

MENDEL UNIVERSITY IN BRNO

Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies

Institute of Territorial Studies

**Analysis of the Political and Security Situation after  
the Falklands War from the Point of View of  
Argentina and Great Britain**

**DIPLOMA THESIS**

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In Brno, April 29, 2016

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Mgr. Marie Dedíková

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## **Abstract**

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The main topic of the diploma thesis is to describe and to analyze the political, security and economical situation of the Falkland Islands and their defenders before, during and after the Falkland War in 1982. The first part is focused on the analysis of recently published secret documents in National Archives in the Great Britain and Argentina and on the bibliography research. The second part deals with the results of statistical analysis of an existing data sets and thus forecasts the future perspectives of the British-Argentinian fight for the Falkland Islands in the third part of the thesis.

## **Key words**

Falkland Islands, Islas Malvinas, Falklands, Malvinas, Falklands War, Guerra de las Malvinas, 1982, Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Cold War, colonialism, Argentina, United Kingdom, Great Britain

## **Abstrakt**

Dedíková, M. *Analýza politické a bezpečnostní situace po válce na Falklandách z pohledu Argentiny a Velké Británie*. Diplomová práce. Brno, 2015

Hlavním tématem diplomové práce je popsat a analyzovat politickou, bezpečnostní a ekonomickou situaci Falkland a jejich obrancu před, během a po válce na Falklandech v roce 1982. První část se soustředí na analýzu před časem zveřejněných tajných dokumentů uložených v národních archívech Velké Británie a Argentiny a na literární resenzi. Druhá část se věnuje výsledkům vlastních statistických analýz existujících datových jednotek a tím dokáže předpovědět budoucí perspektivy britsko-argentinského boje o Falklandy. Třetí část práce navrhuje možný budoucí vývoj situace.

## **Klíčová slova**

Falklandské ostrovy, Falklandy, Válka o Falklandy, 1982, Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Studená válka, kolonialismus, Argentina, Spojené Království, Velká Británie

## **List of Abbreviations**

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

ATS Antarctic Treaty System

PTCs pre-treaty claimants of ATS

RCs reserved claimants of ATS

NCs non-claimants of ATS

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

U.S. United States

IMF International Monetary Fond

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## Introduction

The Falklands War in 1982 had a significant importance in the history. Many involved people do not know the reason why the Great Britain strived for the Falkland Islands many thousand kilometers far away from its kingdom. In this diploma thesis the main task is to uncover undiscovered data and to answer the question of the importance of the Falkland Islands for the Great Britain from the economical, political and security point of view.

The case study is based on 4 critical cases:

- Falkland Islands play very strategic place in the sea with the access to Africa, Australia, Antarctica and South America.
- The Great Britain achieves with its victory a better power position in the world and compensates the then bad economical situation and worsened military reputation.
- Falkland Islands belong to the relic of colonialism due to its potential Argentinian ownership and may be the reason of showing British superiority.
- Falkland Islands are a source of future resources as oil and precious minerals.

Argentinian need to escalate the local problems due to its leading military junta and Argentinian poor knowledge of actual British military situation are good backgrounds of the battle and its results. The looking for the political, economical and security answers is based on the bibliography research. The first part of the thesis deals with the steps that led to the Falkland War and gives a new view into the events before and during the war: Whom do the islands belong to? What influence does a colonial past of Argentina have in the conflict? What did Spain say to the British territory claims over the Falkland Islands? Further the first part of the master thesis lists political and security declarations at strategic (national) levels and what their implementation was like.

The second part compares the United Kingdom and Argentina in the quantitative research. The data sets are derived from an existing variables and provide the analysis of the participating national powers in numbers. Economical indicators of potential future conflict before 1982 are compared with the nowadays situation in



both countries. In the same way the economical growth and the indicators of the economic development are analyzed in this part of the thesis. As part of second chapter the current political and security situation is described with conclusions based on the bibliography research of the previous part.

The third part defines the results of the war and deduce the future consequences of the tense relationships between the United Kingdom and Argentina from the first theoretical and the second practical part of the thesis. It suggests possible solutions in order to prevent the military escalation, tests critical cases of the case study and describes statistically verified forecasts.

## **1. History of the Falkland's Conflict**

At this place has to be underlined that all of the information described in the following chapter about history of Falkland Islands has to be considered with precautions that all below mentioned cannot be said in a poorly neutral way. Historical events of the Falkland Islands have usually ambiguous tendency and every author interprets historical data with a different approach and given opinions.

### **1.1 Argentine and British history of Falkland Islands discovery**

Various sources refer to the initial discovery of the Falkland Islands with different navigators so that it is unclear who discovered the Falkland Islands first. The first navigator who visited the islands was Amerigo Vespucci in the services of Spanish Crown in 1504 (Honeywell, 1982, p. 24). Dobson (1982) rather attributes the first discovery to the Englishman John Davis who accidentally voyaged close to them in a storm in 1592 (Dobson, 1982, p. 14). Oliveri López (1995) points out that even British authors doubt about own "first" discovery of the Falkland Islands. The navigators Davis and Hawkins may have landed at the Patagonian coast instead of the islands in that time. Amerigo Vespucci might have been a first navigator of the Falkland Islands (Oliveri López, 1995, pp. 8-9).

In 18th century there were two first settlements by British and French rule around the similar years 1764-1765. But the Frenchman Antoine Louis de Bougainville made the first official settlement in the Malvinas in 1764. Meanwhile the British rule established a settlement on the opposite side of the islands in their claims unaware of French settlement on January 1765 (Oliveri López, 1995, p. 11). While French claims had a legal ground, the British did not. According to Honeywell (1982) the British knew that the French settlement had been established in the Falkland Islands (Honeywell, 1982, p. 29-30). Because of the Spanish possessions of the Falkland Islands and Latin America the French Crown sold the newly settled islands to Spain for financial compensation in 1767. Already at that time the Falkland Islands were incorporated into the Argentine jurisdiction of Buenos Aires and Spanish governor in Buenos Aires was asked to expel British establishment by force if they do not obey to leave (Oliveri López, 1995, p. 12-13). Due to the British claims there was almost a war between the Spanish and Britain in 1770 (Honeywell, 1982, p. 31). Honeywell (1982) states that there existed a secret promise of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands in 1771. Based on this secret the British left the islands in 1774 (Honeywell,

1982, pp. 31-32). But „there is no record of any written agreement“ that such secret agreement between Spain and Great Britain had ever existed. Since the British withdrawal in 1774 and the Nootka Convention in 1790, the British had never tried to occupy the Falklands ever again (Oliver López, 1995, p. 15-16).

The Spanish Crown formally abandoned the Falkland Islands in 1811 (Honeywell, 1982, p. 34) and the sovereignty rights over the Malvinas Islands were transferred to the Argentine Republic in the same year (Oliver López, 1995, p. 7). The Argentine flag was raised in the Falklands in 1920 (Dobson, 1982, p. xxxi) and first governor became Louis Vernet in 1824. Vernet was no uncivilized barbar as often claimed by British but a honored person who developed the Falkland Islands (Honeywell, 1982, p. 34) and obtained the exclusive fishing rights in the seas of islands (Oliver López, 1995, p. 21).

Three US fishing ships repeatedly ignored the cattle killing and whaling restrictions, therefore one of them was accompanied by Vernet to the Argentine trial (Honeywell, 1982, p. 35). As revenge the warship USS Lexington went to the islands in 1931, destroyed all military base and buildings, arrested local people and claimed the Falkland Islands „free of all government“. This act worsened the Argentine relationship to the United States (Freedman, 1990, pp. xxxi-xxxii). The United States showed a clear preference in the Falklands question with a suggestion supposed that Britain takes an action after Americans claiming no sovereignty rights over the Falklands with exception of fishing rights in that year. After the consulting with the United States the British sailed with the HMS Clio to the islands and raised the British flag in the Falkland Islands in 1833. Unfortunately, there were no armed forces ready to react because the Falkland Islands tried to recover from the recent US piracy in 1931. It is obvious that “Great Britain, the leading naval power took advantage of a weak emerging nation” without previous consideration or proper discussion in the British government. The British prime minister, the Duke of Wellington wrote in 1829: “It is not at all clear to me that we have ever possessed the sovereignty of these islands”. The doubts over the Falklands remained unofficially until the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century on the British side. The response to this letter by John Murray was: “The interval between the cessation of the power of old Spain and the consolidation of that of the new government of South America would be the best time for our resuming our former possession of the Falkland Islands”. The British

supposed to misuse the opportunity of a weak sovereignty claims in the years 1811-1820 between the Spanish Crown and Argentine Republic (Oliver López, 1995, pp. 21-25). British government has never recognized the rights of Buenos Aires over the Falkland Islands officially (Dobson, 1982, p. 17).

As it is demonstrated later in the chapter about Argentina and Great Britain, both forcible occupations in 1833 and 1982 are very similar in their nature. Both misused the opportunity of weak military defense in the Falkland Islands and both disposed of a long period of time during that the counterpart (Britain or Argentina) was not settled on the islands. British administration was last time in the Falklands in 1774 and then retook the islands in 1833. Argentine administration was last time in the Falklands in 1833 and then fought for the islands in the Falklands War in 1982. Especially for Argentina it is very hard to understand why the British occupation in 1833 was legal and the Argentine occupation in 1982 was illegal (Oliver López, 1995, p. 24). Argentina as well as Great Britain reasserted their proclaimed rights in the Falkland Islands. This topic will be discussed in the following chapter of international law and human rights.

## **1.2 Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements between United Kingdom and Argentina and Other Related Declarations**

### *Treaty of Utrecht (1713)*

Treaty of Utrecht was signed as a series of individual peace treaties between Spain, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Portugal, Savoy and Dutch Republic, thus ended the war and established a balance of power in Europe (Palmer, 1961, p. 234).

Particularly, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Spain and Great Britain was signed in 1713 (Oliver López, 1995, p. 10). French and British settlement on the Falkland Islands was therefore regarded as a violation of the Treaty of Utrecht in 18<sup>th</sup> century (Honeywell, 1982, p. 30).

### *Masserano Declaration (1771)*

Masserano Declaration reserved sovereignty rights for Great Britain for a certain time that was prompted by the Spanish in 1771. The British could have a port in Spanish territory of the Falkland Islands. Spain did not return the sovereignty to Britain. The Declaration is interpreted as recognition of Spanish sovereignty over the

Falkland Islands. Based on this agreement the British abandoned the islands in 1774 (Oliver López, 1995, pp. 13-15).

#### *First Convention of Nootka Sound (1790)*

The Convention promises no further establishment of new colonies on the West and East coast of South America and it is agreed between Great Britain and Spain in 1790. What is occupied, remains under the administration of the occupant (Honeywell, 1982, p. 32). It states: Great Britain “shall not erect in the future any settlement on the coast... and the adjacent islands occupied by Spain”. The Convention allows only temporary structures for fishing reasons (Oliver López, 1995, p. 16).

#### *Monroe Doctrine (1823)*

Monroe Doctrine stated in 1823 that any European intervention in South or North America in the attempt to colonize the continent would be viewed as aggression. This act would require an U.S. intervention. Monroe Doctrine establishes a basic document of the US foreign policy ("The Monroe Doctrine (1823)."). The purpose was to exclude the European powers from the American continent and to establish the US hegemony (Honeywell, 1982, p. 115). Latin American leaders knew at that time that the Monroe Doctrine is not enforceable due to little world power of the U.S., the lack of forces and dependence on the Great Britain (Crow, 1992, p. 676). When Great Britain reasserted their sovereignty over the Falklands, no military US action was taken (LaRouche, 1982).

#### *Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (1825)*

Treaty was signed between the United Provinces of River Plata (predecessor of modern Argentina) and United Kingdom in 1825. United Kingdom accepted the 1816 Argentine Declaration of Independence. United Kingdom weakened their claim over the Falkland Islands without the signing any additional treaty (Gustafson, 1988, p. 22). The British did not claim any protest or reference to the Falkland Islands in that time (Oliver López, 1995, p. 21).

#### *Convention of Settlement (1850) (called also Convention of Peace Treaty)*

The main target of the convention was to end Anglo-French naval blockade of Rio de la Plata. The convention states: "Convention for re-establishing the perfect Relations of friendship between Her Britannic Majesty and the Argentine Confederation". Even though the convention does not mention anywhere anything about the Falkland Islands, many diplomats and historians believe that Rosas gave up on the Falklands and gave them away in order to end the British involvement in the River Plate. Rosas only forgot to mention the Falkland Islands in the convention ("Falklands & the Convention of Peace Treaty of 1850.", 2016).

#### *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) (known as Rio Treaty)*

The principle of Rio Treaty is that if one state in South, Central or South America is treated by any power from outside, other states are obligated to help the attacked country. The attack on one is considered as an attack on all of them (Honeywell, 1982, p. 115). Even though the Rio Treaty had been signed before the NATO agreement, the United States gave the priority to the United Kingdom during the Falkland War. From the point of view of the Latin American countries (except of Colombia and Chile) the Rio Treaty failed at this point. The US argued that Argentina was an aggressor of the Falkland Islands invasion (Sennes, 2004).

#### *United Nations Resolution 1514 (1960)*

Resolution aims to reestablish the faith in fundamental human rights, in the worth of the human being and in the equal rights of men and women. The main principle is based on equal human rights, self-determination of all peoples regardless sex, race, language or religion. And "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." All peoples have a right to be independent of the colonial power and the colonialism has to be brought to the end in all its forms ("The United Nations and Decolonization.", 1960).

#### *Antarctic Treaty (1961)*

The Antarctic Treaty was signed to end the claims over the Antarctic territory by Great Britain, Chile, Argentina and other future states. Since then, Antarctica can be exclusively used for peaceful purposes like scientific research and Antarctic Treaty protects local nature and prevents any military conflict in the region (Watts, 1992, p.

206) ("Who Will Control the Antarctic? - Fair Observer.", 2013). Due to British territory in South Atlantic the Antarctic territories of Argentina and Chile overlap with the British. The Falkland Islands lies in the Antarctic proximity, and thus give the Britain the right for the Antarctic British Territory (Sahurie, 1992, p. 92-101).

#### *United Nations Resolution 2065 (XX) (1965)*

Resolution 2065 invites Great Britain and Argentina to find a peaceful solution for the Falkland Islands dispute and recommends following the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It considers the United Nations Resolution 1514 with the aim of bringing an end to all forms of colonialism, including the Falkland Islands and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands ("General Assembly Resolutions 20th Session.", 1965).

#### *Communication Agreements (1971)*

Argentina started to provide a weekly air service to the Falkland Islands and health and educational service together with agricultural assistance. Argentina spent £600,000 on the temporary airstrip for Argentine planes and started to construct a permanent airport. Further agreement was signed in 1974 to supply gas and oil to the Falkland Islands (Honeywell, 1982, p. 41).

#### *United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 (1982)*

UN Security Council Resolution 502 asks for an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces and negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina about the sovereignty of the Falklands. The Resolution was created on request of Great Britain immediately after Argentine invasion in April 1982 as a stand against international aggression (Honeywell, 1982, p. 110). Article 51 of the UN Charter gives any state the right of self-defense that was supported by European Economic Community and Commonwealth (Maechling, 1982).

### **1.3 International Law and Human Rights**

- Br occupation has no legal title (Lopez, p. 9)
- Prominent evidence in 19<sup>th</sup>\18<sup>th</sup> cent but poor evidence in 20<sup>th</sup> cent now (Lopez, p. 9)
- Br does not claim any sovereignty over Falk – bcs of missing sources

#### **1.3.1 Self-determination**

- Falk wants to stay Br colony (Honeywell, p. 104, 107-8)
- no desire to be state (Honeywell, p. 107)
- = easy solution in Falk crisis + resolution of high costs (Honeywell, p. 107)
  - for Br. Falk international humiliating – invasion for UN illegal (Curtis, p. 119)
  - Falk sympathetic to some Arg accommodation (Barnett, p. 25)
  - Wishes of islanders? (Barnett, p. 25)
  - Self-determination by Thatcher (Barnett, p. 55)
  - Def: sovereignty, sovereignty x self-determination (Barnett, p. 121)
  - 3 kinds: 1. Falk too small for independence e.g. Grenada, economic independence needed, Falk asking for Br citizenship (Barnett, p. 122)
  - 2. +3. Falk under UK, community not demanding own sovereignty (Barnett, p. 122-123)
  - Churchill rules + UK based on traditions = wishes of Falk (Barnett, p. 123)
  - Sudetenland compared with Falk (Barnett, p. 123)
  - Nonsense of history, WWII experience: no rights of small community (Barnett, p. 124)
  - Self-determination principle = never absolute, sovereignty = relative (Barnett, p. 125)

### **1.3.2 Status of Terra Nullius and Uti Possidetis Jure**

- Sp neutrality during war (Honeywell, p. 112)

### **1.3.3 Was British Invasion in 1833 illegal?**

- Court of Justice = uncertain result (Honeywell, p. 24)
- peaceful occupation as argument (Honeywell, p. 36)
- US did not have a reason to Br claims over Falk (Honeywell, p. 36)
- relations of power? Br wins (Honeywell, p. 36)
- 1833: act of unjustified aggression (Barnett, p. 24)
- for Br. Falk international humiliating – invasion for UN illegal (Curtis, p. 119)
- Br could ask Arg to withdraw Arg forces from Falk (Barnett, p. 26)

### **1.3.4 Re-establishment of International Law in favor of Great Britain**

- UN Resolution 2065 (Honeywell, p. 38)
- \* United Nations as product of US-Br + Churchill and democracy (Barnett, p. 54)

### **1.3.5 Sovereignty over the Falklands**

- Sp.: “closed sea” principle in 1667 + Sp sphere of influence (Honeywell, p. 26)
- Br doubts over the validity of their sovereignty claim (Honeywell, p. 35)
- in 1980: leaseback agreed with Arg: another government -> to freeze question of sovereignty (Freedman, p. 15)



- leaseback definition (Barnett, p. 25)
- if Falk to Arg, then terr. Problems elsewhere (Curtis, p. 119)
- poor Arg argument of historical base (Barnett, p. 125)
- Br are invaded or Falk are invaded? Br territory claimed by Falk? (Barnett, p.126)
- not Arg. territory aggression -> problem -> not recognized by International community (Barnett, p. 126)
- war = only clash of sovereignty (Barnett, p. 131)

### **1.3.6 Breaking International Law and Human Rights by Great Britain?**

- Mauritius issue (Honeywell, p. 105)
- irrelevance of human beings and rights (Curtis, p. 116)
- Br presented as promoter of human rights in media (Curtis, p. 117)
- removal of 1.800 inhabitants -> breaking UN Charter, after: people living in slums, in poverty, population in Diego Garcia misrepresented in front of US (Curtis, p. 118)
- Falkland Islands x Diego Garcia (Curtis, p. 118)
- western leaders would think of removal as immoral (Curtis, p. 119)
- closer Chile + Br bcs of war, selling military equipment to Chile -> Br did not want to damage relationship with Chile due to defense of Falk (Curtis, p. 134)
- Chile fighting against undemocratic groups? Not really! (Curtis, p. 135)
- 90s: remains promotion of human rights + control of UN (Curtis, p. 181)

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## **1. Argentine Politics and Economy**

### **1.1 Retreat from the Colonial Past of Argentina**

It had not been a long time ago when Argentina became independent and started to build own infrastructure and extricated from Spanish rule. In the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century British Empire attempted to conquer the land militarily (Mack, 1992, p. 53).

### **1.1.1 Argentine Independence and British investment**

In July 1807 Britain tried to retake Buenos Aires but British forces were bloodily suppressed and forced to leave future Argentine land. The English invasions are known as *la Defensa* in Argentina and Latin America. The independence of Argentina was proclaimed on 25 May 1816. The Argentine Republic was formally established in 1853. Great Britain began with the infrastructure investment in Argentina, built rail network, established British banks and created Argentine beef and wheat exports to Britain (Calvert, 1982, pp. 18-19). Britain developed a special relationship with Argentina and also Argentina became informal colony of Great Britain (Honeywell, 1982, p. 51-52) (Calvert, 1982, p. 21).

British Empire influenced Argentine culture, social manners and also inclination to nationalism. Argentina has lived in chaos until proclamation of independence in 1816. Finally, in 1920s Argentina succeeded and transformed into a democratic state (Calvert, 1982, pp. 19, 21). Argentina did not like the British involvement in their economy and tried to get free from British imperialism. President Perón came to power in 1945, pursued economic nationalism and refused the British company ownership in Argentina (Calvert, 1982, pp. 19, 21-23).

The Falkland War is seen from Argentine perspective as a fight against British imperialism (Mack, 1992, p. 53) and thus it is a protest against British rule, against British subordination and past colonialism.

### **1.1.2 Peronism and working class**

President Colonel Juan Domingo Perón became a representative of working movements that emerged in the time of industrialization and a newly arising working class in 1930s and 1940s. He established a mass political movement called Peronism. Peronism remained in the Argentine minds until the military junta in 1976-1982 (Calvert, 1982, pp. 22-24) and has had big impact on the future political and economical formations before the Falkland crisis. Authorities have never supported poor people in the past and it manipulated millions of people to fight for rights of working class.

Perón's main task was to build national industry and to establish social welfare that both were missing in the country. Many industrialists and workers welcomed this change. Even though Perón was forced to go to exile, Peronism remained despite the

military coup in 1955 in the country and was a source of instability over many decades. Every denationalization led to mobilization of a mass population. Civilians established left-wing and right-wing guerillas *Montoneros* that led violent conflicts against each other in 1960s and 1970s. Perón was unfortunately the only one who was at least partly successful with workers demands but was not able to keep up with the emerging division among Peronists (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 58-61).

## **1.2 Military Junta**

Military junta represents upper and middle-class population and Peronism represents working class. These two fractions stood in opposition. Military was in power every time when civilian government was from political and economical reasons overthrown. That happened in 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976.

Military junta is linked with nationalistic tendencies and compared to Nazism in Germany (Freedman, 1990, p. 4) (Calvert, 1982, p. 21). Military government attempted to eradicate any signs of Peronism in the years 1955-1972 and 1976-1982. This caused a wave of protests and disorder in the country (Calvert, 1982, p. 52).

### **1.2.1 Isabel and military coup in 1976**

After Perón returned to Argentina and won presidential elections in 1973, many people believed that the situation will stabilize. On the contrary, Peronist movements radicalized and had difficult requirements to meet. Perón was against radical movements in Argentina and many laws against violence were introduced. But the contradictions within Peronism led to the violence escalation and after Perón's death his wife Isabel became President of Argentina. Isabel delegated her remits to Lopez Rega who established the semi-fascist wing Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance that should eliminate any suspected militants.

The crisis grew during the Isabel presidency and violence between army and guerilla movements led to their infiltration in 1975. In the end the Isabel government was turned into military coup on 24 March in 1976 (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 60-66).

### **1.2.2 Videla, Viola and Dirty War**

As soon as the civil government was overthrown and replaced by a new president Jorge Videla (Calvert, 1982, p. 26), military announced a military war against

guerillas and "terrorists". The state war was in fact led against every different ideology from Western and against every suspect in the country (Honeywell, p. 67). The plan was first to use armed forces against guerillas and then against political movements of protesting working class. The country turned into the civil war and there was no place to think about Falkland Islands (Calvert, 1982, p. 45).

Military government was linked with radical economical changes that lowered real wages and increased prices of local goods. Military sought to remove any revolt between civilians. During the Dirty War brutal methods were used. Suspects were kidnapped, tortured and "made to disappear". 15,000 people disappeared in the years 1976-1982 (Honeywell, 1982, p. 67). People in torture were able to convict any person or close relative of any crime (Calvert, 1982, p. 29).

Roberto Viola replaced President Jorge Videla in March 1981 but the economical situation did not improve (Calvert, 1982, p. 30). Military government followed the "military developmentalism" that had a success in Brazil and had been in power for six years – the longest period of time in Argentine history (Calvert, 1982, p. 26-27).

### **1.2.3 Galtieri and military junta on decline**

Galtieri was responsible for a campaign of murder and kidnapping against guerilla movements on the border with Chile and was linked with fear and confusion in Argentina (Dobson, 1990, p. 34). Galtieri became a president in December 1981 during the time when the military power was at risk of collapse. At that time the armed forces were deeply divided but did not believe a return of civilian government. Military junta was not able to gain any support in the population and thus continue in the office (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 76-77). The will of politicians to continue with their program is not enough, the power given by population is needed (Calvert, 1982, p. 28). Military government had only two options: either to allow democratic elections in Argentina or to regain the trust of population through popular action (Mack, 1992, p. 64). Galtieri had a sufficient target on his political agenda that could save his presidential career.

Already in December 1981 the preparations for the Falkland War have started. On 30 March 1982 the most violent demonstration was held in Buenos Aires and hundreds of people were arrested (Dobson, 1982, pp. 37-38). Galtieri was decided to achieve a political success with the Falkland Islands victory and become a new strong leader of

Argentina (Mack, 1992, p. 52). He would be then possibly able to replace old regime of Peronism without wide protests of Argentineans.

### **1.3 Economical Policy of Argentina**

Argentina had been dependent on the British capital and Great Britain has been usually the only import country that used this privileged position in its favor. Already in 1825 the time of mutual economical cooperation began between both countries (Mack, 1992, p. 54). The Argentine economical profits are gained by the only massive export of one commodity - beef (Calvert, 1982, p. 20) and the interdependence causes some problems with the impact on the local Argentine economy.

#### **1.3.1 British Exploitation**

Great Britain has had most of the colonies and wanted to gain some profits after the independence proclamation of certain countries. It is clear that a former colony usually did not have savings and thus could not pay for the imports. After a former colony became independent, Great Britain usually offered a financial support in the form of sterling balances without exchange rates. Sterling balances were blocked in the form of loan from Great Britain so that a newly independent country ended up with the constantly rising state of debt (Greaves, 1954) (Calvert, 1982, p. 20).

In 1824 Argentina received a loan of £1 million from British Empire. The primitive economic structure was not able to hold the foreign loan. With the rising population in Europe there was a need to focus on the market with additional food products (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 52-53). Britain became the biggest trading partner of Argentina (Calvert, 1982, p. 21).

The Ruca-Ranciman Treaty in 1933 contracted a bilateral trade between Great Britain and Argentina. The Treaty established a meat quota in the British market. In exchange Argentina got lower tariffs on coal. The Treaty was created in favor of bigger profitability for Great Britain, Argentineans were exploited by higher prices and bad service, and meant a humiliation for Argentina. It took at least a generation until Argentina forgot its failure and a short-term financial triumph of Great Britain over Argentina (Honeywell, 1982, p. 55).

In 1939 Great Britain could not afford the beef exports from Argentina but Argentina needed to continue with its meat production. Based on this fact, Argentina was forced to accept the payment in a sterling account in London due to the Second World War (Honeywell, 1982, p. 56). This puts Argentina into the dependent position on Great Britain especially if some country decides to ban the beef imports of Argentina (Calvert, 1982, p. 21).

### **1.3.2 Industrialization and Expropriation of British Firms**

Argentine people did not want to experience the same humiliating mistake of the year 1933 with Great Britain. During the Peron's presidency Argentina followed a path of national economic development (Honeywell, 1982, p. 58).

First step was to expropriate British railway network with full compensation. The foreign debt of Argentina was paid off with the blocked sterling balances in Great Britain and the Central Bank was nationalized. The state owned profits were invested into the industrialization and oil industry. Peron wanted to establish diverse Argentine economy with many products for export (Calvert, 1982, p. 23).

### **1.3.3 Foreign Investment and Oil crisis**

Military coup in 1955 introduced the encouraging of foreign investment. 65 percent were from the United States (Calvert, 1982, p. 25). The problems with balance of payments and rising inflation persisted. Foreign capital of the United States reached US\$1.5 billion in 1968 in Argentina. Between 1963 and 1977, 53 Argentine firms were sold to foreign companies and 19 national banks were bought out to foreign parties in the years 1967 and 1969. Foreign banks had 40.5 percent of the total commercial deposits in Argentine banks in 1970 (Honeywell, 1982, p. 60).

Oil crisis in 1972-1973 in the world caused the economical problems to Argentina. Economical expansionary policy of Argentina with the focus on foreign investment and trade shoot the local economy. The international recession achieved its peak in 1975 when the inflation started to grow rapidly (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 63-64).

### **1.3.4 Stagnating Economy during Military Junta**

In July 1976 the Shackleton Report was published. It was shortly after the military junta came to force in Argentina. The Shackleton Report informed about the possibilities of offshore oil discoveries around the Falkland Islands (Calvert, 1982, p.

46). During the oil crisis in 1972-1973 there was a rising competition for oil exploitation in the world community.

In 1976 the local Argentine economy was at the edge of collapse (Calvert, 1982, p. 26). After the takeover of military junta the minister of economy José Martínez de Hoz sought to attract foreign investors with lowering tariff barriers and to decline high inflation with the policy of exchange rates and overvalued peso. The prices of local goods were more expensive than those from imports. This disadvantaged especially local small and middle-size companies like textile, print industry or machinery, metallurgy and electronics. The wages dropped by 50 percent. Domestic and foreign investors rather made short-term financial operations than long-term. The growth in public consumption continued due to high levels of spending in the military, private consumption was on decline and gross domestic investment grew just slightly. Argentines were struggling to survive and foreign investment has not started to flow into Argentinean economy in that time (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 69-72).

It was a mistake not to diversify the Argentine economy. When the European Community decided to stop all beef imports indefinitely in 1975, it was disaster for Argentina. The inflation increased to over 300 percent per year in Argentina (Calvert, 1982, p. 27). The foreign debt had achieved the figure US\$30 billion by the end of 1980. The international community continued to lend money Argentina as it was a country with a strong and growing economy. The Argentine economy grew only by 1.6 percent in the period 1976 to 1980. The total employment was only 30 percent. The companies started to collapse in Argentina based on the panic on foreign exchange markets (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 73-74).

Military junta proved its economical incompetence in Argentina. In 1980 inflation started to rise into three figures number (Calvert, 1982, p. 28). New president Galtieri needed to distract population from the everyday misery of Argentine economical state, so he showed some gestures of humanity and wealth in order to preserve a power of military junta (Dobson, 1982, p. 36-37). It was too late to save the Argentine economy. The inflation rate rose from 87 % to 149 % in the period 1976-1981. The real wages dropped by 18 % and the foreign debt grew from US\$3.2 billion in 1975 to US\$39 billion in 1982. The number of unemployed people was over

2 million in 1981 (Mack, 1992, p. 64-65). Military junta worsened the economical situation in Argentina between 1976 and 1982 and they found themselves in doubt.

The occupation of the Falkland Islands would have distracted people from the local political and economic crisis and would have gained especially the support of locals. Two days before the Falkland Islands were invaded, 10,000 people demonstrated against military junta and 1,000 people were arrested. This meant the end of military junta obviously. The Falkland Islands distraction became true because on 2 April 1982 the invasion began and four days later 250,000 Argentines were on the streets in support of the occupation (Honeywell, 1982, p. 82).

### **1.3.5 Anglo-Argentinean trade**

International community borrowed money to military junta in Argentina in the years 1976 to 1982. In 1976, British banks provided Argentina loans in the high of US\$75 million to Argentina. At the time of the Falkland crisis the number climbed up to US\$2 billion of the British debt. Argentine imports to Great Britain were US\$344 million and Argentine exports US\$226 million in 1980. Generally, the restoration of order with military junta was seen positively by Great Britain and British exports to Argentina doubled between 1976 and 1978. Conservative Party of Great Britain noticed a good potential of increasing business between Great Britain and Argentina. In 1981 British delegation visited Buenos Aires and assumed that there is a good potential for increasing business between Great Britain and Argentina. Britain was seeking for additional export markets in Argentina and came to the conclusion that they will double or treble their trade relationships.

Social or political situation of the country was not taken into consideration. In 1980, Minister of Trade in Great Britain, Cecil Parkinson said: "I believe civil trade with other countries should be determined by commercial considerations and not by the character of the governments concerned. It is my objective to increase our trade worldwide." Britain did not intend to accept almost any victims of local regime. In assisting Argentine refugees Britain offered to accept 75 urgent cases out of 15,000 killed people. Great Britain was concerned to accept refugees because of the potential damage of trade development with Argentina. Britain supported military junta due to its liberal economical reforms and the profitability of Anglo-Argentine trade but the



local situation of suffering people was not taken into account during the years 1976-1982 (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 83-85).

#### **1.4 Foreign Policy of Argentina**

Argentina is convinced about its geopolitical importance in South Atlantic and counts itself alone to the state with special position in the world politics. Argentina lies quite far away from the center of the world scene. This misperception leads to the overrating of own playground in the international politics and becomes main characteristics of the Argentine foreign policy.

Argentina was influenced by European culture and mentality the most out of all Latin American countries due to its European origin. Argentineans may consider themselves European and Argentine nationalist tendencies can be explained by the British imperialism of 19th and 20th century that left traces in Argentine minds. Thus, Argentina tolerated the rise of the United States with resentment. It was hard to accept the decline of the European world power within the international order. Argentina also isolates itself from other Latin American states based on the European heritage.

Argentina has then undefined position in the international order and usually constantly changes its allies and partners (Mack, 1992, pp. 56-59). This weakens Argentine place in the world and hardens to convince states over Falkland dispute as their own territory.

##### **1.4.1 Diplomatic Power in Latin America and Worldwide**

Even though Argentine is known as a land of changing military governments, it has very good base of lawyers that contributed to the development of international law and diplomacy in Latin America. Therefore, Argentina influenced a diplomatic power of world political powers. The “Calvo clause” and “Drago doctrine” prevented Latin American countries from the war based on the company contract or debt to European or American firms. Without Argentine laws the US would have had much bigger diplomatic power. These laws later contributed to the Charter of the United Nations.

On contrary to the previous chapter, Argentina is really good in diplomacy to maintain its established positions. But some countries may regard Argentina as arrogant in its national claims. Based on the historical events, Argentina has never attended on any war in a real military sense, fights every time for a peaceful solution and is defined by its neutrality in the world (Calvert, 1982, pp. 30-36).

At the beginning of the Cold War, Perón did not want to look for allies in the United States, neither in the Soviet Union and worked on the coalition of smaller Latin American states that is called “Third Position”. Perón brought nationalist support of outer territories into Argentina. With the strong confidence of the Falkland Islands belonging to Argentina Perón sought to turn the diplomatic question of the Falkland Islands into the supranational anti-colonial Latin American territorial problem. (Calvert, 1982, pp. 36-37). In 1980 the cooperative efforts were renewed towards Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The United Nations emerged as a mediator between Great Britain and Argentina in 1960s (Freedman, 1990, pp. 5-6).

It is very alarming that the international financial community welcomed the military coup in 1976 (Honeywell, 1982, p. 82). Even though “it seems natural to assume that a military government will want a military solution to a diplomatic problem” (Calvert, 1982, p. 49). Great Britain did not have a problem to continue with exports to Argentina and did not even started with the refugee policy. France did not make any effort to arrest the Argentine torturer Captain Alfredo Astiz and the IMF provided loans to Argentina regardless their political, social and economical situation (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 78, 82-83). The extensive violation of human rights in Argentina in the years 1976-1982 was not taken into consideration of the world powers. International trade and business took precedence over the human rights of 15.000 tortured and killed people in Argentina.

#### **1.4.2 US vs. Argentina in 1976-1982**

Galtieri’s presidency is linked with the “open and militant alliance with the US”. During 1981 military junta started to work on the foreign policy towards the United States and Western world (Honeywell, 1982, p. 81). Galtieri had good military contacts in the United States and believed that the US will back his foreign policy. Galtieri suggested the option of South Atlantic Alliance against Soviet Union

influence in the South Atlantic, Antarctica and Latin America (Dobson, 1982, pp. 35-36).

But the United States government had many requirements after visiting Buenos Aires in September 1981. They requested to stop with tensions towards Chile, to renew the trade agreement with the Soviet Union, to send Argentine troops to Sinai, to be ready to send troops to Salvador if needed, to pursue more democratic system in Argentina and change diplomatic attitude towards Bolivian military coup (Honeywell, 1982, p. 81). Galtieri hoped that if he fulfills the United States requests and creates the alliance with the United States, he would get their support to the Falkland Islands territorial dispute in return (Dobson, 1982, p.36).

### **1.4.3 Falkland Islands and Foreign Policy**

In 1960s Argentina was successful to achieve the United Nations recognition of the Falkland Islands colonial burden and thus partly international recognition. In 1965 the Resolution 2065 states that “Resolution 1514 (XV) and 14 December 1960 was prompted by cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)” (Gustafson, 1988, p. 64). Based on this claim both sides Argentina and Great Britain were invited to negotiate the solution for the Falkland Islands decolonization. The UN should hold the position of a mediator (Freedman, 1990, pp. 6-7).

The negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain in February 1982 in New York seemed to be peaceful. Three parties attended the meeting of the UN in New York: Falkland Islands, Great Britain and Argentina. Great Britain suggested the “lease back” arrangement that would in 99 years provide Argentina the full sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. But Argentina insisted on the quick results and requested a series of monthly meetings where the topic of sovereignty would be discussed. Both parties came to the general agreements and these only confirmed the Argentine assumption that Great Britain will postpone the question of sovereignty in that meeting (Calvert, 1982, pp. 57-58).

It is noticeable that there are the following problems over diplomatic negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain:

1. British procrastination over sovereignty question and loosing patience of Argentina (Calvert, 1982, p. 42)
2. Argentina is not taken seriously by Great Britain in negotiations over the Falklands (Freedman, 1990, p. 10)
3. Great Britain is interested in “wishes” of the Falkland Islands inhabitants but Argentina is interested in “interests” of the Falkland Islands (Calvert, 1982, p. 38)
4. Great Britain has had a bad reputation of the Falkland Islands administration (Freedman, 1990, p. 6)
5. National problems of Argentina like civil war or military junta of three men (Calvert, 1982, p. 44) (Dobson, 1982, p. 39)

In Buenos Aires Great Britain looked like that it did not want to meet the international commitments and has prolonged the negotiations over sovereignty for 16 years (Calvert, 1982, p. 42.). This shows the disrespect towards the Argentine foreign policy and towards Argentina itself. Further, the Falkland Islands wished to stay under British government because of the long history their administration and Great Britain decided to respect their “wishes” in the negotiations with Argentina. But Argentina spoke about respecting the “interests” of islanders. Argentina promised that their interests will be fully respected by the Argentine government and they have nothing to fear (Calvert, 1982, p. 38). Here may be a core of the Falkland Islands dispute. Great Britain is not able to satisfy the Argentine requirements over sovereignty due to the “wishes” of the islanders and Argentina does not see any reason to fulfill their request over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.

Bad Great Britain administration of the Falkland Islands gives Argentina the reason to complain internationally and achieve the recognition of the Falkland Islands colonial disagreement in the United Nations. The diplomatic contacts in the years 1976-1982 were burdened with national problems of Argentina. The country turned into a state of open civil war and thus diplomatic relations were interrupted (Calvert, 1982, p. 44). Additionally, Galtieri was not the only man who led military junta in 1982 but also two another men were involved, their foreign policy was not synchronized and their decision-makings could be executed unexpectedly without previous consultation with Galtieri (Dobson, 1982, p. 39).

Military junta decided based on these reasons to take further steps what regards the Falkland Islands. Military junta was the opinion that the prolongation of the dispute over the Falkland Islands would “affect national honor, the full exercise of sovereignty and the exploration of resources” and decided to solve the diplomatic problem with the military power (Freedman, 1990, pp. 12-13).

The Argentine press *La Prensa* informed that Argentina prepares the ultimatum for Great Britain with possible military invasion over the Malvinas on 29 January 1982 and in February 1982 President Galtieri visited Uruguay to agree on the military action towards the Malvinas (Honeywell, 1982, p. 82). Even though the United States Ambassador was three times that week in Buenos Aires before the Falkland Islands were invaded in April 1982, he did not inform the British government about the Brazilian naval command that started to support Argentine invasion in the Falkland Islands (Calvert, 1982, pp. 59-60). Galtieri planned the military occupation of the Falkland Islands before the February talks. The military occupation of the Falkland Islands was planned to happen on the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the British occupation on 3 January 1983 (Calvert, 1982, p. 56). Argentina did not expect any resistance of Great Britain after the military occupation of the Falkland Islands. Argentina did expect if the Falklands are once lost by Britain, they will not respond to such eventuality like small islands far away from Great Britain (Calvert, 1982, 58-9). Argentina wanted to achieve better cooperation in diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain; therefore the Falkland Islands had to be occupied by surprise and without blood (Freedman, 1990, p. 13).

## **1.5 Defense Policy**

### **1.5.1 Military Exports from Great Britain to Argentina**

The supply of the military aircraft was forbidden by the United States to all Latin American air forces up to 1969. Swedes broke this embargo as first world player and then big race in air force supplying to Latin America started. Argentina was not an exception (Calvert, 1982, p. 51).

Great Britain, West Germany, the United States, France and other states supplied weapons systems to Argentina in the years 1977-1981 (s. Table). Argentina became the second strongest military force player after Brazil with its military equipment. The national spending of Argentina on military forces was 35 %. Great Britain

supplied especially naval equipment and provided military training. Great Britain wanted to gain profits with the arms manufacturing and military supply to Argentina (Honeywell, p. 85).

British government sponsored the Falkland Islands war with their military manufacturing and with the supply to Argentine in the years 1977-1981. And other world powers did so too.

### **Honeywell**

1 Br and others sell weapons to Arg – Br manufacturing has to gain profits!!! (85)  
+ tables 8, 9, 10 on the pages 131-133

#### 1.5.2 Strength of Argentine Military Force

- To take the control over Falk at 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary (56) (Calvert) but something got wrong (38) (Dobson)

Arg defense (39) (Calvert)

- Arg. Defense (50-51) (Calvert)

+ tables of Honeywell at the end of book

## 1. (In)significance of Falkland Islands before 1982

Great Britain or Argentina, both countries have something to say to Falkland Islands and both countries vary with the attitude towards the long-term conflict over Falklands. Great Britain always considered Islands to be a strategic naval station in the South Atlantic and the entrance to the Antarctic (Oliveri López, 1995, pp. 98-100). On the contrary, the retake of the Falkland Islands have been for Argentina rather a question of a national pride and prestige for generations and a termination of the colonial past (Honeywell, 1982, p. 37). The interest in the natural resources around the Islands is linked to both countries interests.

### 1.1 (In)significant Falkland Islands Stay Under British Administration

- Under Br: peaceful settlement (Dobson, p. 18)

The Falkland Islands lies in the sub-Antarctic oceanic and tundra climatic zones ("Tourism Agency", 2016) and the average temperatures ranges from 2 °C to 10 °C during the year (Honeywell, 1982, p. 2) (s. Appendix 1, 2). The natural vegetation of the Islands is typical of grasslands without trees and with the strong westerly blowing winds and little rain (Calvert, 1982, p. 10). As Honeywell (1982) says: "...the islands have been presented as everything from an idyllic pastoral community to a treeless, windswept outcrop."

The Falklands were not populated until the Europe explored the Islands (Calvert, 1982, pp. 4-5). The population declined between the years 1931 and 1982 by 25 percent. The decline in population was due to the leaving young population looking for a better jobs and education in Great Britain mostly. Falkland women were underpopulated by 39 percent in that time (Honeywell, 1982, p. 2).

In 1982 the most of the Falkland inhabitants claimed themselves to be British based on the long history they have with Great Britain since 1833 (Honeywell, 1982). As long as the Falkland Islands claim themselves British, they stay under British rule. Power of the Great Britain and will of the Falkland Islands to be British give the Britain a privilege to govern Falkland Islands without constraints (Oliveri López, 1995, p. 45).

From 1968 to 1977, negotiations focused on the option of economic cooperation with Argentina in the Falkland Islands. Argentina started with the campaign of economic assistance and provided £600, 000 for air service in the Falkland Islands. Argentina realized that the economic cooperation with the Falkland Islands could result into the Falkland's sympathy towards Argentina in 5-10 years. Argentina found out soon that the drilling works around the Islands continue and threatened to invade. New British conservative government ignored the Argentinean efforts and the negotiations were frozen between both countries. Falklanders were willing to cooperate with Argentina on the future institutional solutions of the Islands (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 40-43).

## **1.2 British Underinvestment of Falklands and their isolation**

On 2 December 1968 The Times wrote that the islanders of Falklands live in a "near feudal state of dependency by absentee landlords, under-investment and inadequate government" (Honeywell, 1982, p. 11).

The GDP per capita was £1,477 in 1974 declining. Britain was accepting all exports of the Falklands and imports of all beverages and food are 40 %. The Falklands have one-crop economy because 99 % of exports are unmanufactured wool. Main local industry is a wool industry but the prices varies based on the wool quality as the table below represents (Honeywell, 1982, p. vii, 6, 10-11).

Table 1: Annual Company reports of wool price in years

<b>1972</b>	<b>1973</b>	<b>1974</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1976</b>	<b>1977</b>	<b>1978</b>	<b>1979</b>	<b>1980</b>
57	65	117	56	98	127	115	124	114

Source: Honeywell, 1982, Port San Carlos Ltd.

Sheep farming does not allow the growth of any other crops than oats, so that any other agriculture failed to grow. Without British imports the local food would be too monotonous for locals (Calvert, 1982, p. 11). The local economy suffers from recapitalization. It means that the revenues from the wool industry are not efficiently invested into the local development and infrastructure. The transport costs are really high due to the distance of the Islands which has to be included into the price of



British supplies. The Falkland Islands are dependent on foreign capital, are non-competitive and the economy is on the slow decline (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 6-22).

Two employees provide the employment in the Falkland Islands: The Falkland Island and the Falkland Island Company. Due to missing trainings and appropriate education system expatriated "experts" are preferred for the local jobs rather than the islanders. Any unemployment is exported. Most of the locals do several jobs. The lower wool prices are, the less farmers are needed. This causes a constant work force fluctuation. The local farmworkers have almost no chance to own the local land, the sheep ranching is controlled by absentee landlords. The paved roads are missing, only 10 km are available (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 3, 5, 8-10). Free primary education is provided up to the age of 15 in Port Stanley and in Darwin on East Falkland.

Secondary and further education is available only in Great Britain, Argentina and Uruguay. Medical Care includes the hospital in Port Stanley for basic needs with 32 beds. Difficult cases are transported to the hospital in Argentina. (Calvert, 1982, p. 12).

It is not surprising that the British colonial administration is criticized by Argentine government and a change for a greater level of self-government in the Falklands is requested (Honeywell, 1982, p. 4). The Falkland Islands evince a significant dependence on the external educational and medical services (Calvert, 1982, p. 13) and an isolation caused by mostly supplied foodstuff from the UK. The local interests of the Falklands are not as important as international interests. The Falkland Islands are more significant from the long-term perspective for British government (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 13, 22). The Argentine arguments over Falkland's sovereignty are therefore well-founded.

### **1.3 Political Geography**

The Falkland Islands are 13.000 km far away from Great Britain. The nearest Argentinian port city Puerto San Julián lies only 643 km far from the Falklands (s. Appendix 2, 3). A state who claims superiority over a very distant territory must have a reason to do so. There must be an additional value of the Islands because the isolated Falkland Islands mean the additional transport costs for the British government.

### **1.3.1 Principle of Proximity and Sector Theory**

Based on the principle of proximity the territories that are close to each other are grouped together. The notion of proximity implies that the state territory naturally prolongs the land territory or domain, or land sovereignty of its coast into the higher sea through its territorial sea which is under the sovereignty of that state (Anand, 1980, pp. 162-163).

The sector principle claims that every land reaching the North/South 60° latitude has a right to own the land in the Arctic/Antarctica. The sector principle can be only used in case of the Arctic polar circle due to the continental land reaching the North latitude (Conforti, 1986, pp. 253-254). But the Antarctica is the most distant continent from the surrounding continental territories.

It is logically possible to come to the opinion that the principle of proximity proves the right of Argentina to consider the Falkland land its territory. Unfortunately, the principle of proximity has no meaning in the international law (Calvert, 1982, p. 15). The sector principle together with the British ownership of the Falkland Islands, Shag Rocks, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands gives the UK the right for the Antarctic territory from between south of 60° latitude and between west longitudes 20° and 80° up to the South Pole. At present, British Antarctic Territory covers 17% of Antarctica (s. Appendix 2). 16% of the British Antarctic Territory is disputed and claimed by Argentina and Chile. The 1982 Falkland War increased the scientific presence in the British Antarctic Survey in South Georgia and therefore the British presence in the Antarctica (Sahurie, 1992, p. 14) and also military presence in the Falkland Islands who looks after all Falkland Islands Dependencies in the South Atlantic. The Falkland Islands Dependencies including the Falkland Islands, Shag Rocks, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands may have the crucial strategic value in the future.

### **1.3.2 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS)**

The intensive territorial rivalry between Chile, Argentina and Great Britain started in 1940s due to the Antarctic territories and took till the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. In 1944 there were still no scientific stations in the Antarctica. The population and the number of stations was increased by 150 men and 70 stations 10

years later. Especially Argentina was quiet proactive in the building and maintaining its presence in the Antarctic region. The UK had problems with the maintenance of its presence there. In June 1948 U.S. government suggested to put all the territorial claimants under one world administration. Britain accepted, even though the Antarctica should be a condominium by all the same states. This step helped Great Britain to stay the Antarctic power. The U.S. were afraid that the Antarctic territorial conflict will become a global armed conflict during the Cold War. The Antarctic Treaty won over Argentinian and Chilean territorial claims (Sahurie, 1992, pp. 284-296) and froze all the claims to territories south of latitude 60° until the year 1961. In 1961 the ATS validity was prolonged (Calvert, 1982, p.15).

The Antarctic Treaty “sets aside disputes over territorial sovereignty” (“British Antarctic Survey - Polar Science for Planet Earth.”, 2016) and was signed to be used only for peaceful purposes. It is possible to use the military equipment but only for scientific reasons in Antarctica (Watts, 1992, p. 206). The ATS protects local flora and fauna and its mineral and fuel resources (“Who Will Control the Antarctic? - Fair Observer.”, 2013).

The Antarctic Treaty was signed on 1 December 1959 in Washington by 12 states. The Treaty went into force in the year 1961 and the total number of the Parties to the Treaty was extended to 52 (“ATS - The Antarctic Treaty.”, 2016). The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) expires in year 2048.

The Antarctic (dis)agreements include three Parties - pre-treaty claimants (PTCs), reserved claimants (RCs), and non-claimants (NCs). The PTCs did claim concrete Antarctic regions before and during 1961 treaties and would like to assess their interests after 1948. The RCs did not do any claims before and during 1961 treaties but would like to do so after 2048 (e.g. China, Japan). The NCs have no territorial interests over continent, are only interested in the research (e.g. India) (“Who Will Control the Antarctic? - Fair Observer.”, 2013). The in the past disputed claims of Argentina, Chile and Britain over Antarctic territory can be a problem after 2048 (s. Appendix 4). The Antarctica is not under the control of a single state but of a group of states. This might be a subject of higher competitiveness for Antarctica before and after the year 1948 and lead to the global conflict (Sahurie, 1992, p. 156).

### **1.3.3 Sphere of Influence in Antarctica and Strategic Value of Falkland Islands**

Britain stated in 1929 in Oslo that they have definite rights to the sectors in Antarctica, including all land down to the South Pole. This claims are related to the sector principle. Great Britain wanted to exclude neighbouring countries from Antarctica based on these claims but the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Argentina and Chile continue into the Antarctic seas (Sahurie, 1992, pp.318-319).

Therefore Argentina and Chile have a shared interests in the Western Antarctica. The states of Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain) and European countries (Norway, France) have mutually confirmed each other's claims about Antarctic territories before ATS went fully in force but they did not acknowledge the claims of Chile and Argentina. Chile and Argentina refuse British claims (Sahurie, 1992, p. 94) which are connected with the Falkland Islands in this context. The Falkland Islands lies in the Antarctic proximity, and thus give the Britain the right for the Antarctic British Territory. The national claims of Argentina and Chile about Antarctica and the national proactivity on the Antarctic continent provide to the local government the respect of the local elites as well as the Argentinian domestic and foreign politics towards the Falklands. The state ownership of the scientific station in Antarctica is linked with international prestige and power for all the above-mentioned countries (Sahurie, 1992, pp. 95, 101). The British Antarctic Survey in South Georgia is the important station as the connection between the Antarctica and the Falklands. Port Stanley is a crucial supply and government base for the British Antarctic Survey (Honeywell, 1982, p. 19).

The Falkland Islands have very significant strategic value in South Atlantic. In the colonial past, the Falklands played the role of station for British Naval Force. The naval force on the Falklands needed a coal which was available not far away in Cape Horn (Calvert, 1982, p. 15). The naval station in the Falklands served as a trade point between Pacific and Antarctic Seas in 19<sup>th</sup> century (Livingstone, 2010). Argentina did not need the Falklands in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they had naval base in Tierra del Fuego (Calvert, 1982, p. 16). In 20<sup>th</sup> century, the strategic importance of Falklands was seen in potential defense by Britain during wars. The Falklands proved their strategic value during the battle of the Rio de la Plata with Germans (Oliveri López, 1995, pp.

98-100). During the territorial rivalries over Antarctica in 1940s, the strategic value of the Falklands rapidly rises for both involved countries Argentina and Great Britain. Obviously, Argentina noticed that the Falklands under British administration assign also a right for a British territory in Antarctica. But the territorial interests of Argentina and Great Britain in Antarctica overlap. However, the international territorial interests in Antarctica remain, therefore also in the Falkland Islands dispute.

- In 18<sup>th</sup> cent: Falk = good base to interrupt colonial influence of Sp (Honeywell, p. 27)
- Falk: strategic position for Br (Honeywell, p. 28)
- Br trade in Rio de la Plata (Honeywell, p. 33)
- Br encyclopedia “opportunity to occupy the islands” / Br was interested in LA in that time (Lopez, p. 25)

#### **1.3.4 Oil in Antarctica/Falklands and Changing Oil Prices as Threat**

The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources came in force in 1988 as an additional part of the Antarctic Treaty. The Article 1.8 defines the activities including exploration and development of mineral resources. The drilling enables the obtaining of only small-scale samples and the drilling only into the depth not more than 25 m. The scientific research should not have any impact on the physical changes in Antarctica (Watts, 1992, p. 233). Environmental Protocol “bans all commercial mineral resource activity” (“British Antarctic Survey - Polar Science for Planet Earth.”, 2016).

The global pressure on the natural resources in the world constantly grows. The above mentioned treaties were ratified by the international community because the changes on the world market can trigger the exploitation of Antarctic non-renewable resources (Sahurie, 1992, p. 155). Even though the exploitation of the natural resources in Antarctica would have been allowed by all ATS Parties, the ice cap of Antarctica would have made the drilling very difficult and the new technology would have been needed there. Many geographic features of Antarctica complicates the oil exploitation. The transport costs for non-neighboring countries would be high (Sahurie, 1992, pp. 98, 144-145).

What can change the international needs for oil exploitation? The scarcity of the non-renewable resources is a real threat for the future. The population growth, increasing


demands for goods and services, changes in trade policies or inconsiderable use of products and their recycling can lead to the higher demands for oil resources, thus the shortage in natural resources as oil, water and food. Unstable prices of primary commodities have a negative impact on the future supply as in the case of oil crisis in 1972-3. A great shortage in oil supply can increase the prices of commodities incredibly much and then convince the global powers to exploit the Antarctic resources at their higher transport, drilling and ecological costs (Sahurie, 1992, pp. 156-158). The ATS avoided potential catastrophic scenario in advance.

Thanks to the oil research made by global actors in Antarctica the oil resources were explored in the Weddell Sea basin. The Weddell lies in the Western Antarctica in the disputed area of Argentina, Chile and Great Britain. It was first estimated in 1973 that the Weddell reserves achieve 15 billion barrels, U. S. Geological Survey changed later its figures to 45 billion barrels (Sahurie, 1992, p. 356). The Western Antarctic proximity with the Falkland Islands gives a good reason to suppose oil reserves will be explored also in the EEZ of the Falklands or around other islands nearby. If we look at the EEZ of the Islands, it is possible to notice that the Falkland's EEZ lies in the shallow waters. Based on this fact the drilling will be much easier.

### **1.3.5 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)**

The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is an area not bigger than 200 nautical miles from the state coast. 200 nautical miles corresponds to 370.4 km. According to V. Part of the Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea a coastal state has a right for exploring and exploiting of living and non-living resources in its EEZ ("PREAMBLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA.", 2016).

Picture 1: Exclusive Economic Zone and Shallow Waters around



Source: Wikipedia, 2016

The map (s. Picture 1, Appendix 5) with the two EEZs of the UK and Argentina represents two territorial areas that do not overlap. Nevertheless, both zones are in their immediate proximity and in the coastal shallow waters. Recently, the UN declared that the Falkland Islands lie in the Argentinian waters. The decision was made by advisory committee, so those are only recommendations. The UN recommended to extend the EEZ of Argentina not more than 350 nautical miles (Glaze, Bloom, 2016) (= 648.2 km). The distance 648.2 km is a longer distance than the distance between the nearest place in Argentina and Falkland Islands.

### 1.3.6 Demarcation line of Spain and Portugal

The Treaty of Tordesillas was signed in 1493. Pope Alexander VI. assigned Spain and Portugal the right of control over all areas in the West and East of the hemisphere. The Treaty was ratified between Spain and Great Britain in 17. and 18. century. Spanish demarcation zone lied in the areas “to the west of an imaginary line drawn 100 leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands and running pole to pole”. Only in 1494 the demarcation line was moved 270 maritime leagues to the west. Argentina says that the Falkland Islands/Las Malvinas Islas have ever belonged to Spain until the Argentine Independence in 1816 (Laver, 2001, pp. 65-66).

Britain had no right to occupy the Falkland Islands and evacuate their local inhabitants to Argentina in 1833 according to the Treaty of Tordesillas. The Falklands lay on the Spanish side of demarcation line of 1494. The problem is that Spanish claims were never accepted by other European political powers in 1494. The same could be claimed also about Gibraltar. The inheritance of Spain in the western

hemisphere cannot be valid nowadays because the world would be divided into 2 parts – Spanish and Portuguese. Argentina would be then entitled to rule the Falkland Islands as well as Uruguay and Paraguay (Calvert, 1982, pp. 5-9).

Picture 2: Demarcation lines of Portugal and Spain 1493-1494



Source: Joe Burgess/The New York Times

#### 1.4 Natural Resources of Falkland Islands

While the local economy of the Falkland Islands did not attract any other industry, was stagnating and was constantly exploited by British rule until the Falklands War in 1982 (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 7, 17), Argentine was suspicious about the British interests in oil of the Falklands and in great economic potential of South Atlantic (Oliveri López, 1995, pp. 100-101).

##### 1.4.1 Oil and Fishing before 1982

The oil potential of the area around the Falkland Islands and the potential of Antarctica were the reasons of Argentinean invasion in 1982 according to Air Commodore Frowe of the Falkland Island Committee (Honeywell, 1982, p. 19). During the oil crisis in 1972-3 the price rise caused oil contest all over the world and Britain and Argentina were no exceptions.



The only prospect of oil seemed to have the Falkland Plateau, around other British Dependencies were not explored any sign of hydrocarbons likelihood. In 1991 the appropriate drilling technology have not been developed, but the region remained to be important from the long-term perspective. However, Argentina is the nearest logistic point for oil sales and provides a great security of investments, therefore the Britain have seen it logical to negotiate the fishing and non-renewable resources with Argentina since 1970s. But as soon as the Argentina noticed the drilling efforts in the Falkland EEZ, the negotiations with Great Britain were cut off (Oliveri López, 1995, p. 86-87, 100-101, 105). Oliveri López suggests the following solutions:

- 1.) "full rights to exploitation of natural resources for Argentina" with the revenue percentage paid to the Falklanders
- 2.) natural resources revenue taxes would be collected and given to Argentina
- 3.) the rights and duties of the United Kingdom for the Falkland administration would be recognized for between five and ten years (Oliveri López, 1995, p. 93).

The British Dependent Territory in the South Atlantic posses various fish species in the amount 80 fishes like krill, Falkland herring, croaker, hake or blue whiting. The krill is especially rare in the huge quantities in which was explored by the British Antarctic Survey near the Falklands and South Georgia. There have been the plans to develop fishery industry since before 1982 (Honeywell, 1982, p. 20). The region was a maritime zone free of any regulation (Oliveri López, 1995, p. 95-96). It was clear that the fishing industry would have an important role with fishing certificate sales for the Falkland and British economy.

#### **1.4.2 Potential for Seaweed and Minerals**

The Britain has shown the potential interest in the seaweed around the Falklands. The alginates revenues for local economy were estimated around £12 million in 1968 (Honeywell, 1982, pp. 19-20).

The potential for minerals around the Falklands and neighboring British Dependencies did not show any evidence (Oliveri López, 1995, p. 84).

#### **1.5 Military Base in the Falklands before War?**

- Falkland Security (9) Freedman

United Nations Resolution 55/146 (2001-2010)

Author (year) claims ....

(Last name of the author, year, pp. /p. number of the pages/page)

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
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
## Appendix 1: West Falkland and East Falkland

The Falkland Islands



Source: Honeywell, 1982

Appendix 2: South America, UK, British Antarctic Territory and Falkland Islands



Source: Calvert, 1982





Appendix 3: Falkland Islands and Argentina




Source: Honeywell, 1982

## Appendix 4: Division of territories in Antarctica



Source: Sahurie, 1992. Watts, 1995


Appendix 5: Continental shelf and EEZ of the Falklands and other Dependencies



- Outer edge of the continental shelf
- /// Gran Malvina (West Falkland) with its EEZ and shelf: Recognition of Argentine sovereignty within the briefest possible time period
- ==== Isla Soledad (East Falkland) with its EEZ and shelf: Preservation of British institutions for a prolonged period (leaseback) and/or delay of any accord for the duration of the period agreed upon by both parties
- ||| South Georgia and South Sandwich with their respective maritime areas: Condominium over the territories or joint administration; EEZ and shelf: Joint administration

Source: Oliveri López, 1995

Appendix 6: Total Exclusion Zone of Falkland Islands



Source: Dobson, 1982