Islam within Europe: A Clash of Civilizations?

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Declaration

I, Narine Hakobyan, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled 'Islam within Europe: a Clash of Civilizations', submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed

Date   17 May, 2011

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<u>Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronym</u>

CD-Centre Democrats

DG-Green party (Die Grunnen)

FN-Front National

LPF -Pim Fortuyn List

PVV-Party for Freedom

 SD- Social Democrats

 SPD-Social Democratic Party of Germany

SVP-Swiss People's Party

 UK-United Kingdom

UN- United Nations

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Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, a political scientist named Samuel Huntington proposed a theory for future conflicts between and within States based upon culture.

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.[1]

He divided the world into 'civilizations', each based upon distinctive cultures, and hypothesised that these civilisations would in the future define geopolitical conflict. In particular, he argued that the 'Western' (principally North American and European) civilization would conflict with the 'Islamic' (principally Middle Eastern and North African) civilization. In support of this hypothesis, he cited Muslim immigration to Europe as a source of past, current and future conflict due to fundamental cultural differences and relied upon historical conflicts between Christianity and Islam.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Muslim immigration to Europe has become an increasingly prominent political issue at local, national and European levels. It has become particularly prominent in European countries with recently-acquired large Muslim minorities such as Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Anti-immigration, and specifically anti-Muslim immigration, political parties have made considerable gains in these countries. Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* and the Danish cartoon scandal, as well as the Islamic heresy trials provoked protests amongst certain Muslims in Europe for blasphemy. Switzerland approved a referendum introducing a ban upon the construction of new minarets (though rejecting a proposal to further tighten its citizenship law), whilst France and the Netherlands banned the wearing of the certain forms of Islamic dress (e.g-hijab, burqa). Thilo Sarrazin's book *Germany Abolishes Itself* (a bestseller) prompted a major debate concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants.

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[1] Huntington, S. P. (January 01, 1993). The Clash of Civilizations?. *Foreign Affairs, 72,* 3, 22-49, online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations (Accessed: 12 April 2010).

These developments suggest that tensions between host populations and Muslim immigrants in Europe are not only increasing but will likely continue to do so. They also point towards a fascinating interface between politics and culture through identity, religion and citizenship.

This thesis seeks to examine these new recent political developments concerning Muslim immigration to Europe through the prism of Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis. The research question that it seeks to answer is whether Huntington's theory is correct within the specific context of Muslim immigration to Europe. In other words, are the political tensions between European host populations and Muslim immigrants and their descendants due to a fundamental clash between cultures based upon distinct civilisational values?

In answering this question, the thesis uses a three-step research methodology. First, in Chapter 1, it examines Huntington's theory in abstract to contextualize it and to identify its strengths and weaknesses with reference to the theory and its critics. Alternative theories concerning Muslim immigration, in particular the 'dialogue between civilizations' theory and the 'European Islam' theory of Tariq Ramadan, are compared with Huntington's approach to determine whether academics accept the existence of the clash of civilizations premise.

Secondly, in Chapter 2, the theory is tested through two case studies of European countries (namely, Germany and the Netherlands) in which there are large Muslim minorities and prominent anti-immigration parties and politicians. Through analysis of the immigration debates in Germany and the Netherlands, the focus upon Muslim or 'Islamic' symbols alongside immigration and citizenship restrictions reveals that the culture is an important theme underlying the integration debate. The research concept is focused on the key political bodies(e-g- Geert Wilders, Ayaan Hirsi Ali,Thilo Sarrazin), who are strongly labelled as persona non grata among Muslim minorities of Europe. By focusing upon the policies of pro and anti-immigrant politicians, the thesis seeks to determine whether subjectively and objectively there exists a clash of cultures or civilizations from the perspectives of the host populations and the immigrants themselves.

Thirdly, in Chapter 3, the thesis assesses the theoretical and forensic data to answer the research question through critical analysis – particularly focusing upon the various concepts that have been proposed for 'assimilation' or 'integration' of Muslim minorities.

On the basis of analysis, it is suggested that both theoretically and practically there exists a clash of civilizations between the Western and Islamic civilizations within the context of Muslim immigration to Europe. However, despite this, civilizational *differences* may not always suggest a *clash* between nation-states and their ideologies.

In offering its conclusions, the author hopes to contribute to the scholarship on the subject through original research that analyses very recent political developments to test a controversial theory. Eventually, it aims to give empirical evidence of civilizational clashes based on identities, cultures and citizenships.

These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis. "The Clash of civilizations" thesis is a gimmick like "The War of the Worlds," better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time."

Edward Said

Chapter 1: The Clash of Civilizations Theory

In 1993, the famous Jewish-American political scientist Samuel Huntington published a groundbreaking article in the *Foreign Affairs* journal[2] in which he first proposed his 'clashes of civilizations' theory as a response to the thesis of Francis Fukuyama that Western liberal democracy marked the final form of human political development.[3] Written in the immediate post-Cold War period, this incisive article was expanded into a book three years later.[4] Huntington´s theory proposed a framework of ´cultural clashes´ within which to understand geopolitical conflicts in the post-Cold War world.

The paradigm of ´culture´ within which to define civilizations was proposed as a replacement of socio-economic criteria that had largely defined the world order of the Cold War.[5] Within that paradigm, he included in his proposed list of eight civilizations a ´Western civilization´ and ´Islamic civilization´.[6] He believed that these two civilizations, for historical and cultural reasons, were in conflict and predicted that the next challenge to the pre-eminence of Western civilization would come from the Islamic civilization.[7] Within the specific context of immigration, he argued that Islam is more conflict-prone than other religions and that Muslim immigration to Europe challenged the integrity of Western civilization rooted in Christianity:

> 'Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe, who are, however, a small minority. It is also manifest, in lesser degree, among Hispanics in the United States, who are a large minority. If assimilation fails in this case, the United States will become a cleft country, with all the potentials for internal strife and disunion that entails. In Europe, Western civilization could also be undermined by the weakening of its central component, Christianity.'[8]

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[2] Note 1, *Supra*
[3] Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press
[4] Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[5] *Ibidem*, 37-38.
[6] *Ibidem*, 26.
[7] Huntington (1993), supra note 2, 32.
[8] Huntington (1996), supra note 4, 266.

His views on Muslim immigration in Europe and America were elaborated upon in a later book.[9] Huntington´s theory provoked much critical analysis.[10] Concerning his belief that Western and Islamic civilizations are in conflict, it has been criticized as biased and unproven.[11] In particular, his observation that Islam has ´bloody borders´[12] due to problems of living peaceably with neighbouring countries, including Europe, has been controversial.

This chapter, through examination of Huntington´s clash of civilizations theory in the specific context of Muslim immigration to Europe, sets out how the theory could be applied as a clash of Western and Islamic cultural identities through assimilation, integration or rejection. In section 1.1, the clash of civilizations thesis is introduced. In section 1.2, the criticisms of Huntington's theory and its applicability to Muslim immigration to Europe will be examined. In section 1.3, the historical interaction between the European and Muslim civilizations in Europe will be explored in order to illustrate the meeting-points between the two. It will be demonstrated how this background can be interpreted either as clashes or as benign cultural exchanges. In section 1.4, the debate about the identities of Muslim immigrants to Europe will be analysed for the purpose of focusing upon the problem of harmonisation between civilizations. Finally, section 1.5 will conclude the chapter by demonstrating the potential understanding of the issue of Muslim immigration to Europe within the clash of civilizations theory.

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[9] Huntington, S. P. (2004). *Who are we?: The challenges to America's national identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster

[10] E.g. – E.g. – Said, E. W. (January 01, 2001). ARTICLES - THE CLASH OF IGNORANCE - Labels like "Islam" and "the West" serve only to confuse us about a disorderly reality. *The Nation, 273,* 12, 11 online at: http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance ,(Accessed: 12 April 2010); Berman, P. (2003). *Terror and liberalism*. New York: Norton 15-21; Sen, A. (2006). *Identity and violence: The illusion of destiny*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.10-12.

[11] E.g. Fox, J. (2002). *Ethnoreligious conflict in the late twentieth century: A general theory*. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 430;

[12] Huntington (1993), *supra* note 1, 35.

1.1 The Clash of Civilizations Theory Concerning Muslims in Europe

In commenting about contemporary Muslim immigration to Europe, Huntington notes that since the late 1980s, 'high unemployment rates, increased numbers of immigrants, and their overwhelmingly "non-European" character produced sharp changes in European attitudes and policy.'[13] Within those non-Europeans, he claims that by the early 1990s two-thirds of them were Muslim and 'European concern with immigration is above all concern with Muslim immigration.'[14] For instance, he wrote:

> 'European hostility is curiously selective. Few in France worry about an onslaught from the East – Poles, after all, are European and Catholic. And for the most part, non-Arab African immigrants are neither feared, nor despised. The hostility is directed mostly at Muslims. The word "*immigré*" is virtually synonymous with Islam, now France's second-largest religion, and reflects a cultural and ethnic racism deeply-rooted in French history.'[15]

Hence, Huntington believes that the hostility of Europeans towards Muslim immigrants can be attributed to two causes: 1) demographics; and 2) historical hostility. This demonstrates that, for Huntington, the modern problem of European antipathy to Muslim immigration is an example of the clash of civilizations thesis.

However, Huntington's approach has been criticized for assuming cohesion within civilizations that are in fact quite diverse and in some cases divided-for example, among the Shiite and Sunni Muslims.[16] Moreover, it could be argued that Huntington's prioritization of the role of civilizations as conflict-builders ignores other factors – political, economic and ideological.[17] One study by Jonathan Fox has argued that, from an Islamic civilization perspective, there had been little change in the amount of conflicts among Islamic and other civilizations.[18] However, from the perspective of Western civilizations, the proportion of conflicts between Western and Islamic civilizations had significantly increased since the end of the Cold War.[19] Fox concludes that the findings depend upon the perspective from which one looks at them. He believes that since Huntington was a Westerner, his conclusions about Western-Muslim relations were coloured by his perspective.

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[13] Huntington, *supra* note 4, 126.
[14] *Ibidem.*
[15] *Ibidem.*
[16] Kay, S. (2006). *Global security in the twenty-first century: The quest for power and the search for peace.* Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield),46.
[17] Rubenstein, R. E., & Crocker, J. (January 01, 1994). Challenging Huntington. *Foreign Policy. ,* 96, 113-128, 121.
[18] Fox, J. (2001). *Two civilizations and ethnic conflict: Islam and the West.* Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center459-472, 466-467.
[19] *Ibidem*.

Several authors have disputed Huntington's claim that Islam is incompatible with Western liberal democracy.[20] Others have said that the true division between the Western and Islamic civilizations is not about democracy but sex.[21] One empirical study of historical interstate conflicts concluded that civilizational difference is not significantly associated with an increased likelihood of interstate war.[22]

Ali Mazrui[23] finds three flaws in Huntington's theory: 1) a factual fallacy, in that it cannot be proven that civilizations will be main lines of conflict in future; 2) a conceptual fallacy, in that there could be alternatives to the clash of civilisations (e.g. – clash of races); and 3) a temporal fallacy, in that inter-civilisational conflicts not only occur in the modern world, but also throughout history. (e.g.-the Crusades, the trans-Atlantic slave trade and European colonisation).

Therefore, Whilst Huntington suggests culture and religion as the causes of future conflict, Berman argues:

> 'On the other hand, neither did the Terror War look like a clash of civilizations. The whole problem with Huntington's theory was always one of scale, and not just nuance. A clash of civilizations has got to be, by definition, huge and eternal, or very nearly so…But there was no reason to look on the Afghan War or on anything that happened afterward as a clash of Christendom and Islam…The reality of the Terror War, then – the real-life vista that first became evident in those early days of the Afghan War – was neither police like, nor Civilizational, nor cosmic. It was an event in the twentieth-century mode. It was a clash of ideologies. It was the war between liberalism and the apocalyptic and phantasmagorical movements that have risen up against liberal civilization ever since the calamities of the First World War.'[24]

Moreover, Berman argues that distinct cultural boundaries do not exist in the present day and there is neither an ´Islamic civilization´ nor a ´Western civilization´, and that the evidence for a Civilizational clash is not convincing, especially when considering broad alliances in 'realistic' foreign policy such as that between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War.[25]

Amartya Sen is one of Huntington's most important critics.[26] He argues that 'a root cause of violence is when people see each other as having a singular affiliation (Hindu or

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[20] E.g. – Said, E. W. (January 01, 2001). ARTICLES - THE CLASH OF IGNORANCE - Labels like "Islam" and "the West" serve only to confuse us about a disorderly reality. *The Nation, 273,* Voll, J. O., & Esposito, J. L. (January 01, 1994). Islam's democratic essence. *Middle East Quarterly. , 13,* 3-11

[21] Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (January 01, 2003). The True Clash of Civilizations. *Foreign Policy,* 135, 62-70.

[22] Henderson, E. A., & Tucker, R. (January 01, 2001). Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly, 45,*2, 317-338.

[23] Kirbassov, G., Has "the Clash of Civilizations" Found Empirical Support? Online at: http://www.fountainmagazine.com/article.php?ARTICLEID=783, (Accessed: 12.04.2011).

[24] Berman, *supra* note 10, 182-183.

[25] *Ibidem*, 8-15.

[26] Supra note 9

Muslim) as opposed to multiple affiliations:(Hindu, woman, housewife, mother, artist, daughter, member of a particular socio-economic class), all of which can be a source of a person's identity'.[27] Sen argues that Huntington's theory is taxonomically simplistic because it ignores the complex nature of identity which includes nationality, location, class, social status, language and politics.[28] As a response to the above-mentioned criticism, Huntington claims that he has always been aware of multi-identities and that the basis of association and antagonism among countries has changed over time and, in the coming decades, questions of identity (cultural heritage, language, and religion) will play a central role in politics.

1.2 Alternative Theoretical Approaches to Muslims in Europe

In this section, we will consider alternative approaches to the 'clash of civilizations' theory. One prominent approach that preceded Huntington, and to which his theory was a direct response, was that of Francis Fukuyama.[29] In his theory, the Western liberal democratic model of governance represents the final form of human government that will eventually become universal. Although he did not suggest that the post-historical world will be free from conflict or that culture will disappear as a distinguishing characteristic of societies, he believed that only the liberal democratic West would continue to dominate world politics.[30]

According to Fukuyama, Muslim societies are particularly resistant to modernity because the Islamic world has the fewest number of democracies and no Muslim countries that have transitioned from the Third World to the First World.[31] He argued that Islam 'is the only cultural system that seems to regularly produce people, like Osama bin Laden or the Taliban, who reject modernity' and questioned whether this rejection was representative of the larger Muslim community and 'somehow inherent in Islam.'[32] However, he also argued that Western liberal democracy remains appealing to Muslim people worldwide.[33] Despite the different conclusions that Fukuyama reaches concerning the universality of Western liberal democratic values, he appears to accept the existence of a distinct Islamic civilization opposed to Western civilization.

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[27] *Ibidem*, 172.
[28] *Ibidem,* 10-12.
[29] Fukuyama, F, The End of History, (1989) The National Interest and Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.
[30] Fukuyama, F, History is Still Going Our Way, 5 October 2001, Wall Street Journal
[31] *Ibidem*.
[32] *Ibidem*.
[33] *Ibidem*.

An alternative theory is the so-called 'dialogue among civilizations'. This approach, like Huntington and Fukuyama, accepts the existence of distinct Western and Islamic civilizations but argues that they are not in conflict. The idea seems to have originated from former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami who declared in his 2000 speech to the United Nations General Assembly:

> 'Islamic civilization is indeed one of only a few world civilizations to have become consolidated and to have taken shape around a sacred text, in this case the noble Koran. The essential unity of the Islamic civilization stems from the unique call that reached all Islamic peoples and nations. Its plurality derives from the diversity of responses evoked after Islam reached various nations.
> There are two ways to realize dialogue among civilizations. First, actual instances of the interaction and interpenetration of cultures and civilizations with each other, resulting from a variety of factors, present one mode in which this dialogue takes place. This mode of interaction is clearly involuntary and optional and occurs in an unpremeditated fashion, driven primarily by vagaries of social events, geographical situation and historical contingency.
> Second, alternatively, dialogue among civilizations could also mean a deliberate dialogue among representative members of various civilizations such as scholars, artists and philosophers from disparate civilizational domains. In this latter sense, dialogue entails a deliberate act based upon premeditated indulgence and does not rise and fall at the mercy of historical and geographical contingency.'[34]

On Iran's suggestion, the UN designated 2001 as the UN Year of ´Dialogue Among Civilizations´´. Although there has not been much academic development of this theory, it seems that central concepts are inherent civilisational plurality and benign inter-relations between civilisations. Within the context of Muslim immigration, it might be proposed as the framework for the idea of 'integration' of cultures without adopting only one or rejecting another. As Giandomenico Picco (the UN representative for the Dialogue of Civilizations Year) argued, mutual communication rather than conflict should be the core of civilisational differences.[35] A similar initiative specifically aimed at reducing tensions between the Western and Islamic worlds is the 'Alliance of Civilizations' first proposed by Prime Minister Zapatero of Spain and Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey at the UN General Assembly in 2005.[36]

One critic of Huntington's thesis, Edward Said, has argued an approach quite similar to the 'dialogue among civilizations' concept. He claims that so-called clashes between civilizations arise from ignorance and also doubts whether 'Western' and 'Islamic' civilizations can be categorised as separate and opposed entities.[37]

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[34] 'Empathy and compassion', (8 September, 2000), The Iranian, online at:
http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2000/September/Khatami/ (Accessed: 25 April 2010).
[35] 'UNESCO Round Table: Dialogue among Civilizations', Picco, Giandomenico, (5 September 2000), online at: http://www.unesco.org/dialogue/en/picco2.htm (Accessed: 22 October 2010).
[36] United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, online at: http://www.unaoc.org , (Accessed: 20 October 2011).
[37] Said, E. W. (January 01, 2001). ARTICLES - THE CLASH OF IGNORANCE - Labels like "Islam" and "the West" serve only to confuse us about a disorderly reality. *The Nation, 273,* para. 3.

In particular, he points to:

> '…the lack of evidence required to confirm a clear-cut divide between "Islam" and the "West" by briefly referring to the numerous plural societies where people from both "sides" live. In addition, he draws attention to the persistence of "Anti-Islamic" perspectives in the "West" and indicates police reports as evidence of the hate speech and actions against Muslims living in Western civilizations. Said contends that this "Anti-Islamic" standpoint, which first manifested itself in 7th century Europe when the Arab-Islamic conquest instigated the destruction of the Christian-Roman Empire and the unity of Europe, has been reignited. However, he maintains that numerous aspects emphasizing the positive relations established in the past are wrongly overlooked; for example, the humanism, science, philosophy and sociology of Islam, which the West gladly embraced. Throughout his article, Said, revisits this notion of a failure to highlight the intricacies of a shared past and present and speculates that it is easier for people to focus on the vast differences and adopt a "them" and "us" approach rather than attempting to acknowledge or accept the more vague similarities.'[38]

Therefore, Said claims that the lack of understanding can create tensions and disputes among civilizations and, at the same time, cause conflicts between the people of these civilizations (e.g.- between Muslim immigrants and the Western host populations). In addition, as seen in the quotation above, Said believes that the clash of civilizations arises from a negative understanding of history and contends that positive historical relations between the Western and Islamic civilizations have been wrongly ignored.

Thus, the next section will compare the possible interpretations of this Civilizational interaction through major historical records of the past centuries.

1.3 Historical Interaction between Western and Islamic Civilizations within Europe

The most striking historical examples of conflict between the Western and Islamic civilizations are the Crusades, which occurred between the 11th and 13th centuries, and the *Reconquista* (8th to 13th centuries).[39] Although the causes behind these historical events were diverse and complex, the principal nature of the conflicts was religious and they can even be interlinked parts of as a single grand, geopolitical world war between civilisations. Additionally, the wars between the Christian Byzantine and Austrian Empires, lesser Christian kingdoms such as Serbia and the Christian Holy League (Holy Roman Empire, Russian Empire, Austrian Empire, Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Croatia and others) in the ´Great Turkish War´ of the 17th century with the Ottoman Empire continue to be invoked as

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[38] Hashemnia, P, "'The Clash of Ignorance" vs. "The Clash of Civilizations"' (14 November 2009), available at: http://pargol444.wordpress.com/2009/11/14/the-clash-of-ignorance-vs-the-clash-of-civilizations/ (Accessed: 01 November 2010).

[39] For background, see Payne, R. (2000). *The dream and the tomb: A history of the Crusades*. New York: Cooper Square Press Gaiduk, I. V. (2003). *The great confrontation: Europe and Islam through the centuries*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. O'Callaghan, J. F. (2003). *Reconquest and crusade in medieval Spain*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Tyerman, C. (2004). *Fighting for Christendom: Holy war and the crusades*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Housley, N. (2006). *Contesting the Crusades*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

evidences of conflict.[40] Moreover, these conflicts are cited by Huntington as historical evidence of the existence of a clash between the Christian-rooted Western civilization and the Islamic civilization:

> 'The initial Arab-Islamic sweep outward from the early seventh to the mid-eighth century established Muslim rule in North Africa, Iberia, the Middle East, Persia, and northern India. For two centuries or so the lines of division between Islam and Christianity stabilized. Then in the late eleventh century, Christians reasserted control of the western Mediterranean, conquered Sicily, and captured Toledo. In 1095 Christendom launched the Crusades and for a century and a half Christian potentates attempted, with decreasing success, to establish Christian rule in the Holy Land and adjoining areas in the Near East, losing Acre, their last foothold there, in 1291. Meanwhile the Ottoman Turks had appeared on the scene. They first weakened Byzantium and then conquered much of the Balkans as well as North Africa, captured Constantinople in 1453, and besieged Vienna in 1529. "For almost a thousand years," Bernard Lewis observes, "from the first Moorish landing in Spain to the second Turkish siege of Vienna, Europe was under constant threat from Islam." Islam is the only civilization which has put the survival of the West in doubt, and it has done that at least twice.'[41]

Hence, Huntington clearly interprets these historical wars as evidence for his thesis of a clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations.

Moreover, the Crusades and *Reconquista* are often cited as examples of extremism or bigotry by Christians and Muslims alike. However, though the existence of a Christendom-Islam conflict in the Crusades and *Reconquista* is difficult to challenge, it is also possible to find evidence of a more complicated interrelationship in the historical record. Specifically, there are indications of a periodic, benign relationship in the cultural-scientific and geopolitical spheres. Even in a time of general conflict between Christians and Muslims, there were specific cases of cooperation and exchanges of experiences at the individual and even state levels.

In the cultural and scientific spheres, there were cases of mutual enrichment and peaceful communication of knowledge and philosophies. One of the chief counsellors and diplomats of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, a Crusader State, was Humphrey of Toron – fluent in Arabic and one of the most respected scholars of the Islamic world whose erudition was respected by Muslim rulers in negotiated treaties with them.[42] Indeed, many of the European, mostly Frankish, Crusaders found themselves to be ´Orientalised´ by the Arabic culture of the Holy Land and many of them lived their whole lives without ever seeing Europe.[43]

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[40] The phrase ´the Turks at the gates of Vienna´ in reference to the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 is used by some of those opposed to the EU membership application of the Republic of Turkey – see, e.g. – Fiegl, The EU, Turkey, and the Islamization of Europe´ (25 June 2010), online at: http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2010/06/eu-turkey-and-islamization-of-europe.html (Accessed: 02 July 2010).
[41] Huntington (1996), supra note 3,133
[42] Payne, supra note 38
[43] *Ibidem*, 135-136, 314.

In Spain, the influence of the Moors was profound in Spanish architecture, literature and art.[44] There is also evidence of considerable cross-cultural interaction between the Christian and Islamic populations in the Holy Land (e.g. – the Greek and Latin city of Antioch).[45]

Despite the broadly hostile relationship between the Crusaders and the Muslims, the complex and fluid nature of the wars resulted in several specific instances of unusual alliances between individual Christian and Muslim rulers.[46] One of those was Unur, Vizier of Damascus, who made alliance with the Kingdom of Jerusalem:

> ´The alliance between Unur and Fulk [King of Jerusalem] was based on a common interest and on similar habits of mind…Actually, at heart Unur detested the Christians, yet he was one of the few Muslim leaders who had an understanding of them and could deal with them in a civilized manner. Fulk invited Unur to attend his court at Acre. It was the first time that a Muslim ruler had been invited to attend the court of a king of Jerusalem. There were festivities, ceremonious exchanges of gifts, and endless diplomatic conversations…In Jerusalem, a rather simple-minded Templar approached Unur and said, "Would you like to see God as a child?" "Yes, certainly," Unur replied. Then the Templar led the vizier to a painting of the Virgin Mary with the Christ child on her lap. "Here," said the Templar, "is God as a child." Unur said nothing; there was wisdom in his silence.

> The alliance between Damascus and the Kingdom of Jerusalem continued into the reign of Fulk's successor…Under Fulk the kingdom in alliance with Damascus seemed to be as secure as it had ever been. Fulk had learned the hard lesson that to survive at all the Crusaders must be more malleable in their attitude to the Muslims, more understanding, and more strenuous in their effort to penetrate the Muslim mind.´[47]

The Crusader King Richard the Lionheart (a ruler now famous for his prowess and courage in battle against the Saracens) unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the peaceful return of Jerusalem to the Crusaders with the Saracen Sultan Saladin (a ruler equally famous for his prowess and chivalry in battle against the Crusaders) by marrying his Christian sister to Saladin´s Muslim brother and making them co-sovereigns.[48] Later, the Crusader Emperor Frederick II Barbarossa was a ruler famously sympathetic to Islam who learnt Arabic and much of the *Qu'ran*, surrounded himself with Muslim scientists, scholars and theologians and successfully negotiated the peaceful return of Jerusalem to the Crusaders through his personal friendship with the Sultan of Egypt.[49]

These examples illustrate that, despite the theoretically and broadly hostile inter-relationship between the Crusaders and the Moors and Saracens, the practical and specific reality was sometimes one of dialogue and even friendship based upon mutual respect or political necessity.

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[44] Fletcher, R. A. (1992). *Moorish Spain*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 171-175.
[45] Asbridge, T. S. (January 01, 1999). The 'Crusader' Community at Antioch: The Impact of Interaction with Byzantium and Islam. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 9,* 305-325. 306 (note 6).
[46] *Ibidem*, 318, 324.
[47] Payne, supra note 38, 144-145.
[48] *Ibidem*, 249-250.
[49] *Ibidem*, 308, 314-320.

Other examples of a potential clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations are the wars between various Christian kingdoms and the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires, which occurred periodically between the 11th and 20th centuries.[50] During these periods, the Turkic peoples were seeking to create an Islamic empire and eventually succeeded in doing so by assuming the leadership of the Islamic world through the Caliphate from 1517-1875.[51] Several wars have been cited as conflicts between the Western and Islamic civilizations: the wars between the Byzantine Empire and the Seljuk Turks, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the lands of Eastern Europe (particularly during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent in the 16th century) and the Great Turkish War between the Christian Holy League and the Ottoman Empire. Huntington expressly relied upon these conflicts as evidence for his argument of the Western-Islamic clash of civilizations.

However, these conflicts have not been devoid of benign interactions as well–as in the case of the Crusades and *Reconquista*. The historical interaction was complex, since there were long periods of truces, trade and cultural exchanges.[52] Additionally, in this context, the *millet* system is noteworthy in that it provided certain legal, political and cultural rights for the Christian and Jewish minorities of the time. Thus, it is also possible to interpret the Ottoman-Christian relationships as a benign dialogue of civilizations.

Despite the wars between the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires and the various Christian states, there were also periods of alliances between those Muslim empires and some of the Christian states. For instance, during the Napoleonic wars the Ottoman Empire made alliance with Great Britain and the other coalition states against Napoleon Bonaparte.[53] Additionally, the Ottoman Empire was considered to be a member of the so-called *Concert of Europe*, which was the informal governing group of Europe during the late 19th century.[54] Consequently, the geopolitical relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the respective Christian states was more intricate than that of enmity.

Additionally, its *millet*[55] system of religious pluralism in which Christian and Jewish minorities were allowed rights of autonomy according to their own religious laws may be

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[50] For background, see, e.g. Finkel, C. (2006). *Osman's dream: The story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923*. New York: Basic Books, Oman, C. W. C. (1922). *The Byzantine Empire: By C. W. C. Oman*. London: J. Fisher Unwin, Brownworth, L. (2010). *Lost to the West: The forgotten Byzantine Empire that rescued Western civilization*. New York: Crown Publishers.

[51] Finkel, *Ibidem*, 492-494

[52] Finkel, supra note 50, 71-72, 90, 113, 222, 334-335, 342, 368-369, 385-386, 377-379, 395, 527.

[53] *Ibidem*, 397.

[54] *Ibidem*, 457.

[55] Najarian, Ari S. *The Millet System and Ottoman Decline*, Scribd, March 2007, 40-50, Online at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/3017610/The-Millet-System-and-Ottoman-Decline

invoked as an example of mutual tolerance and peaceful co-existence between Western and Islamic civilizations.[56] The *millet* system provided the general right to a separate judicial system, under Christian law, for the Christian minorities, and the same for Muslim and Jewish ethnicities under the overall supremacy of the Ottoman administration. Barkey argues that this system disproves Huntington's thesis of a clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations because it demonstrates their compatibility in a system of mutual tolerance and respect.[57] Therefore, it is arguable that the *millet* system was a mere example of a dialogue among the civilizations, than a clash itself.

This section has shown that the historical relationships between the Islamic and Christian civilizations have a direct connection with the modern issue of Muslim immigration to Europe within the context of Huntington's theory. This is because interpretations of that history form the background for a contemporary understanding of these relations as either conflicts or dialogue.

1.4 Immigration Identities and Value Conflicts

The progenitor of Euro-Islam theory is the Swiss-born Egyptian academic Professor Tariq Ramadan, who proposed the concept in his 1999 book *To Be a European Muslim*. Ramadan believes that Muslims in Europe need to create a new ´European Islam´ and emphasises the necessity for Muslim engagement in European society.[58]

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[56] Sachedina, A. A. (2001). *The Islamic roots of democratic pluralism*. New York: Oxford University Press, Barkey, K. (January 01, 2005). Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 19,* 2, 5-19, Finkel, C. (2006). *Osman's dream: The story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923*. New York: Basic Books, 458-470.
[57] Barkey, *Ibidem*, 17-18.
[58] Ramadan, T. (2004). *Western Muslims and the future of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

He proposes that Islam is compatible with European culture if adapted to the European context. Hence, he suggests that we should separate Islamic principles form their cultures of origin and anchor them in the cultural reality of Western Europe. He then argues that it is possible for a Muslim to incorporate all European values that do not contradict his fundamental religious values into his identity, which is a revolution.[59] Thus, the Euro-Islam theory is one of integration or harmonisation of the cultural norms of the Western and Islamic civilisations.

Ramadan is the advocate of the study and re-interpretation of Islam and Islamic texts, and often emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of Western Muslims. In some Islamic countries, Ramadan is considered to be a *persona non grata* [60] because of his 'criticism of undemocratic regimes which deny basic human rights in some Islamic countries'.[61] He also emphasises the difference between 'religion' and 'culture', which he believes are too often confused – arguing that citizenship and religion are separate concepts which should not be mixed.[62] He claims that there is no conflict between being both a Muslim and a European; a Muslim must accept the laws of his country. He believes that Western Muslims must create a 'Western Islam' just as there is a separate 'Asian Islam' and an 'African Islam', which takes account of cultural differences.[63] By this, he means that European Muslims must re-examine the jurisprudence of Islam (*fiqh*) and interpret them through dynamic interpretation (*ijtihad*) in light of their own cultural background, influenced by European society.[64]

He rejects a binary division of the world into *dar al-Islam* ('the house of Islam') and *dar al-harb* ('the abode of war') on the ground that such a division is not mentioned in the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna*.[65] He has also cited favourably the *Dar al-Da'wa* ('the house of information dissemination').[66] However, Ramadan has articulated both the 'ideological geography' of the West and the duty of *da'wa* ('proselytism') in an original fashion and pro-integration fashion. For Ramadan, the West is neither the 'house of war' nor the 'house of

[59] Le Quesne, N "Trying to Bridge a Great Divide," (11 December 2000).Time online at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,998765,00.html.
[60] Caldwell, C. (2009). *Reflections on the revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West*. New York: Doubleday,292.
[61] 'Tariq Ramadan answers the Dutch detractors', Nrc handelsblad (18 August 2009), online at http://vorige.nrc.nl/international/opinion/article2331989.ece (Accessed: 19 April 2011).
[62] Ramadan, T. (1999). *To be a European Muslim: A study of Islamic sources in the European context*. Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation, 162-172. However, he also confusingly uses the term 'European Islamic culture' and 'civilization' – *Ibidem*, 198, 207, 217.
[63] *Ibidem*, 198.
[64] *Ibidem*, 82-89, 198-208, 233-235.
[65] *Ibidem*, 99, 123-127.
[66] *Ibidem*, 145-147.

proselytism' but *dar al-shahada* ('house of testimony' [to the Islamic Message]).[67] He argues that Muslims are 'witnesses before mankind'; they must continue to review the fundamental principles of Islam and take responsibility for their faith.[68]

Importantly, for him the 'Islamic message' to which Muslims are expected to bear witness is not primarily the socially conservative code of traditionalist jurists but a commitment to universalism and the welfare of non-Muslims; it is also an injunction not merely to make demands of un-Islamic societies but also to express solidarity with them.[69] As he writes:

> '... The European environment is a space of responsibility for Muslims. This is exactly the meaning of the notion of "space of testimony" [dar al-shahada] that we propose here, a notion that totally reverses perspectives: whereas Muslims have, for years, been wondering whether and how they would be accepted, the in-depth study and evaluation of the Western environment entrusts them, in light of their Islamic frame of reference, with a most important mission... Muslims now attain, in the space of testimony, the meaning of an essential duty and of an exacting responsibility: to contribute, wherever they are, to promoting good and equity within and through human brotherhood. Muslims' outlook must now change from the reality of "protection" alone to that of an authentic "contribution."'[70]

He emphasises a Muslim's responsibility to his community, whether it be Islamic or not.[71] He criticises the 'us versus them' mentality that some Muslims advocate against the West.[72] He also advocates having Muslim scholars in the West who are versed in Western mores and not relying on religious studies that come only from the Islamic world as well as more Islamic philosophy written in European languages.[73] He thinks that European Muslims' reliance on an 'external' Islam leaves them feeling inadequate and impure, which is a main cause of alienation from European culture.

Essentially, Ramadan believes that Islam should be adapted to European norms in developing a 'European Islam'.

 As he writes:

> 'Instead of thinking in cold, formal terms of a passive integration of Muslims, we should be looking enthusiastically to make a positive contribution in building a new Europe. Their presence is source of richness: it contributes to reflection on the place of spirituality in secularized societies and on the egalitarian promotion of religious and cultural pluralism.'[74]

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[67] *Ibidem*, 165-173.
[68] *Ibidem*, 213-232.
[69] *Ibidem*, 219-221.
[70] *Ibidem*, 150.
[71] *Ibidem*, 153-163.
[72] *Ibidem*, 179-182.
[73] *Ibidem*, 189-198.
[74] Ramadan, 'Immigration, Integration and Cooperation Policies: Europe's Muslims Find a Place for Themselves', Le Monde Dipomatique (1998), available at: http:// www.mon dediplo.co m/1998/ 04/07 islam ,(Accessed: 05 June 2010).

For example, he stresses that a Muslim's freedom of religion is very extensive in the West and that permission of 'un-Islamic' activities (e.g. – drinking or pre-marital sex) does not *compel* Muslims to do anything. This willingness to integrate into European culture reveals that Ramadan does not purport to be an 'Islamist' but a 'Muslim' in that he does not seek to change the surrounding European culture to become an Islamic culture but rather to adapt Islam to harmonise with Europe. For him, to be a European Muslim is to be connected with the modern world through the concept of *ijtihad* rather than to re-create the sixth-century Islamic world.

However, Ramadan rejects the idea that integration 'can end up meaning assimilation – tacitly requiring Muslims to stop professing their faith to gain recognition in the public sphere.'[75] He favourable compares the multiculturalism of the UK with the assimilationism of France.[76] As he said in an interview:

> 'Integration should mean stay who you are, live with your multiple identities and live with the other. It's about how we tackle the visibility of differences and the psychology of knowing that we live with people who are not like use in the name of our common society, within the same legislation and with mutual respect.
> This is not easy. There is no mutual or reciprocal integration without knowledge, education, and taking the time to know more about the other. You cannot have integration or a multicultural society built on mutual ignorance.'[77]

Some academics have welcomed Ramadan's work, detecting liberalising and rationalising tendencies.[78] Another variant of the European Islam theory is that of Professor Bassam Tibi, a German citizen who proposed the 'Euro-Islam' concept for Muslim immigrant to Europe.[79] His approach differs from that of Professor Ramadan in that he believes that Islam should not itself be reformed, but westernised.

 Hence, another variant is that of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former politician in the Netherlands originally from Somalia, who is an apostate from Islam and believes in total assimilation to European culture by rejecting Islam entirely.[80]

In the context of the 'clash of civilisations' thesis, Ramadan's concept appears to reject that there exists such a clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations. Instead, he believes that 'culture' is a distinct concept from religion.

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[75] Ramadan, supra note 74

[76] 'Living together: an interview with Tariq Ramadan', Red Pepper ,online at: http://www.redpepper.org.uk/Living-together-an-interview-with/ (Accessed: 20 April 2011).

[77] *Ibidem*.

[78] E.g. – Brown, L. C., & Ramadan, T. (January 01, 2005). Review of Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. *Foreign Affairs, 84,* 1, 194-194

[79] See, e.g. – 'Europeanisation, not Islamisation' (22 March 2007), online at: http://www.signan dsight.com/features/1258.html, (Accessed: 20 April 2011).

[80] Hirsi, A. A. (2007). *Infidel*. London

This seemingly rejects the very existence of an 'Islamic' civilisation because such a civilisation would be based upon religion rather than culture.

However, his approach may be self-contradictory for the reason that a religious concept of 'European Islam' includes also cultural aspects from the European side. This is because, according to Ramadan, European culture is based upon secular rather than Christian values.[81] Finally, another possible interpretation of 'European Islam' is as integration between the Western and Islamic civilisations in the immigration context. This understanding entails a dialogue or fusion between civilisations rather than a clash as such. By contrast, both Professor Tibi and Ayaan Hirsi Ali appear to accept the existence of a clash between Western and Islamic civilisations and advocate that Muslims assimilate to Western civilisation.

1.5 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the theoretical background of Huntington's ´clash of civilizations´ thesis in the specific context of Muslim immigration to Europe. Huntington´s approach sets a test of ´assimilation´ for Muslim immigrants to not be considered a threat to Western civilization by completely relinquishing their original cultures.[82] Potentially, this threshold would result in the ´integrationist´ concepts of ´Euro-Islam´ or ´European Muslim´ being a threat to the integrity of Western civilization itself. Tariq Ramadan, for instance, could well be a threat to European culture by advocating a fusionist approach between Western and Islamic values.

Clearly, Huntington's view can and has been criticised. The historical perspective suggests that the inter-relationship between the respective civilizations (if one accepts the categorisation) is more complex than first meets the eye. It is possible to find evidence to support both the clash and dialogue interpretations. However, it seems over-exaggerated to be thinking that cultural dividing lines are the only decisive factors behind building conflicts or co-operations in a political context. A number of alternative approaches disclosed its irrelevance regarding civilizational issues.

Consequently, there are other points to be considered, namely the time shift as yet another decisive factor, which spreads light on Huntington´s civilisational statements.

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[81] Ramadan, *supra* note 62, 216, 249.
[82] Note 7, *supra*.

Hence, we should be grateful for the valuable contribution Huntington had on showcasing the nature of conflicts.

In examining the contemporary dynamics of Muslim immigration to Europe, this theoretical and historical context has the potential to influence the mutual attitudes of the immigrants and the host populations.

Chapter 2: Muslim Immigrants within Europe

Having examined the clash of civilizations theory and its critics within the context of Muslim immigration to Europe in abstract, this chapter proceeds to test the practical application of the theory. In doing so, it scrutinizes two case studies of European countries – Germany and the Netherlands – with large Muslim immigrant populations where the issue of Muslim integration and multiculturalism has increasingly become a particularly topical political issue. Special reference is made to the rhetoric of the leading politicians on various sides of the debate (Thilo Sarrazin, Angela Merkel and Cem Özdemir in Germany as well as Geert Wilders, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands) in order to test whether their views are predicated upon the concept of a clash between 'European' and 'Islamic' civilizations or cultures.

Although a variety of political views concerning Muslim immigrant integration or assimilation is analysed, the rhetoric of anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic political parties is particularly interesting.

This is for two reasons: 1) anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic parties have been gaining increasingly greater political support from the European electorates in recent years,[83] which suggests that immigration and particularly Muslim immigration are issues of increasing concern to European host populations even in the midst of the global financial crisis. Through analysis of the immigration debates in Germany and the Netherlands, the focus upon Muslim or 'Islamic' symbols alongside immigration and citizenship restrictions suggests that culture is an important theme underlying the integration debate.

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[83] There has been a series of major victories for these parties. The Swiss People's Party of Christoph Blocher became the strongest party in Switzerland at the 2007 federal election. The Freedom Party of the late Jorg Haider placed third in the 2008 Austrian parliamentary election and second in the 2010 presidential election. The Party for Freedom of Geert Wilders gained the third-most seats in the 2010 Dutch general election following which it struck a support deal with the new minority government. In the 2010 Swedish general election, the Sweden Democrats' party entered parliament for the first time. In the 2011 Finnish general election, the True Finns party took the third-most seats Marine le Pen, leader of the Front National party of France, is predicted to reach the second round of the 2012 presidential election.

2.1   Muslim Immigrants in Germany

The biggest wave of Muslim immigration to Germany started with the arrivals of guest workers from Turkey during the 1950-60s, which increased to a population of estimated three and a half million in 2010. [84] Thus, with time, the Turkish community of Western Europe provided the largest Muslim presence in Germany. Eventually, Islam became the second largest religion of the country:

> Owing to labour migration in the 1960s and several waves of political refugees since the 1970s, Islam has become a visible religion in Germany. As of 2009, there are 4.3 million Muslims (5.4% of the population). Of these, 1.9 million are German citizens (2.4%).[85]

However, with the arrival of more immigrants doubts were raised concerning the full integration of Muslim immigrants amongst the host German population. Amongst all of the immigrant populations in Germany, the immigration debate has focused most upon the Turkish and Arab Muslims. Although there are anti-immigration parties in Germany such as the Germany Republican Party ('REP'), German People's Union ('DVU') and National Democratic Party ('NPD'), hitherto debate concerning Muslim integration has been done at the individual level notably by such politicians as Thilo Sarrazin, Angela Merkel and Cem Özdemir.

Sarrazin, a German economist and Social Democrat, published a provocative book in 2010 entitled 'Germany abolishes itself', [86] in which he argued that Muslim Immigrants constitute an economic and cultural threat to Germany. Subsequently, he was removed from his position as a member of the German State Bank following his criticism of German post-War immigration policy. Sarrazin is considered to be a rejectionist of Muslim culture and an advocate of Western assimilation. His ideas are a matter of wide political debate:

> 'Integration requires effort from those that are to be integrated. I will not show respect for anyone that is not making that effort. I do not have to acknowledge anyone who lives by welfare, denies the legitimacy of the very state that provides that welfare, refuses to care for the education of his children and constantly produces new little headscarf-girls. This holds true for 70 percent of the Turkish and 90 percent of the Arabic population in Berlin.'[87]

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[84] ´Turkey: strategically important partner´, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in London, online at: http://www.london.diplo.de/ (Accessed: 10 April 2011).

[85] *Studie: Deutlich mehr Muslime in Deutschland* (23 June 2009), online at: http://www.dwworld.de/dw /article/ 0,, 441 9533,00.html (Accessed: 05 April 2011).

[86] Sarrazin, T. (2010). *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*. Mu□nchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt

[87] 'Sarrazin muss sich entschuldigen', *Die Zeit* (1 October 2009), at: http://w ww.zeit.de/p olitik/de utschland/2009-10/sarrazin-aeusserung-integration?page=all (Accessed: 12 January 2011).

Thus, Sarrazin argues that integration in Germany is a matter of effort and willingness on the part of Muslim immigrants. He then carefully suggests that the acceptance of the state, the supremacy of the law and the host culture as well as adaptation techniques aimed at mastering the host language and education are the basic requirements for 'integration'. In light of his disparaging reference to ´little headscarf-girls´, it is debatable whether he believes that Islam is fundamentally compatible with German culture. Sarrazin particularly focuses upon Muslims´ unwillingness to inter-marry with Christians (arguably a form (fear) of assimilation) as a sign of this incompatibility.

Therefore, it is possible to label Sarrazin´s views as requiring assimilation of Muslim immigrants rather than integration. Clearly, Sarrazin believes that there exists a clash between the cultures of the host and immigrant populations. However, in an interview Sarrazin opined that the integrationist attitude between differing civilizations should be based on mutual tolerance and harmony. He claims that Muslims, however, are incapable of this:

> ´Muslims are either "unwilling or unable to integrate´´ into Western society. If the majority of migrants from non-Muslim countries don't have any obvious problem integrating, then the failure to integrate on the part of migrants from Muslim countries can't be due to a fault on our side - because all are treated equally. It has to be because of a characteristic of Muslims themselves.´[88]

In Sarrazin´s view, Muslims are either unwilling or are not capable of integrating into Western civilization. This is due to a fundamental incompatibility or conflict between the Western and Islamic civilizations. He predicts that the failure of integration will accelerate due to the eventual outnumbering of native Germans by the Muslim population in Germany. [89] The Muslim population will double in the coming decades, thus creating a gap between the two respective civilizations.

The integration issues are deepening due to low birth-rate tendencies in the countries of Western Europe on the one hand, while compared to the outnumbering of Muslim population on the other:

> ´Culturally and morally the Muslims represent a step backward for German society. If the birth-rate of migrants remains higher than that of the indigenous population, within a few generations, the migrants will take over the state and society.´[90]

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[88]'Germans argue over 'failure to integrate', BBC news, (7 Nov. 2010), online at: http://w ww.bbc.co.uk/b logs/thereporters/gavinhe witt/2010/11 /how_sarrazin_s_ immigration_v ie.html?postid=102949055 (Accessed: 5 May 2011).

[89] 'Immigration Provocateur in Germany Crosses the Line: A Jewish Gene', *Der Spiegel Online* (30 August 2010), online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,714567,00.html (Accessed: 25 September 2010).

[90] 'Islam lowers intelligence', The Last Crusade, online at: http://thelastcrusade.org/2011/01/29/%E2%80%9Cislam-lowers-intelligence%E2%80%9D/ (Accessed: 10 April 2011).

´It is correct that birth-rates are declining among Germany's second generation of women of Turkish origin. However, constant immigration from abroad ensures that the trend toward declining birth-rates is broken.´[91]

If current trends keep static for the decades to come, Germany will have to review its integration policies with a more selective attitude towards immigrants in order not to face challenges that might change the socio-economic picture of the country.

'Sarrazin says Germany is endangering its future because it has allowed too many poorly educated immigrants into the country. Efforts to combat the poor education and cultural segregation are in vain, he says. A single man can allow himself such fatalism. But a society must not succumb to such tempting simplifications. Germany needs its immigrants -- highly qualified ones and the less skilled ones who are here in the second and third generations.   The decline in the birth rate is too dramatic to allow a large proportion of youths of Turkish and Arab origin to leave school without qualifications'.[92]

In addition, Sarrazin believes that the overwhelming numbers of immigrant generations will promote Islamization and degradation of Europe, which in Sarrazin's opinion is unacceptable. In his view, Muslim immigrants are having too many children and will make up a majority in Germany within a few decades.

Interestingly, Sarrazin claims that overwhelming numbers of the Muslim population is not related to race, but instead is connected with Islamic culture. [93] Whilst Sarrazin was putting efforts to advocate assimilation, he states that Muslim immigrants are "hardly compatible" with a Western Society like Germany.[94]

As he notes:

'No other religion in Europe makes so many demands. No immigrant group other than Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime. No group emphasizes their differences so strongly in public, especially through women's clothing. In no other religion is the transition to violence, dictatorship and terrorism so fluid.' [95]

'Boys are taught an exaggerated idea of the readiness to be violent... for the sake of honour you must take the role all the more seriously the less successful you are in the school system". Muslim immigrants are "unwilling or incapable of integrating into Western society".'[96]

Sarrazin is undeniably opposed to Muslim clothing rules regarding women. Hence, it could be argued that Sarrazin´s comments are indicative of an anti-Islam predisposition. This attitude is emphasized in the following comment:

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[91] 'Why Sarrazin's Integration Demagoguery Has Many Followers: The Man Who Divided Germany', *Spiegel Online* (9 June 2010), online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715876-3,00.html (Accessed: 01 September 2010].

[92] Crossland, 'Sarrazin Has Crossed a Red Line with His Racist Nonsense', The World From Berlin, *Der Spiegel Online* (30 Aug. 2010) online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715876-3,00.html (15 September 2010).

[93] *Ibidem.*

[94] Note 7, *supra.*

[95] Sarrazin, 'Schreibt uber den islam', online at: http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/politik/spd-politiker-schreibt-in-seinem-neuen-buch-ueber-den-islam-13749562.bild.html (Accessed: 10 April 2011).

[96] *Ibidem.*

´I don't want the country of my grandchildren and great-grandchildren to be largely Muslim, or that Turkish or Arabic will be spoken in large areas, that women will wear headscarves and the daily rhythm is set by the call of the muezzin. If I want to experience that, I can just take a vacation in the Orient.'[97]

In Sarrazin's perception, there should be some integration or, perhaps more accurately, assimilation. Whilst accepting that some Muslims have integrated, he claims that Germany has gone too far to accommodate Muslims communities. In order to stop Muslim immigration, there should be implemented certain integration-assimilationist proposals as stated below:

'People who obey laws are welcome to live here. For those already in Germany, welfare payments would be dependent on learning German and acquiring language skills. Parents who do not send their children to school (for religious reasons) should be fined. Forced marriages should be forbidden. Muslim migrants must accept German laws, the constitution and the values of their new society.'[98]

Therefore, Sarrazin predicts hostile attitudes towards assimilation by the side of Muslims residing in Europe, which will eventually cause segregation of Muslims in Christian communities. To combat European xenophobia and Muslim hate-speeches, assimilation is most important. Sarrazin has no objection to successfully assimilated ethnic groups like Vietnamese and Indians who have jobs and speak German.[99]

This assimilationist stance has arguably provoked the Turkish minority in Germany. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed that integration is important but assimilation is a crime against the humanity. To his mind, no one has the right to deprive Turks from their own culture and identity.[100] Despite claiming that Muslim immigrants are incompatible with the Western civilization, Sarrazin does not oppose the integrationist-assimilationist approach whilst at the same time stresses the inferiority of Muslim immigrants to native Germans from the educational and intellectual perspective.

To support this argument, Sarrazin introduces the underclass implication as a characteristic feature of Muslim immigrants. He does so by claiming that large numbers of Arabs and Turks in the city, whose numbers have grown thanks to the wrong policies, have no productive function except selling fruit and vegetables. The city should attract highly

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[97] 'A Jewish Gene: Immigration Provocateur in Germany Crosses the Line', *Spiegel Online* (30 August 2010), online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,714567,00.html (Accessed: 18 September 2010).
[98] *Ibidem.*
[99]'Thilo Sarrazin in English', online at: http://www.limitstogrowth.org/articles/2011/01/22/thilo-sarrazin-in-english/ (Accessed: 11 May 2011).
[100] Gezer, and Riemann, 'You are part of Germany, but also part of our Great Turkey', *Der Spiegel* (28 February 2011), online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international%20/europe/0,1518,748070,00.html (Accessed: 2 March 2011).

qualified immigrants; anyone who can do something and strives for something with Germans is only welcome. The rest should go elsewhere. [101]

Additionally, Sarrazin argues that immigrants are an economic burden to the State:

> 'In every European country, due to their low participation in the labour market and high claim on state welfare benefits, Muslim migrants cost the state more than they generate in added economic value. In terms of culture and civilization, their notions of society and values are a step backwards.'[102]

Sarrazin claims that most of the cultural and economic problems (in Germany) are concentrated in a group of the five to six million immigrants from Muslim countries.[103]

Despite Sarrazin's vision concerning the incompatibility of Islamic civilization with the Western one, other German politicians observe certain commonalities between the two. For instance, Islam is viewed as a part of German culture in the speech of German President Christian Wulff, who claims:

> 'Christianity is, of course, part of Germany. Judaism is, of course, part of Germany. This is our Judeo-Christian history. But, now, Islam is also part of Germany.'[104]

Contrary to this, Hans-Peter Friedrich, the Interior Minister of Germany from Christian Social Union party, states that:

> ´Islam is alien to the German culture. Islam in Germany is not something substantiated by history at any point. Nor does Islam or Muslims play a role in German culture.´[105]

While promoting a dialogue between civilizations, that would harmonize relations between Christians and Muslims, Hans Friedrich mentions that Germans should never forget about the Western-Christian origin of their culture.

> ´It is true that Muslims are a part of German history and currently Islam is not a major factor in Germany politics, but just because Islam has been absent in the past does not mean it cannot now be a part of German identity in a pluralistic society. Germany's four million Muslims and Islam can play a role in 21st century Germany in league with German values and the absence of Islam in the past is no impediment for the future, and that brings us to the second point...´[106]

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[101] Anderson, J. J., & Langenbacher, E. (2010). *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the twentieth anniversary of unification*. New York: Berghahn Books,195.

[102] Sarrazin, note 85, *supra*.

[103] *Ibidem*

[104] Serfontein, 'German president says 20 years later, Islam now part of Germany' (4 October 2010), online at: http://www.christiancentury.org/article/2010-10/german-president-says-20-years-later-islam-now-part-germany (Accessed: 19 December 2010).

[105] Villa, 'German Interior Minister: Islam Not Part Of German Culture' (7 March 2011), online at: http://marcovilla.instablogs.com/entry/german-interior-minister-islam-not-part-of-german-culture/ (Accessed: 12 April 2011).

[106] *Ibidem*

The integration issue has also been raised by the incumbent Chancellor Angela Merkel of the Christian Social Union party:

> ´Of course integration has changed our society, but not at the expense of our core values... We are Christians and this informs everything we do... We are for diversity but we will not abandon our basic beliefs.´[107]

As Merkel claims, the acceptance of the immigrant Islamic civilisation within the framework of German multiculturalism should not prevent Germans from considering themselves close to their core beliefs.

The concept of Integration should not be limited to cultural assimilation; hence, it should cover political, social and economic aspects as well. In the context of Immigrant Muslims of Germany, Merkel argues that the immigrant communities should obey the social values and laws of the host country, like native population does.

> ´Anyone who wants to live here in our country has to obey our laws, want to learn our language and accept the rules of our society and every single article of our constitution.´ [108]

Moreover, she openly declares that the German *Multiculti*[109] fails to fulfil its ultimate goal and, thus, is a complete failure. Immigrants must be integrated, rather than accommodated. To support her integrationist position, Merkel refers to successfully integrated Turks who have adapted to the German way of life, stating that positive advancements should in no way be ignored and underestimated.

> ´Problems should be openly expressed, but improvements should not be neglected. There are many examples in Germany that show successful adaptation is taking place. Positive developments, should not be ignored.´[110]

Merkel suggests increasing of integration efforts not only on the part of the state and society of the host country, but most importantly on the part of immigrants themselves. She openly states that in return to the welfare and benefits offered to them by the host country, Muslim communities should also be willing to accept the social norms and systems of the country which has opened its doors to their families.

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[107] 'Thilo Sarrazin finds Muslims inferior', *Illume* (10 November 2010), online at: http://www.illumemag.com/zine/articleDetail.php?Thilo-Sarrazin-Finds-Muslims-Inferior-13381 (1 May 2011).

[108] Erdem, 'Merkel takes tough line on integration to party cheers', *Reuters* (25 September 2010), online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/25/us-germany-merkel-immigrants-idUSTRE68O13720100925 (Accessed: 13 December 2010).

[109] 'Merkel says German multicultural society has failed', *BBC Online* (17 October 2010), online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 (Accessed: 1 May 2011).

[110] 'Merkel speaks out against Sarrazin', *Spiegel* (9 March 2010), online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715522,00.html (1 May 2011).

She also emphasizes the fact that Germany does not approve of or impose forceful assimilation on immigrant communities; instead, Germany treats them as full members of the German society who have a right to talk about their worries to the state. Thus, she declares:

> "What Germans mean by integration is not forced assimilation and denying of one's cultural roots. When Turks have worries and problems, I am their chancellor, too."[111]

In contrary to widely-accepted opinions about the slow and unproductive integration of Muslims in Germany, German President Christian Wulff (in criticism of Sarrazin) states that the majority of immigrants in Germany are resistant and unwilling to integrate:

> 'The majority of people arriving here are now successfully taking integration courses. We need to improve neglected efforts when it comes to integration. Clear demands for immigrants must be formulated.'[112]

Wolfbang Bosbach, the chairman of the German Parliament's domestic affairs committee, claims that Wulff´s approach is not devoid of uncertainties, stating that though millions of people have successfully integrated into German society, there are also many cases of refusal to integrate:

> "Close to one-third of those who were required to take the language courses to improve their opportunities on the labour market, either don't attend classes or quit them early. Foreigners have an obligation.´´[113]

Pro-Integrationist stance is recorded with another persona, the leader of Green Party, German-Turkish politician Cem Özdemir. His roots as a German-Turk often define his identity when it comes to advocating integration policies. He is a de-facto expert on immigration and integration issues for the Green party in Germany.[114]

Therefore, Özdemir expects more contribution from the side of German conservatives in order to provide full integration of Muslim minorities in Germany.

> 'If Europe's conservative parties are not interested in taking lessons in immigrant politics from the United States, they might consider the example of France. In 2003, the conservative French government established the French Council for the Muslim Religion to address the needs of the roughly five million strong Muslim minorities. And in 2002, French President Jacques Chirac recognized that a more pluralist National Assembly could promote social unity. By following the leads from Washington and Paris and embracing the ideas and energy of Europe's immigrants, European conservative parties can play a leading role in integrating European Muslims into mainstream society-and gain new supporters at the same time.'[115]

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[111] *Ibidem.*
[112] Note 28, *supra.*
[113] *Ibidem.*
[114] *Ibidem.*
[115] Ozdemir, C. (January 01, 2004). Europe's Awkward Embrace. *Foreign Policy,* 140, 68-69.

Özdemir asserts that considerable number of conservatives tend to believe that a pro-immigrant agenda is a first-class ticket to electoral defeat. He then states that Europe's political future needs conservative parties that embrace immigrants, particularly Europe's growing Muslim population. And, surprisingly enough, immigrants need the conservatives just as badly. [116]

However at some point Conservatives should gain confidence of the Muslim population in order not to face clashing of ideologies.

> 'On the other hand, European immigrants (Muslims) have never really engaged with conservative parties in order to influence key issues such as immigration legislation or Turkey's EU membership. Conservative immigrants in particular remain politically isolated in Europe; their poor language proficiency and weak knowledge about their host societies often keep the best immigrant minds from joining main-stream political associations.' [117]

In the meantime, as Özdemir notes, the simplification of rules in citizenship conditions will foster integration and more immigrants will gain German identities and Citizenships with their primary ones.

> 'Another crucial question that still needs to be addressed in German politics is whether it is good news or bad news when the number of citizenship applications goes down. It should be our goal that foreigners become citizens. Unfortunately, the current government still thinks it is good to introduce hurdles that make it less attractive to become a citizen. I don't say that we should give citizenship in the market square to everyone. Of course, we need conditions. People have to speak the language. People have to stick to the constitution. But why make it less attractive to become citizens? It is easier to talk citizen-to-citizen then to talk citizen-to-foreigner. But there is no consensus about that yet in German politics.' [118]

In order to become a full-fledged citizen of Germany, Muslim immigrants should start with linguistic obligations, cultural adaptabilities, as well as acculturation in the German reality. In this regard, the spirit of multi-culti should form an integral part of today´s reality. There should be no discriminations on behalf of race, ethnicity, nationality and citizenship; instead he wants a society where everyone has an equal chance, regardless of where they come from. [119]

> 'He asserts that when he gets to the municipality and sees people of colour, it shows him that it is also his municipality. He believes that they need a colour-blind society where people of all backgrounds are represented, all over the place. An inclusive society.' [120]

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[116] *Ibidem*.

[117] *Ibidem*

[118] 'In Conversation with Germany's Cem Özdemir', *Cities of Migration* (19 January 2011), online at: http://citiesofmigration.ca/interviews/cem-ozdemir/ (Accessed: 10 February 2011).

[119] Dempsey, 'Greens in Germany pick son of Turks as a leader' (16 November 2008), online at: http://www.oezdemir.de/en/2123406.html (10 March 2011).

[120] Note 36, *supra*.

As Özdemir proposes, the immigrants should stop talking about Diasporas, because they are the part of the host country, the latter is their country, and immigrants should not discuss its problems as theirs, but as ours. The question of sub-identity is observed with another example below:

> 'That's crucial. If you describe something, describe it as a German, as a European, as a Berliner, but don't describe it as somebody who is not part of the larger community. Of course, you can have your sub-identity; there is nothing wrong with that. But we also need an umbrella identity and the umbrella identity for me is being a republican, being a German, being a European - that's what unites us. And then of course, I have my Turkish roots, but that's the 2nd part of it. The first part should be what unites us. In this matter, it is not only the majority community, but also the minority communities themselves who need to work and challenge themselves.'[121]

Like Sarrazin, Özdemir's views are based upon cultural difference. He refers to a 'sub-identity' and to 'Turkish roots' as part of his multicultural, pluralistic conception of being German. However, his solution is very different. Whereas Sarrazin believes in assimilation through the relinquishment of the foreign identity (particularly through inter-marriage), Özdemir offers a form of integration which allows for the retention of difference. Although this does not seem to go as far as Tariq Ramadan's 'European Muslim' concept, since that envisages compromises by Muslim minorities through dynamic interpretation of Islam in line with European values, it still implicitly accepts that there is are underlying and conflicting cultural differences.

Do the views of Sarrazin, Merkel and Özdemir accept the existence of a clash between 'indigenous German' or 'European' and 'Muslim' cultures? The answer appears to be, to varying degrees, 'yes'. Even Merkel whilst asserting that 'Islam is part of Germany' at the same time acknowledges that 'multiculturalism has utterly failed'. Sarrazin's citation of, for instance, the strict Muslim laws of marriage in contradistinction to the relatively liberal German or Christian norms suggests that there is an objective basis to this. Different cultural norms may not always clash but if, as in this case, they are widely different then there will be conflict. Sarrazin's focus upon Islamic headdress, a prominent symbol of distinction, is also an example of a clear cultural clash. Although Özdemir´s views are very much about harmonisation and integration, he is vague when it comes to concrete issues and he implicitly accepts in asserting that view that there is a clash that needs to be reconciled.

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[121] Note 123, *supra*.

2.3 Muslim Immigration to the Netherlands

The first wave of immigration in Netherlands started with the colonization of East Indies centuries ago. The next decades were marked with big waves of immigration from Muslim countries such as Turkey and Morocco. In the 19th century the Netherlands administered the archipelago that would become Indonesia, a majority-Muslim country with the largest Muslim population in the world. The first Muslims who settled in the Netherlands were these islanders who fled from its bloody war of Independence.[122] In the 1980-90s, Muslims started immigrating to the countries of Western Europe, namely the Netherlands, as refugees and asylum seekers. They were mostly from Bosnia, Somalia, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Multiculturalism is rooted in contemporary Netherlands, as Fukuyama finds, while at times the Dutch are prone to stay more socially conservative.

> 'The Dutch, by contrast, are famous for their pluralism and tolerance and do not share the Germans' nationalist legacy. Yet in the privacy of their own homes, the Dutch remain quite socially conservative: It is much easier for them to tolerate cultural difference when it is practiced in other, parallel communities rather than in their own. Dutch society has been multicultural without being assimilative, something that fit well into a consociational society that was traditionally organized into separate Protestant, Catholic, and socialist verzuilungen, or pillars.'[123]

In comparison to the assimilation trends practiced in France, the Netherlands do not openly impose assimilation; instead propose social inclusion and acculturation as a part of Multicultural Europe. The first step towards integration was the provision of languages competencies for the newcomers, which was implemented with the establishment of language learning centres. Moreover, it was expected that the Dutch partner to be 21 years old and prove income of at least 120% minimum wage for the interfaith/racial/state marriages.

> 'Immigrants must pass tests showing knowledge of Dutch in their home countries. The Dutch partner must be at least 21 years old and prove income of at least 120% minimum wage. These strict laws have caused many Dutch interested in marrying people from other countries to move to Belgium for a temporary period, in what has been called "The Belgian Route".'[124]

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[122] 'Islam in the Netherlands', Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1 November 2002), online at: http://home.deds.nl/~quip/archief/culture/Islam%20in%20Nederland.html (Accessed: 10 March 2011).

[123] *Fukuyama, F. (2006).* Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy

[124] 'België vindt Nederlands vreemdelingenbeleid te streng', *Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau*, (17 January 2006), online at: http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2668/Buitenland/article/detail/762491/2006/01/07/Belgie-vindt (Accessed: 4 March 2011).

However, the new culture imported by Muslim immigrants was not met with hostility from the mainstream parties of Netherlands, such as the Centre Democrats (CD), Party for Freedom (PVV), and Social-Democrat Dutch Labour Parties. The immigration-assimilation debate is prioritized with a wide-popular anti-immigration party- the Centre Democrats of Netherland.

Centre Democrats party is a nationalist party, who hugely oppose to multiculturalism and immigration.

Fearing a Muslim takeover, the Centre Democrats propose either repatriation or assimilation for the immigrants. In 1989, the party claimed that 'foreigners and minorities either adjust to the Dutch ways and customs or leave the country.'

> 'The Centre Democrats considered Dutch culture under threat from foreigners, and that in particular Muslims had come to the Netherlands with the intention of taking over or dominating the country.'[125]

Therefore, Centre-Democrats are conservative towards the Dutch identity as opposed to multicultural marriages and mixed cultures. Their policy is most described as Civic Nationalism. Hence, since 1994, the party adhered to ethnic nationalism claiming the importance of 'indissoluble unity and solidarity of the Dutch ethnic community'.

The anti-immigrant stance is most associated with the name of Pim Fortuyn, a former member of the Social Democrat Labour Party, who later opened a party of his own called LPF ('Pim Fortuyn List'). Fortuyn was perceived as a xenophobe by Muslim immigrants in his opposition to the presence of Muslim communities in Netherlands. He found Islam to be incompatible as such with the Western background. He considered it to be "a backward culture", and stated that if it were legally possible he would close the borders for Muslim immigrants to Netherlands.[126]

> 'I am also in favour of a cold war with Islam. I see Islam as an extraordinary threat, as a hostile religion.'[127]

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[125] Valk, I. . (2002). *Difference, deviance, threat?: Mainstream and right-extremist political discourse on ethnic issues in the Netherlands and France (1990-1997).* Amsterdam: Aksant

[126] 'Fortuyn: grens dicht voor islamietvoor islamiet' (9 February 2009), online at: http://classic-web.archive.org/web/20020212063049/http%3a//www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws/denhaag/1013147690985.html (Accessed: 3 April 2011).

[127] *Rotterdams Dagbald* (August 2001), online at:
http://wn.com/Pim_Fortuyn_debating_with_Marcel_van_Dam_a_social_democrat (Accessed: 1 April 2011).

The hostility towards Muslims was their unwillingness to accommodate and fit the Western culture. Fortuyn emphasized the importance of the integrity of Dutch culture and ethnicity, which was under threat by the presence of Muslims. Moreover, he confessed that if it were legally possible, he would prohibit additional Muslim immigration to the Netherlands.[128]

Fortuyn was often labelled as an advocate of the policy typical of extreme right due to his anti-Muslim activities in Dutch politics. Hence, he was neither a radical nationalist, nor defender of traditional authoritarian values. His mission was to stand for the call of liberalism, women rights and equalities, liberties of sexual minorities in the context of Islamic culture. Hence, Fortuyn was assassinated on the background of his liberal views against Muslim minorities of Netherlands giving the *Es`ta`fet´* to another anti-immigration politician-Geert Wilders.

The Party for Freedom ('PVV') is currently the most prominent Dutch anti-immigration party nowadays. Founded by Geert Wilders, PVV has adhered a policy of either assimilation, or deportation. In order to foster assimilation, Wilders proposed banning the *hijab*, *burqa* and *chador* as he believed in building a homogenous Dutch ethnic community where people will share common values and have chances of making personal choices in regard to religion. Interestingly, PVV is opposed to the accession of Muslim countries into Europe, particularly in the context of Turkey. Wilders claimed that 'if the Dutch don't wake up, Sharia, or Islamic religious law, will take over the country'.[129]

Geert Wilders is the co-thinker of Theo Van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsli Ali. They both had a shared belief: the threat of Muslim immigration to Dutch cultural integrity. Theo Van Gogh was ultimately assassinated by a Dutch- Moroccan immigrant for his blasphemy and hostility to Islam and the *Qu'ran* whilst Wilders has to live with round-the-clock security. Wilders is openly opposed to current policies regarding Islam in the European setting.

While he states that he is tolerant about the Muslim population of Netherlands, he is openly hostile to the religion and the *Qu'ran*:.

'I have a problem with Islamic tradition, culture, and ideology. Not with Muslim people.'[130]

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[128] Allen, 'Islamophobia and its consequences', 154, online at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=45668 (Accessed: 10 April 2011).
[129] 'Following Geert Wilders, Anti Muslim Far Right Rises in Sweden' (21 September 2010), online at: http://www.worldofjudaica.com/jewish%20news/%20internatio%20nal/%20wilders-and-akesson/646/22/ (Accessed: 1 March 2011).
[130] *Ibidem*

His political orientation fails to consider Islam as a religion, based on the belief that it is an ideology of a ´´retarded culture´´. [131]

> I don't hate Muslims. I hate their book and their ideology". [132]

Therefore, when accused of favouring right-wing neo-fascists, Wilders absolutely rejects it to be true stating:

> 'My allies are not Le Pen or Haider. We'll never join up with the fascists and Mussolinis of Italy. I'm very afraid of being linked with the wrong rightist fascist groups. Dutch iconoclasm, Scandinavian insistence on free expression, the right to provoke is what drive him.'[133]

Wilder´s approach to religious tolerance failed to be so in labelling of Koran as a 'fascist book' that needs to be outlawed in the Netherlands, like Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, is noteworthy.[134] Nonetheless, he is carefully pondering over Islam arguing that Netherlands cannot afford Islam any more in its soil:

> 'I want the fascist Koran banned. We need to stop the Islamisation of the Netherlands. That means no more mosques, no more Islamic schools, no more imams... Not all Muslims are terrorists, but almost all terrorists are Muslims.'[135]

Moreover, Wilders is the creator of the short movie called 'Fitna', which explores motivations for terrorism from Islamic universalism. Its title comes from the Arabic word *fitna*, which describes 'disagreement and division among people' or a 'test of faith in times of trial.'[136]

Wilder´s has co-thinkers in the campaign run by his Party. Among them, there is also a female apostate – Somalia-born politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali. She has been propagating the idea of freedom of speech and choice of religion, as well as personal liberties. Somalian by origin, Ayaan stayed faithful to Islam until some point of her life, when she became an apostate. One of the initiatives against the oppression of Muslim women was the coproduction of a movie called ´´Submission´´[137] with the assassinated Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh. On the level of personal relationships, she has no particular dislike or hatred

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[131] *Ibidem*

[132] Traynor, 'I don't hate Muslims. I hate Islam, says Holland's rising political star', *The Guardian* (17 February 2008), online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam (Accessed: 05 March 2011).

[133] Jobling, 'Geert Wilders Takes on Islam in the Name of Liberal Values', online at: http://whiteamerica.us/index.php/Blog/Blog/geert_wilders_takes_on_islam_in_the_name_of_liberal_values/ (Accessed: 1 April 2011).

[134] 'Wilders: verbied de Koran, ook in moskee', *De Volkskrant* (08 August 2007).

[135] Traynor, note 132, *supra.*

[136] 'Hold your breath: 'Fitna' spreading seeds of hatred', *Today's Zaman* (29 March 2008), online at: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=137624 (Accessed: 01 October 2011).

[137] Online at: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=846339861805446088&q=submission+Van+Gogh# (Accessed: 1 April 2011).

towards Muslim individuals, but is a strong advocate of the basic human rights and liberties in the context of Muslims all over the world. [138]

Her separation from the Islamic culture started with the religious background, just after the terroristic attacks in 9/11 in the States. That incident made her review her approaches as a female Muslim who is prone to make a shift in the religious ideologies:

> 'I picked up the Quran and the hadith and started looking through them, to check. I hated to do it, because I knew that I would find Bin Laden's quotations in there.'[139]

Right afterwards, she renounced Islam and became an atheist. As a rejectionist of Islamic ideology, Ayaan Hirsi Ali publicly expressed her approaches thus gaining a labelling of an infidel by the Muslim religion adherents.

The truth about her activities lies in the change, a reform for a better future which is devoid of radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Her close links with assassinated Theo Van Gogh urged her to change the place of living in order to stay alive in the Netherlands. His provocative movie called 'Submission' became widely popular in Europe thus causing waves of discontent and hatred from the believers in Islamic civilization. The movie was the reflection of suppressed rights of women in the Muslim culture, which was a violation of basic human rights and a prejudice against Muslim women. However, even in the light of threats by Islamic fundamentalists, van Gogh did not take precautions for his personal safety and was assassinated by a Muslim immigrant. His assassination happened mainly on the religious and cultural background, which brought together Dutch community for a more secure future for Netherlands.

Van Gogh´s death made it clear that freedom of speech was under danger in contemporary Dutch reality and needed to be reviewed under the circumstances. Truly so, as in the German politics, multiculturalism has failed to be the most desirable political orientation for the Dutch people. After the death of a filmmaker, Minister Rita Verdonk confessed that multiculturalism had failed in Netherlands:

> 'For too long we have said we had a multicultural society and everyone would simply find each other. We were too naïve in thinking people would exist in society together.'[140]

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[138] Hirsi Ali, 'To submit to the book is to exist in their hell', *The Sydney Morning Herald* (4 June 2007), online at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/to-submit-to-the-book-is-to-exist-in-their-hell/2007/06/03/1180809336515.html (Accessed: 10 April 2011).
[139] Hirsi, A. A. (2007). *Infidel*. New York: Free Press, 271.
[140]'Anti-Muslim Dutch politicians in hiding after death threats', *Times Online* (5 November 2004), online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article503307.ece (Accessed: 10 April 2011).

In the outcome, Dutch society started demanding the Europeanization of Muslim immigrants. With a ban on the *hijab*, Geert Wilders predicted a future towards westernization, harmonization of relations with Islamic minorities in general.

> 'Wilder's newest proposal is to tax the Muslim headscarf. Any Muslim woman who wants to wear a headscarf – which he described as a 'head-rag' – would have to apply for a license, and pay one thousand Euros for the privilege. Wilders says the money raised would go toward women's emancipation programmes.'[141]

Recently, the government in Netherlands has decided to introduce a ban on face-covering clothing, popularly described as the 'burqa ban', although it does not only apply to the Afghan-model *burqa*.

For Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders, the *burqa* or *chador* is both a symbol of religious obscurantism and the oppression of women. Western Enlightenment values, in her view, require prohibition, regardless of whether a woman has freely chosen Islamic dress. Islamic dress is also seen as a symbol of the existence of parallel societies and the failure of integration: in 2006 British Prime Minister Tony Blair described it as a 'mark of separation'

Thus, even more so than in Germany, the Muslim immigration debate in the Netherlands has emphasised sharp distinction between European and Islamic cultures. The rhetoric of the prominent anti-Islamic politicians, and even that of the relatively pro-immigration parties, has strongly juxtaposed Islam as a foreign culture incompatible with the indigenous Dutch culture. By focusing in particular upon the status of women and Islamic headdress, they point towards Islamic laws and customs concerning the marriage, modesty and inheritance rights of women to highlight what they view as a major conflict between the egalitarian Dutch culture and the chauvinistic Islamic culture. The steadily increasing popularity of their views and policies suggests that, amongst the Dutch host population, there is a consensus that multiculturalism as a means of resolving fundamental clashes between cultures has failed and that an assimilationist approach combined with stricter laws on Islamic customs and immigration should be tried instead.

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[141] 'Geert Wilders Wants to Tax Women who Wear Hijab', online at: http://www.loonwatch.com/2009/09/geert-wilders-wants-to-tax-women-who-wear-hijab/ (Accessed: 10 April 2011).

2.3   Conclusion

This chapter has sought to test the clash of civilizations theory through examination of the Muslim immigration debate in Germany and the Netherlands. These debates, and particularly the views put forward by prominent politicians, have indicated that there is a subtle consensus that Islam is a distinct culture that is in conflict with European culture. However, there remain major differences amongst the debaters concerning how best to address the conflict – whether through strict or liberal immigration and citizenship laws, tolerance or prohibition of Islamic law or a policy of encouraging or discouraging assimilation or integration of the existing Muslim minorities.

This chapter has been necessarily limited and focused in scope upon these two case studies but it may be suggested that a similar phenomenon of cultural conflict can be identified in other European countries such as Switzerland, France and Austria. There is little doubt that the hostility directed towards immigration is complicated by a range of other factors, such as economic protectionism and preferential state treatment for native citizens. However, this does not explain the fact that, in all of these countries, Muslim immigrants are particularly targeted by anti-immigration politicians. The popularity of this politics suggests that cultural differences and the aversion felt by certain members of the host population towards minarets, *hijabs* and other symbols of Islamic law are a major cause of the general anti-immigration political mood in Europe.

Chapter 3: Muslim Immigrants of Europe – A Clash of Civilizations?

Having examined the clash of civilizations theory in abstract in Chapter 1 and tested the theory by reference to case studies in Chapter 2, this chapter addresses the research question of validity of the clash of civilizations theory within the specific context of Muslim immigration to Europe through critical analysis. In particular, the chapter examines the extent to which Huntington's theory can assist in understanding the political and cultural problems associated with Muslim immigration and the limitations of that theory. Although, in light of the limits of the thesis, the chapter does not offer conclusions concerning the various theories of assimilation and integration that have been offered in tackling the problem of European-Islamic cultural clashes it does scrutinise those theories to identify strengths and weaknesses.

In section 3.1, the chapter addresses the applicability of Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis to the problem of Muslim immigrants to Europe. This concerns the primary research question of the theoretical usefulness of the clash of civilizations theory. Section 3.2 then analyses the integration of Muslim immigrants, particularly through such concepts as 'Euro-Islam' or 'European Islam' proposed by Tariq Ramadan and the multiculturalism advocated by Cem Ozdemir and others. Section 3.3 then examines the assimilation of Muslim immigrants as proposed by Thilo Sarrazin, Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. In offering conclusions in section 3.4, the chapter seeks through critical analysis to identify the usefulness and limitations of the clash of civilizations paradigm in testing the assumptions that are made in the various proposed models of integration and assimilation offered in European politics for Muslim immigration. In so doing, it seeks to pinpoint the nexus between politics and culture within a very topical and sensitive ongoing debate within Europe.

3.1   Applicability of the Clash of Civilizations Paradigm

The first question that must be answered is whether Huntington's clash of civilizations theory is applicable to Muslim immigration to Europe. As explored in Chapter 1, the conceptual validity of the theory needs to be addressed. Next, as examined in Chapter 2, the evidence of existence of civilizational clash in the specific context must be scrutinized. On the basis of this analysis, it is suggested that both theoretically and practically there exists a clash of civilizations between the Western and Islamic civilizations within the context of Muslim immigration to Europe.

On the theoretical level, we have seen that various objections have been made to Huntington's theory. However, though the theory is clearly simplistic in its categorisation of 'civilizations' due to its global scale, it still stands to scrutiny when considering the Western and Islamic civilizations in abstract. Despite the great diversity of cultural norms and strands within the civilizations and the complexity of various other anthropological factors, there seems to be little doubt that such civilizations do exist as separate entities and that they are based upon conceptually different value systems and historical experiences. For example, Christians, atheists and secularists belonging to the Western civilization all share the same historical frame of reference: ancient Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, etc. Similarly, despite the divisions within the Islamic civilization into Sunni and Shi'a, Sufi, Druze, Alawite and others they all share similar historical experiences and cultural background: pre-Islamic civilization, the sixth century, the Abbassids, the Ottoman Empire, etc. Thus, it seems difficult to argue that the Western and Islamic civilizations do not exist and that they differ from one another.

An even more complex question is, assuming that these civilizations do exist, whether they are in conflict. Here, theory and practice both point to the affirmative. The philosophies and value systems of the two civilizations can diverge to such a degree that conflict is inevitable.

For example, the European value upon free speech and the Islamic value of *lese-majeste* concerning the Prophet Muhammad which was illustrated in the Danish cartoon controversy. Similarly, the Western value of monogamy and the Islamic norm of polygamy must jar against each other – which is but part of a wider conflict between the two civilizations' approaches to the status of women. Islamic headdress, in this respect, is emblematic of the conflict: Christian women in Iran and other Muslim countries must wear the *hijab* as a symbol of the modesty of woman whereas certain forms of Islamic headdress have been banned in European countries like France and the Netherlands as offensive to the dignity of woman.

However, the existence of a conflict does not necessarily entail violence. It simply recognises that multiple sets value systems and cultures cannot always agree. Some politicians and commentators, however, do not expressly acknowledge the conflict even when their hostility to Muslim immigrants is based upon it. For example, Marine le Pen (presidential candidate of France´s National Front party) recently said:

'I don't believe that Islam is incompatible with Western values, but *Sharia* law is, and that's what fundamentalists want to impose in France.'[142]

Even accepting her supposed distinction between 'fundamentalist' and 'mainstream' Islam, it cannot seriously be disputed that S*haria* law – which she imposes – is an integral part of Islam. In fact, it can be said *to be* Islam – or at least its essence. Moreover, the rise of popular support for anti-immigration and specifically anti-Muslim immigration parties and politicians such as the National Front in France (FN), Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom in Holland (PVV), the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Swiss People's Party (SVP), Germany's Thilo Sarrazin from Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and others shows that amongst the host populations there is considerable support for the existence of a clash. The next question, therefore, is whether the clash is reconcilable through integration or assimilation.

3.2   Integration of Muslim Immigrants

Integration entails mutual compromise between the host population and the immigrant population to find a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi*. Thus, it envisages the retention of identifiable differences amongst the two populations and is aimed at narrowing those differences to acceptable limits within a common legal and cultural framework. Muslim immigrants are not required to totally relinquish their original identities but rather to adapt and blend those identities with the new identity and culture of the European country to which they immigrate. Assimilation, by contrast, requires abandonment of the original identity and the adoption of the new identity. This entails little or no compromise by the host population and places culture as a requirement for citizenship.

Tariq Ramadan's European Muslim approach is clearly an integrationist way of resolving the clash of civilizations. His method demands two components: 1) education amongst both the host population about Islam and the immigrant population about Europe to increase mutual understanding and tolerance; and 2) dynamic reinterpretation of Islam to create a space for a hybrid 'European Islam' that allows Muslims in Europe to selectively adopt Western cultural values whilst retaining their Muslim identities. He also calls for some accommodation by the host populations of Islam within the legal and political framework through multiculturalism.

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[142] Le Pen,Marine, ´´Mightier than the sword´´, Economist, May 5th 2011, Paris, (Accessed: 01 Oct 2010), online at: http://www.economist.com/node/18651184

This thesis does not address whether integration according to this or other approaches has worked or can work, as that would require a much wider study. However, it is possible to identify certain weaknesses and complexities with the integrationist approach. The first is the lack of precision in the concept of 'Western' civilization, compounded by the diversity of European societies. For example, whereas Britain may be considered to be multicultural, France is much more assimilationist and mono-cultural. Is Merkel right, for example, when she says that Islam is a part of Germany alongside Christianity and Judaism?

There is a broader debate ongoing within Europe concerning the role of religion in European constitutional orders. Does Christianity still form part of the modern European identity? The answer is highly contested, as demonstrated by the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of *Laussi v. Italy* finding crucifixes in Italian classrooms to violate the human right to freedom of conscience under the European Convention on Human Rights and then reversing its ruling on appeal. In France, for example, the hostility towards Islam and Muslim immigrants stems not from a Christian identity and historical clashes between Christendom and Islam but rather from the French constitutional principle of secularism or *laicite*. This is very strict, to the point that all religious symbols are forbidden in French state schools – including Christian crosses and Jewish skullcaps.

However, European societies such as Serbia, Greece and Austria societies are more overtly Christian in their identities and outlooks. Here, hostility towards Muslim immigrants and Islam derives more directly from historical and recent memories of wars with Muslims (e.g. – Austrian opposition to Turkish EU membership and the 'gates of Vienna' dictum). Islam is also seen to contradict the Christian faith. However, Geert Wilders is an agnostic, Ayaan Hirsi Ali is an atheist, Thilo Sarrazin's religious beliefs are unknown whereas Marine le Pen is a Roman Catholic. Yet all believe that Muslim immigrants should be required to conform to 'Western' culture. The lack of content to Western civilization or liberal democratic values is problematic.

A second is the lack of clarity in Ramadan and other integrationists' ideas concerning specifics, or just how many Muslim immigrants should be prepared to concede in the cultural compromise that they propose. Should Muslim girls, if European civilization forbids it, agree to appear in public without *any* form of Islamic headgear? Should Muslims refrain from campaigning against publications they consider to be 'blasphemous' to their faith, such as Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* or the Danish Muhammad cartoons? What is the 'core' Islamic doctrine that Muslims are absolutely forbidden from compromising upon,

regardless of the fact that they are living within a different civilization that expects its values to be adopted? Ramadan and the other integrationists are not clear on the point, and the distinction between 'fundamentalism' or 'extremism' and 'moderate' or 'mainstream' Islam in European political commentary does not help in establishing the specific points of conflict with greater precision.

A third problem is the degree to which cultural clashes are bound up with wider debates about levels of immigration within Europe. Since these broader debates engage economic and political issues that are not specific to Islam, though they also concern Muslim immigrants, even if cultural conflicts could be reduced to manageable proportions or even eliminated totally there would still be hostility towards Muslim immigrants on economic, racial or other grounds. Sarrazin's objections, for example, are largely economic in nature. Thus, it is simplistic to pretend that the cultural clash of civilizations is the only reason for anti-immigration hostility – though events like the Swiss ban upon the construction of new minarets and the Dutch and French bans upon the *burqa* prove that Muslim immigration is a particularly sensitive issue.

Thus, determining whether integration is possible or desirable is a hugely complex and difficult problem with a wide range of factors. It begs sensitive questions about the role of religion in the Western or European identity or identities, the degree to which we can even speak of a single European civilization, the 'fundamental' or uncompromising parts of Islam and finding the middle point in which both host population and immigrant population can accept each other's differences in a multicultural environment. It also raises the issue of whether the endeavour is even possible; particularly when it is declared to have 'failed' in Germany according to Merkel and when multiculturalism is not even accepted in places like France.

3.3 Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants

Immigration into the host country is a complex social and psychological process which normally causes difficulties for all immigrants. However, it is arguable that Muslim immigrants seem to integrate slower and less willingly than non-Muslim immigrants. Even second and third generations of Muslim immigrants find it hard to adapt to the European lifestyle which roughly contradicts the Islamic values and cultural traditions. In fact, some believe that identification with Islamic rather than Western values is stronger amongst young

Muslims disenchanted with their 'alien' environment than with their parents and grandparents who came to that environment for economic, political or other reasons.

Difficulties concerning assimilation, in the sense of total abandonment of the Islamic identity in favour of European identity, may be explained by latent survivalist mechanisms within Islam itself as well as particular difficulties of Muslim immigrants within Europe. Islam, for example, forbids Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women and Muslim women from marrying men who were not born Muslims. Also, apostates (defined as people born Muslims who choose to leave Islam) are condemned to hell and Muslims are even said by some Islamic clerics to have a duty to kill apostates (e.g. – the Khomeini *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie or the case of Abdul Rahman, an Afghan convert to Christianity, who was disowned by his parents and reported by his own family to the police and sentenced to death for apostasy in 2006 but later granted asylum by Italy). Inter-marriage, as noted by Sarrazin, is one of the key hallmarks of assimilation and is one which Muslims have particular difficulty accepting. Compounding this are factors like anti-Muslim prejudice, Muslim poverty, Muslim failures to learn the host language and culture and generally the ghettoisation of Muslim immigrant communities (e.g. – the *banlieues* in France or the Turkish ghettos in Germany). Accentuating this is also the general immigrant fear of assimilation and loss of culture and belonging.

Although many European Muslims are open to a milder form of integration, overwhelming majorities of Muslims in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany resist assimilation, preferring to be a part of Europe while maintaining their own Islamic identity.[143] This resistance is likely strengthened by the fact that the few politicians who have called for Muslim assimilation have been people like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a self-proclaimed apostate who strongly hates Islam. This reinforces the sense of Muslims being under pressure or siege, which makes them less willing to even integrate – let alone assimilate. This leads to a vicious cycle in which the host population perceives Muslims more negatively for their demands for accommodation.

Conversely, this tendency to see Muslims as a monolith has its reverse image in Muslim allegiance to the umma, which transcends other loyalties; tends to reinforce the "we/them" perspective; and is part of the reason why Muslims resist assimilation— the total loss of identity-related indicators of existing differences from European societies—and insist on integration—a reconstituted identity that stresses remaining differences—or,

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[143] *Ibidem.*

in some cases, recommunalization—a physical presence in Europe but no accommodation with European society. In other words, Muslims tend to seek a physical presence in Europe but no accommodation with European society.[144]

Tibi argues that racism is a European invention, and that Europeans must overcome what he calls "Euro-arrogance" and xenophobia to integrate immigrants.[145]
He states:

> 'Muslims have to give up three things if they want to become Europeans: They have to bid farewell to the idea of converting others, and renounce the Jihad. The Jihad is not just a way of testing yourself but also means using violence to spread Islam. The third thing they need to give up is the Sharia, which is the Islamic legal system. This is incompatible with the German constitution. Pluralism and tolerance are pillars of modern society. That has to be accepted. But pluralism doesn't just mean diversity. It means that we share the same rules and values, and are still nevertheless different. Islam doesn't have this idea. And Islam also has no tradition of tolerance. In Islam tolerance means that Christians and Jews are allowed to live under the protection of Muslims but never as citizens with the same rights. What Muslims call tolerance is nothing other than discrimination?'[146]

Although not said in so many words, this is nothing less than assimilation since it requires Muslims to renounce all of their original identity that is based upon Islam. Whilst this may be feasible with certain rare individuals such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, it is unlikely to be so in large numbers – at least, not easily or quickly. Breaking a deeply ingrained and radically different culture with innate survivalist tendencies would require a great deal of time and concentrated effort and may not ultimately be possible.

As with integration, attempts to assimilate are greatly complex. However, in many ways it is much simpler than integration because there is no compromise area being searched for. Despite the lack of clarity concerning 'European' civilization, assimilation can be easily judged by asking whether a particular immigrant still retains 'Islamic' cultural norms or values in his identity. Someone who wears the *hijab*, goes to pray in a mosque, pays the *zakat* or keeps a *Qu'ran* has clearly not assimilated. Muslims who refuse to inter-marry with non-Muslims cannot be 'Europeans'. In short, Muslims who remain Muslims culturally cannot be Europeans.

This assumes, of course, that Merkel is wrong when she says that Islam is part of Germany. It seems incontestable that, historically, Islam has never been a 'part' of European civilization (as opposed to being in dialogue with it from time to time) – if only proved by the great geopolitical Christian-Muslim struggles like the *Reconquista* and

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[144] *Ibidem*

[145] Tibi, B. (2001). *Islam between culture and politics*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 227.

[146] Interview with German Islam Expert Bassam Tibi, "Europeans Have Stopped Defending Their Values", Spiegel online, (Accessed: 14.09.2010), online at:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,440340,00.html

the Crusades. However, it is more difficult to assess whether (paradoxically) Muslim immigration to Europe can make Islam an integral part of Europe. In that case, assimilation is achieved by another route in forcing European civilization to become Islamic. This is the scenario that the European anti-immigration parties, whose support is growing, are so strongly opposed to.

3.4   Conclusions

In this chapter, critical analysis of the clash of civilizations theory as applied to Muslim immigration to Europe has revealed that it is a useful paradigm through which to view the problem. Although there are undoubtedly a range of identities and factors, as noted by theorists such as Amartya Sen, that attach to a personality there is nevertheless substance to Huntington's view that culture matters and that there is friction on several basic lifestyle and social points between the European and Islamic civilizations. Despite the difficulties of generalising so broadly amongst the various countries and sub-divisions within Europe and within the Islamic world, nevertheless it is safe to say even at a broad level that there are points at which the two civilizations are fundamentally different at the cultural level that can lead to political conflict between Muslim immigrants and European host populations (e.g. – Islamic dress or inter-marriage). Moreover, there is little doubt that historical examples of conflict (e.g. – the Crusades, *Reconquista* and Ottoman Empire) matter in shaping peoples' modern perceptions of the 'other' civilizations and its threat to them.

However, Huntington's theory has its limitations. There is such a wide diversity of views within European and Islamic cultures that it would be foolish to generalise too broadly or to necessarily assume that difference will inevitably lead to conflict. Moreover, although the various integrationist and assimilationist approaches are necessarily predicated upon *difference* this may not always suggest a *clash*. Although it would be hazardous to suggest that any one approach will necessarily succeed or fail, it may still be safely assumed that major cultural differences are unlikely to go away quickly or easily. Indeed, this was the basic message of Thilo Sarrazin in pointing out that second and third-generation Muslim immigrants continue to identify with their original culture more than with German culture. Although politicians may deny that there is a clash of civilizations or cultures in order to avoid the label of 'Islamo-phobe' or xenophobe, their views concerning integration or assimilation are necessarily based upon difference and upon *avoiding* conflicts through one means or another.

Thus, they implicitly recognise the possibility of conflict – suggesting that Huntington's theory may have something useful to offer.

<u>Conclusions</u>

With the end of the II World war, Europe started to become a second home for overwhelming numbers of immigrants, in particular, Muslims from the Middle East and Northern Africa. The immigration became even more intense with the increase of integration issues between the host and the home communities, namely the Europeans and Muslim minorities, shaped in light of cultural, religious and linguistic differences in the post-Cold war period.

The interaction was not devoid of disputes and tensions, which built misunderstanding and isolation between the two societies. Moreover, mainstream press and Political Elite (Germany) started declaring the failure of Multicultural society.

Similar dis-integrationist attitudes were justified with the hypothesis of clashing civilizations, advocated by a prominent polemicist Samuel Huntington. Whilst Huntington was predicting Civilizational conflicts to be based on cultural characteristics, scholars found faults with it being simplistic and uni-dimensional.

The hypothesis posed the research question of the thesis: are the political tensions between European host populations and Muslim immigrants and their descendants due to a fundamental clash between cultures based upon distinct civilisational values?

The theoretical background through the mentioned hypothesis in the context of Muslim immigration to Europe was a part of the research. Huntington´s approach posed a test of ´assimilation´ for Muslim immigrants to not be considered a threat to Western civilization by completely relinquishing their original cultures. However, as disclosed, this threshold resulted in the ´integrationist´ concepts of ´Euro-Islam´ or ´European Muslim´ being a threat to the integrity of Western civilization itself. For instance, in the case of Tariq Ramadan, a fusionist approach between the respective civilisations, if advocated, could well be a threat to the existence of European culture. Therefore, research based evidence claimed that one could exclude neither the clash, nor the dialogue interpretations.

In this regard, alternative approaches to the question of dividing lines between the civilisations to not be solely of cultural nature supported the argument.

The Second Chapter related to the study of compatibilities in the specific context of Islam in Europe. Through theoretical critiques, case studies and critical analysis this thesis posed the conclusion that there is, broadly speaking, a clash between European and Islamic cultures. The case studies of two countries of Western Europe, namely Germany and the Netherlands, pointed out to the fault lines with civilizational issues and the failure of multiculturalism.

With reference to the rhetoric of key politicians such as Thilo Sarrazin, Angela Merkel and Cem Özdemir in Germany, as well as Geert Wilders, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands the fault lines with integration debate were revealed and tested in a particular context.

In addition, the stances of anti-immigration political parties regarding assimilation and integration of Muslim minorities were thoroughly analysed. Through research in Germany and the Netherlands anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic parties were proven to have the cultural component underlying the core of civilizational issue.

Nonetheless, the Western civilisation versus Islamic Civilization in the integration context proposed alternatives in the form of Europeanised Islam or European Muslim. For instance, whilst Ramadan was denying the existence of a clash strongly opposing to the European Culture being secular rather than Christian, Professor Tibi and Hirsi Ali were propagating the incompatibility of fundamental Islam in the highly Christianised Europe.

Another case-evidence was disclosed in the European-Islam (Euro-Islam) and its compatibility within European structures advocated by Ramadan. This understanding entailed a dialogue or fusion between civilisations rather than a clash as such.

By contrast, this approach did not find support with Professor Tibi and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who were prone to accept the existence of a clash between Western and Islamic civilisations and advocate that Muslims assimilate to Western civilisation.

Therefore, in light of the limited scope for research, the qualifier must be added that there is room for considerable difference depending upon concrete issues.

Regardless of the political or academic persuasion of the various theorists and politicians whose ideas have been considered in this thesis, there is a widespread acknowledgement that cultural differences between European host populations and Muslim immigrants are an important factor in their inter-relationship. The fact that Islamic headdress, minarets and inter-marriage provoke ire amongst anti-immigrant politicians would not matter so much if they were not indicative of a more widespread problem that seems to arise wherever there are large Muslim minorities in European societies. Antipathy towards Muslim immigrants cannot be explained only through joblessness and state benefits, though as Thilo Sarrazin points out they do matter. The measuring stick for integration or assimilation is increasingly one of culture.

Despite the limitations of Huntington's clash of civilizations theory and its geopolitical scale, it is nevertheless useful for identifying the sources for friction in an issue that is increasingly raising in political importance. Culture matters and the success or failure of attempts to integrate or assimilate Muslims into European societies will be judged in large part by how culturally 'European' they become. Identifying cultural clashes, whether politically correct or not, may be a useful paradigm through which to further examine the politics of Muslim immigration.

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