)	-0.109 (0.066)	0.018 (0.046)	-0.122 (0.043)	-0.379 (0.048)
Salary	-0.018 (0.096)	-0.018 (0.088)	-0.054 (0.122)	0.025 (0.122)	0.01 (0.103)	-0.083 (0.107)	0.334 (0.098)	-0.032 (0.087)	0.101 (0.112)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.058 (0.071)	0.079 (0.067)	0.126 (0.079)	0.061 (0.085)	-0.005 (0.069)	0.086 (0.076)	0.134 (0.067)	-0.044 (0.063)	-0.1 (0.088)
Institutional Trust	0.09 (0.034)	0.083 (0.035)	0.044 (0.043)	0.054 (0.047)	0.124 (0.035)	0.017 (0.04)	0.182 (0.036)	0.046 (0.033)	0.133 (0.044)
Constant	-0.281 (0.443)	-1.622 (0.387)	-1.693 (0.477)	-1.368 (0.493)	-1.939 (0.391)	-1.136 (0.505)	-3.896 (0.388)	-0.331 (0.366)	-1.154 (0.509)
Nagelkerke R²	0.035	0.058	0.067	0.070	0.024	0.024	0.069	0.029	0.122
N	1408	1572	1309	1421	1390	1445	1464	1371	1432

Note: BRA - Brazil, COL - Colombia, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

For example, the Colombian model predicts that a respondent with experience of official corruption is up to one hundred and thirty-one percent more likely to attend political rallies than a respondent without such experience. In the case of the Peruvian model, a respondent who has experience with official corruption is up to one hundred and sixty-one percent more likely than an individual who does not have this experience.

Table 33. The Impact of Perception of Corruption on Attending a Community Meeting

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Corruption Perception	-0.11 (0.131)	-0.171 (0.081)	-0.032 (0.127)	-0.08 (0.088)	-0.031 (0.087)	-0.124 (0.093)	-0.095 (0.076)	-0.091 (0.078)	-0.002 (0.087)	0.005 (0.081)	0.096 (0.085)	-0.23 (0.089)	-0.092 (0.079)	0.003 (0.093)	-0.016 (0.059)	0.057 (0.095)	-0.073 (0.113)
Gender	0.051 (0.242)	-0.209 (0.154)	-0.69 (0.211)	0.093 (0.171)	-0.231 (0.157)	-0.149 (0.195)	0.071 (0.171)	-0.032 (0.162)	-0.192 (0.187)	-0.374 (0.166)	-0.667 (0.172)	0.078 (0.17)	0.023 (0.187)	-0.243 (0.176)	-0.235 (0.113)	-0.108 (0.16)	0.185 (0.229)
Age	0.012 (0.007)	0.023 (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)	0.025 (0.006)	0.015 (0.005)	0.021 (0.006)	0.017 (0.005)	0.017 (0.005)	0 (0.006)	0.014 (0.006)	0.018 (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)	0.022 (0.006)	0.012 (0.006)	0.012 (0.004)	0.03 (0.005)	0.014 (0.007)
Education	0.121 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.052 (0.029)	0.039 (0.026)	0.041 (0.021)	0.018 (0.024)	-0.035 (0.022)	0.043 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.023)	-0.02 (0.021)	0.043 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.021)	0.013 (0.023)	0.035 (0.024)	0.015 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.055 (0.028)
Place of Living	-0.052 (0.113)	-0.177 (0.047)	-0.321 (0.103)	-0.173 (0.059)	-0.375 (0.061)	-0.258 (0.077)	-0.044 (0.053)	-0.225 (0.055)	-0.219 (0.062)	-0.414 (0.056)	-0.223 (0.066)	-0.145 (0.08)	-0.247 (0.068)	-0.37 (0.055)	-0.163 (0.041)	-0.163 (0.051)	-0.027 (0.086)
Salary	-0.115 (0.156)	-0.002 (0.107)	0.016 (0.145)	-0.149 (0.12)	0.012 (0.114)	-0.024 (0.133)	0.102 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.123)	-0.153 (0.149)	0.259 (0.126)	0.014 (0.12)	0.154 (0.129)	0.429 (0.139)	0.143 (0.126)	-0.182 (0.083)	-0.269 (0.119)	-0.007 (0.148)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.211 (0.14)	0.205 (0.089)	0.07 (0.108)	0.309 (0.096)	-0.041 (0.085)	0.374 (0.111)	0.07 (0.09)	0.028 (0.093)	0.16 (0.097)	0.212 (0.086)	0.078 (0.081)	0.12 (0.091)	0.167 (0.094)	0.003 (0.095)	0.028 (0.06)	-0.078 (0.095)	0.284 (0.146)
Institutional Trust	0.057 (0.066)	-0.051 (0.045)	-0.031 (0.052)	0.033 (0.047)	0.014 (0.044)	0.026 (0.06)	-0.083 (0.042)	0.046 (0.047)	0.079 (0.054)	-0.015 (0.046)	0.081 (0.041)	-0.046 (0.048)	0.206 (0.053)	0.126 (0.046)	0.069 (0.032)	0.09 (0.049)	0.034 (0.065)
Constant	-2.905 (0.962)	0.417 (0.596)	-0.973 (0.853)	-2.476 (0.759)	-0.235 (0.617)	-2.398 (0.748)	-0.524 (0.621)	-0.908 (0.661)	-0.712 (0.673)	-0.472 (0.619)	-1.807 (0.632)	-0.191 (0.677)	-3.125 (0.65)	-1.343 (0.678)	-0.327 (0.43)	-0.784 (0.688)	-3.858 (0.994)
Nagelkerke R²	0.045	0.092	0.055	0.083	0.085	0.094	0.055	0.060	0.066	0.171	0.086	0.033	0.166	0.125	0.040	0.102	0.050
N	716	765	667	768	791	682	647	718	625	695	662	701	658	716	1355	713	714

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The Bolivian model predicts that an increase in the value of the independent variable by one degree (e.g., from “half of them” to “more than half of them”) is associated with a decrease of up to 15 percent in the probability that the respondent attended a community meeting. In the case of Mexico, there is up to a twenty percent reduction in the likelihood of participating in this type of political participation.

The regression models show that men are more likely to attend community meetings than women, but only in those countries where there was statistical significance between the variables. Participation in community meetings is also associated with higher age of the respondent. This control variable was statistically significant in almost all Latin American countries. More educated respondents are also more likely to participate in this form of political participation than less educated respondents. The regression models also show that people from rural areas or smaller towns are more likely to participate in community meetings than those from large cities or the capital. Not much can be inferred from the control variable representing the respondent's financial situation, as in two regression models an increase in the respondent's income leads to participation in the community meeting, while in the other two models an improvement in financial situation leads to non-participation. Interpersonal trust is also important for participation in this form of political participation, which was statistically significant in four Latin American countries. Finally, institutional trust, while positively affecting participation in community meetings in the four regression models, discourages participation in this form of political participation in the Dominican Republic.

Table 34. The Impact of Experience with Police Corruption on Attending a Community Meeting

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Experience with Police Corruption	0.122 (0.264)	0.473 (0.123)	0.57 (0.235)	-0.078 (0.443)	0.169 (0.195)	-0.113 (0.386)	-0.08 (0.165)	0.333 (0.179)	0.905 (0.25)	0.382 (0.167)	0.608 (0.185)	0.229 (0.138)	0.096 (0.209)	0.36 (0.209)	0.271 (0.158)	0.269 (0.155)	0.11 (0.551)
Gender	-0.037 (0.172)	-0.084 (0.108)	-0.325 (0.138)	0.363 (0.118)	-0.248 (0.113)	-0.022 (0.136)	-0.212 (0.118)	-0.069 (0.114)	-0.13 (0.132)	-0.487 (0.117)	-0.506 (0.122)	-0.123 (0.12)	-0.043 (0.125)	-0.161 (0.121)	-0.226 (0.114)	-0.113 (0.115)	0.089 (0.153)
Age	0.002 (0.005)	0.019 (0.004)	0.013 (0.004)	0.02 (0.004)	0.017 (0.004)	0.02 (0.004)	0.011 (0.004)	0.014 (0.004)	0.015 (0.004)	0.011 (0.004)	0.022 (0.004)	0.014 (0.004)	0.02 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	0.012 (0.004)	0.023 (0.004)	0.013 (0.004)
Education	0.1 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.05 (0.019)	0.025 (0.018)	0.025 (0.015)	0.043 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.015)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.014)	0.054 (0.016)	0.015 (0.015)	0.021 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.017 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.027 (0.019)
Place of Living	0.003 (0.078)	-0.233 (0.032)	-0.17 (0.067)	-0.162 (0.041)	-0.403 (0.043)	-0.226 (0.054)	-0.056 (0.036)	-0.218 (0.038)	-0.26 (0.045)	-0.354 (0.039)	-0.32 (0.048)	-0.059 (0.055)	-0.142 (0.043)	-0.343 (0.038)	-0.171 (0.041)	-0.187 (0.036)	0.022 (0.059)
Salary	-0.137 (0.111)	-0.004 (0.074)	-0.014 (0.097)	-0.139 (0.084)	0.117 (0.081)	-0.09 (0.094)	-0.029 (0.073)	-0.044 (0.086)	0.026 (0.106)	0.096 (0.086)	0 (0.086)	0.063 (0.088)	0.272 (0.09)	0.128 (0.085)	-0.189 (0.082)	-0.139 (0.084)	-0.124 (0.101)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.072 (0.103)	0.197 (0.062)	0.054 (0.072)	0.186 (0.066)	-0.03 (0.061)	0.237 (0.075)	0.049 (0.059)	0.076 (0.063)	0.087 (0.068)	0.173 (0.06)	0.052 (0.057)	0.043 (0.062)	0.084 (0.061)	0.092 (0.064)	0.025 (0.06)	-0.086 (0.067)	0.213 (0.096)
Institutional Trust	0.093 (0.046)	-0.019 (0.031)	0.029 (0.034)	0.036 (0.031)	0.059 (0.032)	-0.013 (0.04)	-0.019 (0.028)	0.057 (0.032)	0.08 (0.037)	0.005 (0.032)	0.013 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.033)	0.192 (0.033)	0.071 (0.031)	0.073 (0.032)	0.038 (0.033)	0.105 (0.043)
Constant	-3.355 (0.534)	-0.344 (0.364)	-1.989 (0.447)	-2.164 (0.399)	-0.641 (0.35)	-2.502 (0.41)	-0.589 (0.369)	-0.969 (0.393)	-1.549 (0.416)	-0.339 (0.342)	-1.292 (0.324)	-1.534 (0.416)	-3.189 (0.354)	-0.734 (0.375)	-0.455 (0.347)	-0.289 (0.392)	-3.728 (0.491)
Nagelkerke R²	0.033	0.090	0.033	0.062	0.106	0.060	0.026	0.056	0.079	0.135	0.101	0.019	0.092	0.109	0.042	0.079	0.034
N	1455	1572	1406	1552	1582	1410	1385	1469	1302	1423	1395	1450	1463	1469	1372	1433	1471

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panama, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Peru, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients $p < 0.05$).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

For example, the Guatemalan model predicts that a respondent with experience of police corruption is up to forty-six percent more likely to attend community meetings than a respondent without such experience. On the other hand, in the case of the Honduran model, respondents with experience of police bribery are up to one hundred and forty-seven percent more likely to attend a community meeting than those individuals who have not been asked by a police officer to pay a bribe.

Table 35. The Impact of Experience with Clerk Corruption on Attending a Community Meeting

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Experience with Clerk Corruption	-0.002 (0.334)	1.203 (0.168)	0.964 (0.335)	1.504 (0.5)	0.394 (0.33)	1.153 (0.439)	0.17 (0.377)	1.217 (0.28)	1.274 (0.527)	1.128 (0.263)	1.078 (0.296)	0.595 (0.254)	0.81 (0.323)	0.773 (0.308)	0.968 (0.261)	0.961 (0.213)	0.021 (0.549)
Gender	0.497 (0.162)	-0.021 (0.141)	-0.416 (0.181)	-0.117 (0.178)	-0.288 (0.163)	-0.212 (0.184)	-0.451 (0.205)	0.01 (0.204)	-0.387 (0.329)	-0.087 (0.178)	-0.654 (0.214)	-0.071 (0.207)	-0.428 (0.177)	-0.588 (0.197)	-0.274 (0.198)	-0.295 (0.159)	0.502 (0.181)
Age	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.036 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	0.006 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.007)	0.011 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.019 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.005)
Education	0.169 (0.025)	0.026 (0.017)	0.154 (0.026)	0.206 (0.035)	0.06 (0.022)	0.163 (0.022)	-0.026 (0.027)	-0.025 (0.027)	0.065 (0.04)	0.038 (0.023)	0.084 (0.026)	0.016 (0.025)	0.091 (0.021)	0.036 (0.026)	0.082 (0.024)	0.084 (0.023)	0.196 (0.024)
Place of Living	0.166 (0.069)	-0.048 (0.042)	-0.062 (0.089)	0.009 (0.067)	0.056 (0.065)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.105 (0.062)	-0.048 (0.067)	0.062 (0.105)	-0.034 (0.056)	0.268 (0.072)	-0.026 (0.095)	0.14 (0.057)	-0.025 (0.061)	-0.024 (0.07)	-0.146 (0.049)	0.183 (0.072)
Salary	-0.252 (0.104)	-0.072 (0.097)	0.049 (0.126)	0.09 (0.121)	0.11 (0.116)	-0.16 (0.123)	-0.117 (0.128)	0.098 (0.153)	-0.258 (0.257)	0.136 (0.13)	0.069 (0.141)	0.121 (0.152)	0.056 (0.13)	0.025 (0.131)	-0.16 (0.14)	0.018 (0.116)	0.335 (0.121)
Interpersonal Trust	0.1 (0.099)	-0.123 (0.081)	-0.07 (0.097)	0.006 (0.105)	0.004 (0.09)	0.1 (0.103)	0.006 (0.102)	-0.033 (0.114)	-0.144 (0.168)	-0.043 (0.093)	-0.097 (0.099)	0.143 (0.109)	-0.051 (0.085)	0.111 (0.101)	-0.049 (0.104)	0.052 (0.092)	0.127 (0.119)
Institutional Trust	0.022 (0.042)	0.039 (0.04)	-0.048 (0.044)	-0.097 (0.048)	-0.09 (0.045)	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.035 (0.048)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.15 (0.079)	-0.094 (0.048)	-0.113 (0.049)	-0.004 (0.057)	-0.159 (0.04)	-0.127 (0.047)	-0.062 (0.053)	0.025 (0.046)	0.041 (0.051)
Constant	-4.2 (0.514)	-1.506 (0.479)	-2.837 (0.591)	-3.269 (0.645)	-1.918 (0.517)	-3.317 (0.548)	-1.124 (0.63)	-2.283 (0.696)	-2.833 (0.962)	-1.714 (0.526)	-2.599 (0.542)	-3.744 (0.729)	-2.53 (0.462)	-2.403 (0.585)	-2.695 (0.576)	-3.331 (0.547)	-6.075 (0.602)
Nagelkerke R²	0.111	0.062	0.087	0.144	0.053	0.109	0.019	0.030	0.058	0.048	0.136	0.018	0.095	0.049	0.054	0.072	0.184
N	1455	1580	1414	1556	1589	1414	1397	1476	1328	1435	1401	1459	1466	1473	1401	1449	1474

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

For example, the Mexican model predicts that a respondent with experience of official corruption is up to eighty-one percent more likely to attend community meetings than a respondent without such experience. On the other hand, in the case of the Chilean model, respondents with experience of official corruption are up to three hundred and forty-nine percent more likely to attend a community meeting than those individuals who have not been asked by an official to pay a bribe.

Table 36. The Impact of Perception of Corruption on Attending a Town/City Council Meeting

	COL	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAR	PER
Corruption Perception	-0.034 (0.14)	-0.257 (0.14)	-0.049 (0.107)	0.203 (0.111)	-0.069 (0.13)	-0.268 (0.098)	0.004 (0.092)	0.279 (0.152)
Gender	-0.523 (0.253)	0.553 (0.318)	-0.471 (0.232)	-0.407 (0.216)	-0.025 (0.245)	0.387 (0.235)	-0.096 (0.173)	-0.558 (0.242)
Age	-0.003 (0.008)	0.023 (0.01)	0.026 (0.008)	0.015 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	0.015 (0.008)	0.012 (0.006)	0.015 (0.008)
Education	0.04 (0.033)	0.074 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.029)	0.039 (0.028)	0.023 (0.03)	0.084 (0.029)	0.016 (0.022)	0.055 (0.032)
Place of Living	-0.483 (0.091)	-0.201 (0.107)	-0.273 (0.081)	-0.298 (0.087)	0.032 (0.117)	-0.139 (0.084)	0.013 (0.063)	-0.274 (0.074)
Salary	0.203 (0.183)	-0.168 (0.252)	0.652 (0.171)	-0.12 (0.152)	0.119 (0.184)	0.616 (0.168)	0.161 (0.127)	-0.028 (0.177)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.046 (0.133)	0.207 (0.165)	-0.148 (0.118)	0.137 (0.102)	-0.116 (0.13)	-0.111 (0.119)	-0.05 (0.092)	-0.505 (0.147)
Institutional Trust	0.005 (0.071)	0.034 (0.093)	0.063 (0.064)	0.022 (0.051)	-0.004 (0.069)	0.095 (0.066)	-0.026 (0.049)	0.088 (0.072)
Constant	-0.927 (0.967)	-3.463 (1.119)	-2.863 (0.868)	-2.742 (0.8)	-2.343 (0.981)	-3.276 (0.795)	-2.779 (0.66)	-2.429 (1.054)
Nagelkerke R²	0.092	0.065	0.105	0.065	0.007	0.125	0.010	0.096
N	783	639	697	666	699	652	1382	720

Note: COL - Colombia, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The Nicaraguan model predicts that an increase in the value of the independent variable by one degree (e.g., from “half of them” to “more than half of them”) is associated with a decrease of up to twenty-three percent in the probability that the respondent attended a town meeting.

The three regression models show that men are more likely to attend town meetings than women. Older age is also associated with participation in this institutionalized type of political participation. The two regression models that were statistically significant suggest that more educated respondents are also more likely to attend town meetings than less educated respondents. Similarly, just as people from smaller towns are more likely to attend community meetings than those from metropolitan areas, the same is true with respect to participation in town meetings. This type of political participation is also more likely to be sought out by more financially secure respondents, as is evident in the two regression models where this control variable was statistically significant. A paradox is interpersonal trust, which in one regression model has a negative effect on town meeting participation.

Table 37. The Impact of Experience with Police Corruption on Attending a Town/City Council Meeting

	COL	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAR	PER
Experience with Police Corruption	0.3 (0.284)	0.875 (0.376)	0.19 (0.212)	0.69 (0.214)	0.783 (0.193)	0.241 (0.25)	0.494 (0.22)	0.75 (0.205)
Gender	-0.267 (0.177)	0.22 (0.209)	-0.243 (0.155)	-0.429 (0.157)	-0.068 (0.184)	0.026 (0.156)	-0.05 (0.176)	-0.271 (0.174)
Age	0.005 (0.006)	0.029 (0.007)	0.014 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.014 (0.006)	0.015 (0.005)	0.013 (0.006)	0.016 (0.006)
Education	0.054 (0.023)	0.038 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.019)	0.039 (0.02)	0.071 (0.022)	0.015 (0.019)	0.015 (0.022)	0.007 (0.023)
Place of Living	-0.417 (0.064)	-0.193 (0.071)	-0.198 (0.052)	-0.304 (0.063)	-0.029 (0.084)	-0.124 (0.055)	0.008 (0.063)	-0.286 (0.053)
Salary	0.048 (0.126)	-0.042 (0.167)	0.329 (0.112)	-0.024 (0.108)	-0.101 (0.134)	0.437 (0.111)	0.167 (0.126)	-0.112 (0.126)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.039 (0.096)	0.087 (0.107)	0.007 (0.078)	0.126 (0.073)	-0.026 (0.095)	0.059 (0.076)	-0.058 (0.092)	-0.209 (0.101)
Institutional Trust	0.077 (0.051)	0.095 (0.059)	0.032 (0.042)	0.012 (0.036)	0.07 (0.05)	0.084 (0.04)	-0.016 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.049)
Constant	-1.934 (0.546)	-4.258 (0.671)	-2.437 (0.459)	-1.916 (0.414)	-3.662 (0.64)	-3.524 (0.432)	-2.938 (0.532)	-1.131 (0.579)
Nagelkerke R²	0.067	0.052	0.042	0.064	0.043	0.050	0.018	0.081
N	1570	1315	1426	1403	1442	1460	1399	1442
Note: COL - Colombia, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).								

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

For example, the Paraguayan model predicts that a respondent with experience of police corruption is up to sixty-three percent more likely to attend town hall meetings than a respondent without such experience. On the other hand, in the case of the El Salvador model, respondents with experience of police bribery are up to one hundred and thirty-nine percent more likely to attend a town meeting than those individuals who have not been asked by a police officer to pay a bribe.

Table 38. The Impact of Experience with Clerk Corruption on Attending a Town/City Council Meeting

	COL	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAR	PER
Experience with Clerk Corruption	1.161 (0.324)	0.871 (0.506)	0.234 (0.287)	0.556 (0.279)	0.577 (0.22)	0.249 (0.403)	0.856 (0.253)	0.825 (0.236)
Gender	-0.267 (0.176)	0.171 (0.206)	-0.255 (0.154)	-0.495 (0.155)	-0.161 (0.18)	0.017 (0.155)	-0.026 (0.176)	-0.318 (0.172)
Age	0.004 (0.006)	0.027 (0.006)	0.013 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.011 (0.006)	0.015 (0.005)	0.011 (0.006)	0.014 (0.006)
Education	0.05 (0.023)	0.037 (0.025)	-0.011 (0.019)	0.041 (0.02)	0.069 (0.022)	0.015 (0.019)	0.011 (0.022)	0.001 (0.023)
Place of Living	-0.419 (0.064)	-0.184 (0.07)	-0.196 (0.052)	-0.305 (0.063)	-0.018 (0.083)	-0.122 (0.055)	0.006 (0.063)	-0.288 (0.053)
Salary	0.055 (0.125)	-0.066 (0.165)	0.326 (0.112)	-0.029 (0.108)	-0.102 (0.133)	0.437 (0.111)	0.168 (0.127)	-0.13 (0.126)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.048 (0.096)	0.085 (0.107)	0.014 (0.078)	0.117 (0.073)	-0.007 (0.095)	0.058 (0.076)	-0.069 (0.092)	-0.204 (0.1)
Institutional Trust	0.092 (0.051)	0.089 (0.058)	0.03 (0.042)	0.004 (0.036)	0.06 (0.05)	0.083 (0.04)	-0.018 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.049)
Constant	-1.963 (0.545)	-4.092 (0.655)	-2.396 (0.456)	-1.764 (0.406)	-3.392 (0.628)	-3.498 (0.43)	-2.817 (0.528)	-0.877 (0.565)
Nagelkerke R²	0.079	0.048	0.042	0.057	0.030	0.049	0.025	0.079
N	1572	1317	1426	1405	1444	1462	1397	1442

Note: COL - Colombia, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, NIC - Nicaragua, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

For example, the Honduran model predicts that a respondent with experience of official corruption is up to seventy-four percent more likely to attend town hall meetings than a respondent without such experience. On the other hand, in the case of the Colombian model, respondents with experience of official bribery are up to two hundred and nineteen percent more likely to attend a town meeting than those individuals who have not been asked by an official to pay a bribe.

Table 39. The Impact of Perception of Corruption on Participation in a Demonstration

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Corruption Perception	-0.176 (0.124)	0.137 (0.106)	-0.257 (0.165)	0.148 (0.144)	0.004 (0.134)	0.318 (0.138)	0.195 (0.139)	0.025 (0.135)	-0.12 (0.226)	0.268 (0.135)	0.204 (0.157)	-0.094 (0.156)	-0.19 (0.115)	-0.058 (0.146)	0.268 (0.112)	0.343 (0.149)	-0.086 (0.137)
Gender	0.447 (0.229)	-0.248 (0.2)	-0.24 (0.266)	-0.228 (0.254)	-0.047 (0.228)	-0.034 (0.262)	-0.336 (0.288)	-0.228 (0.278)	-0.075 (0.443)	-0.077 (0.247)	-0.708 (0.294)	-0.097 (0.302)	-0.398 (0.256)	-0.566 (0.28)	-0.412 (0.194)	-0.171 (0.22)	0.328 (0.27)
Age	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.038 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.01)	0.004 (0.009)	0 (0.015)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.01)	0.004 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.01 (0.006)	0.023 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)
Education	0.18 (0.036)	0.044 (0.024)	0.198 (0.039)	0.225 (0.051)	0.08 (0.032)	0.12 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.039)	-0.02 (0.038)	0.228 (0.063)	0.02 (0.031)	0.109 (0.035)	-0.025 (0.038)	0.124 (0.032)	0.018 (0.037)	0.09 (0.024)	0.099 (0.031)	0.224 (0.034)
Place of Living	0.194 (0.098)	-0.031 (0.06)	-0.153 (0.136)	-0.033 (0.088)	0.08 (0.095)	0.218 (0.102)	-0.048 (0.087)	-0.022 (0.092)	-0.009 (0.152)	-0.096 (0.08)	0.284 (0.099)	-0.152 (0.141)	0.159 (0.086)	0.027 (0.087)	-0.025 (0.069)	-0.228 (0.069)	0.035 (0.102)
Salary	-0.197 (0.146)	-0.003 (0.137)	0.077 (0.183)	0.095 (0.171)	0.06 (0.164)	0.048 (0.174)	-0.041 (0.182)	-0.245 (0.216)	-0.353 (0.353)	0.156 (0.185)	0.011 (0.198)	0.116 (0.228)	0.19 (0.192)	-0.024 (0.194)	-0.152 (0.141)	0.023 (0.163)	0.548 (0.183)
Interpersonal Trust	0.126 (0.136)	-0.129 (0.114)	-0.176 (0.146)	0.017 (0.153)	-0.057 (0.125)	0.138 (0.145)	0.077 (0.149)	0.077 (0.155)	-0.125 (0.231)	0.127 (0.128)	-0.044 (0.137)	0.19 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.128)	0.051 (0.144)	-0.024 (0.104)	-0.04 (0.129)	0.15 (0.176)
Institutional Trust	0.015 (0.063)	0.062 (0.058)	-0.151 (0.068)	-0.067 (0.072)	-0.035 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.075)	-0.035 (0.068)	-0.029 (0.079)	-0.196 (0.116)	-0.087 (0.067)	-0.074 (0.069)	0.019 (0.087)	-0.19 (0.065)	-0.224 (0.071)	-0.039 (0.054)	0.071 (0.067)	0.036 (0.08)
Constant	-3.896 (0.929)	-2.264 (0.788)	-1.824 (1.061)	-3.931 (1.24)	-2.551 (0.932)	-5.328 (1.066)	-2.117 (1.096)	-1.907 (1.126)	-3.454 (1.631)	-3.449 (0.992)	-3.834 (1.128)	-2.427 (1.197)	-2.123 (0.859)	-1.103 (1.04)	-3.908 (0.775)	-4.757 (1.032)	-6.573 (1.246)
Nagelkerke R²	0.117	0.021	0.114	0.145	0.041	0.091	0.021	0.012	0.124	0.028	0.123	0.020	0.103	0.052	0.044	0.079	0.226
N	716	765	670	769	791	684	647	718	641	701	664	706	657	717	1385	724	715

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The Guatemalan and Paraguayan models predict that an increase in the value of the independent variable by one degree (e.g. from “half of them” to “more than half of them”) is associated with an increase in the probability that the respondent participated in the demonstration by up to thirty percent. In the case of the Peruvian model, an increase in value is associated with an increase in probability of up to forty-one percent.

As for the control variables, the regression models show that men are more likely to participate in demonstrations than women. In Chile, younger respondents are more likely to participate, while in Peru, older respondents are more likely to participate in this non-conventional type of political participation. In the other countries, the age variable was statistically insignificant. In most Latin American countries, more educated people are more likely to participate in demonstrations than less educated people. In three countries, people from larger cities are more likely to participate in demonstrations, but in Peru, South America, respondents living in smaller localities are more likely to participate in this type of political participation. It is of some interest that in Uruguay, people with a better financial situation are more likely to participate in demonstrations than those whose economic situation has deteriorated. In terms of institutional trust, this works along the lines of the more people disrespect state institutions, the more likely they are to demonstrate. However, this variable was statistically significant in only three regression models.

Table 40. The Impact of Experience with Police Corruption on Participation in a Demonstration

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Experience with Police Corruption	0.512 (0.233)	0.734 (0.148)	0.595 (0.282)	0.922 (0.47)	0.352 (0.239)	0.655 (0.398)	0.453 (0.257)	1.122 (0.25)	0.539 (0.477)	0.905 (0.209)	1.108 (0.238)	0.749 (0.223)	0.403 (0.233)	0.856 (0.255)	0.437 (0.235)	0.957 (0.185)	0.227 (0.653)
Gender	0.552 (0.163)	0.007 (0.141)	-0.403 (0.182)	-0.126 (0.177)	-0.276 (0.166)	-0.223 (0.185)	-0.366 (0.211)	0.048 (0.205)	-0.412 (0.33)	-0.005 (0.18)	-0.593 (0.217)	0.016 (0.211)	-0.434 (0.178)	-0.535 (0.199)	-0.331 (0.197)	-0.219 (0.16)	0.507 (0.182)
Age	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.036 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.008)	0.013 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.022 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.005)
Education	0.165 (0.025)	0.028 (0.017)	0.159 (0.026)	0.215 (0.035)	0.062 (0.023)	0.16 (0.022)	-0.031 (0.027)	-0.025 (0.027)	0.065 (0.04)	0.042 (0.022)	0.084 (0.025)	0.017 (0.025)	0.093 (0.021)	0.033 (0.026)	0.089 (0.024)	0.09 (0.023)	0.196 (0.024)
Place of Living	0.17 (0.069)	-0.045 (0.042)	-0.057 (0.089)	0 (0.066)	0.061 (0.065)	0.047 (0.07)	-0.114 (0.062)	-0.053 (0.067)	0.064 (0.105)	-0.048 (0.056)	0.277 (0.072)	-0.035 (0.096)	0.135 (0.057)	-0.036 (0.061)	-0.015 (0.069)	-0.151 (0.049)	0.183 (0.072)
Salary	-0.236 (0.105)	-0.086 (0.096)	0.051 (0.125)	0.078 (0.12)	0.123 (0.116)	-0.148 (0.123)	-0.111 (0.128)	0.082 (0.152)	-0.26 (0.258)	0.116 (0.13)	0.065 (0.141)	0.129 (0.153)	0.048 (0.13)	0.026 (0.131)	-0.161 (0.139)	0.029 (0.116)	0.337 (0.121)
Interpersonal Trust	0.119 (0.099)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.081 (0.097)	0.003 (0.104)	0.01 (0.091)	0.094 (0.103)	0.011 (0.103)	-0.022 (0.114)	-0.145 (0.168)	-0.055 (0.092)	-0.085 (0.1)	0.124 (0.108)	-0.054 (0.085)	0.117 (0.102)	-0.042 (0.104)	0.048 (0.092)	0.129 (0.119)
Institutional Trust	0.025 (0.042)	0.027 (0.04)	-0.039 (0.045)	-0.094 (0.049)	-0.089 (0.045)	-0.072 (0.052)	-0.025 (0.049)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.154 (0.079)	-0.09 (0.048)	-0.095 (0.049)	0.005 (0.057)	-0.162 (0.04)	-0.129 (0.047)	-0.061 (0.053)	0.033 (0.046)	0.042 (0.051)
Constant	-4.379 (0.521)	-1.607 (0.481)	-2.916 (0.597)	-3.315 (0.647)	-2.041 (0.524)	-3.237 (0.548)	-1.293 (0.64)	-2.302 (0.692)	-2.782 (0.964)	-1.866 (0.528)	-2.851 (0.556)	-3.997 (0.742)	-2.523 (0.462)	-2.475 (0.593)	-2.803 (0.578)	-3.65 (0.562)	-6.094 (0.606)
Nagelkerke R²	0.116	0.038	0.082	0.138	0.056	0.105	0.023	0.033	0.048	0.047	0.148	0.027	0.092	0.056	0.041	0.079	0.184
N	1455	1577	1413	1555	1587	1413	1394	1468	1326	1435	1399	1457	1464	1475	1403	1449	1473

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients $p < 0.05$).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

For example, the Argentine model predicts that a respondent with experience of police corruption is up to sixty-six percent more likely to participate in demonstrations than a respondent without such experience. On the other hand, in the case of the Ecuadorian model, respondents with experience of police bribery are up to two hundred and seven percent more likely to participate in a demonstration than those individuals who have not been asked by a police officer to pay a bribe.

Table 41. The Impact of Experience with Clerk Corruption on Participation in a Demonstration

	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	DOM	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU
Experience with Clerk Corruption	0.115 (0.343)	0.711 (0.16)	-0.231 (0.368)	0.741 (0.465)	0.46 (0.269)	0.531 (0.407)	0.269 (0.233)	0.415 (0.21)	0.627 (0.357)	0.403 (0.229)	0.72 (0.24)	0.105 (0.164)	-0.427 (0.385)	0.278 (0.264)	0.387 (0.206)	0.623 (0.19)	0.578 (0.482)
Gender	-0.041 (0.172)	-0.106 (0.107)	-0.375 (0.137)	0.378 (0.118)	-0.25 (0.112)	-0.003 (0.136)	-0.189 (0.115)	-0.086 (0.113)	-0.179 (0.131)	-0.52 (0.116)	-0.541 (0.121)	-0.159 (0.118)	-0.062 (0.124)	-0.183 (0.12)	-0.224 (0.113)	-0.116 (0.114)	0.096 (0.153)
Age	0.002 (0.005)	0.018 (0.003)	0.013 (0.004)	0.02 (0.004)	0.017 (0.004)	0.02 (0.004)	0.012 (0.004)	0.014 (0.004)	0.013 (0.004)	0.01 (0.004)	0.021 (0.004)	0.013 (0.004)	0.021 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.011 (0.004)	0.023 (0.004)	0.013 (0.004)
Education	0.101 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.013)	0.054 (0.019)	0.021 (0.018)	0.024 (0.015)	0.045 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.055 (0.016)	0.015 (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.015 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.016)	0.024 (0.019)
Place of Living	0.001 (0.078)	-0.233 (0.032)	-0.173 (0.066)	-0.161 (0.041)	-0.404 (0.043)	-0.231 (0.054)	-0.056 (0.036)	-0.215 (0.038)	-0.249 (0.044)	-0.351 (0.039)	-0.323 (0.048)	-0.052 (0.055)	-0.141 (0.043)	-0.339 (0.037)	-0.17 (0.041)	-0.186 (0.036)	0.019 (0.059)
Salary	-0.14 (0.111)	0 (0.074)	-0.034 (0.097)	-0.132 (0.083)	0.115 (0.081)	-0.09 (0.094)	-0.019 (0.074)	-0.047 (0.086)	-0.012 (0.104)	0.097 (0.086)	0.001 (0.086)	0.058 (0.087)	0.267 (0.09)	0.132 (0.085)	-0.19 (0.082)	-0.129 (0.084)	-0.116 (0.101)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.073 (0.103)	0.191 (0.062)	0.035 (0.072)	0.194 (0.065)	-0.033 (0.061)	0.242 (0.075)	0.046 (0.059)	0.075 (0.063)	0.084 (0.068)	0.179 (0.06)	0.047 (0.057)	0.048 (0.062)	0.082 (0.061)	0.091 (0.064)	0.019 (0.06)	-0.086 (0.067)	0.215 (0.096)
Institutional Trust	0.093 (0.046)	-0.016 (0.031)	0.024 (0.034)	0.037 (0.031)	0.062 (0.032)	-0.007 (0.04)	-0.016 (0.028)	0.06 (0.032)	0.072 (0.036)	0.001 (0.032)	0.008 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.032)	0.188 (0.033)	0.071 (0.031)	0.07 (0.031)	0.04 (0.033)	0.107 (0.043)
Constant	-3.332 (0.53)	-0.26 (0.359)	-1.825 (0.441)	-2.198 (0.398)	-0.618 (0.348)	-2.589 (0.413)	-0.673 (0.365)	-0.989 (0.392)	-1.336 (0.408)	-0.263 (0.339)	-1.209 (0.321)	-1.445 (0.411)	-3.142 (0.351)	-0.72 (0.374)	-0.375 (0.345)	-0.285 (0.388)	-3.744 (0.489)
Nagelkerke R²	0.033	0.095	0.028	0.064	0.108	0.062	0.027	0.057	0.069	0.134	0.099	0.017	0.093	0.108	0.043	0.086	0.035
N	1455	1575	1407	1553	1584	1411	1388	1477	1304	1423	1397	1452	1465	1467	1370	1433	1472

Note: ARG - Argentina, BOL - Bolivia, BRA - Brazil, CHI - Chile, COL - Colombia, CRI - Costa Rica, DOM - Dominican Republic, ECU - Ecuador, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - Mexico, NIC - Nicaragua, PAN - Panamá, PAR - Paraguay, PER - Perú, URU - Uruguay; Variables that are statistically significant are marked in blue (Coefficients p < 0.05).

This table shows the effect of the independent variable representing the form of corruption on the dependent variable representing the type of political participation in the individual regression models for each country. Control socioeconomic and political variables are also included within the models. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

For example, the Ecuadorian model predicts that a respondent with experience of official corruption is up to fifty-one percent more likely to participate in demonstrations than a respondent without such experience. On the other hand, in the case of the Honduran model, respondents with experience of official corruption are up to one hundred and five percent more likely to participate in a demonstration than those individuals who have not been asked by a police officer to pay a bribe.

Table 42. The Effects of Corruption on Forms of Political Participation

Corruption	Effect of Corruption	Political Participation
Corruption Awareness	Mobilization	Voter Turnout
Eradication of Corruption	Mobilization	
Corruption Progress	Mobilization	
Corruption Awareness	Voting for Government Party	Voting for Opposition/Government Party
Eradication of Corruption	Mixed results	
Corruption Progress	Mixed results	
Corruption Awareness	Mobilization	Willingness to Demonstrate Against Corruption
Eradication of Corruption	Mobilization	
Corruption Progress	Mobilization	
Corruption Awareness	Mobilization	Convincing Others of Political Thoughts
Eradication of Corruption	Mobilization	
Corruption Progress	Mobilization	
Corruption Awareness	Mobilization	Working for Politicians
Eradication of Corruption	Mobilization	
Corruption Progress	Mixed results	

This table shows the effects of different forms of corruption on different types of political participation. The summary table is constructed only from regression models in which the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable was statistically significant. The data were collected in 2020 and are from Latinobarómetro (Latinobarómetro, 2020). Processing: author.

The table shows that in the vast majority of cases, the selected types of corruption have a positive impact on different types of political participation. Thus, the mobilising effect of corruption prevails. Of course, there are also cases where corruption works both ways, as in the case of the question on corruption progress

in relation to working for politicians, or in the case of the questions on eradication of corruption and corruption progress in relation to voting for the opposition party or the ruling party. Especially in the latter case, mixed results are to be expected, as in some countries respondents may attribute past successes in the fight against corruption to the ruling party, while in other countries the ruling party may instead be the one responsible for corruption scandals and the generally negative corruption situation in the country, such that the alternative is a vote for the opposition, which promises to fight corruption.

Table 43. The Effects of Corruption on Forms of Political Participation

Corruption	Effect of Corruption	Political Participation
Perception of Corruption	Deterrent	Voter Turnout
Experience with Police Corruption	Mixed results	
Experience with Clerk Corruption	Mobilization	
Perception of Corruption	Deterrent	Attending a Political Meeting
Experience with Police Corruption	Mobilization	
Experience with Clerk Corruption	Mobilization	
Perception of Corruption	Deterrent	Attending a Community Meeting
Experience with Police Corruption	Mobilization	
Experience with Clerk Corruption	Mobilization	
Perception of Corruption	Deterrent	Attending a Town/City Council Meeting
Experience with Police Corruption	Mobilization	
Experience with Clerk Corruption	Mobilization	
Perception of Corruption	Mobilization	Participation in a Demonstration
Experience with Police Corruption	Mobilization	
Experience with Clerk Corruption	Mobilization	

This table shows the effects of different forms of corruption on different types of political participation. The summary table is constructed only from regression models in which the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable was statistically significant. The data were collected in 2018–2019 and are from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

The table shows that perceptions of corruption and experience of corruption operate in different directions in most cases in relation to different types of political participation. While a higher perception of corruption has a negative impact on political participation and thus manifests a discouraging effect, the experience of

either police corruption or official corruption has in most cases a positive impact on political participation and thus manifests a mobilizing effect. However, there are also deviant cases, for example, the experience of police bribery has been shown to have both effects in relation to electoral participation in different countries. Another deviant example is the perception of corruption among politicians, which manifested itself differently in relation to participation in demonstrations than in the previous four types of political participation, since in this case it did not have a deterrent effect but a mobilizing effect.

Regarding the confirmation or rejection of the formulated hypotheses, it can be stated that *H1: The greater the perception of corruption, the less interest in political participation*, can be rejected. Although politicians' perception of corruption discourages participation in elections and all types of rallies, it has a mobilizing effect on demonstrations. As far as the perception of the level of corruption is concerned, in most cases it has a mobilizing effect on selected forms of political participation. *H2: Awareness of corruption leads to less interest in political participation* can also be rejected. In Latin American countries, awareness of corruption is also a strong predictor of participation in various forms of political participation. As for *H3: Experience with corruption leads to greater interest in political participation*, this hypothesis must also be rejected, as although in the vast majority of cases experience with corruption has a mobilizing effect, different results have been reported across countries for the effects of experience with police corruption on voter turnout. Finally, *H4: A positive view of the possibility of eradicating corruption from politics leads to a greater interest in political participation* can be confirmed, as a mobilization effect was observed in all regression models where the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable was statistically significant.

Gifts for votes? Vote buying as a predictor of turnout in Latin America

This chapter focuses on the repercussions of vote buying on turnout in presidential elections in eight Latin American countries. The research is conducted with individual-level data from the AmericasBarometer database from 2018–2019, which includes unique questions about the respondents' experience with vote buying and whether they participated in the last presidential election. The results of the logistic regression analysis reveal that vote buying was a predictor of turnout in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, whereas in Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru, this variable was statistically insignificant for predicting voter turnout.

Introduction

Vote buying is a phenomenon that occurs in many countries around the world.³⁸ Any election can be susceptible, whether local, regional, or national. Likewise, any individual can be the target, regardless of their social status, education, or gender. Facing this phenomenon is problematic. One way toⁱ fight vote buying is to report it to the authorities, but doing so poses its own issues. If the number of reports is high, the fairness of elections can be challenged in the courts, which can lead to violent political confrontations between candidates. Meanwhile, if vote buying goes largely unreported, it may become a common phenomenon in the electoral process (Vilalta, 2010). Researchers must study the possible effects of vote buying and attempt to verify it empirically.

Research on forms of vote buying and its possible implications for society have been at the forefront of academic interest, especially over the last 10 years (T. Aidt et al., 2020; Devadoss & Luckstead, 2016; Finan & Schechter, 2012; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2017; Leight et al., 2020; Rueda, 2015, 2017). While most research focuses on strategies for buying votes, it is less clear how these strategies truly affect the

³⁸ Studies demonstrate that vote buying is common mainly in Africa (Ferree & Long, 2016; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014; Lucky, 2014; Ndakaripa, 2020; Olaniyan, 2020; Onapajo et al., 2015), Asia (Bowie, 2008; Heath & Tillin, 2018; Ma et al., 2022; Norén-Nilsson, 2016; Pradhanawati et al., 2019; Still & Dusi, 2020; Zhao, 2018), Eastern Europe (Frye et al., 2019; Mares et al., 2017), and Latin America (Albertus, 2013; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2014; Penfold-Becerra, 2007; Serra, 2016a, 2016b; Stokes, 2005).

electoral process, in other words, whether vote buying increases turnout or significantly modifies the number of votes for individual politicians. It is therefore unsurprising that some authors have called for further verification in this area (Guardado & Wantchékon, 2018; Nichter, 2008).

The aim of this chapter is to find out whether vote buying influences turnout. The research focuses on eight Latin American countries for which the most up-to-date opinion polls are available.

This chapter is divided into several parts. The theoretical part introduces the concept of vote buying within the context of theories of clientelism and corruption. Then, the current research on vote buying in Latin America is mapped. The research design is explained in the methodological section, followed by the statistical results. In the last part, conclusions are drawn and possible directions for further research are outlined.

Theory

Clientelism involves purposeful exchange between patrons (politicians running in elections) and citizens with the right to vote. The idea of clientelism is that voters will receive a “targeted” benefit in exchange for their vote for a certain candidate. Thus, the characteristic features of clientelism are targeting and conditionality. In addition, clientelistic exchange may differ, especially in terms of the types of resources, the networks across which it is manifested, and the durability of exchange relations (Yıldırım & Kitschelt, 2020). Vote buying can be considered as “one-off” clientelism, since its targeting occurs only one time, during elections, with the condition for receiving targeted benefits being a vote. Vote buying can also be considered as “electoral corruption” and thus as a form of corruption, in addition to being a form of clientelism (Amaechi & Stockemer, 2022; Hasen, 2000, p. 1325). The low-income sectors of the population, especially those with limited information about the electoral process, are the most common targets of these practices (Canare et al., 2018; Jensen & Justesen, 2014; Khemani, 2015; Kramon, 2016).

There are several vote-buying typologies in academic studies, so it is no surprise that there is an effort to conceptualize them (Owen, 2013). Most often, vote buying is divided into two dimensions. The first is whether the benefits are delivered to individuals or groups. The second dimension is whether the selected benefits are a condition for political support. It is thus possible to distinguish between clientelist

vote buying (distribution of benefits to individuals or groups of citizens in exchange for their political support), legislative vote buying (which also includes distributed benefits, but instead of citizens, the aim is to influence legislators), non-excludable vote buying (politicians buy voters indirectly, for example through various government packages and constituency construction projects), and non-binding vote buying (where, although benefits are distributed to individuals or groups of citizens, their political support is not required in exchange) (Nichter, 2014).

The subsequent analysis of the chapter is theoretically based on the first type of vote buying, clientelistic.

Current research in Latin America – literature review

The literature review on vote buying in Latin America can be divided into several thematic veins, although there may be overlaps in some places.

The first vein covers the effects of vote buying on voter turnout. In Argentina, minor benefits (such as food, clothing, and cash) in exchange for votes have proven to be effective in mobilizing political support, especially among low-income groups (Brusco et al., 2004). Another article concerning Latin America in general examines citizens' confidence in the electoral process, revealing that, while perceptions of election unfairness reduce interest in participating in national elections, material incentives have the opposite effect, increasing turnout. The article works with data from the 2010 wave of AmericasBarometer surveys (Carreras & Irepoğlu, 2013). The authors also distinguish between local public goods and private goods when examining vote-buying strategies and their tools. One study works with Venezuelan social programs at the aggregate level. The authors argue that local public goods use vote-buying politicians for loyal voters in the constituency, and private goods that have the potential to increase turnout are intended for voters in other constituencies (Rosas et al., 2014).

Another vein includes studies that highlight political networks in the context of vote buying. Another study from Argentina—focused on a densely populated neighborhoods in Buenos Aires—points out that, in addition to political networks, there may be non-political networks (such as counseling or borrowing) that can also significantly influence voter choice (Szwarcberg, 2012). Further research, this time on Colombia and Mexico, highlights organizational membership as a strong but often overlooked predictor of vote buying in Latin America (Holland & Palmer-

Rubin, 2015). Another study highlights the importance of informal networks. Using cross-sectional survey data from 22 countries, the authors reveal that individuals who are involved in frequent political debate and are part of large political discussion networks are very likely to receive clientelistic payoffs (Schaffer & Baker, 2015).

Another vein of research on vote-buying in Latin America focuses on what type of voters are prone to this practice. Another article that uses Argentina's AmericasBarometer dataset from 2010 reveals that patrons are more likely to target citizens who do not recognize democratic values over citizens who support these values (Carlin & Moseley, 2015). Some articles from Latin American region look at the issue of vote buying from a completely new perspective, race. Such articles have found that skin color is a robust predictor of vote buying across the region (M. Johnson, 2020). One of the most recent articles is a methodological contribution. It uses a list experiment to estimate the percentage of respondents who received electoral gifts in Mexican legislative and subnational elections in 2015 and 2017. The findings show that this technique works better with educated voters who are not often the target of vote buying than with the less-educated electorate. Research using list experiments should therefore approach empirical findings with caution (Castro Cornejo & Beltrán, 2020).

Finally, the largest vein of research on vote buying in Latin America focuses on what strategies politicians use to buy voters. Research on Ecuador demonstrates the strategy by which political parties target voters, finding empirical evidence for programmatic, clientelist, symbolic, and vote-buying strategies (Mustillo, 2016). Research dealing with Brazilian municipalities demonstrates that vote buying can dramatically affect local elections. Vote buying is perceived in this article as a purposeful outflow of voters from one constituency to another (Hidalgo & Nichter, 2016). Natural disasters, such as the 2010–2011 floods in Colombia, can also help elect politicians through vote buying. The influx of resources in the form of support has increased money for vote buying (Gallego, 2018). One study looks at how one party distributed gift cards in the 2012 Mexican presidential election to see if giving these gift cards affected voting behavior. The conclusions are that persuasive vote buying was evident (Cantú, 2019).

Another article on Mexico demonstrates how Mexican political parties have adapted to modern campaigning, which has made distributing election gifts easier,

to the point that they are no longer limit to the poor (Beltran & Castro Cornejo, 2019). A Guatemalan experimental study deals with two electoral strategies from the general elections held in 2011, intimidation and vote buying. The first strategy is used in cases where the price for vote buying is too high and where the risk of being arrested for violence is lower (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2020).

As the literature review demonstrates, only a minimum of articles on Latin American countries deal with the mobilizing effect of vote buying (Brusco et al., 2004; Carreras & Irepoğlu, 2013; Rosas et al., 2014). Of these articles, only one concludes through individual-level data that vote buying increases turnout, but the data are from 2010 (Carreras & Irepoğlu, 2013). It is necessary to verify its conclusions using the latest data.

Given the theoretical framework of vote buying based on the exchange of targeted benefits for votes and the prevailing empirical scientific literature, the hypothesis of this chapter is as follows.

Voters who are offered a gift are more likely to vote.

Methodology and data

There are two common approaches for measuring vote buying. The first is to use official reports (i.e., when the voter reports vote buying to the authorities, and the authorities record it). The second is to use opinion polls with specific questions focused on whether the respondent or someone they know was offered something in exchange for their vote.

The first way is not reliable, as demonstrated by experimental research from Nicaragua, where in one election 24% of registered voters were offered a gift in exchange for votes, while only 2% reported this behavior (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012).³⁹

The second way of measuring vote buying has long been limited by the absence of data. Now, one of the latest AmericasBarometer databases, which consists of data from an extensive questionnaire survey conducted between 2018 and 2019, offers unique data on the vote-buying experience and turnout in the last presidential

³⁹ This issue is expanded by the findings of further articles using experimental designs, this time focused on eight Latin American states. Vote buying is reported by more educated respondents who are more aware of the perception of corruption and democratic values. Poorer respondents, who are more prone to vote buying, report less (Kiewiet De Jonge, 2015).

election at the individual level. However, it should be added that questions on vote buying were found only in eight AmericasBarometer datasets, which represented countries that do not have developed economies and the standard of living of citizens is relatively low, and such countries could therefore be expected to experience this phenomenon based on theoretical knowledge (Latin American Public Opinion Project—LAPOP 2019).

Method

This chapter uses logistic regression analysis to determine the effect of vote buying on turnout, with the dependent variable being dichotomous. Eight individual regression models were compiled to capture the effect in each selected country. The assembled models were weighted using a variable from the AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019) dataset.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is turnout. The AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019) datasets offer two answers to be generated in the SPSS Statistics software—1 = Yes (voted), 2 = No (did not vote).

Independent variable

The independent variable is vote buying. Respondents were asked if anyone offered them a favor, a gift, or any other benefit in exchange for their vote or support in the elections. There were again two options to be generated from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019) datasets— (1) Yes (something was offered) (2) No (nothing was offered).

Control variables

A number of standard political and sociodemographic variables are also included in the regression models (Nadeau et al., 2019). The first is political interest. People with a higher political interest are much more likely to vote; people with a higher political interest have more information about how the political process works and what it can bring them (Denny & Doyle, 2008; Rosema, 2007). The models also include a variable representing trust in the institution of elections (Verba & Almond, 1989). If people do not trust the elections, they have no motivation to

participate. Political participation is also associated with the level of media monitoring. The amount of information provided by the media on when elections are held, how to vote, and who is running affects the level of turnout (Wellman et al., 2001).

Sociodemographic variables start with a variable representing gender. Earlier literature has shown that men participate in elections more than women (Burns et al., 1997). Another variable is age, since more age is associated with increased political participation (Norris, 2002). Education is another control variable, because with increasing knowledge grows the ability to evaluate information, a higher income, and knowledge about the functioning of the political system within which elections take place (Verba et al., 1995). The models also include the respondents' residence, urban or rural. People from cities have more socioeconomic resources, which make them more conducive to political participation (Verba et al., 1978). For the description of variables, see following table.

Table 44. Variables in the Models

Variable	Description
Dependent Variable	
Elections	Did you vote in the last presidential elections? 1 = Yes, 2 = No
Independent Variable	
Vote buying	Thinking about the last presidential elections, did someone offer you something, like a favor, gift, or any other benefit in return for your vote or support? 1 = Yes, 2 = No
Control Variables	
Political interest	How much interest do you have in politics? 1 = A lot, 2 = Some, 3 = Little, 4 = None
Institutional trust	To what extent do you trust elections in this country? Range between 1 = Not at all, 7 = A lot
Watching news	About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers, or the Internet? Range between 1 = Daily, 5 = Never
Gender	1 = Male, 2 = Female
Age	How old are you? Range between 18–88
Education	How many years of schooling have you completed? Range between None = 0, University = 18+
Residence	1 = Urban, 2 = Rural

This table shows description of variables in the models. Source: LAPOP (2019). Processing: author.

This chapter does not control for one significant variable, whether voting is compulsory. This research is conducted using individual-level data, and the AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019) does not include a question about compulsory voting that would be suitable for inclusion in the regression models. In most Latin American countries, voting is mandatory but unenforced. Furthermore, there is no consensus in the literature concerning compulsory voting and its effects on vote buying.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ On the one hand, some research suggests that compulsory voting can lead to increased vote buying, compared to countries where voting is not mandatory (Gans-Morse et al., 2014). On the other hand, compulsory voting forces political actors to abandon vote buying and focus more on programmatic vote-seeking strategies (Singh, 2019).

Results

Figure 20. Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections




Figure shows the individual-level and national-level turnout rates for the most recent presidential election prior to the survey data collection (which was conducted in 2018–2019).⁴¹ The survey data represents the respondents’ positive answer to the question, “Did you vote in the last presidential elections?” There were two possible answers (“Yes” and “No”). The survey data is given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses. The sources are the AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019) and official election results from individual countries.⁴² Processing: author.

The values show that the majority of respondents in all the selected countries voted in the observed presidential elections. Thus, it can be concluded that the Latin American public, at least from these eight countries, is interested in participating in the most common form of political participation, elections. Still, the increased interest in participating in elections may be related to the type of election. Latin American political systems are set up as presidential, where the president is not only the head of state but is also the head of the executive branch and the most important actor in the political arena who can directly influence people’s lives (Nadeau et al., 2017). Latin American elections also tend to be highly personalized, which dates to

⁴¹ Presidential elections included Colombia in 2018, Dominican Republic in 2016, El Salvador in 2014, Guatemala in 2015, Honduras in 2017, Mexico in 2018, Paraguay in 2018, and Peru in 2016.

⁴² In countries where there are two rounds of voting (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru), values from the first round of voting are shown, at the individual and national levels.

the caudillo era. These circumstances can result in an increased interest in participating in presidential elections. Furthermore, in many Latin American countries, the concept of compulsory voting is enshrined, which may again result in increased turnout, even though compulsory voting is often unenforced in practice, and in some countries, such as Colombia, there is no obligation to vote. It is also questionable to what extent turnout data at the individual level corresponds to reality. Even if the sample of respondents is as representative of the population as possible, a complete match still cannot be expected. Moreover, this chapter works with retrospective questions, and it depends on whether the respondent remembers whether he or she voted in the previous presidential election. Another problem with opinion polls is that respondents may not always be telling the truth. For these reasons, the survey data was compared to turnout data. Figure 1 shows that turnout at the individual level is fairly consistent with official turnout. The difference is only a few percentage points for some countries, such as Colombia and Honduras. In the Dominican Republic and Peru, the numbers are almost identical. It can thus be concluded that the data on voter turnout at the individual level are quite meaningful and can be used to draw conclusions.

Figure 21. Experience with Vote Buying




Figure shows the respondents' positive answer to the question, "Thinking about the last presidential elections, did someone offer you something, like a favor, gift, or any other benefit in return for your vote or support?" The data was collected in 2018–2019. There were two possible answers ("Yes" and "No"). The data is given as a percentage of the total number of valid responses and is from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019). Processing: author.

Figure shows that vote buying was relatively common in the observed presidential elections in the Dominican Republic and Honduras. In these Central American countries, one in five respondents experienced this phenomenon. Mexico followed, with 15% of respondents saying yes when asked if they had been offered something in exchange for their vote in the election. Conversely, vote buying is minimal in Colombia and El Salvador, where only 5% of respondents admitted to the practice. Even so, vote buying is shown to be present to a greater or lesser degree in all these eight Latin American countries, without exception. The purpose of further analysis will be to use statistical methods to determine whether and how this phenomenon affects voter turnout in the selected countries.

Table 45. Results of Logistic Regression Analysis

Variables	COL	DOM	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	PAR	PER
Vote buying	0.296 (0.219)	0.814*** (0.163)	0.205 (0.297)	0.489* (0.191)	0.355* (0.154)	0.384* (0.191)	-0.108 (0.173)	0.227 (0.253)
Political interest	0.423*** (0.064)	0.16* (0.064)	0.182** (0.069)	0.065 (0.066)	0.313*** (0.067)	0.207** (0.078)	0.295*** (0.068)	-0.022 (0.084)
Institutional trust	-0.009 (0.031)	0.001 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.032 (0.035)	-0.088* (0.035)	-0.123** (0.038)	0.064 (0.035)	0.068 (0.049)
Watching news	0.208*** (0.057)	0.031 (0.059)	0.174** (0.063)	0.232*** (0.049)	0.147** (0.051)	-0.048 (0.069)	0.107 (0.063)	0.05 (0.086)
Gender	-0.028 (0.114)	-0.321* (0.132)	-0.15 (0.134)	0.091 (0.123)	0.147 (0.124)	-0.461*** (0.139)	0.12 (0.126)	-0.467** (0.158)
Age	-0.04*** (0.004)	-0.077*** (0.006)	-0.087*** (0.006)	-0.085*** (0.006)	-0.044*** (0.005)	-0.052*** (0.005)	-0.049*** (0.005)	-0.115*** (0.009)
Education	-0.085*** (0.017)	-0.065*** (0.019)	-0.077*** (0.018)	-0.052** (0.016)	-0.098*** (0.018)	-0.108*** (0.02)	-0.107*** (0.018)	-0.131*** (0.027)
Residence	-0.91*** (0.158)	-0.266 (0.153)	-0.521*** (0.149)	-0.319* (0.131)	-0.412** (0.13)	-0.322 (0.176)	-0.001 (0.133)	0.063 (0.182)
Constant	0.638 (0.597)	1.333* (0.561)	2.898*** (0.765)	1.736** (0.596)	0.082 (0.511)	1.961** (0.642)	0.633 (0.59)	3.658*** (0.804)
N	1617	1438	1353	1474	1468	1510	1447	1469
Nagelkerke's R2	0.169	0.266	0.31	0.29	0.381	0.15	0.154	0.324

Notes: COL - Colombia, DOM - Dominican Republic, ELS - El Salvador, GUA - Guatemala, HON - Honduras, MEX - México, PAR - Paraguay, PER- Perú; Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; dataset is weighted by WT provided by LAPOP, 2019. *Source* : Author's calculations, based on LAPOP (2019).

The logistic regression analysis shows that the variable vote buying is statistically significant in only four of the eight cases. The significant cases are for the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. In the remaining countries, the variable is insignificant. In the four states where it is significant, its effect works in the same direction—if a respondent was offered a gift or other benefit in exchange for their vote in the last presidential election, they were more likely to participate in that election. For instance, the Dominican Republic model predicts that the odds of voting in an election are 2.25 times higher for those who said they got something than for those who said they got nothing.

The hypothesis, *Voters who are offered a gift are more likely to vote* can thus only be confirmed in four cases.

Regarding the political variables, the variable political interest is statistically significant in six models in which it positively affects turnout. Trust in the legitimacy of the election is significantly associated with turnout only in Honduras and Mexico; in the remaining states, it is not statistically significant for the last presidential elections. Frequently watching news is a significant predictor of turnout in four countries. Thus, the direction of the political control variables in the regression models is consistent with the literature (Denny & Doyle, 2008; Rosema, 2007; Verba & Almond, 1989; Wellman et al., 2001).

Regarding the sociodemographic variables, in the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Peru, more women than men took part in the last presidential election. In the other models, this variable is not statistically significant. By contrast, the variables age and education were statistically significant in all models. The older the respondent, the more likely they were to vote in the last presidential election. With education, the direction of the effect is the same—the more educated the respondent was, the more likely they participated in the elections. Last, for the variable residence, rural respondents are more likely to vote than urban people, although this variable is statistically evident in only four countries (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). Of the sociodemographic control variables, education and age are consistent with the literature (Norris, 2002; Verba et al., 1995), but regarding gender, women seem to participate more than men in Latin America, as do people living outside the city.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to determine whether the experience of vote buying at the individual level is correlated with voter turnout. The assumption was that vote buying would positively affect voter turnout, based on the theory of vote buying found in the literature.

The results of the regression models reveal that vote buying in the form of gifts or other benefits was a predictor of turnout in the last presidential election in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. The most recent elections for the head of state in Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru were not affected

by vote buying, at least according to the regression models using individual-level data.

The chapter thus confirms the conclusions of the previous research (Carreras & Irepoğlu, 2013).

The chapter also shows out, based on data from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP, 2019), that vote buying is present to varying degrees in all countries surveyed. Thus, Latin America has a problem with this phenomenon and must take it into account during elections. The situation is most problematic in the Dominican Republic and Honduras.

Participation in public affairs, such as elections, can be seen as a positive phenomenon in a democratic political system, but if voter turnout is influenced by vote buying, it is not such a positive phenomenon. Vote buying may increase turnout, but it also undermines the fairness of the electoral process.

The way to reduce vote buying is to increase the transparency of the electoral system. It can be achieved, for example, through state regulation of campaign spending or transparent electoral accounting. The role of state bodies overseeing the electoral process is also important.

Possible directions for further research

The AmericasBarometer survey (LAPOP, 2019) did not focus on all Latin American countries but rather on those where the standard of living is not good. Given that vote buying affects mainly the low-income sector, it could be expected to be more or less evident in the selected countries. At the same time, it is necessary to examine vote buying and its effects on political participation in countries with a higher standard of living, such as Chile, to see whether such countries are also susceptible to it.

The survey was conducted for national elections only. Further research is needed at the local level, where the patron–client relationship (mayor–voter) is often much stronger than at the national level. Other research should examine vote buying at the constituency level to see whether it is more intense in safe districts or swing states, and whether vote buying can be a tool aimed at hostile constituencies, as some research suggests (Casas, 2018). Further research should also examine if vote buying increases when there are more candidates. Competitiveness is vital for any

democracy, but this competition may also promote negative phenomena such as vote buying (Kennedy, 2010).

Furthermore, it is necessary to focus on the role of networks. Networks of family and friends are prone to forms of clientelism such as vote buying, as some authors have demonstrated. Such networks generate influences, connections, and dependencies that overlap with the network of financial flows to the accounts of favored beneficiaries (Walczak, 2018). In Latin America, family networks are strong and far-reaching, due mainly to the region's strong Christian beliefs, culture, and open mentality (Cruz, 2019). Comparing politicians' ability to target family ties in Latin American countries with that in other regions, where the role of the family is not so strong, would be another worthwhile area of further research.

The ability to define and identify the practice of vote buying cannot be overlooked. A politician who buys votes can argue that he or she is just handing out harmless promotional items to voters. In some countries vote buying may be a common practice in elections, and as a result, there may be a high tolerance for the phenomenon, which complicates efforts to curb it. In other words, further research in this area should not neglect the issue of tolerance for vote buying.

Conclusions

The ambition of the dissertation was to contribute to solving the research puzzle of how different forms of corruption affect different types of political participation in Latin America. The conclusions of this dissertation should also be seen as a contribution to one of the great debates on the effects of corruption on society in general (De Vries & Solaz, 2017; Školník, 2020d).

The final chapter will first present the findings based on the data from the graphs, which were descriptive in nature, and then present the conclusions drawn from the results of the regression models, which were analytical in nature. All conclusions were reached based on data from the AmericasBarometer (LAPOP) 2019 and Latinobarómetro 2020 polling databases.

Several conclusions could be drawn from the graphs, which essentially represented the data for the independent and dependent variables that were worked with in other parts of the analytical section.

Firstly, the graphs based on data from the 2020 Latinobarómetro polling database showed that there is a prevalence of interest in participating in elections in Latin America. This may, of course, be due to the fact that in the vast majority of Latin American countries voter participation is compulsory. In addition, similar questions from the AmericasBarometer database explicitly asked about participation in presidential elections, both past and future, and since Latin America has presidential forms of government, with the president essentially being the most important actor within the political system, it can be expected that there will be a high level of interest from voters in these first-tier elections. Voters in Latin America naturally alternate between the ruling party and the opposition party, although it is possible to mention, for example, Nicaragua and El Salvador where the vast majority of voters would give their vote to the ruling party, while in Costa Rica and Peru the vast majority of voters would vote for the opposition party.

Furthermore, it can be noted that in Latin American countries, the willingness rather than the unwillingness to demonstrate against corruption and abuse prevails. People in these parts of the world have no problem with these non-institutionalised forms of political participation and it is the willingness to participate that demonstrates that they seem to see them as something natural where they can engage.

Roughly a third of respondents across Latin American countries try to convince others of their political thoughts. While this is not necessarily a form of political participation, it does speak to a fairly advanced form of political engagement, where citizens are not only interested in political issues but also actively persuading others about them, which may evolve into some form of political participation, or this activity is already taking place during some form of political participation, such as political rallies or canvassing.

Based on data from the Latinobarómetro database, it was also evident that the vast majority of citizens across Latin American countries do not work for politicians, either for candidates in elections or for political parties. Although around twenty-five percent of respondents in Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay expressed themselves positively, in the remaining Latin American countries there is minimal interest in this form of political participation. Working for politicians or parties can involve a range of activities from distributing promotional material, sending out emails in support of the party or door-to-door canvassing.

Regarding views on freedom of political participation in the country, for example, in Uruguay over seventy percent of respondents believe that freedom of political participation is fully guaranteed in the country, while in Colombia almost seventy percent of respondents believe that this is not the case. In the other countries, society is divided on this issue, although it tends to be more predominantly negative. The opinion on freedom of political participation served a control function in the regression analyses, as if this freedom is not guaranteed, it may lead to a decline in political participation due to fears from particularly repressive forces in the country. The graphs also revealed that people in Latin American countries do not participate much in political rallies. The greatest interest in this type of political participation was in Paraguay, where over thirty percent of respondents attend political rallies.

It is participation in community meetings that is of much greater interest in Latin American countries. In a number of countries, up to forty percent of respondents in Bolivia participate in this type of political participation. However, there are also exceptions, such as in South American Argentina, where participation in community meetings is around ten percent.

By contrast, participation in town meetings is comparable to participation in political meetings, at around ten percent. Unfortunately, for the questions on

participation in political meetings and town hall meetings, data were missing in some countries, but even so, the selection of countries was fairly representative.

Finally, the last figure, which was on types of political participation, was on participation in demonstrations in Latin American countries. The figure showed that the vast majority of Latin Americans do not participate in this unconventional type of political participation, as participation across countries was only around ten percent of respondents. When comparing actual participation and willingness to demonstrate, it is evident that willingness prevails. A certain specificity of opinion polls is that people tend to exaggerate what the actual reality is, as this example with questions on demonstrations shows.

The figures also showed that in almost all Latin American countries, citizens believe that there has been an increase in corruption in the country over the past year. Only in Uruguay do nearly fifty percent of respondents believe that the level of corruption in the country has remained the same, and in El Salvador, most respondents think that the level of corruption has decreased over the past year.

In terms of awareness of corruption, the vast majority of respondents and their family members across Latin American countries are unaware of any act of corruption in the last year, but it cannot be said that there was no awareness of corruption. For example, in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, around twenty percent of respondents have awareness of corruption, and in Argentina as many as forty percent of respondents know of an act of corruption in the past twelve months.

In terms of people's opinion on whether corruption can be eradicated from politics, Latin American society is rather divided in two halves.

A figure that looked at the perception of corruption among politicians revealed that across Latin American countries, a greater proportion of respondents believe that more than most or even all politicians are involved in corruption. These results, along with those regarding the evolution of the corruption situation in the country, are of course alarming, as they show a huge scepticism and distrust of the Latin American public towards their elected representatives.

However, looking at the graph on police bribery, it is clear that only a minimum of respondents has experience of police corruption, with only in Bolivia and Mexico did around twenty-five percent of respondents say that a police officer had demanded a bribe from them in the last twelve months.

And even fewer percentages of respondents across Latin American countries said that an official had demanded a bribe from them in the last year.

These findings point to the phenomenon that people's perceptions of corruption tend to be highly inflated and often do not reflect their actual experience of corruption. There may be several reasons for this. First of all, perceptions of corruption may be influenced by a number of other variables, such as frequent media coverage, but it cannot be ruled out that people may simply exaggerate their perceptions of corruption.

Finally, there is the graph on the experience of vote-buying, which demonstrated that in countries such as the Dominican Republic and Honduras more than twenty percent of respondents had encountered this phenomenon in the last presidential election, but the results from the remaining countries suggest that vote-buying is not as common, with only five percent of respondents in El Salvador, for example, having experienced it.

The second part of the analytical chapter was based on the interpretation of the results of the regression analyses. Logistic regression analysis and ordinary least squares regression were used in the research, depending on the type of dependent variable. Regression models were constructed for each country separately.

First of all, it should be noted that the findings cannot be generalised to all countries, as in some countries there was no statistical significance between the independent variable and the dependent variable within the models. Nevertheless, despite this fact, the findings offer a fairly comprehensive view of the impact of different types of corruption on different forms of political participation.

The results of regression analyses based on data from the Latinobarómetro database revealed that awareness of corruption has the potential to increase voter turnout. Similarly, if people believe that corruption can be eradicated, the more likely they are to turn out to vote. A mobilisation effect was also found for the effects of changes in corruption levels on voter turnout. If people believe that there has been an increase in the level of corruption in a country, the more likely they are to turn out to vote.

Corruption awareness also makes people more likely to vote for government parties than for opposition ones. However, views on the eradication of corruption and the evolution of the level of corruption in the country in relation to voting for opposition or government parties offer different results. While in some states a positive view

of corruption eradication leads to voting for a government party, in other states it leads to voting for an opposition party. Similarly, an increase in the perceived level of corruption in some states is more likely to lead to the election of an opposition party, while in other states it leads to the election of a government party.

The willingness to demonstrate against corruption is positively influenced by both awareness of the phenomenon and a positive view of its eradication, as well as a perceived increase in the level of corruption in a country.

These three variables representing corruption also lead to activities such as convincing others of political thoughts or working for politicians. If one knows about an act of corruption, the more likely one is to try to convince others of one's political thoughts and also work for a politician or political party in some capacity. Similarly, if one believes that one can eradicate corruption from politics, the more likely one will try to convince others of one's political views and work, for example, on the election campaign of a candidate or party. Finally, if one believes that the level of corruption in the country has increased, this too will be an incentive to participate politically.

The results of regression analyses based on data from the AmericasBarometer database revealed that perceptions of corruption have a deterrent effect on voter turnout. The more politicians involved in corruption, the more likely one is not to participate in a presidential election. The experience of police corruption in relation to voter turnout yielded mixed results. While in some states the experience of police bribery is an incentive to participate in presidential elections, in other states it discourages this type of political participation. However, the experience of clerk corruption only works in one direction and has a mobilizing effect on voter turnout. The deterrent effect of perceptions of corruption also emerged from regression models where participation in political meetings was the dependent variable. The more politicians involved in corruption, the more likely one is not to attend a political meeting. However, experience with both police corruption and clerk corruption has exactly the opposite effect on political meeting attendance, namely mobilizing it.

In terms of attending a community meeting, again the deterrent effect of higher perceptions of corruption was evident, while the mobilizing effect was evident for the experience of police and clerk corruption.

The same trend of the effect of perception of corruption and the two types of experience of corruption was also evident in terms of participation in town meetings. While perceptions of corruption have a negative effect on participation in this type of political participation, experiences of either police or clerk corruption have a positive effect. These results confirm the findings of previous research on the effects of corruption on participation in local politics (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019).

It is only when it comes to the effect of corruption on participation in the rallies that this trend has been disrupted. This is because for this type of unconventional participation, both higher perceptions of corruption and both types of experience with this phenomenon have a mobilizing effect. It should be noted that these results are inconsistent with previous research using an earlier AmericasBarometer dataset from 2016 that found that perceptions of corruption have a deterrent effect on participation in demonstrations in Colombia (Školník, 2020c).

Regarding the effects of vote-buying on turnout, it was found that this electoral corruption positively affected turnout in the last presidential elections in four of the eight Latin American countries studied.

The dissertation thus reliably met its stated objectives, which were to examine how different forms of political participation affect different types of political participation across Latin American countries. Thus, the dissertation expanded knowledge and built on scholarly articles that have addressed this issue whether in Latin America (Bonifácio & Paulino, 2015; Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019; Školník, 2019, 2020c), Europe (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019; Školník, 2022), or globally (Bazurli & Portos, 2019; Olsson, 2014). In addition to contributing to the big debate on the impact of corruption on political participation, the dissertation's findings have a number of policy implications for Latin American societies.

First of all, the somewhat paradoxical positive effect of corruption should be mentioned. Although corruption can be perceived as a negative social phenomenon, it can also contribute to increasing participation in different types of political participation that most of the Latin American public does not participate in, such as political meetings, community meetings, town meetings and demonstrations. These meetings address a range of political and social issues, so if corruption is one of the possible determinants of participation, it may increase participants' interest in other

topics and in public affairs in general. Interest in public affairs is of course healthy for democracy, both at the local and national levels.

Another political implication of the mobilising effect of corruption may be that it may put pressure on, or even lead to, the resignation or removal of corrupt politicians and other public administration or security officials, and their replacement by non-corrupt individuals. Of course, it depends on the extent and magnitude of corruption in the country; for example, in countries where corruption has been systematic and has extended from the rank and file to the highest political levels, the replacement of a few individuals may not guarantee an improvement in the situation. The mobilizing effect of corruption can also bring negative concomitant phenomena when it affects participation in demonstrations. This is because these non-institutionalised forms of political participation can very easily erupt into violence when demonstrators clash with other demonstrators or repressive forces.

Another political implication is the deterrent effect of perceived corruption, which is often significantly higher than what the actual awareness of or experience with corruption is. It is a great challenge for politicians to act and act with transparency, credibility and not be prone to corruption, as one corruption case can cast a negative light on the entire political representation and even on the institutions and political parties in which politicians serve. As a result, perceived corruption levels may increase, which may not only have a negative effect on different types of political participation, but also, for example, on institutional trust.

Perhaps the biggest policy implication that was evident from the results of the cross-country regression models is that the phenomenon of corruption and its effects can occur in any country, regardless of its size, location, population, economic situation or level of democracy. In fighting corruption, therefore, it is important to remember that it does not choose and can affect any country and depends only on whether the fight against it is persistent and effective and what the political, social and structural conditions are for it to flourish.

However, the dissertation also had several limitations that it is responsible and transparent to mention. The first limitation may be the nature of the data, as the dissertation worked exclusively with individual-level data. Although the opinion polling data came from respected organizations that have extensive experience in collecting individual-level data in Latin America, the reliability of the data

obviously cannot be ruled out. For some questions, the responses were not from all respondents included in the survey, which ultimately led to a reduction in the number of cases when building regression models. Nevertheless, the sample of respondents was still representative for each country. Another problem with public opinion surveys is that people can be insincere, especially on sensitive questions such as those related to the phenomenon of corruption. For these reasons, survey experiments are carried out, but they are financially and organisationally very costly and therefore the dissertation did not resort to them. Even so, the results of opinion polls and their interpretation must be approached with some caution. It is certainly appropriate to compare individual data for scrutiny with other types of data, as was the case when this dissertation also compared real voter turnout data and aggregated Transparency International corruption perception data.

Other limitations include the fact that the dissertation did not address the causes or deeper interpretation of differences in the effects of corruption on political participation between countries. However, the results showed that it was not possible to trace much of any trends between states except in the general directions of the variables.

Other limitations of the dissertation may include the construction of regression models without a number of control variables other than those with which it was working. For example, the dissertation did not account for mandatory voter turnout and was limited to selected socio-economic and political variables from opinion poll databases. However, it was already announced in the theoretical part that political participation in Latin America can be influenced by a number of variables and that it is not an ambition to include all of them in the research design. The priority of this dissertation was to examine the effect of independent variables representing types of corruption while controlling for at least selected socioeconomic and political variables.

Another certain limitation of the dissertation may be that it was limited exclusively to data from opinion polls and did not include data on corruption from, for example, corruption indices. Similarly, the dissertation did not include data on political participation in the form of surveys of actual voter turnout in the regression models. However, this issue has also been discussed in the theoretical part of the dissertation, that a number of researches work with corruption indices and data on voter turnout and for this reason the focus will be only on opinion polls, whose

databases additionally offer different types of corruption and political participation, which, for example, have not been represented in the scientific literature so far.

Possible directions for future research

Given that the preponderance of existing research is limited to the most typical form of political participation, electoral participation, the scope of future research should be expanded to include other forms of political participation that could also be influenced by corruption, as demonstrated in this dissertation.

Attention needs to be paid to the different outcomes of corruption perception among experts and citizens. Future measurements should be comparable across space and time in order to discern trends rather than one-off studies producing different results. Aggregated data at the national level should be compared with individual data at the national level. Data such as that from the Corruption Perceptions Index should not be combined with the results of local surveys, which are usually narrowly focused on the selected country or location, which makes international comparison inappropriate. These comments relate to what was indicated in the theory section – there should be new research about what corruption means to respondents in different countries and cultures and where the tolerance threshold for corruption is. In general, what is needed is a better understanding of corruption. Study samples should be selected to compare not only individual countries but also international regions. Existing research has, after all, already demonstrated regional differences: in Latin America, some forms of corruption appear to lead to political participation, while in many European countries corruption in general is a significant disincentive.

It would also be worth-while to conduct comparative studies of Latin American countries with and without compulsory voting systems to determine whether and how the effects of corruption on participation differ depending on each voting system. It is important for research on the effects of corruption to assess political practice at all levels, from the national to the municipal, not only Europe but in Latin America. It should not be forgotten that voters have a third option—besides voting or staying home—by which they can register their opinion regarding the corruption of politicians, namely, invalidating deliberately their own vote in protest (Kouba & Lysek, 2016; Luis Raúl Cámara-Fuertes Gustavo J. Bobonis, 2015). It is

crucial for future research to ask and evaluate whether perceptions of corruption, awareness of corruption, or personal experience with corruption may motivate such an action. Future studies may also wish to compare the effects of corruption more generally to the effects of a specific corruption scandal or series of scandals (Bowler & Karp, 2004; Fernández-Vázquez et al., 2016). It is also important to distinguish between non-interested respondents and respondents with distinct ideological orientations or political party affiliations. Although some authors claim that the voter is „very sensitive to corruption and is unlikely to support a corrupt politician, even if this politician delivers public goods“ (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013, p. 426), past studies have demonstrated that partisans of either the ruling party or opposition parties have a strong predisposition to support these parties, often ignoring corruption as a result (Ecker et al., 2016; Redlawsk & McCann, 2005). In addition, it is important for future studies to focus on how overall perceptions of the party system affect participation; for instance, if respondents perceive the whole party system as corrupt, even if they perceive the party currently in power as corrupt, it will not play a decisive role in their decision making because the oppositional alternatives are similar in their eyes (Cordero & Blais, 2017). Finally, further research should seek the best predictors for engaging in different forms of political participation. For instance, further research could investigate whether perceived corruption or experience with corruption are strong predictors, as some research suggests (Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019). This research should be conducted at both the national and local levels.

Further research on the impact of corruption on political participation could also include new forms of political participation, such as online forms of political participation and specifically social media participation. And that's because social media is gradually replacing traditional forms of mass communication in Latin America (Altamirano-Benítez et al., 2019). This process naturally attracts social media researchers. Research on this topic has been carried out in Latin America over the last decade or so. This is of course due to the fact that social platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp and others started to emerge after 2000 and it was necessary to give some time to see how they really work, how often they are used and, above all, what impact they can have on society (Gómez & Borges-Tavárez, 2017; McGough et al., 2017; Motti et al., 2021; Navarro et al., 2018; Pazos, 2012; Salzman, 2015). The role of social media as a communication platform has grown

during the covid pandemic, as physical contact has been reduced and social life has moved online. This was and is no different in the Latin American region (Haman et al., 2022). Social media is most often examined in the context of election campaigns.⁴³ Social media also provides a space for political activism.⁴⁴ Moreover, research in this area does not only use big data from social media, but also from polling databases, with which this dissertation has worked.⁴⁵ However, there is a lack of research on how corruption can affect social media participation.

In conclusion, political participation and citizen involvement in general is healthy for any civil society. If corruption affects political participation, it is necessary to know how. Corruption may be a deterrent leading to the resignation of citizens and their indifference to the political system. On the contrary, it may also have a mobilizing effect, especially for unconventional types of political participation, such as demonstrations, which may lead to violence or social instability. The literature review has noted that, just as it is difficult to fight corruption, it is also difficult for social scientists to accurately assess this diverse phenomenon and test hypotheses about its effects. However, in order to fight corruption effectively, it is essential to know what impacts it can have on society. At the very least, the debate on corruption and political participation is well underway, as demonstrated by the growing number of studies in this area, and the growing diversity of research, as manifested by the inclusion of various forms of corruption and political participation. Nevertheless, there is still much work to be done.

⁴³ Of note is an article that looked at Twitter activism during presidential elections in five Latin American countries between 2015 and 2017. Among other things, the authors revealed that emotions on social media correlate with subsequent electoral outcomes (López-López et al., 2020).

⁴⁴ It is therefore not surprising that there is research examining activists' use of social networking sites and analysing how they use them and to what end (Harlow, 2014). How social media influences civic attitudes was also examined. For example, social media use was found to have a negative effect on civic attitudes towards national political conditions, especially in countries with high levels of internet freedom (Gainous et al., 2016). In fact, social media can be seen as a kind of public sphere where participants take positions that can be described as more democratic (Salzman, 2019). Other research in this area also suggests that social platforms have two positive effects for the democratic process, namely social engagement and information diffusion. However, social media can also have negative effects, for example, extremist and otherwise hateful views can be freely disseminated on these platforms, not to mention the presence of misinformation (Mitchelstein et al., 2020). Research on the use of social media in social protest in Latin America, for example, has focused on hashtags, which can have quite a lot of explanatory value (Kosevich, 2021).

⁴⁵ The researchers for instance examined the relationship between social media use and protest participation using survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project. They concluded that social media use for political purposes increases protest chances and also reduces protest gaps associated with age, gender, psychological engagement with politics and recruitment networks (Valenzuela et al., 2016).

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