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INFLUENCE OF MEDIA ON VIETNAM WAR

Bakalářská práce

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Prohlašuji, že jsem bakalářskou práci vypracoval samostatně a použil pouze uvedených pramenů a literatury.

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List of Abbreviations

NVA	North Vietnamese Army
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
U.S.	United States
S&D	Search and Destroy
VC	Vietcong
TV	television

Abstract

This thesis focuses on a description and analysis of the Vietnam War and its media coverage. It explains a transformation of journalism and style of reporting that occurred during the Vietnam War and questions the ability of media to be the sole reason for losing a war. It further explores the government's treatment of media and the impact it had on American public.

Introduction

The Vietnam War was a lengthy and costly affair that, accidentally, took place during a time of many changes which contributed to the shaping of the American society to the point where it is now. One of the changes was also taking place in media.

Since the invention of newspaper and magazines, governments in every part of the world were using it, more or less successfully, to advance their own agenda and it was not otherwise during the Vietnam War. The newspapers often printed statements from government officials or the president, not questioning whether they were being lied to. It probably would not have changed were it not for an almost complete freedom of movement in the actual battlefield. There, the correspondents were witnessing a different course of events than what was being told by the officials and naturally, they began to report of the inconsistency.

Of course, the media were not an innocent player who just happened to notice the ambiguity of government and reported it. They often twisted the facts or leave out information altogether simply because reporting is primarily a business with information and the more dramatic the information is, the more money it brings.

This thesis tries to give an accurate portrayal of the relationship between media and government; and media and public. It tries to question the consensus that American media were the sole responsible agent for losing the Vietnam War and to show that it was not only the manipulation of public by media that contributed to the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, but also a manipulation of media by government.

1 Vietnam War

It is difficult to determine what particular event can be considered as the beginning of a military conflict known as the Vietnam War. It is, however, generally accepted to be the First Indochina War¹. The United States entered the war rather gradually, first, by giving a financial assistance to the French troops, then, by sending military adviser to the south of Vietnam in 1955 and finally, by engaging in an open military conflict and starting bombardment of the North Vietnam in 1965.

By the end of the First Indochina War, it was becoming clear that a communist North could gain control of all parts of Vietnam and that is why President Eisenhower held a press conference on April 4, 1954. There, he expressed his reasons for the involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam and explained the famous “domino theory”², which was later used by future President Lyndon B. Johnson to justify further military engagement (Anderson, 2011, p. 146). It seems that his motives were, to some extent, driven by economy and fear for the production of certain materials such as rubber or jute. He also expressed his worry for people who might lose their freedom “*under a dictatorship*”. (*Public Papers of the Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1954)

Despite the seemingly noble intentions for the intervention in Vietnam and deployment of more than five hundred thousand soldiers during the years, the conflict ended on April, 1975 with the United States losing the war and sending the remaining troops home.

¹ Military conflict between France and Vietnamese communist over former colonies of France, lasting from 1945 to 1954, ending in French defeat.

² Based on domino principle: if one country in South-East Asia becomes communist, others will inevitably follow.

As Anderson (2011) points out, the unsuccessful ending of the Vietnam War left the U.S. disappointed and uncertain whether the cost and casualties were beneficial at the end. Nevertheless, the majority of political figures seemed to agree on one matter and that was the role media played during the war and how it helped end it.

2 Development of media

Before looking into the Vietnam War any further, it is imperative to understand the change in media at that time, especially television.

During the war in Vietnam, reporters and photographers enjoyed an unprecedented freedom of both speech (and photography) and movement in South Vietnam seemingly without any censorship from the government. While correspondents in World War II had to submit their works to the inspection of the government, the reporters in Vietnam were given a rare opportunity to join military forces, observe their daily lives and later write about their experience (Hammond, 1990, p. 6). As one can guess, their reports were often subjective and unlike in WWII, they used sources that not only disagreed with one another on some affairs, but also stayed unnamed. This left the reader somewhat confused and distanced from the “war efforts“ (Hallin, 1989).

Hallin (1989) explains that the press was no longer the extension of government; they simply did not feel the responsibility to present news with a certain consideration for a political agenda. He further says that as the press gained more political independence, journalists began to question the authority and decisions of people in power and when in the early 1960s official government policy did not seem to correspond with the actual situation in Vietnam, naturally, journalists expressed their confusion. The newfound independence of media contributed to the general consensus that media played a significant role in Vietnam War.

Even though the newspapers and radio reported regularly on the situation in Vietnam, and they were important sources of information, it was really a television that excited interest

among Americans. Not a single war before Vietnam had had the advantage³ of being portrayed on TV, simply because it was not invented yet, in case of WWII, or because not many people had it in their homes, in case of Korean War. In an essay *Television Coverage of the Vietnam War and the Vietnam Veteran* by E. McLaughlin; Bonior, Champlin and Kolly (1984) estimate the figures of homes with television. In 1950, it was only 9 percent whereas by 1966, it was already 93 percent.

The opportunity to see the news from all over the world in one's living room lead to an increase in both the viewer ratings of evening news broadcasting and credibility of the news. Hallin (1989, p. 106) demonstrates the growing power in the results of a series of surveys done by the Roper Organization for the Television Information Office during the years 1964 and 1972. In 1964, on a question, which medium people got most information from, 58 percent respondents admitted to television which was closely followed by newspapers with 56 percent. In 1972, the figures for television went up by 6 percent while for newspapers they dropped to 50 percent. The same survey also researched the trustworthiness⁴ of television and newspapers and came with interesting results. Nearly half⁵ the people asked said that they trusted the news being shown on television more and only 21 percent of interviewees would have chosen newspapers to believe. Hallin (1989) suggests the percentage in support of television is so high because it carries a few hereditary characteristics such as "*the presence of pictures*" and "*personal nature*". Every day viewers watched the same presenters read them the news and they eventually built a trust in them, such as it was in case of an anchorman Walter Cronkite.

³ Or a disadvantage, depending on a point of view of an individual

⁴ The survey asked which medium the respondents would have believed more in case the media gave contradictory account.

⁵ 48 percent

In his article, Mandelbaum (1982) describes that it became a widely accepted truth that television gained an immense power and by showing disturbing reality of war it created an unflattering image of American government and soldiers alike. Some people believe that television did contribute to withdrawal of the U.S. personnel from Vietnam and essentially losing the war. In 1975, Marshall McLuhan contributed to the issue when he said:

“Television brought the brutality of war into the comfort of the living room. Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of America, not on the battlefields of Vietnam.”(cited in *The Media and the Vietnam War, Truthful or Deceptive?*, 2012)

Hallin (1989) gives an alternative point of view and says that there are people, such as David Brinkley⁶, who does not agree with the notion that media played any part in decision making about Vietnam. Brinkley goes as far as to say that television only provided the images of war, it did not create them and if the viewers did not like those, it was in no way fault of the television.

Nevertheless, the images of violence were broadcasted and must have had some impact on Americans, as Hallmann explains it in his essay in *The Cambridge Companion to Modern American Culture* from 2006, the atrocities seen went against American’s impression of themselves as heroes and protectors of innocent. As the war was being fought and more lives of both Americans and Vietnamese were being lost, the public support was becoming nonexistent. It is not surprising then that the government decided not to participate in the war any longer.

⁶ An American broadcaster for NBC and ABC news.

3 Early years

After France was forced to agree to a cease-fire in 1954, it was the United States and President Dwight D. Eisenhower who decided to support Ngo Dinh Diem⁷ in his run for a presidency to keep South Vietnam from a potential threat of communist North Vietnam uniting the whole Vietnam into one communist country. As it turned out, Diem was not exactly the best candidate for a leader of a free country. He came from an elite Catholic minority and gave government jobs to Catholics, he even restricted freedom of speech and not to mention, used financial aid from the U.S. not to improve living conditions in the rural areas ,but to advance his own interests. Nevertheless, he was the only choice the U.S. felt they had to prevent Vietnam from becoming communist (Anderson, 2011).

During the presidency of Diem, there was number of issues, aside from the ones that Diem himself created by his undemocratic policy, that were undermining the newly found republic. There were guerrilla troops from North Vietnam, Viet Minhu⁸, which were quickly gaining support of the peasants in the South by giving them land to work on, in cases of anticommunists, by threatening them. Fighting between Viet Minhu and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was more frequent. As an answer, President Eisenhower increased the amount of financial support to \$220 million (Anderson, 2011; *Historie světa*, 1998).

The media reported on the changes in Eisenhower's policy toward Vietnam, but it did not raise much awarness or alarm among Americans. Their attention was turned towards other pressing issues that were happening in the United States at that time, such as the African-American Civil Rights Movement. Hallin (1989) even claims that according to a survey, 64 percent of Americans had not paid close attention to Vietnam and had given it only a "little thought" until the escalation of the situation in 1964.

⁷ Ngo Dinh Diem was the first president of South Vietnam from 1955 to 1963.

⁸ Later called Vietcong (VC)

3.1 The Kennedy Administration

Anderson (2011) says that when John F. Kennedy became a president in January 1961, he was almost right away informed by General Edward Lansdale about the dire situation in Vietnam. It was becoming obvious that efforts of Viet Cong to seize control over the South had been successful and it was important to intervene immediately. As Hallin (1989) writes, there was also a report done by Walt Rostow, who generally agreed with the assessment of Gen. Lansdale and together with General Maxwell D. Taylor advised Kennedy to send out 6,000 to 8,000 military troops to help ARVN with training and strategy.

It was important for Kennedy to take action because as a new president during Cold War he could not afford a losing battle with Communists, especially after the lost invasion of Cuba at Bay of Pigs. Moreover, during his campaign for presidency, Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower's foreign policy towards Vietnam, saying that he was too hesitant in making decisions about Vietnam. Those were the main reasons why Kennedy decided to heed Taylor's advisement and by fall of 1961, he sent several hundred "advisers" to Vietnam (Anderson, 2011). After that, there were several articles in newspapers about the expected positive outcome which, as we now know, did not happen, quite the opposite actually, when in the span of just two years the number of the U.S. military personnel climbed up to over 16,000. (Hellman, 2006)

Although the account above is seemingly a boring assessment of Kennedy's tough decisions portrayed in media, it is not so. When one takes a closer look to what was actually happening in presidential meetings and what was being told to media, one finds rather contradictory information.

Hallin (1989, p. 30) shows that even though General Taylor advised President to introduce military forces to Vietnam and Kennedy agreed, reporters were being told that

Taylor and Kennedy both were “reluctant” to send any Americans. After days of stalling and giving out false information the media finally got a message that President would indeed help Vietnam and send a few “advisers”. According to Hallin (1989), this was “*the first case of government management of Vietnam news*”. It was necessary for government to keep media from writing pessimistic reports, so the process of decision making had to appear routine, as if it was not even significant.

Another riff between the actual situation and political statements was the use of the word “advisers”. While the administration maintained the pretence that they were sending just advisers, it was clear to the reports in the field that they were simply military troops. Hellmann (2006) adds that they were not even regular soldiers but Green Berets⁹. Although, when Tom Wicker in January 1962, asked the question whether there were American troops in combat in Vietnam, President Kennedy said a resolute: “No”. (Hallin, 1989, p. 26)

Same as his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy tried to downplay the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam, whether it was by refusing to use words like military forces and troop, or by showing American men in glory, helping Vietnamese, enjoying their exciting new adventure and occasionally dying, but always heroically in the fight against their enemy (Hellmann, 2006). The news reports usually consisted of disclaimers from officials in Vietnam or White House. Stories and interviews from soldiers in battlefield were also printed. (Hallin, 1989). Mandelbaum (1989) adds that in case of television viewers were shown images of soldiers and combat but usually as a background to the commentary of reporters.

It is true, however, that since the middle-1962 there was a negative coverage of Diem regime, although on the small scale. As mentioned earlier, Diem regime displayed signs of

⁹ Military force specially trained in combat, survival and medical skills.

dictatorship. Naturally, journalists took notice and published articles in which criticized Diem's practices. (Hallin, 1989)

Disenchantment with Diem regime grew not only among journalists but also in Washington. Before Kennedy could withdraw his support of Diem, there was the Buddhist Crisis that helped change the way journalist wrote about affairs. (Hallin, 1989)

3.1.1 The Buddhist Crisis

As with many stories, there is always the version of one party, the version of opposition and the truth. It was not different for the Buddhist Crisis.

Diem, as a Catholic, supported the Catholic minority and even appointed Catholics and his family members to high government function. It was a Catholic deputy province chief who on May 8, 1963, prohibited the usage of flags during a celebration of Buddha's birthday, even though a week before the Catholics could have waved their flags during a celebration for Diem's brother. This decision elicited a flurry of opposition among Buddhists and ended with deaths of nine people in gunfire.

The South Vietnamese government claimed that the deaths had been a consequence of a Vietcong member who threw a grenade among the throng of people. That lie only caused more uproar and came to a head on June 11, 1963 when a Buddhist monk set himself on fire in the middle of a busy street in Saigon¹⁰.

The photograph of a burning Buddhist monk taken by Malcolm Browne shocked people all around the world but Hallin (1989) gives evidence that Buddhists in fact invited the journalists and photographers to help them spread the word about their plight.

¹⁰ The capital city of the Republic of Vietnam.

Hallin (1989) takes note that during the crisis not many journalists paid attention to it and when the Buddhist monk set himself on fire it did not even make the 1st page in Times. It was later that Americans realised the horror of picture and what it signified. Now, Americans could see that the Diem regime, the regime that was supported by their homeland, could not even spark loyalty in the South Vietnamese people. It was long before American public started to heavily criticize Vietnam War, but it did bring forward the idea that American troops were helping someone who did not have the loyalty of most of the citizens (Hammond, 1988). As Hallin (1989) adds, the reporting of the crisis showed the first major inconsistency in what the government had been proclaiming about Vietnam and what had been really happening so far.

The Buddhist crisis contributed to the decision that continuing Diem regime would not have been right for either the citizens of South Vietnam or the objective of the United States. With a support of the U.S., Diem regime was overthrown in a military coup and Diem himself was killed on November 1, 1963.

3.2 Early Johnson administration

Only three weeks after Diem regime ceased to exist, President Kennedy was assassinated during a campaign trip in Dallas. Thus, Lyndon B. Johnson became the new President of the U.S.

After he was informed by his Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, that the situation in Vietnam was still not contained, Johnson did not waste time and immediately decided on a new policy that was to help win the war. The plan was divided into two phases. The first was to increase military pressure against North Vietnam even if it should involve bombing. If the first phase did not prove a success, the second was an addition of ground troops (Hallin, 1989).

In an article by A. Dahm *The Media and Vietnam* (2003), K. Turner mentions that President Johnson hoped the excessive bombing would be enough to persuade North Vietnam that the U.S. was willing to help the South by any means necessary. Sadly, it was not enough and few months after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the ground troops were sent to Vietnam to fight the war alongside South Vietnamese soldiers.

3.2.1 Objective journalism

Reporters during the Kennedy and Johnson administration used primarily two sources: White House officials and soldiers in action. While these sources did not change during the course of the Vietnam War, the way journalists wrote about the war did. (Hallin, 1989)

According to Hallin (1989, p. 68), journalists in America followed three principles when it came to reporting. First, *Independence*, media should stand alone and not feel pressured by the influence of outside forces, either politicians or advertisers. Second, *Objectivity*, journalists should present only “the fact”, not to make subjective commentary on them. Those should be clearly separated from the facts. Third, *Balance*, news should be “*impartial*”, not favouring either party involved in a controversy.

Hallin (1989) points out that these principles are inherently “negative”. They only mention what a journalist *cannot* or should *not* do; they do not give guidance on how to actually report. They do not tell journalists which stories to focus on, or which “facts” to emphasize and last but not least how to “*present those facts*”.

Journalists, therefore, could choose to report about the events they found most interesting or shocking and they could choose what to say about them without even breaking the principles. It happened during the Buddhist crisis and the Tet Offensive and it is still happening now. Even if journalists strived for objectivity in their pieces, it is not possible for

them to achieve it. Even if it was possible for them to achieve it, there would always be the individuality of every single reader or viewer who would interpret the news in his own way.

It also cannot be forgotten that the media is just like any other business, only the commodity it sells is, essentially, information. The more scandalous and shocking the information is, the more it attracts the public and the more the television or newspaper makes through advertising or sales. This proved to be true later, but during early Johnson's presidency journalists cited mostly official government sources and gave account of official policy.

3.2.2 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was one of the events that contributed to the change in the style of reporting. Not in large, it was not until the Tet Offensive that media started to question the war, but it was the beginning.

On August 2, 1964 the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* was on a secret espionage mission near North Vietnam's coastline to gather electronic intelligence. As an answer, North Vietnamese fired torpedoes on *Maddox* to challenge their presence in North Vietnam waters. A brief battle ensued, ending in a damaged North Vietnam's boat and no casualties on the Americans side. The U.S. declared they had the right to be in the open sea and sent another destroyer for further surveillance of the coast. (Murray, 2005; Anderson, 2011)

Two days later, electronics operators reported to Washington that they were being under attack. Almost immediately it was followed by messages that the situation was not clear and the supposed attack might have been a mistake. Even though Johnson was not certain of the attack, he used this incident to appeal to Congress who issued The Tonking Gulf Resolution which stated that:

“... the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” (Tonking Gulf Resolution, 1964)

President Johnson had the means and power given by Congress to begin an attack, yet he did not and at the end of September proclaimed:

“... for the moment I have not thought we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys.... So we are not going north and drop bombs at this stage of the game...” (cited in Hallin, 1989, p. 76)

While discussions in Pentagon about strategies in Vietnam were under way until February, 1965, there were only very few news about those strategies. In February, government officials started tentatively giving out statements about a bombing¹¹ ordered by the president as retaliation for death of nine U.S. soldiers in an attack on barracks in Pleiku (Anderson, 2011). By the spring of 1965, Johnson decided to send more military troops to South Vietnam. Rotten (1999) points out that the start of bombing and the issued Tonkin Gulf Resolution could be considered if not as an actual “declaration of war”, than as factual. The United States were now fully committed to the war in Vietnam.

With the expansion of commitment in Vietnam, administration wanted to contain as much information as possible from public. It seems quite understandable that Washington did not want to alarm Americans with the news that the war that was already being fought during Truman’s presidency, was not finishing, but escalating. Hallin (1989) analyzed the coverage of the escalation in *Times* and found out two interesting occurrences.

¹¹ In February 13, administration consented to operation Rolling Thunder which was essentially a sustained bombing of North Vietnam.

One, the government officials were describing the situation as “*retaliation*” to “*continued acts of aggression by Communist Vietcong*” or that they wanted to keep the involvement of Americans “*limited*” and that they were just “*considering sending a small number of additional troops to South Vietnam*”. James Reston wrote about the policy of government on the bombing, saying: “*Our masters have a lot of long and fancy names for it, like escalation and retaliation, but it is war just the same.*” (cited in Hallin, 1989, p. 62). The Washington simply wanted to downplay the American involvement. Dahm (2003) gives an excellent example. When Johnson decided to increase the number of personnel to 150 thousand to be sent by the end of summer, Washington correspondent J. Finney wrote only about 21 thousand. Whereas a journalist in South Vietnam disputed this number, saying it would be more than 100 thousand.

The second occurrence Hallin (1989) discovered was the placement of different kind of articles. The reports containing the official statements were usually on the 1st page while columns of reporters in South Vietnam who were able to see the situation there with their own eyes and began to question the official information were further into the newspapers. The practice of putting official disclaimers to the front page is, however, very common in objective journalism. Correspondent to the White House during Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Tom Wicker, explained it:

“We were being told that this was Communist aggression....The Secretary of State tells me that, and who am I to argue with him... that’s the view one had at the time....We had not yet been taught to question the President....We have not been taught by bitter experience that our government like any other in extremis will lie and cheat to protect itself.” (cited in Hallin, 1989, p. 63)

3.2.3 Search and Destroy

After the deployment of large numbers of troops in 1965, it was critical to establish a new strategy in defeating North Vietnamese. General Westmoreland came with a military tactic called search and destroy. It was based on an assumption that if the ground troops took a more active approach, started searching for the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army and destroying it, eventually, there would be no more enemy's soldiers left and North Vietnamese government would agree to a peace. (Currey, 2011)

Hellman (2006) describes a different tactic, part of S&D, in which South Vietnamese from rural areas were to be moved into towns and cities, so they would not be able to help Communist by e.g., providing them with shelter and food. Vast areas of countryside were proclaimed as free-fire zones and everybody who was not American or South Vietnamese soldier was to be deemed an enemy.

From a military standpoint, it was a sound tactic, but Currey (2011) explains that Gen. Westmoreland did not anticipate the problems that would turn up when facing the reality of battlefield. Currey (2011) mentions that there were hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese males "*reaching a drafting age every year*" who simply replaced those who were killed. Another problem was that the North Vietnamese soldier knew the area and climate conditions better and actually initiated a number of attacks.

From a human point of view, it was a rather cruel tactic. As Hellmann (2006) points out, people moved from their villages were barely surviving in the slums made in the cities. They had to resolve to begging and even prostitution. Homes of South Vietnamese who stayed were, as part of S&D, scoured and their food or huts were destroyed to prevent North Vietnamese from using them.

Until 1971, military followed the first phase of Johnson's strategy. Air forces were steadily bombing the North Vietnam¹², but they also managed to spray "17.6 million gallons of Agent Orange¹³ over 3.6 million acres of Vietnam" in a belief that Ho Chi Minh¹⁴ would realize that he was losing too many citizens, farming land and food.

Meanwhile in the U.S. it seemed, as Hallin (1989) puts it, that once the U.S. committed fully to the war, the attention of media turned from debating and sometimes questioning the country's involvement in Vietnam and its purpose to "the effort to win".

In the beginning of the full commitment to the war, when the morale of soldiers was great and the outlook for a success in Vietnam was positive, television was running stories on "American boys in action". Most of the coverage during the war was done from the battlefield. Journalists gave reports of the daily lives of troops and interviewed soldiers who still had hopes to win the war and gave a supportive commentary. Soldiers themselves were portrayed as everyday Americans who became heroes and brave men by helping South Vietnamese to live their lives freely. (Hallin, 1989)

Hallin (1989) shows that once again, the language became an integral part in the perception of the news. Words that had a cartoonish character to them were used to describe violence¹⁵. Also, the war and fighting was made to seem trivial and like a sport tournament that needs to be won. Hallin (1989) provides a few example of it: "...forces had somewhat better hunting today" or in a report that said: "American soldiers today captured the biggest prize so far...".

¹² Specifically: NVA's military bases, camps and headquarters. Pilots did not intentionally target civilians, but it was inevitable that many villages still got hit.

¹³ Chemical compound used to destroy flora of Vietnam.

¹⁴ North Vietnamese leader

¹⁵ Words like *smashed*: the U.S. army *smashed* the enemy's troops.

Another thing that became typical for reporting of the Vietnam War at that time, was the body count. The reason for this was because of S&D tactic which measured success in the number of dead enemies (Currey, 2011). Therefore, every cover story of Vietnam in news started with the so called “roundups” about how many Vietcong and NVA soldiers were killed and how many strategic points had been captured that day.

Television also showed scenes from war on a regular basis. The American public was used to seeing troops engaged in combat (Hallin, 1989). It cannot be argued that they had not seen the horrors of the war before the Tet Offensive, which marked the turning point in public’s opinion. They did, and one can even say that they were accustomed to it and saw the fighting just as another part in a day of soldiers in war. They were, in a way, disassociated from the frightening images. (Hellman, 2006)

Many times, when the news was showing disturbing footage, some reporters would even agree with the atrocities, such as in Cam Ne¹⁶. A reporter Jack Perkins who was with the troop during the Cam Ne incident defended the soldier’s action saying the village “advertised” itself as a “*Vietcong village with signs and flags... the whole willage had turned on the Americans, so the whole village was being destroyed.*” (cited in Hallin, 1989, p. 140)

It was at the end of 1967, when it was being clear that the military forces were not making any progress in stopping the Communists and the American troops themselves were beginning to feel frustrated and expressed their frustration freely to the journalist, that media reports started to show more of the negative side of the military involvement of the U.S. (McLaughlin, 2012).

¹⁶ Cam Ne was a Vietnamese village which American soldiers set on fire.

4 The turning point

Hammond (1988, see p. 328) explains that Johnson was worried about the public's perception of the situation in Vietnam, but also his ability as a leader of the U.S.. Correspondents in Vietnam were following the troop and they saw and reported that the tactic the U.S. had was ineffective. Johnson wanted to maintain the support of Americans, he did not want them to doubt the military affords and so he ordered to gather statistics, such as the body count, to be presented to Americans.

In the autumn of 1967, Johnson even made an address in which he explained the situation in Vietnam and a future strategy regarding the war. He gave a special praise to American soldiers who had been carrying the load of fighting for so long. Johnson also conceded that the battle against Communists in Vietnam was not over yet and that he could not make any promises for years to come, but his advisers in Vietnam agreed that it was only a matter of time Ho Chi Minh realized he could not sustain the fighting any longer and that the prize for winning was too high for him. (*State of the Union Address, 1967*)

Hallin (1989, see p. 146) conducted a research of news reports to determine how many journalists in the three years prior to the Tet Offensive assessed the involvement in Vietnam as a success or failure. He discovered that 62 percent of the stories of military operations were presented as triumphs for the U.S., 28 percent as victories for the enemy and just 2 percent were said to be "*inconclusive*". When it comes to an assessment of the progress of the war itself, 79 percent of the news seemed to have an optimistic outlook for the future outcome of the Vietnam War. As Hallin points out, Americans generally believed in a successful outcome of the war and when the reports on the Tet Offensive came, in January, 1968, viewers were shocked to see Vietcong attacking and the number of Americans who believed in a successful outcome dropped from 51 to 32 percent.

4.1 The Tet Offensive

The Tet Offensive is most often mentioned as the turning point in Vietnam War. It began at the end of January, 1968 and was characterized as a series of Vietcong attacks against several military crucial points and more than one hundred cities and towns in South Vietnam (Hammond, 1988). Even though the North Vietnamese were defeated in every battle during the period, Americans were so shocked by the sudden attacks that their support of the Vietnam War began to waver and was eventually lost.

The reason why the attacks came as such a surprise was a national week-long holiday, Tet, an annual celebration of Vietnamese New Year. Every year prior to the Tet Offensive, a cease-fire was declared and most importantly maintained and it was not supposed to be different in 1968.

The phrase “*the turning point*” is frequently used to demonstrate how media coverage changed the attitude of public towards Vietnam War¹⁷ by sometimes leaving out important information and giving misleading reports in general. Few of these occurrences, The Embassy, Nguyen Ngoc Loan and Khe Sanh, will be dealt with in detail further into the thesis. However, it is crucial to first mention how reporters were moving away from the idea of objective journalism.

While during the early years of President Johnson’s involvement in the war, correspondents gave reports with the statements of official, they did not try to assess the truth of those statements, they did not question them and did not much expressed their opinion on the matter, the Tet Offensive changed that. Hallin (1989) shows that before the Tet Offensive 5.9 percent of news contained personal commentaries, but during the following few months

¹⁷ Thus helping to lose the war

the number of commentaries grew to 20 percent and again lowered to 9.8 percent after Tet, but it still was higher than before the attacks.

It was not only the personal commentaries of journalists that influenced public's opinion. Reports appearing in different newspapers were often offering different data and as Jack Riggins (2007) notes, it created confusion among public as to what the truth really was.

Shortly after the raid on embassy ended, General Westmoreland was asked to assess the failed attacks and he expressed his opinion:

"...this is diversionary to his main efforts which he had planned to take place in Quang Tri Province, from Laos toward Khe Sanh and across the demilitarized zone.... Now yesterday the enemy exposed himself by virtue of this strategy, and he suffered great casualties." (Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite – *The Tet Offensive part 1*, 1985, at 6:40)

Hanson W. Baldwin then wrote an answering article in which he provided Americans with different opinions on the purpose behind the VC raids. One of his official sources claimed that, *"The enemy hopes to foster war-weariness; to strengthen the opposition to the war in the United States and in South Vietnam, and to force negotiations at a disadvantage."* (cited in Riggins, 2011, p. 23) Baldwin also gave a different point of view of one of his sources who said that:

"The overall strategy of the enemy, as interpreted by the Pentagon, is aimed primarily at political and psychological objectives. The terrorists' attacks in Saigon and elsewhere were intended as 'headline grabbers' as one officer put it, 'to make us look silly' and to impress United States and South Vietnamese public opinion with the enemy's strength." (cited in Riggins, 2011, p. 23)

Knowing the outcome of the war, the statement above does seem like an accurate assessment. The Tet Offensive was given a large coverage in the U.S. media and it changed both public's stance on the war and the way of reporting.

4.1.1 The Embassy

At dawn of January 31, VC raiders broke into the embassy grounds in order to destroy it. Although the military did not expect to be attacked during Tet, they handled the situation well and in a matter of just few hours they managed to detain or, in most cases, kill the members of VC and prevent them from penetrating the actual building of the embassy.

When the attack was over, Colonel G. Jacobson gave an interview in which he stated that one VC soldier got into his house, whom he killed, and VC did not break into the main chancery building (*Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite – Tet Offensive part 1*, 1985, at 5:10). It is probable that this information, at first, may have been the source of confusion whether the VC soldiers got to the embassy building or not. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the attacks, not only at the embassy but other places as well, were contained quickly and it was actually a military success for the U.S.. It was not, however, a success in a political sense and it contributed to a change of public's opinion of Vietnam veterans and the war itself and ultimately led to a withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Vietnam.

There were several matters that helped to sway the public. First and foremost, it was the contradictory reports from different sources and the rise of commentaries from the journalist. Another issue was the emphasis on the devastating effect of the attacks on cities and civilians. Last but not least, it was the credibility of the U.S. government. Each of these problems will be dealt in more detail.

It is important to take a note, in a defence of the journalists, that it took more than half a day to get the stories from Vietnam to the U.S. and while they were being printed, there were already new information.

In January 31, the headline of the *New York Times* read: “*Raiders Wiped Out After 6 Hours; Vietcong Widen Attack on Cities*”¹⁸, which was the truth, but nonetheless shocking. The front cover of *Washington Post* was a report with a headline: “*Vietcong Seize Part of the U.S. Embassy*”¹⁹. One of the definitions in *Merriam Webster Online Dictionary* for the word *seize* is: “*to attack and take control of (a place) by force or violence*”. This, however, did not happen and the headline seems as a clever way to shock the readers and bring more sales.

As Hammond (1988) writes, the reporters did not have a good view of the grounds and were only able to see the upper floors²⁰ of the embassy and there could be heard just a lot of noise of gunfire. Yet, both the *Times* and *Washington Post* reported that the VC soldiers broke into the embassy building with the *Washing Post* going as far as to say the VC had enough time to gain access to sensitive information²¹. Further confusion among the U.S. public began over the actual number of the attackers and whether they were acting as embassy employees²². A few hours after the attack General Westmoreland clarified in a news conference that there were 19 VC members and they failed to break in the embassy (Riggins, 2011; Hammond 1988). However, the reports had been already read and Americans were confused about what to believe.

¹⁸ Cited in *News Media Coverage of th 1968 Attack on the American Embassy in Saigon*, Jack Riggins, 2011, p. 19

¹⁹ Cited in *News Media Coverage of th 1968 Attack on the American Embassy in Saigon*, Jack Riggins, 2011, p. 19

²⁰ The embassy was surrounded by walls and the streets were closed off.

²¹ Even if they did gain access to those, they would not have been able to use them in any way, since most of the attackers were dead and the rest arrested.

²² It was later found that they were indeed embassy drivers.

It was not just inaccuracy and ambiguity of reports that influenced the image Americans had of the Vietnam War, it was the personal commentaries of reporters as well. One of the most important commentaries was made by Walter Cronkite.

It was already mentioned that viewers of TV news found news presenters trust worthy because of the “personal nature” of TV and Walter Cronkite, a news presenter for CBS Evening News, was said to be “*the most trusted man in America*”.(Hallin, 1989)

When the Tet Offensive happened and it became a great issue, Walter Cronkite was sent to Vietnam to report personally from Saigon. After he finished with the thorough report of the situation in Vietnam, he said that now he was going give his “*personal view*” of the war. He proceeded to deliver a speech, cited below, that Walter Cronkite himself admits, had a great effect on public. (*Walter Cronkite – on his on-air commentary about the Vietnam war, 1999, at 1:40 and 3:15*)

“...*To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.... But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honourable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.*” (*Report from Vietnam by Walter Cronkite, 1968*)

It was unusual to make such a bold commentary and most definitely, it was against the rules of objective journalism and it was, in a way, manipulation of the viewer. It may have changed the America’s opinion of the war but as Hallin (1989) points out, it cannot be entirely

blamed for the decision to withdraw the troops from Vietnam. According to Clark Clifford's²³ report, shown in Hallin (1989, p. 170), it would take over 200 thousand more soldiers to win the war, and that was just an assumption that it would help.

This leads us to the credibility of the U.S. government, or rather lack thereof, which contributed to the negative perception of the war. Riggins (2011) mentions that in the first reports of Tet correspondents emphasised the point that the U.S. personnel were caught off guard by the attacks. This might have been true because the North Vietnamese agreed to size fire during Tet and Gen. Westmorland even gave leave to half of South Vietnamese soldiers, the military did not expect to be attacked.

It is safe to say that the public did not expect it either. Before the offensive, media were full of official reports about the progress military made, about the success of S&D and "*the light at the end of the tunnel*" (cited in Hallin, 1989, p. 170). There were, of course, stories from soldiers and journalists in field who were becoming disillusioned about the real progress, but these were not on the front cover.

In 1967, Jackson made the already mentioned address in which he basically declared that the defeat of the Communists in Vietnam was well underway. At the end of 1967, a new U.S. embassy was finished in Saigon²⁴ and it received a lot of positive and patriotic coverage. Riggins (2011, p. 22) gives evidence in an article in the New York Times written about the embassy opening. The author of the article stressed the indestructibility of the embassy, namely: "*shatterproof Plexiglas windows, reinforced concrete walls and solid doors*".

Therefore, when journalists were reporting about the embassy being broken into, it did come as a surprise. The entire belief that the U.S. government and military had everything

²³ Secretary of Defense for President Johnson

²⁴ The same embassy that was attacked.

under control was suddenly a lie. The idea of the possibility, that the VC could plan such an event for so long and actually execute it, was unbelievable for Americans and some government officials as well. One senator even asked: “*What happened? I thought we were supposed to be winning this war.*” (cited in Hammon, 1988, p. 346).

It also did not help when the television reports started showing images of wounded civilians who were trapped in gunfire or injured during the VC raids in Saigon. The correspondents concentrated on the destruction of cities and how many lives of Americans, South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians were lost. As Hallin (1989, p. 171) says: „*The war appeared on television as a really brutal affair.*“ Americans at home were able to see that not only North Vietnamese were dying, but fellow Americans and innocent bystanders as well.

4.1.2 Khe Sanh

Khe Sanh was a military base in the North of South Vietnam, near the demilitarized zone, which was built to prevent NVA from coming to the South Vietnam. In the middle of January 1968, it was attacked by NVA who laid siege to the base that lasted for seventy-seven-day. (Hallin, 1989, p. 172) Media frequently reported on the situation at Khe Sanh for several reasons.

First, it reminded many people of the battle of Dien Bien Phu²⁵. The base was located in a similar landscape, in a valley enclosed by forested mountains, and the soldiers were surrounded by troops of NVA, which was the same scenario that occurred in Dien Bien Phu. Moreover, there were only 6 thousand American soldiers, whereas NVA had 20 – 40 thousand. Even Gen. Westmoreland commented on the similarities, saying: “*He²⁶ still intends to make Khe Sanh another Dien Bien Phu, and ... to seize all of the two provinces*” (cited in

²⁵ A battle in 1954, during the First Indochina War, which France lost to the North Vietnamese. France underestimated the power of the enemy and shortly after the battle left North Vietnam.

²⁶ Ho Chi Minh

Hammond, 1988, p. 360). With the reminder of the loss of France, the situation looked rather grim.

Second, as Dennis (2012) says, the siege quickly became a good TV drama with very little effort. Because the area was easily accessible for TV crews and they got good shots from vantage points. TV reports often showed images of planes dropping bombs on the NVA camps hidden in the trees and there was a lot of fire and smoke which made for a good TV.

In contrast, people at home could also watch American soldiers hiding in trenches when NVA plane flew over firing on the troops or soldiers filling sand bags and building covers. In the interviews, soldiers admitted that they could not be sure whether the base would be overrun or not. When a reporter asked a soldier if he was worried with the NVA so close, the soldier answered: *“Yeah, you would be an idiot not to.”* When asked what would happen if NVA tried to take this place, he exclaimed: *“We are gonna get hurt bad, real bad”* (Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite – Tet Offensive part 2, at 10:13, 11:10, and 11:42)

Typically, such reports from the field were ended with a gloomy commentary from a broadcaster. Hallin (1989, p. 173) shows one such glossary on CBS, March 29: *“So there is no end in sight.... for the marines, there is nothing to do but sit and take, just to wait, and hope they’ll rotate out, leave before they join the roster of the wounded and dead here.”* Week later, the siege was over.

One can argue that the siege of Khe Sanh was shown much more often than it should have and when NVA gave up their effort to take over the base and the U.S. essentially won, with less casualties than NVA, the information of a victory was somehow lost in translation and Khe Sanh became a symbol of the frustration Americans started to feel towards the constant fighting in Vietnam.

On the other hand, one can say that the media only portrayed the battle as it was happening and there was nothing wrong with it. For whatever reason, probably because it was an excellent material and brought a number of viewers, media reported on Khe Sanh constantly and when the battle was won, the successful result was not important for the audience because they had already watched American marines having doubts about a positive outcome of the siege. And this feeling of doubt just stayed with the American, regardless of the actual result.

4.1.3 Nguyen Ngoc Loan

General Nguyen Ngoc Loan was a Chief of South Vietnamese National Police who, on February 1, 1968, shot a suspected Vietcong soldier to the head in a middle of a street, in broad daylight in Saigon. He became quite infamously known because the precise moment when he fired his pistol and the bullet entered the prisoner's head was documented by an Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams who sent the Pulitzer Prize winning photograph (see Appendix 1) to America where it was aired that day during evening news. (Culbert, 1998, p. 421)

When Americans saw the picture, they were shocked that a South Vietnamese, a person fighting alongside Americans, could just shoot another man who had just been captured, without evidence or a proper trial. The photograph became symbolic of the many horrors of the war and changed a lot of people's views on the war. Peter Braetstrup explained in an interview the significance of the photograph for media and the emotional impact it had on people: "*In journalist terms, it was fantastic.... It was kind of the supreme melodrama... a kind of ultimate horror story that you capture in living colour.*" (cited in Culbert, 1998, p. 424) But he also adds that the photograph, or rather the media that showed the picture, failed to portray the background story, saying: "*... in terms of information it told you almost nothing.*

That's the chronic problem especially for television and for the still photos, the difference between drama and information.” (cited in Culbert, 1998, p. 424)

In her article, Corona (2013) explains the circumstances which lead to the Chief of Police shooting a prisoner and were not said when the photograph was aired. The man getting shot was actually a leader of Vietcong soldiers who were tasked to assassinate South Vietnamese officers and their family members. He was found hiding at a mass grave with 34 bodies of officers and their families, many of whom were friends of General Leon.

There is no question that it is a terrible thing to kill a person and nobody should have the right to take someone else's life simply because it is not his to take. It is even written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) that *“everyone has the right to life”*. But there is also written that *“no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”* and there are many cruel acts done during a war.

War is such a strange affair, people are being killed and tortured on daily basis and civilians are aware of it but nobody wants to think too much about it. When the photograph was released it reminded people that the war and killings were real. Nguyen Ngoc Loan was deemed a killer and a criminal but nobody stopped to think about his motives because there was just the photograph and no words of explanation attached to it.

Eddie Adams himself spoke in defence of Nguyen Ngoc Loan in Time Magazine and proposed a question to all people, saying:

“The general killed the Viet Cong; I killed the general with my camera. Still photographs are the most powerful weapon in the world. People believe them, but photographs do lie, even without manipulation. They are only half-truth... What the photograph didn't say was, 'What would you do if you were the general at that time and place

on that hot day, and you caught the so-called bad guy after he blew away one, two or three American soldiers?” (Adams, 1998)

4.1.4 My Lai Massacre

My Lai was part of a small, rural village Son My and it was situated in South Central Vietnam, in a province which was often under attack from Americans because of the presence of VC. On March 16, 1968, a group of American soldiers lead by Lieutenant W. Calley was sent to My Lai on a search and destroy mission in order to investigate whether there were any VC hiding. (History.com Staff, 2009)

When they arrived to the village they proceeded to look for VC units by searching villager’s homes and interrogating them. As Linder (1999) points out, well before the actual troops arrived, the village was fired upon from helicopters, so any VC would have probably left. Any people who the soldiers encountered were the actual inhabitants of the village and there were mostly women and children, they did not find any males who would be at the age possible for drafting. Nevertheless, the soldiers started raping the young girls, burning homes and firing at the villagers, killing them. (Dennis, 2012)

Few villager’s lives were saved thanks to a pilot Hugh Thompson and his crew who arrived at the scene, stopped the massacre and flew the remaining civilians to a hospital. Thompson immediately reported the incident to his superiors who, naturally, did not want a story of such atrocities done by Americans to be known to public and that is why the government tried to cover it up and make it as if it had never happened. (Linder, 1999)

When media reported on My Lai in March, 1968, it was not a big story and it was mentioned only in passing as a victory for the U.S. with over hundred enemy dead (Linder, 1999). There were no photographs or shots of huts burning and dead bodies piled in a ditch at

that and it was not because there were no journalists present, there were, it was because they chose, for whatever reason, not to publish any material.

It was because of affords of two people that public got to know the truth about My Lai. First was GI Ronald Ridenhour who, hearing several Vietnamese tell stories about the village, started his own investigation of the massacre and later sent letters to number of members of Congress. Second was Representative Morris Udall who pressed for an official investigation. (Linder, 1999)

In November, 1969, newspapers and TV news reported what truly happened in My Lai and photographs of the massacre were published in Life magazine. Hallin (1989, p. 180) says that even though the massacre itself was shown in media, it was rather a legal trial with Lieutenant Calley that got the most coverage. Nevertheless, when the news got out, it only reinforced the belief that the morale of American soldiers was low and that it was past time for the U.S. to leave Vietnam.

5 Withdrawal

After the Tet Offensive, President Johnson refused to send more soldiers to Vietnam on General Westmoreland's request and appointed another commander of military units, General Abrahams, who started to work on a new strategy that would give more responsibility to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. When Richard Nixon was elected president in January 1969, he utilized Johnson's idea and prepared a strategy that was based on a gradual withdrawal of combat troops and giving training to ARVN soldiers so they could eventually fight the war by themselves. The withdrawal from Vietnam took seven years (Anderson, 2011. p. 59).

During these seven years, a few important events occurred; publication of Pentagon Papers belongs to one of them.

The Pentagon Papers was a secret study made in 1967 by Department of Defence to analyze "*U.S. political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967*" (History.com Staff, 2011). It was never supposed to be seen by the public, but Daniel Ellsberg, one of the analysts, decided that it was only fair to show Americans what was really happening behind the doors of White House and Pentagon and that it did not always correspond with what the White House told in media.

The study showed that the Johnson Administration decided to enter an open military conflict months before the Tonkin Gulf incident, they even started bombarding North Vietnam. While the bombing was already taking place, in media President Johnson was giving statements that he was reluctant to start air attacks on North Vietnam. (*Introduction to Pentagon Papers*, 1971, p. 9-10)

Since the beginning of the Vietnam War, the presidents used the fear of Communists taking over a large part of the world as a reason for the involvement in Vietnam. However, in the Pentagon Papers, it was stated that they saw the South Vietnam and Saigon as a “*suitable base for U.S. action.*” (*Introduction to Pentagon Papers*, 1971, p. 9)

The Pentagon Papers also included a private note from President Johnson of his opinion on why it was important to continue with the war:

“70% - To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat.

20% - To keep [South Vietnam] (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

10% - To permit the people [of South Vietnam] to enjoy a better, freer way of life“

(Pentagon Papers, 1971, cited in Dennis, 2012)

When the Pentagon Papers were published, the American public were astonished that the government could have lied continuously about such a costly²⁷ war for so long. Chief-of-staff in White House, R. J. Haldeman, said what many people thought after reading about Pentagon Papers:

„You can't trust the government; you can't believe what they say; and you can't rely on their judgement. And the implicit infallibility of presidents, which has been an accepted thing in America, is badly hurt by this, because it shows that people do things the president wants to do even though it's wrong, and the president can be wrong.“ (Haldeman, cited in *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers*, Ellsberg, 2002)

When in 1975 the last soldier left South Vietnam, it was clear that American public was deeply affected and media reporting changed from objective to investigative.

²⁷ Costly in lives and money.

Conclusion

In 448 BC., Aeschylus said: “*In war, truth is the first casualty.*” Even though it is an old quote, it still remains to be true, especially in Vietnam War.

The truth was being hidden by the U.S. government when decisions about the war were made behind the closed doors and falsehoods were released into the media. When the Americans found out that not even the reason for the involvement in Vietnam was true, they felt betrayed. They realized that their government was not the best in the world and that American soldiers were sent to Vietnam not to help South Vietnamese, but to pursue their own interests.

The truth was being obscured by media when they showed a photograph of Nguyen Ngoc Leo without any additional information, creating an outrage among Americans and wave of protest against the Vietnam War. And it is know that any text taken out of context becomes a pretext, same can be applied to photographs.

Finally, the truth is being obscured even now. Initially, I approached the thesis as a piece of writing that would demonstrate how media influenced the Vietnam War because there is a general consensus that media did indeed have a great influence in swaying public’s opinion on the war, which at the end essentially helped lose the war. It is accepted that media played a primary role in losing the war, that without media, government would have been able to send more troops or drop more bombs and the war would be won.

As I found out, it is not so. I don’t want to diminish the influence of media on public’s opinion in any way because they did influence the public and they did publish Adam’s photo

“Rough Justice on a Saigon Street” without a context as a great shocking story. Cronkite also expressed his opinion about the war during a news report, which was not very professional of him, but all this happened not because they just felt it would be a good idea.

No. All this happened as a reaction to the decision of the U.S. government to tell something different than the truth, and that had one great flaw: freedom of correspondents in field. The journalists could see with their own eyes what was actually happening in Vietnam and when they reported it, it created confusion because it just did not correspond with official statements. There were more and more ambiguous reports and statements and when the Pentagon Papers were published, it was clear that the government had not been telling the truth for a long time.

In conclusion, media definitely played a part in changing America’s opinion and losing Vietnam War and it is interesting to see a change in media itself, but the primary role was always played by the government.

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Appendix 1



Rough Justice on a Saigon Street

Source: ADAMS, E. In: © 1968 World Wide Photos, 1.2. 1968. Dostupné z:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/3672428.stm

Resumé

Tato práce se zaměřuje na popis a analýzu války ve Vietnamu a její zprostředkování sdělovacími prostředky. Vysvětluje transformaci tisku a stylu psaní článků. Dále zpochybňuje schopnost sdělovacích prostředků stát se výhradním důvodem v prohrání války.

ANOTACE

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Název práce:	Vliv médií na válku ve Vietnamu
Název v angličtině:	Influence of Media on Vietnam War
Anotace práce:	Tato práce se zaměřuje na popis a analýzu války ve Vietnamu a její zprostředkování sdělovacími prostředky. Vysvětluje transformaci tisku a stylu psaní článků. Dále zpochybňuje schopnost sdělovacích prostředků být výhradním důvodem k prohrání války.
Klíčová slova:	Válka ve Vietnamu, média, vliv, názor, tisk, změna
Anotace v angličtině:	This thesis focuses on a description and analysis of the Vietnam War and its media coverage. It explains a transformation of journalism and style of reporting. It further questions the ability of media to be the sole reason for losing a war.
Klíčová slova v angličtině:	Vietnam War, media, influence, opinion, journalism, change
Přílohy vázané v práci:	Appendix 1: <i>Rough Justice on a Saigon Street</i>
Rozsah práce:	
Jazyk práce:	angličtina