

MENDEL UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies

**Political and economic development of the region of
Western Balkans – Kosovo**

Bachelor thesis

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Brno, 2016

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Acknowledgement

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Abstract

SKOUPILOVÁ, N. *Political and economic development of the region of Western Balkans – Kosovo.*
Bachelor Thesis. Brno, 2016

Aim of the thesis is to propose changes in social, political and economic policies in the context of Kosovo-Serbia relations. The theoretical part aims at definition of theoretical approaches of conflict theory and post-conflict development, democratization process, demography as well as ethnicity. The main focus of analytical part is the historical review of the conflict between Serbian and Albanian population in Kosovo, analysis of post-conflict process in Serbia and Kosovo, examination of general elections in Kosovo and analysis of demographic characteristics. Proposal part is based on the results of SWOT analysis which provide a key to proposing possible scenarios and solutions.

KEY WORDS

Kosovo, Serbia, conflict, post-conflict development, SWOT analysis, Operation Allied Force, NATO intervention

Akstrakt

SKOUPILOVÁ, N. *Politický a ekonomický vývoj regionu Balkánu – Kosovo*
Bakalářská práce. Brno, 2016

Cílem práce je návrh změn v oblasti sociálních, politických a ekonomických politik v kontextu Kosovsko-Srbských vztahů. Teoretická část práce si klade za cíl definovat teoretické přístupy teorií konfliktu, post-konfliktního vývoje, procesu demokratizace, demografie a etnicity. Analytická část práce se zaměřuje na historický přehled konfliktu mezi Srbskou a Albánskou populací v Kosovu, analýzu post-konfliktního vývoje v Srbsku a Kosovu, výsledky parlamentních voleb v Kosovu a analýzu demografických charakteristik. Návrhová část je založena na výsledcích SWOT analýzy, která slouží jako klíč k návrhu možných scénářů a řešení.

KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA

Kosovo, Srbsko, konflikt, post-konfliktní vývoj, SWOT analýza, Operace Spojenecká síla, intervence NATO

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INTRODUCTION

Seventeen years have passed since the end of the war in Kosovo yet it is still very sensitive topic. The disputed territory on the Balkan peninsula has been a subject of discussions for a long time. The roots of the hostile relations between the Serb and Albanian population lie in the history. Ethnic Albanian population settled in the territory of Kosovo during the Ottoman Empire and since then two ethnic groups, Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Albanians, were extruding each other. Both nation see Kosovo as a cradle of their civilization. Throughout the history, Kosovo was a part of Kingdom of Serbia, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. With the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (federal republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia with autonomous territories of Kosovo and Vojvodina), the strained relations were worsening.

Throughout the years, Kosovo has been under supremacy of Serbian government which stripped the rights of Kosovo and oppressed the Kosovar population. The oppression was leading to disorder until 1990s, when Slobodan Milošević begin to carry out his plan to deprive Kosovo of Albanians and in the context of whole Yugoslavia, to keep Yugoslavia together, as the republic of the federation were fighting for independence. In terms of Kosovo, the situation was so bad, some may proclaimed the ethnic cleansing being a genocide.

NATO and United Nations played a key role in settling the conflict. Milošević fought the Kosovo Liberation Army and deprived the region of its population. After being reluctant to any negotiations, NATO initiated a humanitarian military mission to stop the violence. NATO deployed almost 50,000 military troops in Kosovo to make Milošević stop the attacks by force. However, the intervention was not authorized by the United Nation's Security Council, the question regarding the legitimacy of the operation arises. From the NATO perspective, it was necessary to stop the crimes being committed on civilians.

AIM OF THE THESIS

Aim of the thesis is to propose changes in social, political and economic policies in the context of Kosovo-Serbia relations. In order to successfully complete the proposal part, an analysis will be performed to obtain all necessary data. The theoretical part aims at definition of theoretical approaches of conflict theory and post-conflict development, democratization process as well as ethnicity. The main focus of analytical part is the historical review of the conflict between Serbian and Albanian population in Kosovo, analysis of post-conflict process in Serbia and Kosovo, examination of general election in Kosovo and analysis of demographic characteristics. The last section of the analytical part is focused on SWOT analysis of mutual relations between Kosovo and Serbia including matrix.

METHODOLOGY

Author approaches the thesis as a case study of Kosovo-Serbia relations. To complete the theoretical part, literature research had been done. Information from different resources were gathered and formed into comprehensive overview of basic theoretical approaches. To complete analytical part, author collected data from official resources of institutions and organizations to provide results complemented by graphical representation and author's interpretation. SWOT analysis is used to identify the strong and weak links of the mutual relations between Kosovo and Serbian as well as potential threats and opportunities. Proposal part is based on the results of SWOT analysis which provide a key to proposing possible scenarios and solutions.

1 LITERATURE RESEARCH

Before the actual review and examination of the issue of Kosovo crisis, it is important to outline the basic terms regarding the concept of conflicts and ethnicity to better understand the meaning and the links between the terms.

1.1 Conflict

The concept of conflicts is a complex issue as many different views may differentiate between different aspects and factors leading to conflicts. When speaking about the issue of conflicts in terms of international relations, collective violence is important to explain. The term defines violence committed against a group by another group or by a group on an individual or by an individual on a group. The actors of the collective violence may also be a state or an agency (Varshney, 2008). When the outside state uses force, we speak about forcible measures which contain broad spectrum from full-scale military operations to undercover operations directed against an individual (Lubell, 2010).

The conflicts can be characterized and defined based on numerous factors such as place, time, intensity, method, motive and so on. In terms of place, we recognize local, regional and global conflicts. The distinction lies in territorial demarcation, whether the conflict affects small areas, the whole region or the whole world is participating. The time aspect distinguishes short wars, which last less than a year, and long wars, which may last for decades. According to intensity, we recognize limited wars, characterized by the limited marked out political goals, and total wars, which may be recognized as an effort to reach an absolute goal such as overthrow of the government or occupation. Another criterion is a method of warfare and the respect for war law (Šedivý, 2011).

When analyzing conflicts, it is necessary to understand the distinction between violence and conflict. If examining the ethnically plural society, it is more likely to encounter conflicts based on identity cleavages. Needless to say, conflicts may occur in both democratic and authoritarian led regimes. Comparing the issue based on the political system, we assume that in democratic systems people have the choice of free expression. In authoritarian regimes, discontent may be kept in silence but later it may lead into an outburst when the system undergoes a liberalization (Varshney, 2008).

1.1.1 The course of the conflict

A conflict is a dynamic process in which all different factors such as structure or mutual relations influence the character of the conflict. Gradual process of the conflict is divided to phases according to the level of development and intensity of the conflict. Understanding the nature and dynamics of the conflict serve us as a tool to manage the conflicts and identify potential threats and risks.

In the sense of dynamics of the conflict, authors identify seven phases. Latent conflict, manifestation or emergence, escalation, stalemate or dead point, de-escalation, dispute settlement and peace-making. The phases may be difficult to distinguish sometimes (Smolík, 2014). Figure 1 provides basic schema depicting the gradual process of a conflict.




Figure 1 - Phases of a conflict

Source: Brahm, 2003

Before the start of the conflict, the system is characterized by a balance where each side carry out their own plans and values without the intentions to start a conflict. The subject of their interest and plans can be a trigger of a conflict, though. However, once the interests are crossed, the balance is disrupted. As soon as the actors of the conflict manifest their differences, the conflict slowly begins. This is the right time to intervene as the emerging conflict can be dealt with as just a problem. If the effort is not successful, the situation escalates and the pressure to solve the conflict is intensified as well as the barriers which hinder the possible resolution (Prorok and Lisa, 2011). When tactics fail or available resources are depleted, the conflict reaches the stalemate point,

when neither side is able to win or back down. If the leader benefits from the conflict, it is difficult to reach for de-escalation or settlement, they may also fear the loss of reputation. At the end, all conflicts become tractable as the collective identities change. The tension is reduced and even the third party may intervene to restore the order and communication. The seeking for solution of the conflict may be forced which leaves the weaker actor of the conflict discontent (Brahm, 2003).

The relation between the opponents is one of the ways to distinguish between the types of conflicts. The course of the conflict may be affected by opponents mutual past history, the number of participants of the conflict, the degree to which the opponents are integrated and finally the level of asymmetry between the opponents (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012).

1.1.2 Armed conflicts

The international humanitarian law recognizes three types of conflicts:

- the international armed conflict,
- non-international armed conflict, and
- internationalized armed conflict.

Even though the predominant type of armed conflicts is non-international conflict, the international armed conflict still persists in international relations (Verhoeven, 2007). As the Geneva Conventions¹ of 1949 appoint, the *international armed conflict* is a conflict or declared war which arose between two or more engaged parties, even if the state of war has not been recognized, as well as the case of partial or total occupation of the territory even without no armed resistance. Generally appointed, this case applies to a conflict between legal armed forces of two different states. (Vité, 2009).

Non-international armed conflicts are defined by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as an armed conflict occurring within one engaged party. Generally speaking, the conflict occurs between a party of governmental nature and a non-governmental party.

¹ Geneva conventions – international treaties obliging the states which have accepted the conventions to obey. The treaties serve to protect vulnerable participants of the conflicts (ppu.org.uk, n.d.)

It is necessary to distinguish between the non-international armed conflict and other forms of violence such as riots, disorder etc. as these forms of violence are not defined as a non-international armed conflict. From a theoretical aspect, it is quite difficult to make a precise definition of the distinction. To appoint whether a conflict could be defined as an non-international armed conflict, there must be certain conditions fulfilled - the level of intensity must reach a certain level and the engaging parties must be organized at a certain level (Vité, 2009). Today, the non-international armed conflicts are the most common armed conflicts characterized by high mortality of civilian population caused by cruel actions of those in charge but this type of armed conflict is not properly handled by the international humanitarian law (Verhoeven, 2007).

The third type of a conflict defined by IHL is an *internationalized armed conflict*. This new concept comprises complex circumstances for appointing the conflict to be internationalized. One of the situations can occur between two groups fighting internally but they are supported by external actor, e.g. different state (Vité, 2009). Another situations could be portrayed as a foreign intervention supporting rebels battling against the government and the last but not least a situation involving two foreign actors who intervene in an internal armed conflict in order to support opposing sides. From a legislative perspective, it is difficult to incorporate the internationalized armed conflicts into the law system even though the factors distinguishing these from the international and non-international conflicts exist, no compromise can be made regarding the law applicable in internal armed conflicts as no bases exist (Stewart, 2003).

1.1.3 Foreign intervention

Foreign interventions have been frequent over last sixty years. Definition of foreign intervention may contain providing an economic and logistic aid, delivery of arms or deployment of foreign troops to help to either rebels or the government. The question is: When does the foreign intervention turn internal conflict into an international conflict?

Many authors argue that the intervention which has a significant impact on the internal conflict, actually internationalize² the whole conflict (Haye, 2008).

When exploring the notion of foreign intervention, it is eligible to define whether the intervention is justified or not. Even if a state as an actor of the conflict acts unjustly does not justify realization of intervention. This is why certain level of actions much be reached in order to morally validate the intervention. If the topic of ethnic cleansing or slavery is discussed, the intervention becomes potentially legitimate solution (Chatterjee and Scheid, 2003).

1.2 Post-conflict development

The term *post-conflict* means reduction of hostilities, peace-creating opportunities in a conflict which may escalate again if the measures are not implemented properly. Post-conflict reconstruction of a state involves series of processes and activities aiming to ensure the improvement of military, political, economic and social conditions. Economic aspect is very important feature of postconflict development as it includes activities such as restoration of social services, infrastructure, conditions appropriate for the private sector development and adoption of reforms which contribute to economic stability and growth (Tzifakis, 2015).

Dynamics of the process are determined by human interactions within social environment. Time is a key factor when overcoming impediments of psychological and structural nature which emerged from lingering conflict. Social aspects of reconstruction are substantial component of peace-making (Jeong, n.d.)

Processes of post-conflict reconstruction has been divided into three phases, from the ending of the conflict through the support of restoration of economic and political structures to ensuring the proper functionality of the whole system:

1. First phase occurs *immediately after the cessation of violence*. During this phase, humanitarian aid is usually provided and units of military intervention are deployed to the region to provide the basic security.

² The process of internationalization is explained in Chapter 3.1.2

2. In the second phase the *restoration of economy, governance and operational structures occurs*. During this phases measures needed to restore basic social services need to be adopted.
3. During the third phase measures preventing the renewal of the conflict are adopted. *Peacekeeping authorities withdraw from the territory* and local administration takes over the normalization process (Naraghi Anderlini and El-Bushra, 2004).

One of the essential steps towards the peace, it is necessary to *restore order and security*. Dysfunctional order is often an originator of disruption of social institutions and the rise of chaos. The effective way to prevent these results is to focus on development of law enforcement from long-term perspective. With the effort to restore the peace in society, it is necessary to *demobilize and reintegrate fighters* back to the society as it servers as a breaking the circle of violence. The process of establishing *interim institutions* is an important part of securing peace and further development (United Nations, 2004).

1.2.1 Actors of post-conflict reconstruction

International actors are essential factor contributing with technical and financial assistance to the post-conflict recovery. One of the valuable roles of international support is creation of national capacity for implementation of post-conflict strategies and programmes. From a long-term perspective, the assistance should also focus on leadership skills and capabilities which secure future effective implementation of policies and decisions. The limitation of *international actor* could be perceived in the lack of sufficient knowledge of local conditions which could be crucial for proposing strategies. In that case, *local, national and regional institutions* provide effective guidance which can later take over the long-term reconstruction (United Nations, 2007).

1.3 Democratization process

The democratization process is defined as a transition from one political system to another towards democracy. The system of transition is not strictly defined. It can be move from authoritarian regime towards full democracy, move from semi-authoritarian

regime towards semi-democratic regime. The concept of democratization shows the dynamic quality of democratic evolution especially in developing countries. Until 1974, only 27 systems were democracies. In 1974, the Third Wave of democratization emerged which is considered to be the biggest democratic wave in the history.

Interesting fact is that some theoretists assume that a successful democratic state can only exist if the society was able to deal with the problems of material nature. One of the key factors of successful democratization is the presence of middle class which acts as a stabilizer of society and the link between the rich and the poor.

1.3.1 The concept of democracy

Theories of democracy basically prescribe how democratization can be realized and what constitutional form and the content of democracy. David Held assumes that cosmopolitan model of democracy exist within two dimensions: *international* and *local*. The international democracy needs a system of global nature such as United Nations in order to be democratized. On the other hand, the local democracies need to strenghten the democratic base of civil society. Joseph Schumpeter approaches the concept of democracy with the idea of competitive democracy. When comparing Robert Dahl's theory, we can state that his approach focuses on procedural aspect of the political process. In Dahl's concept a key element is elective polyarchy (Samarasinghe, 1994).

1.4 Ethnicity³

The precise distinction of ethnicity is notoriously difficult to mount. The recognition of the phenomenon is based on variety of different aspects. Generally, individuals form a group (ethnic group) which is indentified as en ethnically united community related by language, skin colour, religion, location or history. The features mentioned above play a key role in determining an ethnic identity only when there is a shared perception when distinguishing own group from other groups (Smith, 2004).

Ethnicity is a complex phenomenon which changes its form, place and role in society. Mutual relations between different cultural groups and their development and

³ Appendix 1 and 2 depict schema of ethnic distribution of Kosovar population in 1991 and 2000.

socio-economic aspect of their mutual relations play an important role. These factors contribute to the intensity of ethnicity. Ethnicity exists in both developing and developed countries, in countries with different historical development and origin as well as countries influenced by different ideologies. The positive aspect of this phenomenon is binding individuals together and develops the awareness of the social roots. On the other hand, the modern globalized world creates opportunities for problematic coexistence and harmony in multi-ethnic societies (Singh, 2008).

As a reaction to the oppressive homogenization of cultures, individuals embrace primary identities such as ethnic and cultural identity. Cultural identity of individuals could be defined as ethnicity.




Figure 2 - Cultural Identity
Singh, 2008

The most general western concept of ethnicity is the level of individual behaviour. The weakest element is perceived as the way of life also called life style. Traditional ethnicity is different from modern ethnicity. Traditional context sees ethnic diversity as omnipresent. Modern ethnicity came with the evolution of modern world system (Singh, 2008).

1.4.1 Ethnicity and conflict

The issue of ethnicity and conflict often have a common core – territory. It is said, if a territory is inhabited by an ethnic group which is a majority, there is more likely effort to control the territory, demand independence which may result in violence. If a state is inhabited by two or more ethnic groups which are capable of seceding, there is a high possibility of violence in order to keep the borders (Moore, 2016).

To measure a level of ethnic conflict, we might need particular variables such as number of incidents, casualties, number of involved, etc. According to Gilley, 2004, there is a contradiction between the estimation of Samuel Huntington, who upheld the fact that there is an increase in number of ethnic conflicts, and Jonathan Fox, who showed that ethnic conflicts across state borders has not increased in post-cold war era. Civil wars are more common in inter-state wars now which involve ethnic conflict. Considering indicators such as refugees or state failure, it is safe to say, there is a decline in ethnic conflicts (Gilley, 2004).

1.4.2 Ethnic cleansing

Ethnic cleansing is a term which became widely used in 1990s, due to the conflicts occurring in former Yugoslavia. The true meaning depicts getting rid of unwanted members of population of different ethnic background through deportation, displacement or mass killing. Even though world has experienced the cleansing in the past, e.g. the religious cleansing in Europe – disposing Jews and Muslims in order to cleanse the Christian Europe, or forced reallocation of Native Americans in North America; the term of ethnic cleansing in its strictest meaning is truly a phenomenon of the 20th century (history.com, 2009).

As the ethnic cleansing is in a contrary to the international law, the Security Council of United Nations (UN) in association with the crimes committed in former Yugoslavia, defined the ethnic cleansing as a purposeful policy of one ethnic or religious group using the force or deterrence in order to remove civilian population of another ethnic or religious group. It is important to denote the fact that ethnic cleansing is influenced by geographical factors (Lieberman, 2010).

2 ANALYTICAL PART

2.1 History of Kosovo

The process of inhabiting the region of today's Kosovo has been a long journey. There were two main settlers in this area: the Serbs and the Albanians. These two ethnic groups have very different interpretations of their origin. The origin of the Albanians is quite unclear. They consider themselves as descendants of the Illyrians who were ancient settlers of the Balkans (Sotirović, 2013).

From the other perspective, the Serbs are considered to be of Slavic origin. Some authors hold the view that today's Serbs are descendants of Central Asian nomads who invaded Europe along with the Huns and blended with indigenous Slavic population (Youngblood Coleman, n.d.).

In the 13th century, Kosovo became a part of the Kingdom of Serbia. An important milestone is the Battle of Kosovo of 1389 which made a history of the region. The Serbs clashed the Ottoman Empire army making it a big defeat of the Serbs. This event led to the Ottoman supremacy for the following four hundred years which has been written to the core of the Serb nationalism (Knaus and Warrander, 2010). At the turn of the 18th century, the Habsburg army made an invasion to the Balkans but soon was repelled by the Ottomans. As the Habsburgs backed off, the dozens of Orthodox Serbs escaped from Kosovo. The Ottoman Empire solved the reduction of Slavic population by letting the Alban population, professing Islam, settle in that area. This resulted in constant religious disputes between the Albanians and the Orthodox Serbs (Intl Business Pubns, 2012).

During the Big Eastern Crisis in the late 19th century, the disputes between the Serbs and the Albanians continued. After the Congress of Berlin ended the crisis, some of the border areas along with the ethnic Albanians were given to the Montenegro. This accelerated the process of liberation of the Albanians. In 1878, the League of Prizren was formed and aimed to unite the Ottoman provinces within the Ottoman Empire. The league did not accomplish any of its goals because soon after the creation, the league was removed by force. The only positive output was the spread of awareness about the single Albanian nation (Knaus and Warrander, 2010).

2.1.1 Onset of the 20th century

At the turn of the 20th century, during the final period of the Ottoman rule, the region was marked with a disorder and anarchy. Violent Albanians rebelled against the Ottomans which was later intensified by the reprisals of Turkish forces. The Ottoman power fell followed by the fall of national movements. That was the beginning of so called Balkan Wars, which occurred in 1912-1913. The Ottoman Empire was defeated and most of the territory was occupied by the Serbian and Montenegrin army. The Serbian government demanded the access to the Adriatic Sea and the creation of the separate independent Albanian state was its least concern. The independent Albanian state was created in 1912 with the support of Austria-Hungary and Italy with the governance of Ismael Kemal (Duijzings, 2000).

A year later, the new independent Albanian state was approved during the London conference through the Treaty of London. The only hitch was the absence of the national borders (Intl Business Pubns, 2012). Even though Serbia demanded the seaport of Durrës and Kosovo, as stated in the peace agreement, Serbia was given only Kosovo. The act was highly supported by Russia because of the need of the support its ally. At that time, superpowers acted regardless the national borders. This is why the most of the Albanian population found themselves out of the national territory. The biggest region inhabited by the Albanians outside the state was Kosovo (Hall, 2002).

In 1913, the Albanians of Kosovo rebelled against the new constituted power. The rebellion was quickly suppressed by the Government of Belgrade. The era was marked with the Serbian national enthusiasm which is the irony considering what Serbia has done. There was a minority of Serbian democrats who denounced the crimes Serbia committed (Intl Business Pubns, 2012).

From July 1914, when Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, the relations between the Albanians and Serbs were intense. Serbia had to defend its territory against the power of the Triple Alliance⁴ as well as attack the Albanians in Kosovo on the other side including the civilians. Between the WW1 and WW2, Serbia started a colonisation programme with political and strategic intentions. The territory of Kosovo was invaded by Serbian farmers which affected the pension in Kosovo. It made

⁴ Triple Alliance – Alliance formed by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy

its mark on the living situation of the Albanian population which was deprived of the things Serbs were given. The programme attracted over 70,000 settlers but at the end, most of them left the territory for more productive land in Serbia (Knaus and Warrander, 2010).

The coexistence between Albanians and Serbs has always been a zero-sum game⁵. The situation between the wars was very intense and the gap between the nations was deepening. The wounds of the past were the source of everyday terror. During the WW2, the Serbian population was massacred by the Albanian nationalists. The major part of Kosovo was given to Italy after the occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941. The Albanian nationalists aimed to „albanize“ the region. This led to massive escapes of the Serbian population of Kosovo. The other side welcomed Italian invaders with the vision of deprivation of the Serbian supremacy over Kosovar territory. In 1944, Kosovo was liberated by Partisans led by Fadil Hoxha and became a province of Serbia within the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (Intl Business Pubns, 2012).

2.1.2 Tito's regime

After the World War 2, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia dominated and considered itself a political party fighting for the equality of all Yugoslav nations. The motives were nothing but political as the Communist Party desired to recreate an analogy of Stalinism. After the liberation of Yugoslavia, a wave of rebellion struck Kosovo because the Albanians of Kosovo were highly against the practices of communism as well as the unwilling integration into the Yugoslav state. Yugoslav government was definitely not supporting the right of Kosovars for their national self-determination. This led to the state of emergency and Kosovo was proclaimed a territory under military administration (Knaus and Warrander, 2010).

When Josip Tito took office, his regime did not have a clear notion of what the future of Kosovo could be about. The reason is that during war, they had tendencies to avoid the debates regarding this topic because the leader and his communist government feared a bad reaction from the Serbs. But it was time to make decision. There were some solutions to this situations such as leaving Kosovo to Albania, connecting the

⁵ Zero-sum game – a situation when one party dominates, the other party is subjugated (Mojzes, 2011).

territory to Montenegro or split Kosovo between Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia. Ultimately, the decision to leave Kosovo to Serbia was made. The decision was supposed to look like a „friendly“ step forward towards the Albanian population. In fact, the main motive was strictly political (Elsie, 2011).

To show that Tito does not favor Serbs and in any case won't allow discrimination, he opened the borders for the Albanians to move freely to Kosovo. He also forbade migration of Serbs who were banished from the Kosovar territory before, which allowed him to ease the tension that pressured Kosovo for so long. However, the aim of this act was to integrate Kosovo to Yugoslavia, more precisely Yugoslav Federation (Perritt, 2010).

In 1946, the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and in 1947, the Constitution of Republic of Serbia was adopted, creating the constitutional order in Kosovo. The Constitutions designated two autonomous units. In 1948, certain autonomous rights were approved. Although any decision made by autonomous bodies could be abolished by the governmental bodies, having the opportunity to be autonomous was a huge progress. The first time in history of Yugoslavia, population of non-Serb origin was granted rights of ethnic minorities (Bieber, 2003).

In the late 40s, the situation within the territory of Kosovo deteriorated again. The main cause was escalated situation between the Soviet Union and the SFRY. Albania took advantage of the situation and in the lead with Enver Hoxha, Albania criticized the Yugoslav policy oriented against the Albanians and called for defence of the rights of the nation and its identity, as well as the elimination of Josip Tito. Ultimately, the majority of Albanians remained neutral towards both regimes (Knaus and Warrander, 2010).

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia established a strict regime in order to regain obedience of the Yugoslav Albanians. The leader of this regime was Aleksandar Ranković, Tito's right hand, who practiced both physical and mental terror on the Albanians who supported the regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania. As so often happens, even the innocent civilians were arrested based on false accusations. When it comes to the political representation, until 1966, Albanians were basically excluded from it. The

situation was the same in both Yugoslav political parties and Serbian. The situation in public administration was not very different from the federal one. The reason for this was mainly reluctance towards communism but in a way the level of education played its role as well (Elsie, 2011).

Due to this situation, the possible chance of autonomy of Kosovo was nowhere in sight. The amended constitution from 1963 made Kosovo an autonomous region, making the two autonomous units equal. At first glance it may look progressive but in fact, the change in constitution only deepened the gap between the autonomous territories and their „leaders“ making them even more dependent (Knaus and Warrander, 2010).

In 1966, a change was made and Aleksandar Ranković was removed from his position. Josip Tito allowed the liberalization of communism and refined the policy towards the Albanians. He also provided an economic and financial aid for development of underdeveloped territories. The rights of autonomous Kosovo were extended on the basis of amended constitution of the SFRY from 1968 and 1971. The territory was renamed to Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (SAP Kosovo) and own government and constitutional court were established (Intl Business Pubns, 2012).

The Republic of Serbia was stripped of the rights to control the matters of Kosovo without approval of the parliament. The communist regime started to use the Albanian national flags as a symbol of Yugoslav Albanians. Another step was made in favour of Albanians, when the cultural and social institutions were supported, for example establishment of the University of Pristina, scientific institutions, media etc. As already mentioned the problems with insufficient representation in political structures were rectified (Mojzes, 2011).

All these measures ensured the Albanian self-awareness and a desire to create the republic of Kosovo. The desire was very apparent due to the high level of unemployment and persistent economic gap between Kosovo and other territories. One of the possible reasons for the establishment of the republic could be seen in the numbers of Albanians which were twice as big as in the case of the Montenegrins.

In 1968, demonstrations spread across Kosovo. New militant groups emerged supporting the split of Kosovo and Yugoslavia and allying with Albania which was

under the Hoxha regime. The biggest goal for Kosovar Albanians was to become a part of „Greater Albania (Perritt, 2008). It is important to say that the brains behind these actions were extremist individuals. Police was suppressing the demonstration and manifestation by force. Even though the government stated it won't allow any form of pressure and violence, they were aware of the possible consequences so they were willing to make a possible compromise regarding the autonomy of Kosovo.

The situation between the nations in the region was not improving. Because of the improved status of Albanians, the Serbs and the Montenegrins were not content with the fact that they were losing their superior position. The situation from political and economic perspective was deteriorating as well. This led to a massive outflow of the Serbs and the Montenegrins from Kosovo (Mojzes, 2011).

New constitution was adopted in 1974 which was a step forward. The aim of the constitution was mainly the stability of Yugoslavia. Each republic of the Yugoslav Federation dealt with their own issues. The only thing that fell under the common policy was the market policy and everything related to it (Reka, 2003).

The position of Kosovo as an autonomous territory was elevated on the level of the federal republics – they were able to adopt its own constitution and establish the constitutional court and also held the right of veto in Federal matters. As mentioned above, Serbia was stripped of some competencies and after the constitution was adopted, decision making regarding Kosovo was beyond their competencies as well. During this period, the tension between the communism and the Albanian groups grew and constant fights were rampant. Between 1974 and 1981 up to 618 civilians in Kosovo were accused of nationalist activities and the police brutality grew in force to make those accused not forget there is no freedom (Clark, 200).

In 1981, students of the University of Prishtina demonstrated because of the inhospitable study conditions. The demonstration continued with arrests of the leaders because the regime was afraid of possible resumptions. This whole situation led to a massive wave of demonstrations which spread to other towns as well as Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, calling for independence and a tolerable economic situation in Kosovo. The demonstrations were shed blood and were ended by force after

impositioning of emergency. The result of the protests was not only casualties but persecution and arresting followed as well (Reka, 2003).

Serbian governance introduced measures in order to „correct“ the order regarding Kosovo. The communist fraction removed almost two thousand Albanians and Serbs from the party, the ones who were allegedly favouring the demonstration and did not share the same opinion about the way the demonstration was handled. The governance took steps further. Influencing through media to denigrate Albanian population, making accusations regarding the oppressed Serbs and the Montenegrins living in the Kosovo territory. Even though the unfair „campaign“ was accepted more or less positively, the process of „albanization“⁶ of Kosovo was not stopped, it was even intensified. The economic crisis also contributed to the outflow of the Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo (Knaus and Warrander, 2010).

In 1986, Serbian newspaper published excerpts of a draft of memorandum document summarizing the conditions and situation in Serbia, released by the the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. This document analyzed the causes and consequences of political, economic and moral crisis in Yugoslavia. The aim of the document was to make Yugoslavia a loose confederation because the other republics were slowing down the growth of Yugoslavia. Authors of the Memorandum named the originator of the current situation, Josip Tito's regime, which they called „anti-Serbian“. According to the Memorandum, by creating a federal state in favor of „the enemies“ of Serbs, he jeopardized the Serbian nation. He left the actual core of Serbian state to Albanians and was favouring them at the expense of Serbs. The nation was harmed not only socially but economically as well. The Memorandum asked for autonomy restraint and revival of Serbian identity and criticized the current governance. Document was not accepted positively, especially by media. It was criticized and denounced by the current communist leader Ivan Stambolić, who later became a president (Sell, 2002).

⁶ Albanization – process of assimilation to the Albanian culture

2.1.3 Milošević's regime

Slobodan Milošević⁷ was named an apparatchik⁸ of the Serbian Communist Party in February 1986, supported by the current chairman Ivan Stambolić. With Milošević in politics, the conflict in Kosovo escalated. His intentions were to combine the Serbian nationalism and the crisis in Kosovo, remove his opponents and to gain political control over whole Serbia. In April, 1987, Milošević participated in a Communist meeting in Kosovo. He presented himself as a supporter of Tito's regime but after his statement no tolerance for violence on Serbs, he found himself on the other side of barricade. After that, he openly supported Serbian nationalist events even financially. They also created a professional demonstrating squad which demonstrated in different towns as it was needed. By the fall of 1987, Milošević disregarded Serbian president, he devaluated his reputation and his presidential days were numbered (Sell, 2002).

With all that, Milošević was very successful in achieving his goals. He then focused on autonomous territories to gain more supporters in the context of Federation. If he gained a support in autonomous territories and Montenegro, he would be able to control those whole Yugoslavia.

In 1988, Milošević took control over Montenegro and an autonomous territory of Vojvodina but all he encountered was mass demonstrations and protests. In November 1988, there were protests in Prishtina, the capital of Kosovo, defending the autonomy of Kosovo. It was a result of alleged attempts of Milošević to depose popular Tito's supporters from the Communist Party in Kosovo. Serbia had to use an army to get the situation under control. After that, Milošević named his loyal Rrahman Morina a leader of Kosovo. This was followed by strikes of miners which led to the global strikes. They were able to remove Rrahman Morina from his function (Sell, 2002).

In March 1989, the assembly of Kosovo was forced to accept the constitutional amendments regarding their autonomy and competences. By this amendment, the autonomy of autonomous territory of Kosovo and Vojvodina was abolished. Their competencies in the context of federation were denied, they could only manage the self-

⁷ Slobodan Milošević graduated from the Faculty of Law and after studies he worked as an adviser, director of a state corporation and finally as a director of a bank. In 1984, he entered politics as a chairman of Belgrade municipal organization (Sell, 2002).

⁸ Apparatchik – functionary of the Communist party

government office. This resulted in mass bloody riots of Albanians and arrests and persecution. This is when the Albanians were stripped of their rights and expelled from the organizations and health and education facilities. Months later, Milošević made a speech in Kosovar city of Gazimestan to a very large number of Serb population at the celebration of 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. The speech was a helping factor to strengthen his power and authority among Serbs (Intl Business Pubns, 2012).

The abolition of autonomy was an impulse to start resistance which lasted from the end of 1989 to the end of 1990. Albanians were forbidden from civic and state institutions en masse (Drezov, Gokay and Waller, 2014). Milošević became Serbian president in May 1989, and a year later he consolidated his authority, moving the government and parliament to the back. From now on, Milošević directly controlled the Ministry of Interior. He established his own political party – Socialist Party of Serbia, which secured his position in politics (Watkins, 2003).

Meanwhile in Kosovo, the population was strictly controlled by Yugoslav People's Army. Later in 1990, Kosovo and Vojvodina were stripped of the last pieces of their autonomy, from now on, these territories were strictly under the Serbian control. Milošević even adopted a law regarding dissolution of the assembly of Kosovo, which was clearly against the SFRY constitution. It was basically a step initiating the occupation of Kosovo. Human rights were restricted, the media were forbade to report in Albanian, education was limited and was strictly under the Serbian rules. Serbian society was highly influenced by the regime of Milošević. Books spreading the propaganda were released, some private media independent networks were closed and everything Albanian related was shut down – media, educational and health facilities (Elsie, 2011).

Public sector was filled with the Serbs and Montenegrins. Albanians were dismissed which significantly increased unemployment among the Albanian population. Within three years, over a hundred thousand Kosovar Albanians lost their job (Sell, 2002).

Ten years before the war, Milošević was trying to keep Kosovo isolated but they kept the track of the situation in other republics of the federation. Kosovar communists were not trustworthy so the new independent organization gained their powers. One of the

biggest was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), established in 1989. The executives were unexperienced because they entered politics only after Kosovo was deprived of its autonomy. The leader of the league was author and historian Ibrahim Rugova. The Democratic League of Kosovo became very influential union which later gathered over three hundred Albanians. This inspired to the creation of other movements and parties. It is important to say that the reason behind these parties was mainly disputes within the Albanian society. So those who failed in the Democratic League of Kosovo simply created their own party. Soon the scene was filled with the same-structured parties (Perritt, 2010).

The LDK was active within the whole territory of Kosovo and was in charge of coordination of educational and health care activities. Their leader, Ibrahim Rugova, was a symbol of Albanian resistance to Milošević. Because Rugova was opposed to any contact with the KLA, their chiefs considered Rugova a traitor regarding the possible autonomy of Kosovo. The representatives of LDK in Europe along with the U.S. were doing their best to oppose the money flow to KLA (Perritt, 2010).

By canceling the autonomy, Milošević ripped the last pieces of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovars decided to ignore Milošević's efforts so the only option Milošević had was the support of Serbs living in the Kosovo territory. A part of a plan that Kosovo opposition had was demand of release of political prisoners but another protests followed (Elsie, 2011).

The situation was escalating rapidly. Albanians started to ignore all Serbian regulations and assert separation of Kosovo from Serbia. In 1990, they declared independence of Kosovo to be an independent unit of the Yugoslav community, being equal part to all other republics within Yugoslavia. During a secret meeting of Kosovo-Albanian assembly, they validated the constitution which made the independence valid (Bieber, 2003). This was a reaction to the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, but the event was marked with negative responses as no state except Albania recognized Kosovo's proclaimed independence (Perritt, 2010). In late 1991, Ibrahim Rugova submitted a request to the European Community asking for separation of Kosovo. Not only his requests were not granted by Milošević regime or the western world. In 1992, presidential and parliamentary elections were held.

Undisputable winner was Ibrahim Rugova as a leader of the LDK, when he became a president (Reka, 2003). The following period was marked with development of social facilities (educational, health, media etc.).

As the Kosovo state became stronger within its own borders, attempts of Milošević regime to start a civil war were wasted. The era until 1998 was more or less peaceful which was merit of Rugova's policy. The policy was based on idea of no confrontations with Serbian regime as it would only have a negative impact on Albanian population. We cannot forget the fact that during that time, other republics were struggling in war – Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though Milošević was dealing with those events, he did not forget about Kosovo. He made his anti-Kosovo policy even more strict. He took actions to discredit Kosovo and its representatives (Perritt, 2010).

2.1.4 Kosovo Liberation Army

In the 1990s, the economic situation in Kosovo was worsening due to sanctions that had been imposed on the Yugoslav Federation by UN. Ibrahim Rugova was making his attempts to inform the world about the Kosovo crisis but still without any response. This rose question whether his peaceful policy is really helpful and effective. Another radical group led by Rexhep Qosja stood up against Rugova and his policy, making it clear that they demand more radical solutions to the problem (Paes, 2001).

During 1996, the situation in Kosovo escalated even more after few assassinations were executed, hurting mainly Serbian civilians. A year later, another attack was made, this time, against rector of the University of Pristina, who was known for his anti-Albanian attitude. An organization behind the attack was the Kosovo Liberation Army which was said to be an offshoot of the Democratic League of Kosovo. The main aim of the organizations was of course liberalization of Kosovo. The total number of the KLA members was around 20 thousand. The leader was Hashim Thaci. Regarding the existence of KLA, certain speculations appeared. Some suggest that the army was active even before the attack in 1994 (Reka, 2003).

The participation of KLA in the conflict was a final effort to make justice for the ethnic Albanian population and humble the oppressors - Serbian authorities. The Army

was composed of two generations of Albanians. Those of young generation who did not seek a political refuge after they left their homeland, united with those of older generation of Kosovar Albanians (Perritt, 2008).

2.2 The war

To solve the current problematic situation, there were only few options. As a part of the first option, the Albanians were to be left in Kosovo, with own government, outside the Serbia and even Yugoslav Federation. Or splitting Kosovo with respect to the ethnic borders – the area where Serbs are living would stay a part of Serbia and the other area with Albanian population would be an independent and not a part of the Federation anymore. The last option was according to Milošević's idea. Kosovo would be deprived of all Albanians, leaving Serbs in the territory.

This is how Milošević started off with his plan. All Milošević's opponents, who stood up against him, have been removed, he would not stand any resistance as all attempts would be quickly suppressed. In February 1998, Milošević started attacking some of the Kosovar villages with police and paramilitary units. The main of the action was to completely remove the Kosovo Liberation Army and all ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. From February 1998 to March 1999, over 400,000 people left their homes and more than 2,500 were killed (Watkins, 2003).

Milošević was aware of his strong position and power. In the past years, there had been no signs of remarks about the situation from the outside world but later, the United States of America called Milošević to remove his units from Kosovo and start negotiating with Albanians in Kosovo. OSN also imposed sanctions on arms import and the Kosovo Liberation Army. When Serbian deputation went to Pristina to negotiate with Albanians, they were ignored (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003).

Kosovo Liberation Army had under control up to 40% of the Kosovo territory. The power they had fell because of insufficient arms and on top of that, the Serbian army intervened. Serbian units removed all Albanians from some parts of Kosovo (Perrit, 2008). Later that years, USA along with representatives of Russia and four other countries of the European Union started to change their attitude towards the cruel actions of Serbia. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) warned that they are ready to

start air strikes if Milošević would not stop the ethnic cleansing (Drezov, Gokay and Waller, 2014).

Milošević responded by signing an agreement, obliging to lower the numbers of military units in Kosovo and allow the refugees to go back home. Valuable at the first sight, the agreement did not really change the status of Serbian-Albanian relations. The agreement was focused only on the current fights but it did not deal with the main problem and cause of the pain – Kosovo independence (Sell, 2002).

At the end of the year, the fights continued. The Liberation Army ignored the commitments in the agreement of Milošević and he refused any compromises in return. This is when the Kosovo Liberation Army came back to force and started attacking against not only Serbian military forces but also civilians. Serbian units responded with another ethnic cleansing (Perrit, 2008).

At the beginning of 1999, the humanitarian situation deteriorated rapidly as the conflict was escalating. The representatives of the western nations made a plan to organize a meeting with the representatives of Belgrade and Albania which had a significant impact on mutual relations (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003).

However, a conference held in Paris in February 1999 was inconclusive. A peace plan contained placement of peace corps led by NATO in the territory of Kosovo, as well as access to the whole territory of Yugoslavia, including water and airspace. The Yugoslav Federation took the plan as a disruption of their sovereignty. Around the time of the conference, KLA went through a change. The chiefs became publicly known persons and created a government in exile in Tirana⁹ (Drezov, Gokay and Waller, 2014).

The Rambouillet conference held in Paris in March 1999 was inconclusive no less. A successful step was persuasion of the representatives of the Liberation Army to sign the agreement from the first Paris conference and the Albanian side of the conflict moderated their demands regarding the referendum about the future of Kosovo within three years. On the other hand, Milošević insisted on their disapproving attitude towards the peace plan (Davis, 2004).

⁹ Tirana – capital of the Republic of Albania.

2.2.1 Operation Allied Force

With ongoing peace negotiations, the crisis in Kosovo was escalating. Targets under the attacks were mainly civilians on both sides, killed for more or less ethnic reasons. It was an impulse for NATO to intervene and prevent a possible humanitarian crisis.

The NATO airstrikes began on March 24th, 1999, entitled Allied Force. The operation, described as humanitarian intervention, lasted for 78 days. The main aim of the operation was to stop inhumane killings – ethnic cleansing and make Milošević to do following: to stop the violence caused by military operations in Kosovo, removing Serbian military forces, placement of international military units, return of all refugees back to Kosovo and fulfill the conditions of Paris meetings (Janssens, 2015).

Needless to say, the Operation Allied Force was not intended against Serbian population. The main aim was to stop the Serbian governance in committing violence on other nation. When dealing with a massive operation to solve a conflict of such a size, it is important to take into consideration the psychological effect. Because such a big and powerful organization as NATO intervened, the assumptions were the surrender of Serbia.

The Yugoslav Federation considered this act as an enormous violence and declared a state of war. Immediately cut all relations with USA, Great Britain and other European countries and banned all western-oriented media, so the general public was dependent on national media which was largely manipulated (Sell, 2002). Right after the launch of attacks, Serbian military started to terrorize the Albanian civilians. All men were drafted into the war by the Liberation Army and many civilians fled from the terror of Serbian units, NATO bombing and even the call-up (Duijzings, 2000).

By the end of March 1999, NATO launched its second phase of airstrikes, as the Serbian forces attacks were focused not only on military targets but civil targets as well, making the second phase much more intense. These airstrikes were supposed to destroy the infrastructure which would make Serbian military functioning difficult (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003).

As the airstrikes continued, new negotiations started. A people behind the organization of the peace-making were a Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Finnish president Marti Ahtisaari. During that time, the negotiations between the

Intelligent Services of Germany, Russia and Yugoslavia were held (Drezov, Gokay and Waller, 2014). After more than two months of war, Milošević surrendered and accepted the deal which was based on the Paris agreement. The only part left from the agreement was the movement of NATO forces in the territory of Yugoslavia. Serbian parliament ratified the agreement on the June 3. After that, Yugoslavia negotiated with the Liberation Army about the troops withdrawals from Kosovo which was sealed in an agreement on June 9. A day later, on June 10, 1999, NATO stopped the airstrikes. Until Milošević accepted the peace offer, more than 850,000 Kosovo Albanians fled, around 12,000 civilians were killed and 500,000 civilians had been internally displaced (Janssens, 2015).

2.2.2 Evaluation of NATO intervention

Reflection on the NATO operation can be quite difficult and taking in consideration all factors and aspect of the intervention, the final evaluation of the Operation Allied Force may appear as a challenging task. Whether the intervention brought negative impacts, it is necessary to state, that the primary goal – to stop the violence and persecution in Kosovo – was accomplished.

The Operation Allied Force was quite unique. During the intervention, NATO used its armed force during its existence, the first mission to stop violence and crime committed on humans by a state actor, the first mission with the intention to carry out the Security Council resolution issued by United Nations but without the actual authorization of UN. Even though the representation of NATO refused to refer to the event as a war, it was a war as the use of armed force against a state was used. Because of the humanitarian aspect involved in the operation, institutions defending and protecting human rights drew negative consequences (Roberts, 1999).

Most of the critics was trying to find faults in NATO's strategy, anything that could be criticized and then denounced. When assessing the situation NATO was in, certain aspects must be reminded: the participants of the conflict purposed irreconcilable goals without any scruples to achieve them, NATO was already involved in the territorial area, the role of UN Security Council was precluded from dealing with the

crisis and the force would have to be used preventively anyway. After considering these aspects, it is apparent that the starting-point was to intervene (Pharo, 2000).

What was behind the willingness of all NATO members to participate? The answer is probably not the failure of the negotiations during Paris conferences, but lies in the conscience. The states tried to correct the mistakes they made in lax attitude or inability to adopt a sufficient policy and intervene within the ongoing wars in former Yugoslavia (Roberts, 1999).

Many agree on a standpoint that the NATO intervention was morally right but unlawful. This approach may indicate a criticism of international law. It is obvious that the law should undergo a change because if the morals allow us to justify the humanitarian (military) intervention, it should be legally justified as well (Greenwood, 2002).

2.3 Post-conflict development

2.3.1 United Nations assistance

After the Operation Allied Force, United Nations in cooperation with other organizations were responsible for creating and providing public security structures and local police force – Kosovo Force (KFOR).

The responsibilities of KFOR included:

- ensuring public safety and order
- establishment of a secure environment for refugees to return
- demilitarization of KLA and other Albanian militant groups
- support and cooperation with the administration council
- protecting borders, and other. (Janssens, 2015).

The same day the Operation Allied Force was ceased, UN's Security Council established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The structure of UNMIK with its pillars is depicted in Appendix 3.

The responsibilities of interim administrative council:

- supporting the establishment of autonomy and self-government

- basic civilian administrative functions
- managing the development of interim institutions, and other. (Janssens, 2015).

UNMIK authorized an temporary international civil administration and consisted of four pillars: civil administration by UN, humanitarian assistance by UN's Refugee Agency (UNHCR), democratization and institution-buidling by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and economic reconstruction by the European Union (Katayanagi, 2002).

Within 2 months after the end of NATO intervention, 850,000 Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo and 100,000 of the Serbian population in Kosovo fled to Serbia. During fall of 1999, political parties have been formed and the interim (temporary) administrative council launched its function at the beginning of 2000 (Elsie, 2011).

2.3.2 Political development of Kosovo

The elections in 2000 and 2002 constituted a structure for Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. PISG included an Assembly, President, Government and Courts. The Municipal elections held in 2000 were boycotted by Serbs and the following elections reported to have only 20 % of participation.

In 2001, the first elections for Kosovo Assembly supervised by OSCE were held. As a result all political parties formed all-party unity coalition and Ibrahim Rugova was elected as a President with Bajram Rexhepi being elected as Prime Minister. Security Council adopted „Standards fo Kosovo“ which consisted of priorities which were necessary to establish Kosovo's institutions. The document came in to force in 2004 through Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan In the first half of 2004, riots hit Kosovo, which was believed to be the worst event since the war in 1999. Unsubstantial incidents led to escalation of disorder, which soon subsidied (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2015).

The same year, LDK and Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) formed a new coalition which excluded Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and Reformist Party ORA. Forming the coalition secured Ramush Haradinaj (member of AAK) a position of Prime Minister. Excluded parties PDK and ORA opposed the coalition and since then

accused government of corruption. A year later, the Prime Minister Haradinaj was accused of war crimes by the ICTY but in 2008, he was released. His successor Bajram Kosumi announced his resignation after the coalition of LDK and AAK agreed on changes in leading the Provisional Institutions.

After the death of President Ibrahim Rugova in 2006, new president Fatmir Sejdiu was elected by Assembly of Kosovo. Out of total 120 votes, Sejdiu gained 80 votes. A chair of the Prime Minister was taken by former KPC commander Agim Çeku. The participation of Kosovo Serbs in political process remains marginal (UNMIK, 2006).

In 2007, Finnish diplomat Martii Ahtisaari proposed a plan to UN’s Security Council of settlement between Prishtina and Belgrade. The aim of the plan was to devolve a local government, military and civil protection and special protection of non-Albanian communities. The Ahtisaari plan was supported by United States and European Union (EU) but strictly opposed by Russia. Prishtina accepted the settlement, but Serbian side rejected (Elsie, 2011).

In February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo declared independence. Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, who replaced Agim Çeku, declared that equal opportunities of all Kosovo inhabitants will be provided and the discrimination will be eliminated. In June 2008, new Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo came into force which was followed by establishment of Ministry of Foreign Affairs which contributed to plan of realization of diplomatic missions (UNMIK, 2008).

Participation in Parliamentary elections



Figure 3 – Participation in parliamentary elections 1
Source: idea.int, 2011

The Figure 3 shows the participation of Kosovo population in parliamentary elections held in 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2014. It is apparent from the graph that the voter turn-out never exceeded level of 50 %. The level of 50 % of eligible voters who participated in the elections was almost reached in 2004, when 49,52 % came to vote. In 2007, 43,23 % eligible voters participated in elections. In 2010, the participation increased by 2,39 %. In 2014, the participation in parliamentary elections declined by 2,99 % in comparison with the previous year.

The central assembly election in 2004 represented Albanian majority as well as Kosovo’s minorities (Turk, Bosniak, Roma, Egyptian, Serbian). The event was perceived by outside world as a step forward towards multi-ethnic Kosovo. To secure the order and prevent unexpected events, NATO provided 2 000 troops.

POLITICAL PARTY	PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)	45,3 %
Democratic Party of Kosovo(PDK)	28,7 %
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)	8,3 %
Ora Citizens’ Initiative	6,3 %

Figure 4 - Results from the Kosovo elections in 2004
Source: ndi.org, 2004

The results from this year’s elections basically *copied the results from the elections of 2001*. The LDK led by the President Ibrahim Rugova won with more than 40 %.

2.3.3 European Union assistance

As a supporter of Kosovo independency, EU Council established European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in 2008. The mission is only temporary and will persists as long as Kosovo authorities need to gain enough experience to provide the benefits from the rule of law area to all members of the society. Again, Serbia opposed this plan and suggested the UMNİK to continue (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2015).

As stated above, European Union takes actions to support the rule of law in Kosovo so from 2007 to 2011, EU provided 680 million euro as a support. The audit performed a revision to analyze the efficiency of of EU assistance in the rule of law in Kosovo. The results confirmed that the efficiency is not on the level as it should be as

delays or doubts occurred. However, generally speaking, the progress is slowly improving and the rule of law records its success in the fight against crime and corruption (eca.europa.eu, 2012).

UNMIK and EULEX arranged constitution regarding the transfer of obligations from UNMIK to EULEX in the field of law, security (police) and customs. As Serbia was opposing the plan, United Nations and Serbian side started negotiating with the effort to restore UNMIK which was highly opposed by Kosovo (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2015).

European Union contributes with its financial assistance to peace-keeping, institutional and economic development and already mentioned rule of law. During the era from the end of Kosovo war till 2007, EU provided 3,5 billion euro. Needless to say, Kosovo is the biggest receiver of EU assistance per capita in the world.




Figure 5 - EU Assistance to the rule of law area (2007-2011)

Source of data: eca.europa.eu, 2012

Figure 3 shows the comparison of total value of funds and funds provided to the rule of law by European Union to Kosovo. Within the outlined period, the total value of funds did not cross the lower boundary of 190 million euro. The total amount provided for the five-year period was 1,2 billion euro. The amount assigned to the rule of law in total is 680 million euro. This implies that the value of funds assigned to the rule of law makes 56 % of total EU assistance.




Figure 6 - EU Financial Assistance in 2011 (Western Balkans)

Source of data: eca.europa.eu, 2012

Figure 4 shows the distribution of EU funds among the states of former Yugoslavia in million euro in 2011. Kosovo is provided 68 million euro which is the highest level if considering EU assistance per capita – 116 euro (in comparison with Serbia – 28 euro per capita, Albania – 31 euro per capita, Croatia 36 euro per capita).

2.3.4 Political development of Serbia

Since the chaotic era of 1990s, Serbia coped with number of problems but also managed to push the development through economic and democratic reforms. Serbia is heading to the European Union so the main precedence of the Serbian government is the integration. In 2008, Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement which came into force two year later. Serbia was able to prove its ability and effort to fully cooperate (Grbic, 2010).

The main goal of the government is accession to the EU so in December 2009, Serbia officially applied for EU membership. To be qualified for the membership, the process of self-development and improvement is awaiting. The issue of the Yugoslav conflicts arises regarding the trials of Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić and the Kosovo bloodshed. Serbia expressly opposed the constitution of independence of Kosovo in

February 2008 and immediately complained to ICJ which confirmed that Kosovo did not violate any international law (Woehrel, 2013)

The local, parliamentary and presidential election were held in May, 2012. The representative of Democratic Party (DS) rising president Boris Tadić won over Tomislav Nikolić of the Serbian Democratic Party by only 1,2 %. Due to the no majority in votes, runoff elections were held between Tadić and Nikolić. This time, Nikolić won the elections with almost 50 %. The loss of Boris Tadić was a subject of discussions as many believed, it was sort of a punishment for bad economic situation in Serbia and corruption.

The formation of new government was rather difficult because the plans to form coalition of Democratic Party and the Socialists failed. New Prime Minister became Iвица Dačić who is believed to be the „manipulator“ in the issue of changing coalition. Serbia was strongly influenced by sustained economic crisis which naturally effects the morala of the population. Serbian government managed to improve its reputation by establishing a anti-corruption program. Among other problems that Serbia has been facing is the issue of autonomous territory of Vojvodina which demands more rights, on the other hand, the Serbian government keep strictly the province. Some conflict situations emerged in southern Serbia which is inhabited by Albanian majority. Albanians complained about the lack of support and discrimination which cause minor confrontations (Woehrel, 2013).

2.4 Demographic changes

Demographic characteristic of Kosovo has been influenced by ethnic diversity of the region. With the outflow of Serbs and Montenegrins and high birth rate of Albanians, the rate of Albanians increased from 1961 to 1991 by 15 %. In 1991, Albanians were majority population group in all Kosovo regions except for northern regions which were inhabited by substantial numbers of Serbians (Klemenčič and Žagar, 2004).

If we look back, the trend of decreasing in Serbian and Montenegrin population had begun after the end of WW2. The trend was even more intensified during the civil

wars in Yugoslavia during 90s. Rationally, newly established independent republics would show an increase of the most numerous nation present. Between 1941 and 1981, more than 100 000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo and from 1989 to 1993, over 6000 Serbs, 1 200 Montenegrins and 9 700 Albanians left Kosovo. On the other hand, we also have to consider the forced migration. During the same period, almost 300 000 Albanians from Kosovo were forced to move (Popov and Gojković, 2000).

Appendix 1 and appendix 2 depict the comparison of ethnic composition of the territory of Kosovo in 1991 and 2000. As we can see, the general distribution of ethnic groups within the territory didn't change very much which is very typical for northern regions which has been inhabited mainly by Serbian population. The south of the territory is inhabited by Bosniaks, Gorani and Torbesh groups. Maps also depict the distribution of Roma minorities within Kosovo.




Figure 7 - Estimates of the total population of Kosovo
Source: icty.org, 2002

Figure 5 shows the estimates of the total population of Kosovo in between the years 1948 and 1998 in five-year intervals. The population growth reports a growing trend which was during the whole examined period until 1998, respectively 1999, when there is a significant impact of the war on population growth.




Figure 8 - Ethnic composition of Kosovo and Serbian population in Kosovo
Source: icty.org, 2002

Figure 6 presents ethnic composition of Kosovo population between 1948 and 1991. If we compare the results displayed in Figure 5, we can prove the growing trend of Kosovo population. As it is apparent, the major ethnic group is still Albanians which is caused by the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo and increased birth rate of Albanians. The percentage above each column represents the population growth since the previous census.

2.4.1 Migration

Before the year 1989, most of the emigration from Kosovo was represented by young men migrating to central and western Europe for unskilled work. During 1970s, the wave of emigration decreased due to the creation of new jobs in public sector (Dobruna, 2015). Within the ten-year period before the war when the autonomy was abolished, over 150 000 Albanians workers lost their jobs. This raised migration to western Europe countries. Leaving Kosovo was the only way to escape poverty and uplift the quality of life. During the war in 1998-1999, almost one million refugees escaped Kosovo to Albania, western Europe and USA. After the war, the immigration conditions are not so beneficial from Kosovo migrants anymore (Russell, 2014). People who immigrated during the period between 2000 and illegal migration wave, left the country for: migration for family reasons, legal migration for education and work, and

illegal migration due to poverty, corruption, unemployment and no bright prospects (Dobruna, 2015).




Figure 9 - Average age of emigrants from Kosovo
Source: undp.org, 2014

Figure 7 shows the age composition of migrant men and women at the time of their emigration. The values prove what was stated above, majority of emigrating population were young people seeking for better job opportunities.




Figure 10 - Asylum seekers in EU
Source: indep.info, 2015

Figure 8 depicts the numbers of asylum seekers in European Union between 2008 and 2014. Red bars represent Kosovar asylum seekers in EU out of total amount of asylum seekers represented by blue bars.

Even after relative stabilization of the region and declaration of independence, data show a growing trend in migrating Kosovar population seeking new homes within European Union. The possible explanation could be unfulfilled expectations from independence. The social and economic problems persisted in society and people rather left the country. In fact, after 2008, the rate of migration increased by 20 %.

2.5 SWOT ANALYSIS

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • signing the Brussels Agreement on normalization of mutual relations • cooperation with international actors • effort to integrate to european community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serbia refuses to recognize the independence of Kosovo • high rate of corruption • low level of economic development • persisting strained relations • boycott of institutions and events
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • improving relations within the framework of EU conditions • attractng foreign investors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • tension in regions inhabited by minorities • refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent state • recognition of Kosovo's independence by the members of EU

Figure 11 - SWOT analysis

Strenghts	Importance	Probability	Rating
signing the Brussels Agreement on normalization of mutual relations	0,6	4	2,4
cooperation with international actors	0,2	3	0,6
effort to integrate to european community	0,2	3	0,6
Weaknesses			
Serbia refuses to recognize the independence of Kosovo	0,25	-5	-1,25
high rate of corruption	0,1	-3	-0,3
insufficient social policies	0,25	-4	-1
persisting strained relations	0,3	-5	-1,5
boycott of institutions and events	0,1	-3	-0,3
Opportunities			
improving relations within the framework of EU conditions	0,3	5	1,5
mutual respect	0,45	4	1,8
foreign investments	0,25	3	0,75
Threats			
tension in regions inhabited by minorities	0,45	-5	-2,25
refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent state	0,35	-3	-1,05
recognition of Kosovo's independence by the members of EU	0,2	-2	-0,4

Figure 12 - SWOT analysis

By analyzing strenghts, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, we were able to identify importance, probability and rating which allow us to idenfy the future trend of mutual relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

When counting strenghts (3,6) and weaknesses (-4,35) we get -0,75. When counting opportunities (4,05) and threats (-3,7) we get 0,35. If we subtracte the results we get number -0,4. Negative marks proves that mutal relations between Kosovo and Serbia will be rather report negative progress.

If we evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the table 12, we see that weaknesses dominate. Unfortunately, the mutual relations between the two nations are so deeply rooted in the past that it will take enormous amount of time and effort to make changes.

3 PROPOSAL PART

The conclusion of SWOT analysis proves that the mutual relations are so damaged, that the negative development of relations is anticipated. Each particle of the SWOT analysis serve as a tool for identification of possible solutions of the current situation.

In 2013, the Brussels Agreement was negotiated between Kosovo and Serbia to normalize their relations. As Serbia is aiming the accession to the European Union, it is necessary to fulfill given conditions. Serbia must amend the relations with neighbouring countries including Kosovo. The fact that both sides allowed the negotiations is a huge step forward for possible future solutions. The Agreement brought Serbia closer to European Union but it is likely to be a situation to nothing but profit – open door of EU. The effort to integrate to european community is a strong link. The needed development is a long-term process for both parties but eventually, one day they could benefit from the partnership. Cooperation with international actors such as United Nations, NATO or European Union is a huge potential for both states. These organizations provide necessary resources and guidance which could be beneficial for further development of both countries individually but from a long-term perspective it could contribute to appeasement within the territory. Both countries should focus on the strengthening of the relations with international actors and should take appropriate actions to prelude the internal boycott as it would influence the positive partnership.

The issue of recognition of Kosovo independence has been a subject of discussions and negotiations for years now. As the attitude of Serbia is apparent, it is not beneficial to push Serbia into betraying own persuasion. However, both parties should learn how to coexist because the constant disorder affects the potential

development. Governments should focus on the elimination of corruption, during elections it has very negative impact and often results in boycotts. Policy should be also oriented on the social level. Hostile living conditions are the cause of disorder and emigration. Governments should protect the peace in the region and attract foreign investors, new job opportunities should be opened which would have a positive impact on the demographics of Kosovo and Serbia.

CONCLUSION

The thesis focused on the analysis of the course of Kosovo conflict and the post-conflict development after the war between Yugoslav army led by the president Slobodan Milošević on one side and Albanian rebel group Kosovo Liberation Army on the other side.

The issue of Balkan wars has been highly discussed as it was a source of violence, mass killings, oppression, denial of human rights and displacement of population. The roots of the issue in this context was ethnic diversity and unification under one federation. Disputes and efforts of particular leaders to keep the federation together led to war.

The evaluation of mutual relations between Kosovo and Serbia is very complex issue and requires a knowledge of historical context. After the chaotic 1990s period, both Kosovo and Serbia are on the path towards development but it will be a long journey. Both countries have problems with economic situation, corruption, ethnic disorder which result in outflow of population. The governments should rationally think about the future of their countries and learn how to coexist as neighboring countries. Serbia is should not be forced to recognize Kosovo as its independent state but on the other hand, Serbia should not exact submission from Kosovo as it is no longer legitimately autonomous territory.

The thesis made an analysis of the mutual relations between Kosovo and Serbia from the historical perspective, post-conflict development in the context of political and demographic development. SWOT analysis helped identify the characteristic elements of the mutual relations which could be a starting point to make a change.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAK – Alliance for the Future of Kosovo

EU – European Union

EULEX – The European Union Rule of Law Mission

IHL – International humanitarian law

ICJ – International Court of Justice

ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

KFOR – Kosovo Force

KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC – Kosovo Protection Corps

LDK – Democratic League of Kosovo

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ORA – Reformist Party ORA

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PDK – Democratic Party of Kosovo

PISG – Provisional Institutions of Self-Government

SAP Kosovo – Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo

SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

UN – United Nations

UNMIK – The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

WW1 – World War I

WW2 – World War II

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APPENDIX

Ethnic Majorities 1991



Yugoslav Census (1991)		
Albanian	1,596,072	81.6%
Serbian	194,190	9.9%
Muslim	66,189	3.4%
Roma	45,745	2.3%
Other	53,989	2.8%
Total	1,956,185	



NOTE
The majority of ethnic Albanians boycotted the 1991 census. The table on the left reflects official estimates made by the Yugoslav Institute of Statistics.

Appendix 1 - Ethnic distribution of population in Kosovo in 1991

Source: UN, 2000

Ethnic Majorities 2000

Estimate Based on KFOR and UNHCR Surveys



Change in Serb Communities


The maps to the left compare Serb communities between 1991 and 2000.

1991 data are taken from the Yugoslav census.

2000 data are taken from the KFOR map 'Ethnic Distribution' dated 13 April 2000 and the UNHCR/OSCE report 'Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo' dated February 2000.

Appendix 2 - Ethnic distribution of population in Kosovo in 2000

Source: UNHCR, 2000



Appendix 3 - Schema of four pillars of Civil Administration in Kosovo

Source: Dursun-Ozkanca, 2015