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DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

**Nigeria's Foreign Policy from 1960 – Global Era: What Went
Wrong?**

(Master's Thesis)

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Declaration of Authorship

I do solemnly declare that I have written the present master's thesis Nigeria Foreign Policy for independence in 1960 to Global Era: What Went Wrong? independently and that I have correctly acknowledged bibliographical references and quotations.

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Acknowledgement

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Abstract

After many years of leading the continent and contributing to its liberation from the claws of apartheid and racism, Nigeria's power in Africa has declined and she's unable to assert herself or play such roles in the continent or within critical governance structures in recent times. The study was aimed at establishing the factors that led to this decline. It is established that Nigeria is facing severe internal challenges that is affecting her leadership role. However, findings reveal that in her 58 years of existence since independence in 1960, the different governments (military and civilian democratic) misunderstood the concept of power in foreign policy, especially with changes in international system, from end of apartheid in South Africa to the growing force of globalization. Despite her achievements with the same foreign policy objectives in place, the absence of a unified foreign policy approach has led to different interpretations, strategies and implementations by the fourteen military and civilian governments from 1960 till date. The study has therefore established that regime changes and leadership styles are major factors that have contributed to Nigeria's power decline in this global era.

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R u l e s f o r e l a b o r a t i o n :

The Objective of this study is to evaluate Nigeria's external relations from the period leading up to independence in 1960 to 2018

According to McGillivray and White (1993), aid (development) is an instrument of foreign policy. Nigeria's foreign policy was African-centred. From 1960, different military and civilian leaders in Nigeria used untied financial aid, human capital support, including propaganda as foreign policy tool to fight apartheid, racism and colonialism in Africa. Nigeria played key roles in formation of the Organization of African Unity (African Union), Economic Community of West African States-ECOWAS and led in establishing and funding the ECOWAS Ceasefire (Peace) Monitoring Group-ECOMOG which was employed to tackle the conflicts that engulfed Western Africa in 1990s to early 2000.

Nigeria established Nigerian Technical Aid Corp, including Nigerian Trust Fund and Technical Development Cooperation Fund to support African Development Bank in assisting African countries in need and has been involved in many peace-support operations since 1960. Nigeria's influence and commitment to African unity was widely recognised and acknowledged as one who can dominate and lay claim to supremacy in black Africa.

However, in an era that many countries are positioning themselves as part of global decision-making architecture like BRICS, Nigeria's influence has declined. The study therefore seeks to establish what led to this decline, which military or civilian administration's foreign policy thrust contributed to the decline and establish the link between development aid and foreign policy.

Through case study and qualitative research method, the thesis will answer the following questions: - What is the component of Nigeria's foreign policy? - How was Nigeria's foreign policy articulated during military regimes and democratic administrations? - How did the systems, military regimes or civilian democratic governments aid Nigeria in asserting her influence locally and globally? - How has regime change impacted on implementation of her foreign policy over the years? - Why has her foreign policy not impacted on her role as a continental hegemon or superpower?

Data will be obtained from primary and secondary sources, mainly from Palacky Electronic Information Resource Portal and other relevant and critical professional sources. The motivation for the topic is mainly derived from the lectures received from MRS/International Development Studies and the researcher's experiences/interactions and how people perceive Nigeria in Europe, the need to provide a reference material on the topic and add to the discourse. The outcome will be disseminated in a public forum in Olomouc.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter One is the introductory chapter. It focuses on the background to the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives, motivations, justification and significance. It guides through the research methodology, sources of data and data gathering techniques and analysis.

Chapter Two reviews existing literatures and what has been written on the topic already. It also covers the theoretical framework and the scope of study, and analyses frameworks used in other studies.

Chapter Three covers extensively the main research. It covered Nigeria's development initiatives with the external community over five periods from 1953 prior to independence till the present era. It examined the military governments and the civilian transitional democratic settings situated within the five periods; the component of the policy and domestic environment that shaped the foreign policy thrusts and Nigeria's relationship with the rest of the world.

Chapter Four discusses the findings. It strikes a comparison between the two dominant governments in Nigeria - military authoritative regime and civilian transitional/democratic government and establishes each government's foreign policy thrust and implementation and establishes which of the governments' approaches contributed to Nigeria's dwindling influence.

Chapter Five conclude the study by answering concretely the hypothesis and research questions.

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Abbreviations

AU	African Union
ANC	African National Congress
ICJ	International Court of Justice
NACAP	National Action Committee Against Apartheid
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAC	Pan-African Congress
SARF	South Africa Relief Fund
UNCAA	United Nations Anti- Apartheid Committee
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
Afrocentric	A pan-African ideology that focuses on the history, culture and life of black Africans

Chapter One:

Nigeria's Africa, Africa's Nigeria

"So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think we are not interested in the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organisation, but being human we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighbours. On the question of colonialism and racial discrimination, I am afraid that we in Nigeria will never compromise"
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, first Prime Minister of Nigeria first address the UN 1960
(in Nwanuole and Iwoha, 2012:76).

1.0 Background of the Study

In every region of the world, pivotal powers take the lead. Such powers possess the geo-strategic advantage to determine the direction of events and actions and shape arrangements regionally, continentally, etc. They adopt different strategies, from diplomacy-economic and public (Sevin, 2015), security, economy, aid and assistance, grants, etc. in their relationships and interactions and also have critical say on issues relating to development and peace of the region. Such powers played critical roles in establishing important organizations like NATO, European Union-EU, the United Nations Organization-UN, etc. (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011). Such was Nigeria's role after independence from British control in October 1960.

Located in the Gulf of Guinea West Africa, Nigeria is the tenth largest country in Africa, with a landmass of 924,000 square kilometres (African Economic Outlook, 2003, Country Reports 2017), 853km long coastline. Prior to 1914, present-day Nigeria was simply regions and later Protectorates, of Southern and Northern Nigeria, including the Colony of Lagos. It was amalgamated in 1914 by the British government and later granted independence in what can be described as a negotiated self-rule (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Apart from oil, Nigeria has about thirty-three other varieties of solid minerals that when fully utilized will make Nigeria the leading economy in Africa. There are 371 ethnic nations spread across six geopolitical zones in Nigeria (Vanguard Newspaper, 2017). Nigeria's population stands at 185.989.640 million, accounting for 47% of West African population. In 2015, Nigeria had the largest GDP in SSA at \$521.8 billion. In 2016, it reduced to \$USD404.653 ((Didia et al, 2015:234; World Bank, 2018).

Nigeria was an agrarian monolithic society until 1970s. 75% of her revenue came from resources like cocoa, palm-fruits, maize, etc. (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016::28). Oil was first discovered in Oloibiri, in Bayelsa State in 1956 making Nigeria the first oil-producer in Africa and a critical member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries-OPEC. The Yom Kippur war led to increased global oil price and revenue from 1971. By 1980s, Nigeria relied on oil (crude) for 92% of her foreign earnings. Between 1979 and 1985, oil earnings stood at

\$104.06 billion, making Nigeria a wealthy nation (Aboje, et al, 2016; Mbach, 1992 in Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28). Nigeria is estimated to have 37 billion barrels of oil with production capacity of 1427.3 barrels per day and crude oil exports (1000 b/d) 1,738.0 (OPEC, 2018). Her proven natural gas reserves is 120 trillion cubic feet, with recoverable gas reserves of 45 tcf, making her the 9th largest resources in the world, with reserve-production ratio at 125 years for gas. Today, about 77-80% of Nigeria's revenue comes from oil amounting to USD 55.45 billion (Adi and Friday, 2017; Malden, 2017:2).

Nigeria has an army of 200,000, the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2018) according to 2016 estimates. Nigeria also has an estimated 50% of the potential for manufacturing production in West Africa, with Lagos as the engine-room for the region. The combination of human and natural resources, ethno-politics, the diplomatic and military engagement of successive regimes in the continent's affairs makes her a power in the continent (Bach, 2007:302). These factors, especially oil and population were deciding factors in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation. Owing to the critical role played in the continent, Nigeria became a central locus in Africa. Whatever happens in Nigeria impacts Sub-Sahara Africa positively or negatively according to Gambari (2008). Henkel (in Ali, 2012) refers to Nigeria as a "regional hegemon," committed to integration through peace and security. Wright (1998) calls Nigeria a "Champion" which the Western powers would listen to, and that could champion causes that other nations were too weak to stand up to.

Between 1950's to early 1990's, black African nations were embroiled in liberation struggles. In March, 21st, 1960, about sixty-nine unarmed South Africans, protesting against the carriage of Pass to designated areas in South Africa were killed. This 'Sharpeville Massacre' aroused African consciousness and brought to limelight the atrocities of the apartheid policy (Abegunrin, 2008:13). Other black nations under severe colonial subjugation achieved independence through blood and heavy clampdown. Countries like Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe were not liberated until the 1980's. South Africa followed subsequently upon Nelson Mandela's release from prison in February 12th 1990. Identified expertise and resource gaps impeded many independent states from advancing. Conversely, Nigeria's journey to independence was smooth in comparison, with less confrontation.

Despite a smooth independence, Nigeria was left with a weak and dependent economy given the many years of colonial domination and exploitation, and without real legacy for economic development or technological take-off (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016). Nations across the world adopted modernization concept of development to achieve social and economic changes in postcolonial world and World War II. Developed States adopted the theory to push developing states and former colonies to economic growth (Jiafeng, 2009:73).

This was not the case in Africa as many of the colonial powers adopted different exit strategy from colonies. It was in this weak state that Sir Abubakar Balewa declared that “*Nigeria’s Africa, Africa’s Nigeria*”, meaning that Nigeria is taking responsibility to support Africa, making African liberation and unity the centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy and development initiatives. Nigeria possessed the needed resources which placed her in position to fill the identified gaps in other black states.

The foreign policy objectives were enshrined in the 1979 Constitution and upheld in Chapter 2, Section 19 of the 1999 operational Constitution (Nigerian Constitution, 1999). Four objectives were designed to facilitate Nigeria’s leadership role while the first focused on the internal (Appendix). The promise to tackle issues peculiar to Africa, where the forces of apartheid and colonialism were still prominent (Ajayi, 2005) shows that Nigeria placed liberation of other African nations above internal affairs. Foreign policy dictates how a State relates with other countries, socially, politically, economically and in a military sense. Nigeria’s foreign policy covering aid, assistance, propaganda, grants, concessional loans, etc. dictated her relationship.

Indirectly, Nigeria took up the crucial leadership role as a continental hegemon, to fight colonialism, racism, apartheid (Emenike, 2007; Ezeolisa, 2015), combat conflict and assist weak African nations to build stronger institutions and promote African unity. Nigeria’s foreign policy was therefore interpreted along these lines, under different governments. In 58 years of independence, 27 years were under different military leaders with three intermittent attempts at democratization. Nigeria committed resources to financially weak African, Caribbean and Pacific nations.

Nigeria initiated the Economic Community of West African States-ECOWAS along with Togo and Ghana (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011). Nigeria is the sixth largest contributor to the Commonwealth Secretariat budget (Akinrinade, 1997; Scotland and Morland, 2017). Nigerian Trust Fund, Technical Development Cooperation Fund and Technical Aid Corps have served many black nations in the last 30 years. Apart from the force of globalization which later replaced modernization, Nigeria’s journey from independence, spanning 58 years is enough for the institutions responsible for external affairs to mature and gain practical experience (Effiong, 2012; Jiafeng, 2009), firm up strategies and become very relevant in international development cooperation platforms like Organization for Economic Cooperation And Development-OECD. Rather, the different approaches to external affairs by the 14 Leaders led to positive and negative impacts on Nigeria’s position and aspirations as a continental power. It has therefore become imperative to navigate the political, economic and social landscape of Nigeria over the years to comprehend the nature and content of her external affairs (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016).

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria has contributed significantly to African development. Nigeria's foreign policy thrust from 1960 earned her the names "*Frontline State*" and "*Giant of Africa*" (Ezeolisa, 2015; Ojatorotu and Adeleke, 2017). Events and literature reveals that the different foreign policy approaches adopted by different leaders over the years created problems that impacted negatively on her foreign policy. Many have also identified the weak and struggling economy, personality and character of leadership and their perception of how to handle the economy, including ethno-religious diversity as contributory factors to Nigeria's fading influence (Rosemary, 2005; Soremeku, 2003). Pine (2011) opines that the Afrocentric concept "Africa, the Centrepiece of Nigeria's Foreign Policy" is a problem as it lacks deep and profound philosophical reflection and some elements of reciprocity.

In an era of increased cooperation, when many countries are positioning themselves as part of global decision making architecture, Nigeria's assertive role in the continent has declined and has lost her admiration and esteem (Aiden and Schoeman, 2013; Fagbayibo, 2014). This study therefore identifies this declining role and loss of prestige as the problem and seeks to establish which governments'-military or civilian actions, domestic challenges or changing international scene contributed to Nigeria's declined influence in the continent and her inability to make the necessary impact despite her potentials.

1.2 Objective of Thesis

1.2.1 Main Thesis Objective: To evaluate Nigeria's foreign policy from the period leading up to independence in 1960 to the present global era - 2018.

1.2.2 Specific Objectives: pursuant to this main objective, the derived objectives are;

- To evaluate side-by-side how military regimes and democratic civil rule handled Nigeria's foreign relations and how it shaped her influence in the continent;
- To understand the role aid played in Nigeria's foreign policy, its components and how it became essential instruments of the foreign policy;
- To identify how each government within a specified period in Nigerian history designed its foreign policy thrust and ascertain the differences in each government. This is crucial because Nigeria as an independent nation has been characterised by only two phases of either authoritarian (dictatorship) military rule or democratic transitional civilian rule. This will help to ascertain inherent differences in the foreign policy in relation to regime type;
- To determine the origin and factors that influenced each government's approach, the challenges and priorities. This is important to understand how and why the governments adopted different thrusts and how it impacted on her image. This will

cover the political, economic and social climate within each period and how it shaped the adoption of the policy thrust.

1.3 Methodology - Research Design

The study employs qualitative research to discover, trace, gather information and establish new facts regarding Nigeria's external relations (Durrheim, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Hiatt 1986, cited in Harwell, 2011). Case study as a methodology is adopted because "*it investigates a phenomenon in-depth and within a real-life context...it copes with technically distinctive situations in which there will be more variables of interests than data points*" (Yin, 2009:18). Case study methodology provides the framework to investigate this phenomenon in-depth. Method of analysis is purposive, explanatory, evaluative and comparative. The "how," "why" and "what" questions capture complex issues and allows for comparison of the different governments in the established periods (1953-2018) in order to identify factors that caused the power decline.

1.3.1 Research Questions

- What is the component of Nigeria's foreign policy?
- How was Nigeria's foreign policy articulated during military regimes and democratic administrations?
- How did the systems, military regimes or civilian democratic governments aid Nigeria in asserting her influence locally and globally?
- How has regime change impacted on implementation of her foreign policy over the years?
- Why has her foreign policy not impacted on her role as a continental hegemon or superpower?

1.3.2 Variables

Dependent variable is decline of Nigeria's influence in Africa as influenced by the regime changes. Independent variable is the decline of Nigeria's influence in Africa as influenced by character or leadership style.

1.4 Data Source: Inclusion and Exclusions

Data source are primary and secondary and medium of analysis is the Palacky University Electronic Portal. Online Archival Analysis was utilized for select information from government records. The study also obtained directly from other academic sites e.g. Jstor,

Scribd, Liste, and Academia. For vital information not available on the School Portal but were crucial to the study, non-academic sources were explored and included. Resources include academic research articles, books, book chapters, peer reviewed-dissertations and theses, evaluation reports, book reviews, newspapers, academic citations and relevant professional accredited websites, licensed websites and internationally-recognized stakeholders and organizations whose thematic areas cover foreign policy and international development assistance initiative.

The non-academic sources and websites are authenticated and their primary aim, agenda and motivation is to educate. The characteristics of the websites and resources bordered the relationship to the topics, use of English language, credibility of the writers, authors and administrators, quality and depth of analysis, reliability and relevance to the topic. Examples of key words used in the search are “Nigeria’s foreign policy in military era,” “General Obasanjo’s foreign policy,” “Economic Diplomacy,” Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy, etc. “Scholarly articles on” were added at the beginning of some searches which were not available on Palacky Information Resources. While references and bibliographic articles are majorly from the year 2000, special consideration is given to prior select works that are very critical to the study.

It was difficult to establish the page numbers or columns of some online sources. The bibliography represents the research population, collection of objects and individuals with similar binding features. Ideally, the study covered from 1953 till March 1st 2018 which should give an estimated sixty-four (64) years and four (4) months, including leap years. Since data was mostly generated online, it is impossible to follow this process to conduct a thorough archival search of activities from 1953 till March 2018. The study is therefore authentic to work within the 64 years. Html links were followed and websites were directly accessed and examined to establish its suitability for the study. The study was also peer reviewed where the opinions of colleagues with backgrounds in law, international relations and development studies and similar competence were sought.

1.5 Approach

The study follows a chronological pattern of analysis from 1953 till 2018. It is divided into five periods starting 1953-1960 to 2018. The timeframes are important and awards opportunity for the reader to determine the regime types, changes, priorities, challenges and continuities of the policy (Effiong, 2012).

1.5.1 First Period - 1953 Independence in 1966 (First Republic)

Preparations for Nigeria's independence commence in 1953 with establishment of *Office of the Cabinet for External Affairs*. Election into the Federal House was held in 1957. Members of the House represented the different (371) ethnic groups and regions in Nigeria. The last British colonial Governor-General, Sir James Robertson handed over officially to Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Fulani Muslim from Northern Nigeria on October 1st 1960. By 1963 when Nigeria officially joined the Commonwealth of Nations, the first president, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe from Southern Igbo group replaced the Queen and Nigeria became a Republic. This period in post-colonial Nigeria is referred to as the "First Republic 1960 - January 1966.

1.5.2 Second Period - 1966-1979 Military Regimes

Four military coups and a civil war (Nigerian-Biafran War 1967-1970) characterised this period. General Aguiyi Ironsi from Igbo ethnic group Southeast Nigeria took over in January 16th, 1966 following the assassination of the Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa and other Northern leaders. As a nation of many ethnicities, fears of marginalization began to seep in. General Ironsi was assassinated in a second military coup by a group of northern army officers six months later on July 12th (Ujumadu, 2016). General Yakubu Gowon, Christian from Northcentral Nigeria became Head of State on August 1st 1966.

In July 29th, 1975, General Gowon was overthrown in a third military coup which brought to power General Muritala Mohammed, a Hausa Muslim from the north. Muritala was later assassinated in a fourth military coup in February 13th, 1976 and his deputy; a Southwestern Yoruba, General Olusegun Obasanjo became military leader. In 1979, General Obasanjo handed over to a democratically elected government. The distinctive aspect of this period is the Kippur Yom war which led to oil windfall that assisted Nigeria in exercising her leadership role. Until 1970, 75% of Nigeria's revenue came from agricultural products, cotton, palm oil, groundnut, etc. As at 1960, oil accounted for 2.6% of export earnings. In 1971, oil production climaxed one million barrels per day, thus crude oil replaced agricultural products as main driver of the economy. Agricultural revenue fell from 75 percent to 55 percent by 1971 and further to 45 percent in 1974. By 1980, it was less than 20 percent and contributed only 7.5 percent revenue. The oil revenue which stood at 20 percent in 1966 rose to 36 percent in 1970, 55 percent by 1974 and by 1980; it stood at 80 - 98.6 percent (Alkali, 1997:65-66; Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28; Ahmed, 1990 in Ojeh, 2014).

1.5.3 Third Period - 1979-1984 Democratic Governmenta (Second Republic)

Alhaji Shehu Shagari was democratically elected the president in 1979, with Sir Alex Ekwueme as Deputy. Shagari completed the first term of four years of democratic government in October 1983. The oil shocks of late 1970s led to economy turndown during this period and the government was faced with severe economic crisis and resorted to external borrowing. Shagari's government was overthrown in another military coup three months into the second term in December 31st 1983.

1.5.4 Fourth Period - 1984 - 1999 Military Regimes (2 successful and 3 aborted coups)

The coup of December 31st 1983 brought to power General Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon. The military regime was in place until August 27th 1985 when it was toppled by the third high-ranking member of the Supreme Military Council, General, Ibrahim Babangida. According to domestic and international observers, Alhaji Moshood Kashimawo Abiola had the highest votes in the presidential election held on June 12th, 1993 following a successful Gubernatorial, Federal and State Houses of Assembly elections. This was to mark the "Nigeria's Third Republic." However, the election was declared "nulled and void." An Interim Government was setup with Ernest Shonekan (not a contestant) as the Interim Head of Government.

In November 17th 1993, General Sani Abacha replaced Shonekan as Head of State. Between 1993 and 1998, the winner of the acclaimed elections, Moshood Abiola was incarcerated and died in July 1998, weeks after Abacha. This period is known as "The Dark Days" in Nigerian history. General Abdulsalami Abubakar became Head of State in July 8th 1998 following Abacha's demise. He laid the groundwork for democratic government. A retired General Obasanjo won the election and became president from May 29th, 1999.

1.5.5 Fifth Period - 1999 - date Democratic System - "Fourth Republic"

Between May 1999 and date, four presidents have been sworn in. Obasanjo handed over to Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua, a passive president due to his health condition. Yar'Adua passed on in May 5th 2009. His deputy, Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in to complete the tenure and subsequently won the 2011 election. Retired General Muhammadu Buhari won the 2015 elections, this time as civilian president of Nigeria. The study therefore analyses, evaluates and explained how Nigeria's foreign policy initiatives and frameworks were designed and articulated within these five periods.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The research was feasible despite the anticipated challenges. There are enough academic materials on the topic; the Palacky Electronic Information Portal provides rich information

resources. The research design and methodology are well-understood. Many used the term foreign policy, foreign assistance, foreign aid, diplomacy, etc. interchangeably. Foreign policy as already stated is about the strategies and actions that guide states at international field using aid or development assistance as its tool. Since a greater part of Nigeria's assistance to African states was financial aid, these thesis uses the term "foreign policy and foreign aid" to analyse the impact of the assistance.

The study covers five periods and four republics from 1953 to March 2018. Additionally, the study concentrates on Black Nations in Africa and to an extent blacks in the Caribbean and Pacific regions, excluding blacks in Europe and the United States because Nigeria's focus was black Nations in disadvantaged situations. No interviews are conducted. Primary and secondary sources are used. The terms "she" and "her" are used in the study to describe or represent Nigeria, a former British territory, under Her Royal Majesty, the Queen of England. Queen Elizabeth II was the Head of State until 1963, when Nigeria became a Republic. Thus, the feminine words "she" and "her" are officially used to represent Nigeria.

1.7 Limitation

Time constrain and financial resources to travel to Nigeria for in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussions with critical stakeholders. By delimitation, the researcher is unable to do quantitative and qualitative research at same time but some aspects of quantitative methods are integrated in the study.

1.8 Motivation

The motivation for this topic is derived from different sources. Nigeria's absence as a key player in international affairs, unlike in the past which was widely recognized; the negative perception of Nigerians within and outside Africa; my experience as a Nigerian with other Africans here in Czech Republic and in Europe; the misinformation and misconception about Nigeria's role in Africa; the xenophobic attacks in South Africa, targeting mostly Nigerians; the absence of a literature that explains the role Nigeria played in African integration in post-colonial and post-apartheid Africa in Palacky University Library; the quest for justice for the lives of Nigerians lost to these attacks and the need to speak about it more; the need to contribute to a comprehensive text that focuses on what Nigeria's relationships with the rest of the world entailed and to situate it within other contexts in development field.

I was also inspired by the lectures in MRS/International Development Studies, my recent encounter and association with the Group - *Young Professionals in Foreign Policy*, following my internship in Brussels. And because this is a field I recently developed interest in, it could inform my future work in the field or further study at PhD level. The study also added value and improved my research skills. And while it may serve as recommendation to appropriate

authorities, it also provides the department and Palacky University with a resource and reference point for those seeking further knowledge and information in the field and about Nigeria.

My focus on Nigeria's external support stems from the need to understand how the two systems-military dictatorships and democratic transitional governments articulated the foreign policy. I have also examined the issues emanating from the meetings I have attended within development circles in Europe, examine how other countries tackled external issues while Nigeria's sacrifices to African unity is rarely mentioned or acknowledged. Many are only aware of the corruption cases and influx of Nigerian migrants to other countries while the leadership role Nigeria played in the continent is downplayed. Xenophobic attacks target Nigerians in almost all parts of the world, including in places where Nigeria committed enormous resources. It is my deepest interest to understand what led to Nigeria's current backseat position and to share the findings.

1.9 Justification

To establish the regime type in Nigeria and the foreign policy thrust that positively impacted on the international system. It equally seeks to understand the component of the policy. While studies have been conducted on various aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy, this topic is far from being exhausted as a research field. Study shows that Nigeria still stands in position to dominate the entire continent given many factors, including her population, natural endowments, economy-potential and her manufacturing and production capacity which stands at 50% in West Africa (Bach, 2007:301; Williams, 1991). This, achievable through positive foreign policy interpretations, is far from reality as Nigeria's influence over the years continue to wane.

Most importantly, this study seeks to strike a link between development aid and foreign policy because apart from propaganda, financial aid was the major foreign policy tool used by different governments in Nigeria. Aid was a Second World War development strategy and was instrumental in realizing the modernization theory of development. At a period aid was used as a weapon of diplomacy and to build alliances, Nigeria's external affairs bordered on financial and technical assistance to liberation movements in Africa and to promote African unity. However, this support is yet to translate into meaningful impact or benefit to Nigeria as her influence continues to decline. In 1973, Hans Morgenthau (in Ajayi, 2005:61), asserted that no nation can have true guides on what to do in foreign policy without accepting national interest as guide. The Adedeji Commission Report of 1976 endeavoured to interpret the foreign policy objectives as:

- The defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;

- The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the same time foster national self-reliance and rapid economic development;
- The promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity especially the dignity of the black race;
- The defence and promotion of world peace.

Nevertheless, what constitute National Interest is still unclear except Point.1. The objectives failed to spell out how it should be implemented to benefit Nigeria and Nigerians. Different governments endeavoured to premise what they considered to be Nigeria's interest within prevailing circumstances. Support from Nigeria is sufficient to meet Official Development Assistance standard and place her on the OECD list of Donor Countries. Her assistance to Africa and her power and influence could be perfected as an influential tool to garner support and be relevant at international circles. However, the reverse is the case as decision makers settled for good neighbourliness in place of economic benefits and strategic partnership (Pine, 2011). This study has therefore become imperative to unravel the factors behind this backwardness.

In terms of significance, this study helps to examine and build appreciation for Nigeria's role and how her best practices can be adapted to meet today's needs. This study reawakens our consciousness to her role in liberating the continent from the claws of apartheid, racism and colonialism. It serves as lessons learned document, reference point for further research and debate on the topic. It will contribute to the discourse that may inspire the redefinition of Nigeria's foreign policy initiative to better respond to today's needs. Additionally, the in-depth knowledge contributed to the researcher's development-career aspirations and her chances of succeeding in the field.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.0 Introduction of Chapter

The chapter examines existing academic literature and scholarly articles on the topic, to bring to the fore what has been done within this topic. Due to diverse opinions that surround debate on this topic, it was important to go beyond academic works to relevant sources to enrich this section. The chapter also covers the theoretical frameworks which the study is structured on.

2.1 Foreign Policy Expectations and Practicality

According to Hill (2003: p-43-45), Foreign Policy is expected to protect citizens who pursue life or work abroad, from prison sentences for possessing drugs to labour exploitation and a country's identity abroad through cultural activities, language acquisition, maintain territorial integrity and social peace against external aggression. Ajayi (2005) sees foreign policy as a transaction among states entailing high diplomacy aimed at achieving certain national objectives. To Goldstein and Pevehouse (2011:103), it entails strategies that guide actions of governments in spelling out these objectives in international system. Rolenc (2013) sees it as the positioning of the state towards its surrounding, hence towards other players in international system. Matt (2015) calls it issues on "internationalist" agenda while Petric (2013) sees it as activities with which a state fulfils its interests within the international arena.

For Celenk (2015), foreign policy enables states to identify certain political, economic and military interests of concern and pursue them through different channels. Chibundu (2003) says it's a State's external action which can be friendly or aggressive, casual, intense or complex. To Hill (2003), it is about mediating a two way flow between internal and external dynamics and cannot be detached from the domestic where it springs from. Ayam (2004), Dokubo and Oluwadare (2010), Alao (2011) also attest to this relationship between internal and external dynamics.

Foreign policy could be based on economics, politics, military, morality, culture or establishment of relationships and cooperation with the rest of the world. While Kisangani and Pickering, (2015), Preble (2010) attests to this military approach/intervention, Bernie Sanders (2017) in his address at Westminster College affirms that foreign policy is not just tied to military but directly connects with economics, taking into account the outrageous income and wealth inequality that exists today, global peace and security and should be employed to prevent an oligarchic form of society where a few exert influence over the economic and political life of our world.

This study defines foreign policy as a set of goals and course of actions a state wishes to pursue in its external relations, either to build goodwill and appreciation for itself as a responsible member of the society or promote international development. It entails financial aid, technical support, scholarships, development programs, diplomacy, etc. These understandings and definitions demonstrate a general consensus on the role and aims of foreign policy. It generally presents foreign policy as a governance tool that could be used to question the extent to which societies are obligated to one another and decide the principles of international order (Hill, 2003). This consensus rightly establishes the linkage between foreign policy, foreign aid and domestic dynamics that impacts on foreign aid positively or negatively.

2.1.1 Decision-Makers, Agency and Actors in Foreign Affairs

Decision-making, the starting point in foreign policy rests within the agency. In foreign policy, this agency is the State and those responsible for making decisions are bureaucrats and politicians. Titles and locations may vary according to the type of system or international actor represented (Guerlain, 2014). Foreign policy sums up official external relations conducted by an 'independent actor' in international relations (Hill, 2003). Actions taken by transnational, international organizations, International Non-Governmental Organizations-INGOs are counted as foreign policy initiatives, depending on the issues at stake. Support for single currency project of the European or African Union or opposition to nuclear testing by Greenpeace, CONCORD Europe can impact on foreign policy. This makes NGOs and lobby groups critical foreign policy actors (Abelson, 2014; Hafsa, 2014; Snider, 2003).

Financiers like George Soros (Soros Foundation), Bill Gates (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and multinationals like Shell Petroleum; ExxonMobil may not be fully involved but also share vulnerability in cases of unpleasant incidents. The conflict over oil exploration, between Royal Dutch/Shell, Nigerian Government and Host Communities in the Niger Delta especially the Ogoniland serve as example. The execution of the Ogoni 9, including Ken Saro Wiwa, a playwright and environmental activist impacted negatively on Royal Dutch/Shell activities. Shell has faced many legal actions following these incidents and ceased operating in Ogoniland since the executions in 1997. The publicity following the incidents demonstrates the critical role of the Press in foreign policy (Hennchen, 2015; Obayiuwana, 2001; Schutz, 2017; Ugwu and Moko, 2014:151).

Authority for implementation of external policy lies with the ministry of foreign affairs under supervision of a minister, or Secretary of State like the United States. Some ministers are believed not to have full powers and often refer to heads of Governments. Conversely, some heads of Governments serve as Ministers while some are often sucked into the roles, for

instance, the Presidents of United States of America and France (Fuchs and Richert, 2016; Slovak Academy Press, 2010). In Nigeria, the Minister and Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is statutorily established to reinforce Nigeria's external dealings (Mimiko and Mbada, 2014:147-148).

2.1.2 Personality, Regime Type and Foreign Policy

At every point in a nation's history, wielders of powers determine the nature, character and direction of the nations' relations in the international system (Magbadelo, in Akintenwa, 2010). Personalities of leaders, leadership style, institutional designs, etc. are critical to foreign policy (Mimiko and Mbada, 2014, Brommessen and Ekengren, 2012). The issue of personality and political regime type has been greatly discussed in academic and policymaking circles as it is believed to be one of the fundamental issues in the field. Historical analysis shows that a country's foreign policy is tantamount to the personality of those at the helm (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Additionally, domestic, external and psychological factors such as the mental process of decision-makers and the rationale behind the decisions have been identified as the foundation on which the foreign policy of a country is hinged on (Ogwu, 2005).

2.1.3 Does Nigeria's Foreign Aid Make Her A Hegemon?

Due to nature of the international system, States seek power to maintain their sovereignty and security through economic diplomacy and safeguarded by military superiority (Fiamnghi, 2011; Fukuyama, 2004; Mearsheimer, 2010; Muller, 2008; Papadimitriou and Pistikou, 2013). Some states take further steps to maintain this sovereignty by exerting hegemonic influence and taking up leadership role. Nigeria played crucial roles at regional and continental level which was fully recognized within and outside the continent (Bach, 2010; Henkel, in Ali, 2012; Wright; 1998). Although Ogunnubi and Okeke-Ofodile (2016) through application of hegemonic stability theoretical lens affirmed that through her interactions, Nigeria's foreign policy initiative displayed few signs of continental hegemonic disposition, Nigeria was never an expansionist, blackmail or coerced other weaker nations to accept her views and policies but was guided by legal equality, non-alignment, non-interference principles (Olusanya and Akindele; 1986:4 in Obi, 2008).

2.1.4 Image and Foreign Policy

Image is an individual's perception of what is good or bad and the meaning people ascribe to or from it (Hosti 1996). The perception of any nation by members of the international community and how it pursues its relations with others, including the citizens' behaviour all

determine the country's image (Zimako, 2009). For a state to be successful and secure its national interests depends on her image, international credibility, reputation of the states, including her military, economic and political powers (Celenk, 2015). Image has therefore become a fundamental part of a nation's foreign policy and forms a critical element in a country's strategy for foreign policy formulation and implementation. It requires a well-focused purpose to create and reinforce favourable images to the external world (Adeniyi, 2012; Alimi, 2005). The study agrees that a nation's attempt to meaningfully impact on and influence the world is guided by her foreign policy objective and national interests and how effectively it is communicated to the world. The advantages flowing from good image internationally are inestimable and often stem from the opinion people have of its citizens (Federal Ministry of Information Nigerian, 2012:345).

2.1.5 Reciprocity and Nigeria's Foreign Aid Initiative

Development cooperation aims to support national or international development priorities. It is not profit-driven but based on cooperative relationships ranging from financial (in-kind) transfer, capacity support, emergency aid to policy change (Alonso and Glennie, 2015). Development assistance can be traced to the period the *Organization for European and Economic Cooperation* now *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development* was established officially, to complement the US Government Marshall Plan at the end of the Second World War. The success of the Marshall Plan motivated many countries to provide aid to least developed states. Today it is called "*Official Development Assistance-ODA*", employed to promote economic and social development in developing countries (Todaro and Smith, 2009; Riddell, 2007), through multilateral and bilateral agreements. Developing countries are targeted because their financial institutions are weak, infrastructures underdeveloped and market failures endemic (Sengupta, 2002).

McGillivray and White (1993:2) therefore posits that

"aid is an instrument of foreign policy serving to promote political and diplomatic relations with developing countries; enhance stability within countries of strategic importance; expand export markets, procure strategic imports and gain kudos in international fora by being seen as responsible, caring member of the international community helping countries in need and seeking to promote international development."

Official foreign aid and assistance are therefore vehicles of a country's foreign policy (Sogge, 2002:194), encompassing concessional public resource transfer from one government to another with at least 25% grant element, with one purpose of furthering development in a poor country (Lancaster in Picard et al. 2008:39). During the Cold War, aid was a political instrument of rivalry between the Eastern and Western Bloc. The success of the Marshall Plan changed attitude of donors and was a motivation to assist disadvantaged countries

(Fuhrer, 1994). Foreign aid has therefore become an important aspect of international system, a blend of political, economic or military motive. Aid, in this study is therefore taken as an instrument of statecraft, like propaganda, diplomacy or military action (Picard et.al, 2008).

It recognises foreign aid and foreign policy as part of development assistance initiatives. Due to domestic politics in aid-giving countries, foreign aid is used in foreign policy for variety of purposes ranging from domestic politics to international pressures (Lancaster, 2007). In foreign aid sometimes, there is a lack of mutual exchange or reciprocity (Picard et.al, 2008) like the case of Nigeria's foreign aid. Reciprocity has been studied in terms of the levels of cooperation and conflict (Stern and Druckman, 2000). It is an optional principle of international law that has the capacity to build mutual trust and confidence as well as strengthen bond amongst states (Blaut, 1987, in Palmer et al, 2002). Unlike what obtains in official development assistance circle, Nigeria's aid was untied and unconditional with no mutual exchange (Pincin, 2013; Round and Odedokun 2004; Sung-Kee and Young-Ham, 2016). The dictates of global system frowns at this absence of reciprocity as many countries do not know how to pay back (Bassey, 2004; Saliu, 2006a; Ubi and Akinkuotu, 2014).

In the area of cooperation, virtually every nation and regions of the world belong to some cooperation and organization that promotes economic or monetary integration, free trade or security (Anushiem et.al, 2017). Nigeria has collaborative and bilateral relationships across the world Africa (Meyer et. al, 2010) and is a member of many international organizations (DTAC, 2018). However, at time of alliance building and influential network coordination like BRICS with increased impact on international political and economic governance, Nigeria's presence is unfelt within these arrangements which provide enormous potential for development. Developing countries are reshaping global investment architecture while South-South Cooperation is a key element in global economic development (Ewelukwa, 2011; Elkamann and Ruppel, 2015; Udombana, 2002).

The literature review for this study summarily reveals that the method of gathering evidence was detailed and reliable. Nearly all the researched papers chronologically analysed Nigeria's foreign policy from 1960 till date. In terms of limitation, Effiong (2012) and other similar studies did focus on the policy thrust of each government but with no in-depth analysis of the successes, impact and failures of each government's foreign policy. This study sees that as a gap to bridge. Some of the works have highlighted corruption and fading image while others have endeavoured to highlight the political culture and history of Nigeria which impacts on her governance arrangements over the years.

Additionally, many of the academic works were structured within decision-making, globalization, bureaucratic politics model, with only one focus on Marxist's political economy. None of the analysed works adopted triangulation with Marxist, realism or liberalism theories which make my work unique. Furthermore, the literatures all focused on foreign policy without finding the link between foreign policy and foreign or development aid. This study therefore locates these differences and similarities and establishes the linkages.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Given the competing frameworks of foreign policy, theoretical triangulation is adopted by this study to interpret Nigeria's foreign policy and assistance over the years. This includes role theory, realism, liberalism, elite theory, liberal realism, globalization, decision-making theory. However, it is mainly structured on Marxism and realism which bothers on hard power and hegemony as exhibited by the military regimes and liberalism which deals with the economy and soft power diplomacy. The triangulation enhances our knowledge of the power and nature of Nigerian State, origin and direction of Nigeria's foreign policy over the years and how the military and civilian leaders with different ideological and political orientations interpreted the policy.

Role theory distinguishes individual and group's perception and behaviours in social settings. It is a key component to understand the relationships that exists at different levels of society (Folarin, 2010:93, also in Fayomi, 2015; Turner, 2001) and examines the linkages between organizations, culture and human performance in the course of interaction (Martin and Janelle, in Ritzer, 2005). Social structures and class division were propagated in Africa through colonialism, apartheid and racism. In the late 1980's to 2003, West Africa was spontaneously overwhelmed by conflict which threatened the region's foundations and aspirations. These conditions called for concerted efforts which Nigeria was obliged to respond (Banton, 1965; Turner, 2001:234). Nigeria subsequently assumed a leadership role where the elite class, bureaucrats and institutions responsible for external relations and the populace contributed. The decision-making represents their ideological, political orientations and behaviours and the harmony and dissonance that shaped the conception, formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy overtime (Fayomi, 2015).

Realism, considered too focuses on the role of the state, security and importance of power, character of states' populations, egoism, brutality and the unsociable (Heywood, 2011). Morgenthau (1985; 37; 1946:193) opines that the desire for power as the distinctive element of international politics constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action. The underlying motives of foreign policy allows a State or select groups in a State to use state apparatus for

their needs, to protect, enforce class structure and exercise power (Buse, 2012; Hill, 2003). Apartheid South Africa was brutish in seeking class division (Abegunrin, 2009).

Marxist's theory, also considered sees the state as operating in the interest of the capitalists; an authoritative structure representing the dominant minority with power to establish laws and enforce them on members of the society, jail, execute or initiate war. Marxist's insists that a State is an instrument for creation of class and hierarchies, domination, for oppression and exploitation of those economically weak who lack the power to make decision. It is a tool for establishment and maintenance of the hegemonic influence of the minority rich and powerful over the indigenous majority poor in society. This concentrates wealth in a few hands, in some cases through exclusionary polices and legislations like apartheid which blocks the majority from gaining access (Chua, 2004; Lenin, in Johari, 2005: 72) and Decree No 2 by the Buhari government (1984-1985) in Nigeria.

Liberalism in this study is associated with soft power diplomacy. Through interaction, States recognize differences and resolve them through bargaining, negotiations and peace treaties to achieve systematic improvement in conditions (Heywood, 2011). Liberation focuses on different actors and their influence over the formulation of policies and emphasizes on measurement of power through economy, free markets, legitimacy, and cooperation. It spreads democratic and economic principles to bring forth the upshots of globalization, economic integration and interdependence. It downplays use of force and coercion in human affairs (Kaufman, 2004). Liberalism thus aims to maximize individual freedom for all and rejects colonialism and imperialism (van de Haar, 2009). Nye (2004) sees it as the ability to shape the preferences of others through intangible assets like attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions as well as policies that are legitimate.

Elite theory (Weber, 2005/1922 in Lopez 2013) is based on minority ruling class in society in control of power sources and authorises the entrance of new elites to a scene through different mechanism, like military coups in Nigeria where new elite class takeover. Elite theory explains elite behaviour, interaction, transformation and connections (Lopez, 2013), just like Marxist's. It affirms that those who exercise major influence or controls the formulation and implementation of political, economic and social decisions are the elites (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Decision-making theory (Snyder and Sapin, 1962; Rosenau, 1969 in Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013:37) conversely analyses the political systems, processes, behaviours (Gaubu, 2003). It looks into the choices individuals, groups and coalitions make that affects a nation on the international stage (Mints and DeRouen, 2010). Decision lies within the interest and power of those at the helm of affairs and are made based on worldview, circumstances, perception and motivations, reflecting ego, ambition and experiences of those in control.

Liberal realism talks about a society of States with common norms and interests that promote order and stability. It points to Nigeria as a nation with capacity to influence Africa but failed to develop strategies that combine her military might with soft power like the financial aid. Liberal realism requires understanding and moving with secular diffusion of global power (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 2004). Another relevant theory is globalization, a new paradigm within global politics and economic relations which links democracy and capitalism. In modern society, globalization has tilted and shifted economic power of States to the hands of institutions like European Union, World Trade Organizations-WTO, International Monetary Fund-IMF, United Nations Organization, NATO and the African Union which brings new constrains and conditions for effective international governance. It removes decision making from the hands of governments, mandating States to adjust in conducting international business, managing national politics and adapting them to pressures from transnational forces (Ley, 2001).

Chapter Three: Research Findings Presentation

3.0 Introductions

This chapter covers the main findings of this study. The presentation of findings form the basis for comparison of the two governments- military and civilian democratic governments from 1960 and their foreign policy approach.

3.1 First Republic - 1957 - 1966

3.1.1 Government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 1957 - 1966

Nigeria, under British arrangement started preparation for independence in 1953. Personnel, groom for the foreign affairs department were granted some level of authority over foreign policy affairs (Adoba, 2014). In 1957, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became first Prime Minister and started to exercise some powers. The department was transferred from the Office of the Chief Secretary to Prime Minister' Office as the Department of Cabinet Office. Sir Balewa was sworn in as the first Prime Minister on October 1st 1960 under a presidential form of government. Nigeria officially joined the Commonwealth of Nations in 1963 (Ashiru, 2011 in Mimiko and Mbada, 2014; Effiong, 2012) when Nigeria became a Republic and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe replaced Queen Elizabeth as President.

As the first government for an independent Nigeria, the Balewa government had the privilege of shaping the foreign policy decision-making structures and processes. The period was characterised by anti-colonial struggles and crisis of collective racial identity of the colonized. Balewa's foreign policy took a conciliatory approach to the racial issue in Southern Africa in connection to the nature and structure of world systems, including the vocabulary of politics of that time (Abegunrin, 2009; Adebayo, 2003; Jinadu, 2005). Idang as far back as 1973 (Abegunrin, 2008) described Sir Balewa as having a calm and placating attitude which enabled him to pursue a conciliatory but firm foreign policy.

In April 5th, 1960, a Private Member Bill was passed at the Lower House of the Federal Parliament urging the Federal Government to take actions to ban the importation of South African goods to Nigeria. Secondly, Nigeria organized the All Nigerian Peoples' Conference in 1961 which provided a "*picture of foreign policy attitudes, views, perceptions and opinions by a national cross section of Nigeria intelligentsia*". This provided the Prime Minister's Office with broad based of public opinion to guide in foreign policy formulation (Idang, 1973:92 also in Mimiko and Mbada, 2014). Nigerian government established the National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAP) to educate Nigerians about apartheid. Mass education from primary schools to universities, in public squares, offices and markets squares, through

posters and billboard messages (Inamete, 2001), with support of Nigerian Press. In his first speech as the 99th member of the United Nations, Sir Abubakar Balewa stated that, Nigeria is naturally concerned first with what affects her immediate neighbourhood (Balewa, United Nations October 8th, 1960). The statement specified that Nigeria's focus is Africa, her immediate neighbour.

At the Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly-UNGA 1961, Nigeria spearheaded the international campaign against apartheid and discrimination in South Africa, and canvassed for the imposition of mandatory sanctions against the regime. The international reputation and contribution of many Nigerians also fits into this role. Dr Taslim Olawale Elias, Nigeria's Attorney General and Minister for Justice won significant roles for Nigeria in international affairs. The United Nations nominated Taslim as Chairman of the United Nations Committee of Experts that drafted the first Constitution of Congo-1961-1962 and Africans also nominated him to chair the committee that drafted the Constitution of the Organization of African Unity and its Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (Aluko, 1986:89; West Africa, 1992:1486, in Inamete, 2001). Elias was elected by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations to the ICJ and became the first African jurist to be elected as President of the Court in 1982 and later to the Permanent Member, Court of Arbitration at The Hague (Bello, 1992).

Nigeria at the International Labour Organization- ILO, Geneva Meeting moved a motion for expulsion of South Africa which received 163 to nil with 89 abstentions. When this was not acknowledged, Nigeria along with other African delegates walked out of the ILO meeting in 1963 (Idang, 1973:123, in Inamete, 2001). Nigerian government also persuaded, unsuccessfully, other nations to expel South Africa from Commonwealth of Nations and the UN because of its apartheid policies (Ogunbanjo, 2002:7). Foreign Minister, Nwachukwu (November 1961, cited in Abegunrin, 2009:13) affirms that:

It was our suggestion at the United Nations that the Security Council applied the provisions of Article 6 of the United Nations Charter, which says that when a member continues to disobey or infringe the Charter of the Organization, then the possibility of such member's expulsion must be considered under Article 6 of the Charter. We, in conjunction with other African states, brought this resolution to the political Committee and it was passed. Now we want the Security Council to consider the possibility of expelling South Africa from the UN under Article 6"

Nigeria's success in creating a spirit of revulsion against apartheid at international forums became a mass movement of the people, spearheaded by the people, especially in Nigeria (Egedo, 1987). A year after Nigeria entered into an Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact with Britain in 1961; it was terminated as a result of the pressure mounted by Nigerian students and interest groups (Inamete, 2001) due to Britain's continued relationship with South Africa.

Balewa recommended economic integration within regions which became the bedrock of African integration program and a prelude to the formation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) which he played key roles. Nigeria was instrumental in negotiating a peace settlement between factions in Congo Zaire Civil War, known then as Congo Leopoldville, later as Congo Kinshasa and now Democratic Republic of Congo. Apart from participating in the UN Advisory Committee on the Congo, serving on the Secretary-General's Congo Club and providing the Chairman of the Congo Conciliation Commission, Nigeria contributed 1,796 soldiers and policemen to the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) and ensured Belgian paratroopers withdrew peacefully from Congo, 1960-1964 (Akinwunmi, 2000:55; Lawrence 1996:192). By invitation of Julius Nyerere, Nigeria sent troops to end the mutiny within the Tanzanian armed forces (Peter and Aminu, 1986:93-94, in Inamete, 2001:29).

As a result of Nigeria's leading role in the continent, Chief Jerome Udorji, a Nigerian administrator was commissioned to restructure Ugandan Civil Service. Chief Egbert Udo Udoma was also commissioned to reorganize Ugandan legal system. Sir Udo Udoma was one of the first black Africans to earn a PhD in Law in 1944 from Oxford University. He served as Nigerian High Court Judge in Nigeria before his secondment to Uganda as the first African to serve in the capacity. He was thereafter appointed Chief Justice of Uganda from 1963 to 1969. Recently, Nkemdilim Izuako was Judge of the High Court of Solomon Islands. It is also on record that a team of Nigerian health professionals set up one of the most prestigious private medical schools, the Kampala International University School of Medicine in Ishaka, Uganda in Eastern Africa (Ezeala, 2008; Whiteman, 1998).

The first post-independent Development Plan was dependent on capital flow from the West. As a newly independent state, Balewa constantly consulted Britain to keep the economic space of the country flowing with needed resources (Aluko, 1983:82-84; Imobighe, 1981:10-17 in Adoba, 2014). British Secretary to the Cabinet, Mr. Peter Stalland was still at the background providing support and autocratic but informal control of the country's external affairs (Aluko, 1981:24, in Effiong, 2012:34). This dependence affected the execution of revolutionary foreign policy as Balewa sort Britain advice on many issues, including the Bizerte crisis where Tunisian government imposed blockade on French naval base (Laskier, 1994).

Balewa's government evaded the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc until December 1961. The Soviet embassy at establishment in Lagos in 1961 was limited to ten diplomatic staff whereas no such restriction was placed on diplomatic missions of Western European countries or the United States of America. The Soviet embassy was allocated five diplomatic car plates whereas British and United State of America were entitled to one hundred each. In 1961, Nigeria broke diplomatic ties with

France due to France's atomic test in the Sahara Desert and renewed the relationship in 1965 (African Concord 10, 1991 in Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016; Army Institute of Education, 1977).

While it supported the liberation struggle, Balewa's government refused to train armed militia for Angolan fighters waging war against Portuguese colonialists and other freedom fighters (Ezirim, 2011). With Nigeria's population, many were of the belief that Nigeria will emerge as the leader/Secretary-General of OAU or the Headquarters would be in Lagos (Alli, 1986). Balewa's government did not grant audience to Henry Nkumbula, leader of Rhodesia National Congress in Lagos in 1961. Francisco Xavier Ndego, leader of the Popular Idea of Equatorial Spanish Guinea Party who found his way to Nigeria to see the Prime Minister without valid papers was jailed for two months and thereafter deported.

However, the government mandated Mazi Mbazulike, the Aviation Minister to host Nelson Mandela in his home, where he spent six months. Mandela voluntarily returned to South Africa where he was arrested and imprisoned (Ujumadu, 2016). When the opposition party, the Action Group in the House of Assembly initiated a motion to debate on the assassination of Patrice Lumumba of Congo in 1961, the ruling party, Northern People's Congress (NPC) rejected the debate that it was a foreign affair on the exclusive list of the Federal Government but went ahead with the South African issue (Ojeh, 2014). The first military coup led to assassination of Sir Tafawa Balewa in 1966. It ended the first civilian government in Nigeria and the only government in the First Republic.

3.1.2 Second Period 1966-1979 Military Regimes

The second period starts from January 1966 to October 1979 covering four military Heads of Governments. Four military coups, Nigerian Civil War, Yom Kippur War, oil windfall, oil shocks and intense liberation struggles in Africa were recorded within this period.

3.1.3 General Aguiyi Ironsi January 16th, 1966 - July 12th 1966

General Aguiyi Ironsi, the first military Head of State emphasized the importance of the Africa-centred policy and vowed to honour all treaty obligations and financial agreements in respect to external relations. The government barred Portuguese and white South Africans from entering Nigeria and denied them the use of Nigerian airspace and seaport facilities because of their status as colonialists (Abegunrin, 2009; Effiong, 2012). The Ambassadors' Conference was held in June 1966 in Lagos to re-examine the premises and directions of the country's foreign policy (Adedeji, 1976; Wogu et al, 2015). As a result of the ethnic differences following the first coup, a second military coup took place on July 12th 1966 and General Ironsi was assassinated.

General Yakubu Gowon, August 1st 1966 - July 1975

Nigeria was enmeshed in a three-year civil war, (Nigerian - Biafran War, May 30th 1967- January 1970) under General Gowon's government. 1-2 million people were estimated to have died in this war (Igbogwe, 1995:15 in Iwuagwu, 2012:283). The foreign policy under this period was war diplomacy, geared towards countering secession by the Biafra from southeast and preventing other countries from recognizing Biafra (Ajigbola, 1978:42-57, in Effiong, 2012:36). Britain's refusal to supply arms for the war motivated Gowon's government to solicit for support from the Eastern bloc. When it was realised that the Soviet Union was willing to support Nigeria, Britain supported Nigeria in the war. However, Nigeria still forged ahead with her affairs with the East. Soviet ideas, previously deemed subversive were allowed in Nigeria. Soviet literature and films were distributed which led to increased interest in communist world. Nigeria's military trainings and supplies, which were exclusively handled by the West, were altered to favour the Soviet Union (Ashaver, 2014; Dauda, 2006; Ezirin, 2011).

Support came in terms of logistics, military and propaganda for Biafra from South Africa who saw it as a way to get back at Nigeria. Many countries, including Israel, France, Portugal, Belgium, Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania and Zambia supported Biafra. Nigeria's intelligent sources reveal Tanzania and Zambia diverted arms meant for the liberation struggles to Biafra (Wilmont, 1989:4). At the end of the civil war, Nigerian government renewed her struggles against the apartheid regime. At the 7th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity-OAU, Summit of Heads of States and Ministerial Conference of the OAU Gowon and the External Affairs Minister, Okoi Arikpo reiterated Nigeria's position to proscribe South Africa as an unfit member of the international community due to its racist policy (Abegunrin, 2009:14; Omotosho, 2004:41).

Nigeria provided material and financial assistance to the Coordinating Committee of the Organization of African Unity-OAU for the Liberation of Africa and the Nationalist Liberation Movement of South Africa, African National Congress and Pan-African Congress (Abegunrin, 2009). Nigeria led a boycott of the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany in protest against apartheid regime. At the regional level, Nigeria's first peacekeeping force was dispatched in 1971 to Guinea to repulse invasion from Guinea Bissau and later to Chad (Dumbuya, 2015). In 1972, Justice Akintola Aguda was seconded to serve as Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho Chief Justice (Agbede, 1986/2000).

With the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, "*the oil boom provided Nigeria a new impetus to practice her non-aligned stances and position of neutrality in international events*" (Egbo, 2003:65). It awarded the chance to focus on a policy that involved economic

expansion and eventual establishment of ECOWAS in June 1975 (Institute of Army Education, 1977:11-13), the Niger Basin Authority and Chad Basin Commission (Adebayo, 2003:80). ECOWAS was established to foster integration of the region in line with Nigeria's foreign policy objective and Balewa's recommendation for regional economic integration to actualise African development and unity. The pioneering initiative was spearheaded by Nigerian president General Gowon. Together with Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, the presidents toured West African States to study the challenges and opportunities and brought the integration idea to life (Akinterinwa, 2017; ECOWAS, 2016). Nigeria provided land for ECOWAS Secretariat and regularly pays its annual contribution of 32.5% of the Community's budget (Ajayi, 2005:53; Folarin, 2013). Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, the pioneer Secretary-General of United Nations Economic Commission for Africa-UNECA (1975-1993) took the lead in bringing ECOWAS to life. Adedeji was instrumental in creating other regional groupings in Africa (Adedeji, 2002; News Agency of Nigeria, 2018)

The government provided crude oil to African countries at concessionary rates (Adoba (2014). The anti-apartheid struggle earned Nigeria the Chairmanship of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee in 1972-1975 and from 1976-1994; a strategic position to launch vehement global campaign to stir up international moral indignation against the apartheid system. The government commenced contribution to the voluntary UN Educational and Training Programme in 1973 which enabled black South Africans to attend higher education in other countries (Abegunrin, 2009).

Between 1973 and 1975, Nigerian government provided financial support of N3, 377.895 to African states to assist in addressing drought and other natural disasters. Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe received N1, 297,400 as gift at independence. N644, 000 was given to Niger, N500, 000 to Zambia, N400, 000 to Sudan and N124, 000 to Sao Tome and Principe (Ogunsanwo, 1978:40-41; Ojeh, 2014:106). Papua and New Guinea received funds for development as small countries inhabited by blacks. Grenada and Guyana were assisted in payment of civil servants salaries and to settle the balance of their recurrent budgets following their near bankruptcy in May 1975 (Aluko, 1981:201, Aduke-Abiola, 1999:89; Garba, 1991:26 in Ojie, 2014). Nigeria also assisted Great Britain with her financial obligations of N20 million to Jamaica (Aligbe, 1988:12 in Ojeh, 2014) and some neighbouring states. At this point, exchange rate was N1-US\$1.65 (Meierding, 2010:7).

Internally, Gowon's government established an Indigenization Policy in 1972 to create economically independent Nigeria with improved opportunities for indigenous businesses. The oil boom provided more impetus to shift the economy from Western-dependent towards nationalism and the government expanded protection for import-substituting industries,

enlarged role of State-owned enterprises and increased protectionism (Anyanwu, 1997:95; Eliagwu, 1976. Ogbuabu, 1983:250 in Fuady, 2015; Lewis, 2007:137). When the United States' Ambassador to Nigeria demanded an explanation on why the Soviet Embassy had increased the number of staff from 10-13, Nigerian government's response that the number of diplomats allowed into Nigeria were entirely her responsibility (Ashaver, 2014) stemmed from Nigeria's less dependence on the West.

With her unrepentant attitude towards dialogue with apartheid South Africa, it is established that Gowon's government kick-started the process of building up Nigeria's prestige and power in the black world and spearheaded the aggressive and vigorous foreign policy which provided platforms for successive governments to further the objectives, build alliance and broadened Nigeria's contact (Dauda, 2006:23; Sotunmbi, 1981, in Ojeh, 2014:106). In July 29th, 1975, General Gowon was overthrown in a third military coup (Wilmot, 1989).

3.1.3 The Government of General Murtala Mohammed 1975 - 1976

Murtala Mohammed government established a Commission with membership drawn from the academia, mass media and the military to assess the policy system, substance and apparatus. Headed by Adebayo Adedeji, Chair of United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the outcome was the *Adedeji Commission Report* which although did not change the policy objectives and principles, provided a blueprint for Nigeria to tackle her Afro-centric policy in a radical and aggressive manner (Obiazor, 1992 in Adoba, 2014). Murtala's speech at the OAU, 11 January 1976, "*Africa has come of age; it is no longer in the orbit of any continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country however powerful...the fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar...*" situated apartheid as part of imperialist strategy in Africa (Akomolafe, 2015; Wilmot, 1989).

British-owned Barclays Bank was nationalized in Nigeria, renamed Union Bank and barred from buying South African government bonds. These were weighty decisions, capable of attracting political, economic and social reprisals but Nigeria valued the welfare of blacks in South Africa. Murtala's government also refused to sell oil to South Africa in protest and lost an estimated \$41 to 45 billion between 1970 and 1983 (Akinyemi, in Ojeh, 2014:116; Koutinin in Ifijeh, 2017). Other African countries came to agree that it was only Nigeria that could take actions needed to decolonize Africa and therefore looked up to Nigeria for support (Aluko, 1981:50-52 and Aligbe, 1988:13 Moyela, 1999; in Ojeh 2014; Banwo and Ighodalo, 2011; Effiong, 2012).

Angola was a Portuguese colony. Three groups, Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) - MPLA, National Front for Liberation of Angola-FNLA, National Union for Total Independence of Angola-UNITA were

involved in independence struggles (Effiong, 2012). A government of national unity was initially proposed which Nigerian government and most African States supported. When African leaders realised US CIA and Portuguese PIDE controlled of FNLA and UNITA respectively and apartheid South African troop invaded Angola, Murtala's government recognised the MPLA in November 25th 1975 as the representative of Angolan people against American endorsement. The United States government wanted Nigeria to remain neutral or continue support for national government (Ojeh, 2014; Wilmot, 1989). The Murtala administration provided \$20million/N13.5 million, including military assistance to the MPLA. The international community was startled on how Nigeria can take a stance on global issues and mobilize other African states (Akinyemi, 1980:112, Olusanya and Akindele, 1986:5, Sotunmi, 1981:27 in Ojie, 2014:106,108; Kolawole, 2004:81; Onyeisi, 2011:226).

In the heat of the conflict, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger persuaded Angolan government to place oil royalties from Gulf Oil into an escrow account, pending the outcome of war. Gulf Oil, which also operated in the Niger Delta was later asked to pull out of Angola. Nigerian government put pressure on the oil company to reopen its Angolan operation and pay \$100 million to the government (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1976; Harding, 2016; Ojeh, 2014; Wilmot, 1989:6). The government also barred the annual meeting of the International Press in Lagos in 1975 because of white South African delegates (Ashaver, 2014). Angolan, Namibian and other Movements were encouraged by the government to set up diplomatic missions in Nigeria which allowed them to mobilize external resources to fight the racist administrations (Garba, 1987). One was the South African Revolutionary Youth Council (SAYRCO) led by Khotso Seatholo. Some of the youths were enrolled in Nigerian higher institutions (Abegunrin, 2009; Ojeh, 2014). The leader of the Soweto Students Representative Council, Tsei Machimini also took up permanent residence in Nigeria (Ibok, 1983 in Dauda, 2006:27-27).

Shortly after approving the sum of two (2) million dollars and \$500,000 to African National Congress and Namibia's SWAPO (Wogu et al, 2015:142) respectively and issuing a press statement in response to the Letter from President Gerald Ford of United States on the Angolan crises, General Murtala was assassinated in a military coup in February 13th, 1976. Ford had disclaimed knowledge of or responsibility for South African's actions and urges for more negotiation to block the Soviet or Cuban intervention which Murtala found offensive and patronizing. General Murtala made public the message, describing it as interference and an affront on Africans (Ashaver, 2014:291; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1976; Ojeh, 2014).

Nigeria accused Britain of complicity in his assassination as the coup leader Major Suka Dimka had proceeded straight to the British High Commission in Lagos to contact Gowon, Murtala's predecessor who was in exile in London. Some youths and student descended on

the embassies of US and Britain in protest against Murtala's death. The British High Commissioner expressed disappointment at the attacks and proclaimed that Her Majesty's government reserve the right to claim full compensation for the damage. Nigeria's External Affairs Minister demanded for a recall of the Commissioner given his timing and language, which was granted. Nigeria also requested for extradition of Gowon which was not granted, due to non-availability of Extradition Treaty with Nigeria and no guarantee for fair trial. Nigeria broke diplomatic ties with Britain (Ashevar, 2014; Effiong 2012).

3.1.4 General Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo - 1976 - 1979

General Murtala's Deputy forged ahead with the Soviet/Communist bloc and Nigeria's foreign policy was widely accepted and respected within critical decision-making circles in the East and West (Ezirin, 2011). At the height of the struggle and when the ANC went underground, Nigeria was approached for humanitarian support by the guerrilla wing which was gladly provided. The NACAP's mission had gained ground in Nigeria and Obasanjo's government established the South African Relief Fund (SARF) in 1976, to pool money from different sources within Nigeria to assist black South Africans. With a strong educational system and civil service at that period, all civil servants and public officers were encouraged to make voluntary contribution of 2% of their monthly salary to the Fund. Secondary schools and university students offered to skip their lunch in school to save money. The Obasanjo administration contributed \$37 million. Obasanjo made a personal donation of \$3000. Each member of his cabinet made personal donation of \$1,500 to the fund referred to as "*Mandela Tax*." The Soweto Massacre was around this period where over 700 protesting students were killed by the apartheid government (Abedunrin, 2008:18) during rally.

86 South African students travelled to Nigeria to further their education with support from the Fund. About 300 passports were also provided by Nigerian government South African youths who choose to study abroad but were denied passports and documents by the apartheid regime. Apart from providing training ground at the Kaduna First Mechanised Army Division and material support to ANC guerrilla forces, Nigeria also provided \$5million aid annually to ANC and PAC, excluding the special financial allocation for OAU Liberation Committee and other expenses borne by NACAP and SARF (Abegunrin, 2009:18,20; Ogunbanjo, 2002:7). As noted by Pan Africanist Congress leader Robert Sobekwu, "*Nigeria's support in Angola and Mozambique had encouraged the blacks in South Africa to fight for the total liberation of the country, from white dominance.*" (Abegunrin, 2009:20). Mugabe also pointed out that the African continent without Nigeria is hollow (Akinterinwa, 2017). Oliver Tambo (1981) encouraged other countries to emulate Nigeria's mood and actions towards the racist policy.

In 1976, Nigeria's bilateral relationship with the US became strained to the point that Nigeria denied the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger a State Visit during his African tour. In August, 22-26, same year, Nigeria hosted a World Conference for Action Against Apartheid, calling on the world to take positive actions to end apartheid (Ashaver, 2014; Scott-Emuakpor, 1980 in Ojeh, 2014:108). The Conference outcomes led to the Security Council Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa (Gambari, 1984:2). In 1978, Nigeria participated in drafting the UN Resolution 435, which included the UN Plan for independence of Namibia to draw more attention to the racist policy. Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the UN, Leslie Harriman suggested that the Council should stop all investments and loans to South Africa (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1978).

Nigeria's campaign led to withdrawal of several African countries from the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal, Canada as a result of New Zealand's rugby tour of South Africa and the Olympics International Committee's refusal to sanction New Zealand. 20 of the 26 countries were already in Montreal but returned without participating. Again in 1978, Nigeria led a boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Alberta in continued protest against New Zealand's participation and sporting contacts with South Africa. At the Commonwealth Heads of States' Conference in London, 1977, Nigeria succeeded in pressuring the Conference to adopt the *Gleneagles Agreement* which mandated all Commonwealth Governments to discontinue sporting links with apartheid South Africa (Abegunrin, 2008:17; BBC News, 1976; Otubanjo, 1989 in Ashaver. 2014; Tambo, 1981).

The government nationalized British Petroleum (BP) for supplying oil to the regime and recognizing Muzorewa Tendekayi's regime in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia just to add momentum to the struggle (Genova, 2010). From August 1st, 1979, it barred British firms from tendering for contracts in Nigeria (Aluko, 1990:112-123, in Effiong, 2012:38). From 1977, Thabo Mbeki was a guest of Nigerian government and resided in Lagos, Nigeria to evade the oppressive regime until 1984 when he moved into the ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia (Abedunrin, 2008).

In 1976, Nigerian government set up the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF), in agreement with African Development Bank as a soft window of the Bank and to assist the development efforts of fragile and low-income regional member states whose economic and social conditions and prospects require concessional financing. Its initial capital was US\$80million and stood at \$253 million in 2012. The terms of loans provided was jointly established by World Bank and IMF (4% with maturity up to 25 years, with 5 year grace period) (ADB, 2018; ADB 1976 Annual Report 31, 1977; Barnes, 1984:169). The NTF contributed 12.64% share of the total cost of the Abidjan-Accra Highway, 29.92% of the Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications project and 36.46% share of the Diama Dam project which enhanced

communication, regional transactional flows and inter-territorial links (The African Development Bank Annual Report (1977, 1978 and 1979).

Nigeria led Peace-making efforts between warring factions in Chad in 1978 and formed a Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) although the exercise was shortlived (Kessings Contemporary Archives, 1980, Rikye, 1984:161 in Olanisokin, 1997; Sansani, 2000:32 in Adoba, 2014). At domestic level, the government restructured the workforce which led to decline in bureaucracy in Nigeria. The oil windfall led to improved revenue and surplus on balance of payments and growing foreign reserves, stimulating higher consumption. Second Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture-FESTAC'77 organized had 17,000 artists from 57 countries from Africa, Caribbean and Pacific who met to re-enact their cultures in Nigeria (Kuna, 2012:48; Monroe, 1977:34). However, due to the Energy Crisis 1979 (Macalister, 2011) which affected oil revenues, the economy sharply contrasted and performed badly. The government turned to external borrowing. Foreign debts increased, currency was overvalued and investment low due to monetary control and indigenization program. Nigeria's GDP dropped from \$119bn in 1977 to 112bn in 1978 (Fuady, 2015:1354).

3.2 Third Period-1979 - 1984 Second Republic - Democratic Government

The third period and second republic cover one administration. It was Nigeria's second democratic experience. Nigeria relied solely on oil as major revenue source which accounted for 92 percent of her foreign earnings by 1983 (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28). Progress was also marred by oil shocks and debts crisis. Agriculture which brought in 75% of revenue in the 1960s contributed only 7.5% of revenue by 1979-1980. Between 1979 and 1985, oil earnings stood at \$104.06 billion, making Nigeria a wealthy nation (Alkali, 1997:65-66; Ahmed, 1990; Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28; Ojeh, 2014).

3.2.1 The Administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari

October 1st 1989 - December 31st 1984

In his first address at the Joint Session of National Assembly 1980, Shagari asserted:

"Africa remains the cornerstone of the Nigeria's foreign policy. My administration is committed to the causes of that total liberation of Africa as the absolution of racism in all its ramifications. We shall neither relax nor relent until all Africans and black men are free"(Effiong, 2012:40).

Shagari's government foreign policy thrust was non-radical. The Bakassi conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over land and maritime boundary, including the Bakassi Peninsula first broke out in 1981. Public opinion expected a military approach but Shagari adopted a

diplomatic option and peaceful resolution with reparation to bereaved persons (Baye, 2010; Effiong, 2012; Eshiet, 2008). Shagari's government provided \$5 million for Zimbabwe's independence, regarding Mugabe's victory during the elections in 1982 as victory for the Third World. Nigeria again joined the OAU Peacekeeping Force in the Chad conflict (Operation Harmony 11). For a number of reasons-logistics, poor communication strategy, vast Chadian terrain, the peace support operation failed. Nigeria made efforts to cushion the impact of the logistics gap and wrote off about eighty-two (\$82) billion dollars of the OAU debt (Akinwunmi, 2000:45; Adebayo, 1984:100-101 in Olonisakin, 1997; Kuna, 2012; Sansani, 2000:32 in Adoba, 2014).

Nigeria's Vice-President, Alex Ekwueme reiterated Nigeria's displeasure at Britain for its continued sports link with South Africa, in repudiation of *the Gleneagles Agreement* in his address at the Main Plenary Session at Anti-Apartheid Conference in London and at the United Nations/Organization of African Unity Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa in Paris, May 20, 1981 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1982; Tambo, 1981). Nigeria also led the Lancaster House negotiations on Zimbabwe's transitional process (Ogwu in Ojeh, 2014:109-110).

Expulsion Order issued in January 17, 1983 for illegal immigrants in Nigeria affected about 2 million people, mostly Ghanaians. This led to widespread condemnation from within and outside Africa, including the UK House of Commons and Pope John Paul II, the Ghanaian president, Lt. Jerry Rawlings and other ECOWAS Member States. Mathieu Kerekou, President of Benin Republic and ECOWAS Chair was delegated to discuss the impact of the expulsion order on ECOWAS with Nigerian government which yielded little result. Nigeria financially compensated the affected ECOWAS States and sent delegations to many African countries to explain her actions (Aluko, 1990:17 in Effiong, 2012:41).

The External Affairs Minister was not a member of the ruling party or the inner decision making caucus. The Ministry could therefore not act as an authoritative point for external relations. Propelled by increased oil revenue, non-career personnel were recruited into Foreign Service and appointed ambassadors on the basis of political constituencies and party affiliations. It led to over-expenditure on personnel and created friction in terms of postings and promotions (Anifowoshe and Emenyo, 1999). Competition and rivalry among parties led to economic mismanagement. A sudden fall in global oil prices left Nigeria in severe economic crisis. Failure to diversify the economy led to worsening balance of payment, inflation, rising unemployment, mounting external liabilities and looming food crisis and external borrowing which accumulated from multilateral loans from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-IBRD, Suppliers' Credit and Contractor Finance, etc. (Olukoshi, 1990:39-52 in Effiong, 2012:42; Enwere, 1990:86-89).

The political system fared badly (Diamond, 1985) and by this time

“the steam had gone out of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The momentum and zeal which had characterized Nigeria’s foreign policy in the previous five years was replaced with a lack of forthrightness and excessive caution in approaching issues. The regime lacked definite focus and fundamental framework, lapsed into unenthusiastic conceptualization and incoherent policy vacuum. The innovativeness and assertiveness of the last two regimes was lost. Shagari’s foreign policy became a flash-back to the conservatism and legalism of the Balewa’s era, such that while lots of noises were made for good measure, the reality was one of incompetence and impotence borne out of indifference, confusion and political foot-dragging” Egbo (2003:78, also cited in Ezirin, 2011:5)

According to Ihonvbere (1996:196), the three years of democracy bled Nigeria dry, mismanaged oil rent doubled the foreign debt and destabilised production and manufacturing base. At this point, the aggregate index for manufacturing sector fell by 20.7% in 1983 while employment in construction fell by more than 62% between 1980 and 1983 (Forrest, 1986:18). After the first term, the identified lapses and corruption led to another military takeover in December 31st 1983. This marked the end of Second Republic, the second democratic experience and the beginning of the second phase of military rule in Nigeria.

3.3 Fourth Period - 1983-1999

The fourth period starts from 1984 to 1999, covering three Military Regimes, 2 successful and 3 aborted coups. Nigeria was involved in peace support operations in Bosnia Herzegovina-UNIPROFOR-1992, Iran-Iraq-UNIMOG-1988-1991, Kuwait, Western Sahara-MINURSO-1991, Mozambique-ONUMOZ-1992, Rwanda-UNAMIR-1992-1993, Somalia-UNOSOM-1992-1993, and Cambodia-UNTAC-1992-1993. Nigerian troops served as military observers during GAZA Strip-UNASO 1994 and Israel UNTSO 1995 (Dumbuya, 2015; Ofoegbu, 1990:213)

3.3.1 The Administration of Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon

December 31st 1984 - August 27th 1985

The Buhari/Idiagbon administration suspended the 1979 Constitution and ruled by Decrees. Because of their penchant to command and control, the foreign policy thrust was “*concentric circle of interests.*” “... *at the epicentre of these circles are the national economic and security interests of Nigeria which are inextricably tied up with the security, stability and economic/social well-being of our immediate neighbours, ... whom we share identical goals of regional stability and peace*” (Ibrahim Gambari, 1989:3, 21).

The foreign policy terrain was monopolised by elite class and members of the Supreme Military Council, the highest decision-making body. The Ministry and Minister of External Affairs were instruments for implementation. Nigerian government under Buhari replaced the combative South African policy with diplomacy and hosted a Conference on the Legal Status

of Apartheid Regime in South Africa to chart a way for the recognition of apartheid (Gambari, 1984; Garba, 1984 IN Ojeh, 2014). The economic situation had created fewer jobs and there were increased smuggling activities. The Maitatsine Islamic extremism resurged and many of its participants were foreign residents, especially illegal immigrants who identified with the cause. Thus an estimated 700,000 were ordered in April 15th 1985 to leave Nigeria by May 10th, 1985, despite signing of the Quadripartite Agreements between Benin, Ghana and Togo. The government closed the borders and stationed military contingents along the borders with Chad and Cameroon.

The government declared three Nigerian politicians who took refuge in England, including Umaru Dikko, the Transport/Aviation Minister wanted. Umaru Dikko was kidnapped from his Bays Water home in London 1984 and was found unconscious in a crate labelled “Diplomatic Bag” at Stansted Airport in Essex, London. The UK government reacted by impounding the Nigeria Airways Boeing Cargo Plane that was billed to load the crate, detained the aircrew, including Nigerian officials and the two Israelis that were part of the arrangement. Two diplomats, the Counsellor, Peter Oyedele and Edet Okon were asked to leave Britain. Nigerian government retaliated by asking two British Diplomats, John Harrison, the Head of Consul and Steward Evans (Attache) to leave Nigeria and recalled Nigerian High Commissioner, Major General Hananiyya for consultation. Nigeria requested Britain to do same with Sir Hamilton Whyte, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria. A British Caledonian Jet enroute London with 221 passengers and 22 crew was also detained by Nigerian government for fifteen hours. However, the passengers were treated as “Guests of Nigerian Government” with utmost courtesy (Effiong; 2012, 42-43; Fawole, 2003:18-19; Mimiko and Mbada, 2014).

The inherited weak economy pushed the country to adjust its economic and political relationships with major powers and negotiate with the IMF and international creditors (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016). The government opted for stringent “belt-tightening” measures and state regulation as against free markets and refused to devalue the naira, adopt trade liberalization and privatization or remove subsidies on petroleum which was a precondition for a loan from the IMF. The government cut-down workers and devoted 44 percent of export revenues to debt servicing. Shortage of consumer goods led to adoption of “Counter-Trade” using commodities as medium of exchange with Brazil amounting to 40% of 2.5 billion. This was hindered by the West and financial institutions (Gambari, 1984:149). Nigeria also requested a loan from the Saudi Arabian government which was not secured due to same pressure. The government was therefore forced to maintain the pre-existing import level against the background of falling oil prices (Dauda, 2006:60).

Nigeria signed the Cultural and Educational Cooperation and Credit Line Agreements with Bulgarian and reciprocal visits by the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Grisha Filipov to Nigeria and General Idiagbon Soviet Union took place. Idiagbon, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Military Council was a strict, unyielding and disciplined general, solidly in charge of most foreign policy issues like the expulsion order and border closure. Nigeria's introduction of Death Penalty and execution of those found guilty under the Decrees did not align with emerging liberal democratic values. At the international level, the policies led to strained relationships between Nigeria and the Paris Club, London Clubs, Bretton Woods Institutions (West Africa, February 27, 1984(472), February 4, 1985 (237) in Inamete, 1990).

Conversely, Nigeria was at the forefront of the negotiations for the withdrawal of French and Libyan troops and provided the Kano Airport as base for evacuation (Agbu, 2015; Adesoji, 2011; Ezirin, 2011; Isichei, 1987). Nigeria gave legitimacy to the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on November 11th, 1984, the eve of 20th OAU Summit to prevent Morocco from taking ownership of the territory which it occupied since Spanish exit. Morocco left the meeting and organization in protest (Agbu, 2015; Effiong, 2012). The military regime was toppled by another military officer, General Babangida.

3.3.2 The Government of General Ibrahim Gbadamosi Babangida

August 25th, 1987 - 1993

General Babangida expounded that:

“Nigerian foreign policy in the last 20 months has been characterised by inconsistency and incoherence. It lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood on matters of international concern to enable other countries relate to us with seriousness. Our role as Africa's spokesman has diminished because we have been unable to maintain the respect of African countries. The ousted military government conducted our external relations by policy of retaliation, reaction. More so, vindictive consideration must not be the basis of our diplomacy.

Africa's problem and their solutions should constitute the premise of our foreign policy. The realisation of the Organization of African Unity of the Lagos Plan of Action for self-sufficiency and constructive cooperation in Africa shall be our primary pursuit. The Economic Community of West African States must be reborn with the view to achieving the objective of regional integration. The problems of drought-stricken areas of Africa shall be given more attention and sympathy, our best efforts will be made to assist in their rehabilitation within the limits of our resources ...we hereby make a renewed request to the non-aligned movement to regroup and re-immigrate its determination to restructure the global economic system” (Ibrahim Babangida, 1985, in Effiong, 2014:44; Siollun, 2013).

The government's repair efforts led to lifting of embargo on loans, grant-in-aid and other programmable funds by Paris and London Clubs (Sesay and Ukeje, 1997). The government opened up the IMF loan issue to national debate, including how to chart a new way for Nigeria's foreign policy. Foreign policy priority issues were abolition of apartheid in South

Africa and enhancement of Nigeria's relations with major industrialised countries to increase foreign investments and capital flow (Ojeh, 2014). Many States became independent but lacked skilled workers and professionals in specialized fields. The Minister of External Affairs, Professor Akinyemi introduced the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS) as Nigeria's foreign policy tool.

TAC was designed like the American Peace Corps to fill certain gaps in manpower needs of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Those sent under the scheme, on basis of assessed needs are young professionals, Doctors, Engineers, Lawyers, Pharmacists, Nurses, Medical Lab Technologists, Radiology, Accountants, Insurance Experts, Sports, Lecturing, Coaching, Artisans for a period of two years. Professor Omoriege, President of Nigerians in Diaspora-Namibian chapter and Senior Lecturer-University of Namibia, while addressing Nigeria's 50th Anniversary festival in Windhoek noted that by 2010, more than 30 recipient countries have benefitted and over 2000 volunteers have participated in the scheme (Jinadu, 2016; Salami, 2012; Umoru, 2010).

The administration also abrogated many Decrees, released detainees and lifted the ban on political debates. It publicly rejected the IMF loan in line with public opinion but implemented the IMF conditionalities, adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Its reflection in the 1986 Federal Budget led to decline in naira exchange rate and reduced social services. The removal of petroleum subsidy brought indescribable hardship on Nigerians and deepened her dependence on international capital. As a result, Nigeria's conduct and initiatives in respect to her foreign policy was confined to this dependence (Enwere, 1990: 89). While it restored relationship with Israel severed in 1973 (Ambe-Uva and Adegboyega, 2007). Nigeria remained silent on US bomb attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986.

Professor Akinyemi embarked on economic shuttles to sell the SAP to key Western stakeholders with the conviction that the goodwill of the West in matters like debt re-scheduling and foreign investment will benefit the SAP. In 1988, the government of Ibrahim Babangida adopted the Economic Diplomacy officially as her foreign policy thrust. It incorporated the rescheduling of external debt burden, encouragement of financial flows and foreign investment into the policy agenda (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:29 Ogwu and Olukoshi, 1991). General Ike Nwachukwu, who replaced Professor Akinyemi as the External Affairs Minister emphasised on employing Nigeria's foreign policy instruments to advance the course of economy recovery (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016; Nwachukwu, 1988).

Adoption of economic diplomacy reflected Nigeria's changing national circumstances and adaptation to realities of rapidly changing international environment to foster great inflow of foreign capital and expand foreign trade (Okolie, 2010:137). The debts crisis demanded new

tactics and strategies in foreign policy and abolition of absolutist sovereignty in order to link the domestic with external (Alao, 2011; Ayam, 2004; Dokubo, 2010). It required a foreign policy that leads to where there was technical assistance and nearness to global powers that have historically shaped global diplomacy and to build alliances with emerging ones (Adeniji in Alao, 2011:6). There was therefore a paradigm shift from the regional, continental, Afro-centric to a globalized policy (Akintenriwa, 2004; Adeniji, 2003, cited in Fayomi, 2015:187). The government sign bilateral agreements, encouraged joint ventures and partnerships with interested investors, remove trade restrictions and introduce measures that promoted such investments, e.g. time-bound tax holiday and removal of tariff on industrial raw materials and equipment (Aligbe, 1988:8 in Ojie, 2014; Mbakwe and Chukwu; Nwachukwu, 1992).

The government was successful in getting Nigerians into two key positions in international organizations. Chief Emeka Anyaoku became the third Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations from 1990-2000 and Major-General Joseph Garba (Rtd.) became the President of the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1989 (Mbakwe and Chukwu). Former President Olusegun Obasanjo was selected among the three International Eminent Personalities to arbitrate in the South African political debacle by the Commonwealth (Ezirin, 2011) and Nigeria also nominated Obasanjo for the UN Scribe position which Koffi Annan eventually won.

In 1986, 32 of 59 Commonwealth countries in Africa, Asia, and Caribbean joined Nigeria to boycott the XIII Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh due to British government attitude towards South Africa. The Game was referred to as the “Boycott Games” with only 26 nations, 1,662 athletes and 461 officials in attendance (Newsquest, 2014). Prior to emergence as OAU Chairman in 1991 (Abegunrin, 2003; Effiong, 2012), Nigeria provided \$20 million to South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 1989 election, played crucial roles in securing Namibia’s independence and sustained Angola during the war to consolidate her independence (Anifowoshe and Emenuo, 1999 in Mimiko and Mbada, 2014:46).

The emergence of FW De Klerk as President ushered in a new environment in South Africa which led to improved relations with many countries, including Nigeria (Abegunrin, 2003; Effiong, 2012). Nigeria’s Vice President Justus Aikhomu insisted on scrapping of apartheid and release of prisoners (Agbebaku, 1991:153; Ojeh, 2014:98). Nigeria was among the first few countries Nelson Mandela visited after release in February 12th, 1990 (Abegunrin, 2009) due to Nigeria’s contribution to the struggle. Nigeria thereafter relaxed her position and began to parley with South Africa and FW de Klerk visited Nigeria in April 1992. A Nigerian educational team also visited South Africa in September and in October 1992; both countries’ football teams played a friendly football match in Lagos. Thus, Nigeria’s

engagement with the new government of De Klerk in South Africa was instrumental in the further relax of apartheid system (Ojeh, 2014; Abegunrin, 2009).

At regional level, the several warring factions with changing boundaries in the Liberian War, 1989 led to largescale massacre with disregard for traditional rules of war. Cote D'Ivoire opposed the idea of intervention when it was tabled at the United Nations Security Council Meeting in 1990. The US position that the problem should be solved by Africans was shared by the Council members (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994; Wippman, 1993). However, United States and Nigeria endeavoured to support Samuel Doe's government with weapons and military advice in the early days of the war. Upon realisation that it was a well-planned military rebellion, adding to delay in international response, the Organization of African Unity called on Nigeria to take the lead. A Standing Mediation Committee-SMC consisting of Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Togo and Nigeria was quickly put in place. The ECOWAS Chair, Ibrahim Babangida, Nigerian Head of State called an emergency meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the SMC to draw modalities for a cease-fire and deployment of peace force.

The ECOWAS Ceasefire (Peace) Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, consisting of 3000 troops from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra-Leone and Nigeria was established. Nigeria contributed 1,375 of the force while a Ghanaian served as first ECOMOG Force Commander. The many warring factions with differing needs and expression made it difficult for ECOMOG to operate. ECOMOG's mandate changed to enforcement leading to first cease-fire in November 1990 and later the Cotonou Accord, allowing the UN Observer Mission in Liberia - UNOMIL to work with ECOMOG. The alternating between Peacekeeping and enforcement drained ECOWAS and militarily weakened the force (Adibe, 2002; Khobe, 2000; Kuna, 2012; Olanisokin, 1994; Yoroms, 1993 in Odibe, 2002).

The specialization of the ECOMOG troops was challenging due to difference in training and doctrines for each contingent. Ghanaian contingent were good at peacekeeping because Jerry Rawlings engaged them in the field to keep them away from politics during his presidency. Nigerian contingent is crack force for peace enforcement or outright battle due to Nigerian-Biafran war experience. The Sierra-Leonean and Guinean contingent blend the two extremes. For the Gambians who were trained by Nigeria, it was their first external operation. Nigerian government established an Endowment Fund to support the operation which received no contributions. When other contingents threatened to withdraw due to inadequate resources to shoulder such responsibility, Nigeria provided substantial support (Azgaku, 2015).

Nigeria reviewed the ECOWAS annual dues from 32.5% to 40 % (Ajayi, 2005:53) provided largest number of vehicles and equipment and field engineering services required for all

contingents to ECOMOG. Nigerian contingent's workshop repaired and maintained the vehicles and equipment of other contingents except Ghana until the United States came to aid of the expanded ECOMOG Force (Adebayo, 2004:293). Two field hospitals established by Nigeria at the ECOMOG base served as sanctuaries for injured soldiers and civilians before Liberia became accessible to International Relief Organizations. Nigerian Airforce provided Close Air Support (CAS) to ECOMOG ground forces while Nigerian-led Naval Task Force vessels took relief materials to berths at seaports and discharge canoes which served lives of Liberians and later Sierra Leoneans (Sule, 2013).

While Babangida's government was providing resources for support to African development, it did not match visibility at international scene with commensurate returns that benefit domestic socio-economic development. Nigerians were groaning under the IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (Atte, 1990:22-27). Although Nigerian movie industry-NOLLYWOOD rose at this period (William, 2017), Nigerians agitated for a return to democracy and shifts in election timetable led to nationwide protests which the government responded with clamp-down and repression. Babangida's administration repealed the Decrees that supported the political program, e.g. Decree *13-Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provision* and *52-Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme)* which automatically suspended the national electoral body and cancelled the elections held in June 12th 1993 (Okpokpo, 2000; Sesay and Ukeje, 1997). Ernest Shonekan was appointed to head an Interim National Government. Babangida retired from the Army in August 1993 (Ajayi, 2005). Three months (82 days) later, Shonekan was relieved of his duties by General Sani Abacha.

3.3.3 The Government of General Sani Abacha

November 17th 1993 - June 8th 1998

In his maiden address, General Abacha advised the international community to suspend judgement and give Nigeria the break to grapple with her task of nation building, reconciliation and repairs. He added that the government was a child of necessity and needed time to resolve the problems internally (Effiong, 2012:45).

During Abacha's tenure, the restive issue in Niger Delta arose due to oil exploitation and environment degradation; revenues which accrued only to the Federal Government with little benefit to oil-producing communities. Ogoniland is among these many communities that lacked basic facilities. The Ogoni people designed a Bill of Rights to address the injustices which the government failed to honour. The Ogonis demanded royalties from the oil Multinational Companies and embarked on protest activities that disrupted the operations of the Multinationals. Many oil Multinational Host Communities joined in this agitations. The

dishonesty on the part of government and the Multinationals resulted in chaos. The case of Ogoni involved killings which the government took steps to address through military tribunal. Many were convicted and sentenced to prison but nine Ogoni indigenes, including Ken Saro Wiwa, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People-MOSOP spokesman were sentenced to death (Agbonifo, 2009; Ijomah, 2000; Imam, 1999).

In September 1995, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative arrived in Nigeria on a fact-finding mission, following series of protests and reports of human rights abuses (Akinrinade, 1997; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 1995). Sani Abacha executed Kenule Saro Wiwa and 8 other Ogonis (Abiodun, 1996; Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015; Ikenga-Metuh, 2001:14-15; Isumonah, 2015) on November 10th, the eve of the 29th Commonwealth Conference in New Zealand, despite the huge outcries from the international community. A shaken Nelson Mandela, South Africa's President described Sani Abacha as barbaric, corrupt, irresponsible and arrogant leader who lacks legitimacy at home. Abacha replied that Mandela was out of touch with reality because of his prolonged years in jail. Nelson Mandela thus led the call for sanction against Nigeria, just as Nigeria led against apartheid South Africa (Abiodun, 1996:69; Ajayi, 2005).

The World Bank was considering the financial details of Liquefied Natural Gas project; the United States was exploring the possibilities of lifting previously-imposed restrictions on Nigerian airports; a delegation of the FIFA led by FIFA President, Joao Havelange was in Nigeria to inspect sporting facilities (Sesay and Ukeje, 1997) in the light of the 1995 edition of the World Youth Soccer Championship within this period. Nigeria was stripped of her right to host (Effiong, 2012). The Ogonis barred Royal Dutch Shell from operating in Ogoniland (Edighin nd Ootoghile, N.D.; Ikenga-Metuh, 2001:14; Ugwu and Moko, 2014:151).

More than 25 countries, including allies like USA, Canada, Germany, Britain, all EU ambassadors, South Africa, and Latin America, etc. withdrew their diplomatic representations (Akintola, 2007). Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth on November 11, 1995 and given a two-year deadline to democratize and improve human rights records or stand to be expelled while the Commonwealth Action Group-CMAG recommended 9 non-economic sanctions (Sesay and Ukeje, 1997).

The Canadian delegation was denied visas for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers who were to accompany the Canadian delegation during the Commonwealth Team visit to Nigeria. The Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister, Tom Ikimi accused Canada of encouraging the overthrow of government by funding dissents group and trying to bring armed soldiers into Nigeria under guise of diplomats. Canada drop from the mission (Potter, 1997). Nigeria closed her embassy in Ottawa and requested Canadian workers to leave Nigeria. Nigeria

turn to Asia and South-South Cooperation like the D-8 comprising of Libya, India, Iraq, Sudan, North Korea, Turkey and Syria. This drew criticism as the countries were mostly Islamic bodies while Nigeria is a secular State. The visit of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who was facing UN sanctions further angered the international community as it defied the UNSC Resolution. These further alienated Nigeria from dominant powers and impacted negatively on the foreign policy objectives (Ashaver, 2014; Abiodun, 1996; Effiong, 2012).

Internally, external debt and inflation increased (Ezirin, 2011) while Moshood Abiola, the acclaimed winner of June 12 1993 election was detained. The developments sparked protests and series of strikes and rallies by the masses led by organized labour unions and civil society groups (Nigeria Overview, 2017) which crippled the economy. Newspaper houses were proscribed, many activists, journalists, students and Union leaders, including Professor Wole Soyinka were hounded into self-exile while many including Gani Fawehinmi, Chima Ubani, Fela Anikulapo Kuti, Beko Ransome Kuti, Femi Falana, Shehu Sani, including student and university union activists were detained. Wife of Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the elections, Kudirat Abiola, was assassinated, along with Pa Alfred Rewane, the financier of the coalitions (Fawole, 2003; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017).

The Abacha administration constituted a 50-member committee from every interest group, traditional rulers leaving out career diplomats, intellectuals and experts of international relations and foreign policy to direct him on his governance style. The Committee came up with recommendations in two days to insist on the return to democracy and release of prisoners. The government also set up a 13-man National Constitutional Conference Commission to organize a Constitutional Conference. In June 1995, the Conference produced a Draft Constitution which also recommended a Transitional Implementation Committee to monitor the transition to democracy among others (Ijomah, 2000).

The coups of 1995 indicted former military Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo, his deputy, retired General Shehu Yar'Adua, along with 38 others who were sentenced by the Military Tribunals to varying jail terms while 13 were sentenced to death. The reported coups of 1997 indicted service Chiefs with other senior military officers and civilians. Some of the accused were executed, some prematurely retired from service while the international community's plea for clemency led to commuting of some sentences to life imprisonments. The UN Fact-Finding Mission's visit and election monitoring request yielded little results as every aspirant was either detained or cowed to relent for Abacha's emergence as the only democratic candidate for the five registered political parties (Beran, 1997; Effiong, 2012; Ijomah, 2000; Ikenga-Metuh, 2001).

On the regional level, General Abacha took measures to sustain ECOMOG operation until election in which Charles Taylor emerged the winner in Liberia. ECOMOG helped to train and equip Sierra Leonean army to fight the Revolutionary United Front-RUF. Nigerian-led ECOMOG troop stationed in Liberia reversed the coup staged by Major Jonny Koroma and reinstated Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone, March 10th. General Maxwell Khobe, a Nigerian was appointed to head the Sierra Leonean army (Effiong, 2012; Dumbuya, 2015:83). It is established that Nigeria provided 90% of funds in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adebayo, 2004:293; Ajayi, 2004b:207; Anifowoshe and Emenyo, 1999). Except the first ECOMOG Force Commander, Lt. General A. Quainoo, a Ghanaian; the other ten military commanders were Nigerian officers (Olofinmuagun, 2003:43). Tempo (1995, in Effiong, 2012) described Nigeria as importing what it has in excess and exporting what it lacks in his success in Sierra Leone. General Abacha died in June 8 1998 (Beran, 1997; Ijomah, 2000; Ikenga-Metuh, 2001).

3.3.4 The Administration of Abdulsalami Abubakar

June 8th 1998- May 29th 1999

General Abdulsalami Abubakar became Head of State and with Ignatius Olisaemeka, the Foreign Affairs Minister embarked on diplomatic shuttles to major world powers to convince them of the sincerity of the government. His foreign policy therefore bordered on rejuvenation and redeeming Nigeria's image, especially the human rights aspect (Akintola, 2007:463; Effiong, 2012; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). General Abubakar reversed the harsh decrees, released political prisoners and detainees including General Obasanjo and lured Nigerians, Chief Anthony Enahoro exiled in Canada, Professors Wole Soyinka and Chinua Achebe, etc. in self-exile back home.

On regional affairs, Abubakar adopted a hybrid system of military presence and a democratic setting and allowed the domestic environment to guide his foreign policy approach. Through his engagement with West African leaders, Abubakar endeavoured to channel resources for maintenance of peace and stability in the region and through this approach salvage Nigeria's image and charted a path towards democracy and national reconciliation. The government also re-establish links with traditional Western nations who agreed to resume diplomatic relations and lift sanctions (Ashaver, 2014; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2003:383).

At the domestic level, critical stakeholders, including the UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan were invited to dialogue with Moshood Abiola to renounce his mandate in view of the events over the years which he declined. Abiola died of cardiac arrest during the visit of American delegation in July 19th 1998 (Effiong, 2012). General Abubakar redesigned a timetable for a

democratically elected government and set up a Committee to review the Draft Constitution initiated by Sani Abacha. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, the operational constitution was produced (Boma et.al, 2015; Ijomah, 2000; Welsh, 1998).

In the Constitution, Nigeria's mandate for intervention in foreign conflict must be limited to peacekeeping operations. Thus, General Abubakar attempted to withdraw Nigeria from the intervention in Sierra Leone since it was launched by his predecessor prior to adoption of the Constitution. The conflict was also costly financially and Nigeria was losing men. The international community was alarmed given its potential threat to sub-regional security and subsequently committed more funds and logistics to ECOMOG (Berman and Sams, 2000:124-126). In May 29th, 1999, retired General Obasanjo, who was imprisoned by the Abacha government, became the first President of the Fourth Republic. This 'Dark Days of Military Dictatorship' ended in Nigerian history (Badmus and Ogunmola, 2003; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2006).

3.4 The Fifth Period 1999 Democratic System - "Fourth Republic"

3.4.0 The period covers four presidents and for the first time, a change of power from the ruling party to the opposition.

3.4.1 Retired General Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo

May 29th 1999 - May 29th 2007

Obasanjo's antecedents as military Head of State in 1979 earned him respect at international arena (Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). General Obasanjo in his inaugural speech, he stated that:

"Nigeria once a well-respected and key player on the international community became a pariah nation. We shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly relations with all nations and will continue to play a constructive role in the UN, OAU and other international bodies. We shall honour existing agreements between Nigeria and other countries. It is our firm resolve to restock Nigeria fully to the prestigious position of eminence in the comity of nations" (Obasanjo, Inaugural Speech 1999).

Olusegun Obasanjo prioritized a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone. In July 7th, 1999, ECOWAS leaders, UN officials and other critical stakeholders met with the warring factions in Togo to sign the Lome Peace Accord which formed the basis for peace in Sierra Leone. When Nigeria pulled out, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL's advance elements were Nigerian contingents. Already, the Chief of Defense Staff in Sierra Leone, Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe was a Nigerian. UN Secretary General also appointed a

Nigerian diplomat, Olu Adeniji as Special Representative and UNAMSIL Head of Mission (Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017:67).

The government adopted economic liberalization and shuttle diplomacy as his administration's foreign policy thrust. Obasanjo embarked on extensive shuttle diplomacy, using his personality and moral stature to promote Nigeria's image, multilateral and bilateral relations and canvass for investment and re-integration of Nigeria into the world systems (Ashaver, 2014; Folarin, 2013). Obasanjo with his Foreign Affairs Minister, Sule Lamido travelled extensively, calling for foreign investments, debt forgiveness and return of stolen monies. His domestic policy was a springboard for foreign policy (Effiong, 2012; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017).

Nigeria's Finance Minister, a World Bank executive, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala used her good office with assistance from the US Treasury Department to lobby the Paris Club to cancel and reschedule Nigeria's debt. Eighteen (\$18) billion (60%) of about twenty-seven (\$27.008) billion external debt was written-off by the Paris Club (Chiejina, 2005:1, also cited in Ajayi, 2005:55; Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013:42-43; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). Cooperation and bilateral relationships were signed and renewed with United States in 2000. Military cooperation, *Military Professional Resources Initiative (MPRI)* empowered the United States to send military support and assist Nigeria to procure military aid. Nigerian soldiers also went on refresher programs for enhanced peacekeeping assignments (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013; Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, 2018; International Crisis Group, 2016:4).

Nigeria-China relations deepened during the Obasanjo administrations. In 2001, both states signed an agreement to establish Nigeria Trade Office in China and China Investment Development and Trade Promotion in Nigeria (Gregory, 2009). The reciprocity in visits by the President of Nigeria and China, including China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabo provided room for strengthened relationships and an Intergovernmental Nigeria-China Investment Forum was established in 2006 (Obioma, 2013 in Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Nigerian relationship with Israel was strengthened with the exchange of technical and professional knowledge between both countries (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013).

Obasanjo administration's National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), designed to overhaul the economy, boost productivity and roll back poverty provided an enabling environment to implement her economic diplomacy, revamp the national economy and attract investment. The banking, financial and capital market were restructured for investors. The Ports Act of 1959 and 1999 were amended to enhance proficiency at the ports (Muhammad-Zaki, 2011; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). Foreign policy therefore focused on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with establishment of Nigerian

Investment Promotion Commission-NIPC. Nigerians in Diaspora were also encouraged to participate in national development. Nigeria once again, assumed leadership of organizations like ECOWAS, African Union, G-77 and gained more international friends (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013; Ajayi, 2005).

Nigeria hosted International Summits-ECOWAS, Commonwealth Heads of States and Governments-CHOGM-2004, New Partnership for African Development-2005, the Junior FIFA World Cup-1999 and All African Games-2004, and the president chaired UNESCO events. There was increased Development Financial Flows and Foreign Investments (Boma et.al, 2015; Ikuomola, 2005:1, in Ajayi, 2005:55). It brought psychological relief to critical stakeholders, including Nigeria citizens as foreign investors became regular visitors in Nigeria and jobs were created. The impact of foreign interactions sank in (Ezirin, 2011).

As a follow up to Nigerian Trust Fund of 1976, Nigerian government established Nigerian Technical Cooperation Fund (NTCF). The Fund, like the Nigerian Trust Fund is domiciled in the African Development Bank (AFDB) and is jointly managed by the Bank and Nigeria's Directorate of Technical Cooperation (DTCA). It serves as a grant facility for regional projects or programs that promote technological and socio-economic development, regional cooperation and integration. The Fund's initial \$25 million grew to \$28.9million; \$24,7million has been committed to 93 projects and activities across Africa (AFDB, 2013; African Development Bank Group, 2017; Directorate for Technical Cooperation Aids, 2018).

When conflict broke out in Cote d'Ivoire in 2001, Nigeria played active role in establishing the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) and the signing of various ceasefire and peace agreements by warring factions. Obasanjo as AU Chair and later as a member of the AU-mandated International Working Group (IWG) remained at the forefront to aid implementation of peace agreements (Badmus, 2015; Ogunmola, 2013). On the Second Civil War in Liberia (1999-2003), Obasanjo worked in concert with ECOWAS, African Union and the United Nations. By August 2003, Charles Taylor relinquished power in Liberia, accepted a bargain that he would not be prosecuted with the International Contact Group comprising British, US, French and took asylum in Nigeria (Aremu, 2015; Reno, 2007:79). Nigeria took responsibilities in setting up ECOWAS Mission in Liberia-ECOMIL instantly with backing of the US and UN. ECOMIL, commanded by a Nigerian, General Festus Okoye preceded UNMIL-United Nations Mission in Liberia (Badmus, 2015; Cook, 2005; Ross, 2005 in Ogumola and Badmus, 2017).

When the Sudanese conflict broke out in February 2003, Nigeria as AU Chair became a major force in finding solution. Supported by the Chadian president, Idris Derby, negotiation for peace agreements led to the Inter-Sudanese Ceasefire Agreement on Darfur Conflict

(HCA) and adoption of Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance for Darfur. On many occasions, Obasanjo personally went to Sudan to dialogue with the factions and hosted a peace talks in Abuja-Nigeria. Nigeria was also the main troops contributing country (TCC) to the AU-mandated African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor compliance with the HCA which enabled the environment for humanitarian assistance (Badmus 2015). Nigeria was the leading TCC to the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which succeeded AMIS in 2007 and provided substantial financial and humanitarian support. A Nigerian, General Martin-Luther Agwai headed the Mission (Badmus, 2015; Oche in Miracle, N.D.).

When the International Court of Justice granted ownership of most of the disputed Bakassi Peninsula and maritime rights to Cameroon, Obasanjo abided by the judgement and commenced formal handing over in 2006 which lasted till August 14, 2008. Obasanjo government withdrew Nigerian soldiers stationed in the region since 1980s despite internal uproar, as Nigerians have been occupying the Peninsula since 1450 (Olukoya, 2012) and regarded it as home. When the Green Tree agreement signed by both presidents was breached by Cameroon, Nigerian government relocated Nigerians to prevent outbreak of conflict. Nigeria was given a 10-year period but refused to appeal the judgement as at 2012 (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2015; Falana, 2012; Eshiet, 2009; Ojeh, 2010; Schneider, 2015).

When Faure Eyadema made efforts to take over as president following Gnassingbe Eyadema, his father's death, Nigeria as Chair of AU insisted on the legitimacy of the Togo Constitution. A presidential election was held and Faure emerge the winner. Nigeria hosted the AU Meeting in Abuja, with Faure and opposition leader to consolidate fragile peace and promote reconciliation in Togo. In July 16, 2003, the President Fradique de Menzes of Sao Tome e Principe was in Nigeria for the 6th Reverend Leon Sullivan Summit when a coup ousted him. Obasanjo led the process along with other AU members and the international community to reverse the coup and accompanied the reinstated president to his country (Ashaver, 2014; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017; Porto, 2003:34-35, also cited in Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017:70).

With Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo reorganized the Organization of African Unity to promote Africa's development by addressing key socio-economic and political problems. NEPAD- New Partnership for African Development was rooted in Pan-Africanism ideals and set against the backdrop of globalisation and Millennium Development Goals, now Sustainable Development Goals. The leaders of Algeria-Abdulazeez Bouteflika, Senegal-Abdoulaye Wade, and Egypt-Hosni Mubarak were also part of this initiative in 2001. African Peer Review Mechanism-APRM, the instrument through which the governance component of NEPAD can be measured was also designed (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011; Ogunmola

and Badmus, 2017. Obasanjo chaired the NEPAD Implementation Committee of Heads of States and hosted the 2005 Summit in Abuja. Nigeria provided the human and material resources that were crucial in conceiving, implementing as well as promotion of the NEPAD. Aliyu and Sharkdam (2017) asserted that Nigeria's commitment to NEPAD was in alignment with her long-standing Afro-centric foreign policy.

Majority of the time, Obasanjo acted alone, bypassing the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Minister, including the National Parliament (Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017; Omojuwa and Hamman, (2009), except on matters pertaining to peace interventions which the Legislature was mandated to approve (Miracle, N.D.). The democratic spirit gave room for expressions and his administration was hampered by pockets of conflicts across the country, including Jos-Plateau conflict and Niger Delta youth restiveness which reduced oil production from 2.6 million barrels per day in 2005 to 1.3 million barrels per day in June 2009 (Obi, 2010:220). This also impacted on oil revenues, global and national energy security (Ibaba, 2011) Obasanjo's attempt to modify the Constitution to enable him run for a third term in office made him lose credibility (Ezirin, 2011). He also handpicked his successor, Musa Yar'Adua, who was sickly with a very low style.

3.4.2 The Administration of Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua

May 29th 2007 - June 2010

Yar'Adua's Seven-Point Agenda for socio-economic and political transformation did not accord Nigeria's foreign policy any significant priority. Neither was his approach able to actualize the Vision 20-20-20 for Nigeria to be among the 20 wealthiest nations by 2020 (Morgan, 2011; Nwakudu, n.d.; Nuhu-Koko, in Adoba, 2014). Yar'Adua administration adopted citizens' diplomacy as its foreign policy thrust. Many are of the belief that the policy thrust was vacuous, lethargic, and opaque, lacking theoretical coherence. Nigeria's voice was barely heard in major events. The country initiated nothing spectacular, apart from few bilateral agreements which were hardly followed up (Abba, 2009, in Ezirin, 2011; Ezirin, 2011; Nwakudu, N.D.).

Nigeria was conspicuously absent at global events that other governments prioritised and the president missed many opportunities to address the UN General Assembly. In his place, his Foreign Affairs Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, lacking finesse and diplomatic decorum represented him. On one occasion, Yar'adua decided to honour the Saudi Arabian King's invitation in place of the UN General Assembly (Ezirin, 2011). Yar'Adua displayed preference for economic relations with Russia in respect to the Gazprom project (Gazprom International;

2009) after expressing desire to partner with the United States on AFRICOM during his official visit to the United States of America in 2007. Apart from addressing South African Parliament in June 2008, Yar'Adua attended no further meetings. At a meeting by G-20 and other countries in Washington DC following the economic meltdown in 2008, Nigeria was conspicuously absent and received no invitation to the next G-20 Meeting (Nwakudu, N.D.).

The issue of the Niger Delta militancy was brought under control with the Presidential Amnesty Program. There was relative peace in the region and oil production was boosted to its maximum (Ajayi and Adesole, 2013). Beneficiaries of the program were rehabilitated and enrolled in various entrepreneurship programs (Ibaba, 2011). Although these were great feats, it was not enough to boost Nigeria's image at the international level. Onyejekwe (2009, in Ezirin, 2011) affirms that the little gains the country earned under Obasanjo was threatened by Yar'Adua's diplomatic indifference at a time the world was reinventing stereotypes against Nigerians. Yar'Adua's ill-health and evasive nature translated into a standstill and he failed to hand over to his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan or disclose his state of health. Musa Yar'Adua passed on the 5th of May 2010 and his Vice, Jonathan was sworn in to complete his tenure (Business Monitor International, 2010; Nossiter, 2010).

3.4.3 The Administration of Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan

May 6th 2009- May 29th 2015

Jonathan embarked on a number of diplomatic shuttles following Yar'Adua's demise to reaffirm Nigeria's commitment and position in the Comity of States. It was a hotly contested polity for Jonathan to seek election, after completing Yar'Adua's term. Jonathan reformed the electoral process and won one of the fairest elections in Nigeria in 2011. Coben in Campbell (2011) likens Jonathan to Harry Truman, who became the president of the United States when his predecessor died in a natural death. He was uncharismatic, obscure but performed well.

In the first 100 days of his election in 2011, Jonathan commissioned the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations to coordinate the reforming of Nigeria's foreign policy to be economic cooperation and investment-driven. He spent time with Nigerians in diaspora and planned for *Nigerians in Diaspora Commission* to take charge of Nigerians abroad as reservoirs and ensured effective use of their inputs in development agenda. The government's foreign policy focused on improved relationships with other military forces to build peace, improved bilateral and multilateral trade relations, cooperation and assistance in curbing health challenges as well as promotion of the welfare of Nigerians abroad to ensure they are treated with respect and dignity (Boma et. al., 2015).

Dora Akunyili, the Information Minister in Yar'Adua and Jonathan governments introduced the "Rebrand Nigeria" project to repair Nigeria's battered image which according to Akunyili, was important since Nigeria's development is tied to it. At this point, the Department of Homeland Security Special Screening of passengers on international flights to US targeted Nigerians, following Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's attempted bombing of a US-bound plane in 2009. Jonathan's meeting with the American President led to delist of Nigeria from the list (Aririesike, 2009 in Iyorza, 2014; Boma et.al, 2015; Obayiuwana, 2009; Stickings, 2010).

Jonathan signed the first Nigeria-United States Bi-National Commission, as a mechanism for sustained bilateral, high-level dialogue to improve diplomatic, economic and security cooperation. The domestic components covered good governance, transparency and anti-corruption, investments, etc. This fed into the government's foreign policy thrust, *the Transformation Agenda* (Alao, 2011; Gyong, 2012) designed to tackle the deplorable living conditions and attract investments to Nigeria. Jonathan opined that since the primary responsibility of government is to ensure peace, progress and economic development, foreign policy should be employed to support these initiatives and diversify the economy. Foreign policy was subsequently repositioned to support internal programs and reduce poverty (Ashiru in Ojeme, 2011).

Jonathan appointed experienced Nigerians into his cabinet. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former World Bank Managing Director was the Finance Minister. Okonjo-Iweala was the Finance Minister under the Obasanjo government of 1999-2007 and had resigned voluntarily when she was reassigned to Foreign Affairs Ministry. In Jonathan's administration, Okonjo-Iweala served as the Coordinating Minister of the Economy (Alinyeji, 2011). Olusegun Aganga took Trade and Investments while Oruma Otteh, a former Vice, African Development Bank headed Nigerian Stock Exchange. The former director of Nigerian Food Drugs Administration and Control, Dora Akunyili who recorded tremendous success in the fight against fake drugs (Land, 2008; Larkin, 2006; Lemonick and Gilbert, 2005) retained her position as the information Minister where she continued with the *Rebrand Nigeria Project*. Akinwunmi's success in the agricultural sector won him the Headship of African Development Bank and Noble Prize for Agriculture 2017.

Jonathan's administration also overhauled the Foreign Service and empowered the diplomatic missions to act as operators of foreign policy and look for opportunities and programs that will improve the situation in Nigeria. Jonathan's administration involved the Organized Private Sector: Nigerian Association of Chambers and Commerce, Industries Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA), Nigerian Association of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises-NASME, Manufacturers Associations of Nigeria (MAN), Nigerian Association of Small-Scale Industries (NASSI), etc. in trade and investment initiatives. The government also

mobilised Nigerians in Diaspora to support development and investment at home. He also held meeting with the about 4000 Nigerians working in the United Nations and sought their inputs in development affairs.

Jonathan's administration renewed bilateral relationships with many countries, including Czech Republic in 2011. The government relaxed visa rules and signed more Bi-National Commissions-with Canada, Germany, Australia to further improve economic ties and cooperation. Nigeria-China relationship was also boosted during his tenure as investment worth \$25 billion was agreed on and five bilateral agreements were signed (Ashiru in Ajaebili, 2011; Abati, 2012; Akinterinwa, 2014: 268-269; Boma et.al, 2015; Jayi and Ayotunde, 2016).

The administration adopted reciprocity in positive and negative form in her external relations to an extent. In countries where Nigerians were not subjected to abuse in visa applications, Nigeria provided same treatment. In places where visa applications by Nigerians were bound by restrictions, delays and maltreatment, Nigeria applied same approach in her dealings. When Muammar Gaddafi suggested that Nigeria should break up into Muslim north and Christian south, Jonathan recalled Nigerian ambassador in protest and emphasis on Nigeria's unity (Boma et al, 2015).

Nigeria as ECOWAS leader managed the ouster of Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire when he refused to relinquish power after losing election. Although the African Union opposed foreign interventions in Libya, in 2011, Nigeria along with Gabon and South Africa and other members of the Security Council voted in favour of the UNSC Resolution 1973 which was the legal platform for NATO intervention in Libya and the eventual oust of Muammar al-Ghaddafi. Again in August, Nigeria joined the Western powers to recognize the rebels in Libya, but was alone as the AU and South Africa disapproved. In December 2014, Nigeria under Jonathan also voted on the Palestinian statehood. The vote created an imbalance in votes and shows to an extent that Nigeria was giving diplomatic room to Western nations (Akomolafe, 2015).

The last few months of Jonathan's government was marred by deadly attacks and bombings by boko haram insurgents compounded by Chibok girls kidnapping. Efforts to purchase weapon to tackle the insurgency was blocked by America while South Africa also seized the available funds meant for purchase in South Africa which left the government with little hope in defeating the insurgents (Boma et.al, 2015). In his address, Jonathan emphasized that his ambition is not worth contesting the results of the 2015 elections despite evidence of malpractices (Associated Press, 2015).

3.4.4 The Administration of Retired General Muhammadu Buhari

May 29th 2015

Retired General Muhammadu Buhari's election was the first transfer of power from ruling to opposition party in Nigeria. His campaign cardinal agenda was hinged on fighting corruption, insecurity and economy, job creation which reflected in his foreign policy. Buhari embarked on extensive travels and engagement with the G-7 and other Western countries, including China, the G-20 Meeting in Germany and African Union Summit in South Africa (Schneider, 2015). Buhari's known personal integrity won him the trust of the West who helped him recover about \$230 million from the Swiss Bank (Onyeama, Foreign Affairs Minister 2016 in Salau, 2016).

Buhari visited neighbouring countries that are affected by boko haram and renewed commitment to the fight. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in place since 1998 yielded little result due to mistrust over small border issues dating back to 1980s. Intelligent sharing was hindered making it easily overrun by the insurgents. The visit therefore enhanced opportunities for firmed decisions on the alliance to fight boko haram (Schneider, 2015). Buhari's government signed more Agreements with China and assured of a one-China Policy by recognizing China, Taiwan and Mainland China as single State of China and relocated the Taiwanese Embassy from Nigeria's Federal Capital, Abuja to Lagos and downgraded its activities (Yusuf, 2017, in Bello et.al, 2017; Mama, 2016).

Between May 29th 2015 when he was sworn in and 2017, macroeconomic indicators had revealed a double dip slowdown and later into recession. From the biggest economy in Africa by its GDP which recorded growth of 2.57 percent by second quarter of 2015, it fell to historic low of -0.36 percent its worst performance in 25 years. Inflation climbed to 13.72 percent by April 2016 from 9 percent as at May 2015. The government's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) to improve productivity and economic growth by 7.8% by 2020, provide jobs for more than 15 million Nigerians was designed (Chima, 2016; Parmar, 2017:59-59; Country Profile, 2017). However, the Central Bank's role in determining the exchange rate instead of the market flow and the foreign exchange strategy leaves foreign investors with little confidence in the current Central Bank leadership and foreign equity portfolio flows (Bekkali, 2017).

The government has complied with international humanitarian law in conduct of its foreign policy but the foreign policy space is fraught with political instability and inconsistency. Like Jonathan, Buhari criticised the United States for not providing enough weapons to tackle insurgency, therefore indirectly aiding and abetting boko haram (Akinterinwa, 2017;

Schneider, 2015). Buhari with Ghana objected to re-admittance of Morocco into ECOWAS and commissioned another research to determine the gains and losses to ECOWAS. Conversely, Buhari's government renewed relationships with Morocco with the visit of Moroccan King, His Majesty, Mohammed VI. An agreement to jointly develop regional gas pipeline connecting both states was signed (Canada Newswire, 2016).

The government did not appoint diplomatic Heads on time upon removal of the Ambassadors appointed by the last administration. Out of the about 112 Missions, the government presented a list of 47 to the Legislative Arm of Government for screening as required by the Constitution and the commissioning was in 2017. This did not speak well of Nigeria as Missions like Russia, United States, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, including Czech Republic were left without ambassadors while the respective countries had their substantive Ambassadors in Abuja. Many of the Missions were facing challenges in terms of funds due to lean budgets and some lacked quality personnel in terms of relevant skills and experience since most appointments are based on political considerations rather than merit (Akwaya, 2016; Vanguard Newspaper, 2017)

The human rights violation under the Buhari's government, nepotism and clannish approach to governance, instead of Federal Character produced more threats to the nations' unity like embolden boko haram insurgents, the pastoral conflicts and Biafran-IPOB agitators. The injustice and unfairness in dealing with IPOB agitators and Shiites, including the continued detention of the leader, AL-Zak Zaky leaves many in doubt of the government's capability to manage a modern democratic society (Akinterinwa, 2018). The suspended Presidential Amnesty Program led to renewed threats by Niger Delta militants who returned to the creeks to disrupt oil activities, impacting on power supply, government oil exports and revenues. There are now more IDP Camps in Nigeria, unlike in the past and large numbers of Nigerians are refugees in many West African states and form part of the group migrating through the Libyan border to Europe.

Chapter 4: Discussion of Findings

4.0 Introduction of Chapter

Features of Nigerian foreign policy have been discussed to the extent possible within the specified periods in history in the preceding chapter. Chapter four identifies notable planks in each period and establishes how civilian and military governments handled Nigeria's foreign policy.

4.1. First Period 1953 - 1966 - First Republic (Civilian Rule)

Sir Balewa was privileged to design a framework for foreign policy but he adopted conciliatory approach to radical. In line with its principal objective to fight apartheid, notable points include the NACAP as a platform to educate Nigerians on the situation of blacks in Southern African countries and generated strong support from the grassroots. The first motion for the suspension of South Africa at an international meeting (International Labour Organization) took place with one-hundred and sixty-three (163) - nil and eighty-nine (89) abstentions. Nigeria led a first walkout in next ILO meeting. Nigeria contributed troops to the UN Peacekeeping Mission Support in Congo and also commanded the Mission; including the India-Pakistani Mission under UNIPOM and Observer Mission under UNSF in New Guinea. Nigeria's reputation was also boosted by the crucial roles played by Udorji, Elias and Udoma at international level.

Failure to emerge as OAU Chair at its formation and siting of the headquarters in Nigeria was perceived as weak and failed to commensurate with Nigeria's leadership potentials. It was noted that Balewa had placating personality which in reference to Nye (2004) shaped his foreign relations approach. Accommodating Mandela for six months in 1962 rang positive bells but leaving out other liberation movement leaders who looked up to Nigeria was a negative approach to his Africa-centred foreign policy. Another negative point is that while an elected Parliament openly debated the apartheid South African case, the Northern Peoples' Congress, Sir Balewa's party vetoed the debate on the assassination of Patrice Lumumba which was suggested by the Action Group in the Parliament. It was a negative point compared to military approach in the second period.

4.2 Second Period 1966 - 1979 (Military Government)

Ironsi's government was a shift from the Balewa conservative approach. The Ambassadors' Conference ensured more commitment to African liberation. Portuguese and South Africans, including their vessels were barred from entering Nigeria. Gowon adopted war diplomacy to ensure a united Nigeria. Unlike the Balewa government, Gowon established friendship with Soviet world to support the war and built awareness of the Communist ideals in Nigeria. The

financial assistance to the liberation movements, to smaller African and non-African nations and to fight drought in some parts of Africa were positive signs. Commitment to the liberation struggles which earned Nigeria the Chairmanship position of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee was also in line.

A second boycott of an international event, the Munich Olympic Games occurred in this period. While Balewa made suggestions in respect to African economic cooperation, Gowon's government spearheaded the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, provided land for its headquarters. Out of the eleven (11) members of the Union, Nigeria took responsibility to pay thirty-two percent (32%) annual dues to sustain the regional mechanism. The government also established Niger and Chad Basin Development Authorities respectively. Two personalities Adedeji at UNECA and Akintola Aguda also boosted the international reputation of Nigeria.

General Gowon's government was very bureaucratic and personalised. Elements of bureaucratic and decision-making theories came to play when Gowon spent money without recourse to consultation and often bypass the ministry of external affairs. The Civil War provided the basis to prioritize sovereignty over national economy with establishment of an Indigenization Policy to boost an environment economically independent from the West unlike Balewa. The oil boom provided more stimulus and expanded protection for import-substituting industries. Elements of Marxist's and realism were displayed in Gowon's retaliative foreign policy in post-war Nigeria which targeted countries that supported Biafra during the war and revenues from oil which the government egotistically lavished on other states. From the analysis, it can be established that Gowon drastically altered the terrain and expanded Nigeria's contact at international level.

General Murtala adopted the Balewa strategy for public participation in foreign policy-making, unlike the Gowon government. The *Adedeji Commission Report* provided direction in implementing a well-defined foreign policy. Outstanding moments include Murtala's statement at the OAU Summit that Africa is no longer in the orbit of any colonial powers which situated apartheid as an imperialist structure, revealing the contents of US President Ford's letter in a Press Conference following the Angolan crisis, recognition of MPLA and the financial support rings positive points for the government. Unlike the Balewa civilian administration, Murtala and Obasanjo's government provided space for liberation movements to set up missions in Nigeria and mobilize external resources for the liberation struggle. These fit into realism, the use of power and resources as political weapon to fight apartheid and colonialism.

The South African Relief Fund-SARF-*Mandela Tax* supported by the masses and promotion of South African youths welfare are remarkable moments. The World Conference for Actions Against Apartheid in Nigeria in 1976 leading to the United Nations Security Council Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa in 1978 are included. Like in Balewa and Gowon era, Nigeria led a third and fourth boycott of Summer Olympics and Commonwealth Games in Montreal and Alberta. The refusal to trade crude oil with South Africa and the amount of money deliberately lost in line was a strong demonstration of Nigeria's distaste for apartheid while the nationalisation of British companies added more points to Nigeria's opposition to apartheid policy and respect for black Africans.

The festival for Arts and Culture allowed blacks in Caribbean and Pacific to meet together as a single group on African soil and attracted over 500,000 spectators (Monroe, 1977). It also projected Nigeria's rich and diverse culture to the world. Nigerian Trust Fund is a "prime mover", which in addition to ECOWAS Compensation Fund serve as positive integrative force in West Africa (Barnes, 1984:169-170). Many Nigerian musicians made the liberation struggles a central theme of the music, e.g. *Sunny Okosuns*. The rotation of about seven thousand (7,000) soldiers through nine (9) battalions In Lebanon under the UN Interim Force in Lebanon UNIFIL-1978-1982 was in line with Nigeria's foreign policy objective to promote world peace (Azkagu, 2015:88-92). Unlike General Gowon's government, the Obasanjo administration restructured the workforce which led to decline in bureaucracy in Nigeria. Nigeria experienced two oil windfalls and shocks within the period.

4.3 Third Period 1979 -1983 Second Republic (Democratic Government)

Liberalism can be gleaned from Alhaji Shagari's peaceful handling of the Bakassi conflict which downplayed the use of force preferred by the majority in Nigeria. The financial support to Robert Mugabe 1982 in Zimbabwe celebrated the victory of Africans in spite of the colonial struggle. The open condemnation of Britain for continued links with South Africa against the Gleneagles Agreement and at the Lancaster Negotiation were positive points in protest against racism. While the Shagari government provided funds to cushion the challenges experienced in the first and unsuccessful OAU Peacekeeping Mission to Chad, the government demonstrated a double standard through expulsion of immigrants in Nigeria.

External Affairs Ministry and the Minister faced exclusion on most foreign policy issues due to party affiliations. Career diplomats were often excluded as employment was based on party affiliations instead of merit (Anifowoshe and Emenuo, 1999). The over-expenditure, rivalry among parties, corruption (Diamond, 1985) mismanaged oil rent, external debt, destabilised the economy (Ihonvbere, 1996:196). Decision-making and Marxist's theory are

visible with the class imbalance and concentration of wealth in a few hands while the State was in debt.

4.4 Fourth Period 1984 - 1998 (Military Regimes)

Buhari's government adopted concentric circles as foreign policy thrust, making national economic, and security interests of immediate priority before the regional. The elite monopolized the foreign policy making terrain and critical issues were directly under the supervision of General Tunde Idiagbon and members of the Supreme Military Council. The government authorised the second expulsion due to Maitatsine extremism and closed Nigerian borders with Cameroon and Chad which were negative points. The Conference on Legal Status of Apartheid, organized to chart a new way for people to accept apartheid as a legal system was a departure from the assertive Southern African policy of previous governments. The positive aspect of the government was the recognition of Saharawi Arab Republic SADR in protest against Morocco's occupation of the region, just like the liberation struggles.

Conversely, the government adopted a reactive approach in opposition to the West and its efforts at tackling corruption created friction and soured external relationship. The belt-tightening measures aimed to neutralise the impact of oil-shocks and manage the economy created more friction at the international credit market and more hardships internally. General Idiagbon's unbending posture also created a background that hindered diplomacy and relationship building. His personality and the expulsion order were not in line with the Concentric Circles. Foreign policy was top-down without citizens' engagement unlike in Balewa (1960-1966) and Murtala/Obasanjo's governments (1975-1979).

Internally, introduction of death penalty and execution, imprisonment and the belt-tightening feeds the Marxist and Realist's theory of State, whereby the regime adopted hegemonic stance to exercise power and influence over the population. The suspension of the Constitution translated into more hardships as the Decrees led to gross violation of fundamental human rights whereby convicted criminals and drug smugglers were jailed and prosecuted under Decree Two. Babangida's government economic diplomacy led to new relationships, bilateral agreements and increased capital flow. Notable aspects include opening up of the IMF recommendations for public participation like the Balewa and Murtala's governments; the fifth and last boycott of an international event - the XIII Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh in 1986 which was thereafter referred to as '*the Boycott Game*' and securing two (2) prominent international roles at the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations for Nigeria to boost Nigeria's reputation. Nigerian students regularly embarked on demonstrations in support of the liberation struggles. Awareness in schools

was also strong within this period as textbooks and billboards depicting the struggles donned many school environments.

Another landmark achievement is the ECOWAS Peace Ceasefire Monitoring Group-ECOMOG, including an Endowment Fund to support the war and an increased in Nigeria's Annual Dues from thirty-two percent (32%) to forty percent (40%) to assist the peacekeeping effort. Nigeria filled logistic gaps in the contingents from other countries (Ajayi, 2005:53). Like Nigerian Trust Fund established by Military government in the second period, the Technical Aid Corp-TAC assisted many African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations from inception in 1986 till date. The mechanism projects Nigeria as a facilitator of effective cooperation. The project is recognised as the only service of its kind operated by an African country and challenges the notion that Africa is only a recipient of aid. Nigerian Government pays the allowances and fringe benefits for volunteers while the recipient country provides accommodation and other basic services needed on ground.

Although a military regime, the initial phase of Babandiga's administration fits the liberalist's theory as it measured power through economy, free markets and cooperation, economic integration and interdependence. The established ECOMOG and friendship with South Africa under De Klerk were positive signs. The football game by Nigeria and South Africa shows sports as a unifying force and a conflict resolution and peacebuilding tool. However, the adoption of economic diplomacy, under this consideration marked a shift from the Afro-centric foreign policy of Nigeria which had won her respect internationally, to a more country-centred policy to remain relevant in international arena according to Nikiton (1983), Mbakwe and Chukwu (2016). In this case, it supported Papadimitrou and Pistikou, (2014) that economic diplomacy can contribute to national security as a secondary factor, since the armed forces are major players.

Replacement of Akinyemi with a military external relations minister facilitated the elite takeover of the foreign policy space. New entrants to the bureaucratic and elitist class of foreign policy decision-makers are in line with elite theory. Since the government operated in the interest of the capitalist world, it also reflects Marxist's and realist's theory of state. Unlike the second period when military administrations like Gowon, Murtala and Obasanjo condemned actions taken by the West especially with respect to African nations, the social climate and expected economic assistance from the West required less radical approach to external affairs. Nigeria remained silent on many issues in the activities of the West to avoid alienation. The charged political climate and scuttled electoral process placed Babangida's government in negative light.

Abacha's government sustained the Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia until Charles Taylor emerged as president and reversed the coup in Sierra Leone which reinstated Tejah Kabbah. However, Abacha's continued incarceration of the presidential candidate Moshood Abiola was not approved by Nigerians and the international community. Many Diplomatic Missions in Nigeria were shut down and sanctions imposed by major Western powers, led by the Commonwealth of Nations following the execution of Ogoni 9 including Ken Saro Wiwa in Ogoniland, in Niger Delta and targeted assassinations.

Liberal realism talks about a society of States with common norms and interests that promote order and stability which Abacha found in the D-8 Group. Conversely, Abacha's term as Nigerian Head of State came at a time the liberation struggles in Africa had ended. The focus on liberation struggles as a major component of the Afro-centred foreign policy became obsolete. The force of globalization was also taking roots and human rights became defining principles of modern society. Liberal realism requires understanding and moving with secular diffusion of global power (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 2004). Abacha failed to redirect the foreign policy in line. Instead, Nigerian foreign policy machinery stumbled from one negative action to another. There was a general mismanagement of the Ogoni and Commonwealth of Nations crisis. The External Affairs Minister Tom Ikimi attacked Nigeria's suspension and recommended a review of Nigeria's Foreign Policy objectives. Other senior members of the cabinet made combative statements which was interpreted as a threat to the international community and poor understanding of the workings of the international system (Akinrinade, 1997).

Although he based his policy on the afro-centric framework, Abacha's government foreign policy therefore was "reactive and isolationist" in total disregard for diplomatic norms and lacked finesse which stunned the world (Akintola, 2007:462-463; Ezirin, 2011:7-8). The Abacha tenure demonstrates realists,' Marxist's and elite theories through exploitation of the minority in Niger Delta, exclusionary decisions, enforcement of class structure and concentration of wealth in a few hands. Dach (2007) observed that Nigeria, viewed as an emerging power in 1983 belonged to a group of least developed countries by 1999. General Abubakar made efforts to reverse the oppressive structures set up by Abacha and released prisoners. His shuttle diplomacy and attendance of international events and election timetable assured the international community of his motivations which was opposite of Abacha.

4.5 Fifth Period 1999-2018 - Fourth Republic (Democratic Government)

Through economic liberalization and shuttle diplomacy, Obasanjo won back friends who deserted Nigeria. Unlike Babangida (1985-1993), Obasanjo succeeded in getting a reduction

in external debts and created enabling environment for foreign investment and job creation. Obasanjo played crucial roles in resolving the Sierra Leonean, Liberian and the Sudanese War. Obasanjo led in establishment of ECOWAS Mission in Liberia-ECOMIL and ECOMICI during conflict in Cote D'Ivoire, including AMIS in Sudan. Nigerian army later formed the advance force for United Nations Mission in Liberia-UNIMIL and Hybrid UN/AU Operations in Darfur. Nigerian Technical Cooperation Fund assists Western Africa with some projects that contribute to actualizing the Sustainable Development Goals. Nigeria under Obasanjo relinquished hold on the disputed territories with Cameroon following the ICJ Judgment and relocated her citizens to prevent reprisal attacks and full-blown conflict. Nigeria offered asylum to Charles Taylor and together with Thabo Mbeki restructured the Organization of African Unity to African Union. These fit into liberalism.

Obasanjo's tenure as democratic president was highly personalised, unlike in the past and often bypass the Ministry. The democratic environment also gave room for grievances and his government was marred by pockets of conflicts across Nigeria. Obasanjo's efforts were dashed when he attempted to modify the Constitution to enable him run for a third term in office which led to loss of standing at many circles. Apart from visiting the White House and attending the African Union Summit in 2007, Yaradua attended no international event and Nigeria was not invited to events, including the G-8 Meeting where Heads of Governments deliberated on the global economic meltdown of 2008. His foreign policy thrust, citizens' diplomacy did not make any tangible impact locally and internationally.

The Presidential Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations guided Jonathan's government in pursuing an economic and investment-driven foreign policy. The Transformation Agenda was hinged on promoting investment and job creation internally and welfare of Nigerians abroad and he charted a way for Nigerians in Diaspora to participate in nation building. Jonathan's visit and discussion with the Obama administration led to delist of Nigeria from the Special Screening List of passengers to the US following Abdulfatai Mutallab's attempted bombing of the US-bound plane in 2009. Jonathan's government signed many Bi-National agreements, opened more diplomatic missions to endear Nigeria to many countries, reinvent Nigeria's image like Obasanjo and encourage investment in Nigeria. By commissioning the Heads of Missions to promote the country and attract investment to Nigeria, Jonathan's government earned more points in his external relations which feeds into liberalism.

The adoption of reciprocity in dealings with other countries was mandated by the widespread maltreatment of Nigerians in many countries. To promote democratic freedom in West Africa, Jonathan's government condemned in strong terms and led other ECOWAS states in removing President Gbagbo of Cote D'Ivoire when Gbagbo failed to relinquish power after losing election. While Nigeria voted with Gabon and South Africa for UNSCR 1975 for

NATO's intervention in Libya, Nigeria was alone in voting for recognition of the Libyan rebels which led to ouster of Muammar Gadhafi and receive less approval from African states in his vote against Palestinian statehood which was in support of US position.

An impediment to a robust implementation of foreign policy was the boko haram insurgency which badly affected Nigeria's leadership role. Perception of incompetence and corruption in diplomatic circles hampered investment and economic growth. The response to the Chibok Girls kidnapping was also a negative score-point. The insurgency still persists in the Buhari administration, in addition to mismanaged economy, recession and low confidence by foreign investors. The confirmation by President Buhari that Nigerians hold criminal records in many countries rings negative point. While many Missions were closed, the late appointed of Ambassadors to a number of Missions did not speak well of Nigeria in diplomatic circles. Insecurity has become endemic under the Buhari government.

5. Chapter Five Conclusion

The aim of the study was to evaluate Nigeria's external affairs from the period leading up to independence in 1960 to the present - 2018. It was equally aimed at comparing how civilian and democratic governments interpreted the outlined foreign policy objectives and how it contributed to Nigeria's rising and fading power and influence:

- Promotion and protection of national interest.
- Promotion of the total liberation and support of Africa unity
- Promotion of international cooperation for mutual respect among all nations and elimination of racial discrimination in all its manifestations;
- Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication;
- Promotion of a just world economic order (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria)

The study was guided by following questions;

- (1) What are the components of Nigeria's foreign policy?
- (2) How was Nigeria's foreign policy articulated by the military regimes and democratic administrations?
- (3) How did the systems, military regimes or civilian democratic governments aid Nigeria in asserting her influence locally and globally?
- (4) How has regime change impacted on implementation of her foreign policy over the years?
- (5) Why has her foreign policy not impacted on her role as a continental hegemon or superpower?

Findings reveal that for question one; components of Nigeria's foreign policy include soft and hard power tools. Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others by attracting and persuading others to adopt/support one's goals. In Nigerian case, it includes financial aid, festivals/culture- FESTAC 77, Nollywood-Nigerian Movie Industry, educational grants, reputation and institutional support, lobbying and campaign, soft concessional loans through ADB, agreements, trade and economy. Hard power, the ability to use carrots and sticks of military and economic might to make others follow your will includes international pressure,

propaganda, war diplomacy, technical support, Southern African policy, technical cooperation, military intervention and peace support missions.

For question (2), findings reveal that the military and civilian administrations adopted both soft and hard power tools to express the foreign policy objectives. However, the difference lies in extent and severity of use of these tools. The civilian government in first period was not radical or revolutionary but firm and conciliatory in his approach. The only hard power-military activity in the period was UN Peace Support Mission and taking the lead in boycott of international event. The government's policy actions was backed and guided by the masses' decision. The military governments in second period used economic might and oil revenue to launch Southern African policy. The first period government believed in peaceful approach to independence of African States while military governments in second period believed in revolutionary approach. The same soft power tools were therefore articulated in an assertive and revolutionary manner.

While Gowon's government (1966-1975) incorporated some elements of brusqueness in relationship with the West and the use of war diplomacy to protect Nigeria's sovereignty, the government expanded Nigeria's international contacts and was the only government that provided grants to the Caribbean and Pacific black nations. The bureaucracy and personalising did not allow for participation unlike the Balewa (1960-1966) and government of Murtala and Obasanjo (1975-1979). The Murtala government was assertive in its Southern African policy. Its use of antagonistic speeches, actions, open call for sanctions and rejection of Western interference in African issues was different from the civilian approach. The manner of lobbying and campaign in military regimes was demanding; the lead role in boycotts of international events was felt at international level and earned Nigeria critical positions which were only sustained in the civilian governments.

Apart from the Balewa administration when Nigerians were nominated to vital positions within and outside Africa and Nigeria led the first boycott of an international event, no other Nigerian was recognized during civilian administrations because of their less radical expression of the policy objectives except in contribution of troops to Peace Interventions. There was one boycott in civilian government while there were four boycotts in military regimes. The FESTAC'77, Nollywood and hosting of international events are great avenues to express Nigeria's cultural heritage and the professional support and institutional building in other states built Nigeria's reputation as a foreign policy tool. The education initiatives and soft loans were softer uniting and integrative forces which were expressed during Military administrations. However, the financial aid was sustained by the civilian administration in

1979-1983, with strong criticism of countries supporting apartheid at international events while only one government in fourth period continued with the Southern Africa policy but did not condemn the Western activities in other parts of Africa as a result of the economic diplomacy and debt crisis.

It can be said that oil played a major role in how each government articulated the policy objectives. The oil boom during military regimes in second period led to increased revenue while oil shocks and poor state of the economy left the fourth period in debts. To manage the economy, two of three military regimes in fourth period adopted retaliative and reactive policies that soured relationships and isolated Nigeria from the rest of the world while one of the regimes (1985-1993) adopted economic diplomacy to manage the economy which opened it to the world. The government also established the Technical Aid Corps to promote South-South Cooperation and Nigeria's reputation. While it did not condemn Western interference in Africa like the second period, it led the last boycott of international event and took a firm position to Southern African affairs. The established ECOMOG and military intervention was strongest expression of hard power which is widely recognized and appreciated.

The first government in the fifth period of civilian administration employed another tool, Nigerian Technical Cooperation Fund to articulate Nigeria's foreign policy following the 'Dark Days of 1993-1998. Obasanjo's personality, personal commitment and lead role in peacebuilding initiatives in Africa and the transformation of OAU to African Union expressed Nigeria's foreign policy. His achievement stem from his experience as military Head in 1976-1979 when his foreign policy thrust was widely recognised and accepted. The civilian administrations in fifth period have endeavoured to articulate the policy through peace support operations in Africa.

Findings in question three (3) reveal that both the civilian and military governments assisted Nigeria in asserting her influence differently. While both governments worked within the stipulated foreign policy objective framework, the different thrusts adopted led to different interpretations of the objectives, based on the understanding and prevailing circumstances. The second period (military) was radical and aggressive in a positive way as it contributed to the welfare of blacks and exposed the ills of apartheid to the world. However, the momentum was sustained in public statements and condemnation of attitudes of the international community towards the plight of Southern Africans like in the second period. The oil revenue provided more impetus for assertion and to support the liberation struggles and other weaker nations financially while ECOWAS and ECOMOG promoted regional integration in line with Nigerian policy and promoted her military might.

For the findings on the fourth question; regime changes in Nigerian history led to adoption of different foreign policy thrusts and implementation strategies. While the first government was conservative, the regime change in 1966 led to radical implementation of the foreign policy objectives, expanded Nigeria's contact and won international support on the anti-apartheid policy while the change to civilian government in 1979-1983 led to a less radical approach, except for the peace support operations. One civilian administration and one military government displayed double standard in its implementation strategy by expelling Africans living in Nigeria.

The economic diplomacy by military government (1985-1993) led to less aggressive approach due to the expected investment, debt relief and rescheduling. The government was saddled in-between two regimes that adopted reactive and retaliative actions. The regime change in 1985 and 1993 therefore resulted in poor implementation strategy and a reversal of achievements of the second government and left Nigeria in a pariah state. A change from the government in 1998 allowed hybrid actions of military and democratic ideas to win back friends who deserted Nigeria during the 'Dark Days.' Conversely, a change to civilian regime in 1999 allowed for implementation of the objectives through Technical Cooperation Fund in partnership with the African Development Bank and alignment with the UN and AU on peacekeeping initiatives, foreign direct investments, etc.

Findings for question five reveal that Nigerian foreign policy since 1960 has witnessed success and failures like many countries of the world. Many believe it should have been premised on strong domestic environment for support. But the dynamic nature of the international environment demands the actors to change their interests in line with the changes. The 1990's was a defining moment in global politics. Nigeria, a nation with capacity to influence Africa failed to develop strategies that combine her military might with soft power like the financial aid to flow with the current.

The leaders misunderstood the concept of power in foreign policy. With release of Nelson Mandela, Nigeria failed to build alliances with potential powers or shift its foreign policy approach. The fifth period endeavour to bridge the gap with the Nigerian Technical Cooperation Fund, peace support initiatives. The insurgency requires cooperation with neighbouring states who depended on Nigeria in the past while many Nigerians take refuge in camps in those countries due to the insurgency. These interpretations impact differently on Nigeria's role as a superpower. In response to the hypothesis, while Nigeria's foreign policy objectives have remained unchanged from 1960 till the present, the absence of a unified foreign policy approach has led to different interpretations, strategies and implementation by the fourteen military and civilian governments. Therefore, regime

changes, both civilian democratic and military as well as leadership style are major factors that have contributed to Nigeria's power decline in this global era.

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Appendix

Structure of Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In 1953 under British colonial arrangement, Nigeria began to groom personnel for the foreign affairs department and was also granted some level of authority (Adoba, 2014). In 1957, when Sir Abubakar Tawafa Balewa was appointed the Prime Minister prior to independence, Nigeria started to exercise that power. The department was therefore transferred from the Office of the Chief Secretary to Prime Minister' Office as the Department of Cabinet Office. At independence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was established to handle external affairs while the Cabinet remained the policy formulation body of the government, including foreign policy (Ashiru, 2011, also cited in Mimiko and Mbada, 2014; Effiong, 2012; Inamete, 2001). The names were later changed to Ministry of External Affairs and now Foreign Affairs.

The Ministry operates at different levels from Headquarters, Missions, Home Services, International Organizations and other Institutions. At the helm is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the political head who works closely with the Minister of State 1 & 2, the Permanent Secretary, the Administrative Head of Foreign Service, Four Under-Secretaries who oversee groups of Departments, while Directors supervise affairs of various departments and Divisions at the Ministry. Nigeria's foreign policy objectives, as enshrined in the extant Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, under Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, Chapter 2, Subsection 19, 1999 establishes the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as already defined.

Agencies of the Ministry include

- The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs-NIIA
- Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies-IPCS
- Directorate for Technical Aids Corp-DTAC
- Directorate for Technical Cooperation in Africa-DTCA
- Foreign Service Academy (Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).