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**Imagined immigration: Did national newspapers  
influence how A8 and A2 immigration was perceived in  
the United Kingdom in 2004 and 2014?**

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## **MA Programme Euroculture Declaration**

I, Benjamin Thom, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled "Imagined immigration: Did national newspapers influence how A8 and A2 immigration was perceived in the United Kingdom in 2004 and 2014?", submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ben Thom", written on a light-colored rectangular background.

Date

5/5/15

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## Introduction

On 1<sup>st</sup> January 2014, Bulgarians and Romanians gained full working rights to live and work in the United Kingdom as the seven years of working restrictions applied to them came to an end across the European Union (EU). At London Luton Airport, the first arrivals on British soil were greeted by the strange sight of Keith Vaz, chair of the Home Affairs Committee, and his fellow committee member, Mark Reckless, accompanied by a large group of journalists. These two Members of Parliament had arrived to see for themselves the procedures in place to deal with an expected rush of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants heading to the UK. Instead, they found “a plane three-quarters full, with the majority of the 146 passengers returning to jobs in Britain after spending Christmas with their families at home.”<sup>1</sup> For some, the debate leading up to, and immediately following the lifting of restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian workers, “increasingly resembled a contemporary moral panic.”<sup>2</sup> An anxiety about immigration has been on the increase, as reflected by Nigel Farage, the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party- Ukip, declaring that “this country in a short space of time has frankly become unrecognisable.”<sup>3</sup> Whilst the migration of poor people to rich countries is “a phenomenon overloaded with toxic associations”, it is true that a large number of migrants have arrived in the UK since the lifting of restrictions on the Accession 8 nations<sup>4</sup> on 1<sup>st</sup> May 2004<sup>5</sup>. What this thesis seeks to understand is the role that imagined immigration, and its ‘toxic associations’, may have played in the formulation of the EU immigration debate in the United Kingdom in 2004 and 2014.

Immigration now frequently has a negative connotation within the national sphere as revealed by David Goodhart’s bestselling *The British Dream*, which stated that Britain has had too much immigration, too quickly, and has endured “the biggest short-term movement in peacetime European history.”<sup>6</sup> This statement is open to debate, and immigration is certainly a fiercely contest topic. However, what is even more subjective,

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<sup>1</sup> Rajeev Syal, ‘Romanian ambassador mocks MPs and media waiting for immigrants’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/02/romania-ambassador-jinga-mps-migrants-airports-godot>, 2/1/14, accessed 9/2/15.

<sup>2</sup> Alex Balch and Ekaterina Balabanova, ‘Ethics, Politics and Migration: Public Debates on the Free Movement of Romanians and Bulgarians in the UK, 2006-2013’, *Politics* (Nov 2014) p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Andrew Sparrow, ‘Nigel Farage: Parts of Britain ‘are like a foreign land’’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/28/nigel-farage-ukip-immigration-speech>, 28/2/14, accessed 9/2/15.

<sup>4</sup> A8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia

<sup>5</sup> Paul Collier, *Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (London: Penguin, 2013) p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> David Goodhart, *The British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-war immigration* (London: Atlantic Books, 2013) p. 212.

is the question of how society itself has interpreted, reacted to, framed and analysed the immigration that has occurred since 2004. Indeed, it is arguably of limited importance whether Britain has received too much EU immigration or not, as what also matters is what people believe to be true as they shape their migration outlook with this in mind. This paper draws inspiration from Scott Blinder's piece –*Imagined Immigration*– in which he writes that public opinion “is directed toward pictures in our heads of immigrants rather than immigration per se and, further, that these mental representations of immigrants may help determine attitudes toward immigration policy.”<sup>7</sup> Indeed, immigration is such a large issue –on a national scale– that it is almost impossible to comprehend without the use of one's imagination.

In seeking to explore the concept of imagined immigration, two national newspapers which had different political outlooks in 2004 and 2014 will be analysed; *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian*. The words these newspapers use, the number of articles they devote to immigration, and when these articles were published could reveal some interesting results as to how they chose to discuss, and scrutinise EU immigration from the new member states (Accession 8 and Accession 2).<sup>8</sup> This exercise will prove useful in clarifying one element which influences the shaping of imagined immigration within the minds of the British public, the role of the national media. This paper predicts that there was a relative lack of attention afforded to the 2004 A8 accession and its impacts by these newspapers; which was then compensated for with a greatly increased scrutiny of the 2014 A2 accession which contributed to a far more negative portrayal of EU immigration.

### Fortress Britain

Immigration has continually inflamed passions and Paul Collier accurately points to the notion that now, and in the past, “migration is a subject on which almost everyone seems to have strong views.”<sup>9</sup> However, the strong views in the UK context seem to have intensified in recent times as revealed by a finding from the *2014 British Social Attitudes Survey*, which revealed that 77 per cent of respondents wanted to see immigration reduced ‘a little’, whilst 56 per cent wanted it reduced ‘a lot’.<sup>10</sup> Not only do British citizens see it as an issue, but also many see it as one of the most important issue facing the country.

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<sup>7</sup> Scott Blinder, ‘Imagined Immigration: The Impact of Different Meanings of ‘Immigrants’ in Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain’, *Political Studies*, Vol. 63 (2015) 80-100, p. 81.

<sup>8</sup> A2: Bulgaria and Romania

<sup>9</sup> Collier, *Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 14.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Geddes, ‘The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain’, *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (July-September 2014) 289-295, p. 289.

Polling by *Ipsos Mori* in June 2014 showed that 39 per cent of people believed that it was a key question, more important than the economy and education.<sup>11</sup> Comparatively, the level of antipathy towards immigration has risen noticeably (in 1995 63 per cent wanted immigration reduced a little, and 39 per cent chose a lot), although the negative feeling has remained largely unchanged since 2008.<sup>12</sup>

The shift in public opinion has also translated into changes within the political world. For example, in 2010 the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition decided to specify a net migration target –to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands per year– whilst Ukip’s 2014 European election success came on the back of a campaign that included a pamphlet which claimed that 26 million unemployed EU workers wanted to move to Britain.<sup>13</sup> Herein lies the likely cause of the rise in apparent antipathy as from 2004-2008, following the A8 accession, an estimated 1.5 million migrants arrived in the UK from these countries.<sup>14</sup> The vast majority of these migrants arrived from Poland as over 1.1 million National Insurance numbers had been granted to Poles by 2013 (a NI number is required to work).<sup>15</sup> In contrast, the 2001 Census recorded that there were only 61,000 Poles resident in the UK as of April 2001, which highlights the rapid, and sizeable scale of arrivals from Poland in a little over a decade.<sup>16</sup> In fact, it only took four years for Poles to become the largest foreign national group in the UK, and by 2008 their rise from the thirteenth largest, to the largest group had been observed.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, the change was so drastic that many were caught unawares, as the Home Office’s 2003 prediction of between 5-13,000 net arrivals per year proving to be a glaring underestimation.<sup>18</sup> In fact, by 2014 there were 826,000 Polish nationals in the UK and they now accounted for 16 per cent of all foreign citizens.<sup>19</sup> The Polish group represent the dominant migrant group from the Eastern European members of the EU who had provided a combined (A8+A2) 1.525

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<sup>11</sup> Bobby Duffy, ‘Perceptions and Reality: Ten Things We Should Know About Attitudes to Immigration in the UK’, *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (July-September 2014) 259-266, p. 259.

<sup>12</sup> Geddes, ‘The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain’, p. 289.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 291.

<sup>14</sup> Goodhart, *The British Dream*, p. 212.

<sup>15</sup> Marek Okolski and John Salt, ‘Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004; Why did so many come?’ *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* (December 2014) 1-27, p. 21.

<sup>16</sup> Catherine Harris, Dominique Moran & John Bryson, ‘EU Accession Migration: National Insurance Number Allocations and the Geographies of Polish Labour Immigration to the UK’, *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, Vol. 103, Issue 2 (April 2012) 209-221, p. 211.

<sup>17</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles? Post-EU enlargement migration flows to (and from) the UK* (April 2008) <http://www.ippr.org/publications/floodgates-or-turnstilespost-eu-enlargement-migration-flows-to-and-from-the-uk>, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Alison Stenning et al, *Assessing the Local and Regional Impacts of International Migration*, Department for Communities and Local Government (2006) p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> John Salt, *International Migration and the United Kingdom: Report of the United Kingdom SOPEMI Correspondent to the OECD, 2014* (2014) p. 66.

million people into the UK by 2014, an increase of 260,000 on the year before, to represent 29.6 per cent of all foreigners.<sup>20</sup>

Headline statistics do reveal dramatic levels of immigration which were not anticipated or planned for before the original A8 accession in 2004. There has of course in the UK been significant immigration, however one might predict that this has not had as significant an impact on British citizens as they believe. It is possible that the media has played a significant role in the intensifying coverage of immigration which provides much of the information for how we assess immigration and its impact in the UK. Predictions, worries and fears in relation to immigration may overestimate the reality of the situation, as opinions arguably hardened in the build-up to the 2014 A2 accession because of how people perceived Bulgaria and Romania, and how people assessed the results of the 2004 A8 accession.

#### Immigration anxiety and the relevance of inverted nimbyism<sup>21</sup>

Evidence suggests that people in the UK are becoming increasingly sceptical as to the benefits of immigration, and many people now believe that it is one of the major issues facing the country.<sup>22</sup> Whilst, there has been large-scale immigration, analysis of immigration is very closely related to how an individual interprets the situation. This interpretation is influenced by -amongst various factors- what information they are exposed to, how they evaluate the data, what they deem to be of importance, and what personal experiences they have. Therefore an individual's opinion of immigration will be influenced by how good or bad they think things are rather than necessarily how good or bad they actually are. Polling from *Ipsos Mori* provides a good source of information on how the British public perceive immigration. This first graph for instance shows that public worries about immigration actually match up rather closely with the reality of changing net migration figures for the period from 1974-2013. From around 1999 onwards the increase in net migration is roughly matched by an increase in immigration as an important issue for the general public. There is perhaps in evidence an interesting delay in the public perception of immigration as shown by the two/three year wait for high levels of net migration in 2001 and 2004, to translate into high levels of anxiety towards immigration in 2003 and in 2007. We may infer from this that time is required for the

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, p. 65.


<sup>21</sup> Nimby: Not In My Back Yard

<sup>22</sup> see *British Social Attitudes Survey 2014*



effects of high levels of net migration to be visible, or perhaps, that the time required to gather official statistics is often around two/three years as shown by the net migration figure only having been updated to 2011. Could this increased knowledge and reporting of immigration numbers lead to an increased level of concern on the part of the general public?

**Figure 1**




The issue here is that people’s opinions are highly subjective, even if objective statistics clearly play a part. Figure 2 and figure 3 (also from *Ipsos Mori*), show the vast disparity between the percentages of people in Britain who consider immigration to be a national issue compared to those who consider it to be a personal/local issue. One can break this down and translate national issues as areas that individuals are aware of and which probably affect them indirectly or to a less visible, tangible extent. On the other hand, issues of local importance are visible to people, they are directly impacting upon their daily lives and are important to the individual themselves. Clearly issues on a personal level are more directly important –and relevant- to an individual than issues on a national level. Figure 2 reveals that around 50 per cent more people from 2006 to 2010 considered immigration to be important nationally than people who state that it is important on a local level. This disparity highlights the notion that many people are against immigration, even if it does not directly affect them. So if many in the population think that immigration is a big issue even though they have a limited personal experience of it, where are the negative views coming from?

<sup>23</sup> Bobby Duffy and Tom Frere-Smith, *Perceptions and Reality: Public Attitudes to Immigration* (London: Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute, January 2014) p. 8.

Figure 2


Figure 6.3: Immigration as a problem in Britain and the local area



An idea which could be posed is that fears of immigration are closely related to the idea of nimbyism which is based on the notion that things are good, as long as they do not affect somebody's own interests. Interestingly, with people's self-reported opinions of immigration, we can see that people think that it is a problem, even though it is not greatly affecting their own personal interests. However, one should not conclude that nimbyism is irrelevant to the immigration debate. The inverted nimbyism that is revealed by these graphs represents the fear and insecurity of people who think that something might be changing in the country, even if it is not yet evident in their own lives. Figure 3 reveals the extent to which this sizeable disparity between immigration being a personal, and it being a national concern, is in effect a specifically British issue.

Figure 3

Figure 6.4: Immigration as an important issue at a national and personal level, among Britons compared with other people in Europe



<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 90.


Clearly, immigration is far more important to UK nationals on a personal (10 per cent), and national level (32 per cent), when compared to the feelings of EU-27 citizens on both counts (4 and 10 per cent respectively). Therefore, why is immigration so much more of an issue in the UK, and why is the disparity between immigration representing a personal concern or a national concern so particularly significant in the UK?

### Is the United Kingdom a special case?

It is frequently claimed that the UK is an overcrowded nation and that this is due to its geography as a relatively small island nation which has experienced wave after wave of immigration since the 1950s. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) prediction that the population will rise to 81.5 million by 2060 could certainly reinforce this claim.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the UK already has one of the highest population densities in Europe (262.7 people per km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>27</sup> However, high levels of population density do not directly feed into concern over immigration as shown by figure 4. This graph shows that Belgium and the Netherlands -who have far higher levels of population density- do not seem to be as concerned with immigration when compared to the UK.

**Figure 4**

**Figure 1.10: Immigration as an important issue by population density, 2011**



Another commonly made claim is that the UK is the prime destination in Europe for migrants due to a number of factors including the English language, economic development and flexibility of the labour market. These issues are pull factors that encourage migrants to head to the UK. However, the statistics do not back up the

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p. 88.

<sup>26</sup> Goodhart, *The British Dream*, p. 22.


<sup>27</sup> Eurostat, Population density, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00003&plugin=1>, accessed 21/4/15

<sup>28</sup> Duffy and Frere-Smith, *Perceptions and Reality*, p. 14.

argument that the UK is receiving far more migrants per year. Indeed the *Ipsos Mori* results shown in figure 5 reveal that both Germany and Italy had more net migration in 2011 and yet these nationalities were less than half as concerned about immigration when compared to the UK population.

**Figure 5**

**Figure 1.7: Immigration as an important issue by 2011 net migration**



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Thus one can see that the UK is not the most crowded country in Europe, nor does it have the highest levels of net migration, and yet it consistently ranks as a nation which is one of the most worried about immigration. As a result it is salient to ask: why is the UK so much more concerned with immigration? In order to answer this question, we will again return to the concept of imagined immigration.

One simple truth is that most populations greatly overestimate the size of their immigrant population, and the UK is one of the worst culprits in this regard. An overestimation of the reality leads to more pronounced feelings on the issue and may explain the difference previously illustrated whereby immigration was more of a national issue than a personal or local one. Figure 6 highlights the fact that the general public in the UK overestimate their migrant population by almost 20 per cent. This reinforces the perception that, proportional to total population, the UK has almost the highest migrant population in Europe. In actual fact, Spain, Sweden and Germany all have proportionally larger migrant populations, and yet their overestimation of this community is far more minimal than that highlighted in the UK. This overestimation factor will surely ensure that immigration is seen as more of an important issue, and it may follow that it may even be


<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p. 11.

seen as more of a negative issue as people seem to believe that it is far more widespread than reality suggests.

Figure 6

Figure 1.19: Estimated vs actual foreign born population

In your opinion, what percentage of the total (COUNTRY) population are immigrants? You can answer any number between 0 and 100.




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A potential correlating factor with the general public’s exaggerated estimates is the notion that there are too many foreign-born people living in the country. In simple terms, the higher the overestimation of the foreign-born population, the more likely it is that people will suggest that there are now too many foreigners in the country. This state of affairs is accurately illustrated by figure 7 which shows both the UK population’s exaggerated analysis of the migrant population, and the notably anti-immigration sentiment of there being too many foreign born people. In short, people think there are more immigrants than there really are –even though local and personal experience suggests otherwise- and as a result their views towards the whole issue harden.

Figure 7

Figure 1.20: Overestimation of foreign born population vs too many foreign born people in COUNTRY



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<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 23.

## The rise of Ukip and the intensifying immigration debate

In the European elections of May 2014, Ukip became the first party in modern times other than Labour or the Conservatives to win a national election in the UK. Their rise from a protest party has been rapid and they now have two MPs and are regularly polling around 14 per cent in the build-up to the 2015 General Election (as of April 2015). Ukip derives a great deal of its support from anti-EU sentiment, but research by Lord Ashcroft clarified that immigration is the primary concern for Ukip supporters.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the *British Social Attitudes Survey* of 2014 showed that 13 per cent of those who have strong negative views on immigration align themselves with Ukip, compared to just 1 per cent of those who have positive views.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, Ukip clearly gains much of its support from people whose “prime motivation is their opposition to immigration”.<sup>34</sup> Whilst their leader Nigel Farage argues for controlled immigration, it is current policy to introduce a five-year ban on all immigration; this policy highlights the anxiety towards immigration which can be found within the political party.<sup>35</sup> Another 2014 survey of Ukip supporters revealed that 57 per cent of them wanted immigration levels to be reduced ‘a lot’ whilst at the same time 41 per cent stated that they had ‘no migrant friends’.<sup>36</sup> This perhaps again points to the notion that many people are anti-immigration, without themselves having any profound, personal contact with the objects of their anger. Furthermore, other evidence exists which underlines the belief that Ukip supporters are – on a relative level- not directly affected by immigration in their local area. Research by Andrew Geddes has shown that Ukip’s support is strongest in areas where the population is “predominantly if not overwhelmingly British-born”, which reflects what he has described as a “displaced halo”.<sup>37</sup> What this means is that whilst Ukip support is largely driven by anti-immigration sentiment, its support is strongest in areas which have not been greatly affected by migration and are “socially, economically, culturally and spatially

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Michael Skey, “‘How do you think I feel? It’s my country’” Belonging, Entitlement and the Politics of Immigration’, *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Jul-Sep 2014) 326-332, p. 328.

<sup>33</sup> Robert Ford and A. Heath, ‘Immigration: A Nation Divided?’, *British Social Attitudes 31* (London: National Centre for Social Research, 2014) <http://www.bsa-31.natcen.ac.uk> p.14.

<sup>34</sup> Geddes, ‘The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain’, p. 292.

<sup>35</sup> Patrick Wintour, ‘Nigel Farage: Ukip wants five-year ban on immigrants settling in the UK’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jan/07/ukip-ban-immigrants-nigel-farage>, 7/1/14, accessed 29/4/15

<sup>36</sup> Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, ‘Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind’, *The Political Quarterly*, No. 3 (July-September 2014) 277-284, p. 281.

<sup>37</sup> Geddes, ‘The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain’, p. 292.

distant from those that have been”.<sup>38</sup> For example, Ukip’s two MPs, Mark Reckless and Douglas Carswell, have constituencies which are 89.6 per cent, and 92.8 per cent White British respectively (UK average is 80.5 per cent).<sup>39</sup> Ukip support as a result could offer another prime example of imagined immigration. For Nigel Farage has stated that in “many parts of England you don’t hear English spoken anymore”, and that these are not the kinds of communities “we want to leave to our children and grandchildren”.<sup>40</sup> Judgements such as these could be considered by some to be relevant in parts of the nation, however, the simple truth is that Ukip supporters generally do not live in these communities and are far more likely to be relatively unaffected by the changes that are taking place due to migration. Therefore, this ‘displaced halo’ theory for Ukip support means that individuals who are very anti-immigration have limited direct contact with immigration within their own community, and have very little personal contact with immigrants themselves in the form of personal relations. As a result, opinions are being formed on immigration not on the basis of personal experience but on the perceived impact of immigration. This idea of imagined immigration is therefore evident in Ukip support, the divergence between national, and local/personal concern over immigration, and in the startling overestimation of the size of the immigrant population in the UK. However, how are these perceptions, estimates and opinions formulated?

#### The role of the media in shaping perceptions of immigration

Opinions which are not based on personal experience have to come from exterior sources in some way, shape, or form. Oscar Wilde wrote:

“Most people are other people. Their thoughts are someone else's opinions, their lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation.”<sup>41</sup>

Wilde argues that we are profoundly influenced by the thoughts of other people, thoughts which can take the form of gossip, advice, correspondence, education, body-language or any other direct, or indirect form of communicative influence. Whilst this quote may exaggerate the extent to which outside information moulds us, it is true that to make a judgment on something of which we have little personal experience, we often rely on outside help. It is for this reason that this research paper focuses on imagined immigration

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<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> ONS, *2011 Census: Key statistics for local authorities in England and Wales* (ONS: London, 2011)

<sup>40</sup> Andrew Sparrow, ‘Nigel Farage: Parts of Britain are like a foreign land’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/28/nigel-farage-ukip-immigration-speech>, 28/2/14, accessed 12/3/15

<sup>41</sup> Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, 1897 (Book Jungle: London, 2007)

and the role of the media, or more specifically on the national newspapers that are read every morning up and down the country. These newspapers inform people of events from around the world, events which they themselves will never experience and which hold little direct relevance to their daily lives. Newspapers expose us to the outside world from the comfort of our homes and educate, inform and entertain us with issues that the editorial team wants to analyse. This is not to say that this is a one-way street where newspapers tell people what to think and how to feel. In the age of the Internet and twenty-hour news, there are a plethora of ways to access information and current affairs. Therefore, people are arguably now less likely to believe everything they read as other points of view are more readily available. Nonetheless, the Culturalist theory of mass media claims, “that people interact with media to create their own meanings out of the images and messages they receive”.<sup>42</sup> Audiences thus play an active role in interpreting events, but they are also indubitably influenced by the information that the mass media provides them with.

An article in *The Guardian* in 2014 drew attention to the role of newspapers in the immigration debate. This research article disclosed that the number of migrant workers from Bulgaria and Romania had increased by 35 per cent between 2005 and 2006, but that the media coverage of these groups (from the major national newspapers) had risen by 325 per cent in the same period.<sup>43</sup> Disproportional media coverage such as this, arguably ensures that the general public will believe that immigration is far more of an issue for them than the actual statistics might otherwise suggest. Whilst a 35 per cent increase in migration in one year is undeniably a sizeable increase, the 325 per cent increase in media coverage will ensure that people’s exposure to –and opinions of– Bulgarians and Romanians will reflect an exaggerated form of imagined immigration, rather than a realistic view of the sizeable immigration that the UK receives.

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<sup>42</sup> CliffsNotes, *The role and influence of mass media*,  
<http://www.cliffsnotes.com/sciences/sociology/contemporary-mass-media/the-role-and-influence-of-mass-media>, accessed 13/3/15

<sup>43</sup> Mona Chalabi, ‘UK migration: real figures v the headlines’, *The Guardian*,  
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/reality-check/interactive/2014/jan/06/uk-migration-statistics-v-headlines>, 6/1/14, date accessed 9/3/15



## **Research methodology**

This research project will focus on the two major EU accession events in the last decade, the periods surrounding the 2004, and the 2014 EU visa-free enlargements. This time frame is a salient period to work on since such sizeable immigration occurred in the decade following 2004. It could be argued that the effects of the 2004 accession were relatively unanticipated by official sources (2003 Home Office report), but also that the media and the public failed to grasp the changes that were going to occur. In contrast, I would suggest that the 2014 A2 accession of Bulgaria and Romania received far more attention due to what had happened in the decade since 2004. This thesis will therefore proceed to analyse *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian* newspapers for three months before, and three months after the accession dates. For this research the online newspaper database *NewsBank* will be utilised. This website contains all published articles from *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian* for the designated period of study. Both these newspapers are quality broadsheets and they are read each morning by a significant number of British citizens. Indeed, in 2014 the combined PC and print readership in the UK was almost 12 million per month for *The Daily Telegraph*, and 12.5 million for *The Guardian*.<sup>44</sup> These newspapers are undoubtedly influential given their readership numbers, and these particular publications have been chosen because they analyse immigration from traditionally different political perspectives.

Since the 1997 General Election, *The Guardian* has backed the Labour Party twice and the Liberal Democrats once (in 2005 their support was split between the two).<sup>45</sup> Moreover, *The Guardian* was founded to promote liberal values in the aftermath of the Peterloo massacre, and more recently its features editor, Ian Katz, declared that, “it is no secret we are a centre-left newspaper”.<sup>46</sup> In contrast, *The Telegraph* has backed the Conservative Party in every single general election since 1997,<sup>47</sup> and generally holds views that are broadly in line with the party mantra, thus leading to the nickname “The Torygraph”.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the readership of both newspapers generally have similar

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<sup>44</sup> National Readership Survey, January-December 2014, [http://www.nrs.co.uk/downloads/padd-files/pdf/nrs\\_padd\\_jan\\_dec14\\_newsbrands.pdf](http://www.nrs.co.uk/downloads/padd-files/pdf/nrs_padd_jan_dec14_newsbrands.pdf)

<sup>45</sup> Katy Stoddard, ‘Newspaper support in UK general elections’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/may/04/general-election-newspaper-support>, 4/5/10. accessed 10/3/15

<sup>46</sup> Matt Wells, ‘World writes to undecided voters’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/16/uselections2004.usa2>, 16/10/04, accessed 10/3/15


<sup>47</sup> Stoddard, ‘Newspaper support in UK general elections’

<sup>48</sup> Brian Curtis, ‘Paper Tiger: Strange days at The Daily Telegraph’, *Slate*, 2006, [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/letter\\_fromlondon/2006/10/paper\\_tiger.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/letter_fromlondon/2006/10/paper_tiger.html), accessed 10/3/15

political leanings to the newspapers themselves. This statement is proven by the fact that only nine per cent of *Guardian* readers voted Conservative in 2010, compared to 70 per cent of *Telegraph* readers.<sup>49</sup> The left/right divide is emphasised by the finding that 46 per cent of *Guardian* readers voted Labour, whereas only 9 per cent of *Telegraph* readers did the same thing. The politically homogenous nature of the readers and their newspaper might indicate that the readers' political views are influenced by the newspaper or that they choose to read a paper that is politically congenial to them. Either way, the action of reading a newspaper each day with specific political views and with a particular way of interpreting events must have some impact upon the reader. These traditional political affiliations –of both the newspapers and their readers- may provide contrasting interpretations of the immigration issue which would offer an interesting opportunity to analyse and compare, in a balanced manner, the different ways in which the A10 immigration debate is framed in the UK.

Existing research on British newspapers and their readers played a part in formulating this paper's methodology and confirmed that *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian* represent salient choices for comparison. Research from *The Guardian* highlights how much news coverage different national newspapers afforded to specific migrant groups in 2013.

**Figure 8: National newspaper coverage of various nationalities in 2013**



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
Figure 8 shows us the interesting contrast between the two newspapers, as we can see that *The Telegraph* had more headlines than *The Guardian* on Romanians, Bulgarians and the Polish in 2013. Not only does *The Telegraph* newspaper emphasise immigration as an issue, but its readership does too. Figure 9 highlights this situation as readers of *The*

<sup>49</sup> Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Andrew Blick and Stephen Crone, 'The political affiliations of the UK's national newspapers have shifted, but there is again a heavy Tory predominance', *LSE Blogs*, 21/12/13, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-political-affiliations-of-the-uks-national-newspapers-have-shifted-but-there-is-again-a-heavy-tory-predominance/>

<sup>50</sup> Chalabi, 'UK migration: real figures v the headlines'


*Telegraph* were over 20 per cent more likely than those of *The Guardian* to state that immigration is the most important issue facing Britain today.

Figure 9



*The Telegraph's* readers think that immigration is an important issue, but they also overwhelmingly think of it in a negative manner and therefore believe that it should be reduced. Figure 10 shows that 78 per cent of *Telegraph* readers think that immigration should be reduced; this contrasts with only 46 per cent of *Guardian* readers. We can therefore confirm that these two newspapers, and their readerships, have different political ideologies, alongside alternate coverage and interpretations of immigration as an issue.

Figure 10



<sup>51</sup> Duffy and Frere-Smith, *Perceptions and Reality: Public Attitudes to Immigration*, p. 94.

This thesis will proceed to analyse the coverage that each newspaper affords to EU immigration as an issue, and a multi-faceted analysis of the *NewsBank* resource will occur as follows. Within the specified time frame any published articles from these two newspapers that use the word “immigration” and concern the A10 states will be collated together into a database. This database will allow us to ascertain how many articles were written in each period, when these articles were written, and also interestingly, what words were used –and how frequently- within the parameters of the A10 immigration debate. The research will therefore be of a primarily quantitative nature, but will also involve discourse analysis as the usage of words can provide a great deal of information as to how the debate is presented by the media, and therefore how it is understood by the general public.

The hypothesis for this paper is that one should expect to find great differences between how each newspaper covered A10 immigration, with more coverage from the anti-immigration *Daily Telegraph*, than the more liberal *Guardian*. It is also probable that there will be a marked difference between the respective time periods, with 2014 revealing more intense coverage –in both newspapers- of an increasingly negative nature as A10 immigration became much more of a headline issue in the period from 2004-2014.

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
<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, p. 93.

## Results and analysis

### The A8 Accession of 2004 in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*

This research project begins with the three-month period before the May 2004 A8 accession event and finishes three months after. The differences between the pre- and post-accession periods in terms of media coverage are evident in figure 11. It is clear to see that there are far more articles before the 1<sup>st</sup> May, than after the accession day as interest appears to fall off almost entirely. Indeed, *The Guardian* only published ten articles in the three months following the accession event, and *The Telegraph* only had five. *The Guardian* therefore maintained a more sustained interest, but both newspapers seem to consider immigration a minor issue once accession has occurred. In the pre-accession period there is a clear spike of articles in late-March and early April. This corresponds to the Home Office visa scandal involving Beverly Hughes, which implied a lack of scrutiny, and shortcuts for visa applications from Bulgaria and Romania.

Figure 11: Newspaper coverage in 2004



There is also a noticeable minor surge in interest just before the accession day as newspapers consider the direct implications of the event. Interestingly, *The Guardian* contained 68 articles in 2004, whereas *The Daily Telegraph* only published 37 articles. This goes against what might have been expected since *The Telegraph* now has a

reputation as an anti-immigration, and EU-sceptic newspaper. That may now be the case, but in 2004 *The Guardian* published more articles on A10 immigration, and maintained a far more sustained interest in the topic before, and after the 1<sup>st</sup> May 2004.

**Figure 12: Newspaper coverage and official workforce data in 2004**




Figure 12 combines the number of articles published by both newspapers in each period in 2004, alongside the number of registered workers from the A8, and from the A2 countries in each period (1= pre-accession, 2=post-accession). It combines this project’s research with 2004 ONS data derived from the Labour Force Survey. One can thus clearly see that even though the number of workers from the A8 nations rose from 63,000 to 86,500 following the accession, the number of articles in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* fell from 90 to 15 articles. In other words, a 37 per cent increase in A8 workers was accompanied by an 84 per cent reduction in the number of articles. A clear reduction in coverage following the accession is in evidence but for 2004 the newspaper coverage for A10 immigrants remained high relative to the number of workers registered in the UK. In fact, there was one article for every 257 A2 workers, 712 A8 workers, or one article for every 969 A10 immigrants in work in 2004. This clearly represents a relatively high concentration of coverage for A10 migrants, even though the overall coverage fell whilst immigration levels increased throughout the period analysed.

### The A2 Accession of 2014 in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*

There is a noticeably higher concentration of articles in evidence from both *The Guardian* and from *The Daily Telegraph* in 2014 as revealed by figure 13. Not only are there more articles in general but there is also more sustained coverage both before and after the accession. This is shown by continuing coverage after the 1<sup>st</sup> January with *The Telegraph* particularly covering the issue in early January, whereas *The Guardian* maintains a more continuous level of coverage until late February 2014. Even if both newspapers' coverage falls in March, there is still a continuing level of interest in immigration which reveals how it has become more of a mainstream issue. Therefore, in 2014 smaller reductions in coverage followed the accession event as *The Telegraph's* coverage only fell from 67-55 articles, while *The Guardian's* fell from 44-41 articles. As a result, not only are there far more articles, but they are more evenly spread across the period which reflects a trend whereby immigration has become more of a story to cover, rather than the accession event itself being the issue.

**Figure 13: Newspaper coverage in 2014**





Figure 13 also highlights another spike in coverage as the accession nears in mid-November, and just before the accession itself from both newspapers as the imminence of the accession heightens coverage. The relative lack of coverage in October highlights this shift and it shows that whilst the A10 countries are now a constant preoccupation, they

grow in importance the closer one arrives to the enlargement event. This shows that the uncertainty factor that is in place before the accession leads to intensified coverage as immigration worries and fears have much more scope to accelerate given the vacuum of tangible reports and concrete facts. This analysis of 2014 highlights a build-up in anxiety before the 1<sup>st</sup> January. Coverage is maintained however, following the accession event, a fact which could point to the idea of immigration having now become a mainstream concern.

**Figure 14: Newspaper coverage and official workforce data in 2014**



This combined analysis of the newspaper coverage in 2014, illustrated by figure 14, shows that overall coverage has again fallen in the immediate period following the accession. Nonetheless, it has not fallen by a huge amount as the reduction of 14 per cent, or 15 articles, is far less significant than that which was noted in 2004 (84 per cent reduction). However, one can now see that there are many more A2 and A8 immigrants in UK employment when compared to 2004, and yet surprisingly newspaper coverage of these migrants is now relatively less concentrated. Indeed, there was one newspaper article for every 633 A2 workers, 3,731 A8 workers, or one for every 4,364 A10 migrants in UK employment in 2014. Coverage could therefore be claimed to be four times less intense on a proportional level compared to 2004 (A10 migrant workers/number of articles). What is of particular interest in figure 14 is the fact that the number of A2 workers fell by 894 in the period following accession. This occurred against a backdrop of intense media




coverage of the removal of restrictions against Bulgarian and Romanian migrants and suggests that the anxiety aroused by the idea of a flood of migrants was not born from truth as A2 migrant worker levels actually fell immediately following the accession. In contrast, the A8 worker group increased by 75,971 people, or 10 per cent in the same period. Clearly much of the attention paid to A10 immigration in late 2013 and early 2014, was closely related to the advent of visa-free restrictions for Bulgarians and Romanians. However, official data shows that these worries were misplaced and that A8 migration continued to be on a far greater scale.

#### What changed from 2004-2014 in how much the media scrutinised A10 immigration?

Comparing the two periods analysed (2004 and 2014) could identify how the intensity, and nature of newspaper coverage of A10 immigration has changed over time. The changes in the coverage of *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian* could reflect wider changes within UK society and they could also highlight whether the A8 accession impacted upon the perceptions of the A2 accession a decade later. This first chart (figure 15) directly transposes the newspaper data from 2004 and 2014 onto the same graph and thus comparisons are more easily identifiable. For instance, it is clear from both periods that there is significantly more coverage before the accession, compared to after it and this is shown by the preponderance of dots to the left half of the chart. Furthermore, the high number of red and blue dots shows that 2014 saw a far greater amount of A10 coverage when compared to 2004. Nonetheless, the most intense period of coverage remains the 2004 Beverly Hughes visa scandal which perhaps shows that political scandal and immigration is a particularly newsworthy combination. One other thing that draws attention is the forty-day surge in coverage.

Figure 15: Newspaper coverage in 2004 & 2014 by date




The period 40 days before, and 40 days after the accession event (period begins on the 39/1 before accession, and after it ends on the 41/2) contains the vast majority of articles on the issue. In the period before the accession this may mean that the closer one gets to the event, the more relevant the issue becomes and thus more attention and focus is given to it. On the other hand, we may infer from the period after the accession that attention is maintained due to the proximity of the event, but then that after forty days interest drops and the news moves on. This theory appears to be reasonably accurate, although the sustained interest in A10 immigration following the 2014 accession slightly challenges the theory, as coverage is maintained past the forty-day mark.

The second overview chart (figure 16) proceeds to illustrate the coverage of A10 immigration by newspaper and period in 2004 and 2014 (1=pre-accession, 2=post-accession). One can see that every post-accession period contains less articles than in the pre-accession period. This is true for each newspaper and every period, although the fall is far less clear-cut in 2014 as more consistent coverage is in evidence. In contrast, 2004

showed a relative lack of interest in the issue from both newspapers as their combined coverage fell by 84 per cent to only 15 articles in the post-accession period.

**Figure 16: Newspaper coverage in 2004 & 2014 by period**



The traditional left/right wing divide between these two newspapers does not appear to influence their coverage of A10 immigration as their coverage in 2014 follows a similar upwards trend when compared to 2004. Interestingly, *The Guardian* had more articles in 2004, which does not reflect the stereotype of the left-wing media being less concerned about immigration. However, whilst *The Guardian*'s coverage increased by 25 per cent from 2004 to 2014, *The Telegraph*'s coverage rose by a sizeable 330 per cent, an increase which reveals a stark rise in the prominence of immigration for *The Daily Telegraph*. A10 immigration has clearly become more of an issue for *The Telegraph* in the period from 2004-2014, whereas *The Guardian* experienced a more measured rise. In total there were 102 more articles in 2014, an increase of 97 per cent which highlights how immigration gained far more of the spotlight when compared with 2004.

**Figure 17: Newspaper coverage and official workforce data in 2004 & 2014**




Figure 17 identifies the shifts from 2004-2014 in newspaper coverage alongside the number of A2 and A8 nationals in UK employment. The sharp rise in immigration is illustrated in this chart and this perhaps explains why immigration received more coverage in terms of articles in 2014, and also why the coverage was more sustained over the entire period analysed. One can see that the A2 population in work increased by 482 per cent in the pre-accession periods analysed, whilst the A8 population rose by 840 per cent in just a decade. In the same period, the number of newspaper articles rose by 23 per cent –or 21 articles- which shows a clear upsurge in pre-accession media interest. Nonetheless the largest rise in media coverage is found in the post-accession period as there were 81 more articles in 2014, a large increase of 640 per cent. One might argue that such a rise is easily explained by the fact that the A2 population in work had multiplied by 479 per cent, and that the A8 population had similarly grown by 928 per cent in the post-accession periods analysed. However, if this research analysis of three-month periods shows an increase in A10 immigration coverage of 23 per cent (period 1), and 640 per cent (period 2), then what would an analysis of the entire decade of coverage from 2004-2014 show? For ten years of immigration was also of course accompanied by ten years of newspaper coverage.

The increases in the A2 and A8 population are indubitably significant, however there was one *Guardian* or *Telegraph* article for every 4,364 A10 migrants in work in the 6-month period of analysis in 2013/14. This is certainly an intense form of coverage and

one that other migrant groups do not have to endure to such an extent. For example, it is often claimed that London is France's sixth largest city and that there are 270,000 French nationals living there.<sup>53</sup> If this statement is true, and if the newspapers covered the French migrant population in the same manner as the A10 immigrants, then there have been 62 *Guardian* and *Telegraph* articles about London's French population in the 6-months of 2013/14 which were analysed. Furthermore, the UK's Spanish population has been surging since the economic crisis with the population having doubled to 150,000 from 2009-2012.<sup>54</sup> A similarly proportional analysis of the rapidly growing Spanish population (27,000 arrived from 2012-2013)<sup>55</sup> would have ensured that there were 34 articles on Spanish immigration in the 2014 accession period.<sup>56</sup> Such levels of coverage did not occur, and as a result one must ask what is particularly newsworthy in regard to the A8 and A2 accessions? High levels of intense immigration can account for some of the coverage, and yet from the comparison with the French and Spanish populations we might infer that this cannot be the only explanation. In an effort to analyse why A10 migration is particularly newsworthy, and how the coverage changed from 2004-14, this research project has also assessed how *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* described A10 immigration within their own articles. The that words were used, and when they were written, could reveal some interesting findings, since the idea of understanding how people comprehend A10 immigration is closely tied to the issue of how it is presented to the general public.

#### What changed from 2004-2014 in how the media presented A10 immigration?

Discourse analysis has been applied to all of the articles found in the *NewsBank* resource which made an explicit reference to A10 immigration. This database of articles from both *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* was then analysed to chart the frequency of certain words across the four 3-month periods that were researched. Using discourse analysis for newspaper coverage is of particular relevance since the newspapers are often presenting real, hard facts in the manner which they judge to be most suitable. Statistics can of course be manipulated, however, there is more freedom in the vocabulary used by a

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<sup>53</sup> Wesley Stephenson, 'Is London really France's sixth largest city?', *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26823489>, 1/4/14, accessed 3/3/15

<sup>54</sup> Harry Wallop, 'The new Spanish armada is on its way', *The Daily Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/state-of-europe/10134803/The-new-Spanish-armada-is-on-its-way.html>, 21/6/13, accessed 3/3/15


<sup>55</sup> James Walsh, 'Romanians and Bulgarians in the UK react to furore', *The Guardian*, 3/1/14, accessed 5/3/15

<sup>56</sup> Based on 2012 population estimate, 2014 number can be assumed to be higher

journalist to interpret news in whichever way they see fit. Words not only describe situations, they also express opinions and feelings. As a result, the words used in the A10 immigration debate could show what issues the journalists consider to be of particular importance, and they could also provide real clues as to the changing tone of media coverage.

The discourse analysis has been presented in line charts in order to portray simply the shifting usage of particular words within the A10 immigration debate. Figure 18's theme is location, since it contains words that determine the countries and regions that are of particular importance in the migration debate.

**Figure 18: Location words**



One interesting thing that this chart shows is the fact that “Romania” and “Bulgaria” were frequently mentioned in 2004 even though the A8 accession did not actually include them, and there were only 27,000 A2 workers in the UK at this time (see figure 17). Whilst there was a Home Office visa scandal involving Bulgaria and Romania, it does seem strange that the A2 nations received more mentions than “Poland” in 2004- a country that was part of the A8 accession, and which ended up providing over 1.5 million migrants for the UK. The frequency of “Poland” in 2004 is more prominent pre rather than post accession, and there is interestingly less usage in 2014. Perhaps the lower usage of “Poland” in 2014 is

explained by the fact that it is no longer newsworthy since the largest surge in immigration occurred from 2004-2008 and the UK had grown more accustomed to Polish immigration. Whilst it is to be expected that Romania and Bulgaria should receive more coverage in 2014, it is odd that they were also considered to be more relevant than Poland in 2004. It is also noteworthy that the A2 nations were more prevalent in *The Daily Telegraph* in 2014, whereas in 2004 they featured far more frequently in *The Guardian*.

Elsewhere the words “EU”, and “European”, unsurprisingly appear frequently in articles which discuss immigration and the European Union. Far greater usage is in evidence in 2014 which points to a higher profile for the EU when compared to 2004. There is also more consistent interest in the “EU” both before, and after the 2014 accession when compared with 2004. The word “European” follows a similar trajectory to the “EU”, and yet in every period it is used less frequently in the post-accession period, whereas the “EU” is of more importance to *The Guardian* in 2014’s post-accession months. Finally, the word “Eastern” appears to be more common for *The Telegraph* in 2014 than in 2004, whereas over the same period *The Guardian* has started to use it less frequently.

**Figure 19: Types of immigration**




Figure 19 includes words which relate to what type of immigration is being discussed, and how immigration is considered in the UK. As with the other charts, the number of key words is higher in 2004's pre-accession period compared with its post-accession period. Nonetheless, we can still see that the word "workers" receives the smallest fall in coverage from *The Guardian* in 2004, from which we could infer a more sustained emphasis. "Workers" may have a positive connotation since it links immigration with migrants who are economically productive, but it can also have a negative connotation since these "workers" might be making the labour market more competitive for the native-born population. The word becomes more prevalent in 2014 and is almost equally common in *The Telegraph* in 2014, whilst *The Guardian* uses it even more after the 2014 accession. Its continued usage ensures that the word is closely tied to the concept of A10 immigration, a state of affairs that reveals changes to employment as one of the major side effects for migrants and the host society alike.

The changing use of the word "asylum" is of particular significance here. It is evident that "asylum" was one of the most important issues in 2004 –in both newspapers– but that its importance fell and its usage almost completely stopped in 2014. This could be due to the visa scandals involving Roma in 2004, and the notion that asylum was no longer relevant to A10 migration in 2014 due to the expansion of the visa-free area to include the A10 nations.

"Benefits" in this context is actually a negative word and usually concerns the welfare benefits allowed to new migrants in the UK. "Benefits" was an issue in 2004 although its importance greatly increases in 2014 with a mass level of usage by *The Telegraph* in 2014 1 compared to *The Guardian's* more moderate usage. Whilst *The Guardian's* usage of the word in 2004 and 2014 remains fairly constant, the focus placed on "benefits" by *The Telegraph* in 2014 1 reveals that it is a very important issue for the newspaper and is almost three times more commonly used than the nations where the migrants come from (see figure 18). The word "welfare" is also closely tied to the concept of what state aid –if any– the A10 migrants can receive upon arriving in the UK. Analysis of this word shows that it was of little importance to *The Telegraph* in 2004, but grew in importance in 2014. Moreover, *The Guardian* used it more in 2004, and every newspaper used it more in the pre-accession, rather than the post-accession period. Both "welfare" and "benefits" often have negative connotations and it is therefore interesting that their usage is almost always higher in the pre-accession period when increased scrutiny and anxiety begins to develop.



Elsewhere, the words “economic” and “job” can have either positive or negative connotations and refer to the economic effects that A10 migration can have. There appears to be an increased awareness of the economic effects of migration in 2014 as coverage of these words is of a more prevalent and consistent nature. These economic aspects appear to be of limited relevance to *The Telegraph* in 2004 (in comparison with the word “asylum”), and *The Guardian* also deploys the words relatively sparsely since they are among the two least used words for 2014 on this graph. This is of interest, since 2004 appears to have a greater focus on the direct effects of migration such as “asylum”, “benefits”, “welfare” and “workers”. In contrast, the indirect effects of migration such as “economic” and “job” appear to be of lesser importance, and yet this lack of scrutiny has changed by 2014 as there is more consideration of the indirect economic effects of A10 migration.

**Figure 20: Numerical words**





Figure 20 contains words that relate to the numerical descriptions of A10 migration. The word with perhaps the most negative connotation is “flood”, as it refers to an overwhelming arrival of migrants which could transform the host society. Every pre-accession period shows a higher usage of the word “flood” compared to the post-accession period which might highlight increased fears before the accession compared to after it. However, in these newspapers the use of this emotive term is limited, which could be

explained by the fact that they are both broadsheet newspapers which tend to report in a less sensationalist manner when compared with tabloid newspapers.

“Thousands” and “million” represent two descriptive words that quantify the migrants or predict their possible impact. “Thousands” is used most commonly in *The Telegraph* in 2014<sup>1</sup>, although *The Guardian*’s pre-accession coverage in 2004 also illustrates a high level of usage. Overall, one can see that “thousands” is used more commonly before the accession in every period apart from *The Guardian* in 2014. This heightened pre-accession coverage could represent anxiety expressed in the form of numerical predictions. “Million” is used in a similar way as it is always used more frequently before the visa-restrictions are dropped. Whilst *The Telegraph* continues using it in a reasonably consistent manner, *The Guardian* appears to attach less importance to it in 2014 as its usage falls slightly.

“Migrants” and “immigrants” describe the people who are the personification of immigration. The high incidence of these words should therefore be expected. However, it appears that *The Telegraph* uses these words much more often than *The Guardian* in 2014 which could reflect an emphasis on the people who are arriving, rather than the immigration concept itself. Interestingly, *The Guardian* seems to greatly prefer the word “migrants” rather than “immigrants” in 2014 (the same trend occurs to a lesser extent in 2004), this could be because “immigrants” sometimes has a negative connotation which is associated with outsiders arriving. In contrast, *The Telegraph* uses “immigrants” more freely in 2014 and it is the most used word on this chart for their publications before the 2004 accession. Whether a newspaper uses the word “immigrants” or “migrants” to describe new arrivals is an example of how newspapers can influence and shape the immigration debate. *Guardian* readers would be more exposed to the word “migrants” which infers that individuals are moving across borders both into and out of the UK, whereas *Telegraph* readers would be more exposed to the word “immigrants”, which infers that individuals are moving to the UK.

Figure 21: Negative interpretations



This final image charts the rise of anti-EU, anti-immigration sentiment within the UK as it tracks words which place a negative value on A10 immigration. Both “Farage” and “Ukip” are related to the rise of anti-EU politics which is closely tied to an antipathy towards the entire concept of freedom of movement across the EU. The usage of “Ukip” in 2004 is only really identifiable in the period following the A8 accession as the pre-accession months contain no mention of the party. This graph shows that “Ukip” had almost no importance or relevance to the immigration debate in 2004, although media interest in the party did immediately rise once the accession had occurred which could reveal the start of an upwards trend. This trend greatly accelerates as 2014 shows that the party is now the third most common word on the chart for *The Telegraph*, and the first/second most common for *The Guardian*. Moreover it is perhaps surprising that “Ukip” is used more commonly by *The Guardian* in 2014, than by *The Telegraph*. As “Ukip” are a right-wing party one might expect a centre-right newspaper to provide more coverage of them than a centre-left newspaper. However, *The Guardian* appears to be far more interested in “Ukip”, a state of affairs that may represent an opportunity to deride and criticize, rather than to support. A similar situation is shown by the increasing prevalence of “Farage” in *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian*. “Farage” is not mentioned by either newspaper in 2004, and yet in 2014 he receives consistently high coverage from

*The Telegraph* and a sharp spike of usage in *The Guardian* following the A2 accession. It is thus clear to identify the rise of “Ukip” from a protest party in 2004, to a political force in 2014.

Figure 21 reveals that a more explicitly negative view of immigration is on the rise across the period, and this is reflected by the increasing usage of “problem” and “restrictions”. *The Telegraph* identifies both words in 2004 before the accession and yet again, post-accession their usage drops. In contrast, one can see that in 2014 *The Telegraph* published the word “restrictions” on far more occasions in both periods, with an obvious spike in coverage before the A2 accession. “Restrictions” refers to the idea that the visa-free entry should be modified and that some limits should be placed on the migrants rights to live, and work in the UK. “Restrictions” can imply limiting the numbers who can arrive, what jobs they can do, and even what benefits they can receive upon arriving. Regardless of in which context it is used in relation to immigration, it always has a negative connotation and we can clearly see that the idea of “restrictions” was particularly prevalent in *The Telegraph* before 1<sup>st</sup> January 2014. *The Guardian*’s coverage of the word “problem” is vaguely similar to that of *The Telegraph* as more usage is identified before, rather than after the accession in 2004, whereas higher, more consistent usage is seen in 2014 as a whole. In simple terms, both newspapers link immigration with the word “problem” much more frequently, and much more consistently (before and after accession) in 2014. Negative implications of immigration continue in *The Guardian* as its 2014 usage of the word “restrictions” also increases –although to a much lower extent when compared with *The Telegraph*. Ultimately though, there is an increasing incidence of words that negatively interpret immigration in articles related to A10 immigration, which highlights the rising negativity that was associated with EU immigration in 2014.

### Key findings

Some key elements from the research results are identifiable in a number of these charts. Firstly, it is important to pinpoint the idea that there are always more articles in the pre-accession period compared to the post-accession period (figure 16). This occurs in both newspapers and is true in 2004, and in 2014. One can also identify a peak surge in coverage just before the accession date itself as it arguably represents a newsworthy story of great proximity and interest to the readership (figure 15). Also in evidence is the idea of a forty-day period of intense coverage which stretches out before and after the accession day itself. It is in this 40-day time frame that A10 immigration coverage is most intense in

*The Guardian* and in *The Telegraph*. It is in this period that the issue holds the most relevance, but it might also be the period in which anxiety is at its highest since unknown factors are at play, as predictions and fears take centre stage. Anxiety is in evidence as certain words which describe a large number of people are more common before the accession rather than after it, as revealed by the newspapers' increased use of the words "millions", "thousands" and "flood" (figure 20).

There is also a clear contrast in the coverage shown in 2004, and that revealed in 2014. In 2004, the difference between the pre and post accession period is stark as interest seems to completely fall away once the accession has occurred (figure 11). This could illustrate a general lack of interest in the topic, a feeling that could point to it being a low-priority, unimportant issue. The situation has changed by 2014 as not only are there far more articles, but these articles are spread more evenly across the period analysed (figure 16). This means that A10 immigration coverage was more consistent in 2014, and that interest was maintained after the accession, from which we can infer that an interest had developed in A10 immigration, rather than an interest just in the accession event itself (figure 13). In fact, the contrast between the two periods could have been even more glaring were it not for the visa scandal involving the Home Office which occurred in March 2004 and gained a great deal of coverage (figure 11). Whilst the total coverage in 2014 increased by 23 per cent before accession, and 640 per cent after, it could be argued that the coverage is now more proportional than it was in 2004. Whilst there was one article per 969 A10 workers in 2004 (figure 12), there was one for every 4,364 in 2014 (figure 14). This does appear to be more proportional and yet when compared to the coverage received by Spanish and French migrants, it seems that the A10 nationals may still receive a disproportional amount of newspaper coverage.

There is however a difference in how *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian* report on the same issue. *The Telegraph's* coverage surged to 330 per cent more articles in 2014 when compared to its lower 2004 coverage, which resulted in 37 more published articles on the issue in 2014 when contrasted with *The Guardian*. On the other hand, *The Guardian's* coverage was more intense in 2004 when compared to *The Telegraph*, whereas it then rose at a slower rate of 23 per cent in 2014 (figure 16). These two newspapers come from different sides of the political spectrum, and yet their status as broadsheet newspapers perhaps ensures that the differences that were expected between their coverage were not as drastic as first predicted. However, it is clear that immigration became much more of an issue for *The Telegraph* in 2014, and that the word "benefits"

was of far more importance to *The Telegraph* when compared to *The Guardian's* 2014 coverage, and its own reporting in 2004. Whilst the word “benefits” grew in importance across the period, the word “asylum” became largely irrelevant to the newspapers’ coverage (figure 19). It was commonly used in 2004 but due to the visa-free enlargements, its usage became unnecessary in articles on A10 immigration.

Each newspaper describes immigration in a different way, and this could affect the perceptions of their readers. Whilst *The Guardian* favours the word “migrants”, *The Telegraph* uses the word “immigrants” much more commonly across both periods (figure 20). Whilst “migrants” is a more general word referring to the movement of people, “immigrants” tends to imply people coming into the UK, which could provoke more negative connotations. In fact, *The Telegraph* uses both words more frequently which could imply that this newspaper generally focuses more attention on the people who are arriving. Whilst *The Telegraph* may focus more on the arrivals themselves, both newspapers display an increased interest in the more long-term effects that migrants can have. The words “workers”, “economic”, and “job” are all used more commonly, and more consistently in 2014 than in 2004. The inference is that newspapers are now looking beyond the immediate fact that migrants are arriving, and are focusing more on the outcomes which their migration can have on UK society. This increased scrutiny of more long-term connotations must surely be related to the UK’s experience of the 2004 A8 accession and the effects that followed.

In general, the immigration debate from 2004-2014 appears to be taking more of a negative tone. This is shown by figure 11, which highlights the rise of anti-EU, anti-immigration politics in the UK. We can note that “Ukip” only receives some coverage following the 2004 accession whereas “Farage” is not deemed to be relevant at all. In contrast, both words become much more common in 2014 with higher coverage in *The Guardian* culminating in a sizeable post-accession surge which may be linked to concern, rather than support. Whilst the increased usage of “EU” and “European” in 2014 point to a higher level of prominence, one might deduce that this is often in a negative framework (figure 18). Indeed, negative words such as “restrictions” and “problem” consistently rise across the period analysed (figure 21). When combined with the rise of “Ukip”, such a state of affairs may suggest an increasingly toxic A10 immigration debate in 2014. A great deal changed in the reality of UK immigration, and in the nature of its debate, and yet it is of significant interest to note that there is a consistently high interest in “Romania” and “Bulgaria” across both periods (figure 18). The scrutiny in 2014 is understandable given

that these countries' visa restrictions were being lifted, however the 2004 attention is less clear-cut. Across all periods analysed, the A2 nations were mentioned more frequently in articles than "Poland". This even occurred in 2004, when there were only 27,000 A2 nationals in work in the UK (figure 12), and when Poland had just lost its visa restrictions as part of an event which would see over 1.5 million Poles arrive in the UK to work.

Three key questions that have arisen from the research results will therefore be addressed. That is, why was immigration coverage always higher in the pre-accession period? Why did immigration receive so much more coverage in 2014, and why was it of an increasingly negative tone? And, why did Romania and Bulgaria in particular receive such intense media scrutiny? All three of the questions relate to the idea of imagined immigration, or how people interpret immigration as an issue, and how they decide whether it is successful or not. It is not a case of simple arithmetic; rather it is an issue of the subjectivity of the formulation of attitudes, as information is combined with first-, and second-hand experiences to create opinions. Indeed, the pre-accession period concerns how people think A10 immigration will be, the scrutiny towards Romanians and Bulgarians addresses how people perceive these nationalities, and the increasingly negative debate in 2014 tackles the issue of how people judge the success or failure of EU immigration into the UK.

## **An explanation of the results**

### Anxiety in the information vacuum: Why was immigration coverage higher in the pre-accession periods of 2004 and 2014?

One could reasonably claim that there was more coverage in the pre-accession periods because this is when the visa-free enlargement process had its most newsworthy status since a change was occurring. This may well be true to an extent, however one should drill down further to consider why the accession events themselves were considered to be so significant. The change brought about by the lifting of work restrictions on the A10 countries in 2004 and 2014 quite simply removed the ability of governments to actively control EU immigration levels. Indeed, the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition's 2011 plan to reduce net migration to 100,000 a year has catastrophically failed as net migration in the year to September 2014 rose to 298,000.<sup>57</sup> Almost half of the immigration was accounted to EU citizens which shows how the EU improves freedom of movement, and therefore reduces the power of a European government's immigration policy. It is perhaps this perception of uncontrollability that leads to escalating fears in the pre-accession periods.

The idea that immigration from the EU cannot be controlled provides a great deal of manoeuvre for predictions to be made. In other words, the unknown nature of future EU immigration following enlargements creates an information vacuum. Predictions, estimates and beliefs are employed to foretell how many people will arrive. The 'back of the envelope' estimates from MigrationWatch UK in 2003, and the Home Office's 2003 report which estimated that annual A8 migration would be fifteen times smaller than it turned out to be exemplifies how much uncertainty there was -even from the experts- as to how many immigrants would arrive.<sup>58</sup> The media, politicians, and research institutions, are more than willing to try and exploit this vacuum to make predictions, or even to serve their own interests. Indeed, it is more difficult to deal with predictions than commentary, since disproving predictions literally requires time and because considering our own futures can easily provoke anxiety. It should come as no surprise that one of the most notorious anti-immigration speeches of modern British history was a prediction, as Enoch

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<sup>57</sup> Andrew Grice, 'David Cameron immigration pledge failed spectacularly', *The Independent*, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/tory-immigration-pledge-failed-spectacularly-as-figures-show-net-migration-nearly-three-times-as-high-as-david-cameron-promised-10071710.html>, 26/2/15, accessed 4/3/15

<sup>58</sup> Alison Stenning et al., *Assessing the Local and Regional Impacts of International Migration*, p. 8.



Powell foresaw “a river foaming with blood”.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, worries relating to the future prey on our fear of the unknown and promote collective insecurities that can intensify into the contemporary moral panic which Balch and Balabanova have attributed to the immigration debate in the UK.<sup>60</sup> Fears like this can change voting patterns and a Ukip poster showing an escalator running up the white cliffs of Dover reveals that some political parties seek to encourage immigration anxiety.<sup>61</sup> Such an image is misleading, and yet the lack of clear information related to immigration ensures that an information vacuum is created which can be utilised to provide a plethora of different interpretations of immigration.

The media play an important role in informing the public, however, with little solid information available in pre-accession periods “journalists have pounced on unofficial numbers – sometimes little more than informed guesses – to fill the empty space”.<sup>62</sup> Take a 2013 article in *The Telegraph* which claimed in a headline that 350,000 Bulgarians and Romanians were looking for work in the UK.<sup>63</sup> Actually, the majority of those surveyed said that they would only move if they received a firm offer of work. If this same methodology was extrapolated to the *The Sun*'s 2012 survey on British nationals and emigration, then one could claim that 30 million Brits are looking for work abroad.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, the reality in Bulgaria is that recorded emigration rates of only 6 per cent, contrast with figures of up to 50 per cent recorded in polls from the capital Sofia.<sup>65</sup> It therefore seems clear that immigration polls should be closely scrutinised since they reflect migration intentions which are related to a number of changing factors. Another example of the media's use of evidence arose from the uncritical coverage of a report by the Democracy Institute, an American libertarian think-tank, which predicted that 385,000 people would come from Romania and Bulgaria to the UK over the five years following

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<sup>59</sup> Robert Winder, *Bloody Foreigners: The story of immigration to Britain* (London: Abacus, 2004) p. 5.

<sup>60</sup> Balch and Balabanova, ‘Ethics, Politics and Migration’, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup> Geddes, ‘The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain’, p. 291.

<sup>62</sup> The Migration Observatory, *Jumping the gun: Waiting for the facts before estimating Romanian and Bulgarian migration* (Oxford: The Migration Observatory, December 2013), p. 2.

<sup>63</sup> Peter Dominiczak, ‘350,000 Bulgarians and Romanians looking for work in the UK’, *The Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10009654/350000-Bulgarians-and-Romanians-looking-for-work-in-the-UK.html>, 22/4/13, accessed 5/3/15

<sup>64</sup> Tim Spanton, ‘48% of Brits want to get out of the UK’, *The Sun*, <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/features/4257682/48-of-Brits-want-to-get-out-of-Britain-says-new-Sun-survey.html>, 2012, accessed 5/3/15

<sup>65</sup> Mona Chalabi, ‘Eastern Europeans in the UK: Are they arriving in hordes?’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check/2013/jul/31/eastern-europeans-uk-numbers-benefits>, 31/7/13, accessed 5/3/15

the accession.<sup>66</sup> This report was described as “deeply flawed” by a migration expert and it provides no information about the methodology used to generate their migration prediction.<sup>67</sup> Nonetheless, the report was uncritically referenced in *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Daily Mail*, and *The Daily Express*. Indeed, the mass media are not necessarily in the business of being methodologically correct as they have their own ideas for selecting what should be considered newsworthy. The media are motivated by maintaining the interest of their readers, a goal that can induce sensationalist stories which are compressed within a simplified form to form a stylised narrative.<sup>68</sup> Stories that do not fit within the narrative are not necessarily ignored, however stories that do may receive greater emphasis and coverage since they draw attention, and provoke feelings other than that of measured neutrality. There is undoubtedly a great difference between editorial departments, however what aspect other than the Democracy Institute’s report being newsworthy could have led five major national newspapers to feature it, even though it was completely lacking in evidence? One could argue that the report symbolised what the editors thought the public wanted to read, or that it matched their own editorial narratives. Both factors at play are largely subjective and this example again reveals the power of the media in informing the general population with carefully selected data, analysis and news.

On the other hand, we should not simply criticise media outlets for using questionable data, or for interpreting immigration in the way they deem most fitting. This is because the immigration debate remains a largely subjective arena, and because even official data struggles to capture resolutely accurate facts about immigration. Scott Blinder talks about distinguishing between “statistical immigration as seen and measured by the state and imagined immigration as constructed by citizens interpreting their own social and political world”.<sup>69</sup> This implies that statistical immigration is reliable and that imagined immigration depends on the individual’s own experiences and analysis. However, statistical immigration itself is far from reliable and whilst it adds some numbers to the immigration debate, it continues the trend whereby the immigration debate is generally lacking in clarity. Take the International Passenger Survey (IPS) conducted by the ONS. The IPS is the unique source of annual emigration data, yet it only surveys 2,400

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<sup>66</sup> Scott Blinder, ‘Pseudo-Research pulls 385,000 Migrants Out of a Hat’, [http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/the-conversation-uk/immigration-statistics\\_b\\_4425268.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/the-conversation-uk/immigration-statistics_b_4425268.html), 11/12/13, accessed 5/3/15


<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Christina Boswell, ‘Knowledge, Legitimation and the Politics of Risk: The Functions of Research in Public Debates on Migration’, *Political Studies*, Vol. 57 (2009) 165-186, p. 168.

<sup>69</sup> Blinder, ‘Imagined Immigration’, p. 81.

immigrants, and 2,000 emigrants each year.<sup>70</sup> This survey is key for formulating estimates of net-migration and yet like any survey it has a margin of error as we can only ever be 95 per cent confident that the data is accurate. *The Migration Observatory* analysed 2009's emigration figures and showed that there was a range of 43,000 people from the top to the bottom estimate of emigrants.<sup>71</sup> The finding that 315,800-359,100 people emigrated from the country in 2009 is certainly useful, but it also shows that the immigration debate does not have the benefit of accurate and specific data. One further example of the uncertainty surrounding immigration arises from the contrasting results produced by the most common measures of net-migration, the Long-Term International Migration estimates based on the IPS, and the Annual Population Survey which includes data from the Labour Force Survey.

**Figure 22**



Source: Annual Population Survey (APS) and Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates, ONS <sup>72</sup>

Figure 22 shows how these different methodologies can produce different estimates for the annual net-migration results. A difference of over 50,000 individuals is shown in 2009, whilst there is a staggering 100,000-person divergence in 2006 depending on which estimate you follow. Both estimates represent official data but their contrasting results show how challenging it is even for official sources to accurately estimate the annual net-migration figure.

The state of affairs whereby even official data is not entirely reliable ensures that an information vacuum is created which can be filled by predictions of varying accuracy. Matters are made even more complicated in pre-accession periods since there is no direct

<sup>70</sup> Goodhart, *The British Dream*, p. 39.

<sup>71</sup> The Migration Observatory, *Top Ten Problems in the Evidence Base for Public Debate and Policy-Making on Immigration in the UK* (Oxford: The Migration Observatory, April 2014) p. 4.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

precedent of visa-free immigration tendencies to rely upon for the accession countries. It is arguable that this information vacuum worries people, and that a fear of the unknown encourages newspapers to rely on predictions, and to intensely scrutinise the accession process before it has actually occurred.

Why did A10 immigration receive more coverage in 2014, and why was it of an increasingly negative tone?

European Union migration: Overflowing borders or permeable boundaries?

The implications of A10 immigration are complex, varied, and fluid. Nonetheless, this research paper and other findings highlight the notion that there is an increasingly negative debate surrounding immigration in the UK. Indeed, Nils Muiznieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that ‘the UK debate has taken a worrying turn’,<sup>73</sup> whilst in 2009 three-quarters of adults in the UK supported the idea of sending migrants who cannot find a job home (more than two thirds in Italy, Spain, Germany and the US also agreed).<sup>74</sup> There could be a plethora of reasons for the negative feelings illustrated in this research project and in various opinion polls (see figure 2); one of them is certainly the fact that in 2014 there were 1.525 million citizens from the A10 accession nations in the UK, or 29.6 per cent of all foreigners.<sup>75</sup> The vast majority of these migrants will have arrived since 2005 when there were less than 300,000 A10 migrants living in the UK.<sup>76</sup> Whilst it is clear that a large number of migrants arrived from 2004-2014, it is important to know what social and economic effects their arrival had in the UK. Such data can influence, although not decide, how people consider immigration as a concept, and it may explain the increasing negativity surrounding immigration.

The direct effect brought about by the 2004 A8 accession, and the immediate effect of the A2 accession, are quite accurately illustrated by figure 23, which shows the NI registrations by country from 2002/3, right up to 2013/14.

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<sup>73</sup> Balch and Balabanova, ‘Ethics, Politics and Migration’, p. 3.

<sup>74</sup> Martin Ruhs and Bridget Anderson, *Who needs migrant workers? Labour shortages, Immigration, and Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 1.

<sup>75</sup> John Salt, *International Migration and the United Kingdom: Report of the United Kingdom SOPEMI Correspondent to the OECD, 2014* (2014) p. 3.

<sup>76</sup> Dave McCollum et al, *Spatial, sectoral and temporal trends in A8 migration to the UK 2004-2011: Evidence from the Worker Registration Scheme*, Economic and Social Research Council, Working paper number 17 (2012) p. 2.

Figure 23: National Insurance registrations by nationality 2002/3-2013/14

c) Top Ten Countries each Year of Registration

2002/03		2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07		2007/08	
India	24.8	India	31.5	Poland	61.1	Poland	171.1	Poland	220.4	Poland	210.7
Australia	18.7	South Africa	18.5	India	32.5	India	45.9	India	48.8	India	49.8
South Africa	18.5	Australia	17.3	Pakistan	20.2	Lithuania	30.9	Slovak Rep	28.6	Slovak Rep	30.0
Pakistan	16.7	Pakistan	16.8	South Africa	19.2	Slovak Rep	27.5	Pakistan	25.0	Pakistan	24.8
France	13.7	Portugal	14.1	Australia	16.5	South Africa	24.0	Australia	24.2	Australia	24.1
Philippines	11.6	China Rep	13.4	Lithuania	15.5	Australia	23.8	Lithuania	23.9	Romania	23.0
Spain	11.6	France	13.1	France	13.2	Pakistan	22.3	France	20.0	France	21.8
Zimbabwe	10.1	Spain	12.0	China Rep	12.6	France	17.2	South Africa	16.8	Lithuania	19.0
Iraq	10.0	Poland	11.3	Portugal	12.2	Latvia	14.4	Germany	15.1	Germany	15.5
Portugal	9.6	Philippines	10.9	Slovak Rep	11.1	Germany	13.4	China	13.0	Italy	15.4

2008/09		2009/10		2010/11		2011/12		2012/13		2013/14	
Poland	134.36	India	75.38	Poland	81.18	Poland	79.1	Poland	91.4	Poland	101.9
India	59.39	Poland	69.94	India	74.41	India	47.3	Spain	45.5	Romania	46.9
Slovak Rep	24.09	Lithuania	23.42	Pakistan	41.24	Pakistan	38.3	Italy	32.8	Spain	45.6
France	24.01	Latvia	23.20	Lithuania	40.84	Lithuania	33.2	India	31.3	Italy	42.0
Romania	23.95	Pakistan	22.96	Latvia	27.26	Spain	30.4	Lithuania	27.3	India	28.8
Pakistan	23.46	Bangladesh	21.18	Spain	24.37	Italy	24.3	Hungary	24.7	Portugal	27.3
Australia	21.39	Romania	17.68	France	22.55	Romania	22.9	Portugal	24.6	Hungary	23.6
Italy	18.63	France	16.45	Italy	22.10	France	21.6	France	21.2	Lithuania	22.4
Lithuania	17.62	Nigeria	16.23	Romania	22.00	Latvia	18.6	Romania	17.8	France	22.3
Nigeria	17.46	Nepal	14.59	Nigeria	17.84	Hungary	18.1	Pakistan	16.2	Bulgaria	17.8

Source: 100% extract from National Insurance Recording System

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The pre-accession periods are largely dominated by Commonwealth nations, however matters changed upon the A8 accession in 2004 as Poland immediately surges to the top of the list for NI registrations. Polish nationals receive the most registrations in every year apart from 2009/10 and more than 1.2 million of them had received NI numbers by the end of the 2013/14 period. There is also in evidence a short-term bump of 50,000 extra Polish nationals that occurs in 2004/5 –just after the accession- when compared to 2003/4. However, Poland is not the only nation that was affected by the A8 accession as shown by the increased presence of Lithuanians, Slovaks, Latvians and Hungarians. One can also identify the immediate effect of the A2 accession in 2014, since the Romanian registrations rise by almost 30,000 and the Bulgarian registrations rise to reach 17,800. This chart shows that the EU enlargements have both short-term, and long-term effects on immigration into the UK, since Poland is still the highest nationality for NI registrations with over 100,000 Poles registering to work in 2013/14, 10 years after the A8 accession. The dominance of Polish nationals is clearly illustrated by both figure 23, and also by figure 24 which follows on the next page. Polish migrants made up the bulk of A8 immigrants, and yet it is particularly revealing to note that from 2004-2009 almost 100,000 Romanians and Bulgarians registered for NI numbers, even though they were not part of the A8 enlargement, and were still subject to strict regulations on their right to enter the UK and the jobs they could undertake.

<sup>77</sup> Salt, International Migration and the United Kingdom, p. 96.

**Figure 24: The countries of origin for NI registrations 2004-2009**




Figure 1. NiNo registrations to NMS nationals entering the UK.


78

Importantly, A8 migration should still be analysed in the context of overall net-migration figures. From 2000-2011 about 1.5 million extra EEA migrants were added to the population, whereas 2.9 million non-EEA migrants also arrived in the same period.<sup>79</sup> Thus, even with the significant boost from A8 migration, non-EEA net-migration was still twice as large as EEA net-migration for this decade. Nevertheless, the effect of the A8 accession is shown in figure 25 which clearly illustrates the spike in immigration resulting from the 2004 accession.

<sup>78</sup> Catherine Harris, Dominique Moran & John Bryson, 'EU Accession Migration: National Insurance Number Allocations and the Geographies of Polish Labour Immigration to the UK', *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, Vol. 103, Issue 2 (April 2012) 209-221, p. 216.

<sup>79</sup> Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, *The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK* (London: Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration at UCL, 2013) p. 17.

**Figure 25: Long-term international migration 1993-2013, Non-British Citizens In-and Outflows**



80

The sharp rise from 2003-4 can only be explained by the A8 accession, and the consistent increase of around 100,000 extra immigrants per year is arguably closely related to the notion that eight further countries could enter the UK without restrictions. The sheer size of immigration resulting from the A8 accession is clear; however, to understand the effect these migrants had on their environment and on British citizens, it would be beneficial to analyse where they went.


The Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) tells us a great deal about what A8 migrants actually did in the UK. This transitional arrangement was in place from 2004-2011 and was designed to help the government keep track of how the UK labour market was affected by the arrival of A8 workers. The WRS tells us that whilst 180,000 migrants went to London, and a further 150,000 headed to the South East of England, A8 migrants are noteworthy for the fact that they moved to areas which had not previously received much immigration.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, 2008 analysis by the Institute for Public Policy Research showed that A8 and A2 migrants were less than half as likely to live in London as other immigrants on average.<sup>82</sup> Figure 26 concisely proves this point as we can see that on a relative level, London has the fourth highest concentration of A8 migrants from 2004-2011. Interestingly, over five per cent of workers in the East Midlands, Northern Ireland, and the East of England in this period come from A8 nations which shows that areas that were unused to migration, received a great deal of it from 2004-2011.

<sup>80</sup> Salt, *International Migration and the United Kingdom*, p. 35.

<sup>81</sup> McCollum et al, *Spatial, sectoral and temporal trends in A8 migration to the UK 2004-2011*, p. 14.

<sup>82</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles?* p. 6.

**Figure 26: A8 migrants as a percentage of workforce jobs 2004-2011**



The regional aspect of A8 migration is exemplified by the statistic that in 2007 it was possible to fly to twenty-two different British airports from Poland, and 385,000 passengers made such a journey each month.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, budget flights make it easy to hop back and forth from country to country, a situation which is particularly useful for short-term migrants who plan to work in the UK, and then return home. Interestingly, in 2011, about 30 per cent of EEA immigrants had been in the UK for a maximum of five years.<sup>85</sup> This is because many of them arrived as working restrictions were dropped following the A8 accession, but also because many of them did not intend to stay in the UK for more than a few years. Such a situation is often because A8 migrants come to the UK for seasonal work, or because they wished to earn some money for a few years before returning home with their significant savings. Figure 27 clearly shows that 59 per cent of workers registered on the WRS in 2007 intended to stay for less than three months.

**Figure 27**

*Intended Length of Stay of WRS Registered Workers in the UK, January 2007 to December 2007*

Intended length of stay	12 months ending December 2007	Per cent
Less than 3 months	121,550	59
3 to 5 months	3,450	2
6 to 11 months	6,350	3
1 to 2 years	8,645	4
More than 2 years	16,465	8
Do not know	50,505	24
Total	206,965	100

Source: Accession Monitoring Report May 2004–December 2007. 86

Indeed, the WRS statistics initially appear dramatic, and yet as many as 61 per cent of those who registered on the WRS scheme in its first month of May 2004 are estimated to

<sup>83</sup> McCollum et al, Spatial, sectoral and temporal trends in A8 migration to the UK 2004-2011, p. 14.

<sup>84</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles?* p. 6.

<sup>85</sup> Dustmann and Frattini, The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK, p. 18.

<sup>86</sup> David Blanchflower and Chris Shadforth, 'Fear, Unemployment and Migration', *The Economic Journal*, 119 (February 2009) 136-182, p. 146.



have already been in the country before the A8 accession.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, for the year following accession a total of 232,000 A8 migrants arrived and yet 30 per cent of these individuals were already in the UK in the pre-accession period.<sup>88</sup> This total of 232,000 is notoriously more than fifteen times the Home Office estimate made by Dustmann, and yet it is wrong to think of these migrants as static arrivals. Whilst thirty per cent of them may already have been in the UK, a further 50 per cent of them are estimated to have returned home by 2008.<sup>89</sup> This shows that the intentions of A8 workers as shown in figure 27, are backed up by their actions as many of them come to the UK for a short period of time before heading back to their home country. The decision to return home is undoubtedly affected by a number of factors, one of which would of course be economics. A reduction in the number of migrants on the WRS from late 2007 as the credit crunch began –in particular from Poland- is accurately shown in figure 28. Furthermore, it was commonly felt within employment agencies, the Polish media, and in the migrant communities themselves that the UK had become less attractive to Poles following the recession.<sup>90</sup>

**Figure 28: WRS registrations 2006-2011**



\*The low figure for 2011 Q2 is likely to be due to the end of the WRS in April 2011. Hence this ‘quarter’ only contains one month’s worth of registrations (April) as opposed to three (April – June)

Figure 28 appears to back up this assertion as WRS registrations drastically fell as the Polish economy strengthened whilst the UK economy and its pound were weakening. On the other hand, more recently it is thought that the pendulum has swung back the other way as 2014 showed that the burgeoning UK economy encouraged the Polish migrant

<sup>87</sup> Stenning et al., *Assessing the Local and Regional Impacts of International Migration*, p. 9.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

<sup>89</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles?* p. 5.

<sup>90</sup> Catherine Harris, Dominique Moran & John Bryson, ‘EU Accession Migration: National Insurance Number Allocations and the Geographies of Polish Labour Immigration to the UK’, p. 209.

<sup>91</sup> McCollum et al, *Spatial, sectoral and temporal trends in A8 migration to the UK 2004-2011*, p. 18.

population in the UK to increase by 21.6 per cent to 826,000.<sup>92</sup> These findings prove that A8 migration was not as clear-cut as it is often portrayed to be, and that it is actually far more flexible and fluid in nature. This was the intention of the removal of work restrictions, as freedom of movement across the EU was established, and less regulated, more transparent borders were created which allow for immigration to adapt to the economic environment of the time. However, migrants are not only affected by economics, for they themselves also influence the UK's socio-economic landscape.

*What were the socio-economic impacts of A8 immigration in the UK?*

It is important to reemphasise an important factor to consider. That is, not all immigrants are the same and they do not form a homogenous group. There are few areas that more clearly illustrate the disparity between various migrant groups than with the analysis of economic performance. For instance, 1 per cent of Poles claim income support, compared with 39 per cent of Somalis.<sup>93</sup> There is no such thing as a typical immigrant. There are rather immigrants from all over the world, each of whom displays different characteristics. On an economic level it is assumed that the open door immigration policy is best for business, since it provides cheap, willing labour, much of which has already been educated at the cost of foreign taxpayers. Indeed, the headline figure is that recent EEA migrants between 2001 and 2011 contributed to the fiscal system 34 per cent more than they took out, with a net fiscal contribution of about £22.1 billion. In contrast, over the same period, natives' fiscal payments amounted to an overall negative fiscal contribution of £624.1 billion.<sup>94</sup> However, the real, and perceived, socio-economic impact of immigration is certainly very complicated indeed, and A10 migrants have been variously accused of affecting wages, taking jobs, and from generally being a drain on taxpayers, infrastructure and the nation as a whole.

Many of the A10 migrants arriving in the UK could be classified as economic migrants. That is they arrive in the UK to work, and to receive higher wages and better opportunities than they might expect in their home country. Upon succession, the A8 nations had "less than one quarter the income per head of existing members", a state of

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<sup>92</sup> Salt, *International Migration and the United Kingdom*, p. 66.

<sup>93</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles?* p. 27.

<sup>94</sup> Dustmann and Frattini, *The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK*, p. 27.

affairs which certainly represents a possible incentive to migrate.<sup>95</sup> This wage disparity ensures that migrant testimonies such as these are not uncommon:

“There are no jobs in Slovakia and the wages are very low. One week wage is as much as one month wage in Slovakia.”<sup>96</sup>

“We are doing easy work for small money. But small money here is big money in Poland”<sup>97</sup>.

Therefore it seems clear that poorly paid jobs in the UK, embody good jobs for some A8 migrants. The result of such a scenario is that many new migrants from the eastern enlargement process came to work in physical, low-paid sectors such as agriculture where “there was a structural shortage of unskilled labour”.<sup>98</sup> Agriculture makes up less than one per cent of jobs in the UK, yet around a quarter of workers in this sector in 2011 were A8 migrants.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, an interesting survey from the National Farmers’ Union in 2008 showed that the 268 employers questioned took on an extra 28,206 workers for the peak season. Of these seasonal workers, 49 per cent were from the A8 countries, and 32 per cent came from Romania and Bulgaria.<sup>100</sup> The overwhelming dominance of A10 workers is evident, and the same survey may reveal one of the reasons why, as 91 per cent of employers cited work ethic as the reason that they favoured migrants over British workers.<sup>101</sup> This could be because migrants are motivated to work hard, on poorly paid jobs, because one can earn £300 a week picking strawberries in Kent, or £150 a month as an accountant in Bulgaria.<sup>102</sup> There is a view from employers that migrant workers “are willing to do jobs that other people would class as beneath them” and this reinforces their image as cheap, hard-working labour, which is further emphasised by figure 29.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Goodhart, *The British Dream*, p. XXVII.

<sup>96</sup> Joanne Cook, Peter Dwyer and Louise Waite, ‘The experiences of accession 8 migrants in England: motivations, work and agency’, *International Migration*, Vol. 49, Issue 2 (April 2011) 54-79, p. 7.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> Ruhs and Anderson, p. 4.

<sup>99</sup> McCollum et al, Spatial, sectoral and temporal trends in A8 migration to the UK 2004-2011, p 11-12.

<sup>100</sup> Andrew Geddes and Sam Scott, ‘UK food businesses’ reliance on low-wage migrant labour: a case of choice or constraint?’, in Martin Ruhs and Bridget Anderson, *Who needs migrant workers? Labour shortages, Immigration, and Public Policy*, 193-218, p. 201.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204.

<sup>102</sup> BBC, *The Truth About Immigration*, aired on Tuesday 7<sup>th</sup> January 2014

<sup>103</sup> HR manager of a high street retailer, cited in CIPD, *The state of migration: Employing migrant workers* (London, March 2013) [http://www.cipd.co.uk/binaries/the-state-of-migration-employing-migrant-workers\\_2012.pdf](http://www.cipd.co.uk/binaries/the-state-of-migration-employing-migrant-workers_2012.pdf), p. 9.

**Figure 29: Occupations of A8 workers 2004-2007**

Process operative	197,845
Warehouse operative	59,070
Packer	43,835
Kitchen and catering assistants	42,295
Cleaner, domestic staff	39,290
Farm Worker	30,810
Waiter, waitress	26,090
Maid, room attendant	25,210
Care Assistants and Home Care	20,015
Labourer, building	20,680
Sales and retail assistants	20,325
Crop harvester	12,620

*Source:* Home Office (2008), Accession Monitoring Report May 2004–December 2007.

Mechanical engineer	1,045
Doctor (hospital)	730
Engineer, software	695
Civil engineer	675
Teachers	655
Manager, office	610
Pharmacist, pharmacologist	600
Engineer, other transport related	555
Researcher, higher education	470
Architect	445
Dental practitioner	370
Nurse	365
Researcher, medical	340
Systems analyst	255
Chemical engineer	225
Surveyor	200
Veterinarian	165
General practitioner	120

*Source:* Home Office (2008), Accession Monitoring Report May 2004–December 2007.<sup>104</sup>

Whilst there are certainly a large number of A8 workers from 2004-2007 who found highly skilled positions in the UK, their number is dwarfed by the size of the unskilled working population shown in the table on the left hand side.

One can therefore conclude that A8 migrants were highly employable as they filled difficult jobs, worked hard and did this all for very little financial reward. In fact, 77 per cent of A8 migrants in the Labour Force Survey from 2004-2007 declared that they were earning between £4.50 and £9.99 per hour (the national minimum wage ranged from £4.50 to £5.52 in this period),<sup>105</sup> whilst in 2007 nearly 90 per cent of East Europeans were paid less than £400 a week, compared to 57 per cent of British-born individuals.<sup>106</sup> A8 wages were therefore definitely in the lower reaches of the pay scale; a situation with ramifications for native Brits who were also competing for similarly low paid jobs. Indeed, various academic studies have clarified that immigration generally benefits the wages of the majority of the population, but that it has a negative impact upon the wages of the poorest section of society.<sup>107108</sup> Christian Dustmann's 2008 paper was one of the first to address this issue, and he found that each 1% increase in the share of migrants in the UK-born working-age population led to a 0.6% decline in the wages of the 5% lowest paid workers, a 0.4% decline for the 10% lowest paid, and to an increase in the wages of higher paid workers.<sup>109</sup> Greater job competition from new migrants can thus lead the poorest in society to receive lower wages, but it can also lead to a growing fear of

<sup>104</sup> Blanchflower and Shadforth, 'Fear, Unemployment and Migration', p. 153.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*, p. 154.

<sup>106</sup> Goodhart, *The British Dream*, p. 232.

<sup>107</sup> CIPD, *The state of migration: Employing migrant workers*, p. I.

<sup>108</sup> Blanchflower and Shadforth, 'Fear, Unemployment and Migration', p. 136.

<sup>109</sup> Christian Dustmann et al., *The Effect of Immigration along the Distribution of Wages*, (London: Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration at UCL, 2008) p. 22.

unemployment as A10 migrants display a remarkable ability to find employment in the UK.

An unemployed adult is sometimes seen as a drain on the state since they are more likely to seek state benefits, in the form of welfare payments or social housing. In fact, A10 migrants work an average four hours more per week compared to UK-born workers (46 hours compared to 42), which proves how hard working they are as a group.<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, A8 and A2 migrants are more likely to be in employment than British nationals, and Polish migrants display the highest levels of employment of any migrant group other than Australians. In fact, in 2014 78.9 per cent of A2 nationals in the UK were employed, 81.2 per cent of A8 nationals were employed, and an impressive 83.4 per cent of Polish nationals had jobs.<sup>111</sup> This is compared to an average of only 73.6 per cent for British nationals.<sup>112</sup> Of course some factors which lead to economic inactivity are less relevant to migrants, including the notion that many UK nationals of working age are still in education, or may have issues related to finding a job, such as having a disability. Nonetheless, the employment level of A10 workers shows that they are disproportionately more likely to be employed than UK nationals. The employability of recent-EU migrants has been consistently in evidence as recent EU immigrants have had employment rates of 75 per cent since the mid 2000s, compared to 70 per cent for natives, and 62 per cent for non-EU migrants.<sup>113</sup> Whilst this finding merges A10 migrants with other EU arrivals, it is clear that there is a significant disparity between EU and non-EU migrants' employment levels. This highlights the idea that there is no typical immigrant since there are vast discrepancies in employment depending on the migrant's home region, or even their country of origin. However, upon drawing together the statistics, one can make the conclusion that A10 migrants –as a group- have higher levels of employment than UK nationals, non-EU migrants, and EU-15 migrants.

This paper's research showed that arguments related to welfare and benefits became much more prominent in *The Telegraph* in particular in 2014, when compared to 2004. This is an interesting development when one considers that A10 migrants showed themselves to be highly employable from 2004 onwards. Moreover, research shows that from 2004-2007 only 2.4 per cent of post-enlargement A8 migrants who registered for a

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<sup>110</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles*, p. 5.

<sup>111</sup> Salt, *International Migration and the United Kingdom*, p. 82.

<sup>112</sup> ONS, *UK Labour Market, January 2015* (ONS: London, 2015) p. 13.

<sup>113</sup> Dustmann and Frattini, *The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK*, p. 19.

NI number actually claimed benefits.<sup>114</sup> Furthermore, even when adjusted for age –to factor in the ageing UK population- recent EU immigrants are 50 per cent less likely to claim benefits or tax credits when compared to natives.<sup>115</sup> Other statistics reinforce the idea that recent A10 migrants, alongside their EU counterparts, are statistically less likely to claim help from the state when compared to natives or non-EU migrants. For example, they are 7.5 per cent less likely to live in social housing compared to natives, whereas non-EU migrants are 2.6 per cent more likely to be in such a situation.<sup>116</sup>

One explanation for such a state of affairs is that A8 migrants, in particular, are young and extremely well educated. Of those who registered on the WRS from 2004-2007, 83 per cent were aged from 18-34,<sup>117</sup> while 57.3 per cent of Poles resident in the UK in 2011 were aged from 20-34.<sup>118</sup> These migrants are less likely to use healthcare<sup>119</sup> since they are predominantly young, and few of them require education services, since they are economically active and have relatively few children.<sup>120</sup> What follows is that the UK is receiving a workforce that has been educated at no extra cost to the UK taxpayer. Indeed, Dustmann and Frattini found that around 35 per cent of A8 migrants left full-time education at or after the age of 21 (17 per cent of UK natives), and only 11 per cent left school before the age of 17 (56 per cent of natives).<sup>121</sup> This indicates that roughly 35 per cent of A8 migrants arriving in the UK have received a form of higher education, when compared to only 17 per cent of UK nationals. It is logical that highly educated migrants provide a greater economic benefit to their destination country since they have more knowledge and skills to offer to their employer. Furthermore, even though A8 migrants heading to the UK can expect to receive a relatively low wage by UK standards, the country is still attracting a great number of highly educated individuals. This occurs even though EU immigration is of course unregulated which reflects positively on the attraction of the UK jobs market. Interestingly, “the UK is among the Western European countries

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<sup>114</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles?* p. 5.

<sup>115</sup> Dustmann and Frattini, *The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK*, p. 28.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22.

<sup>117</sup> Blanchflower and Shadforth, ‘Fear, Unemployment and Migration’, p. 155.

<sup>118</sup> Marek Okolski and John Salt, ‘Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004; Why did so many come?’

*Central and Eastern European Migration Review* (December 2014) 1-27, p. 11.

<sup>119</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, *Floodgates or turnstiles*, p. 54.

<sup>120</sup> Under 15s make up 11.4 per cent of Poles in UK, in Marek Okolski and John Salt, ‘Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004; Why did so many come?’ p. 11.

<sup>121</sup> Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini and Caroline Halls, C. ‘Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK’, *Fiscal Studies*, Vol. 31, Issue 1 (2010) 1–41, p. 29.

with the highest share of tertiary educated immigrants after only Ireland and Norway”.<sup>122</sup> Not only does the UK receive highly educated migrants, but it also attracts better-educated migrants from the same emigration countries when compared to other European nations. In other words, in 2007 26 per cent of Polish immigrants in the UK had a tertiary education, whereas in comparison only 11 per cent of Poles had a similar education level in Germany.<sup>123</sup> The education levels of A8 workers in the UK may explain their particularly high levels of employment, and this state of affairs largely refutes the idea that such migrants are a burden on taxpayers.

Economics is not the only relevant area of debate in regard to A10 migrants, since migrants “become not just a part of the labour force, but a part of society”.<sup>124</sup> There has been a limited amount of research on the social effects of A10 migrants, but it is evident that sustained immigration, without significant integration, could damage the host country’s internal solidarity and social cohesiveness. New migrants can certainly bring cultural benefits in the form of diverse new products, outlooks and ways of life. And yet, A10 migrants are -as previously identified- frequently economic migrants who wish to earn some money in the UK, before returning back home in the not too distant future. Integration efforts will surely be affected if somebody is not planning on staying in the host country for an extended period of time. Indeed, why bother integrating if saving money is one of the prime motivations for living in a country? A scenario develops whereby new migrants naturally spend much time with their own diaspora, since they either work with them, or they represent their only point of contact in the new host country. This is confirmed by a Joseph Rowntree Foundation report from 2007 which showed that during the first six months of their stay in the UK, half of Eastern European migrants surveyed said that they had no contact with local people at all.<sup>125</sup> As A10 migrants are often short-term, economic migrants who frequently work in manual sectors dominated by foreign workers, their contact with natives is limited, even after an extended period of time. Indeed the same Rowntree report showed that even after two and a half years, one quarter of the sample still said they had no leisure-time contact with the local population, and fewer than one in five said they spent most of their time with British

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<sup>122</sup> Dustmann, Frattini and Rosso 2012, in Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, *The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK*, p. 29.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> Collier, *Exodus*, p. 134.

<sup>125</sup> The Joseph Rowntree Foundation, *Migrants lives beyond the workplace* (JRF: York, 2007) <http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/Reports/2007-05-EEMigrants.pdf>, p. 58.

people.<sup>126</sup> We can therefore see evidence of a hard-working migrant population that has an extremely limited degree of contact with natives. Research by Cook, Dwyer and Waite has shown that even when A8 migrants worked and lived alongside established communities, these encounters did not open up opportunities for “meaningful engagement” which meant that stereotypes and barriers to integration could not be broken down.<sup>127</sup> As a result, “proximity does not relate to meaningful contact” and a state of affairs seems to be in evidence whereby A8 migrant workers are often tolerated, rather than ever being truly integrated into the host community.<sup>128</sup>

In general economic terms, Dustmann and Frattini’s recent analysis of immigration showed that immigrants arriving since the early 2000s –especially EEA migrants- have made a positive fiscal contribution to the UK’s balance sheet.<sup>129</sup> This is not a normal situation (analysis in Norway showed the opposite result, Bratsberg et al. 2013) and it demonstrates that compared to natives and other migrants, A10 workers in the UK have high employment levels, high education levels and are less likely to claim state welfare or use public services such as education. Moreover, Dustmann and Frattini correctly identify that this situation “contrasts starkly with the view often maintained in public debate”.<sup>130</sup> Issues such as remittances payments, migrant beggars and gang master employment receive much attention. However, positive economic statistics are harder to locate in the public debate, such as the fact that 125,000 current accounts were opened by Poles with Lloyds TSB in 2006, or that the ‘Polish pound’ was worth around £4 billion to the UK economy in 2007.<sup>131</sup> Nonetheless, from 2007 onwards, the economic situation greatly deteriorated following the global economic crash. Rising unemployment in the UK (increasing by 1 million people from 2007-2011)<sup>132</sup> and a double-dip recession suddenly made many British citizens worse off as living standards only returned to pre-recession levels in 2015.<sup>133</sup> This economic downturn could indicate that citizens were more likely to

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<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> Joanne Cook, Peter Dwyer and Louise Waite, ‘Good relations among neighbours and workmates? The everyday encounters of Accession 8 migrants and established communities in urban England’, Vol. 17, Issue 6, *Population, Space and Place* (November/December 2011) 727-741, p. 738.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 737.

<sup>129</sup> Dustmann and Frattini, *The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK*, p. 25.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>131</sup> Bob Sherwood, ‘British banks set sights on Polish pound’, *The Financial Times*, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/135a45a4-f1de-11db-b5b6-000b5df10621.html>, 23/4/07, accessed 9/3/15

<sup>132</sup> BBC, ‘Economy tracker: unemployment’, <http://www.bbc.com/news/10604117>, 18/3/15, accessed 25/3/15

<sup>133</sup> Fernando Giugliano, ‘UK living standards set to bounce back to pre-recession levels’, *The Financial Times*, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/03b68f46-c1be-11e4-bd24-00144feab7de.html#axzz3VPIZGnH3>, 4/3/15, accessed 25/3/15



have negative feelings towards migrant workers since these new arrivals might be challenging their already precarious economic position by competing for the scarce supply of jobs. This situation enhances the feeling of being threatened and various reports have found that the greater the perception of threat, the more likely citizens are to look negatively upon labour migrants.<sup>134</sup> The rate of growth of a foreign born population, and the growth of unemployment levels both affect levels of prejudice as existing residents begin to feel threatened by change.<sup>135</sup> The UK's increasingly negative migration debate may therefore be of a defensive nature since heightened economic insecurity leads to a fear of change. This fear is then left to fester due to the scarcity of reliable immigration numbers, and the rarity of reassuring personal experiences, as the lack of integration identified within some sections of the migrant worker population illustrates a worrying isolation from the native population. This lack of contact could mean that the perception of immigration receives more impetus from imagined immigration, and a fear of the unknown than from any real experience of encountering immigrants in a work or social situation.

The weak confidence held in migration statistics, the lack of contact between certain migrant groups and natives, and the newsworthy narratives employed by newspapers all contribute to a gap between perception and reality.<sup>136</sup> Indeed, when the public was asked to describe in a survey how they picture an immigrant, 62 per cent reported thinking of permanent arrivals, while less than a third considered any of the three temporary categories on offer.<sup>137</sup> Furthermore, over 60 per cent of those surveyed stated that the main reason for migration would be asylum, whereas only 29 per cent thought that it would be to study. In actual fact, the reality is the reverse of this as shown by figure 30.

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<sup>134</sup> Rebeca Raijman, Moshe Semyonov, and Peter Schmidt, 'Do Foreigners Deserve Rights? Public Views Towards Labor Migrants in Germany and Israel', Vol. 19, *European Sociological Review* (2003) 379-392, p. 379.


<sup>135</sup> Kilpi, Elina, *Prejudice as a response to changes in competitive threat: Finnish attitudes towards immigrants 1986-2006*, Sociology Working Papers Paper Number 2008-01 (Oxford: University of Oxford) <http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2008-01.pdf>, p. 2.

<sup>136</sup> Goodhart, *The British Dream*, p. 42.

<sup>137</sup> Blinder, 'Imagined Immigration', p. 88.

Figure 30

Figure 1: Public Perceptions of Immigration by Reason for Migrating, Compared with Statistical Estimates of Immigration to Britain in 2010



Sources: Ipsos MOR/Migration Observatory; Office of National Statistics

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The largest migrant group in 2010 –students- was estimated to be the smallest, and the smallest group –asylum- was estimated to be the largest. In other words, the public’s perception of immigration could not have been much more wrong. There is perhaps a lack of awareness as to the positive side of migration, whether they are bright young students or successful entrepreneurs. Much research –detailed earlier- highlights the notion that migrants are economically beneficial, and yet public opinion does not reflect this finding. Indeed, the *British Social Attitudes Survey* in 2014 showed that 47 per cent of people think immigration has been bad for the economy.<sup>139</sup> However, such responses differ according to education levels as 60 per cent of graduates think that immigration has had positive economic effect, compared with only 17 per cent of those with no qualifications.<sup>140</sup> Nonetheless if the population is grouped together as a whole the findings are not positive, as 64 per cent of people in an *Ipsos Mori* survey stated that immigration was more of a problem for the UK than an opportunity,<sup>141</sup> and only two out of five Britons feel that “immigration contributes to Britain’s culture”.<sup>142</sup>

Whilst EU migration is often portrayed as a simple case of hundreds of thousands of migrants arriving in the UK from poor countries, the reality is more complicated, and certainly more fluid. It is important to remember that there are over 1.4 million UK nationals who live in other EU member states,<sup>143</sup> that at least 30,000 British nationals are

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> R. Ford and A. Heath, ‘Immigration: A Nation Divided?’ *British Social Attitudes 31*, London: National Centre for Social Research, 2014, <http://www.bsa-31.natcen.ac.uk>, p. 1.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> Duffy and Frere-Smith, *Perceptions and Reality*, p. 14.

<sup>142</sup> Max Wind-Cowie and Thomas Gregory, *A place for pride* (Demos: London, 2011) [http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Place\\_for\\_pride\\_-\\_web.pdf?1321618230](http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Place_for_pride_-_web.pdf?1321618230) p. 30.

<sup>143</sup> House of Commons, *Leaving the EU*, Research Paper 13/42, 1 July 2013, p. 70.

on benefits across the EU,<sup>144</sup> and that 327,000 Brits emigrated from the UK in 2014.<sup>145</sup> Migration is not a static entity, it moves, it changes, and freedom of movement in the EU can encourage emigration, as well as immigration. However, the contemporary moral panic that has developed around the immigration debate in the UK has ensured that calm and considered debate is sometimes less of a priority than perhaps it should be. Indeed, some of the headlines in the build-up to the accessions of 2004 and 2014 provoked fear and represented sensationalist interpretations of future events. The following *Daily Mail* headline reveals the anxiety that can be found in pre-accession periods when there is a scarcity of concrete information and reasoned debate, but it also points to a particular problem faced by A2 migrants in the UK.

“We’re on our way to Britain: A year from now up to 29m Bulgarians and Romanians will have the right to settle in Britain and claim benefits. And these gypsies in the slums of Sofia can hardly wait...”<sup>146</sup>

#### Why did Romania and Bulgaria in particular receive such intense media scrutiny in 2004 and 2014?

The research conducted on *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian* highlighted a high level of scrutiny for Romania and Bulgaria in articles related to A10 immigration. This was the case in 2004 and in 2014 when both countries were mentioned more frequently than Poland. This is a surprising state of affairs given that the bulk of A10 immigration to the UK has been from Poland, and that in 2004 Romania and Bulgaria were still confronted with a heavily restricted UK visa regime. Indeed, what is so special about these two nations? Why did the Prime Minister, David Cameron, rush through a block on EU migrants’ access to benefits from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2014?<sup>147</sup> And why did politicians and the national media head to Luton airport to greet the arrivals off a flight from Bucharest?

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<sup>144</sup> Alberto Nardelli, ‘Revealed: Thousands of Britons on benefits across EU’, *The Guardian*, 19/1/15, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/19/-sp-thousands-britons-claim-benefits-eu>, accessed 9/3/15

<sup>145</sup> ONS, *Migration statistics: Quarterly report, February 2015* (ONS: London, 2015) p. 1.

<sup>146</sup> Sue Reid, ‘We’re on our way to Britain: A year from now up to 29m Bulgarians and Romanians will have the right to settle in Britain and claim benefits. And these gypsies in the slums of Sofia can hardly wait...’ *The Daily Mail*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2252675/Were-way-Britain-In-year-29-million-Romanians-Bulgarians-right-settle-Britain-claim-benefits-And-gipsy-community-hardly-wait-here.html>, 23/12/12, accessed 5/3/15

<sup>147</sup> Patrick Wintour, ‘Tories rush through curbs on benefit access for Romanians and Bulgarians’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/18/david-cameron-benefits-romanians-bulgarians>, 18/2/13, accessed 9/3/15

ONS statistics show that in the three months following the A2 accession, there were an estimated 122,000 Romanians and Bulgarians working in the UK, a reduction of 3,000 individuals compared to the last three months of 2013.<sup>148</sup> The fear of a rapid influx did not come to fruition immediately following the accession. On the other hand, by the end of 2014, 37,000 A2 citizens had migrated to the UK,<sup>149</sup> and there were a total of 154,000 A2 nationals in work.<sup>150</sup> Nonetheless, Bulgarians and Romanians have consistently been in the minority when compared to the migration levels seen from the A8 nations (especially Poland), and this trend continued in 2014 as A8 immigration made up double the amount of the total A2 immigration into the UK (30 per cent A8, and only 16 per cent A2).<sup>151</sup> Polish is now the second most common language in the UK,<sup>152</sup> but recently, the focus has been on Bulgaria and Romania as numerous predictions have been made emphasising the notion that 29 million of their nationals now have the unrestricted right to work in the UK. Judging by 2014's figures, *MigrationWatch's* prediction of 50,000 migrants per year for five years is the most accurate prediction even though it still overstates the number of arrivals by 35 per cent.<sup>153</sup> Other predictions were even more amplified as the *Daily Mail* claimed 80,000 Bulgarians would arrive after the restrictions were dropped,<sup>154</sup> whereas the Conservative MP Phillip Hollobone predicted that within two years, there would be an influx of over 333,000 A2 migrants.<sup>155</sup>

The reason for the exaggerated predictions and scrutiny of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals could be explained by Alfred Sauvy's claim that "populations most distant from one another fear each other most".<sup>156</sup> Differences between groups can affect community cohesiveness since different cultural norms challenge the homogeneity of daily life. New arrivals into a community who are perceived to share similar traits will arguably be more readily accepted since they will do little to unsettle the status quo. This perception of how immigration will change the community is another striking example of

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<sup>148</sup> ONS, *UK Labour Market, May 2014* (ONS: London, 2014) p. 54.

<sup>149</sup> ONS, *Migration statistics: Quarterly report, February 2015* (ONS: London, 2015) p. 2.

<sup>150</sup> ONS, *UK Labour Market, February 2015* (ONS: London, 2015) p. 55.

<sup>151</sup> ONS, *Migration statistics: Quarterly report, February 2015*, p. 12.

<sup>152</sup> ONS, 2011 census: *Quick statistics for England and Wales, March 2011* (ONS: London, 2011) p. 2.

<sup>153</sup> Migration Watch UK, *Incentives for Romanian and Bulgarian Migration to the UK*, Briefing Paper EU 4.20 (February 2013) <http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefingPaper/document/290>

<sup>154</sup> Simon Tomlinson, 'Destination UK: How 80,000 Bulgarians plan to move to Britain when border controls are dropped in less than six months', *The Daily Mail*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2360078/Destination-UK-How-80-000-Bulgarians-plan-to-Britain-border-controls-scrapped-months.html>, 11/7/13, accessed 10/3/15

<sup>155</sup> The Migration Observatory, *Jumping the gun*, p. 2.

<sup>156</sup> Alfred Sauvy, 'Psycho-social aspect of migration', In *Economics of International Migration*, ed. by Brinley Thomas, 297-302 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1958) p. 297.

imagined immigration. For example, Spanish or French immigrants share some historical and cultural bonds with the UK, and such a link with France and Spain may explain the limited media coverage afforded to their sizeable migrant populations in the UK (see page 29). We may infer from this that migrants from Western Europe would be reasonably well accepted into the UK, since they are thought to have a similar cultural heritage, and perhaps more importantly British citizens know what their culture is, and have been continually exposed to it. Whilst Western European nations are extremely accessible to British citizens and have been for decades, Eastern European cultures enjoy far less exposure as they are often seen as being geographically, and fundamentally distant. Indeed, the 'Iron Curtain' that was established during the Cold War, ensured that it was nigh on impossible to visit these European cultures prior to 1990. The UK and the A2 nations are different, not least because their cultures are imagined in different ways. For instance, in the area of international migration one can say that the UK has experienced significant immigration over the last decade, whereas the A2 nations have experienced high levels of emigration. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the A2 nations have relatively low levels of socio-economic development, and their populations contain a minority group that is stigmatised across Europe, the Roma.

In sections of the UK media articles concerning Bulgarians and Romanians are frequently accompanied by photographs of poverty, be those makeshift shantytowns or beggars on street corners. The independent *Migration Observatory* at Oxford University summarized the problem by declaring –in relation to A2 migration- that “anecdotes, pictures and guesses cannot be the bedrock of an evidence-based policy debate”.<sup>157</sup> There are of course negative examples of A2 migrants in the UK, but there are also good examples which rarely receive coverage in the British media. Such a situation results in these nationalities getting a bad name. Things got so bad that in 2014 the *Alliance Against Romanian and Bulgarian Discrimination* was created which wanted to see a more evidence-based portrayal of A2 migration. They believe that more coverage of the 2,140 Romanian doctors in the UK,<sup>158</sup> or of the 154,000 A2 migrants who make up part of the UK labour force would be a positive step forward. The coverage is however often stuck in the idea that the A2 nations are poor, therefore their nationals want to emigrate and they will be bringing their way of life, and their poverty to the UK. A *Daily Mail* article in

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<sup>157</sup> The Migration Observatory, *Jumping the gun*, p. 3.

<sup>158</sup> Matthew Taylor, 'Romanian and Bulgarian NHS workers feel rising tide of patient hostility', *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/24/romanian-bulgarian-nhs-workers-hostility-patients-lifting-restrictions>, 24/1/14, accessed 9/3/15

2012 accurately represents this view as it proclaims, “Romania's population has fallen by more than 12 per cent since 2002 as hundreds of thousands leave the poverty-stricken nation for richer countries such as Britain”.<sup>159</sup> *MigrationWatch's* report, *Incentives for Romanian and Bulgarian Migration to the UK*, continues the words of warning as it declares that “even a family earning an average wage in Bulgaria and Romania could be three or four times better off if working in the UK at the minimum wage”.<sup>160</sup> The relatively high earnings in the UK surely provide a pull-factor to A2 migrants, and yet the actual emigration process is far more complicated with the financial aspects representing only one of many factors influencing decisions to emigrate. If money were the only thing that mattered then would the priority for A2 citizens not be Switzerland or Scandinavia? Family ties, the ease of finding work, and the affordability of emigrating are all relevant factors. Indeed, an April 2013 survey of Romanians intending to work in another EU country showed that 30 per cent wanted to go to Italy, 24 per cent to Germany, and 16 per cent to the UK.<sup>161</sup> It is certainly true that thousands of Romanians and Bulgarians are coming to the UK to find work. However, it is not an overwhelming flood, and they are still well in the minority compared to other migrant groups. Nevertheless, the low levels of socio-economic development in the A2 nations has led to a rather toxic debate as these immigrants are judged not as individuals, but as members of groups who have their characteristics -or stereotypes- defined for them by external actors.

The movement of people from poor countries to rich countries has consistently attracted negative connotations since the rich citizens may judge that there is little obvious benefit to them, or their society. The toxic nature of the A2 debate is arguably intensified by the existence of a sizeable population of Roma in Romania and Bulgaria. This minority group is heavily discriminated against in their own countries –and across Europe- and whilst the 2011 Romanian census estimated that 3 per cent of its population are Roma, Amnesty International have claimed the true figure could be as high as 10 per cent.<sup>162</sup> That same charity have heavily criticised the Romanian government for their prejudicial and discriminatory treatment of the Roma community, whilst in Bulgaria the Roma are even

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<sup>159</sup> Rick Dewsbury, ‘Romania’s population falls by 12% as three million flock to richer countries including Britain’, *The Daily Mail*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2096110/Romanias-population-falls-12-million-flock-richer-European-countries.html>, 11/4/12, accessed 9/3/15

<sup>160</sup> Migration Watch UK, *Incentives for Romanian and Bulgarian Migration to the UK*

<sup>161</sup> Alan Travis, ‘Number of Romanian and Bulgarian workers in UK falls’, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/14/number-romanian-bulgarian-workers-falls-border-controls>, 14/5/14, accessed 9/3/15

<sup>162</sup> BBC, *Why has Romania got such a bad public image?*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21550768>, 25/2/13, accessed 9/3/15

barred from forming electoral associations.<sup>163</sup> Some of these communities understandably try to emigrate to the UK in order to start a new life free from widespread poverty and prejudice. However, in the UK this minority group are also stigmatised since they are associated with crime, anti-social behavior, begging, and rubbish tipping.<sup>164</sup> Interestingly *Migration Observatory* research from 2012-2013 showed that tabloid newspapers described and discussed Romanians in a similar manner. Romanians were frequently discussed in relation to crime and anti-social behavior and particularly common words included: gang, criminal, beggar, thief and squatter.<sup>165</sup> Mentions of the words Roma and gypsy were also common, and an idea is developing here which is also picked up on by Balch and Balabanova who argue:

“What lies behind some of the fears expressed in Britain about an influx of Romanians after December is the often unspoken assumption that for Romanians read Roma”<sup>166</sup>

The Roma are perhaps more used to being characterised and tarnished by anecdotal stories, and yet in the UK the stigmatisation of the Romany is conflated with an increasing stigmatisation of all Bulgarian and Romanian citizens. Both developments are unwelcome, and the visibility of negative news stories –particularly in the tabloid press- contributes to the negative reputation implanted upon all A2 migrants. High-profile media stories such as the Roma camp next to Marble Arch during the Olympics, or the social cohesion problems in Page Hall, Sheffield, play a huge role in defining how the public perceives A2 immigration. There is certainly a crime problem related to Romanian nationals in London as shown by the fact that 10 Romanian officers joined with the Metropolitan Police for a three-month crackdown on their fellow nationals in 2012.<sup>167</sup> Furthermore, in the same year it is believed that Romanian gangs committed ninety per cent of cash machine fraud, but it should be remembered that all of these examples combined still represent a tiny minority of A2 migrants who are living in the UK.<sup>168</sup> Such limited evidence does not justify the

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<sup>163</sup> Janusz Bugajski, ‘Bulgaria: Process and Development’, In *Central and East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*, ed. by Sharon Wolchik and Jane Curry, 251-76 (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) p. 269.

<sup>164</sup> BBC, *The Truth About Immigration*, report on Page Hall in Sheffield which experienced an influx of Roma from Slovakia

<sup>165</sup> The Migration Observatory, *Bulgarians and Romanians in the British National Press* (Oxford: The Migration Observatory, 2014) p. 2.


<sup>166</sup> Balch and Balabanova, ‘Ethics, Politics and Migration’, p. 10.

<sup>167</sup> BBC, *Romanian police tackle West End begging gangs*, 18/7/12, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-18882050>, accessed 9/3/15

<sup>168</sup> Nick McDermott, ‘Rolling in it: Romanian gangs behind nine in ten cashpoint robberies rake in £30m a year’, *The Daily Mail*, 25/3/12, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2120049/Romanian-gangs-cashpoint-robberies-rake-30m-year.html>, accessed 9/3/15

claim made by Conservative MP, Phillip Hollobone, who argued that Britain was “importing a wave of crime from Romania and Bulgaria”.<sup>169</sup> Tarnishing a whole group of migrants with the same brush could have a drastic effect and may certainly account for some of the negative feelings directed towards A2 migrants from the British public. Indeed, figure 31 highlights the particularly low popularity of A2 migrants in the UK, in comparison to other potential immigrants.

**Figure 31**



The A2 nations are found in the lowest priority group, i.e. they are the least desirable immigrant group in the UK and receive a negative rating, which indicates that the majority of UK citizens surveyed think that their entry should be blocked. Such a depressing finding is exacerbated by figure 32 which highlights the view that almost a majority of those surveyed by *Ipsos Mori*, thought that Romanians make a negative contribution to life in Britain today.


<sup>169</sup> Matt Chorley, ‘We’re importing a wave of crime from Romania and Bulgaria: Tory MPs round on ministers as immigration curbs are lifted’, *The Daily Mail*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2526486/Were-importing-crime-wave-Romania-Bulgaria-Tory-MPs-round-ministers-immigration-curbs-lifted.html>, 19/12/13, accessed 9/3/15

<sup>170</sup> Duffy and Frere-Smith, *Perceptions and reality*, p. 81.



Figure 32

Figure 5.9: Attitudes towards the contribution to British life of immigrants from different parts of the world



The clear unpopularity of A2 migrants in the UK is a definite reason for the intense, and increasingly negative scrutiny applied by the media to these nations in 2004 and 2014 as illustrated by this research paper. Their unpopularity arguably does Romanians and Bulgarians living in the UK an injustice, since stereotypical descriptions of them as beggars and criminals are prevalent, whereas migration success stories are rare. This situation has been able to develop since there was a general lack of concrete knowledge before the accession event in 2014 as to how many migrants would arrive. This information vacuum did not however stop politicians and the media from making what at best could be described as predictions, or at worst simple guesses. Exaggerated predictions and anecdotal stories filled the information vacuum, and in so doing, they encouraged a form of contemporary moral panic and affected how the public valued Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in general. Official ONS data of course shows that A2 migrants have high levels of employment, and that far fewer migrants arrived as was than had originally been predicted. However, official data is only one element which informs how people imagine immigration to actually be. Indeed, interpretations of historical A8 migration, the critical analysis of the Roma minority, and the wider socio-economic generalisations related to the nature of A2 migrants contribute to the public's impression that Bulgarian and Romanian immigration into the UK is imagined to be almost entirely negative.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid*, p. 82.

## **Conclusion**

The 2004 A8 accession had a lower profile compared to the A2 accession which followed ten years later, and immigration has grown as a political issue to become one of the major topics of concern according to British citizens. This paper's research has shown that there was a significant increase in coverage of immigration from the A10 nations from 2004-2014 in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*. Interestingly, the differences between the two newspapers were not as great as was first anticipated. In fact it was *The Guardian* that had more coverage in 2004 with 31 more articles identified in that period. However, *The Telegraph's* coverage in 2014 had risen by 330 per cent, a finding that identifies how immigration rapidly rose to a position of prominence in this newspaper. Coverage in *The Guardian* also increased –by 25 per cent- which might suggest that A10 immigration became more newsworthy across the political spectrum. As a result, the hypothesis which predicted that *The Daily Telegraph* would pay more attention to immigration was incorrect in 2004, but it was proven to be correct in 2014.

Differences between the newspapers' coverage also extended to the words they used to describe and analyse A10 immigration from 2004-2014. For example, *The Daily Telegraph* used the word "benefits" far more over the period analysed. Elsewhere it is particularly interesting that *The Guardian* preferred to use the word "migrants", whereas *The Daily Telegraph* more commonly used the word "immigrants". These two words have slightly different meanings, and it does show how a newspaper's choice of words can influence the perceptions of its readers. Whilst there are differences between the two newspapers, and their political allegiances, there is an increasing negativity attached to the overall A10 immigration debate in the UK. This is shown by the rise of anti-EU, anti-immigration politics which was highlighted in this research project. The words "Ukip" and "Farage" were barely used in 2004, but become much more common in both newspapers in 2014. Furthermore, words which place a negative value on immigration, such as "problem" and "restrictions" also greatly rose in usage across the period analysed. This thesis' results therefore identify an increased negativity towards A10 immigration, which matches national surveys that have also suggested a hardening of attitudes to EU immigration in the UK.

The reasons for the increasingly toxic immigration debate are broad and varied. The underlying truth is that people are feeling more anxious and worried about immigration, as revealed by strong support of around 14 per cent for the anti-EU immigration political party, Ukip. The main source of negativity that is evident in the

newspapers analysis could be due to what happened in the decade following the A8 accession. Large numbers of immigrants arrived from the accession states after 2004, and many of them went to areas which had not traditionally experienced significant levels of immigration in the past. These immigrants certainly had an effect, and yet the underlying statistic seems to be that A10 immigrants have had a positive impact on the UK economy. They are more likely to be young, highly educated and employed than British nationals, and they are seen as hard workers who moreover are less likely to claim help from the state. Overall then, perhaps A10 migrants have a positive economic effect on the UK, however, it has been suggested that these migrants drive down wages in the poorest sections of the jobs market. In industries such as agriculture and labouring, A10 workers can sometimes dominate the workforce. What occurs here is that migrants often live, work, and interact with their own diaspora rather than mixing with British nationals, or even other migrant groups. Limited interactions with local people, and sparse examples of meaningful relationships, leads to an isolated migrant group who are frequently more like workers, than citizens. This situation gives power to opinions based on belief and perceptions, rather than on experience and interaction. Imagined immigration therefore becomes increasingly important as what people think immigration is doing comes to the fore, since they are more exposed to the concept of immigration, than immigrants themselves.

Fallacies about immigration are quite common in the UK. For example, people greatly overestimate the size of the foreign population and associate immigration with asylum seekers, rather than students or economically productive individuals. Such misconceptions may contribute to the negativity surrounding immigration and this is extremely important, because what people think is happening will shape their outlook, their opinions, and the political parties they may choose to vote for. The most prominent anti-immigration party is Ukip, however their support is strongest in areas that have experienced low levels of immigration, and Ukip supporters are also extremely unlikely to have a friend from a foreign country. Furthermore, many British citizens consider immigration to be an issue of national importance, rather than an issue which is important on a local level, or on a personal level for them as individuals. What this means, is that many people are interpreting immigration as an important issue even if may not be directly affecting them on a daily basis. In other words, they are imagining immigration. This negatively imagined immigration is motivated by fear and anxiety, a situation which is exacerbated by the fact that predicting, measuring and analysing EU immigration is a

notoriously difficult task. The underestimation of A8 immigration in 2004, and the information vacuum concerning migrant numbers has allowed exaggerated predictions and stereotypes to fill the gap. These predictions led to a form of contemporary moral panic that built up before accession occurred, and this situation was clearly identified in this research project. In every period, and in both newspapers, coverage of A10 immigration was always higher in the months leading up to the accession itself. This difference between pre and post-accession coverage was more pronounced in 2004, but the gap had narrowed by 2014, which suggests that immigration became more newsworthy, rather than just the accession event itself being of interest.

Misconceptions, predictions and stereotypes are all mixed up in the A10 immigration debate. Nowhere is this perhaps more clear than in the discussion surrounding A2 migrants, as this thesis reveals that Romania and Bulgaria consistently received high levels of coverage in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* in 2004 and 2014. Indeed, it is important to note that in 2004 both of these countries were mentioned more frequently than Poland, even though the A2 nations were not part of the 2004 accession. Poland would go on to send around 1.5 million migrants into the UK workforce, and yet in 2014, the words “Bulgaria” and “Romania” were still used more than “Poland”. This particularly keen interest in the A2 nations seems to stem from negative stereotyping, and a continuing anxiety regarding how many immigrants might arrive. The A2 migrant population has certainly increased following the accession, and yet the increase is far below some of the predictions posed by organisations such as *MigrationWatch*. It is arguable that these nations received particularly intense coverage in both 2004 and 2014, because they are poorer, but also because they are seen as being culturally distant. A lack of exposure to these nations ensures that stereotypes of beggars, shantytowns and criminals continue to flourish. In contrast, there is limited awareness of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants having high employment levels in the UK, or of their contributions to the NHS. Instead, A2 nations are often characterised as dangerously different, a fear which is perhaps intensified by the existence of the Roma minority. All of this results in A2 migrants consistently being seen as low value individuals who offer little to the UK. The critical perception of A2 nationals and some media headlines highlight the impact that imagined immigration can have, for A2 migrants were perceived to be a negative phenomenon before many of them had even arrived.

The immigration debate in the UK has certainly been influenced by the newspapers that people choose to read on a daily basis. This research paper shows that

*The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* interpreted A10 immigration in different ways, and thus to some extent influenced the opinions of their sizeable readership by the varied articles that they wrote. The influence of newspapers is heightened in the immigration debate since some people are forming opinions on immigration without actually being directly exposed to it, thus newspapers may be one of the only mediums through which certain communities are experiencing immigration. Furthermore, the lack of concrete information creates an information vacuum which ensures that predictions and interpretations are given a great deal of credence. Immigration is an important and complex issue with varied connotations for the host society. It is for this reason that imagined immigration holds such importance, for it deals with a subject which greatly concerns citizens, and it is a topic that has a vast number of subjective interpretations due to the wide-ranging, multi-faceted effects that immigration can indeed have. This thesis paper has shown that A10 immigration coverage in *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Guardian* was different, that it did become more intense in 2014, and that it was also of an increasingly negative tone. The general public's analysis of EU immigration in 2014 followed a similar trajectory –as shown by the rise of Ukip and immigration surveys- and therefore the newspapers' changing coverage was certainly reflecting clear trends in the national debate. Nevertheless, “no man is an island”,<sup>172</sup> and these newspapers changing interpretation of A10 migration in the UK will have had some effect on how people across the country imagined it to be, as articles, words, statistics, predictions and analysis all played a role in how they formulated their own mental image of the effect that A10 immigration was having on the UK.

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<sup>172</sup> John Donne, *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions*, 1624, accessed at <https://web.cs.dal.ca/~johnston/poetry/island.html>

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## Annex

### NewsBank research results

#### 2004 newspaper analysis: number of articles in the pre-accession period

<b>Date</b>	<b>The Daily Telegraph 2004 1</b>	<b>The Guardian 2004 1</b>
31/1		1
2/2	1	1
3/2		
4/2	1	1
5/2		3
6/2		
7/2		
9/2		1
10/2		
11/2		
12/2		1
13/2		
14/2		1
15/2		
17/2		
18/2	1	
19/2	2	1
20/2		
21/2		
23/2		1
24/2	1	2
25/2		2
26/2		
27/2	1	2
28/2		2
1/3		
2/3		
3/3		
4/4		
5/3		
6/3		
8/3		
9/3	1	1
10/3	2	
11/3	1	
12/3		
13/3		
15/3		
16/3		
17/3		
18/3		1
19/3		
20/3		
22/3		
23/3		
24/3		
25/3		
26/3	2	
27/3		
29/3	2	
30/3	2	1
31/3	3	6
1/4	5	4
2/4	5	8
3/4		1
5/4		1
6/4		2
7/4		
8/4		
9/4		
10/4		1
12/4		
13/4		

14/4		
15/4		
16/4		
17/4		
19/4		1
20/4		
21/4		
22/4		1
23/4		1
24/4		
26/4		1
27/4		2
28/4	1	3
29/4		1
30/4		2
1/5	1	1

TOTAL= 32

=58

2004 newspaper analysis: number of articles in the post-accession period

Date	The Daily Telegraph 2004 2	The Guardian 2004 2
3/5		
4/5		1
5/5		
6/5		
7/5		
8/5		
10/5		
11/5		
12/5		
13/5		
14/5		
15/5		
17/5		
18/5		
19/5		
20/5		
21/5		
22/5		1
24/5		
25/5		1
26/5		
27/5		
28/5		
29/5		
31/5		
1/6		
2/6		
3/6		1
4/6		
5/6	1	
7/6		
8/6		
9/6	1	
10/6		
11/6		
12/6		
14/6	1	1
15/6	1	1
16/6		
17/6	1	1
18/6		
19/6		
21/6		
22/6		
23/6		
24/6		
25/6		
26/6		
28/6		
29/6		
30/6		

31/3		
1/7		1
2/7		
3/7		
5/7		
6/7		
7/7		
8/7		1
9/7		
10/7		
12/7		
13/7		
14/7		
15/7		
16/7		
17/7		1
19/7		
20/7		
21/7		
22/7		
23/7		
24/7		
26/7		
27/7		
28/7		
29/7		
30/7		
31/7		

TOTAL= 5

=10

2014 newspaper analysis: number of articles in the pre-accession period

Date	The Daily Telegraph 2014 1	The Guardian 2014 1
1/10		1
2/10	1	
3/10		1
4/10		
5/10	1	
7/10	1	1
8/10		
9/10		
10/10		
11/10		1
12/10		1
14/10	1	
15/10	1	1
16/10		
17/10	1	
18/10		
19/10		
21/10	1	
22/10		1
23/10		
24/10		1
25/10		
26/10		
28/10		
29/10	1	
30/10	1	
31/10		
1/11	1	1
2/11	1	
4/11		
5/11		
6/11	1	
7/11	1	
8/11		
9/11		
11/11		
12/11		
13/11	1	
14/11	2	3

15/11		
16/11		2
18/11	3	
19/11		
20/11	1	
21/11	1	1
22/11	1	
23/11	3	1
25/11	2	1
26/11	1	
27/11	2	1
28/11	2	4
29/11	3	1
30/11	2	
2/12		
3/12	1	1
4/12		
5/12	2	
6/12		
7/12		
9/12		1
10/12	1	1
11/12	1	1
12/12		
13/12		
14/12	2	1
16/12	1	1
17/12	2	1
18/12	5	
19/12	2	
20/12	1	1
21/12	1	
23/12	2	2
24/12	3	2
26/12		
27/12		3
28/12	1	2
30/12	3	2
31/12	2	3
01/01	1	

TOTAL= 67

=44

2014 newspaper analysis: number of articles in the post-accession period

Date	The Daily Telegraph 2014 2	The Guardian 2014 2
2/1	2	4
3/1	1	2
4/1	1	
6/1	3	3
7/1	1	
8/1	2	
9/1	2	
10/1		
11/1	1	1
13/1		
14/1	2	1
15/1	2	1
16/1	1	
17/1		
18/1	3	1
20/1		
21/1	1	
22/1		
23/1		
24/1	2	
25/1		1
27/1	2	1
28/1	1	1
29/1		2
30/1	1	
31/1	1	
1/2	1	2

3/2	1	
4/2		
5/2	1	1
6/2		
7/2		
8/2		2
10/2	1	1
11/2	2	1
12/2		
13/2	1	1
14/2		
15/2		1
17/2		
18/2		
19/2		
20/2	1	1
21/2		
22/2		
24/2	1	
25/2		
26/2	1	
27/2		
28/2	2	2
1/3	1	1
3/3	1	
4/3		
5/3	1	
6/3		2
7/3	3	
8/3	1	
10/3		
11/3		1
12/3	1	
13/3	1	
14/3		
15/3	1	
17/3		
18/3		
19/3	1	
20/3		1
21/3	1	
22/3		
24/3		
25/3		
26/3		1
27/3	1	2
28/3		2
29/3		
31/3		
1/4		
2/4		
3/4	1	1

TOTAL=55

=41