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**The Government Formation in the Czech Republic in 2013:  
A Case Study Based on the Theory of Political Coalitions**

Bakalářská práce

Vedoucí práce:

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**Declaration**

Hereby I declare that this paper is my original authorial work, which I have worked out on my own. All sources, references, and literature used or excerpted during elaboration of this work are properly cited and listed in complete reference to the due source.

In Olomouc, on 18<sup>th</sup> April 2024

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# 1. Introduction

The national elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic in 2013 produced a surprising outcome. The new populist party, ANO 2011, secured 18.65 percent of the votes, establishing itself as the second-largest party in the parliament. On one hand, significant disparities in ideologies, communication, and party structure exist between ANO 2011 and the established parties. Additionally, this emerging type of political party attracts a significant portion of votes from the traditional parties. On the other hand, given its substantial electoral success, ignoring its influence is no longer feasible. Consequently, the response of established parties to ANO 2011's rise is a compelling area for analysis. They must determine whether to acknowledge each other's distinct differences and choose to antagonize while shunning cooperation, or consider ANO 2011 as a potential coalition partner to address the challenge of forming a minority government. A similar analytical framework applies to the examination of ANO 2011 itself — a party that evolved from critiquing all political parties and elites to becoming an integral part of establishment coalitions.

Furthermore, due to the constitutional framework supporting a proportional electoral system and a multiparty system, the formation of coalition cabinets frequently occurs and represents a pivotal moment in Czech politics. The country has witnessed several coalition government crises and early elections, underscoring the importance of comprehending the process of coalition negotiation and the strategies employed by political actors. Although this election occurred 11 years ago, understanding the processes of government formation involving anti-establishment parties remains crucial to today's debates over the strengthening of populist parties across Europe. Yet, a comprehensive case study detailing the behavior of populist actors in post-election negotiations in the Czech Republic is lacking, a gap that the present bachelor thesis aims to address.

This thesis will primarily analyze the party behaviors of ANO 2011 in 2013 under the framework of political coalition theory. The research questions of this thesis are as follows:

- 1) Was ANO 2011, as an anti-establishment party, less attractive to other mainstream parties for negotiation after the 2013 elections?
- 2) What were the motivations behind ANO 2011's decision to form a coalition with its rhetorically antagonized establishment party after the 2013 elections?
- 3) Which theoretical coalition model does the government coalition in 2014 belong to?

The thesis is primarily divided into three essential parts. The first part focuses on the theoretical basis, specifically the theory of political coalitions. Here, I will expound on the two mainstream theories: office-seeking theory and policy-seeking theory. Both theories encompass several models designed to classify and predict government formations, which will significantly contribute to the empirical part of the thesis. This part draws heavily from seminal works such as *The Theory of Political Coalition* (1962) by William H. Riker, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (2012) by Arend Lijphart and *Přehled moderních politických teorií* (2000) by Blanka Říchová. The second part serves as a brief introduction to the political and party system of the Czech Republic. It will outline the limitations of the constitutional framework, examine the ideological spectrum, and provide a concise overview of all relevant parties and their status during the 2010s. The last part is the empirical segment, which will analyze how governments are formed under the circumstance that ANO 2011 gained a significant number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies during the elections of 2013.

This bachelor thesis is a case study using the methodology of process-tracing, which is one of the essential tools of qualitative analysis. Process-tracing enables a detailed and thorough understanding of the causal mechanism, which is the process through which one factor or multiple factors lead to another, resulting in a particular outcome. By tracing the sequence of events, decisions, and interactions among key actors, process-tracing enables the uncovering of the underlying reasons behind the formation of coalitions or the failure to form a government. Moreover, process-tracing provides a contextual understanding of the government formation in 2013. By examining the

specific context within which decisions were made, it could be better assessed the impact of factors such as party policy preferences, electoral dynamics, institutional rules, and public opinion on coalition negotiations.

## 2. Theoretical part

### 2.1. Definition of coalition

The pioneer of the theory of political coalitions is political scientist William Harrison Riker. Riker endeavored to apply mathematical logic to political science owing to the imperative need for a scientific model of political behavior. He contends that not only political science, but all social scientists are striving to develop a system of rigorously verified generalized models precise enough for predictions, akin to those in the physical sciences.

Riker elucidates the concept of “coalitions” by initially drawing upon David Easton’s definition of “*politics as the authoritative allocation of values for society*” (Easton, 1971). This underscores the notion that political scientists should primarily view the study of politics as an examination of social behavior, extending beyond mere governance and authority. Riker subsequently outlines three categories of authoritative decision-making concerning the allocation of value (Riker, 1962):

- A. *Decisions made by individuals.*
- B. *Decisions made by groups by conscious processes.*
- C. *Decisions made by groups in a quasi-mechanical way.*

The most debatable category among them is category B, as even in autocratic regimes, some decisions are promoted by groups rather than solely made by dictators themselves. Moreover, if there are more than two players involved in situation B, it creates opportunities for forming coalitions. Consequently, in Riker’s book, the theory of coalitions is generalizable and can be applied to all politically related issues, including the formation of coalitions during wartime and decision-making processes such as those within the United Nations Security Council.

On the other hand, Estel W. Kelly’s definition of a coalition is grounded in four key conditions (Kelly, 1968):

1. *A group of individuals or groups of individuals who agree to pursue a common and articulated goal;*
2. *These groups pool their relevant resources in pursuit of this goal;*



3. *They engage in conscious communication concerning the goal and the means of obtaining it;*
4. *And they agree on the distribution of the payoff (benefits) received when obtaining the goal.*

Through Kelly's conception, we understand that forming a coalition is a natural social behavior. The primary distinction of a political coalition from others lies in its goal, which is inherently "political" in nature. "*Hence, both a coalition among pressure groups to influence the application of rules by the executive structures of government and a coalition among parties to form a government can be considered political coalitions*" (Kelly, 1968). Here in my thesis will be mainly discussed only the institutional aspect of forming political coalitions.

## **2.2. Types of institutional coalitions**

In addition to the term "coalition", some scholars also employ the word "alliance" to denote specific institutional cooperative arrangements. For instance, Maurice Duverger suggests that an "alliance" entails a more enduring cooperation between political parties, such as the German parties CDU-CSU (Novák, 1997). Conversely, Giovanni Sartori utilizes "alliance" to signify a transitory coalition (Novák, 1997).

The timing of coalition formation is indeed crucial and is influenced by specific party systems and electoral rules. Miroslav Novák, in his book (1997), delineates the distinct characteristics found in various party systems. For instance, in a strict two-party system, the formation of a coalition is uncommon and typically occurs only during wartime or in times of severe economic and political crises (Novák, 1997). In less rigid bipartisan systems with first-past-the-post voting, such as the contemporary United Kingdom, the negotiation process for forming a coalition often concludes before the onset of elections, resulting in pre-electoral coalitions. According to Chiru's research, cabinets formed by pre-electoral coalitions tend to be more stable, with a 42% lower risk of early election termination (Chiru, 2014). In systems with two-round majority voting, as seen in France, coalition formation typically occurs immediately after the first ballot. During the first

round of French elections, major political parties usually run independently, with none typically able to secure more than 50% of the votes. Consequently, during the second round, parties often coalesce into two loose alliances to increase their chances of winning. Post-election coalitions are more common in countries with proportional representation systems like the Czech Republic, where the mandates gained by the winning party are insufficient to form a single-party government.

From an institutional perspective, Novák (1997) classifies coalitions into three main types: “electoral”, “parliamentary”, and “governmental”. Electoral coalitions pertain to candidates, parliamentary coalitions to Members of Parliament (MPs), and governmental coalitions to ministers. Parliamentary coalitions are divided into two primary categories: “pro-government” and “anti-government” (or “oppositional”). Pro-government coalitions are sometimes referred to as “supportive” or “legislative” coalitions, indicating instances where minority governments in parliament rely on votes from MPs of other parties without those parties being part of the government. Among the types of coalitions mentioned, governmental alliances necessitate the closest connection between the parties. Parties within parliamentary coalitions may act relatively independently, focusing more on providing “alternative support” for specific bills. In contrast, forming an electoral coalition may simply require an agreement based on shared hostility toward a common adversary. Governmental coalitions, however, demand a higher level of consistency in ideologies and political programs among participating parties.

In this thesis, the discussion will primarily focus on the formation process of governmental coalitions.

### **2.3. American tradition and the office-seeking theory**

The theory of political coalition was built in consideration of the so-called “office-seeking theory”, which is mostly the research direction of American political scientists, thus classified as the “American game-theoretical tradition”. The core of “office-seeking theory” is the assumption that all the political parties’ fundamental goal is to

maximize their winning possibility by getting into the cabinet, more precisely to “*maximize, not their votes, but their control over political office*” (Strøm, 1990a). American scholars by using mathematical models based on the game theory endeavor to analyze the after-election battles between all the political parties as the decisive fight over government positions. While coalition cooperation is just one of the methods for parties to gain better results in the struggle for office mandates. American approach of analyzing is largely in accordance with the assumptions that Riker proffered, while the rational choice theory plays an essential role, it principally revolves around “minimax strategy” which means that all the actors of game are more like selfish decision makers primarily prioritizing their own interests who are solely concerned with advancing their personal agenda. Consequently, they aim to maximize their utilities by minimalizing the efforts they exerted. The conception of “minimal winning coalition MWC” that we will detailly discuss in the chapter 2.6 is in reference to this minimax thought approach. Besides, office-seeking theory also need to be based on other two conditions: 1) the votes every party gained must be proportionally equal to the mandates they have in parliament; 2) The government posts must be sufficiently important and attractive so that all game participants consider them the greatest reward for the efforts invested in their struggles. “*In parliamentary systems, power means participation in the cabinet, and maximum power means holding as many of the cabinet positions as possible.*” (Lijphart, 2012). Failure to secure a position in the government results in defeat, with the next opportunity for participation arising only through new elections.

Since the American approach of the political coalition theory is closely related to the worth of government posts, “*the more ‘valuable’ government is, the more likely MWCs will be form*” (Nyblade, & Strøm 2009). According to Strøm and Müller’s study, three factors indicate changes in the office’s value (Müller, & Strøm, 1999):

1. *The richness of the spoils of office,*
2. *The policy-making opportunities that holding office entails,*
3. *And the expected electoral gains (or losses) resulting from incumbency.*

On the other hand, Laver and Shepsle (1996) asserted that not all government positions

can be evaluated equally (Říchová, 2014). For example, the prime minister always holds the highest position and has power to set the overall direction of government, then relatively more authoritative posts include the Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Interior or Home Affairs. Therefore, the allocation of ministerial positions, and who will occupy them, might be crucial in negotiating coalition formations.

#### **2.4. European tradition and the policy-seeking theory**

The American game-theoretical tradition is, to a certain degree, overly reliant on models and has often been criticized for its detachment from reality, for example, the main problems consist of the ignorance of the importance of each party's different policy preferences, analysis based purely on mathematical calculations, and a lack of analysis of the parties' internal factors, among others. On the other hand, the European game-theoretical tradition is "*above all a tradition of empirical theory*", and the "*coalition studies within this tradition have been essentially empirical attempts to fit the experience of European coalition government to an inductive theory*" (Laver, & Schofield, 1998).

Firstly, according to Laver and Schofield, political coalition studies ought to prioritize an examination of the unique constraints governing coalition bargaining within each political system, "*each has a different written constitution, a different set of historical conventions and precedents, and all of these things can have profound effects on the final outcome*" (Laver, & Schofield, 1998). Secondly, European coalition studies often underscore the significance of policy preferences among all parties involved in the coalition negotiations. The "policy-seeking theory" posits that political parties prioritize the implementation of their preferred political agendas and tend to exaggerate their own influence over policies, rather than solely focusing on obtaining government positions. Due to the closer attachment between the executive and legislative power in most European political systems, parties aim to secure voter support primarily as an endorsement of their program, which they subsequently seek to implement in the lower

chamber with the obtained support. Thus, gaining government posts is not the primary goal of the election fight, as described by the game theorists of the American tradition. Consequently, the European tradition also incorporates an ideological and programmatic dimension in the considerations of forming governments. According to Budge and Laver “*most policy-driven coalition theories, ... operate on the basis that both the coalition that forms and its policy are in some sense predictable from the objectives of parties within the system*” (Budge, & Laver, 1993).

## **2.5. Three types of coalition governments**

To address the ambiguity surrounding Riker’s information effect, which contributes to non-minimal winning coalition formation, Lawrence Dodd employs a clearer method in his book *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government* (2015) to analyze the emergence of coalition governments of various sizes. In his view, exist two decisive variables for government formation: 1) “*a generalized a priori willingness to bargain*”, and 2) “*information certainty*” (Lubbert, 1983). *A generalized willingness to bargain* refers to the situation in which all parties are open to the possibility of forming a cabinet coalition with one another. *Information certainty* pertains to two factors: 1) “*weight*” and “*prior moves*”, the former one means the votes that parties gained during the last elections, and “*prior moves are the various bargains, offers, counteroffers, and so forth that parties have made*” (Lubbert, 1983). Accurate calculation of potential coalition sizes necessitates perfect information regarding weights, while guarding against the risk of aligning with undesirable partners requires perfect information about prior moves.

From Dodd’s standpoint, if the bargaining constraints weigh heavily on the parties, then the formation of minority governments will become a trend. If parties face limited constraints on their willingness to negotiate and information certainty is high, then the reality will lead to the minimal winning coalitions. In the same circumstances of bargaining, if parties are uncertain in their information, the possible result is oversized coalitions.

Table 2.5. the three types of coalition government

(resource by author based on Lubbert, 1983).

	<b>High willingness to bargain</b>	<b>Low willingness to bargain</b>
<b>High information certainty:</b>	Minimal winning coalitions	Minority / undersized coalitions
<b>Low information certainty:</b>	Oversized coalitions	

## 2.6. Minimal winning coalitions WMCs

After a parliamentary election the most crucial moment is forming the government. If one of the parties obtains an absolute majority according to the election results, then the undoubted fact is that a single-color government will be established. However, in most multiparty systems with proportional election systems it is difficult to achieve such a great deal of gaining more than 50 % votes. Therefore, coalescing with other parties is inevitable.

Unlike Downs in his *An Economic Theory of Democracy* assuming that “*political parties (a kind of coalition) seek to maximize votes (membership)*” Riker’s *size principle* demonstrate that parties are more likely to minimize their size of winning coalitions to maximize the certainty of winning (Riker, 1962). If at some stage of negotiation “*some proto-coalitions can form a minimal winning coalition and others cannot, those that can may have a strategic advantage*”, because “*those who can form a minimal winning coalition may be able to agree on a more profitable arrangement of payoffs*” (Riker, 1962). If the award of winning an election is fixed, then it is better to have less partners, so that each individual player could expand their own portion of the total payoff. “*The basic assumption of minimal winning coalition theory is both simple and quite plausible: political parties are interested in maximizing their power*” (Lijphart, 2012). Therefore, such winning coalition will only embody those parties that are necessary to give it a majority status. The minimal winning coalition is defined as one which will lose its majority and be blocked in parliament by losing any coalition member.

The problem of the conception of minimal winning coalition is that it is too blurred to precisely predict which cabinet will be formed. For example, in the parliament with totally 100 seats, party A gained 15, party B 36, and party C 18, if B coalesces with A, their gain is totally 51; and if B coalesces with C, their gain is 54. Arithmetically similar outcomes might result in the formation of numerous possible minimal coalitions after just one election, as predicted by our current model. Consequently, many scholars are dedicated to establishing additional criteria to enhance the precision of predictions.

### **2.6.1. Minimum size coalition**

The first criterion is “size”, this point of view was first put forward by Riker. “*If political parties want to exclude unnecessary partners from a coalition cabinet to maximize their share of cabinet power, they should also be expected to prefer the cabinet to be based on the narrowest possible parliamentary majority*” (Lijphart, 2012). Let us still use the above-mentioned example: according to *size criterion* for party B it is more advantageous to make a coalition with A than C, since in the former coalition B’s 36 mandates contribute about 70.6 % of the cabinet’s parliamentary support, but in the latter one only 66.7 %.

In addition, William A. Gamson is associated with the size criterion. In the discussion about Caplow’s coalition study of triads (1956), Gamson attempts to correct his prediction of the situation: “ $A > B > C, A < (B + C)$ ” by applying his *cheapest winning coalition* model (Gamson, 2012). Caplow’s predicted coalitions are “*BC or AC*”, since both A and B have strong incentive to seek the weak man C as a coalition partner, and for C it is possible to choose on either basis. While Gamson points out that C will prefer the coalition BC to AC, “*because he expects that the stronger A will demand a larger share of the payoff in accordance with his superior resources*” (Gamson, 2012).

### **2.6.2. Minimum party numbers coalition**

The second criterion of the prediction model of minimal winning coalition is the number of game participants proposed by Michael Leiserson from the “bargaining

proposition” view. He suggests that coalitions comprising the fewest parties are more likely to be formed, because “*the parties desire to form governing coalitions as easily as possible and to maintain them as easily and for as long as possible*” (Taylor, 1972). Thus, if exists a situation: party A gains 23 seats, B gains 35, C gains 12 and D gains only 5. The minimum size criterion predicts winning coalition as BCD, while the minimum parties criterion’s prediction is AB.

### **2.6.3. Minimal range coalition**

The criteria that I have discussed above mainly concern the so-called “office-seeking theory”, because their predictions are based on the size or numbers of the game players, or more precisely political parties. Under the European tradition with the emphasis on the importance of policy preferences, De Swaan suggests that actors tend to follow the “*satisfying*” behavior rather than a “*maximizing manner*”, because when choosing alliances, actors are more inclined to seek alliances that fulfill their goals rather than pursuing potentially optimal outcomes (Lubbert, 1983). The minimal range criterion offers a new way of predicting, it assumes that political parties choose their coalition partners in accordance with the distance between them and others on a left-right ideological scale. The less “spaces” they have on the scale, the more possible such coalition will be formed.

For example, in a post-electoral situation of what Table 2.6.3 shows (example provided by Lijphart 2012), the minimal winning coalitions include ABC (55 seats), ADE (33), BCD (59), BE (54) and CE (59). However, MWCs in accordance with the minimal range criterion exclude BE and ADE, because the “spaces” in other coalitions are only 2, but for coalition BE is 3, and coalition ADE has 4 “spaces”. Therefore, ABC, BCD and CE are optimal here.



Table 2.6.3. minimal range coalition (Lijphart, 2012)

Parties:	A	B	C	D	E
	(Left)			(Right)	
Seats:	8	21	26	12	33
Minimal winning:	ABC, ADE, BCD, BE, CE				
Minimal range:	ABC, BCD, CE				

#### 2.6.4. Minimal connected coalition

The next criterion is proposed by Robert Axelrod in 1970 in his book *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with applications to Politics* (Lijphart, 2012). In his prediction, the most likely formed minimal winning coalitions are those that are “connected, or closed, in the sense of consisting only of parties adjacent to one another on a left-right scale” (Luebbert, 1983). In other words, when seeking a coalition, a political party tends to ally with other parties that are ideologically most similar, essentially their “neighbors” on the left-right scale. This tendency reflects a “margin-dependent manner”, wherein the similarity in policy preferences minimizes the costs of marginal adjustment (Luebbert, 1983). If two parties alone are insufficient to form a minimal winning coalition, they will proceed to iterate the process with their respective neighboring parties, employing an incrementalist approach until they secure a majority of seats.

For instance, in the scenario illustrated by Table 2.6.4, Lijphart contends that “*minimal connected winning coalitions are not necessarily minimal winning coalitions*” (Lijphart, 2012). Despite the larger size of coalition CDE, comprising a total of 71 seats, the inclusion of party D in the coalition is deemed necessary as a role for connectivity.

Table 2.6.4. minimal connected coalition (Lijphart, 2012)

Parties:	A	B	C	D	E
	(Left)				(Right)
Seats:	8	21	26	12	33
Minimal winning:	ABC, ADE, BCD, BE, CE				
Minimal connected:	ABC, BCD, CDE				

### 2.6.5. Policy-viable coalition

According to the policy-viable coalition theory actors ground their decisions solely on policy rationale. Lijphart states that, “*if we assume that parties truly care only about policy instead of holding office, real power resides in the legislature, where major new policies have to be enacted, rather than in the cabinet*” (Lijphart, 2012). Under such a pure policy-seeking logic, the party that controls the median member of the legislative body in parliament effectively could act as a policy dictator. Because “*parties to the left of it will be unwilling to tolerate a move in a rightward direction*”, and the same logic applies to right-wing parties as well. Thus, the party with the median legislator can form a parliamentary majority with either left-wing or right-wing parties (Budge, & Laver, 1993). Such pivotal party is called as “*core party*” (Lijphart, 2012). For example, in the situation of what Table 2.6.3 shows, the core party is Party C, therefore the predicted coalitions are ABC, BCD and CE.

### 2.6.6. Measuring ideological distance

Due to the minimal winning coalition models (chapter 2.6.3, 2.6.4 and 2.6.5) derived from policy-seeking theory, measuring the ideological distance has become crucial. Michael J. Laver and Ian Budge, in their book *Party Policy and Government Coalition* (1992), devised a method to estimate the position of political parties in a one-dimensional policy space, specifically on a left-right scale, based on their party programs. The first step involves collecting election programs. Secondly, the text is divided into several quasi-sentences, with each quasi-sentence representing a single

statement. Thirdly, each quasi-sentence is coded according to a scheme comprising seven domains (external relations, freedom and democracy, government, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups), totaling 54 categories (see Graph 2.6.6) (Laver & Budge, 1992).

The calculation of individual parties' positions on the left-right policy dimension is facilitated by the Index RILE. This index is derived from the addition and subtraction of 26 categories, with half representing right-wing opinions and the other half leftist. The Index RILE is calculated as the sum of the right categories minus the sum of the left categories (see Table 2.6.6).

Graph 2.6.6. Coding categories of Domain 1. (Laver & Budge, 1992).

<i>Domain 1 External Relations</i>	
101	<b>Foreign special relationships: positive</b>
102	<b>Foreign special relationships: negative</b>
103	<b>Decolonisation</b>
104	<b>Military: positive</b>
105	<b>Military: negative</b>
106	<b>Peace</b>
107	<b>Internationalism: positive</b>
108	<b>European Community: positive</b>
109	<b>Internationalism: negative</b>
110	<b>European Community: negative</b>

Table 2.6.6. RILE method of estimation the party position on left-right dimension (Kožušníková, 2012).

Variables attributed to the right (%)		Variables attributed to the left (%)
104 – Military: positive	Minus	103 – Anti-Imperialism: positive
201 – Freedom and Human right: positive		105 – Military: negative
203 – Constitutionalism: positive		106 – Peace: positive
305 – Political authority: positive		107 – Internationalism: positive
401 – Free market economy: positive		403 – Market regulation: positive
402 – Incentives: positive		404 – Economic planning: positive
407 – Protectionism: negative		406 – Protectionism: positive
414 – Economic orthodoxy: positive		412 – Controlled economy: positive
505 – Welfare state limitation: positive		413 – Nationalization: positive
601 – National way of life: positive		504 – Welfare state expansion: positive
603 – Traditional morality: positive		506 – Education expansion: positive
605 – Law and order: positive		701 – Labor groups: positive
606 – Civic mindedness: positive		202 – Democracy: positive

### 2.6.7. Summary of MWCs

Given the abundance of prediction models stemming from the theory of minimal winning coalitions, Michael Taylor and Michael Laver sought to ascertain their precision through a statistical method, focusing on the formation of 132 government coalitions in twelve Western European countries between 1945 and 1971. They employed criteria such as “minimal size SW”, “minimal ideological diversity DW”, “minimal party number EW”, and “minimal connected MCW” to evaluate these models. Their findings underscore that *size principle* does not significantly influence coalition formation (Laver, & Taylor, 1973). Notably, Axelrod’s minimal connected winning model (MCW) yielded the highest predictive value, followed by its subset EMCW, which integrates MCW and EW, then comes the criterion “pure ideology” model DW (Laver, & Taylor, 1973). This outcome underscores the pivotal role of ideology in the government formation process.

Despite the logical and rational appeal of the theory of minimal winning coalitions,

extensive engagement by political scientists in developing new models, the empirical evidence suggests that the occurrence rate of minimal winning coalitions is not sufficiently high in practice. Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, in their work *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, conducted an analysis of 196 cabinets formed in situations where no single party obtained a parliamentary majority in twelve European democratic countries between 1945 and 1987. Their findings reveal that out of the total cabinets studied, only 39.3 percent (77 out of 196) constituted minimal winning coalitions, while 23.5 percent were surplus majority (or oversized) coalitions, and 37.2 percent were minority cabinets (Laver, & Schofield, 1990). In the book *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Arend Lijphart also presents data on cabinets studied between 1945 and 2010. Except for the case of minimal winning one-party cabinets, the proportions of appearance for various cabinet types are as follows: minimal winning coalition cabinets at 38.9 percent, minority one-party cabinets at 17.1 percent, minority coalition cabinets at 11.4 percent, and oversized coalition cabinets at 32.6 percent (Lijphart, 2012).

These findings highlight how other coalition formations support and enrich theories regarding minimal winning coalitions (MWCs). They indicate the diversity of political contexts and dynamics, leading to the emergence of various coalition configurations. Recognizing the prevalence and attributes of different coalition types improves our understanding of coalition politics and governance structures in democratic systems.

## **2.7. Surplus majority coalition**

The surplus majority coalition, also known as an “oversized” or “grand” coalition, refers to a coalition government that includes one or more redundant members who do not significantly contribute to their total parliamentary mandates. Despite their non-participation, the government maintains a legislative majority. From a rational perspective, the presence of a surplus majority coalition is unconventional. As the number of government positions is fixed, the inclusion of redundant coalition partners

dilutes the representation of other parties within the cabinet. Moreover, the negotiation process can be exceedingly demanding due to the diverse requirements of potential coalition partners. Even after government formation, the continuous balancing the needs of numerous political parties proves to be a formidable task.

The reason that could lead to the formation of an oversized cabinet is explained by the policy-based theories as an addition to the minimal winning theory. Lijphart proposes that, in practice, parties are more inclined to prioritize their policy preferences, which can potentially lead to the expansion of coalition size and scope, rather than adhering strictly to forming minimal range coalitions. He states that, “*each party naturally prefers to form a cabinet that will follow policies close to its own policy preferences; a cabinet in which it participates with parties of about equal weight on both its left and its right is ideal in this respect*” (Lijphart, 2012).

## **2.8. Minority cabinet**

A minority government arises when no single party secures a parliamentary majority, leading to the formation of a cabinet that lacks control over the majority of mandates in the legislature. This scenario, often termed an “undersized” government, presents challenges and complexities in governance. For scholars focusing on political dynamics, the emergence of a minority cabinet is typically viewed as an anomalous or counterintuitive occurrence, often attributed to strategic miscalculations or failures in coalition negotiations. Minority governments confront substantial opposition during the legislative process, hindering their ability to fully exercise executive authority.

The explanation of the rational logic behind forming a minority cabinet is related to the “policy-viable” theory (chapter 2.6.5). Under the condition of the non-existence of strongly overwhelming left or right parties, the role of an ideologically centrally located party that governs the median of legislators will be dominant during the policy-making process. Laver and Schofield (1990) even state that a minority cabinet containing this *core party* could still be “policy viable” and an effective government.

### **3. Political system of Czech Republic**

#### **3.1. The constitutional framework**

The constitution serves as the foundational document delineating the operational framework within distinct nations, establishing the protocols for various processes such as the dissolution of parliamentary chambers, the appointment of new cabinets, and the procedures for casting votes of confidence. Institutional factors exert significant influence on government formation, encompassing not only the explicit provisions of formal constitutional laws but also entrenched customary constitutional practices.

During the nascent stages of the establishment of the independent Czech Republic, extensive deliberations within the party of Civic Forum (OF) revolved around the adoption of either a proportional or combined electoral system. Ultimately, the decision was made in favor of a proportional system with a 5 percent national election clause for the Chamber of Deputies. Notably, the entire state operates as a single electoral district, where voters cast their ballots for candidates on regional lists representing constituencies, as a measure to mitigate electoral bias (Bureš, 2012). Nonetheless, the implementation of proportional representation has fostered the evolution of the party system and provided safeguarding mechanisms for smaller political entities, resulting in a landscape characterized by multipartyism within the Czech political sphere.

In adherence to the principles of a parliamentary regime, which include the sharing of legislative-executive authority and the duality of executive power, the government's accountability to the Chamber of Deputies is a fundamental aspect. The process of government formation initiates with the President of the Republic appointing the Prime Minister, who in turn, pursuant to Article 68 of the Constitution, proposes the appointment of other government members and assigns them the responsibility of overseeing ministries or other pertinent offices. Following the appointment of the government, a crucial procedural step ensues: within thirty days, the government solicits a vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies.

In order for a vote of confidence to be valid, it necessitates the consent of an absolute majority of all present Deputies. Additionally, the Chamber of Deputies shall be

considered to have a quorum if at least one third of its members are present (Constitution article 39). After the formation of government “*the Chamber of Deputies may debate a proposed resolution of no confidence in the government only if it has been submitted in writing by at least fifty Deputies*” (Constitution article 72). Then the government should submit its resignation “*if the Chamber of Deputies rejects its request for a vote of confidence, or if it adopts a resolution of no confidence*” (Constitution article 73).

### **3.2. Party system**

After the first three national parliamentary elections, the Czech Republic entered an era of stabilization within its party system. According to Blondel’s classification of party systems, from 1998 to 2002, the Czech Republic was characterized as a “multiparty system with one dominant party” (Hanáček, 2010). Despite the Social Democracy party (ČSSD) gaining the most votes, it was unable to form a government on its own due to the lack of an absolute majority. The change occurred in 2006 when both the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the ČSSD each gained over 30 percent of the votes, signaling a new era of bipartisanship in the Czech political scene (Hanáček, 2010). However, according to Sartori’s theory of party systems classification, the Czech Republic began to experience alternation between a “moderated multiparty system” and a “polarized multiparty system” (Hanáček, 2010). The former refers to a political system where despite the presence of numerous parties, stability is maintained due to parties clustering around the center on the left-right scale, and the latter indicates significant ideological distances between parties, often due to the presence of more than one radical party (Sartori, 2005). However, from 2010 onwards, the Czech party system began to show tendencies toward a multiparty system without any dominant party, as no single party managed to gain over 30 percent of the votes (Hanáček, 2010).

Subsequently, I will provide a detailed description of the main political parties in the 2013 Czech election. Given that this thesis serves as a case study for the year 2013, my description of the parties may not be current, focusing primarily on their characteristics



as they entered the post-election negotiations.

### **3.2.1. Social Democratic party (ČSSD)<sup>1</sup>**

In the political landscape of the Czech Republic, the left-wing parties of relevance include the ČSSD and the Communist Party. ČSSD stands as one of the oldest parties in the Czech Republic, experiencing a revival after 1989 under the leadership of chairman Miloš Zeman, subsequently emerging as the strongest leftist party. However, since the 2010s, it has faced a decline in public support. The party embodies center-left ideologies, emphasizing principles of freedom, democracy, social justice, and solidarity (Strmiska et al., 2005). Similar to typical social democratic parties in Western Europe, ČSSD advocates for a robust welfare state, a mixed economy, and progressive taxation. Paradoxically, during the 2010s, ČSSD faced its primary challenge due to its dominant position on the left side of the political spectrum. This left the party without a natural ally, except for the Communist Party of the Czech Republic, despite its pledge not to cooperate following the “Bohumín kidnapping” incident (Šlajs, 2016).

### **3.2.2. Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)**

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) has evolved from the former ruling Communist party of Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, positioning itself within the spectrum of the left wing or far-left. It espouses ideologies of anti-capitalism, socialism, and Marxist communism (KSČM, 2004). Despite never participating in any coalition government since 1989, the party has frequently played a significant role in providing tacit support for minority governments or in ad hoc voting coalitions (Šlajs, 2016).

### **3.2.3. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)**

The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) stands as the foremost traditional right-wing party,

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<sup>1</sup> However, the party abbreviation has changed into SOCDEM in 2023.

espousing a blend of conservative and liberal ideologies. During the 2010s, its liberal inclinations manifested prominently in its policy agenda, notably in initiatives such as the liberalization of the Labor Code and advocating for low taxes (Šlajs, 2016). During the 2010s, the liberal inclinations of the ODS party were prominently displayed in its policy agenda, particularly in initiatives such as the liberalization of the Labor Code and advocacy for low taxes (Šlajs, 2016). Conversely, its conservative stance was evidenced by its prioritization of national defense and security, with a specific emphasis on diplomatic strategies (Šlajs, 2016). Additionally, under the leadership of former party chairman Václav Klaus, ODS maintained a Eurosceptic stance toward the European Union (John, 2016).

ODS has consistently commanded substantial support in parliamentary elections, having formed a total of six governments by 2023, the most among Czech political entities. Its traditional coalition partners include the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) and Tradition Responsibility Prosperity (TOP09). Furthermore, ODS has engaged in coalitions with erstwhile partners such as the dissolved Christian Democratic Party (KDS), the Greens, and the defunct populist party Public Affairs (VV).

The interplay between ODS and ČSSD is particularly intriguing. Despite being traditionally viewed as adversaries across the left-right axis, they have forged collaborative efforts on multiple occasions during the process of government formation. In 1996, ODS formed a minority cabinet with the consent of ČSSD, and in 1998, under the Opposition agreement, ODS lent support to ČSSD’s minority cabinet.

#### **3.2.4. Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL)**

The origins of the KDU-ČSL trace back to the Czechoslovakia People’s Party ČSL, which played a pivotal role as one of the five parties comprising the “Committee of Five (Pětka)” during the First Republic. Over time, the party underwent transformation, culminating in its merger with the Christian Democratic Union in 1992, shaping its

present-day identity.

Positioned as centrist, the party holds the flexibility to engage as a coalition partner for both left and right-wing factions. However, during 2010s, this strategic positioning came with its challenges, as evidenced by Josef Lux, the chairman of KDU-ČSL, who championed centrism as the party's main asset in the late 1990s. Despite Lux's efforts, both potential coalition partners pushed the party into the opposition through the "opposition agreement" (Hloušek & Kopeček, 2010).

### **3.2.5. ANO 2011**

Originally established as a political movement in 2011 under the name "the Association Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011", ANO 2011 was founded by businessman Andrej Babiš to voice criticism of the economy, society, and corruption. In 2012, the association transitioned into the political movement ANO 2011, officially registered on May 11th, 2012, in Prague (aktuálně.cz, 2020). ANO 2011 is commonly labeled as a "populist" or "anti-establishment party" characterized by rhetoric that portrays antagonistic relations between "the people (us, the good ones)" and "the corrupt elites (them, the bad ones)", effectively dividing society into two distinct camps (Birinyi, 2019). Despite its structure as a political party, ANO 2011 continues to identify itself as a "political movement" positioning itself as an outsider within the party system (ANO bude líp, Youtube 2013). It places significant emphasis on non-politicism in its communication and campaign slogans, striving to distinguish itself from established political parties (Birinyi, 2019).

ANO 2011 occupies the center of the Czech political spectrum. Saxonberg and Heinisch, in their study of ANO 2011 as a centrist entrepreneur populist party, argues that "*populism seeks to maximize its appeal to desirable voter groups while being unencumbered by ideological principles*" (Heinisch & Saxonberg, 2022). Taggart also suggests that this type of populism is opportunistic, noting that "*if a window of opportunity emerges in the center, populists would arguably position themselves there*" (Heinisch & Saxonberg, 2022). Rather than a coherent ideology, the appeal of centrist

populist parties (CPPs) often hinges on the promised competence of the leader or the claim to increase the participation of the people in the policy-making process (Havlík & Voda, 2018).

### **3.2.6. Tradition responsibility prosperity (TOP 09)**

TOP 09 is a relatively small center-right party known for its emphasis on Europeanness and the rich heritage of ancient and Christian-Jewish culture. The party staunchly supports fiscal conservatism and is a leading advocate for European integration, making it one of the most pro-European parties in the Czech political landscape (Marek & Baun, 2011). While broadly perceived to incorporate elements of both liberal and conservative ideologies, TOP 09 has gradually shifted towards more liberal perspectives over time, departing from its initial conservatism (Grim, 2023).

### **3.2.7. Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit)**

Dawn of Direct Democracy was a radical rightist or radical-right party found in 2013 by Tomio Okamura with goal of “*promotion of direct democracy and the responsibility of politicians in the political system of the Czech Republic and the consistent defense of the national interests of our country*” (Idnes, 2015). The Dawn of Direct Democracy is generally regarded as anti-system radical-right party with ideologies nationalism and xenophobia (Kral, 2023), and it also holds a negative opinion against European Union which is described as the representation of the “hard Eurosceptic” party in Czech political scene (Marek & Baun, 2011).

#### **4. Methodological approach – Process tracing**

The analytical aspect of the thesis will be constructed by employing process-tracing methodology, which serves as a fundamental tool in qualitative analysis. Process-tracing research aims to surpass mere identification of correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). The specific approach involves endeavoring to unveil the “black box” of causality between Xs and Ys through understanding causal mechanisms. Casual mechanism is thus defined as s “*a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts*” (Glennan, 1996).

According to Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen’s study (2013), they categorize process tracing into three kinds based on the purpose of study: 1) *theory-testing process-tracing*, 2) *theory-building process-tracing*, and 3) *explaining-outcome process-tracing*. Theory-testing, the first category, “*deduces a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesized causal mechanism is present in a given case*” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The second type “*seeks to build a generalizable theoretical explanation from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the facts of a particular case*” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The final kind of explanation attempts to construct a minimally sufficient explanation for a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case: “*here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case-centric than theory-oriented*” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This thesis aims to study the behavior of the political party ANO regarding coalition formation, thus the thesis will involve an outcome-explaining process-tracing approach.

The essence of process-tracing lies in gathering data or indicators that corroborate each step in the causal mechanism. However, the challenge lies in translating these observations into empirical evidence. To address this, four tests based on the criteria of necessity and sufficiency are employed to scrutinize the inference: the straw-in-the-wind test, hoop test, smoking gun test, and double decisive test (Table 4.1.(1)). Among

these, the straw-in-the-wind test has the weakest impact; passing it does not fully confirm the hypothesis and failing it does not completely rule out the hypothesis. Conversely, the double decisive test carries the strongest weight: passing it entirely confirms the hypothesis, while failing it unequivocally rejects the hypothesis. However, the differences between those four tests are more like “*useful heuristic*”, and “*should not be taken rigidly*”, Collier in his study about process-tracing states, “*the decision to treat a given piece of evidence as the basis for one of the four tests can depend on the researcher’s prior knowledge, the assumptions that underlie the study, and the specific formulation of the hypothesis*” (Collier, 2011).

Table 4.1.(1). Process-tracing tests for casual inference (Collier, 2011)

		<b>SUFFICIENT FOR AFFIRMING CASUAL INFERENCE</b>	
		<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b>
<b>NECESSARY FOR AFFIRMING CASUAL INFERENCE</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>1. Straw-in-the-wind test</b>	<b>3. Smoking-gun test</b>
		<b>a. Passing:</b> Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	<b>a. Passing:</b> confirms hypothesis.
		<b>b. Failing:</b> Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened.	<b>b. Failing:</b> Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened.
		<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>slightly</i> weakens them. <b>Failing</b> <i>slightly</i> strengthens them.	<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>substantially</i> weakens them. <b>Failing</b> <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.
	<b>YES</b>	<b>2. Hoop test</b>	<b>4. Doubly Decisive test</b>
		<b>a. Passing:</b> Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	<b>a. Passing:</b> confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.
		<b>b. Failing:</b> Eliminates hypothesis.	<b>b. Failing:</b> eliminates hypothesis.
		<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>somewhat</i> weakens them. <b>Failing</b> <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.	<b>c. Implications for rival hypotheses:</b> <b>Passing</b> <i>eliminates</i> them. <b>Failing</b> <i>substantially</i> strengthens them.

The precise steps of a successful process-tracing case study are constructed by Ricks and Liu (2018) by the following checklist: 1. *Identify hypotheses*, 2. *Establish timeline*, 3. *Construct casual graph*, 4. *Identify alternative event/choice at each moment*, 5.

*Identify counterfactual outcomes, 6. Find evidence to support primary hypothesis (straw-in-wind, hoop, smoking-gun or doubly decisive).*

## **5. Coalition negotiation process after the 2013 elections**

The analysis of the formation of Bohuslav Sobotka's coalition government in 2013 is based on the hypothesis that its establishment was primarily influenced by the scandal of the right-wing Nečas's government and the policy-seeking strategies of the coalition parties. The hypothetical causal mechanism is depicted in Graph 4.2.1.


The initial factor acts as an external stimulator. According to the hypothesis, the scandal surrounding the Nečas's government created a vacuum of leadership and trust within the Czech political sphere. As allegations of corruption surfaced, public confidence in conventional right-wing parties diminished, opening the door for alternative political entities to emerge. This climate of political uncertainty and disillusionment presented ANO 2011 and ČSSD with an opportunity to forge new paths of cooperation. Conversely, if the external factor, the political scandal, had not significantly impacted public opinion, the outcome would likely have resulted in losses for opposition parties like ANO 2011 and Social Democracy, as depicted in the counterfactual scenario in Graph 4.2.1.

Secondly, if the shift in political dynamics indeed occurred, the electoral success of ANO 2011 raises questions about its willingness to participate in government. The counterfactual outcome of this stage would result in ANO 2011 becoming an opposition party in parliament. If the answer to the question of whether to govern is affirmative, the next step entails assessing and weighing the advantages and disadvantages of holding governmental office, as well as determining potential coalition partners. Here, two main factors come into play: policy preferences and parties' weight, which are intertwined with the policy-seeking theory and office-seeking theory as discussed in the theoretical framework. The subsequent stage occurs after identifying potential coalition partners and involves initiating negotiations and deliberating on policy trade-offs. If

these negotiations end unfavorably, resulting in the collapse of the tentative cooperation, the process reverts back to the stage of calculating and selecting appropriate partners.

Graph 4.2.1. Casual mechanism of the government formation in 2013.

Created by author.



### 5.1. External factor – pre-electoral situation

In June 2013, a series of arrests shook the Nečas's government as Jana Nagyová, the



Managing Director of the Prime Minister's Office, Milan Kovanda, the Head of Military Intelligence, and ambassadors Ivan Fuksa and Petr Tluchoř were detained by the Police Unit for Combating Organized Crime (Útvar pro odhalování organizovaného zločinu, ÚOOZ) (Blažek et al, 2013). This development plunged the government into a profound crisis. Initially alleged to involve corruption, the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and the misuse of intelligence to surveil the Prime Minister's ex-wife, this affair was deemed the most significant political scandal in Czech Republic history by several newspapers (Idnes, 2013). The Prime Minister Petr Nečas was compelled to replace the 13th member of his cabinet, which many interpreted as the harbinger of the end of the right-wing coalition (Idnes, 2013).

Nečas's coalition government grappled with pronounced instability from its inception. The cabinet was formed by ODS, TOP09, and Public Affairs (VV) after the 2010 national elections, despite ČSSD securing the highest vote share (22.08 percent), it failed to muster a government capable of surviving a vote of confidence. The cabinet weathered six motions of no confidence and the departure of one coalition partner, VV. Subsequent to the police investigation into the political scandal, ČSSD MPs petitioned the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Miroslava Němcová, to convene an extraordinary meeting with a motion of no confidence (Srnová, 2013). However, on June 17th, the day preceding the meeting, Petr Nečas resigned from his roles as Prime Minister and party chairman of ODS (Jh, 2013).

Subsequently, Miroslava Němcová assumed the position of party chairman in ODS, with support from TOP09, ODS, and LIDEM to continue leading the coalition government as Prime Minister (Jurková, 2013). However, President Zeman appointed the non-partisan economist Jiří Rusnok as the new Prime Minister. Rusnok's government failed to secure confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, garnering 93 votes in favor and 100 against (Lidovky, 2013a). Following Rusnok's resignation, President Zeman announced early elections (České noviny, 2013).

## **5.2. Shift in political dynamics**

The hypothetical causal mechanism of this thesis assumes that the political scandal involving the right-wing coalition cabinet serves as an external factor. Consequently, a notable shift occurs in the political landscape, potentially leading voters to become disillusioned with traditional right-wing politics and seek alternative options. Therefore, evidence related to the “shift of political dynamics” step should demonstrate the decline of ODS and other center-right parties, alongside the rise of other opposition parties. Otherwise, the counterfactual outcome will be no change in election results, or vote decline of other opposition parties or others.

According to opinion polls tracking the support rates of relevant political parties in the Czech Republic from March 2012 to October 2013 (Graph 4.2.3.), it is evident that since the scandal in June 2013, the support for ODS has steadily declined from around 16 percent to 8 percent. The outcome of the early national elections, compared to the previous 2010 election, saw a total decrease in ODS votes by 12.5 percent (Table 4.2.3.). However, the poll results also indicate a decrease in support for the Social Democrats, whose backing during this government term dropped from its peak of around 34 percent to 25 percent (Graph 4.2.3.). This decline is likely attributed to the corruption scandal involving ČSSD MP David Rath in 2012 (Novinky, 2012). Regarding the results of the early elections in October 2013, the traditional right-wing party ODS was severely weakened by the external event, and its coalition partner TOP09 was also slightly affected. The largest left-wing party, ČSSD, still secured the top position among parties with the most votes, albeit with a 1.63 percent loss compared to 2010 (Table 4.2.3.). The Communists experienced the most significant success among the other established parties, with a 3.64 percent increase over their 2010 performance. It is worth noting that according to the research of the institution Median, another significant change was the rise of the ANO 2011 movement, a catch-all party appealing primarily to former voters of ODS and Public Affairs, as well as a portion of the Social Democratic electorate (Median, 2013). This information could serve as passing the “double decisive test” for confirming the hypothesis that the “shift in political dynamics” indeed occurred.

Graph 4.2.3. Polls on the support rates of relevant parties from March 2012 to October 2013 (Median, 2013).




Table 4.2.3. Comparison of election results in 2013 and 2010 (Český statistický úřad).

	ČSSD	ANO 2011	KSČM	TOP09	ODS	Úsvit	KDU-ČSL
Gained votes in 2013 (%):	20.45 %	18.65 %	14.91%	11.99%	7.72%	6.88%	6.78%
Gained votes in 2010 (%):	22.08%	X	11.27%	16.70%	20.22%	X	4.39%
Votes changes (%):	-1.63%	+18.65% (new)	+3.64%	-4.71%	-12.5%	+6.88% (new)	+2.39%

### 5.3. Policy analysis

As previously discussed in the theoretical framework, the process of government formation in Europe is characterized by a substantial tradition of policy-seeking analysis. Therefore, a comparison of the parties' favorable policies needs to be presented. Here, the election programmes in 2013 will be the main sources of analysis. Furthermore, the databases of the Manifesto Project group will also be used extensively as a reference for the study.


Graph 4.2.4.(1) illustrates all the parties' positions on the economic topic based on their

election programmes. The horizontal axis represents the RILE index (detailed data shown in table 4.2.4.(3).), where smaller numbers indicate more left-wing parties, with negative numbers representing left parties and positive numbers indicating right-wing parties. The vertical axis represents the parties' opinions on the state's main economic policy. Smaller negative numbers indicate stronger support for the "state" over the "market", while higher numbers indicate a more "pro-market" stance. Graph 4.2.4.(2) shows the parties' opinions on society. On the vertical axis, smaller numbers indicate more progressive opinions, while higher numbers indicate more conservative views. Surprisingly, according to research by the Manifesto Project, all the relevant Czech parties' programs during the 2013 elections fall within the range of "pro-state" progressivism on the political spectrum.


Table 4.2.4.(3). The RILE index of Czech parties in 2013 (resource by Manifesto Project).

	<b>KSČM</b>	<b>ČSSD</b>	<b>KDU-ČSL</b>	<b>TOP09</b>	<b>ANO</b>	<b>Úsvit</b>	<b>ODS</b>
<b>Index RILE</b>	-34.962	-26.279	-23.054	-11.371	-9.945	5.498	6.376

Graph 4.2.4.(1). Economy: state – market (resource by Manifesto Project).



Graph 4.2.4.(2). Society: progressive – conservative (resource by Manifesto Project).



To enhance the analysis of policy similarities among parties, I specifically selected data from several areas that were more closely related to important contemporary topics and public interests during the 2013 elections. The first crucial area to address is the economy, given that the socio-economic divide dominates political conflicts in the Czech Republic (Chapter 3.2). As previously discussed in Chapter 2.7, the Index RILE serves as a reliable method for measuring socio-economic left-right positions.

According to the hypothesis, if ANO 2011 is a policy-seeking party, then its ideal coalition partners should be parties with the smallest differences on the Index RILE scale. Hence, by calculating the ideological distance of every other party with ANO 2011, as indicated in Table 4.2.4.(4), the most promising coalition partner for ANO 2011 emerges as TOP09, followed by KDU-ČSL. However, when considering whether “left” parties would prefer to cooperate with their “left-wing alliance” or their closer “right-wing neighbor” on the RILE scale, the third potential coalition partner differs. In 2013, ANO 2011 is estimated to be a left-wing party (-9.945) according to the Index RILE. In the former scenario, the third potential coalition partner should be the Social Democrats, with the Communist Party as the fourth option. In the latter scenario, the third potential coalition partner would be Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy, with ODS as the fourth option (Table 4.2.4.(4)). However, the measurement of left or right positions according to the RILE index may not be entirely accurate; for example,

TOP09 is classified as a left-wing party with an index of -11.371.

Table 4.2.4.(4). Ideological distance (index RILE) with ANO 2011 (calculated by author).

ANO 2011: -9.945						
<b>Based on number:</b>	TOP09	KDU-ČSL	Úsvit	ODS	ČSSD	KSČM
	1.426	13.109	15.443	16.321	16.334	25.017
<b>Based on left-right:</b>	TOP09	KDU-ČSL	ČSSD	KSČM	Úsvit	ODS

#### 5.4. Assumption of the coalition variants

Table 4.2.5 is founded on the theory of political coalitions, utilizing data from the previously mentioned Manifesto Project to determine parties' ideological stances.

The “minimal winning coalition” category includes all potentially formed coalitions with fewer than ten seats more than the required minimum mandates (101) in the Chamber of Deputies. Among them, the coalition of ANO 2011, KDU-ČSL, TOP09, and Okamura's Úsvit party qualifies as a “minimum size coalition” according to the office-seeking theory (Table 4.2.5). In the “minimum party numbers” category, due to the fragmentation of the election results, coalitions with the fewest partners consist of three parties, with a total of five such coalitions (Table 4.2.5). The minimal ideological distance within the “minimal range” coalitions is three “spaces” and there are four coalitions in accordance to it (Table 4.2.5). Regarding the “minimal connected” coalition model (chapter 2.6.4), the 2013 scenario necessitates the presence of two “connecting parties”, such as TOP09 and ANO 2011 in the KDU-ČSL+TOP09+ANO+Úsvit coalition. However, strictly adhering to the ideological left-right division of the Manifesto Project may lead to deviations from the actual situation. For example, in the second case in Table 4.2.5, ANO and Úsvit should not be considered the “connecting parties” of TOP09 and ODS, which were previous coalition partners. Regarding the model of “policy-viable” coalitions, we can conclude that the TOP09 party controls the median member of the new Chamber of Deputies, thus becoming the

“core party” in the 2013 election scenario. Consequently, in Table 4.2.5, all the minimal coalitions that include TOP09 align with the “policy-viable” model. As for surplus majority and minority governments, there are numerous possibilities depending on the calculation of individual parties.

Table 4.2.5. Possibly formed coalitions according to theory of political coalitions in 2013 (resource by author)

	Ideological left-right scale						
Parties:	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	TOP09	ANO	Úsvit	ODS
Weights (seats):	33/200	50/200	14/200	26/200	47/200	14/200	16/200
<b>Possibly formed coalitions:</b>							
Minimal winning:	KDU-ČSL+TOP09+ANO+Úsvit (101), TOP09+ANO+Úsvit+ODS (103), KDU-ČSL+TOP09+ANO+ODS (103), KSČM+KDU-ČSL+TOP09+Úsvit+ODS (103), ČSSD+KDU-ČSL+TOP09+Úsvit (104), KSČM+ANO+TOP09 (106), ČSSD+KDU-ČSL+TOP09+ODS (106), ČSSD+TOP09+ODS+Úsvit (106), KSČM+KDU-ČSL+ANO+Úsvit (108), KSČM+ČSSD+TOP09 (109), KSČM+ČSSD+KDU-ČSL+Úsvit (111), ČSSD+ANO+KDU-ČSL (111), ČSSD+ANO+Úsvit (111)						
Minimum size:	ANO+KDU-ČSL+TOP09+Úsvit (101)						
Minimum party numbers:	KSČM+ANO+TOP09 (106), ČSSD+KSČM+TOP09 (109), ČSSD+ANO+KDU-ČSL (111), ČSSD+ANO+Úsvit (111), ČSSD+ANO+ODS (113)						
Minimal range:	KDU-ČSL+TOP09+ANO+Úsvit (101), TOP09+ANO+Úsvit+ODS (103), KSČM+ČSSD+TOP09 (109), ČSSD+ANO+KDU-ČSL (111)						
minimal connected:	KDU-ČSL+TOP09+ANO+Úsvit (101), TOP09+ANO+Úsvit+ODS (103)						
Policy-viable:	Core party = TOP09						
Surplus majority:	KSČM+ČSSD+KDU-ČSL+ANO (144), and so on.						
Minority:	KSČM+ČSSD+KDU-ČSL (97), ODS+TOP09+KDU-ČSL+Úsvit (70), ANO+Úsvit (61), and so on.						

## 5.5. Willingness of participation in government

The question of whether the party wants to participate in the government is especially crucial for the new wave of populist parties. According to Mattia Zulianello’s study on

categorizing populist parties (2020), it is clearly shown that some populist parties tend to be “outsiders” of the system and prefer to remain in opposition rather than enter government. For example, after the 2013 election, Okamura’s Úsvit party announced that they would not participate in any government coalition (Lidovky, 2013c).

On October 26th, 2013, Babiš stated that he was pleased with ANO winning 18 percent of the vote, but he himself did not want to join any coalition (Válková, 2013). However, in the early evening at Chodov (ANO party’s headquarter) in Prague, within a building part of the Agrofert<sup>2</sup> complex, Babiš underwent a shift in attitude following the party’s committee meeting, signaling his desire for ANO to engage in government participation (Válková, 2013). Therefore, the willingness to participate in the government is confirmed by passing a “double decisive test”. However, the decision on whether and with whom to form a coalition was not made on that day (Válková, 2013).

## **5.6. Calculation and determining potential coalition partners**

From the perspective of office-seeking theory, ANO’s most likely coalition partners are TOP09 and KDU-ČSL, both of which appear in coalitions with ANO 2011 four times in the “minimal winning coalitions” category (Table 4.2.5). Then, if the “minimum size” model is most favourable for parties, ANO’s ideal partners are KDU-ČSL, TOP09, and Úsvit (Table 4.2.5). If parties prioritize the “bargaining preposition” (Chapter 2.8.2), Social Democracy is the most favourable coalition partner for ANO (Table 4.2.5). From the perspective of policy-seeking theory, TOP09 is the most likely forming partner, followed by KDU-ČSL (Table 4.2.4(4)).

In reality, before the actual elections, the chairman of TOP09, Karel Schwarzenberg, mentioned the possibility of a coalition with the ČSSD in response to a question about potential cooperation with Andrej Babiš’s ANO movement: *“the only realistic possibility to create a coalition is with Social Democracy. Not with the ANO movement. I’m not interested in that”*, said Schwarzenberg (Lidovky, 2013b). In response, Andrej

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<sup>2</sup> Agrofert is a Czech conglomerate holding company founded by Andrej Babiš in 1993. It operates agriculture, food, chemical, construction, logistics, forestry, energy and mass media industries.



Babiš stated, *“TOP 09 strictly refused to cooperate with us, and some other parties also do not want to cooperate with us, which I understand. In our opinion, people matter more than parties. We will cooperate with all decent people who, like us, want fundamental change”* (Lidovky, 2013c). Babiš also added that, *“ODS has become a symbol of corruption in its 20 years in power. (Vice-Chairman TOP 09 Miroslav) Kalousek is also a symbol of corruption for entrepreneurs”* (ČTK, 2013b). Later in the statement, Schwarzenberg specified that a ČSSD coalition with TOP 09 would not happen, for three reasons: Firstly, it was explicitly banned by President Zeman. Secondly, it is unacceptable for TOP 09 to be in the position of a weaker coalition partner. Thirdly, TOP09’s programs are so different that the ČSSD would have to make compromises with which it would definitely not agree (Lidovky, 2013c). ČSSD chairman Sobotka immediately responded that Social Democracy does not consider an alliance with TOP 09: *“we rule out any government cooperation with ODS and TOP 09, which are responsible for the marasmus of the past three years,”* he said (Lidovky, 2013c).

Bohuslav Sobotka, in a post-election interview, asserted that the goal of the Social Democracy is to correct the mistakes and unfair reforms of the right-wing parties over the past seven years. *“It is unimaginable for us that we would promote positive changes for the Czech Republic with ODS or TOP 09, who disrupted the lives of citizens with their antisocial policies”*, said Sobotka (Lidovsky, 2013b). Vojtěch Filip, the chairman of the Communist Party, mentioned that currently the priority is to form alliances with all the important parties to overcome the social and economic crisis (Lidovky, 2013b). *“However, the KSČM will never enter into a coalition with parties symbolizing political corruption of the past years, or parties whose program is based on religious, racial, or ideological intolerance”* (Lidovsky, 2013b). On the other hand, Martin Kuba, the representative of ODS, stated, *“ODS can definitely rule out coalition cooperation with the KSČM. However, after the experience of previous coalitions, the ODS will no longer join any coalition where it would have to abandon its program priorities”* (Lidovky, 2013b). Miroslava Němcová, the vice-president of ODS, also added that ODS will

never cooperate with non-systemic political powers like Babiš or Okamura. She emphasized that ODS does not want to repeat the mistake made after the 2010 elections when they entered into a coalition with the Public Affairs party (ČTK, 2013a). However, in the post-election interview, Němcová told journalists that the election results represent a significant loss for ODS. She expressed that voters have signalled the party should “go on the bench”, indicating that the current personnel changes are insufficient to satisfy the voters (Lidovky, 2013d). Pavel Bělobrádek from KDU-ČSL also expressed a refusal attitude toward KSČM (Lidovky, 2013b). As what I mentioned in the previous chapter, Okamura’s Úsvit party will not participate any government coalition (Lidovky, 2013c). Party chairman Okamura stated that The Dawn of Direct Democracy movement will support any government that helps it push through the law on a general referendum (Lidovky, 2013e).

Due to the existing selection limitations expressed by party representatives or chairmen, KDU-ČSL emerges as ANO 2011’s optimal potential coalition partner from both the perspectives of office-seeking and policy-seeking. In line with the theory, ANO indeed initiated negotiations with KDU-ČSL, thereby confirming the predictions. According to ANO’s vice-president Věra Jourová, the programs of the two parties align approximately 80 percent: “*We are united in tax matters and anti-corruption measures. Perhaps the pension reform and some other things remain to be resolved*”, she said (Lidovky, 2013g).

## **5.7. Coalition negotiation and settlement**

The negotiation of the future coalition started with the first couple of rounds of negotiations between ANO and KDU-ČSL. According to the chairman of the KDU-ČSL, Pavel Bělobrádek, the current distribution of forces in the House of Representatives does not offer many options, cooperation with ANO and the winning ČSSD, whether with direct participation in the government or just support of the minority ČSSD cabinet, is described as the only meaningful and stable one (Lidovky, 2013c). From ANO’s perspective, Social Democracy serves as a good alternative in the

case of non-cooperation intention from the right parties, especially the big election “weight” of Social Democracy leads to the easier model of negotiation according to the theory of “preposition bargaining”. On 31<sup>st</sup> October ANO and KDU-ČSL achieved an agreement: due to the high similarities of both of the parties’ election programmes, they decided to prioritize the policy preferences (Lidovky, 2013f). Regarding the procedure for further negotiations on the future government, the representatives of ANO and KDU-ČSL agreed on three possible options: 1. Both groups will end up in pure opposition, 2. ANO and KDU-ČSL will enable a minority ČSSD government, 3. Into a coalition government either both groups enter, or neither of them (Lidovky, 2013f).

The negotiation barriers between ANO 2011 and the Social Democracy party primarily revolve around tax policies: ČSSD advocates for increasing corporate taxes and reintroducing progressive income taxation, while ANO staunchly opposes placing a heavier burden on companies (Bartošová et al, 2013). Regarding the policy trade-off between ČSSD and KDU-ČSL, while both parties share many program priorities, there are also significant differences. Firstly, akin to ANO, KDU-ČSL opposes raising taxes on companies (Dvořáková & Čermáková, 2013). The second major point of contention is church restitution: ČSSD seeks adjustments to lessen the impact on the state budget, whereas KDU-ČSL opposes any changes (Dvořáková & Čermáková, 2013). ANO 2011 also engaged in negotiations with Okamura’s Úsvit party, primarily finding common ground on economic priorities such as avoiding tax hikes (Lidovky, 2013g). Additionally, ANO supported Úsvit party's push for legislation on general referendums (Lidovky, 2013g).

The disagreement over ministerial posts related to KDU-ČSL is centered on allocation: while Social Democracy claimed 8 posts for themselves, allocated 7 to ANO, and only 2 to KDU-ČSL, representatives of KDU-ČSL insisted on an additional ministerial post for agriculture (ČTK, 2013d). Conversely, both Social Democracy and ANO desired the Minister of Finance position (ČTK, 2013c). At the end, the disagreements settled in Babiš gained the post of minister of finance, and KDU-ČSL added the “posts of Deputy Prime Minister for Science and Research and Ministers of Agriculture and Culture”

(ČTK, 2013e).

On 6th January 2014, representatives of party ČSSD, ANO and KDU-ČSL signed the coalition agreement (Kopecký, 2014). On 18th February 2014, the coalition government won the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies by 110 votes.

## **5.8. Summary**

The 2013 election marked a significant turning point in Czech Republic's political landscape, as the fallout from the corruption scandal led to a substantial loss in voter support for right-wing parties, while concurrently witnessing the rise of left-wing parties and new anti-establishment movements.

The second phase of my study on the dominant winning party, ANO 2011, entails seeking evidence to confirm its willingness to engage in a government coalition, which was subsequently affirmed. To analyze its approach to government formation, this thesis adopts two perspectives: policy-seeking and office-seeking.

Following the elimination of certain potential partners due to refusal or non-participation, ANO 2011 settled on a coalition with KDU-ČSL and ČSSD. The choice of KDU-ČSL was primarily based on policy-seeking considerations, as it passed the "hoop test", albeit not entirely discounting office-seeking factors. This was underscored by a statement from an ANO 2011 representative highlighting the significant overlap in their election programs. Additionally, negotiations with the People's Party revealed a stance of "either both groups enter a coalition government, or neither does" (chapter 4.2.8). The decision to form a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) was influenced by both policy-seeking and office-seeking calculations. From a policy-seeking perspective, ČSSD emerged as the most potential coalition partner after excluding TOP09, Úsvit, and ODS. On the other hand, the substantial weight of the Social Democratic Party helped alleviate the pressure of negotiating among multiple parties from an office-seeking standpoint.

Drawing upon the theory of political coalition, the government coalition of 2013 aligns with the model of the minimal winning coalition, the minimum number of parties and

the minimal ideological range.

## 6. Conclusion

This thesis presents a case study focusing on the formation of the Czech government in 2013, employing the methodology of process-tracing. This approach enables the tracking of causal mechanisms, beginning from the initial political scandal through to the sequential formation of the government involving the Social Democratic Party, ANO 2011 and the People's Party.

In the theoretical part, Lijphart's work, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, offers comprehensive summaries of pertinent findings by political scientists concerning governmental coalition formation. It meticulously outlines various models pertaining to this process, providing valuable insights into the intricacies of coalition dynamics.

Utilizing the theoretical framework of political coalitions, it offers a comprehensive perspective for analysis, incorporating various theoretical models derived from the office-seeking and policy-seeking paradigms. The office-seeking perspective facilitates the estimation of potential winning coalitions based on each party's electoral weight, while the policy-seeking perspective posits that coalitions are formed on the basis of ideological affinities. The electoral weight of parties is defined by the mandates they accrued during the election period, with ideological positions derived from data provided by the research group, Manifesto Project. A synthesis of these assumptions regarding potential coalitions is then conducted, leading to the conclusion that the coalition formed in 2013 adhered closely to the model of the minimal winning coalition, the minimum number of parties and the minimal ideological range. Moreover, ANO 2011's anti-establishment stance generally does not preclude its potential for negotiating coalitions with other mainstream parties. Notably, only TOP09 and ODS publicly declared their non-cooperative stance towards ANO 2011.

However, it is essential to acknowledge certain limitations in the analysis, particularly concerning the RILE index measurement provided by the Manifesto Project. This index primarily relies on the left-right ideological spectrum, thereby neglecting other pertinent factors. Consequently, biases may arise in the policy-based assumptions. For

instance, based on the RILE index the model of the “minimal connected coalition” suggests possible alliances between KDU-ČSL, TOP09, ANO, and Úsvit, or alternatively, between TOP09, ANO, Úsvit, and ODS, which may not align logically. Furthermore, the model of the “policy-viable coalition” proposes that TOP09 would serve as the “core party”, capable of forming a parliamentary majority with either left-wing or right-wing parties, based on the median legislator. However, this assumption diverges from the political reality of the Czech landscape in 2013. In practice, TOP09 did not exert the significant influence characteristic of a “policy dictator” and consequently found itself in the opposition.

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