PALACKY UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

ALEXANDRA KOMÁRKOVÁ

THE US WAR ON TERROR IN AFRICA

Bachelor Thesis

Supervisor: Mgr. Lenka Dušková

OLOMOUC 2015

I declare in lieu of oath that I wrote this thesis myself. All information derived from the work of others has been acknowledged in the text and in a list of references.

Olomouc, 15th May 2015   ....

                                                                            Alexandra Komárková

Acknowledgement

UNIVERZITA PALACKÉHO V OLOMOUCI
Přírodovědecká fakulta
Akademický rok: 2013/2014

ZADÁNÍ BAKALÁŘSKÉ PRÁCE
(PROJEKTU, UMĚLECKÉHO DÍLA, UMĚLECKÉHO VÝKONU)

Jméno a příjmení: **Alexandra KOMÁRKOVÁ**
Osobní číslo: **R12299**
Studijní program: **B1301 Geografie**
Studijní obor: **Mezinárodní rozvojová studia**
Název tématu: **Boj USA proti terorismu v Africe**
Zadávající katedra: **Katedra rozvojových studií**

Zásady pro vypracování:

The thesis is focused on the war on terrorism as part of the National security strategy of the United States. The main objective is to determine whether the fight against terrorism has been successful on the African continent so far and how has it affected developing countries in Africa. The behaviour of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa will also be explained on the principles of political realism.

Práce se zabývá bojem proti terorismu jako součást Národní bezpečnostní strategie Spojených států amerických. Hlavním cílem je zjistit, jestli byl boj proti terorismu na africkém kontinentě doposud úspěšný a jaké měl dopady na rozvojové státy Afriky. Jednání americké zahraniční politiky bude také vysvětleno na principech realistické teorie.

Rozsah grafických prací: **dle potřeby**

Rozsah pracovní zprávy: **10 - 15 tisíc slov**

Forma zpracování bakalářské práce: **tištěná/elektronická**

Seznam odborné literatury:

KALU, Kelechi A. KIEH, George K. United States - Africa Security Relations: Terrorism, Regional Security and National Interests. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

KEENAN, Jeremy. The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa. London: Pluto Press, 2013.

HAM, Carter F. Senate Armed Services Committee: Statement of General Carter Ham, USA Commander. United States Africa Command, 2013. Web. [2014-05-06] $<$http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/Documents$>$

KLARE, Michael. VOLMAN, Daniel. The African 'Oil Rush' and US National Security. Third World Quarterly, 2006. Web. [2014-05-06] $<$http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/Indra.de.Soysa/POL2003H05/klare_oil_TWQ.pdf$>$

OBAMA, Barrack H. National Security Strategy. The White House, Washington, 2010. Web. [2014-05-06] $<$http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strateg

PLOCH, Lauren. Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa. Congressional Research Service, 2011. Web. [2014-05-06] $<$https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf$>$

Vedoucí bakalářské práce: **Mgr. Lenka Dušková**
Katedra rozvojových studií

Datum zadání bakalářské práce: **7. května 2014**

Termín odevzdání bakalářské práce: **16. dubna 2015**

L.S.

prof. RNDr. Ivo Frébort, CSc., Ph.D.
děkan

doc. RNDr. Pavel Nováček, CSc.
vedoucí katedry

V Olomouci dne 7. května 2014

Contents

Introduction

Before the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Africa had long been on the periphery of U.S. interests. However, America's disengagement with the African continent has changed soon after. The September 11 attacks were a crucial turning point in United States' history that has drastically changed its geo-strategic interests and perceptions. Due to the spillage of Al-Qaeda's terrorist activities into Africa, the continent has become one of the top priorities in U.S foreign policy. In the 2002 National Security Strategy the former President Bush stated: *"In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic priority – combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity."* (The White House, 2002)

The aim of this thesis is to describe the ongoing U.S. War on Terror on the African continent; to analyze by what means the United States is attempting to achieve its goals in terms of combating terrorism, and finally, to identify achievements or failures. The U.S. foreign policy was also supposed to be explained on the principles of political realism. However, the author of the thesis decided that it is not critical element in order to achieve objectives of this thesis.

The first chapter deals with theoretical background. It explains why there is no comprehensive definition of terrorism; why it is so important to formulate one; and what consequences definition absence may cause. The last subchapter focuses on the roots causes that drive people to commit terrorist acts.

The Second chapter describes briefly the history of terrorism on the African continent. It starts with the first terrorist attacks in 1980s and continues with analysis of current unstable countries. These can be divided into three regions – the Maghreb and the Sahel, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Horn of Africa.

The third chapter focuses on the U.S. War on Terror on the African continent. The first part gives an brief overview of past and ongoing security programs and initiatives which are supposed to enhance African militaries' capabilities and capacities in combating

terrorism. The second subchapter explores the new African Unified Command which has responsibility over all U.S. security operations on the continent.

The last chapter is the most critical part of the thesis. Its aim is to evaluate interim U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the African continent; identify its achievements and failures; and finally, to determine whether U.S. counterterrorism strategy appears to be efficient.

1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TERRORISM

1.1 DEFINING TERRORISM

It seems appropriate to start with the origin of the term terrorism. Terrorism is derived from the Latin word "terrere", which refers to "frighten" or "tremble." In combination with the French suffix "isme" it implies to "practicing the trembling" or "causing the frightening." It signifies anxiety, panic and extreme fear of an unforeseeable threat. (Matusitz, 2012)

Terrorism is one of the most important and most widely used word in today's world. However, when it comes to defining terrorism one will find out that it is extremely difficult to formulate an all-inclusive definition. Throughout the years, various scientists and institutions have attempted to achieve consensus on the definition of terrorism. Yet, they still have not come to a successful conclusion.

Due to numerous conceptual problems there is also no organized body of legislation that could be called the law of terrorism. Likewise, there is no inherent crime of terrorism which means that terrorists are often charged with other crimes such as bombing, kidnapping, murder, illegal rising of funds, conspiracy etc. (Connor, 2011) One of the Judges of the International Court of Justice in Hague stated: "Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the target protected, or both". (ISSCM et al., 2008)

While neither the international community nor scholars have been able to formulate a universal definition of terrorism, all agree that threatening or killing civilians and non-militants cannot be accepted. Therefore, most of the institutions and experts come up with their own definition. (Botha, 2007) In total there have been recorded around two hundred existing definitions. Here are several examples:

> *A former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan: "an action is terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or*

an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act". (Botha, 2007)

U.S. Department of Defense Definition of Terrorism: terrorism can be defined as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." (Matusitz, 2012)

U.S. Department of State: terrorism refers to "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents." (Matusitz, 2012)

Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: terrorism is "any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources." (Matusitz, 2012)

Although these definitions of various entities vary slightly in comprehensiveness, they share several common denominators, which can be described as individual characters of the crime. These common elements are understandable in the realm of law, however, questionable if translated to more descriptive levels. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) claims that it is important to focus on the means utilized in driving the political, ideological, ethnic, racial or religious motive and summarized these common denominators as follows:

- Terrorism is premeditated act rather than an impulsive act of rage. It is always planned in advance.

- Its goal is to achieve political objectives such as changing policies or an existing political order.

- The targets of terrorism are civilians, not military or combat-ready troops. Terrorists take the advantage of the relative vulnerability of the civilian anxiety and the intense media reaction after committing the crime against civilians.

As terrorism evolves the rules change and military can be also the target of a terrorist attack these days, however, what distinguishes terrorism from other military confrontations is the element of surprise. The September 11 attack on pentagon or bombing attack against US military base in Iraq can serve as an example. (Ogundiya et al., 2008)

In addition, the decision to commit a terrorist act is not the result of suffering from some personality disorders or being abnormal. Rather, it is the outcome of a rational decision-making process, based on a cost−benefit analysis, which persuades the terrorists to be the most effective method to achieve their political objectives. (Suarez, 2008) Terrorism can also be characterized as asymmetric warfare. This term indicates fighting between grossly unequal sides whose relative military power or strategy differs significantly. The weaker opponent cannot attack the more powerful force (e.g. military, government) under conventional rules of war. On the contrary, to have a chance to win it is compelled to use unexpected and unconventional tactics to exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy. (Matusitz, 2012) Capabilities utilized comprise the most primitive as well as highly advanced forms of weapons, mobility, tactical communication or manipulation. The techniques used by terrorists include hostage taking, kidnapping, intimidation, torturing, hijacking, skyjacking, bombing, assassination, armed assault or ambush, incendiary attack or arson, cyber-warfare, utilizing of chemical, radiological or bacteriological weapons etc. (Ogundiya et al., 2008)

Speaking of defining terrorism, it is important to bear in mind that its character varies according to location. Therefore, sub-regions and countries should proceed against terrorism differently, based on their unique perception of the threat. Since the thesis deals with terrorism on the African continent, it is required to focus attention on what the terrorism as a concept means in the context of Africa. However, this might be challenging due to the fact that Africans often use Western models to categorize terrorism. Anneli Botha (2008), a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, expresses his concerns regarding this matter in the article "Challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa" and explains that after the September 11 attacks most of the African countries re-enforced a state-centric approach in understanding, preventing and

combating terrorism. This might cause reality distortion, as the terrorism in Africa will differ from that of other parts in the world.

As provided in the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the Organization of African Unity (OAU/AU) (2010) formulated a comprehensive framework on what an act of terrorism in the African context implies. According to Article 1, OAU interprets terrorism as:

> *"(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:*
>
> > *(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or*
> >
> > *(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or*
> >
> > (iii) *create general insurrection in a State".*
>
> (b) *any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to(iii)."*

Article 3, Section 1 is however also worth emphasizing:

> *"Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts; however Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act."*

1.2 WHY IS THE AGREEMENT ON A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION INCONCLUSIVE?

Despite the above proposed definitions and the fact that scholars have reached consensus on what key denominators does terrorism include, the international community has not come to an agreement on a universal definition of terrorism yet. The definitional problem arises as one of the main issues in political science, because the essence of this matter does not lie with the aspects of terrorism, like violence, strategies and objectives, but with the political sphere. The aim of the following subchapter is to explain what elements exactly hamper these efforts of formulating the definition. (Suarez, 2008)

As we experience it in everyday life, the core of the problem lies in the diversity of how we perceive things. If a certain group of people was supposed to describe what does "freedom" mean to them it is most likely that we would end up with many different results. Words such as "freedom" do not have the same meaning for everybody due to different origin, culture, and experience of that particular person and such differences obviously hamper communication. Therefore, it might be impossible to request to create all-inclusive definition that would include all perspectives on terrorism of every human, state, and international organization. (Terrorism Definition, 2008) As an example of different perceptions of terrorism a well-known statement *"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"* can be stated, which was said by Yasser Arafat, former Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in his 1974 speech before the United Nations. (Matusitz, 2012)

Boaz Ganor, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, created a summary that offers an exhaustive answer to the question why is it so problematic to attain a universal definition. First of all, he remarked that to some extent the political, legal, social science and popular notions of terrorism are diverging and, therefore, it is a contested concept. The second reason is that there are too many types of terrorism with different manifestations. For a more detailed explanation Ganor quoted Mr. Jenkins: "We should be careful not to think of terrorism or terrorists as monolithic. Terrorism is a generalized construct derived from our concepts of morality, law, and the rules of war, whereas actual terrorists are shaped by culture, ideology and politics – specific, inchoate factors and notions that motivate diverse actions." Another fact we need to consider is that the struggle over the meaning of terrorism is linked to (de-)legitimization and

criminalization. The use of term terrorism implies a moral judgment, in other words, successful labeling an opponent a terrorist requests to indirectly persuade others to adopt such a moral viewpoint. Therefore, the attributing and defining ability is intrinsically related to power and language hegemonies and as it is generally known, even if the power distribution in the international system changes slightly, states of the Western world continue to preserve the hegemonic control over legitimate use of violence. Last but not least, certain complication is also given by undergone changes in the meaning of terrorism. The term has existed for more than two hundred years, however, there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism. (ISSCM et al., 2008) Ganor divides terrorism into three time periods – the classical, modern, and postmodern. Classical terrorism is described as a direct warfare which means small-scale offensive actions aimed at specific non-significant targets. The extent of damage as well as the number of casualties is usually low. Modern terrorism manifests today's terrorist acts that are much more indiscriminate and destructive and which promote psychological warfare. Postmodern terrorism represents future terrorist efforts to acquire and utilize unconventional CBRN weapons (i.e. chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons) whose consequences would be as great as possible. (Ganor 2002)

Other scholars suggest a simpler division. They maintain that paradigm shift happened in the mid 1990s when a new concept of terrorism was created, which involves different actors, tactics, goals and actions. To distinguish these two terrorism concepts scholars use terms Old terrorism and New terrorism. (Matusitz, 2012) Old terrorism was driven by predominantly secular motivations and rational political reasons such as independence for an ethnic group. Despite the fact that it was often difficult to meet demands of both parties, these terrorists were at least willing to negotiate. Compared to new terrorists they used discriminate violence to bring a message across to their opponents and theirs attacks were directed at highly symbolic targets of the authority they opposed. If they would promote excessive indiscriminate violence it might reduce their legitimacy and result in loss of their supporters and that is not what they could afford. (Spencer, 2006)

On the contrary, new terrorism can be characterized by extreme indiscriminate violence and by strict compliance with religion. It can be conducted with weapons of mass destruction to produce as many casualties as possible. One of the reasons is that modern terrorists lack clearly defined political demands and secondly, they are not interested in any attempts to negotiate. They promote an uncompromising world view in accordance with

their religious belief and aim at elimination of every society that does not share the same values, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, and concepts of morality. In other words, as Alexander Spencer (2006) noted "today's terrorists don't want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it." Loss of their supporters due to killing a lot of innocent people does not impose a threat to religious terrorist, because they consider themselves as their own constituency accountable only to God. (ISSCM et al., 2008) High number of casualties and the interests of mass media actually enable them to transfer their message of fear and intimidation to the public. Except the cause of rational fear, modern terrorists tend to heighten the public's fear of terrorism to a level of irrational and uncontrolled anxiety. The public's thought "anybody could be the next victim" transforms into political pressure on governments to act, as people feel they must do whatever it takes to halt a terrorist campaign. (Suarez, 2008)

Focusing still on defining terrorism, entirely divergent stand is taken by scholars, e.g., Thomas H. Mitchell, who maintain that the only solution how to create a concept of terrorism is to assert so called "negative definition". In other words, instead of determining what terrorism is, they imply that it would be easier to define what terrorism is not. However, this approach has not caught on so far. (ISSCM et al., 2008) Critical authors, e.g., Walter Laqueur, even hold the view that a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist nor will it be formulated in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the debate over the definition of terrorism continues as the following subchapter explains why it is important to reach a positive conclusion.

1.3   THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION

Over the last decade, terrorism has become a global phenomenon and is no longer a local problem of specific countries but rather an issue involving a number of international aspects. Nowadays, there exist international networks of terrorist organizations which appear to receive direct and indirect assistance from different countries, have offices and training camps throughout the world and victims of their attacks are of different nationalities sometimes. Therefore, responses to terrorism have to be on an international level too. However, without knowing what it is we are dealing with, there can be hardly taken any common steps to combat terrorist organizations and prosecute countries supporting terrorism. In order to develop an effective international strategy, we need a common agreement on the notion. (ISSCM et al., 2008)

The following excerpt from the talks between Ned Walker, Assistant to the Undersecretary for Middle East Affairs at the U.S. State Department, and the Hon. Lee Hamilton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, held under the auspices of the Committee on Foreign Affairs at the House of Representatives, demonstrates the necessity of creating a comprehensive definition of terrorism (Ganor, 2002):

"Hamilton: Well, how do you define terrorism, do you define it in terms of non-combatance?

Walker: The State Department definition which is included in the terrorism report annually defines it in terms of politically motivated attacks on non-combatant targets.

Hamilton: So an attack on a military unit in Israel will not be terrorism?

Walker: It does not necessarily mean that it would not have a very major impact on whatever we were proposing to do with the PLO.

Hamilton: I understand that, but it would not be terrorism.

Walker: An attack on a military target. Not according to the definition. Now wait a minute; that is not quite correct. You know, attacks can be made on military targets which clearly are terrorism. It depends on the individual circumstances.

Hamilton: Now wait a minute. I thought that you just gave me the State Department definition.

Walker: Non-combatant is the terminology, not military or civilian.

Hamilton: All right. So any attack on a non-combatant could be terrorism?

Walker: That is right.

Hamilton: And a non-combatant could include military?

Walker: Of course.

Hamilton: It certainly would include civilian, right?

Walker: Right.

Hamilton: But an attack on a military unity would not be terrorism?

Walker: It depends on the circumstances.

Hamilton: And what are those circumstances?

Walker: I do not think it will be productive to get into a description of the various terms and conditions under which we are going to define an act by the PLO as terrorism."

The absence of a commonly accepted definition invites abuse. First of all, authoritarian governments often use the label "terrorism" as a powerful instrument to crush their opponents such as resistance movements or guerrillas, however, they seldom agree that their actions should be included in a definition on terrorism too. (ISSCM et al., 2008) This perception creates so called double standard which means that a certain phrase or rule are perceived as acceptable to be applied by one party, but are considered unacceptable when applied by another party. In other words, when a group resorts to violence against a government or segment of society it is regarded as terrorism, but when a government or security forces use the same or even worse violence, it is done in the name of security. Despite the fact that the question of categorization of state terrorism remains unsolved, the attention of policy makers to this matter has been captured already. (Botha, 2008)

Secondly, it also depends on how a third party perceives a particular situation. Anneli Botha (2008) noted: "If one identifies with the victim of the attack, then it is considered terrorism, but if one can identify with the perpetrator it is not." This demonstrates the problem of implying a moral judgment when labeling someone a terrorist, and therefore, a problematic question – who should have the power to define what terrorism is and is not – persists. (ISSCM et al., 2008)

1.4 MOTIVATIONS FOR TERRORIST ACTS

To better understand the concept of terrorism it is necessary to focus on the root causes that are driving individuals to resort to terrorist acts. In general, these underlying factors may have psychological, political, economic, or socio-cultural background and can be divided into four sub-categories: internal or external factors, and long-term or short-term factors. Long-term causal factors involve prolonged issues like social inequities, economic depression, or political disfranchisement, while short-term factors are the results of sudden emergency situations such as rapid upsurge of ethnicity, relative deprivation or government repression. (Ogundiya et al., 2008)

The first condition that might lead to terrorism is based on psychological state of mind. Countries with heterogeneous population composed of different ethnic or religious groups often proved to be a target of terrorism as the result of search for self-determination. (Botha, 2007) If a group of a diversified population is being oppressed and disadvantaged for a long time a feeling of marginalization and frustration (i.e. aggression syndrome) will be created. As a result of such discrimination a social movement develops which is supposed to redress ongoing grievances and manage to gain either equal rights or a separate state. If the movement is facing disappointment at failing to achieve its goals the aggrieved persons might attempt to inflict pain on the perceived enemy by committing a terrorist act. For instance, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) has taken hostages and shut off oil installations in agitating for political and economic equity in Nigeria. (Ogundiya et al., 2008)

The second factor is economic. Central Intelligence Agency of America emphasizes in its recent reports that suspected terrorist groups operate predominantly in failed states. This term refers to states perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. Such widespread conditions of conflict, deprivation, poverty, unemployment, and luck of education therefore provide a breeding ground for radicalization and terrorist activities. (Ogundiya et al., 2008) Failed states are often wealthy in natural resources, however, this contributes to higher degree of instability, rather than to economic growth of the country, as it is usually under control of social movements. (Botha, 2007)

The third factor has socio-cultural background. Focusing on conflicts in Africa, the main issue lies in artificial (unnatural) borders of most African states. Eighty percent of African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines which were usually drawn based on where was a border between France and England during the colonial times. As a result, various ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups were thrown together or separated without any respect for their aspiration leading to unstable internal power balance, economic obstacles and separatist intentions in majority of the African countries. (Alesina et al., 2008) Diversity of a country, from a religious perspective in particular, is a very sensitive issue and can easily ginger violence. In the past, original religion of the African people used to provide a sense of identity and community belonging, and thereby to overcome national, racial and language differences. However, nowadays the religious divide in Africa is being more and more manipulated to drive people to extremism and in a

number of cases to acts of terrorism. Jihadists realized they would benefit from divided world between Christianity and Islam and after declaring the war on terror and launching efforts to promote democracy and secularism by the West they started to compare the war on terror to a war against Islam. To highlight this allegation and to minimize the voice of moderates, mass media and the Internet is often being used. Therefore, as Anneli Botha (2008) confirms, "African nationals and states find themselves in the midst of a war between extremists and moderates for the heart and spirit of Islam, in addition to a war against terrorism."

Last but not least, political factor can also promote terrorism and this happens to be the most significant cause. The overall health of governance and government control over their respective territories often appears to be poor on the African continent. Weak governance contributes to spread of illegal activities (e.g. arms trafficking, drug trafficking, and terrorism itself) because ungoverned parts of state territories provide favorable conditions for terrorist groups to train, plan and launch attacks, even on local populations. This is associated with border control. Anneli Botha (2007) highlights that "a line on a map might not always correspond with a border that's being effectively monitored to prevent the movement of unwanted individuals". For instance, Somalia and the Sahara represent such regions where governments are unwilling or unable to carry out these responsibilities due to lack of human, financial and technological resources. Talking about the health of governments, draconian and closed political systems are another intricate issue. Draconian state regimes can be characterized by domination, oppression, deprivation, and restrictions on basic human rights, including freedom of expression and political participation. For instance, a particular ethnic group living in a specific geographic location whose needs and demands are being disregarded by the government may feel marginalized and feel the need to establish a representative government. However, it is difficult to overthrow an authoritarian government as the political entity ensures its power remains strong. Lack of the opportunity to change the government in a democratic way provokes civil disturbances and it might result in terrorist activities. (Botha, 2007)

Some of these underlying factors originate in internal environment (created within the state), whereas others are caused by external forces under the effects of globalization. As part of the processes of globalization, sophistication of network of communication via the Internet, transportation, scientific inventions, or urbanization, which makes the city an easy target of terrorism due to anonymity, mobility and accessibility, have increased complexities on all levels of the society and created new opportunities and vulnerabilities. (Ogundiya et al., 2008) Terrorist use the Internet as a tool not only to spread ideology of radical extremism but also to recruit, communicate and train independent cell structures all over the world. International markets, on the other hand, provide access to guns and electronic equipment. (Botha, 2007)

Both internal and external causes are important as they are not mutually exclusive but rather interwoven and both can contribute to a state's vulnerability to terrorism. However, it should be noted that the underlying factors can always be traced back to domestic circumstances which are the primary cause of domestic terrorism that may later escalate into transnational terrorism. (Botha, 2007) Since the September 11 attacks, world attention is fixed on transnational terrorism, but as it was mentioned above, firstly it is important to eliminate domestic terrorism with its latent causes. Anneli Botha (2008) summarized this fact: "In the developing Africa domestic terrorism presents a more immediate threat to security than does the transnational terrorism which is experienced in the developed world. On the other hand, Africa cannot isolate itself from developments relating to the threat of terrorism in other parts of the world because factors such as globalization, the Internet and the impact of United States' foreign policy in the Middle East directly influence perception formation and radicalization that extend beyond national, or even continental, borders."

2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA

The African continent became entangled in international terrorism in the 1980s when several Palestinian-led terrorist activities took place in Sudan, including the attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy and the assassination of an American ambassador. After the National Islamic Front came to power in 1989, Osama Bin Laden was invited by its leader, Hassan al-Turabi, to Sudan and built there a network of financial and terrorist operations. These include, for instance, the 1995 assassination attempt on the former president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, or the bombing of two American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. The United States responded with a retaliatory attack on a chemical factory in Khartoum, claiming it was producing elements for chemical weapons for al-Qaeda, and added Sudan to the U.S. list of countries supporting terrorism. (Lyman, 2009)

The situation even worsened when the 1992 elections in Algeria were canceled and civil war broke out. Tens of thousands of people died and many more were wounded and displaced from their homes. The country fell into chaos and thus provided fertile seed for radicalization. The neighboring countries launched immediate countermeasures to prevent the further spread of terrorism throughout the region, however, terrorist attacks have continued to appear from time to time. (Cilliers, 2003)

Since the September 11, a disturbing trend of security challenges is emerging in the Maghreb, Sahel, Horn, and other regions of Africa. It is demonstrated by the continuing escalation in violent attacks, motivated by ethnic, racial, religious, tribal, and national ideologies, perpetrated by broad range of lawless sub-national movements such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Dine, Ansar Al-Sharia, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, al-Mourabitoun, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, or Ansaru. (Alexander, 2015)

The following chart (see figure 1) demonstrates the rising terrorist activity in North Africa and the Sahel since the 9/11. The statistical record of 2013 indicates that terrorist attacks in the region grew by an alarming 60 percent from the previous year. The statistical record of 2014 shows only a 25 percent increase in the number of attacks, however, the

amount of 289 terrorist incidents represents the highest annual total in the region in more than a decade.

Figure 1 – Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb & Sahel between 2001 and 2014

Source: Alexander, 2015

2.1 THE MAGHREB AND SAHEL STATES

In this case, the Maghreb comprises the political units of Mauritania, the territory of Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya in the Northwest Africa. The Sahel stands for countries located in the Sahara Desert, i. e. Mali, Chad, Niger, and Sudan. It is an area of vast open land, states with weak central governments, and a long history of smuggling, human trafficking, banditry and violence. Over the last decade, it has become a significant battleground in the war on terror as much of the U.S. efforts on the global war on terror are centered on the unstable Sahel corridor and its surrounding areas. However, it is necessary to distinguish occasional signs of radicalism. The majority of inhabitants of the region, whether Muslim or Christian, are focused mainly on domestic interests and their national politics. The Tuareg and other nomadic groups are a considerable segment of the population and are the most marginalized in national politics and development. (Lyman, 2009)

Yet in a region with limited government presence, ungoverned spaces, and porous borders, there are only a few restraints that hinder terrorist organizations to operate transnationally. (Aronson, 2014) The Maghreb states face challenges in guarding its borders, especially in the south, what allows the insurgents to spread out into the nations of the Sahel, engage in cross-border terrorism and built profitable working relationships with tribes that have controlled smuggling routes through Africa for centuries. (Alexander, 2014)

The main insurgent group in the region is indisputably the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. In 2007, it announced to be officially part of al-Qa`ida after renaming itself as the Organization of al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and recently it also sworn loyalty to the Islamic State. It seems that these actions are primarily motivated by an effort to maintain relevancy as a terrorist organization on the global stage, however, the group's interest has still remained strictly regional. (Aronson, 2014) While much of its ideology has been preserved, some philosophical disagreements with its leader Abdelmalek Droukdel occurred resulting in both new alliances and continued fragmentation. Most popular are the al-Mourabitoun, formed by the former military commander of AQIM Mokhtar Belmokhtar; the Ansar al-Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) operating in northern Mali; the militant

movement Ansar al-Sharia based in Libya. These insurgent groups surfaced also during fighting launched in Mali in January 2012 when secular Tuareg rebels, called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), were trying to declare their independent Azawad state. (Østebø, 2012)

They consist of assailants of different nationalities (e.g. Algerian, Tunisian, Malian, Nigerian, Egyptian) and their objective is to wage jihad against corrupt and repressive incumbent regimes in northwestern Africa. Due to their ability to work with the historic customs and traditions of local societies and increased Western military involvement in this highly xenophobic and anti-colonialist region, they have managed to spread across much of northern and western Africa, thus posing a threat to national governments and Western interests mainly because of rich mineral deposits. (Tribal Analysis Center, 2015)

Recently, a new emerged failed state has become also Libya. Since the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the country has basically reached its lowest and most violent point and appears to be on the verge of civil war as the battle over the country's governance, balance of power among competing groups, and control of Libya's oil fields intensifies. This provides an ideal situation for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) to take advantage of the instability in terms of recruitment and propaganda, to expand its reach. (Alexander, 2014)

Another terrorist threat is posed by ongoing civil war in Darfur, Sudan, which has led to displacement of more than 2.5 million people since 2003; or the growing threat of radicalization in the refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, that are run by the Polisario Front, the representative of the people of Western Sahara. (Lyman, 2009)

2.2 THE GULF OF GUINEA

In the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria continues to be the country most impacted by terrorism. With an estimated population of about 178 millions, it is the most populous country in Africa and has the largest Muslim population on the continent. Tensions between the Muslims, living predominantly in the north, and equally large Christians, living mainly in the south, are persistent and often lead to violence. Moreover, the Muslim north is poor and ranks below standards elsewhere in the country. (Lyman, 2009)

In May 2013, the Government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in three northeastern states, which has been extended until November 2014. After years of calling for the creation of an Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria, the local Islamist militant group Boko Haram now intends to establish one by force. (ACAPS, 2015)

Boko Haram, meaning Western education is forbidden, was established by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. The aversion to Western education is rooted in the colonial period when Christian schools run by missionaries emerged and Muslims were afraid that it would lead students away from Islam. In general, their attitudes toward the United States tend toward sharp criticism of U.S. foreign policy toward Muslim states. (Østebø, 2012)

Due to the quest for revenge after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 and anger over the police's alleged abuse of force in its dealings with Boko Haram members, the new leader Abubakar Shekau has chosen a more strategic approach and started targeting key infrastructure to seize and hold new territories. Over 2014, Boko Haram seized large parts of the territory in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states and the conflict spilled over into neighbouring Cameroon, Niger and Chad. (ACAPS, 2015)

Despite presumptions that the groups' operational links to international terrorist organizations are limited, AQIM's leader Droukdel has confirmed cooperation in terms of providing weapons, training, and support to Boko Haram. Furthermore, Boko Haram militants recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). On the other hand, there are some disagreements in tactics between Boko Haram and Ansaru, an Islamist jihadist movement operating in and around Kano state in northern Nigeria. While Ansaru also seeks to establish a caliphate in northern Nigeria, its leader has condemned Boko Haram's inhuman actions and enounced it would not kill innocent non-Muslims or security officials, except in self defense. (Aronson, 2014)

2.3 THE HORN OF AFRICA

To better understand current developments of Islamic militancy in the Horn, knowledge of the unique political history of Somalia is required. The authoritarian regime of Siad Barre that lasted for more than twenty years produced democratic deficits and a weak civil society. When Somalia collapsed into civil war in the early 1990s, each African-led attempt to establish a unified interim government was thwarted and Somalis started finding refuge in religion. This was due to the fact that previous decade saw the rise of

Islamic charities which started fulfilling some of the social, educational, and humanitarian needs, and therefore, gained trust and support of local people. It was an important precursor for the gradual politicization of Islam in Somalia that evoke emergence of a number of fundamentalist Islamic movements, fighting one another in a scramble for power. In 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) gained control over Mogadishu and established a strict Islamist government. The implementation of Islamic law was supposed to usher in an end of the anarchic violence and offer a degree of political stability and predictability. However, the UIC was crushed by the Ethiopian intervention just a few months later, resulting in continuing chaos and the establishment of Al-Shabaab, a militant Islamic movement currently operating in the region. (Østebø, 2012)

Whilst Al-Shabaab was without question the most powerful force in southern Somalia in 2009/10, it has experienced a steep decline over the past few years, losing control over key towns, including the capital Mogadishu and the port of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab´s reduced military activity is the result of disagreements within its top leadership over ideology, strategy, and tactics as well as the combined efforts of African Union, the Kenyan, Ethiopian and Somali armed forces, and the intelligence-led commando operations. (Bryden, 2014) Moreover, the Horn has been the most U.S. militarized region in Africa. In terms of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) between 1,200 to 18,000 U.S. troops operated in Djibouti since 2002. (Lyman, 2009)

Despite strategic setbacks inflicted by AMISOM forces (African Union Mission in Somalia), al-Shabaab remains to be dangerous as it still controls most of southern and central Somalia. The Horn, sometimes called Africa's bridge to the Middle East, could be further destabilized by escalating situation in neighbouring Yemen which is currently on the edge of civil war. Dozens of Yemeni refugees, seeking shelter in Somalia, might provide breeding ground for radicalization and recruitment of fighters. Other experts warn that Somalia´s neighbors and AMISOM troop-contributing countries are currently most at risk of terrorist attacks as al-Shabaab is seeking for revenge. (Bryden, 2014)

The Kenya's 2011 invasion of Somalia, known as Operation Linda Nchi, only aggravated the already tenuous relationship between Muslims in the Horn and the Kenyan government. Kenya has lost control over a great portion of the north-eastern hinterland and Al-Shabaab and their jihadist affiliates in Kenya (e.g. al-Hijra) have conducted more than

50 terrorist attacks in this country, primarily as retaliation for Kenya's role in the Global war on terror and the 2011 invasion. (Aronson, 2013)

2.4 AFRICAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN GENERAL

Salafism is currently the fastest growing branch of Islam in Africa. Initially it implies to a nonviolent religious movement devoted to the struggle for religious purity and Islamic morality. However, later it started being associated with Salafi Jihadism, raising holy war against those who deem to be enemies of Islam, including Western countries with their negative influence. Its main objective is to Islamize society from below in order to establish an Islamic political order and create an Islamic State. These patterns are clearly visible within al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and movements in the Sahel.

Recognizing variations, militant Islamic groups in Africa usually do not possess great military power and command only small minorities within Muslim communities. While large ungoverned expanses of fragile states have been a great opportunity for the implementation of their radical ideologies, militants are not expected to seek power at the state level as they tend to be homegrown phenomena focused on local issues. (Østebø, 2012)

In general, terrorist organizations in Africa do not represent a major security threat to Western countries, however, due to a notable upsurge in the developing cooperation between the African groups and al-Qa`ida as well as the Caliphate of the Islamic State in the Middle East they pose a threat to the interests of the United States and its allies. African countries themselves should address Islamic militancy in all its seriousness as the level of casualties, suffering, and abuses of human rights in terms of terrorist attacks is continuously rising. (Alexander, 2015)

Figure 2 – Africa's arc of instability

Source: Alexander, 2015

3 U.S. WAR ON TERROR IN AFRICA

3.1 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

Over the years, the United States has established a number of bilateral and multilateral security collaborations with African states. In support of U.S. national interests the Department of Defense has implemented various security programs and initiatives to reinforce African militaries' capabilities as part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The U.S. assistance to African countries may include, but are not limited to, military exercises; trainings in intelligence operations and airborne surveillance; peacekeeping operations; non-combatant evacuations; sanctions enforcement; and military equipment supplies. (Ploch, 2011)

The majority of the initiatives are funded by the U.S. State Department which, besides providing funding, also gives overall guidance and direction for the programs. The following pages offer a brief overview of U.S. programs and initiatives towards Africa which are the most relevant in terms of counterterrorism, listed in work of Mr. Gilbert (2009), Volman (2009), Ploch (2011), and Nsia-Pepra (2014).

3.1.1 Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

The TSCTI was launched by the Bush Administration in 2005 when it replaced the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) aimed at increasing border security and counterterrorism capacities of Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger. Thereafter, it was expanded in mission and extended to 11 African nations (i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria). The main goals are to improve intelligence, command and control; to counter the activities of Islamist militants in the Maghreb and the Sahel (in particular AQIM) by discrediting terrorist ideology; and to facilitate cooperation between member states. To achieve these objectives Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) was developed as the military arm of TSCTP.

3.1.2 Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

The CJTF-HOA was established in 2002 as a joint task force aimed at "detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups" operating in East Africa. The CJTF-HOA is based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and it has also one permanent contingency operation location in Kenyan Manda Bay Naval Base and two in Ethiopia at Hurso and Bilate. It consists of about 1,500 to 2,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel.

The original intention of creation of the joint task force that was designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Gulf of Aden, the Red sea, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of the effort to detect and counter terrorist organizations has later evolved into more broadly reflected strategy – the so called "cooperative conflict prevention". As part of this new strategy, the CJTF-HOA has supported several humanitarian missions (e.g.: helping with delivery of medical supplies for the people of Mogadishu; digging wells; or repairing schools and hospitals). However, military activities associated with building the defense capabilities will always remain the key goal. Furthermore, some observers have raised concerns whether these humanitarian activities should be coordinated by civilian agencies or NGOs rather than by the U.S. military.

The CJTF-HOA is probably mostly known for its support of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia between December 2006 and January 2007 that caused an overthrow of the regime of the Union of Islamic Courts. The Task Force also has also provided military training and assistance to AMISOM troop-contributing countries fighting al-Shabaab militants in Somalia.

3.1.3 Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)

The PREACT, formerly known as the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative, is another multi-faceted program designed to counter violent extremism, thwart short-term terrorist activities, enhance regional cooperation, and expand border security in East African countries. It was formed in 2009 and is led by Bureau of African Affairs.

3.1.4 African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)

The ACOTA program is a bilateral program specifically designed to ensure the enhancement of multilateral peacekeeping capabilities of African military forces. This program was created in 2002 when it replaced the African Crisis Response Initiative

(ACRI) and became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative in 2004. African soldiers are trained through the ACOTA program to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations (such as in Liberia or South Sudan). However, the training includes both offensive and defensive military exercises which may be used in police operations against unarmed civilians or military forces of other countries as well.

3.1.5 Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)

The ATA program was launched in 1983 under the guidance of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. It provides military training, technology, and equipment to countries all around the world which are United States' allies in the Global War on Terror. Kenya was the biggest beneficiary of this program in Africa as 454 Kenyan police underwent military courses on "preventing, interdicting, and investigating acts of terrorism; crisis response; post-blast investigation; rural border operation; and terrorist crime scene investigation," resulting in the creation of the Kenyan Antiterrorism Police Unit (KAPU).

3.1.6 African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP)

Since 2003, this program enables the United States to supply specific African countries with specialized military equipment (such as patrol vessels and vehicles, monitors, sensors, communication equipment, or night vision devices) that should contribute to more effective patrolling and defending of their land borders and the coastal waters, thus disabling piracy, smuggling, and other illegal activities. The members of the ACBSP are Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, and Sao Tome.

3.1.7 Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) allows the United States to sell weaponry and defense services to African governments if the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. The FMS program is conducted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency of the Defense Department. In addition, the U.S. government also provides loans to African states through the FMF program to finance the purchase of such military equipment. However, repayment of these loans is usually forgiven.

3.2   THE UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)

In recent years, no issue or event concerning Africa has provoked so much controversy and hostility as the establishment of a new Unified Combatant Command – AFRICOM. The Pentagon's Unified Command Plan divides the world into six zones on the basis of geostrategic military purposes and each zone is assigned to a "unified command". In the past, African had been shared among three unified commands. The European Command (EUCOM) had responsibility over most of the Northwestern and Southern African states; the Central Command (CENTCOM) over East Africa and Egypt; and the Pacific Command (PACOM) over Madagascar, the Seychelles and the African coast in the Indian Ocean. Such a division of spheres of influence is complicated and does not allow security issues to be handled with efficiency, thus resulting in creation of the sixth unified command, AFRICOM, whose area of responsibility (AOR) covers all African countries except Egypt, which remains under CENTCOM.

Figure 3 – AFRICOM's area of responsibility

Source: Department of Defense

AFRICOM began its initial activities in 2007 and became fully operational on the 1st October, 2008. It is responsible for all U.S. Department of Defense operations and military relations with African nations and reports to the Secretary of Defense. (Cruz et al., 2010)

The new command has approximately 2,000 assigned personnel, however, what makes it different from all the other unified commands is that AFRICOM has incorporated a small developmental component. Apart from military personnel, it comprises of more than thirty officials from other agencies, such as the U.S. Department of State (DOS) or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and one of its deputy commanders must always be a senior state department official. (Dean, 2013)

The Mission Statement asserts that "the United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity."

African governments' main security challenge is to mobilize sufficient resources to secure a safe, stable and well governed environment. Recent peacekeeping operations on the continent have revealed low strategic management capacity of the African Union (AU). Some experts argue it has not effective mechanisms for operational level mission management, lacks the ability to manage logistics and is entirely dependent on external partners. (Neethling, 2008) In this sense, General Ward, a retired AFRICOM Commander, considers the establishment of AFRICOM to be promising as it is aimed at "helping African nations improve their ability to provide for their own security" and to "increase their military professionalism, their proficiency, and their capability." (Cruz et al., 2010)

It is noteworthy to mention that AFRICOM is not the first U.S. initiative how to use its Global War on Terror as a cover to infiltrate African states. For instance, The Pan-Sahelian (PSI) and Trans-Sahelian (TSCTP) counter-terrorism initiatives were created for the same purpose, however, these now are administered by AFRICOM itself, along with other U.S. programs and initiatives mentioned in the section 3. (Deen, 2013) The Department of Defense (DOD) officials emphasize that not only does AFRICOM allow the U.S. military to better synchronize these activities, but it also allows DOD to better coordinate with other U.S. agencies, such as the State Department, the Department of

Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, USAID and others, as well as with other governments providing security assistance to African countries. (Ploch, 2011)

AFRICOM is currently located at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Germany, however, a permanent location for the headquarters on the African continent is still in negotiation. So far only Liberian President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, has officially offered to host the command. (Cruz et al., 2010) The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which is the largest regional organization in terms of the number of Member States, uttered that it "flatly refuses the installation of any military command or any foreign armed presence of whatever country on any part of Africa, whatever the reasons and justifications," while the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also expressed firm disagreement with the creation of AFRICOM. However, the most strident criticism was raised by the leaders of Zambia, Nigeria and South Africa. (Deen, 2013) This is due to extensive fears that hosting the headquarters might increase militarization, terrorism and the scramble for natural resources. Furthermore, the South African Defence Minister, Mosiuoa Lekota, warned that any country that agreed to become a base for AFRICOM would have to face the consequences. (Neethling, 2008)

3.2.1 CONCERNS AND PRESSING QUESTIONS

While some African leaders welcomed the announcement of the new Unified Combatant Command, others have expressed some skepticism concerning AFRICOM's overall objectives and United States' renewed interest in Africa.

After the end of the Cold War U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has been one of "benign neglect" or "manifest destiny". As Dr Wafula Okomu explained, such indifference in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union reflects that the African continent matters only when it affects U.S. national interests. The "benign neglect" attitude was experienced during the conflict in Rwanda when the United States hesitated to intervene and to call the acts of aggression against innocent civilians an act of genocide. Currently, we are witnessing once again the reluctance of the United States to take action against the Sudanese government and its campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region. (Cruz et al., 2010; Neethling, 2008)

Some skeptics are worried that AFRICOM might militarize political problems and entrench dictators on the continent. This might happen because of the fact that United States would, for the sake of its national interests, maintain good relations even with states repressing their own people, as long as these states are willing to cooperate with the command. The military cooperation between the United States and Ethiopia serves as an example. U.S. provided military training and equipment to the Ethiopian regime to fight the al-Shabaab militants while Ethiopia was being accused of human rights abuses and attempts to suppress protests and dissent. (Deen, 2013) Furthermore, some authoritarian governments could take the advantage of the ambiguity of the term "terrorism" and use the acquired skills and weaponry to deal with their internal political problems and dissatisfied communities as if these were equivalent to terrorism. (Neethling, 2008)

In general, some observers are worried that the combination of hard power and soft power in Africa is part of a greater U.S. foreign policy strategy. We have already witnessed the process of the GWOT in the developing world, such as in Iraq or Afghanistan, where the face of U.S. foreign policy was clearly a military one. Therefore, placing increasing emphasis on development, education, democracy, and economic growth could be an attempt to put a humanitarian mask on the face of a combatant command in order to win again the trust of the African nations. Pentagon officials, however, deny such allegations. (Cruz et al., 2010)

In addition, Mark Malan, a former South African military officer and respected security analyst, argues that "there can at best be good liaison between and perhaps coordination between humanitarian, developmental and military actors – but not integration." In Africa where violence, mass displacement, and famine are often the humanitarian fallout of political failures, a need for military strength, political direction and humanitarian action is necessary, however, this should not be done unanimously under one combatant command. (Neethling, 2008)

Although the U.S. government denies that the establishment of AFRICOM is part of the new "scramble for Africa", several facts indicate the opposite. In fact, there are many other motivational factors, apart from the security ones, which have led to the creation of AFRICOM. In 2004, an advisory panel of Africa experts authorized by Congress named five factors – oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror, and HIV/AIDS - that have shaped the U.S. Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade. (Ploch, 2011)

Furthermore, a senior DOD official reportedly commented that "a key mission for U.S. forces would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields ... are secure." (Ploch, 2011) This overarching objective in relation to energy security was maintained even in Obama's National Security Strategy as it states: "As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources." (Raphael et al., 2011)

4 ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE GWOT

More than a decade has passed since the former President Bush declared the Global War on Terror in 2001. Since then many counterterrorism efforts have been launched in order to stop the violent extremism and to eradicate terrorist networks all over the world. While there is clear progress in combating terrorism, no final conclusion can be made for several reasons as follows.

First, there can be hardly measured progress in combating terrorism when there is no common agreement on the definition of terrorism or the characteristics of terrorist organizations. (see Section 1.3)

Second, it is questionable which indicators should be used in order to ensure objectivity. When measuring progress in combating terrorism, an overreliance on quantitative data is not recommended, as these may only correlate with progress but not accurately measure it. Cronin highlights in his work that neither classic military measurements (e.g. leaders killed, territory gained, or casualties suffered) nor law enforcement statistics, such as number of incidents, number of successful prosecutions, or the amount of money spent on counterterrorism operations, are adequate. There is no linear relationship between these indicators and a terrorist group's ability to conduct terrorist activities, because no matter how weakened a terrorist group may appear to be, it can still be capable of its most fatal blow. (Cronin, 2012) A 2007 report, written by the Congressional Research Service, acknowledges the difficulty in measurement of counterterrorism efforts and suggests that data, such as impact and significance of terrorist attacks, magnitude, or trends in incidents and attitudes, can be analyzed only over longer time period. (GAO, 2007)

Third, some experts reproach that U.S. security programs, such as TSCTP, lack a comprehensive, integrated strategy that would enable sustainability and facilitate measurement of the counterterrorism efforts. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office a strategy "should include clear goals, objectives, and milestones, including output and outcome indicators, and identify resources needed to achieve the program's goals." (GAO, 2007)

Last but not least, a conclusion on whether or not the United States is winning the fight against terrorism on the African continent cannot be reached, as the war is still in the initial stages, rather than at its end. Nevertheless, some essential questions concerning victory/defeat have been raised. The traditional notion of winning a war is that an enemy is defeated on the battlefield and forced to accept political terms. But how would victory/defeat look like in a war on terror? What exactly is the U.S. goal? And can this kind of war be ever won?

Because of the fact that, in general, narrow and extremist interpretation of Islam is less appealing than liberty, the United States is far more likely to win this war. However, it will certainly not mean complete elimination of terrorism. In his article, where he examines possible outcomes of the GWOT, Gordon states that "victory will come not when Washington and its allies kill or capture all terrorists or potential terrorists but when the ideology the terrorists espouse is discredited, when their tactics are seen to have failed, and when they come to find more promising paths to the dignity, respect, and opportunities they crave." Moreover, he explains that Bin Laden's goal, and terrorist groups' in general, is to drive the United States out of Muslim lands, overthrow the region's leaders, and establish a caliphate. In order to achieve this goal he attempted to provoke and lure the U.S. into "bleeding wars" on Muslim lands and thus inspire Muslim support. As an example he points to the United States' unenviable position today in Iraq. In other words, he implies that in order to win the war, the same sort of patience, strength, and resolve, that was required during the Cold War, will be needed. (Gordon, 2007)

So far, everything points to the fact that the U.S. government has decided to take a different approach to combating terrorism on the African continent than was taken in the Middle East. While the combination of "hard power" and "soft power" and promoting security development appears to be a progress, some experts are warning

of possible overmilitarization due to U.S. military assistance, resulting in a new wave of conflicts in Africa.

In the Cold War, the U.S. top arms clients – Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire (i.e. the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) – received over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry from the United States. Since then, these countries have been involved in many African conflicts and are in a permanent state of violence, thus creating an environment of insecurity and instability prone to terrorist recruitment and crimes such as piracy or money laundering. The ongoing civil war in the DRC exemplifies the devastating consequences of U.S. arms sales policy toward Africa. It sustained the violent regime of Mobutu and built the militaries of eight of the nine countries (e.g. Uganda, Rwanda, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe…) directly involved in the conflicts persisting since Kabila's coup. Instability in Sudan, fueled by militaries of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad or Sudan backing guerilla armies in Uganda, Chad, and DRC serves as another example of the impact of U.S. security assistance. (Nsia-Pepra, 2014; Gilbert, 2009)

The AFRICOM-coordinated 2011 intervention in Libya appears to be one of the most controversial military activities on the African continent. In its immediate aftermath, the intervention was considered successful as Gaddafi's regime was overthrown. However, in retrospect, it was an abject failure. Not only did NATO overstep UN mandate by providing close air support to rebel forces in a no-fly zone, but it also impeded African Union's negotiations for a political settlement, thus resulting in deaths of thousands of people when a political solution could have been found. Overthrowing Gaddafi's regime and leaving the country to its fate resulted in ISIS taking control over Libya, thus further destabilizing an already volatile region. Moreover, the intervention was also the cause of intensified Tuareg rebellion in the Sahel. The provision of military training and equipment by the United States and its allies led to remilitarization of the north. When Gaddafi was killed, many armed Tuareg who had been part of his security forces or who had been working in Libya flee into northern Mali, resulting in a coup by southern soldiers and declaration of independence of Azawad by Tuareg rebels in 2012. (Deen, 2013)

U.S. efforts have achieved also some positive results in terms of combating terrorism. In Somalia, the terrorist group al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened thanks

to AMISOM, Somali, and Ethiopian forces and has lost its control over the port of of Kismayo which was its key source of funding. The significant gains achieved in the past few years were crucial in providing space for the establishment of the new government that is now formally recognized by the United States. In his 2013 statement, General Carter Ham emphasized that "the success of AMISOM forces against al-Shabaab illustrates the positive impact of U.S. defense capacity-building efforts," especially the ACOTA program. The latest combined AMISOM and National Security Agency (SNA) offensive operation began in March 2014, driving Al-Shabaab out of at least ten key south-central towns in twenty days. However, the group is still dangerous and capable of carrying out unconventional attacks to spoil AMISOM operations and the new government's peace efforts. Figure 4 shows that the territory controlled by al-Shabaab is shrinking. (International Crisis Group, 2014)

Figure 4 – Somali areas controlled by al-Shabaab

Source: Ham, 2013

Success was also achieved by military forces of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. These countries, receiving military assistance through various U.S. security programs, joined forces to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) operating in subgroups in borderlands of the countries. So far, key LRA leaders have been captured and the number of attacks on civilian population has been decreased. (Ham, 2013)

CONCLUSION

More than a decade has passed since the War on Terror began, yet, it is hard to say whether or not the United States is winning its war or at least achieving its intended effects. In order to eliminate terrorism for good, not only must the leaders of terrorist groups be captured or killed, but also the root causes of terrorism have to be addressed and the terrorists' ideology must be discredited. This reasoning led to a change in U.S. counterterrorism strategy, thus resulting in creation of several security programs and initiatives as well as a new Unified Command – AFRICOM – which is now coordinating all U.S. operations on the continent.

Through these programs The United States intends to enhance African militaries' capabilities and regional security cooperation, so that the African countries would be able to fight the terrorist groups themselves. To evaluate success of these programs, however, appears to be impossible so far, as broader outcomes of U.S. assistance will occur in the long term. The only achievements, so far, has been the AMISOM intervention in Somalia where the AMISOM troops managed to seize control over key south-central towns controlled by al-Shabaab or the united effort of DRC, CAR, Ugandan, and South Sudanese forces which succeeded in capturing top leaders of the Lord Resistance Army.

Despite these achievements, security experts warn that U.S. military assistance might lead to "overmilitarization" on the African continent, thus causing further instability and violence. Some critics of U.S. foreign policy argue that more efficient would be to focus on the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, human rights abuses, ethnic discrimination, or despotic regimes and continue to support development assistance instead. Moreover, they accuse the United States of indirect support of some authoritarian governments through arms sales to its African allies. These accusations have not been proved, however it is known that African most fragile countries entangled in long-term

conflicts were receiving weaponry from the United States during the Cold War. Among these are Uganda, Rwanda, Chad, Sudan, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

RESOURCES

ACAPS [Assessment Capacities Project]. 2015. *Nigeria: Boko Haram Insurgency.* [online] ACAPS Briefing Note. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b-acaps-briefing-note-nigeria-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf

Alesina, A., Easterly, W., Matuszeski, J. 2008. *Artificial States* [online]. New York University, Harvard University. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/59_easterly_alesina_matuszeski_artificialstates_prp.pdf

Alexander, Y. 2014. Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2013. [online*]* Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. *Fifth Annual Report.* [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://www.iucts.org/publications/reports/

Alexander, Y. 2015. Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2014. [online*]* Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. *Sixth Annual Report.* [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://www.iucts.org/publications/reports/

Aronson, S. L. 2013. Kenya and the Global War on Terror:Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism. [online] *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies* 7 (1 & 2), 24–34. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://www.umes.edu/cms300uploadedfiles/ajcjs/volume_7_issue_1_and_2/vol7.1%20aronson%20final.pdf

Aronson, S. L. 2014. AQIM's Threat to Western Interests in the Sahel. [online] In: Combating Terrorism Center. 2014. Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM's Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali. *CTC Sentinel* 7 (4), 6–10. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqims-threat-to-western-interests-in-the-sahel

Blanchard, L. P. 2015. *Nigeria's 2015 Elections and the Boko Haram Crisis*. [online] Congressional Research Service. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43881.pdf

Botha, A. 2007. *Relationship between Africa and International Terrorism: Causes and Linkages.* [online] The Brenthurst Foundation. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/terror_talks/Relationship%20between%20Africa%20and%20International%20Terrorism.pdf

Botha, A. 2008. Challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa: A human security perspective. [online] *African Security Review* 17 (2), 28–41. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=101487

Bryden, M. 2014. *The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?* [online] Center for Strategic & International Studies. [cit. 2015-03-10] Available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf

Cilliers, J. 2003. Terrorism and Africa. [online] *African Security Review* 12 (4), 91–103. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://www.issafrica.org/acpst/uploads/Terrorism%20and%20Africa%20-%20Jakkie%20Cilliers.pdf

Cronin, A. K. 2012. *U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism.* [online] Orbis. [cit. 2015-05-02] Available at: http://spgia.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/PDFs/Audrey_Kurth_Cronin/Grand_Strategy_and_CT_Orbis_Cronin.pdf

Cruz, J. A., Stephens, L. K. 2010. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): Building Partnership or Neo-Colonialism of U.S.-Africa Relations? *Journal of Third World Studies* 27 (2), 193–213.

Deen, E. S. 2013. *AFRICOM: Protecting US interests disguised as 'military partnerships'.* [online] Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/5/21/201352113492 3251734AFRICOM%20Protecting%20US%20interests.pdf

Ganor, B. 2002. Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter? *Police Practice and Research* 3 (4), 287–304.

GAO [United States Government Accountability Office]. 2008. *Combating Terrorism: Actions needed to enhance implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.* [online] [cit. 2015-05-02] Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08860.pdf

Gilbert, L. D. 2009. The United States Africa Command:Security forWhom? [online] *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 2 (9), 264–281. [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: http://www.jpanafrican.com/docs/vol2no9/2.9_The_United_States_Africa_Command.pdf

Gordon, P. H. 2007. Can the War on Terror be won? [online] *Foreign Affairs Magazine* 86 (6), 53 – 66. [cit. 2015-05-02] Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won

Ham, C. 2013. *Statement of General Carter Ham, USA Commander.* [online] United States Africa Command. [cit. 2015-02-05] Available at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130315/100396/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-HamUSAG-20130315.pdf

International Crisis Group. 2014. Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War. [online] *Crisis Group Africa Briefing 99.* [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b099-somalia-al-shabaab-it-will-be-a-long-war.pdf

ISSCM [COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management], TNO [Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research], FRIDE [Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue], DIHR [Danish Institute for Human Rights], IIR [Institute of International Relations], CNIHR [Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations]. 2008. *Defining Terrorism* [online]. Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf

Jenkins, B. M. 1978. International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities. *Journal of International Affairs* 32 (1), 115 – 123.

Jenkins, B. M. 1980. *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems* [online]. The Rand Corporation. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P6563.pdf

Keenan, J. 2008. Demystifying Africa's Security. [online] *Review of African Political Economy* 35 (118), 634 – 644. [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/mil-docs/keenan.pdf

Lyman, P. N. 2009. The War on Terrorism in Africa. [online] In: Harbeson J. W., Rothchild D.S. 2009. *Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order.* Colorado: Westview Press, 276–304. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/Lyman_chapter_Terrorism.pdf

Matusitz, J. 2012. What is Terrorism? In: *Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction* [online]. New York: SAGE Publications. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/51172_ch_1.pdf

Neethling, T. 2008. AFRICOM: Concerns and Pressing Qestions. [online]*Conflict Trends* 1, 41–47. [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: http://www.accord.org.za/images/downloads/ct/ct_2008_1.pdf

Nsia-Pepra, K. 2014. Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain or Backlash? [online] *Military Review* 94 (1), 50–59. [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20140228_art010.pdf

O'Connor, T. 2011. *Definitions, Typologies, and Types of Terrorism* [online]. MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3400/3400lect01.htm

Ogundiya, S., Amzat, J. 2008. Nigeria and the Threats of Terrorism: Myth or Reality [online]. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 10 (2), 165–189. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsda/v10n2_Summer2008/PDF/ARC_Ogundiya%20and%20Amzat-%20Nigeria%20and%20threats.pdf

Østebø, T. 2012. Islamic Militancy in Africa. [online] *Africa Security Brief* 23. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/acss-africa-security-brief-24.pdf

Ploch, L. 2011. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. [online] CRS Report for Congress. [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf

Raphael, S. Stokes, D. 2011. Globalizing West African oil: US 'energy security' and the global economy. *International Affairs 87 (4), 903–921.*

Schultz, R. H. 1978. Conceptualising Political Terrorism: A Typology. *Journal of International Affairs* 32 (1), 7- 15.

Spencer, A. 2006. Questioning the Concept of New Terrorism [online]. *Peace Conflict & Development* 8. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.461.6671&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Suarez, M. G. 2008. *Twenty-first Century Terrorism: The Definitional Problem of Complex Political Environments* [online]. Harvard University. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Suarez_FINAL.pdf

The Organization of African Union (OAU/AU). 2010. *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* [online]. [cit. 2015-02-16] Available at: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_CONVENTION_PREVENTION_COMBATING_TERRORISM.pdf

Tribal Analysis Center. 2015. *Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Using crime to advance Salafist goals , secure safe havens , and acquire international reach*. [online] Tribal Analysis Center. [cit. 2015-03-02] Available at: http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Al-Qaeda%20in%20the%20Islamic%20Maghreb%20%28AQIM%29.pdf

Volman, D. 2009. *Obama, AFRICOM, and U.S. Military Policy Toward Africa*. [online] PAS Working Paper Number 14. [cit. 2015-04-12] Available at: http://www.africanstudies.northwestern.edu/docs/publications-research/working-papers/volman-obama-africom.pdf

White House. 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.* [online] [cit. 2015-05-02] Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf