

Czech University of Life Sciences Prague

Faculty of Economics and Management

Department of Humanities



Diploma Thesis

**National identity in the era of Globalization: Regions versus States -
case study of Scotland and Catalonia**

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DIPLOMA THESIS ASSIGNMENT

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Economics and Management
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Thesis title

National identity in the era of Globalization: Regions versus States – case study of Scotland and Catalonia

Objectives of thesis

In the era of globalization the issue of national identity is one of the most important for each state. It is impossible to imagine a strong and stable state without national unity, a sense of national community, common shared national interests and values. The study of the formation of national identity will lead us to understanding the current political, social and cultural processes, changes in the public attitudes in the European Union and foreign policy strategies, forecasting regional development scenarios.

Also in the modern world, there is a trend of strengthening the position of regions in the economic, political, socio-cultural aspects, both at the national and international levels, accompanied by a weakening of the role of the state. Today, the region is an element of the system of international economic relations.

This diploma thesis will research national identity in Catalonia and Scotland as an example of the influence of national identity on regionalism. Actors will be identified that influence the construction of national identity in these regions, as well as the impact of these actors on regional separatism.

Methodology

Primary and secondary data analysis will be carried out. The theoretical part deals with the literature and relevant strategies and concepts review, identifying main trends and research questions of the issue.

Case studies of the development in Catalonia and Scotland outline the empirical part of this thesis, while applying the comparative method approach and content analysis. Conclusions are based on the synthesis of the theoretical literature review in confrontation with the practical outcomes of the empirical study.

The proposed extent of the thesis

60 – 80 str.

Keywords

globalization, state, region, national identity

Recommended information sources

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Declaration

I declare that I have worked on my diploma thesis titled “National identity in the era of Globalization: Regions versus States - case study of Scotland and Catalonia” by myself and I have used only the sources mentioned at the end of the thesis. As the author of the diploma thesis, I declare that the thesis does not break copyrights of any third person.

In Prague on 29.11. 2020

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National identity in the era of Globalization: Regions versus States - case study of Scotland and Catalonia

Abstract

This thesis aims to analyze Catalan and Scottish national identities in the era of Globalization. In this thesis, classical and modern research of national identity are studied. The concepts of globalization and regionalization are formulated, and key political actors influencing the formation of national identity are identified. This thesis provides an overview of some of the historical events that influenced national identity construction in the studied regions.

The thesis contains an analysis of public opinion, censuses, referendums, and regional elections in Scotland and Catalonia over the past ten years. Based on the analysis, general trends and differences in the development of Scottish and Catalan national identities are formulated. Besides, this thesis examines the relationship between the processes of strengthening national identity and the intensification of regionalization in Scotland and Catalonia.

Keywords: National identity, Scotland, Catalonia, regionalism, region, globalization

Národní identita v době globalizace: Regiony versus státy - případová studie Skotska a Katalánska

Abstrakt

Cílem této diplomové práce je analýza katalánské a skotské národní identity v době globalizace. V rámci práce je zkoumán klasický a moderní výzkum národní identity. Formulovány jsou koncepty globalizace a regionalizace a dále jsou identifikováni političtí aktéři, jež ovlivňují formování národní identity. Tato diplomová práce také poskytuje přehled historických událostí, které ovlivnily konstrukci národní identity ve vybraných regionech.

Diplomová práce obsahuje analýzy veřejného mínění, sčítání lidu, referend a regionálních voleb ve Skotsku a Katalánsku za posledních deset let. Na základě výsledků analýz jsou formulovány obecné trendy a rozdíly ve vývoji skotské a katalánské národní identity. Zároveň tato práce zkoumá vztah mezi posilováním národní identity a zesílením regionalizace ve Skotsku a Katalánsku.

Klíčová slova: Národní identita, Skotsko, Katalánsko, regionalizmus, region, globalizace

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1 Introduction

In the modern world national identity is one of the most important for each state. It is impossible to imagine a strong and stable state without national unity, a sense of national community, common national interests and values. The stronger the national unity – the higher the civic responsibility.

Many multicultural societies in the context of globalization are faced with growing threats of separatism. The global economic crisis has intensified separatist movements. At risk are multiethnic countries in which decentralization of power has become a requirement of ethnic groups and regional communities. The ethnic and territorial factors of politics are highly dependent. These countries include Spain and the United Kingdom.

The study of the processes of formation of national identity will promote a better understanding of the ongoing political and socio-cultural processes, changing public attitudes in Catalonia and Scotland, foreign policy strategies, forecasting scenarios for the development of the regions.

Political parties and political elites have always had a significant influence on the formation of citizens' national identity. The dramatic events taking place in the world indicate the need for a comprehensive study of political parties and elites as actors influencing the construction of national identity. National identity is becoming the subject of study by researchers representing various sciences and scientific schools.

A key aspect of the study includes the relationship of parties and elites with the Catalan and Scottish societies, which they turn to as part of a political power struggle. Moreover, this study provides an opportunity to establish the direction of the transformation of political systems in these regions. The transformation of the political system naturally reflects on national identity.

The rhetoric of political parties and elites, the ability to express public interests, and transform them into effective political decisions make it possible to assess these actors' degree of influence on the formation of national identity.

2 Objectives and Methodology

2.1 Objectives

The main purpose of this thesis is to analyse the Catalan and Scottish national identities in the era of Globalization and determine the role of political actors in their construction. The thesis examines the trends and prospects of political parties and elites' influence on constructing the national identity of Catalonia and Scotland. This thesis will examine the relationship between the processes of strengthening national identity and the intensification of regionalization. Additionally, an analysis of political parties' institutional development and public opinion in Catalonia and Scotland will be carried out.

In the context of main objectives of the diploma thesis, following hypothesis was formulated: The growing importance of national identity in Scotland and Catalonia leads to the growth of regionalism.

2.1.1 Research Questions:

In the context of the main objective of the diploma thesis, following research question has been set:

- a) What trends can be identified in the development of national identity among the inhabitants of Catalonia and Scotland?
- b) What role do political parties and elites play in constructing the national identity of Catalonia and Scotland?

2.2 Methodology

The theoretical part of the thesis is based on the literature review of classical and modern research on national identity cognition. The system approach was applied as the main paradigm, which allowed us to reveal the factors influencing national identity formation and identify the political parties and elites' role in the national identity construction.

The practical part of the thesis is focused on the analysis of legislative acts, statistical data of population censuses, results of opinion polls and referendums, statements of political leaders,

and materials of newspapers to formulate the main trends in the historical development of the national identities of Catalonia and Scotland. SWOT-analysis and comparative analysis are used to conclude the research results, which allow us to identify the general and differences in national identity formation in both regions.

3 Literature Review

3.1 National identity theoretical concepts

The concept of identity means “the awareness of the belonging of an object (subject) to another object (subject) as a part of the whole, special and universal”.

The problem of determining identity is expressed in the concept of “social habitus”. N. Elias believes that every person, despite the fact that he is different from other people, bears an imprint common to all members of the society to which he belongs. This is the social habitus of individuals. It forms the basis on which those personal attributes are based that makes an individual different from other members of his society. The problem of national character arises precisely in the question of social habitus.

Problems of social habitus are reflected in P. Ricoeur’s identity theory. According to this theory, there are two components of identity: identity as identity and identity as individuality. Identity-identity means singularity as opposed to multiplicity (not one, but two or more) (Ricoeur, 2008, p. 129). This component corresponds to the identification process. For example, a person identifies himself as a Spaniard because he has Spanish citizenship; he “knows” this, nothing more. But the same individual, calling himself a Spaniard, can identify himself with this ethnic community. In the latter case, it will be about identity-identity.

P. Berger and T. Luckmann note that social reality is constructed based on a particular culture and reproduces models of social relationships, relying on the properties of the individual and the properties of other social actors, which, in turn, manifest themselves in relationships with them. The reality we are in is the reality of the society in which we live. From the social construction of reality, identity is a phenomenon that arose in the socialization process of the individual (Berger, Luckmann, 1991, p. 56).

According to the theory of K. Deutsch, people are prisoners of a communication network. National identity does not change as long as the probability of interaction with representatives of another nationality is not equal to the probability of communication with representatives of its national group (Deutsch, 1966, p.87).

Other identity studies are based on the socio-economic conditions of its formation, but the relationship between these factors may be different. For example, researcher E. Poppe, studying interethnic relations, formulated the following question: is it possible that dissatisfaction with the economic situation may lead to accusation of representatives of another national group in this (Poppe, 1999, p. 67).

It is also a very popular theory that considers the historical past as having a significant impact on the awareness of who we are and who we can be. The growth of national identity and a heightened sense of identity are characteristic of peoples who pay more attention to the search for their historical roots.

B. Parekh considers identity as a phenomenon arising from family and business ties. Identity is formed from categories such as gender, race, class, etc. The author emphasizes that identity is the result of history, and it is transformed by history itself (Parekh, 1994, p. 504).

At the moment, social discourse is a matter of social identity, which arises when such categories of identity as gender, race, class become vague, lose their clarity. An individual may not always choose a category that adequately represents his identity, or he may not be satisfied with an already identification category selected. This problem is called the identity crisis.

According to E. Erickson, ideology helps to overcome the identity crisis. Ideology is an unconscious set of values and premises that reflects the religious, scientific, and political thinking of a culture. Ideology answers the main questions of the individual related to the identity conflict: "Who am I?", "Where am I going?", "Who do I want to become?" (Erikson, 1994, p. 126). The collapse of ideological attitudes turns into general chaos and loss of respect for those who regulate the totality of social rules.

E. Erickson was one of the first to point out that the identity crisis is the main problem of humanity. According to E. Erickson, today, an individual is capable of destroying the human race. In this regard, the formation of a universal identity becomes extremely necessary. Therefore, in societies at the stage of transformation, there are "ideologists" who seek to preserve existing categories of identity or change them in accordance with the needs of the time (Erikson, 1994, p.

126). For this reason, in many modern states today, much attention is paid to the problem of an identity crisis.

In a stable world, the question of identity does not arise since the individual has a clear understanding of who he is and what kind of society he belongs to. However, there may be circumstances that may violate stability. In such situations, some people offer identification projects, the purpose of which is to bring about changes in society and establish a new balance. Thus, despite the fact that identity is a relatively stable phenomenon, it is subject to change.

These ideas are confirmed in the theory of T. Schelling, who distinguishes two types of changes: single and cascade. These types of changes usually occur one after another. As an example, the countries of Eastern Europe. In the late 80s of the 20th century, a wave spread led to the fall of pro-communist regimes. In individual countries, single demonstrations arose that were quickly suppressed by the authorities. The completely demobilized society unexpectedly intensified and mobilized. Back in 1988, protests seemed almost impossible, and in 1989 they became commonplace (Schelling, 2006, p. 145).

Such cascading changes occur because people make their choices based on the actions of other people in similar situations. For example, if an individual assumes that no one will picket the streets, he is unlikely to decide on it. But if he is sure that others will also take part in protest actions, he will join the protesters.

Cascading changes also occur with identity. Confirmation of this process can be an example of changing the language. Language, like social identity, can quickly change from generation to generation. For example, immigrants who spoke Yiddish, who arrived in the US in the 19th century, knew that the children of other immigrants who spoke the same language were going to learn English. Therefore, they realized that trying to preserve their native language is useless. Already in the next generation in New York, it was almost impossible to find a person who would speak only Yiddish.

In turn, individual changes can be explained both by the stability of identity and its variability. T. Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point”. The focal point is a state of equilibrium in a given society characterized by a common understanding of all members of a society of their identity. The political elite of society, relying on the focal point, extends its power and strengthens legitimacy, speaking on behalf of “its” group. Identity is stabilized and not contested (Schelling, 2006, p. 145).

Of course, private changes, such as changes in the language, do not mean creating a “new” identity. But these processes change the identity of the future generation. Such changes lead to the fact that identity loses its stability and acquires the potential for change, which is actualized in certain conditions. These conditions are created by means of identification projects, which are implemented in two forms: “identity policy” and “idea policy”. Such forms differ in their focus but are based on the manipulation of identity.

Currently, political strategies based on identity are common. Since the 1960s, social movements of a new type are gaining popularity: demonstrations of students, pacifist movements and civil rights, feminism, and others. These movements are united by the fact that each appeals to the social identity of those who supported these movements.

Researcher M. Kaldor defines identity policy as a movement that arises around ethnic, racial, or religious identity to gain power. However, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts can be designated as identity politics only if they pursue the right to political power (Kaldor, 2012, p. 88).

In turn, the policy of ideas is directed to the future; it provides for reforms and development. For example, the nationalist movements in Europe in the 19th century, aimed at the democratization of society and state-building. In this case, political actions are aimed at integration, cover all members of society who share the basic idea. In contrast to the politics of ideas, the politics of identity is aimed at the division, directed to the past, and is exclusive. Political groups are created under the influence of nostalgia, their appearance is due to the desire to reconstruct the political history, memories of injustices in relation to their ethnic group. Such political technologies find their application in societies where people experience a feeling of insecurity, fear of historical enemies, and others. These rules are dictated by the fact that each individual needs to differentiate his group from others and acquire a positive identity. At the level of society, the need for identity can take various forms: patriotism, chauvinism, nationalism, racism, etc.

Identity occupies an essential place in the formation of a nation. The main attributes of a nation are language, culture, religion, political institutions, history, which identifies itself, and faith in a common destiny.

Often a separate nation living in a compact territory forms a national state, but sometimes this group is divided by political borders (divided Korea). On the other hand, a state may include several nations (USSR). People who make up a nation usually have a sense of national identity.

But there are differences between the concepts of “nation”, “community of citizens” and “state”. If a nation-state is a reality, then there is no difference between citizenship and a nation. But if the ethnic groups that make up the nation feel that they are excluded from “citizenship”, this leads to bloody conflicts. Often such conflicts lead to separatism.

Thus, it can be seen that national identity is a phenomenon arising from a sense of membership in a community that calls itself a nation. A national identity is a special form of group identity. Individuals consider themselves to be united together, as they have a common language, territory, and feel an attachment to the existing ecosystem. Also, their unification is promoted by such categories as general traditions and historical memory.

National identity is not equal to other forms of group identity: linguistic, territorial, political. The formation of identity is caused by psychological necessity, but the formation of national identity is not.

The formation of identity is carried out by various means. For this reason, there are many classifications of national identity.

Researcher W. Bloom builds his typology based on the relationship between national identity and foreign policy decisions. An example is a messianic nationalism characteristic of “historically established” nations, such as Russia and the United States. In Russia, the national “program” of historical nations carries with it a significant share of messianism and defines the mission of its country on a global scale. US President W. Wilson also imparted a messianic character to American politics, using the formula “to fight to end all wars” (Bloom, 1999, p. 167).

In most cases, this kind of messianic vision of the world led to actions of an aggressive, overwhelming nature in relation to neighboring nations. Historically, the transition from a “civilization” to a “nation” makes it easier to adapt to the international system.

Confirmation of the above can be traced by the example of adaptation to the international system of Japan and China. According to the research of J. Breuille, Japan, seeing itself as a nation, had a more positive experience of integration into the world community than China, which saw itself as a “civilization” (Breuille, 2006, p. 245).

The processes of globalization and fragmentation raise doubts about the future of the political community among individuals, which in turn determines the emergence of the identity problem.

According to F. Fukuyama, the requirement of recognition and respect for one's identity is a universal concept that covers much of what is happening in world politics today. It is not limited to identity politics but extends to broader phenomena such as the surge of nationalism. The author argues that most of the so-called economic motivation is based on the desire for recognition and cannot be satisfied by economic means alone. The active politicization of the identity problem is one of the main threats to modern liberal democracies (Fukuyama, 2019, p. 25).

R. Verdugo and A. Milne define national identity as an ideal concept that does not fully reflect reality but is used for analytical purposes. National identity is based not only on ethnicity and culture but also on such external factors as regimes of government and their changes, economic crises, wars and other forms of aggressive activity, and socio-demographic changes in the population (Verdugo, Milne, 2016, p. 78).

According to D. Mccrone, national identity is no less important to people than other forms of social identities, such as their social class, gender, or marital status. National identity matters because it is embedded in people's self-consciousness to such an extent that a person perceives himself as a nation (Mccrone, 2016, p. 67).

National identity is not a hallmark of individual states. Any state and people can create their own unique national identity. However, constructing an identity is a complex process. Besides, national identity can be created only with the obligatory presence of political, cultural, social, and economic conditions (Fukuyama, 2019, p. 78-80).

Summing up, we can say that ethnic and national identity is the main criterion determining the modern world's life. From the answer to the question "Who am I?" depends on stability in the world. The answer to this question is also sought by people who have recently embarked on the path of transformation, and nations whose history has gone centuries.

Identity is formed based on the corresponding national paradigm, at the intersection of the national-historical, socio-psychological, sociocultural, political-cultural, and other spheres. Its content includes the established features of the national culture, ethnic characteristics, customs, beliefs, myths, moral imperatives, etc.

3.2 National identity and regionalism

Currently, there is an intensification of regionalization processes in Europe. This becomes a kind of opposition to regional elites in response to globalization processes.

Regionalism is the political ideology of regional elites, aiming to promote the interests of one region or group of regions. This ideology seeks to increase the political, economic, or cultural influence of the region. In practice, regionalism is realized through the activities of movements that aim to achieve autonomy for a particular region. Such regionalist movements are, for example, the New Flemish Alliance (Belgium), the Scottish Nationalist Party (Great Britain), the Corsican National Party (France), the North League (Italy), and others. Most often, regionalism leads to decentralization and delegation of significant powers to the regions. However, in radical cases, such movements require sovereignty and independence. It should also be noted that regionalism pushes these processes through power decentralization.

Regionalization is the process of redistributing power competencies, transferring functions from national to regional level; the emergence and development of new institutional forms that meet the new role of regions in the decision-making process at the national and supranational levels.

According to M. Keating if regionalism is a “bottom-up” movement, then regionalization processes are carried out already with the sanction of the central government. The author defines the regionalization as an integration process that takes place at the regional level and with the assistance of governments (Keating, 2019, p. 7).

It must be emphasized that regionalization is a process that leads to an increase in the role of regions and its political weight. Regionalization might be split in several types. At least two types of regionalization can be distinguished: supranational and subnational (or intrastate). Both types of regionalization are interconnected and are caused by globalization processes. Supranational regionalization is expressed in the integration of states within the global region, such as integration within the European Union, North America (NAFTA) in Latin America (MERCOSUR), etc.

Subnational regionalization is expressed in increasing the weight of a particular region of a country (for example, Catalonia and Scotland) and the transfer of significant powers to the region by the central government.

3.2.2 Regionalization and globalization

The processes of regionalism have affected many countries of the world (and Europe, in particular). In the past few decades, Europe has experienced a revival of local cultures and languages. The development of these processes has contributed to globalization. Moreover, the processes of regionalization are intensifying as globalization spreads and deepens after the fall of the communist system in the late 80s-early 90s, serious barriers that hindered the development of globalization until now disappear.

The revival of local cultures has become a kind of opposition to the processes of globalization, which threatened regional identities. Spreading common Western values around the world, globalization seemed to erode state and local cultural characteristics. Moreover, globalization leads to the weakening of nation-states. Under these conditions, the role of individual regions is growing, and there is a tendency for the revival of local cultures, and regionalization is becoming opposition to globalization. In the context of globalization, individual groups and ethnic groups begin to come forward with demands for recognition of their independence. Existing trends are changing the position of regions. For example, there is a real restructuring of relations between central, regional, and local governments. At the moment, the world is searching for solutions to problems and the formation of institutions suitable to globalization and regionalization trends. These processes have led to the autonomy of many regions within the state and the delegation of the central government more powers to regional authorities (Wilson, 2014, p. 850).

These processes are also connected with the weakening of the nation-state. In the context of globalization, the nation-state ceases to be the only actor in international relations. New actors appear: international intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, etc. In addition to these actors, regions also become participants in international relations: open their embassies in other countries, enter into their trade agreements, and become participants in global business.

While central governments' role is decreasing, society tends to be divided into smaller components based on cultural, historical, political, linguistic, and other types of identity. Today, regionalism poses a much greater danger to the power and authority of states in Europe than the European Union. As central governments everywhere lose public confidence, regionalism is

becoming a trend that is changing modern Europe's face. The result of these trends is an increase in the authority of regional leaders, and national cultures are caught between mass culture and reviving regional cultures.

A distinctive feature of regionalization processes is the emerging disproportion between regions. Some regions are mobilizing their economic growth, striving to improve their infrastructure, and increase their role in politics, and some do not. As a rule, this disproportion fits into the classic North-South confrontation, which leads to significant conflict potential.

The processes of regionalization, which are rapidly developing in the modern world and affect many countries, also give rise to new cleavages. The strengthening of economic, social, ethnic, cultural, and religious differences between regions in a particular country generates interregional political tensions, contradictions, and delimitations that contribute to the spread of such phenomena and processes as separatism, secession, and irredentism. At the same time, a new phenomenon was the presence of separatist tendencies in the backward and poorer regions of some Western countries and in rich, successfully developing regions. The most prominent examples of this kind are Catalonia in Spain, Lombardy, and the Veneto region in Italy, Texas, and California in the United States. It is important to emphasize that in this case, we are not talking about the classical delimitation “center-periphery”, since these rich and successful regions or states cannot be attributed to the “periphery”, but rather, about the division into “development spaces” and “undeveloped territories”. Of course, in the foreseeable future, the separation of these and other rich regions or states of developed Western countries is impossible. Still, the trend itself is obvious, and it has to be taken into account when making political decisions at both the regional and national levels (Vampa, 2016, p. 34).

Simultaneously, the processes of regionalization, combined with the formation of supranational and international regional unions, affect the transformation of political spaces, reformatting and changing the nation-state's functions. Thus, the subjects of the transformation of political spaces in the EU countries, as a rule, are subnational (regional) elites who seek to redistribute power and economic resources in their favor and try to attract massive social groups to their side.

Thus, political divisions at the subnational level are closely related to the struggle for resources, the transformation of political spaces, and the nation-state's reformatting. In turn, the transformation of political spaces and the nation-state's reformatting require a change in relations

between regions and the center, a more balanced distribution and redistribution of financial and other resources, an effective identity policy, a politics of memory and symbolic politics. Otherwise, interregional contradictions and separatist tendencies will intensify, giving rise to social and political conflicts at the regional level. At the same time, ethno-political conflicts pose a particular danger, during which regional elites use ethnic identity and its various projections (ethno-confessional, ethno-territorial, ethnolinguistic, ethnocultural) as a resource for political mobilization.

Contemporary ethno-social and ethno-political delimitations are closely related to the processes of regionalization and reformatting of political spaces. These processes, in some cases, can lead to acute ethno-political conflicts, reviving seemingly forgotten historical grievances and using ethnic or regional identity as a means of destroying society and the state. Examples of this kind are the former Yugoslavia, the countries of the Middle East, and some post-Soviet states. In this regard, the problem of preventing the transition of interregional and interethnic delimitations that exist in any country into the phase of unregulated and uncompromising ethno-political conflicts becomes very urgent. Currently, this problem has not been fully resolved in any country in the world. However, more prosperous and more developed countries have significant advantages here, redistributing material and other resources between regions and between ethnic groups, and pursuing an effective identity policy and symbolic policy, which requires considerable expenses.

3.2.3 Regional and national identities

With the formation of such a territorial unit as a region, as well as with the emergence of the phenomenon of regionalism, regional identity is a key component. According to Professor M. Keating, “regional identity can be rooted in historical tradition and myths”. However, M. Keating notes that regional identity is a social construction that arose under the pressure of our time's social, economic, and political conditions. The scientist also identifies the criteria for the formation of regional specifics. According to M. Keating, the key components of regional identity are differences in values, norms, and forms of behavior of residents of different regions of one state (Keating, 2019, p. 7).

Thus, we can conclude that, in essence, regionalism is a phenomenon that, according to many criteria, is similar to nationalism. The only specific feature of regionalism in comparison with nationalism is its belonging to a particular region. Nationalism is based on national identity, and regionalism is based on regional identity. But the basis of these identities is the same elements: common traditions, language, territory, common historical past, ethnicity, and religion.

Thus, the phenomenon of regionalism can be described as regional nationalism. However, it must be emphasized that regionalism can only be compared with ethnic or cultural nationalism, i.e., with the type of nationalism carried out by political movements advocating the creation of a new state. Regional nationalism is opposed to civic nationalism (i.e., the nationalism of an already created state and supported by the central authorities of that state). As a rule, a crisis of national identity causes a strengthening of regional identity. This leads to the intensification of the regions' requirements for greater independence and the emergence of a confrontation between central and regional authorities.

3.3 Political parties and elites as actors influencing the formation of national identity

The identity of an ethnic group, nation, and state is the main element that determines the modern world's life. “Who am I?” – the answer to this fundamental question gives rise to war and stability, leads to the collapse of states and their emergence. Identification is a perpetual motion machine, permanent transformation, rethinking.

The construction of national identity remains the central task of political parties and elites of all countries. The states of the European Union are forced to solve such tasks as the definition of territorial borders and the development of the political, cultural, and economic spheres, internal political space, and the consolidation of citizens and democratization. The issues of relations between the center and the periphery, the state and society, in conditions, when elite groups and political parties claim the role of “builders of the nation” turn out to be solutions. Such tasks influence the structuring of political parties and elites and determine not only the main direction of their messages but also their organizational features and style of activity.

3.3.1 Political elites as the subject of national identity construction

National identity is a political and social construct that is formed by national elites. The elites pursue national, historical, and linguistic policies to build a common cultural, historical, and political space and create an identification system with a whole state.

The political elite is an important actor in the political system of society. The political elite is a group of people occupying leading positions in power structures that are directly involved in making the most critical decisions about the use of power.

The study of political elites has a central position in political science. The foundations of the study of political elites are laid in the writings of V. Pareto (Pareto, 1991), R. Michels (Michels, 2016), G. Sartori (Sartori, 2005) and many other thinkers.

Over the past twenty years, many works have appeared in political science related to the empirical and applied study of elites. At this stage in the development of elitology, researchers will pay great attention to the influence of political elites on identity construction. This issue has been given a significant number of studies relating to both national and regional elites.

There are many definitions of the concept of the elite. The term “elite” is included in a broad scientific circulation after the appearance of the works of V. Pareto. V. Pareto defined the elite as a group of people located at the top of the social hierarchy and having reached the highest level of competence in their field of activity, having political and social power (Pareto, 1991, p. 23).

According to G. Sartori, the identities that exist in society are “translated” into the political agenda, and political elites become their “translators”. The elite’s chosen strategy for mobilizing identity and the success of its implementation depends on the extent and for how long these phenomena will affect political processes (Sartori, 2005, p. 35).

The elite is one of the actors that influence the formation of identity. The political elite can play a role in mobilizing citizens to create or strengthen national identities. Usually, the political elite controls this process, but sometimes a nation can influence the political elite's decisions.

An essential aspect of building a national identity is the ability of one person or group to influence others. One of the processes of this influence may be identification, i.e., identification by an individual of himself with some other person, a group of persons. Often, political and social leaders influence other individuals because this part of society identifies itself with these leaders.

National identity is a construct that, under certain circumstances, can be created by the political elite to form a new state - a nation. One of the leading roles at the stage of nation-building is assigned to the elite: political, cultural, setting the main vectors of development of the state, and future development.

Even though the elites play a decisive role in the formation of identity, the elites are not its primary carrier. History has a large number of examples where state elites changed quite often, while national identity remained practically unchanged.

A good example of the influence of political elites on the construction of national identity is the European Union experience. At this stage, the position of elites in relation to European integration plays a significant role. It is the political elite that sets the agenda, i.e., initiates the consideration of European problems from a certain angle, which contributes to or prevents the formation of a positive perception of European construction processes by society. The more the national identity is mobilized, the more discrepancies within the elites on European integration issues. Respectively the more ambiguous attitude to the European project is demonstrated by European society.

Representatives of the political elite who participate in the activities of European political institutions and national political institutions are forced to develop a definite position regarding the ongoing processes. Thus there is no decided attitude towards the European integration project among the European political elite representatives. There are supporters, skeptics, and opponents, but there are no those who would not have a formulated position and those who would not feel the political significance of European institutions.

M. Castells says that the ruling elite, forming a “project” identity, gives new impulses to national development. The main task of such projects is the socio-political consolidation of the state and society around national development (Castells, 2011, p. 90).

Great Britain is another example of the influence of political elites on the construction of national identity. In the 1970s, the leadership of the Labor Party as a vector of the country’s development took the concept of the “third way”, developed by the famous British sociologist E. Giddens. The precondition for choosing this concept as the primary development model was the rejection of “economic regulation in favor of economic incentives.” The welfare state’s paternalistic policy has been revised in favor of “social investment” in the individual and ensuring

the “social inclusion” of all its citizens. Adherents of the “third way” in the Anglo-Saxon political tradition countries and the United States fought for a “just society” (Hemerijck, 2013, p. 237).

Often when constructing national identity, political elites use the factor of ethnicity. From the point of view of instrumentalism, in the hands of the political elite, ethnicity is a useful tool used in the power struggle. Groups of people who support such elites make rational choices based on specific physical and cultural characteristics, with the help of a social group that can advance and realizes its interests. In this case, it is not the innate psychological connection between people of decisive importance but their awareness of ethnicity’s political advantage.

Thus, instrumentalists think that ethnicity is a resource for political mobilization and not a reflection of real problems in relation to ethnic groups. At the moment, we can safely say that ethnicity’s politicization is one of the strongest social characteristics of a person, which, ultimately, allows it to be so widely used as a tool for mobilizing the masses. This concept considers ethnic conflict as a result of intergroup competition for the possession of certain economic, natural, and socio-cultural resources, and not as a result of a clash of group identities. Elites dissatisfied with their position, use the political resource of ethnicity to level out intergroup differences.

In turn, constructivists agree with instrumentalists and believe that ethnicity itself does not generate conflict, but is used by elites when political mobilization in the power struggle is necessary. The difference from the instrumentalist concept is the recognition of the possibility that a kind of pathological state of the socio-political system as a whole, amenable to control only by the political elite, can become the basis for conflict.

Thus, today almost everyone recognizes that the elites play an essential role in the politicization of ethnic identity, making it possible to achieve the political mobilization of ethnic groups. Still, the degree of influence on these processes is interpreted in different ways.

I. Prizel distinguishes several types of national identity, depending on the foreign policy of the state. The first type includes national identities based on political institutions rather than religion, language, or myths about common ancestors. This type of identity is characteristic of the United States and Great Britain since their political institutions were formed in the 18th century and remain the main sources of legitimacy. The political elites of these countries broadcast the conviction that their political systems are rational and political values are universal (Prizel, 2009, p. 176).

The second type of identity is clearly represented in states that have freed themselves from imperialist or colonial rule. These include the states of Central and Eastern Europe, South America. Representatives of the nations living in these countries have a deep sense of cultural and political “resentment” towards the “conquerors”. Such resentment has generated a sense of political and social injustice in these nations and a desire to defend their culture and idealize the past. The countries of Eastern Europe glorify the 18th century, from where they originate, the Latin Americans - the era that preceded the discovery of the New World.

Unlike the British and American political elites, which formed their national identity as self-sufficient and did not build it based on opposing their nation to “others”, the elites of the Central and Eastern European countries often use the factor of “others”. Given the multinational composition of Eastern European countries, the definition of “others” has a cultural, political, and economic basis. This kind of national rhetoric on the part of the elites is often reinforced by introducing new political and economic privileges (Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) or preserving traditional values.

Starting in 1948, the imposition of norms and orders in Eastern European countries, which dominated the USSR at that time, deprived the region of creating a new national identity. The USSR was the embodiment of the collective “other” against which inverted nationalism arose in Eastern Europe. After the collapse of the USSR, a new task emerged for the political elites - to redefine national identity and create a new “other”, from which threat and pressure would come. Some countries have found a new image of the enemy in modern Russia, while others - in the image of the United States.

The third type of national identity created by the political elite can be seen in France. France is a state with well-established political traditions, and a characteristic feature of its national identity is a universal culture. In this regard, the political elite's actions in the foreign policy arena aim to protect cultural integrity and assert the status of France as a unique culture and great power.

The fourth type of national identity, according to I. Prizel, arose in the twentieth century, which became widespread in the former European colonies in Africa and Asia. National identity in these countries took shape during the struggle against the colonial authorities. After gaining independence, these states' political elites often faced a difficult choice of the country's development strategy. The ruling elite is trying to maintain a fragile identity, addressing the colonial period's grievances, the unfair position in the international system, and the common

problems of cultural and economic imperialism. Also, the political elite is trying to create a broader context for the nation's existence through regional cooperation. Thus, membership in the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, participation in the Non-Aligned Movement not only provides post-colonial countries with a presence in the international arena but also legitimizes and strengthens the feeling of “anti” based on which their national identity is built. Thus, the formation of national identity as a support for the development of the state becomes the primary task of the country's political elite. The elite sets the vector for constructing identity, by the priorities of state policy (Prizel, 2009, p. 176).

The most common element used by elites is the relationship with significant “others”. However, the peculiarity of national identity is that there is no single universal source of national identification or uniformity in its impact on foreign policy. Moreover, the concepts of nationalism and national identity are the subject of constant rethinking. Although redefining national identity is a gradual process, in situations of prolonged stress, even well-established identities can change markedly, as can individuals' collective memory. Moreover, the origins of national identity are unique to each nation and subject to constant re-creation. Therefore, the process of forming the identity of each nation and the influence of the political elite on this process in each state requires particular consideration.

3.3.2 Political parties as the actor of national identity construction and regionalization

Political parties are important actors in the political system of society. A political party is the main political institution that actively participates in the power struggle and participates in the circulation of the political elite. A political party is not just a public association created by citizens to protect social interests but also acts as an actor of power relations.

There are many definitions of the concept of a party. At the end of the 18th-century researcher E. Burke defined the party as “a group of people united to advance by joint efforts of the national interest with the help of some specific principle, about which they all agreed” (Norman, 2013, p. 98-101). K. von Baime considers the party as an organization that performs the function of aggregating interests, and the most important function for the party is the function of uniting people (Baime, 1985, p. 287).

In turn, A. de Tocqueville described the stages of the formation of parties. The researcher noted that “in the beginning, people are united by common views, a common worldview, purely spiritual ties arise between them. Then, in the second stage, these same people form small associations representing a fraction of the party. And finally, at the third stage, they seem to create a separate nation within the entire nation, their own rule within the state government”.

Today the party is an institution that reflects new trends in politics. At the moment, a political party is very different from the activities and organization of parties in previous political life stages. Parties have become an integral part of the political system of society. Political parties link society and the state expressing the needs, goals, and interests of certain social groups. The party's primary goal is to transform citizens' interests into a single political interest. The actions of citizens in political life are formalized through the parties. Parties exert ideological influence on citizens and participate in the formation of political culture and consciousness. The activities of political parties have a significant impact on the construction of national identity.

Currently, the positions of regional parties are strengthening throughout Europe. Central governments lost the role they played in the past. Some functions began to be delegated to the local level. The regions have become significant actors in European politics.

It became possible to talk about the strengthening of direct communication across the state borders by different regions. The concept of "paradiplomacy" has appeared - regions can negotiate, conclude agreements and act in coalition with other regions, even if they are in different states, but have common historical ties, common cultural roots, or just general economic or other interests. The basis for paradiplomacy and the "sovereignization" of regions is the concept of a Europe of regions, which has become one of the EU's development principles (Moreno, 2016, p. 288).

The EU has been pursuing a policy of supporting regions since 1975 when the European Fund for the Economic Development of Regions (FEDER) was established. This fund and several other EU structures were supposed to provide a potential equalization of welfare in various countries joining the EU (this was especially true in the 1980s concerning Portugal, Spain, and Greece) (ERDF, 2020). The Maastricht Agreements of 1993 made regional development one of the priority areas in the EU; the amount of aid allocated was significantly increased (European Parliament, 1993). Still, the importance of maintaining regional life was also emphasized: preserving the historical heritage, learning minor languages, local traditions, etc.

The EU has given to the regions the instruments to self-increase their well-being and defend their identity. In 1988, the European Parliament adopted the "Community Charter on Regionalization" (European Parliament, 1988). This document explicitly called on states to begin the process of decentralization and empowerment of regions. Since 1991, a committee of regions also began to function, where states should send representatives of the regions to allow local authorities to express their views at the pan-European level.

Certainly, the movement of regionalization in the EU countries will not lead to the disintegration of the current nation-states since the sovereign regions are unlikely to become serious players in domestic and foreign policy.

To summarize, regional separatism in the EU is less dangerous in the short term than separatism in other parts of the world. In some countries, people fight for independence with arms in hand and not through legal action alone. However, in the long term, separatism in the EU can lead to big problems: the collapse of the system of nation-states in Europe, a complete weakening of the EU, a large number of potential hotbeds of instability, and the emergence of failed states in one of the most prosperous parts of the world.

The most promising is preserving regions within the framework of existing states by restructuring the general principles of this state, for example, devolution, federalization or cultural autonomy. EU efforts to equalize the welfare of the regions should lead to the fact that local separatists' economic agenda will be untenable. Issues of national and regional identity will remain, but they can be resolved within giving a special status to local languages and quotas. The future of Europe is equal alliance of nation states made up of unique and dissimilar regions that find ways to negotiate and conduct legitimate dialogue with central governments, setting an example for regions and local authorities around the world, but do not require radical transformations that threaten possible disintegration European system of nation states. Scotland and Catalonia, which are presented in the practical part of this thesis, can be examples of such regions.

4. PRACTICAL PART

4.1 CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CATALONIA (2010-2019)

Catalonia is 16% of Spain's population, 19% of GDP, and 26% of Spain's exports. The share of agriculture in the region is 9.7%. The region has one of the highest living standards among the autonomous communities. Catalonia gives more to the center than it receives in government subsidies of 16 billion euros a year (8% of regional GDP).

Catalonia has a rich history and culture, its language, but it has never been an independent state. Demanding for several centuries to recognize their difference from the rest of Spain, the Catalans rarely raised the issue of secession. The nationalist movement was dominated by the desire to rebuild Spain's territorial political organization in a federal or confederal manner. The state of autonomies, formed in Spain during the democratic transition of 1976-1983, is a decentralized unitary state, and the statuses of autonomous communities are asymmetric (Política, 2012).

4.1.1 Formation of national identity in Catalonia (until 2012)

During the years of democracy (after 1975) before the global crisis of 2007-2008, there was no question of Catalonia's withdrawal from Spain. The preconditions for the development of regional nationalism into separatism were formed in the 1980s and 1990s. The Convergence and Union (CiU) governmental coalition continuously formed the governments of the autonomy (Generalitat). Its leader, Jordi Pujol, considered the founder of modern Catalan nationalism, played a huge role in this transformation. J. Pujol and his party pursued a policy of "recatalonization of Catalonia" to seize key positions in the media and education by nationalists and impose their views and rules on the local society; the goal was to construct a Catalan identity separate from the Spanish one.

The nationalists considered myth-making, the reproduction of Catalonia's ideas as the most ancient nation that had been the victim of unfair oppression by Spain, which had been cultivated for centuries by their ideological predecessors as an important propaganda tool. The population was taught that Catalonia and Spain are two different nations with nothing in common with each other. The relationship between them is the relationship between the colony and the metropolis.

Simultaneously, Spain's image was promoted as a country poor and backward, in contrast to modern, European, and advanced Catalonia (Borrell, 2017, p. 56-67).

A considerable role in the formation of the "Catalan nation" was assigned to the Catalan language. In Catalonia's educational system, the model of "language immersion" was introduced, which aimed at ousting the Spanish language and turning the region into a monolingual one.

The leading parties in Spain - the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, PSOE) and the People's Party (*Partido Popular*, PP), did not respond to the activation of Catalan nationalism. This can be attributed mainly to the support provided by the Convergence and Union coalition between the PSOE and PP, which did not have a parliamentary majority.

Remarkably, the nationalists intensified their activities in the face of the elimination of Francoism and the transformation of the Spanish state from a unitary to a decentralized asymmetric state of autonomies, when the autonomy of Catalonia, abolished during the years of the dictatorship, was restored. The regional government has acquired such a scope of rights and powers that it has never had in its history. In accordance with the 1978 Constitution and the 1979 autonomous statute, Catalonia has its parliament and government, police, television, and radio. Catalan is recognized as an official language, along with Spanish. The concept of "Catalan" was first defined as "nationality". Meanwhile, if some Catalans perceived the acquisition of autonomy as an achievement of the ultimate goal, others - just as an intermediate stage in the struggle for independence.

Since 2005, the institutional crisis of the autonomous state has been growing. In 2006, the Parliament of Catalonia achieved the adoption of a new edition of the Statute of the Autonomous Community. In it, the Catalans are for the first time named a nation; the obligatory knowledge and use of two languages (Castilian and Catalan) in the community have been established, the powers of the autonomous community in international relations, the judicial system and finance have been qualitatively expanded. The region's powers in international relations, the judicial system, and the financial sphere have been significantly expanded (50% of tax revenues remain in the community's budget) (Molina, De Miguel, 2014).

However, the People's Party and a number of other legal entities challenged specific provisions of the new statute in the Constitutional Court, claiming that they were contrary to the Spanish Constitution. The Constitutional Court in June 2010 recognized a higher degree of self-

government of the autonomy in comparison with the 1979 statute, but at the same time classified 14 articles of the new statute as fully or partially unconstitutional (Política, 2012).

Much controversy was caused by an article stating that there is no legal basis for considering the inhabitants of Catalonia as a separate nation. These debates have a long history: nationalists have been demanding recognition of Catalonia as a nation since the 19th century. This position contradicts the Spanish Constitution, which postulates the existence of only one nation on the territory of Spain - the Spanish. According to many experts, the transformation of Spain from a "nation of nationalities" as it is now into a "nation of nations" will lead to the collapse of the state (Borrell, 2017, p. 68-69).

According to another point of view, Catalonia's recognition as a nation does not mean neither secession from Spain, nor the granting of rights to the Catalans that are different from those of other Spaniards. Two or more nations can coexist in one state. The specific "Catalan case" does not fit into the framework of generally accepted legal norms. The Constitutional Court left Catalonia's definition as a nation only in the preamble of the document, which has no legal force. Many Catalans found this decision offensive, violating national dignity. Thus, the new statute did not defuse, but, on the contrary, destabilized the situation in Catalonia.

The situation worsened even more during the 2007-2008 global crisis. The ruling party of Catalonia "CiU" worked with the Spanish government on austerity policies, cutting governmental payments to the people. Faced with massive widespread dissatisfaction, the Generalitat of Catalonia, headed by Arthur Mas, decided to shift responsibility for Catalonia's problems to the central government. A. Mas saw the solution to the problems of Catalonia in the separation of the region from Spain.

Since 2009 under the influence of nationalist propaganda, dozens of small towns and villages in Catalonia have held referendums, in which participants voted to secede from Spain. These referendums had no legal force, but they had a noticeable impact on autonomy's political climate. An unprecedented manifestation of protest activity was Barcelona's demonstration on September 11, 2012, on the National Day of Catalonia, under the slogan "Catalonia - a new state in Europe". According to various estimates, from 600 thousand to 2 million people participated in it. Similar demonstrations took place on this day (11th of September) all subsequent years (Mondelo, Amargós, 2014, p. 46-47).

Nationalist media often broadcast that Catalonia is "feeding" Spain, annually investing in the state budget 16 billion euros more than it receives from it. Madrid's fiscal policy towards Barcelona qualifies as a "tax robbery". The expression "Madrid is robbing us" has become stereotypical. Meanwhile, Spanish economists' calculations show that the money transferred by Catalonia to the central budget generally corresponds to the level of its economic development (Arza Mondelo, Coll Amargós, 2014, p. 147-168).

4.1.3 The Catalan crisis 2012-2017: political, institutional and ethno-political aspects

In 2012, Catalonia, along with several Spain regions, presented an ultimatum to the state authorities with demands to redistribute budget revenues. In 2014, a poll was conducted on Catalonia's status, and in 2017, a referendum on independence unrecognized by Spain was held. Certain historical events were used to unite the people. The day of the defeat of the Catalan independence movement on 11th of September 1714, was turned into a day of mass demonstrations when images of the monarch and the national flag were publicly burned. There is a well-organized and well-funded Museum of the History of Catalonia in Barcelona. The entire history of the Catalan lands and people is rethought exclusively from the struggle for independence and Castile's opposition. The basic myth of the continuous Catalan statehood that has existed since the 9th century and destroyed by Castile's aggressive expansion has been introduced into the mass consciousness. The priority of the Catalan language is promoted at all stages of education. Road signs, advertising messages, and etc. are given in two languages, but with the priority of the regional language (Kamen, 2012, p. 78-90).

4.1.4 Analysis of surveys on national identity of Catalans conducted from 2006-2017

The analysis of questionnaires to determine the national identity of the inhabitants of Catalonia from 2006 to 2017 was carried out. According to the Center for Sociological Research in 2006, 18% of the respondents considered themselves only Catalans. Another 28% of respondents identified themselves as Catalans rather than Spaniards. 41% of the respondents felt that they were Catalans and Spaniards equally. To a greater extent, 5% considered themselves Spaniards, and only 7% considered themselves Spaniards (Table 1).

The survey conducted in 2009 revealed: 44% consider themselves “both Spaniards and Catalans”, “more Catalans than Spanish” – 23%, “only Catalans” - 15%, “only Spanish” - 10%, “more Spaniards than Catalans”- 7% of respondents (Table 1).

The poll conducted in 2012 showed: 35% consider themselves “both Spaniards and Catalans”, “more Catalans than Spaniards” - 26%, “only Catalans” - 25%, “only Spanish” - 6%, “more Spaniards than Catalans” - 5% of respondents (Table 1).

The poll conducted in 2015 turned out to be close to the poll conducted in 2012. According to a 2015 poll, 36% considered themselves "both Spaniard and Catalan", "more Catalan than Spaniard" - 22%, "only Catalan" - 22%, "only Spaniard" - 6%, "more Spaniard than Catalan "- 6% of respondents (Table 1).

According to the survey conducted in 2017, 38% of respondents identified themselves as "Spaniard and Catalan", and 22% identified themselves exclusively as "Catalans" (Table 1).

The survey conducted in 2019 had the following results: 38% of respondents identified themselves as "Spaniard and Catalan", and 26% identified themselves exclusively as "Catalans". (Table 1).

Table 1 Results on Catalonia national identity surveys (2006-2019)


Which of the following phrases do you identify with the most?						
Year	2006	2009	2012	2015	2017	2019
I feel only Spaniard	7%	10%	6%	6%	6%	5%
I feel more Spaniard than Catalan	5%	7%	5%	6%	6%	5%
I feel equily Spaniard and Catalan	41%	44%	35%	36%	38%	38%
I feel more Catalan than Spaniard	28%	23%	26%	22%	24%	21%
I feel only Catalan	18%	15%	25%	22%	22%	26%
I don't know	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	3%
No answer	1%	1%	2%	8%	3%	3%
<i>Number of respondents</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>2966</i>	<i>1872</i>	<i>987</i>	<i>2450</i>	<i>1500</i>

Source: Sociological Research Center, 2020

Thus, the trend towards a change in national identity among the inhabitants of Catalonia continues. Based on the analysis of the surveys conducted by the Center for Sociological Research (2006-2019), we can conclude that Catalan national identity is not inherited and can be constructed. More and more respondents identify themselves as both Spanish and Catalan. The last

survey showed that the number of people identifies themselves as only Catalans are getting higher. We can say that a complex identity prevails in Catalonia – a symbiosis of national, ethnic, regional, and local identities (Figure 1).

Figure 1 National Identity Surveys in Catalonia (2006-2019)



Source: Own figure, 2020

4.1.5 Analysis of public opinion on the independence of Catalonia (2015-2019)

From 2015 to 2017, before the 2017 Catalan independence referendum, a series of surveys were conducted among the region's inhabitants. According to surveys, the majority of Catalan residents agree with the federalization of Spain.

The poll conducted by the Metroscopy service in November 2015 assessed the projective assessment of the independence referendum. If the ballots had the opportunity to choose a federal structure, then 26% would support independence, 45% would support the status of a federation subject with "new, guaranteed, exclusive rights" of Catalonia, and 20% would support the current status of Catalonia. Consequently, a share of the responsibility for the growth of separatism is

supported by the Spanish government's irreconcilable unitarian course and the ruling People's Party (Metroscopy, 2015).


A questionnaire survey conducted by Metroscopy on 8-10 May 2017 clarified Catalonia's residents' attitude towards the independence of the region (Metroscopy, 2017). The poll showed that 42% of Catalans would vote for Catalan independence. On the other hand, in this hypothetical referendum, the share of those who will vote to keep Catalonia as part of Spain remained at 49%. Simultaneously, when respondents were asked to imagine that Catalonia's independence would entail the region's withdrawal from the European Union, the number of respondents who voted for the region's independence fell to 39%. Further, the respondents were offered a third alternative scenario - acquiring Catalonia's special status within Spain. 49% of respondents would vote for federalization. The number of residents who favor independence decreased to 29%, and those who wanted to leave everything as it is amounted to 16% (Table 2).

Table 2 Survey conducted among residents of Catalonia on May 8-10, 2017

	In the event of a referendum on the possible independence of Catalonia, you would vote for	Percentage
1	Independence of Catalonia	42%
2	Catalonia remains to be part of Spain	49%
3	N/A	1%
	If Catalonia's independence meant that Catalonia would automatically exit from the European Union, that you vote for?	Percentage
1	Independence of Catalonia	39%
2	Catalonia remains to be part of Spain	54%
3	N/A	1%
	If a third alternative is proposed, in which Catalonia remains part of Spain, but with a new exclusive status and rights, which is more likely you will vote?	Percentage
1	Independence of Catalonia	29%
2	Catalonia remains to be part of Spain	16%
3	For Catalonia to continue to be part of Spain, but with new and guaranteed exclusive rights and status	49%
4	N/A	6%

Source: Metroscopy, 2017

Figure 2 Results of Monitoring public opinion for the independence of Catalonia (2006-2019)



Source: Government of Catalonia, 2019

According to a 2019 poll by the Generalitat of Catalonia, about 37% of respondents favored complete independence for the region, while another 22% openly supported Spain's federalization (Figure 2).

Thus, we can observe a downward trend in the supporters of secessionism. More and more respondents are in favor of federalization and granting Catalonia a special status.

4.1.6 Analysis on the referendum results on the self-determination of Catalonia (2017)

The illegal referendum on the independence of Catalonia was held on October 1, 2017. Its legal basis was two laws passed by the Catalan parliament on September 6 and 7, 2017. The first law determined the conditions for the referendum. Its participants had to answer the question: "Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state with a republican form of government?"

According to the law, Catalonia's independence was proclaimed if there were more votes in "favor" than votes "against". The minimum level of participation in the referendum was not set. In the event of the victory of the supporters for the independence of Catalonia, a second law entered into force (the so-called "law of severance"), according to which Catalonia became a "legal, democratic and social republic" (Government of Catalonia, 2017).

In the future, it was planned to hold elections to form a parliament to adopt a new constitution, which was to be approved in a referendum. The referendum was conducted without democratic guarantees, without voting control (Cordero, 2017)


The referendum confirmed the delicate balance between supporters and opponents of secession. According to the official data of the Generalitat, the turnout was 2,286,217 people (43.03% of those eligible to vote). 2,044,038 people (90.18%) voted for independence, 177,547 (7.83%) were against, and 1.98% of ballots were declared invalid. The lowest support for secession was in Barcelona (Table 3).

Table 3 Results of Referendum on the self-determination of Catalonia 1st of October, 2017

Region	Yes	Yes (%)	No	No (%)	N/A (Blank)	N/A (%)
Alt Pirineu i Aran	26674	93.87%	1350	4.75%	391	1.38%
Barcelona	1239232	87.80%	138759	9.83%	33418	2.37%
Camp de Tarragona	142386	92.61%	8897	5.79%	2464	1.60%
Central Catalonia	205285	94.70%	8638	3.98%	2840	1.31%
Girona	244758	94.86%	10140	3.93%	3131	1.21%
Lleida	118799	93.69%	6274	4.95%	1730	1.36%
Terres de l'Ebre	62652	93.51%	3434	5.13%	916	1.37%
External Voters	4252	98.13%	55	1.27%	23	0.53%
TOTAL	2044038	93.65%	177547	4.95%	44913	1.39%

Source: Government of Catalonia, 2017

Figure 3 Results of Referendum on the self-determination of Catalonia 1st of October, 2017



Source: Own figure

The Catalan government interpreted the results of the referendum as a victory. However, these results did not determine the real balance of power since only 43% of voters participated in the vote – 2 million out of 5.3 million eligible to vote (Government of Catalonia, 2017).

European institutions publicly rejected Catalonia's independence and declared that the crisis is an internal matter of Spain. A large-scale export of capital took place from Catalonia; big business condemned the declaration of independence. But in the long term, the technology of proclaiming the independence of an intrastate region can become a model for the strategies of separatist forces in Scotland, Flanders, Northern Italy, etc. The Europe of Regions project in a radical version of dismantling states suits transnational corporations, and the process should continue.

Only at the end of October 2017 the Spanish government made a difficult decision, dissolving the Parliament of Catalonia and the Generalitat, and arresting the secessionist coalition leaders. The dissolution of Catalan authorities, the suspension of the Statute of the Autonomous Community, and the arrests of active participants in the secessionist movement led to reformatting Catalonia's political system radical parties and social activities to act outside the legal space.

4.1.7 Analysis of the construction of national identity in the activities of political parties and elites in Catalonia (2012-2019)


The ideology of the nationalist parties in Catalonia has undergone radical changes during the global crisis. They were led by separatist politicians, with many transformed from rather moderate nationalists to fighters for independence. This applies primarily to the head of the Generalitat, A. Mas. At a meeting between A. Mas and Spanish Prime Minister M. Rajoy, in September 2012, the head of Catalonia demanded that the region be given full control over the taxes collected and an independent ministry of finance be created here. M. Rajoy refused the demand. In response, A. Mas announced his intention to ensure that Catalonia secedes from Spain and join the EU (Mondelo, Amargós, 2014, p. 167-169).

A. Mas, in his speeches to the inhabitants of Catalonia, often used the word "we" to denote the Catalans as a nation capable of reviving Catalonia as a separate country. The politician often expressed historical grievances against Spain, which oppressed the Catalans, not recognizing their culture, language, and way of life. As an argument, A. Mas often said that Catalonia supports Spain at its own expense. Also, A. Mas often called for making Catalonia free, refusing cooperation with Spain, and starting the separation process. At the same time, A. Mas personifies himself with the Catalan people and takes responsibility for its future as a separate self-determined nation. A. Mas's speeches influenced many Catalans' thinking, who perceive the secession as a positive phenomenon.

C. Puigdemont became A. Mas's replacement as President of Catalonia's Government in 2016 and did not slow down his separatist rhetoric, but more balanced than his predecessor approached the referendum's issue and its legality.


In 2012 and 2015, separatist parties won parliamentary elections and formed the regional government. Thus, in the 2015 elections, "Together for yes" (JxSí) and Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) won the absolute majority of parliamentary seats – 72 out of 135, bypassing unionist parties and coalitions – Ciudadanos, Socialist Party of Catalonia, People's Party and Coalition "Catalonia, yes, it is possible", which included the Podemos party. However, in terms of the number of votes collected, the separatists lagged behind the unionists – 47.8% against 51.3%. In other words, the majority of Catalan voters voted against secession from Spain (Figure 4 and 5).

Figure 4 Results of Catalan regional election: 2012



Source: Government of Catalonia, 2012


Figure 5 Results of Catalan regional election: 2015



Source: Government of Catalonia, 2015

Snap parliamentary elections were held following the events of the October 2017 referendum. The elections were scheduled for December 21, 2017. The elections were characterized by high political participation of voters (turnout was 81.9%). The separatist parties and alliances – Together for Catalonia (JUNTSxCAT), Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), and Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) - won 70 seats in the regional parliament (two less than in the 2015 elections) (Figure 6).

Figure 6 Results of Catalan regional election: 2017



Source: Government of Catalonia, 2017a

However, having won the absolute majority of the parliamentary mandates, these separatist parties took second and third places, respectively. The winner was the “Citizens” (C’s) party (36 seats, 25% of the vote), which firmly stood for the territorial integrity of Spain and, at the same time, was formed in Catalonia. For the first time in all years a non-nationalist party won the elections (Government of Catalonia, 2017a).

Summing up, we can say that the positions of separatism are weakening. There is no political unity between the two leading political forces - Together for Catalonia and the Republican Left of Catalonia. The “Together for Catalonia” association demonstrates its readiness to re-enter

into a confrontation with the state. On the contrary, the Republican Left of Catalonia believes that it is necessary to expand the social base of separatism to “force the state to enter into negotiations” and achieve an internationally recognized independence referendum.

The fundamental principle of the Catalan problem is hidden in the model of the territorial and political organization of Spain, which does not allow finding a way out of the current deadlock in relations between the center and the authorities of the autonomy. It is not yet possible to change this model due to the lack of agreement between the leading parties. The attitude to the Catalan conflict is splitting the Spanish political and civil society. Moderate, compromise solutions are not popular among separatists and unionists. It is hardly possible to find a formula for mutually acceptable relations between Catalonia and Spain. In the foreseeable future, Spain is doomed to live with a built-in destabilizer in the face of rebellious Catalonia.

Catalan nationalism transformed into separatism. The main reason for this was the systemic crisis that arose in Spanish society. The ruling elite of Catalonia directed protest mood into the fight to secede the region from Spain.

The 2017 elections confirmed that there are “two Catalonia” that will have to coexist. The next parliamentary elections in Catalonia are due to take place on February 14, 2021. The new government will influence the course of building national identity in the region.

4.2 CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SCOTLAND (2010-2019)

Scotland is 8.2% of the population (5,463 mil people) and 8% of the United Kingdom's GDP. The share of agriculture in the economy of the region is around 1%. In 2017 the exports from Scotland reached 81.4 billion pounds. The majority of Scottish trade conducts within the UK and the European Union. About 90% of all oil in the United Kingdom is produced on the Scottish shelf.

Scotland was an independent state from 843 to the beginning of the 18th century. In 1707 the British and Scottish Parliaments adopted the Union Act and the Kingdom of Great Britain. Scotland has significant and wields great political resources of the national movement. The issue of national independence has always been topical for this region (Bell, Miller, 2004, p. 23-26).

Scotland is currently a kingdom (state) within the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland with its autonomous government, the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh. It is the most isolated autonomy in the United Kingdom, with its own judicial and legal system, different from the British.

4.2.1 Formation of national identity in Scotland (until 2012)

In 1979, the first referendum on devolution and the creation of a Scottish parliament was held. The majority of the voters supported this idea, but the plebiscite's insufficient turnout did not allow the referendum results to be recognized. Thus, the creation of a Scottish parliament was postponed for 20 years.

The second referendum on devolution took place in September 1997. This time 74.3% of the plebiscite participants voted for the creation of a local parliament, which amounted to 44.87% of the total number of voters. Thus, the 40% barrier was passed, and the next year the British Parliament adopted the Scottish Act, based on which Scotland received its own parliament and local government (Taylor, 2002, p. 45-46).

However, the getting of self-government by Scotland contributed to the revitalization of local nationalists. During the 2007 election campaign, the flagship of this political movement, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), promised, if it won, to hold a referendum on the full sovereignty of Scotland, which was a direct challenge to London (Hassan, 2009, p. 268).

Having won an absolute majority in the local parliament in the next elections (2011) and formed the Scottish government, the SNP launched a massive campaign supporting Scottish independence in May 2012. The intermediate result of it was the signing on October 15, 2012, by British Prime Minister David Cameron and the first Scottish Minister, SNP leader Alex Salmond, an agreement on the referendum's conditions, called the "Edinburgh Agreement". In this document, the parties agreed that the referendum will have a transparent legal basis and will be the final decision of the people of Scotland and respected by all parties (Scottish Government, 2012).

As the plebiscite date approached, opinion polls began to show a steady increase in Scots' opinions in favor of independence. The number of supporters of such a choice exceeded those wishing to maintain the status quo. The prospect of separation of Scotland from Great Britain was becoming a reality.

In 2012, the British Parliament passed the new Scotland Act 2012, which transferred financial powers to the Scottish government (UK Government, 2012). Since 2016, the regional parliament has received the right to set the income tax rate independently.


European integration processes have significantly strengthened Scottish regionalism, Scottish national self-awareness, and the Scots' awareness of their significant role within Great Britain, both in political and socio-economic aspects. Culturally and linguistically, Scottish Gaelic and Scots were officially recognized in 1992 by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by the UK government in 2001 (McGarvey, 2013, p. 187-191).

4.2.3 Analysis of surveys on national identity in Scotland (2010-2019)

Scottish identity appears in different parts of Scotland to varying degrees. In Edinburgh, only two-thirds of the population say they are primarily Scots. In Glasgow, this group reaches 74%, and in the rest of Scotland - 73%. It should be added that similarly, respondents across the UK associate their identity primarily with the region (region) of residence, and not with Britain as a whole (60% versus 25%), or declare the equivalence of these concepts and almost no one associates themselves with the whole United Kingdom.

According to the latest UK census in 2011, only 18% of Scotland has a dual national identity, while 62% chose only Scottish and 8% - only British identity. The next population census is scheduled for 2022 (Figure 7).

Figure 7 Census 2011. Scotland



Source: The United Kingdom Government, 2011


The analysis of surveys on the national identity of Scotland's inhabitants from 2010 to 2019 was carried out. According to the survey conducted in 2012, only 6% of respondents identified themselves only as British, 30% of Scots declared double self-identification, and 23% said that they are exclusively Scots (ScotCen, 2019).

The survey conducted in 2014 revealed: 32% consider themselves “both Scots and British”, “more Scots than British” – 26%, “only Scots” - 23%, “only British” - 6%, “more British than Scots”- 5% of respondents (Figure 8).

The poll conducted in 2017 showed: 28% identified themselves “equally Scots and British”, “more Scots than British” – 30%, “only Scots” - 24%, “only British” - 5%, “more British than Scots”- 4% of respondents (Figure 8).

The last survey was conducted in 2019 which determined: 26% identified themselves “equally Scots and British”, “more Scots than British” – 26%, “only Scots” - 29%, “only British” - 5%, “more British than Scots”- 4% of respondents (Figure 8).

Figure 8 National Identity of Scots. Survey Results (2010-2019)



Source: Own figure.

Thus, it can be concluded that the exclusive Scottish national identity has been strengthening over the past ten years. The number of respondents with dual self-identification is gradually decreasing. The number of residents who consider themselves more Scots than British has been increasing over the past few years. Comparing Scottish and English identities in the region, we can note the strength of the Scottish identity and the weakness of the British one. The trend towards strengthening Scottish identity also was caused by Brexit. Scots associate themselves, not with Great Britain, but with Europe and the European Union.

4.2.4 Analysis on the referendum results on Scotland's independency (2014)


The most important process in recent years has been the preparation and conduct of a referendum on Scotland's independence. The agreement on the terms of the referendum was signed on October 15, 2012.

The referendum took place on September 18, 2014. Two days before the referendum, Prime Minister David Cameron, along with the leaders of two other major British parties (Labor Party and Liberal Democrats Party), took an extraordinary step: they promised a "vow" - a document calling on the Scots not to vote for independence. In exchange, they pledged to expand the Scottish government and parliament's powers as part of the devolution process. In particular, it is planned to pass a law expanding Scotland's autonomous rights, the draft of which should be ready by January 2015. Before this, London launched a broad campaign "Better Together", also designed to convince the Scots that having chosen independence, they enter into "the territory of the unknown", from where there is no way back (RTÉ, 2014).

According to many analysts, the prime minister's vow and "Better Together" campaign almost predetermined the referendum's outcome, securing the victory of opponents of Scottish independence.

The referendum was attended by about 85% of all Scottish citizens eligible to vote. About 55% voted in favor of maintaining the status quo, while 45% favored independence (Figure 9).

Figure 9 Results of Scottish independence referendum 18 September 2014



Source: The United Kingdom Government, 2014

Despite the defeat of the supporters of independence in Scotland, the referendum itself constitutes a relevant precedent for a peaceful, politically correct, and legally significant solution to the complex issue of secession of a part of the territory from the state. Also, supporters of independence have confirmed the importance of their agenda in the region.

At the same time, Scottish nationalists took it as a rehearsal for the next referendum on Scottish independence, while the Conservatives and Labor Parties were too alarmed by its results. Besides, the 2014 referendum proved the legitimacy and rationality of the idea of Scottish independence. The central government's unwillingness to agree to the state's federalization became one of the factors supporting the nationalist aspirations of the Scots.

4.2.5 Analysis of the construction of national identity in the activities of political parties and elites in Scotland (2012-2019)

In Scotland, the national movement leader for a long time (from 2007 to 2014) was the First Minister, Alex Salmond, who, after the defeat of his project (the referendum on Scotland's independence in 2014), announced the end of his political career. Before his retirement, he spoke of Scotland's identity and its great past and future. According to the politician, an independent

Scotland could give a lot to the world. He was implying that Scotland is 90% of the oil and gas resources of the European Union. For this reason, the politician wanted to live in a world where independent Scotland works for itself and rules itself in its interests. However, the independence plan failed even after that; A. Salmond saw the opportunities Brexit gave and called for a referendum on Scottish independence since 62% of Scottish voters voted against Britain's exit from the EU. In general, the discourse of this Scottish politician has remained unchanged.

In 2014, Nicola Sturgeon became the successor to A. Salmond, the new first minister of Scotland, and the SNP leader. Her rhetoric before the announcement of the Brexit outcome was generally loyal to London, but realizing that most Scots do not want to leave the EU, she, like her predecessor, saw this as an opportunity for a second referendum on Scottish independence (Mitchell, 2016, p. 12-17).

In Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) plays a key role. The growth of SNP's influence since its inception has been steady and unchanged. The party was able to gain credibility with the Scots as the only powerful political force capable of defending Scotland's interests. SNP assumed responsibility for the region's socio-economic development, which was especially important during the global financial crisis in 2008.

The SNP has won three regional elections in a row to the Scottish Parliament (Table 4). The parliament consists of 129 people. It is elected based on a hybrid majority-proportional system. The Scottish Parliament was empowered to legislate and regulate its health, education, relations with local government, social services, economic development and transport, environmental protection, agriculture, etc.

Following the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014, a new commission, the Smith Commission, prepared recommendations for the delegation of authority to the Scottish government. The recommendations included tax collection and taxation, voting, unemployment regulation, licensing of oil and gas activities, and social security issues. Thus, when nationalists won regional elections, they received full control over the above areas.


Table 4 Results of Scottish regional elections (1999-2016)

Results of Scottish regional elections. Total MSPs Elected: 1999-2016					
<i>Party/Year</i>	1999	2003	2007	2011	2016
Scottish Labour	56	50	46	37	24
Scottish National Party	35	27	47	69	63
Scottish Liberal Democrat	17	17	16	5	5
Scottish Conservative & Unionist Party	18	18	17	15	31
Scottish Green Party	1	7	2	2	6
Scottish Socialist Party	1	6	0	0	0
MSP for Falkirk West	1	1	0	-	-
Save Stobhill Hospital Party	-	1	0	-	-
Scottish Senior Citizens Unit Party	-	1	0	0	-
Margo MacDonald	-	1	1	1	-
Total seats	129	129	129	129	129

Source: Scottish Government, 2017

Since 2007, the SNP has won the majority of parliamentary seats. In 2011, it received 47 seats, and in 2016 - 63. According to the elections in 2017, the nationalists also took the majority of seats - 63 (Figure 10).

Figure 10 Results of Scottish regional elections (1999-2016)



Source: Own figure.


The SNP acting under the slogan "independence in Europe", connects Scotland's future with the European Union, orienting its voters towards the European vector of development and the European single market.

It is also important to note that the SNP supports the idea of deepening European integration, and its ideal is a confederate Europe. At the same time, nationalists believe that it is possible to fully participate in European integration (as well as in globalization) only in an independent nation's status. As an independent European state, the SNP emphasizes that Scotland will be able to become an independent member of leading international organizations and participate in making the most important decisions, defending its interests and supporting the confederal alliance, and preserving the existing relationship with NATO (Keen, Audickas, 2016, p.10-11). The SNP position, which has a significant impact on the political struggle both within the region and in the UK as a whole, has always influenced and will continue to influence the integration agenda.

4.2.6 Analysis of United Kingdom European Union membership referendum in Scotland (2016)

The results of the referendum on Britain's exit from the EU, held on 23 June 2016, showed that 51.9% of those who took part in the vote (more than 17 million people) voted for the country's exit from the EU, 48.1% voted for maintaining EU membership (16 million people). The Scots supported maintaining the status quo (62% of the votes were against the country's exit from the EU (1.6 million people)), 38% (1 million people) for the exit, with a turnout of 67.2% (one of the lowest in the country) (Figure 11).

Figure 11 EU referendum results by region: Scotland



Source: The United Kingdom Government, 2019

The gap recorded in Scotland between pros and cons - 24% in favor of retaining EU membership - was the largest among all British regions. In Scotland, voting took place in 32 council areas. The greatest support for the idea of maintaining the membership in the EU was in East Dunbartonshire (71.4%), East Renfrewshire (74.3%), as well as in the administrative center of Scotland – Edinburgh (74.4%). For the country's exit from the EU voted, for the most part, residents of the regions of Morey (49.9%), Dumfries and Galloway (46.9%), Aberdeenshire (45%). Thus, the Scots' clearly expressed position on the issue submitted to the referendum gave the political elite of the region new grounds to defend the right of the inhabitants of Scotland to another expression of will on the issue of its independence.

Leaving the EU for Scotland in the long term will cause a decline in trade, investment, and labor mobility, according to several studies. According to the most optimistic forecasts, the region's GDP will immediately fall by 3-5%. Brexit will lead not only to a reduction in Scottish exports to the EU but to a systemic crisis in the region's economy, which will be manifested in a fall in wages and market competitiveness, a decrease in tax revenues, and an increase in inflation (Hunt, Wheeler, 2019).

Although the idea of Scottish independence is firmly entrenched in the political thinking of Scottish nationalists and remains an integral part of their election manifestos, against the background of Brexit, it has acquired an exaggerated character. The SNP has been actively organizing protest marches to draw public attention to discussions on Scottish sovereignty. In October 2018, Scottish nationalists organized a march of independence supporters in Edinburgh, which gathered over 100 thousand people. The lack of constructive dialogue between London and Edinburgh only exacerbates the situation and may lead to the region's final loss of loyalty. The British government does not yet have a clear alternative to offer Scots worried about the economic outlook for Brexit. Even the further expansion of regional autonomy will in no way affect Scotland's decision to leave the United Kingdom if there is a serious need to do so.

Nevertheless, Brexit has become an additional, and very significant factor ensuring the high legitimacy of the idea of a new referendum on Scottish independence since its population supports the EU and associates its prosperity and future with membership in the European Union.

4.3 Comparative analysis of national identities of Catalonia and Scotland

As a result of the practical part of the thesis, several general trends and differences in national identity development in both regions can be identified.

Catalonia and Scotland have many parallels in the development of national identity over the past ten years. In Scotland, the number of people identifying exclusively with Scots has steadily increased over the past few years. According to the survey results, about 55% of the respondents identified themselves with the Scots. The same trend is observed in Catalonia; according to the 2019 survey, about 49% of respondents had a Catalan identity.

Both regions are developing their national languages. In Catalonia, about 80% of the population speaks Catalan, and the status of the language is recognized as the official language in the region. At the same time, only 30% of Scots can speak Scottish, and only 1% of the population speaks Gaelic. Both languages are recognized as minority languages in the United Kingdom.

A significant difference is that Scotland had an experience of independent existence - it was an independent state until the 18th century. Catalonia has a more complex history; it always fought for its independence, gaining it for a short time and then losing it. It should be noted that both Spain and Great Britain are unitary states under a constitutional monarchy.

Despite their different backgrounds, both regions have chosen a peaceful way to defend their rights through an independence referendum. In a referendum held in Scotland in September 2014, most Scotland residents opposed secession (55.3%) and only 44.7% in favor. It is worth noting that the Scottish referendum had legal status and if the opposite result, Scotland could gain independence starting in 2016. Nevertheless, the Scottish example inspired Catalonia to hold its referendum. A referendum on the independence of Catalonia was held in October 2017. During the vote, 90% of those voted in favor of the independence of Catalonia. However, this referendum was illegal and was invalidated. Within the framework of this Constitution of Spain, Catalonia cannot implement either federalization or secession from Spain. According to the Union Act, Scotland has the right to secede from the UK without breaking the laws.

The consolidation of Catalonia began in 1979 with the adoption of the Autonomous Statute of Catalonia, followed by the creation of a parliament in 1982. Unlike Catalonia, Scotland got a parliament only in 1999.

Political parties and elites had a significant influence on the development of national identity in Scotland and Catalonia. The Scottish Regional Leader is the Scottish National Party. The SNP notes that Scotland has every opportunity to become an independent state with its potential and resources (now used by the central government). The party assumed responsibility for the socio-economic development of the region. Today SNP has stable support. In 2011 and 2016, the party won the majority of seats in the regional elections (69 and 63, respectively). However, no political alliances have emerged in Scotland to strengthen the region's autonomy. While in Catalonia by the beginning of the twentieth century. There were various regionalist parties such as the Catalan League, the Catalan Union, etc. According to the last three regional parliamentary elections in Catalonia from 2012 to 2017, separatist parties won. In 2017, the separatists gained the majority and took 70 out of 135 seats. Unlike Scotland, in Catalonia, the secessionist parties do not have internal unity, and the nationalist movement is not homogeneous.

Also, both regions tend to European integration and preservation of membership in the European Union. For example, about 62% of Scotland residents did not support Brexit. Brexit has become an additional and very significant factor that ensures the high legitimacy of the idea of a new referendum on Scottish independence since its population supports the EU and associates its well-being and future with membership in the European Union. Most of the inhabitants of Catalonia also associate their future with the European Union. During a survey on Catalonia's

future status, 54% of those surveyed answered that if with the hypothetical separation of Catalonia from Spain, the region loses its membership in the EU, they will prefer to maintain the status quo and remain part of Spain.

As a result of this comparative analysis, it can be concluded that both Scotland and Catalonia have a strong national identity. Both regions have been fighting for a long time to defend their national interests. Catalonia and Scotland's national identity is a powerful tool in the hands of political parties and elites in the struggle for regional independence. Despite some differences between the two regions, both Scotland and Catalonia see their future within the European Union, which indicates a strengthening of European identity among their inhabitants.

4.5 SWOT Analysis

As a result of comparative analysis, it was revealed that national identity has an important role in Scotland and Catalonia and shapes regional development trends. At the same moment, the development and strengthening of national identity create some problems. SWOT analysis was carried out to identify the strengths and weaknesses of this process and determine opportunities and threats (Table 5).

As a result of the SWOT analysis, it can be concluded that the development and strengthening of national identity will contribute to the preservation of the national language and culture. At the political level, political parties and elites appear to strengthen the positions of the regions. All this leads to an increase in civic responsibility among residents of the regions, which in turn increases citizens' involvement in the political process.

Nevertheless, some weaknesses in this process can be identified. For example, some political leaders, pursuing their goals, can engage in populism and promote myths about their nation's exclusivity, which can be seen among Catalan politicians. In turn, this is used as a tool to influence citizens in the struggle for independence, which leads to the growth of secessionism.

It should be noted that developing national identity in the regions has many opportunities. The thesis proves that Spain and the United Kingdom's central authorities pay significant attention to Catalonia and Scotland's problems and solve critical problems peacefully. For example, there has been a transfer of many powers from the center to regional parliaments and authorities. The distance between the political elite of the state and the citizens of the regions is shrinking. The

European Union also helps regions of Europe. The EU has provided the regions with tools to express themselves and protect their identity. In 1988, the European Parliament adopted the "Community Charter on Regionalization Problems". These documents explicitly call on states to begin the process of decentralization and regional empowerment.

However, the strengthening of national identity in Catalonia and Scotland carries several threats. For example, a legal referendum held in Scotland in 2014 inspired Catalonia to hold its illegal independence referendum. This referendum violated the laws of Spain and led to serious conflicts between the central and regional authorities.

Table 5 SWOT analysis

Strength	Weaknesses
Ethnic and cultural revival; Preservation of historical heritage; Development of the national language; Strengthening the position of the region; The emergence of regional parties and elites; The growth of civil liability; The involvement of citizens in the political process.	Striving for independence and secession; Attempts to falsify history and myth-making; Populism by national political leaders.
Opportunities	Threads
Drawing the attention of the center to the problems of the region; Transfer of rights from the center to the regions (intensification of regionalization); Reducing the distance between the political elite of the state and the citizens of the regions; Attracting attention from the EU; EU support for the regions.	Conflicts with the central government; An example for other regions in the struggle for independence; Violation of the laws of the country.

Source: Own figure.

Thus, national identity growth is a serious factor in developing regions and an essential tool in the hands of political elites in the power struggle. Catalonia and Scotland's problems should not be ignored by the central authorities, as this can lead to conflicts and the growth of separatism.

5 Results and Discussion

The study of national identity in the era of globalization in Catalonia and Scotland allows us to formulate answers to the thesis's research questions. Answering the first question, *"What trends can be identified in the development of national identity among the inhabitants of Catalonia and Scotland?"* we can determine several trends:

- 1 In both regions, over the past ten years, a growing number of people identify exclusively with Catalans and Scots. This can be seen from public opinion analysis data;
- 2 Pro-independence political parties in Scotland and Catalonia win regional elections, hold the majority of seats in regional parliaments, and have high citizen confidence;
- 3 Both regions show a tendency towards European integration and preservation of membership in the European Union. Despite Brexit, the majority of Scotland's population opposed secession from the European Union. Thus, there is a trend towards the formation of a European identity along with a national one;
- 4 Catalans and Scots advocate a peaceful way of defending their identity through independence referendums.

Also, the results of the practical part of this thesis allow us to answer the second question: *"What role do political parties and elites play in constructing the national identity of Catalonia and Scotland?"* It can be concluded that political parties and elites have a significant influence on national identity. Political parties use various techniques and strategies for constructing national identity, ranging from national consolidation to confrontational mechanisms. According to the regional parliamentary elections, the majority of seats in both the Catalan and Scottish parliaments are occupied by nationalist parties and parties advocating regional independence. Thus, the results of public polls and elections coincide. Scottish and Catalan political parties advocate for the interests of voters and continually empower regions. At the same time, political leaders can create myths about a nation's exclusivity, as in Catalonia, or express populist ideas that the region will have a great future if it is independent, as, for example, did A. Salmond in Scotland. Thus, national identity can be both a creative force and an instrument for manipulating the population by political actors.

The results of comparative and SWOT analyzes allow us to formulate another important conclusion about the role of national identity in the intensification of regionalism processes. Strengthening national identity contributed to the emergence of political parties representing the interests of the Scots and Catalans. These parties were able to obtain from the central governments the empowerment of Scotland and Catalonia and the transfer of powers from the center to the regions. The distance between the political elite of the state and the citizens of the regions is shrinking. All this testifies to the intensification of regionalization in Scotland and Catalonia. Thus, these facts indicate that the **hypothesis** “The growing importance of national identity in Scotland and Catalonia leads to the growth of regionalism” turned out to be proved and can be accepted.

6 Conclusion

National identity turns a people living in a certain territory into a nation by creating or deepening a common cultural paradigm of thinking, a common set of values, ideals, and a common worldview.

Political parties and elites are key actors in shaping national identity. They express the interests, needs, and goals of certain social groups, connect society and the state and act as bearers of different political interests. The party's main task is to transform citizens' interests into a single aggregate political interest.

Scotland and Catalonia have many parallels in the development of national identity. In Scotland, the number of people identifying exclusively with Scots has steadily increased over the past few years. The same trend is observed in Catalonia. Both regions stand for the preservation of national languages and cultural traditions. Catalans and Scots advocate a peaceful way of defending their identity, and they choose to hold a referendum as a tool.

Thanks to national political parties and elites' activities, both regions have achieved their empowerment and gained regional parliaments. National political parties and elites traditionally hold a majority in regional parliaments and have big confidence and support among Scotland and Catalonia. Thus, the strengthening of national identity correlates with the intensification of regionalization. The central government delegates part of its powers to the regions. At the same time, the activities of political parties sometimes have negative aspects. Economic problems are often replaced by national identity problems, while political leaders themselves speculate on myths of national exclusivity.

Both regions show a tendency towards European integration and preservation of membership in the European Union. Despite Brexit, the majority of Scotland's population opposed secession from the European Union. And the inhabitants of Catalonia choose the status quo if it is guaranteed that they will retain their EU membership. Thus, there is a trend towards the formation of a European identity along with a national one.

The main problem in Spain and Great Britain is unfinished nation-building, the weakness of Spanish and British identities, the import of institutions and technologies of secession in Catalonia, which used technologies applied in Scotland.

To reduce the risks of separatism, Spain, and the UK must pursue an identity policy that increases Catalans and Scots' commitment to the state and civil nation, reducing the popularity of the myths of separatism.

The author of the diploma thesis hopes that this work will make a modest contribution to the accumulation and interpretation of empirical data on the territorial and ideological-political structure of identities in modern Spain and Great Britain. This thesis's results may be of interest to diplomats pursuing foreign policy and para-diplomacy concerning Scotland and Catalonia.

This thesis can contribute to understanding the ongoing political and sociocultural processes, changing public attitudes in Scotland and Catalonia, forecasting scenarios for the development of regions.

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8 Appendix

8.1 List of Catalonia's political parties used in the thesis

Parties and coalitions in Generalitat						
Logo	Name	Abbr.	Ideology	Position on Catalan independence	Foundation	Dissolution
	Citizens (<i>Ciutadans</i>)	C's	Liberalism, Spanish nationalism	Spanish unionism	2005	active
	Together for Catalonia (<i>Junts per Catalunya</i>)	JUNTSxCAT	Catalan nationalism, Liberalism	Catalan independence	2017	active
	Republican Left of Catalonia–Catalonia Yes (<i>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya–Catalunya Sí</i>)	ERC	Republicanism, Social democracy, Catalan nationalism, Left-wing nationalism	Catalan independence	2011	active
	Socialists' Party of Catalonia (<i>Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya</i>)	PSC	Social democracy, Federalism, Pro-Europeanism	Spanish unionism	1978	active
	Catalonia in Common–We Can (<i>Catalunya en Comú–Podem</i>)	CatComú - Podem	Eco-socialism, Alter-globalization, Left-wing populism, Republicanism, Democratic socialism	Catalan right of self-determination	2017	active
	Popular Unity Candidacy – Constituent Call (<i>Candidatura d'Unitat Popular–Crida Constituent</i>)	CUP	Anti-capitalism, Socialism, Left-wing nationalism, Pancatalanism	Catalan independence	1987	active
	People's Party of Catalonia (<i>Partit Popular de Catalunya</i>)	PP	Conservatism, Christian democracy, Spanish nationalism	Spanish unionism	1989	active
	Initiative for Catalonia Greens (<i>Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds</i>)	ICV	Eco-socialism, Federalism, Catalan nationalism	Catalan independence	1987	2019
	Convergence and Union (<i>Convergència i Unió</i>)	CiU	Catalan nationalism	Catalan independence	1978	2015
	Together for yes (<i>Junts pel Sí</i>)	JxSí	Catalan nationalism	Catalan independence	2015	2017
	Catalonia Yes We Can (<i>Catalunya Sí que es Pot</i>)	CSQP	Catalan nationalism	Catalan right of self-determination	2015	2017