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**COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
OF THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES**

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Z á s a d y p r o v y p r a c o v á n í :

The thesis aims to analyze development assistance of the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). Sectorial and territorial fragmentation of ODA both individually and collectively, legal establishment, relevant institutions in place and intergovernmental cooperation within the region will be major points of interest. Furthermore, financial volumes; their structure and inflation of aid will be assessed. As non-governmental development organizations and other key actors are important in development assistance attention will be given to their activities and cooperation within the region. The work will also aim to reflect to what extent ODA is solely an instrument of foreign affairs policies and what can be assessed as genuine aid. At last the paper will briefly analyze the impact of financial crisis on ODA and the future prospects on development assistance of the Visegrad countries.

Structure:

1. Introduction
2. Methodology
3. Origin and establishment of ODA in the Visegrad countries
4. Legal establishment of ODA and relevant institutions
5. Motivation for providing ODA
6. Fragmentation of ODA
7. Financial aspects of ODA
8. Key actors in development assistance
9. Impact of financial crisis on ODA
10. Conclusion and future prospects
11. Abstract in Czech and English
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List of Abbreviations

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSP	Country Strategy Papers
CZDA	Czech Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCR	Development Co-operation Report
EU	European Union
FoRS	Czech Forum for Development Co-operation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNI	Gross National Income
HAND	Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
IDC	International Development Co-operation
IIR	Institute for International Relations
LDC	Least Developed Country
LIC	Low Income Countries
MA	Ministry of Agriculture
ME	Ministry of Environment
MEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
MH	Ministry of Health
MI	Ministry of Interior
MIT	Ministry of Industry and Trade
MLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoFACZ	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Czech Republic

MoFAHU	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary
MoFAPL	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Poland
MoFASK	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Slovakia
MT	Ministry of Transport
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NGDO	Non-governmental Development Organization
NMS	New Member States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODACE	Official Development Assistance in Central Europe
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPZRS	Czech Development Platform of Private Companies
SONS	State Office for Nuclear Safety
TESCO	Organization for International Technical and Scientific Co-operation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V4	Visegrad Four

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1. Introduction

The New Member States (NMS) of the European Union (EU) are among the 50 wealthiest countries in the world. Most of them have gone through many changes and reforms over the past 15 years as they have had to quickly adjust to the fast changing world and integrate into the global society. In a very short period of time, they have become part of international structures such as the EU, NATO, and OECD.

The Visegrad group is an alliance of four Central European countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia¹. The countries share a common history, as well as cultural and religious background, and even their development after the fall of the iron curtain has led them on a similar path. The Visegrad Declaration, signed in 1991, states the main goal of the alliance as mutual co-operation and joint efforts in the process of integration into the European institutions. Other aims included co-operation in the process of social and economic transition (The Visegrad Group 2006a). All four countries are currently members of NATO and members of the European Union (since 2004), and so the first goal of the alliance has been achieved. In 2004 the countries signed a new declaration aimed at supporting the integration processes and the implementation of European policies in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. Besides mutual co-operation within the group the declaration also reflects the needs for co-operation with other countries within the wider region. Since 2004 the countries have engaged in joint foreign policy activities, mainly in the field of democracy promotion and security (The Visegrad Group 2006b).

After the fall of the iron curtain the Visegrad countries have all become recipients of financial as well as technical assistance from the international community. Although all countries provided development assistance to a certain extent even before 1989, a majority of the programmes were terminated as the countries entered a cumbersome journey of social and economic transition. These were not the only changes taking place in the Central European region. In 1993 Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and was superseded by the independent states of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. It was not until 1995 that the first attempts at development assistance were begun again in

¹ Initially the Visegrad Group comprised of only three countries – Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. After the separation of Czechoslovakia the group enlarged to four members. Hence the name ‘The Visegrad Four’ or the ‘V4’.

the Visegrad region. At the beginning many established international donors provided support to the newly establishing official development assistance (ODA) programs. The Visegrad countries received substantial support from the Canadian International Development Agency, United Nations Development Programme and Austrian Development Agency, among others. Quite quickly, these countries have shifted from being the recipients of foreign aid to becoming so called 're-emerging donors' and providing ODA. Being part of the EU the NMS have a set target of allotting 0,17% of their gross national income for ODA by 2010 and 0,33% GNI by 2015.

The presented thesis aims to analyze official development assistance of the Visegrad countries, assess the differences and similarities and conclude whether the Visegrad Four can be considered "like-minded" donors and whether there are any possibilities for closer co-operation in the field. The work is divided into seven main parts; firstly explaining the origin and historical background of development assistance in the region as history is an important factor even for the contemporary programmes of ODA. Second part focuses on institutional and legal framework for providing development assistance. In recent years all four countries have taken important steps to reform their ODA systems to make them as effective and transparent as possible. Motivation of the V4 members to provide development assistance is another yet very significant aspect that greatly influences the selection of priority countries, sector orientation and allocated funds. Furthermore the analysis focuses on territorial and sectoral aspects of the V4 ODA; analyzing main partner countries and regions, and primary sectors of ODA aiming to identify overlapping regions or sectors of development assistance. Financial allocation has become increasingly important after joining the EU. As mentioned above, the European Union has set its members (including the NMS) specific targets for development assistance which they try to comply with, however without much success. Sixth part of the study therefore focuses mainly on the financial aspects of ODA, volatility and predictability. Non-governmental organizations as well as private companies represent important stakeholders in the area of development and part of the work will also focus on their involvement. The analysis concludes with an even more urgent issue of the impact of the financial crisis on development assistance of the Visegrad Group. The final conclusion assesses to what extent the Visegrad Four can be considered 'like-minded' donors and draws on perspectives of future co-operation.

2. Methodology

The thesis 'Comparative Study of Development Assistance of the Visegrad Countries' aims to analyze and compare official development assistance of Central European countries that belong to the so called Visegrad group; these being the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Based on the analysis the thesis also seeks to derive conclusions on possible future co-operation of the respective countries.

The thesis is divided into seven main parts, each part focusing on a particular aspect of development assistance. The first three chapters focus on a detailed description and analysis of the historical background, legal establishment and institutional structures in place as well as motivations of the respective donors to provide development assistance. For this, the thesis uses various sources of information mainly official policy and strategic documents concerning development assistance as well as other sources available such as NGO reports.

The fourth part of the thesis represents some of the key findings of the work. Fragmentation of ODA is analyzed based on territorial aspects as well as sector orientation. Using OECD DAC statistical database of development assistance², and three development indicators (GDP per capita³, Freedom House Index and Bertelsmann Transformation Index) the work analyses potential patterns in official development assistance of the Visegrad Four. The main tool for the analysis is correlation function, analyzing dependencies between the provided ODA and the defined indicators. These were selected in relation to the Visegrad countries' motivation and goals for providing ODA. For the purpose of the analysis the Visegrad countries ODA net disbursements in 2004-2008 were analyzed; and the reference year for the respective indicators was defined as 2007; these were the most recent data available. For assessing the state of development of individual countries the DAC list of recipients (for 2008 flows) was used⁴.

The following part of the work is focusing mainly on detailed analysis of ODA net disbursements provided by the Visegrad countries in the above mentioned period. The

² ODA net disbursements for all Visegrad countries as reported by OECD aid statistics can be found in annex 5. -8.

³ GDP data were taken from HDR 2009 and CIA World Factbook.

⁴ Complete list can be found in annex2.

analysis includes financial volumes of development assistance as well as share of gross national income provided for ODA.

Furthermore, the thesis gives an overview about other relevant actors active in the area of development assistance in the Visegrad region; these being the international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private companies and the general public. Information provided by the respective organizations and companies as well as the results of public opinion polls of Eurobarometer (2007), Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland are used.

Finally the work strives to analyze the potential impacts of the financial crisis on the provision of development assistance by the Visegrad Group. However, it needs to be taken into consideration that very few sources exist. Mainly the Aid Watch report and official OECD preliminary ODA statistics for 2009 were used for this part of the work.

Part of the work are also 3 maps visualizing the priority countries of the Visegrad Four, financial volumes devoted to each priority country and top 15 recipients of all 4 Visegrad members. The maps were created in ArcGIS, version 3.2, using the OECD DAC aid statistics.

The thesis concludes with discussing the key findings and aims to derive possible areas and ways for co-operation among the Visegrad members in the area of development assistance.

In addition to the above mentioned sources, the author uses her knowledge and experience gained in the past few years as a member of the Advocacy working group of AidWatch initiative and a member of Policy working group of FoRS; and through participation in various seminars and conferences on the topic of development assistance.

3. Origin and Establishment of Official Development Assistance in the Visegrad Countries

When assessing historical ties and connections of the Visegrad countries with the developing regions of Africa, Latin America and Asia very few sources are available, especially those concerning development assistance. Due to this fact, this chapter is based on compilation of information from those sources accessible, although as already mentioned, these are very limited. Concerning Czech and Slovak development assistance before 1989 some reliable sources do exist, mainly due to research grants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic that were conducted in 2004-2005 and 2006-2008 and later published as two publications 'Czechoslovakia and Sub-Saharan Africa in 1948-1989' and 'Czechoslovakia and the Middle East in 1948-1989', authors Petr Zidek and Karel Sieber. Concerning development assistance of Hungary and Poland, the situation is very different. Historical background of development assistance is mentioned in neither official documents nor NGO reports. The only source of information currently publically available on development assistance before 1989 is transcripts of Radio Free Europe called 'Hungary's presence in Black Africa' and 'Poland's presence in Black Africa' both published in 1979. Nonetheless, these transcripts provide valuable information on development assistance and other connections of Hungary and Poland with the African countries. The same transcripts are available for former Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe as a whole.

Assessing the Visegrad Four and their possible interventions in the developing regions, there are a few distinct features that differentiate the Visegrad countries from the established donors. Szent-Iványi (2009) summarizes the following diverse aspects and backgrounds of the Visegrad members that distinguish them from traditional donors:

- The Visegrad countries were not colonial powers⁵. Many of them made first formal contacts with developing countries during the Communist period.
- Their economic relations with developing countries are limited.

⁵ After the First World War Czechoslovakia was considered to receive Togo as a colony, however this transfer was never completed.

- The Visegrad countries are not influenced so heavily by security threats coming from weak states and global poverty. On the other hand, stability in their neighbourhood (namely the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia) is of high importance to them.
- The topic of international development is not a topic of high public interest in these countries. Awareness of development issues is much lower than in Western countries.
- The four countries themselves are facing development challenges of their own; it is therefore likely that governments do not think that spending large amounts on foreign aid is justifiable to the taxpayers.

In early 1950s, socialism had already been dominant in the Visegrad region, and therefore the countries' policies were greatly influenced and determined by their alienism towards the Soviet Union. At that time, the First Secretary Khrushchev as the USSR leader promoted the 'non-capitalist' development approach. As Pierre Botha (in Kanet, Miner and Resler 1992:182) mentions, the approach mainly served as theoretical support for Khrushchev's international interests of supporting revolutionary movements in the Third World. The theory was based on two main principles of "political independence and economic liberation from imperialism". Botha also explains the initial origin of the theory: "The notion of non-capitalist development was based on a vague statement made by Lenin during the Second Comintern that backward countries could bypass capitalism with the aid of the victorious proletariat." This approach lasted for more than three decades, until 1985 when Gorbachev became the new President of the USSR. As Kanet and Katner (in Kanet, Miner and Resler 1992:129) underline, "new thinking of Gorbachev implied 1) demilitarization of regional conflicts and the search for political solutions to those conflicts; 2) the deidealization or secularization of interstate relations and the basing of those relationships on mutual interests; and 3) refraining from violating the sovereignty of other nations including interference in domestic political debates".

The former Czechoslovakia, but also Poland and Hungary, were to greater or lesser extent engaged in development assistance during the communist era. Of course the priority sectors and priority countries were in line with the above described Soviet approach. Several classifications can be found in available literature. Zidek and Sieber (2007) underline that since 1960's the Soviet Bloc recognized three categories of the

developing countries⁶ – (i) countries of high interest, (ii) countries with mutually beneficial relations, and (iii) countries under imperialism. The main aim of the soviet strategy was to ‘move up’ the countries to the highest category, from where it was only a small step to adopting the socialist ideology and becoming an ally of the USSR. Exnerova, Jelinek and Kaplan (in Exnerova ed. 2005) add one more category of Non-European Socialist Countries, which included Cuba, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia⁷. According to Zidek and Sieber former Czechoslovakia classified Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and United Arab Republic⁸ as countries of high interest. The second category included Ethiopia and the third category consisted of all former French colonies (with the exception of Mali and Guinea)⁹. Czechoslovakia applied slightly different classification for countries in the Middle East. Zidek and Sieber (2009) distinguish five different categories of countries:

- 1) Israel – After the Second World War Czechoslovakia played an important role in the creation of the independent state of Israel. Despite the embargo laid on Israel by the United Nations, Czechoslovakia supported Palestinian Jews through the supply of arms. Zidek and Sieber (2009) underline that this gave Czechoslovakia a privileged position in partnerships with those countries oriented towards the USSR. However, since 1952 the state of Israel has been considered an enemy.
- 2) Conservative Feudal Arab States – Czechoslovakia never managed to establish diplomatic relations with these countries, although rather occasional non-formal contacts existed. This group included mainly Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates.
- 3) Pro-Western regimes recognized by Czechoslovakia – Czechoslovakia attempted to cooperate with these countries (Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan) mainly for economical purposes but also for political and

⁶ This categorization was mainly applied in Africa; however countries in other developing regions – Latin America, Asia – were mostly categorized in similar manner.

⁷ This categorization is also supported by the Country Strategy Papers of Vietnam (CZDA n.d.b), which state that North Vietnam belonged to that particular category.

⁸ United Arab Republic was a union of Egypt and Syria that lasted only three years (1958-1961).

⁹ Exnerova ed. (2005) classifies the following countries as countries of high interest – Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique and Nicaragua – and the following countries of mutual benefits – Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, India, Congo, Benin, Mexico, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau, Iran and Nigeria.

ideological reasons. Some attempts were more successful than others – Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, whereas any engagement in Libya failed.

- 4) Arab Nationalistic regimes – Represent the most important group of countries which tolerated or even supported communism. These were Algeria, Yemen, Syria, Egypt and others.
- 5) Yemen – The only Arab country that aimed for a communist regime and thus received substantial development assistance from Czechoslovakia.

Czech development assistance was provided through various means, however mainly as supply of equipment (food, medicines, tools etc.), technical assistance¹⁰ and scholarships. Technical assistance was provided through an established independent entity – Polytechna. Polytechna provided trainings for foreign experts in Czechoslovakia, but was also in charge of sending Czechoslovakian experts abroad (CZDA 2009). University education of foreign students was since 1961 managed by the November 17th University. However, as noted by Otto Pick (1979:10) “The experiment was not too successful.” Eventually, the university was transferred into administrative body in charge of foreign students and it was completely closed in 1974 (ibid). Estimations of the number of foreign students that have completed their university studies in former Czechoslovakia vary greatly. Exnerova, Jelinek and Kaplan (in Exnerova ed. 2005) estimate around 20 thousand students have undergone university studies/higher education in Czechoslovakia. However this estimation is contradictory to the facts given in the Country Strategy Papers of Czech development assistance. CSP of Mongolia (CZDA n.d.a) estimate that 20-30 thousands of Mongolian citizens studied or participated in internships in former Czechoslovakia. CSP of Vietnam (CZDA n.d.b:7) state that “currently there are thousands of graduates of Czech universities and vocational schools living in Vietnam” and similarly CSP of Angola (CZDA n.d.c:9) gives the following details “...in the late 1980s, the quotas were set at 20 scholarships per year for university study, 20 for secondary school, and 3 grants for post-graduate study“. Although it is not possible to come to an agreement, it can be concluded that the number of students was quite significant.

¹⁰ The OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts (OECD n.d.) states that technical co-operation “includes both (a) grants to nationals of aid recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad, and (b) payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries (including the cost of associated equipment)“.

Although provision of arms should not be at all included in development assistance, during the communist era it was a very important aspect of mutual relations with the developing countries. It is reported (Pick 1979) that in late 1970's Czechoslovakia was among the world's major arms suppliers. Examining arms supply to Africa, Pick reports that Nigerian government and the Biafran regime as well as Ethiopian government and Eritrean revolutionaries, countries of Uganda, Ghana, Angola, Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo among others traded arms with Czechoslovakia. As Pick concludes, the purpose was mainly to support revolutionary anti-imperialist movements thus gain more influence in Africa.

Hungary's interest in less developed countries, mainly in Africa was reinforced during the 1955 Bandung Conference which gave basic guidelines for possible African-Hungarian relations. As mentioned above, the conference built on the non-capitalist development approach and thus stated that "those countries who were struggling against the 'imperialists' for their independence were to receive the fullest political support directly and also in the form of international politics" (Bereznai 1979:2). In the 1950s Hungary's co-operation with Africa was limited to three main partner countries which were the United Arab Republic, Guinea and Ghana. However, over the course of time Hungary made further contacts with Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Concerning development assistance Bereznai (1979) explains the system which was the same as described in the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Assistance took form of supply of equipment, scholarships and mainly technical assistance. As in the previous case, also Hungary established a separate institution that was in charge of organising and administering technical assistance as well as scholarships. The organization was called TESCO – Organization for International Technical and Scientific Co-operation and was created in 1962. Bereznai (ibid) states that in 1973-1974 over 1200 foreign students from 65 developing countries studied in Hungary and more than 900 foreigners from the developing countries participated in various training courses and study tours. In late 1970's over 600 specialists were engaged in consultancy and advisory work in the developing countries, majority of them in Africa.

According to Stefanovski (1979), Poland has engaged in co-operation with the African countries at the end of 1950's. Among the first countries of Polish interests were Nigeria, Ghana and Angola. As Stefanovski (1979:2) points out "...Poland's efforts in Africa were ... coordinated with the rest of the bloc, in order to serve the political and ideological, as well as tactical and strategic interests on the Soviet Union." Similarly to former Czechoslovakia, Poland provided development assistance mainly in the form of technical assistance and scholarships for foreign students. As in the case of Czechoslovakia it is difficult to estimate the exact number of foreign students that have studied in Poland. Stefanovski indicates an annual average of around 3000 students in 1975/76 and 1976/77. Apart from the provision of scholarships, Poland also provided technical assistance in the form of expert consultancies. Polservice Foreign Trade Enterprise was in charge of sending out experts abroad; they might have varied from doctors, engineers, lecturers, economists to urban planners. The exact number of sent out specialists is estimated to 800-1000 (in the given time frame 1950's-1979). Poland also provided on-the-spot trainings in various African (and other) countries, being it assistance in organizing Conakry Film School in 1970's, assistance in establishing vocational schools in Angola or organizing trainings in Kenya (ibid).

It is very difficult to assess any financial volumes of development assistance before 1989; however, Robinson (1979:13) provides at least some information on the subject. According to an OECD report published in 1978 Robinson calculates that development assistance of the East European countries (Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria) "amounts to no more than 0.04% of gross national product of the 6 countries combined". Looking at individual shares of the respective countries, Czechoslovakia has always been in the first place among the Visegrad countries, providing 27% of aid in 1966-1970 and 16% in 1971-1975 (being in second place both terms, GDR and Romania being first respectively). In the same periods Poland provided only 7.6% and 13.9% respectively. Overall in 1954-1977 the biggest recipient of Eastern European development assistance was the Middle East¹¹ and South Asia receiving

¹¹ Including Egypt

almost 4bn USD in total), in second and third place being Africa and Latin America with 1.5bn and 1.3bn USD.

Similarly for all three countries, their development assistance efforts ended with the fall of the iron curtain and for the next five years, the Visegrad countries focused on their own development and transition to market economy, and their integration into international structures. Major political changes also took place in the region and Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and was superseded by the Czech and Slovak Republics. Development assistance was not renewed until 1995 when the Czech Republic, first among the Visegrad Four, entered the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Assessing the historical background of development assistance of the Visegrad countries shows that all three countries based their development aid during communism on technical assistance to the developing countries. All three countries provided scholarships for foreign students, trainings and internships for foreign workers, and material assistance. Without a question, these activities have left valuable contacts, thousands of foreigners speaking not too common languages of Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak; and the respective countries' experts have build a good reputation all over the world. This experience will have helped the Visegrad countries to rebuild their development assistance systems in the upcoming years. As will be explained in following chapters their historical partnerships with the developing countries played an important role in the selection of priority countries for the current development assistance systems.

4. Legal Establishment of Official Development Assistance and Relevant Institutions in the Visegrad Countries

This section of the work aims to analyze the legal and institutional background for providing development assistance in the Visegrad countries. In order to compare the institutional framework for development assistance of the respective countries the OECD typology for ODA management systems will be used. Although the typology might be simplifying and not all management systems will suite one of the five categories, it will provide us with general framework of institutional establishment in the respective countries. It is also important to bear in mind that some of the ODA systems are currently in the process of transformation. Considering the legal basis for providing development assistance the paper compares official documents, strategies and concepts for ODA in the Visegrad Four. Therefore this chapter is divided into two sections each focusing on one of the mentioned aspects.

4.1 Institutional Framework

In the OECD paper ‘A comparison of management systems for development co-operation in OECD/DAC members’ Chang, Fell and Laird (1999) define five basic institutional structures that were identified among the DAC members. These five organisational systems are the following¹²:

- an integrated Ministry of Foreign Affairs – areas of trade, foreign policy and development assistance are grouped according to regions rather than thematic areas;
- a development co-operation directorate or division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the institution responsible for development co-operation is located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- a policy ministry with a separate implementing agency – the area of aid policy is the responsibility of MoFA while the implementation part is assigned to one or more separate agencies;


¹² A more detailed description of the individual systems can be found in Annex 1.

- an autonomous aid agency or ministry – the respective institution possesses broad responsibilities in the areas of both policy and implementation;
- multiple ministries, with a separate implementing agency – a range of ministries is involved in the management of development assistance each being responsible for a particular aspect of the system.

After the re-emergence of development assistance in 1995, no particular development structures were in place. International development was under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each individual country. Although the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs was officially established as the co-ordinating body of Czech ODA it did not possess the necessary competencies to execute any co-ordinating power. Together with the MoFA nine line ministries and the State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) were in control of development projects according to their sectoral priority (Government Resolution 153, 1995). Each ministry as well as SONS were in charge of project cycle management and at the same time were not obliged to report on all their activities to the MoFA. Out of the 9 line ministries the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Environment disposed quite significant budgets for development co-operation projects, therefore having greater position than others. Such fragmentation resulted in lack of transparency, lack of inter-ministerial co-operation and co-ordination; and overall contributed to the limited impact of development interventions. According to the OECD typology such system can be classified as ‘Multiple ministries with separate implementing agencies’, although as mentioned previously, there are minor differences between the stated category and the actual system.

In 2001 the Development Centre of the Institute of International Relations was established as an advisory body for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2002 the Concept of Czech Development Assistance for the time period of 2002-2007 was acknowledged (the document was not approved) by the government (Government Resolution 91, 2002). Reflecting some of the above stated problems the new concept outlined the reform of Czech Development Assistance which should have taken place within the given period.


Graph 1: Institutional Structure of Czech ODA before 2008



Source: Naprstek, 2009

A year later the Department of Development Assistance was established at the MoFA. The Concept for 2002-2007 (MoFACZ 2002) suggested an establishment of a development agency – an implementing body of Czech ODA. Such agency however was not established until January 2008. The Czech Development Agency (CZDA) arose from transformation of the Development Centre. As stated in the Proposal for Transformation of Czech Development Assistance (MoFACZ 2007) the agency will be in charge of bilateral projects and other grant schemes, focusing mainly of the identification, formulation and implementation of development interventions. Programming and evaluation will remain within the competencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, the Ministry of Finance will remain in charge of multilateral assistance. Humanitarian assistance will be coordinated in co-operation of MoFA and Ministry of Interior, scholarships for students will be under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. Establishment of the agency was an important step for the transformation process which should lead to greater transparency, co-operation and coherence of Czech ODA. The process should be finalized by the end of 2010. Gradually the competencies of individual ministries will fall under the responsibilities of CZDA. Not all ministries were supportive of the reform, as it resulted in less competencies and funds, mainly the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Environment. Together with the development agency the government also established the Council for Development Assistance as an inter-ministerial co-ordinating body for Czech ODA. Such model corresponds with the third category according to the OECD typology ‘Policy ministry with separate implementing agency’.

Graph 2: Czech ODA institutional arrangement after transformation



Source: MoFACZ, 2007

Institutional structure of Hungarian development co-operation is the most unclear among the Visegrad Four. According to a recent publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Inspired by experience" the MoFA, namely Department of International Co-operation, is responsible for planning and co-ordination of development assistance and humanitarian aid (MoFAHU n.d.a). However, the ministry administers only 20% of the total ODA budget, with the remaining part being provided by other government departments (MoFAHU n.d.b), yet it is not clear which departments. An inter-ministerial Development Cooperation Committee, chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is responsible for development policy and strategy. Also the Group for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid falls under the auspices of MoFA. Development-related committees are supported by Civil Advisory Board comprised of political parties, trade unions, academic institutions, CSOs and independent experts. Apart from the Department of International Cooperation, HUN-IDA a non-profit company was contracted for implementing technical assistance programs for delegations arriving to Hungary. The initial contract was for 2003-2009 time period (MoFAHU n.d.c); currently it is not clear whether the contract will continue, and what is going to be HUN-IDAs role in the upcoming years. Moreover, as Paragi (2008) mentions, the public procurement procedures within HUN-IDA have been informally questioned mainly by Hungarian non-governmental organizations. Given the unclear circumstances, it is difficult to assess which of the five management systems best describes Hungarian ODA. Should HUN-IDA be functioning, it would fall under the category of 'Policy ministry with a separate implementing agency', however, considering the current circumstances classification of 'Development Cooperation Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' is much more relevant.

During the transition period Poland was the one of the largest recipients of official aid from international donors, being on the list of 'official aid' recipients until its entry to the European Union in 2004 (MoFAPL 2009). However, already in 1996 the country joined the OECD and by the end of the millennia it engaged in very first development assistance activities. The first projects were managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of United Nations System. It was not until 2005 when a separate department of Development Co-operation was formed within the MoFA (MoFAPL 2007). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main co-ordinating body for Polish ODA. "It establishes directions

and priorities of Polish aid, it is responsible for the implementation of multilateral and bilateral development assistance, and undertakes initiatives in cases of humanitarian and food catastrophes (humanitarian aid)” (MoFAPL 2007:25). Apart from the MoFA the Ministry of Finance manages ODA financial transfers and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education is responsible for coordination of scholarships for international students studying in Poland. Because there is no implementing agency in the Polish ODA system, it can be classified as ‘Development Co-operation Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.

Slovak Development Assistance shares its history with the Czech Republic, as the two countries formed the former Czechoslovakia until 1993. Unlike the Czech development assistance the Slovakian program did not properly begin until 1999, although initial attempts can be traced to early 1990s. In 1993 the government established the Inter-ministerial commission for co-ordination of development assistance. The Commission functioned under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an advisory body (Rusnak, U., Szep, A., Brzica, D. 2002). The initial aim of the commission was however never achieved as it eventually co-ordinated aid received by Slovakia in the transition period. A complex and coherent programme of development assistance was not established until 2003 when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a Medium-term Strategy for Official Development Assistance in 2003-2008 (MoFASK 2003). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established as the co-ordinating body of development assistance; however other ministries were also engaged in providing development assistance. Moreover two administrative and contracting units were established – Bratislava-Belgrade Fund and Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund. The responsibilities of these units were to co-ordinate the project cycle, monitor and launch tenders, and build capacities of Slovak actors in development assistance.

In 2007 a complex reform of Slovak ODA system began. In January 2007 the government established the Slovak agency for international development assistance as the implementing body (MoFASK 2007). The Agency took over the responsibilities of the administrative units, however in 2007 and 2008 the institutions functioned parallel; the two contracting units terminating at the end of 2008. Similarly to the Czech Republic, the new Agency functions under the guidance of the MoFA. Apart from the MoFA other

ministries (mainly Interior, Agriculture, Education and Environment) also participate in development assistance programs and policies through the Inter-ministerial commission for development assistance. The reformed system can be therefore also classified as ‘Policy ministry with separate implementing agency’.

Assessing the institutional framework of all four countries shows that only two out of the five above described models are used among the Visegrad members.

Table 1: Institutional Framework of the Visegrad countries

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
integrated Ministry of Foreign Affairs				
development co-operation directorate or division within the MoFA		x	x	
policy ministry with a separate implementing agency	x			x
autonomous aid agency or ministry				
multiple ministries, with a separate implementing agency				

Source: author’s assessment

The institutional framework of the Visegrad group is quite complex and dynamic. Each country re-entered the development assistance arena at different time periods, with different backgrounds and different transition progress. Although the Czech Republic was the first country to provide a more coherent development assistance program its institutional reform took place only recently and it is still not complete, unlike in Slovakia, where development assistance has never been as fragmented as in the neighbouring Czech Republic and essential reforms took place slightly earlier. It is also difficult to say which of the models works better for the re-emerging donors. Each model has to be assessed individually within much broader context of the respective countries. The significance of development cooperation is also greatly affected by the interest and activities of civil society, private sector, media and academia, and also by the political parties in power and their interest in international development as such.

4.2 Legal Framework

The Visegrad Four had all re-emerged as donors by the end of the new millennia, after joining international structures such as the OECD and NATO. The first country to renew the official development assistance programme was the Czech Republic, approving the Principles for Providing Development Assistance on March 15th 1995¹³ (Government Resolution 153, 1995), and thus providing the newly established programme with basic guidelines. Apart from stating the general principles, the document established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main co-ordinating body of development assistance and at the same time assigned individual projects according to their sector focus to the relevant ministries. Thus creating a very complex and non-transparent system as described above. In the late 1990s the development assistance of the Czech Republic was fragmented both territorially and by sector. Assistance was provided to more than 40 recipient countries through 9 line ministries. Such fragmentation together with limited financing resulted in negligible impact of the implemented projects. These problems were recognized and in January 2002 the government acknowledged the Concept of Czech Development Assistance for the time period 2002-2007 (Government Resolution 91, 2002). Initially the Concept should have led to a reform of the system in the respective period; however, the aim was not fully achieved. Nonetheless the number of priority countries was lowered to around 20 and the government also fully acknowledged the Millennium Development Goals. An important milestone in Czech ODA was the entrance of the country into the European Union in 2004. The government approved The Principles of Development Assistance of the Czech Republic after the Country's Acceptance into the EU in March 2004 (Government Resolution 302, 2004).

The Principles established 8 program priority countries for a five year period, 2006-2010. For each priority country the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) were agreed, identifying the main sectors, and areas for development which also reflected the comparative advantages of the Czech Republic as well as the development needs of the partner country. In 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a comprehensive report on Czech ODA, and continues to annually publish government reports on ODA and its future prospects for the two upcoming years.

¹³ Only 3 days after the official entry into the OECD.

Only recently, the Parliament of Czech Republic approved the Act on Development Assistance. In March 2010 the Act was approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate approved it on April 21st 2010. The Act entered into force on July 1st 2010. The Act (Act No. 151/2010 Coll.), among other things, defines basic principles for providing development assistance, appoints the Czech Development Agency as the main implementing institution and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main coordinator of Czech development assistance. In May 2010 the government approved the Concept of Czech Development Assistance for 2010-2017 (MoFACZ 2010). The concept redefines priority countries and priority sectors for the respective time period.

The Hungarian legal framework is as unclear and ambiguous as everything else concerning Hungarian ODA. In 2001 the government approved the first concept paper of Hungarian Development Cooperation which has set the basic principles for Hungarian ODA (MoFAHU n.d.b). In 2007 and 2008 the Inter-ministerial Committee on International Development Assistance approved a resolution setting out tasks for the upcoming year (MoFAHU n.d.c; 2008). However, it is not possible to assess full text of the resolutions, and it is not known whether such resolution is approved annually, or whether the two stated years were an exception, as there is no such information concerning the legal establishment provided by neither the MoFA nor HUN-IDA. The last (and first) published comprehensive report on Hungarian ODA in 2008 (MoFAHU n.d.a) mentions Hungary's External Relations Strategy which was approved by the government in spring 2008, and defines the principles, aims and means of Hungarian international activity. In the Report on Hungarian IDC Activities in 2007 (MoFA n.d.c) the Hungarian MoFA stated that the law on international development was under construction; the Resolution for 2008 (MoFAHU 2008) presumed the law would be adopted by the parliament in 2009; however, there is no further news concerning the matter. In 2007 three country strategy papers should have been drafted for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Vietnam (MoFAHU n.d.c). However, the reports are not publically available, and we can only assume that they do exist. The same situation exists with the Country Strategy Papers for Moldova and the Palestinian Authority which were supposed to be drafted in 2008 (MoFAHU 2008). Among the Visegrad countries Hungarian development assistance is the least transparent. Many official documents are not publically accessible, including CSPs for priority countries or

key resolutions on development assistance. Therefore Hungary contributes vastly to the ambiguity of development assistance in the Visegrad Four.

In 2003 the Polish government approved the first official document establishing the basic principles and goals of Polish development assistance, The Strategy for Poland's Development Cooperation (MoFAPL 2003). Three years later, after entrance to the EU, preparation of a new strategy for providing development assistance started, taking into account Poland's roles and responsibilities within a broader development constituency. It is not quite clear whether the new strategy has already been approved, or whether it is still in the process of preparation; as it is not clear what years it is going to address; the MoFA provides three different time periods (2007-2015, 2007-2013 and 2010-2015). Work on the development assistance act began in 2005. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited the Polish NGDO platform to provide comments and suggestions on the proposed Act. Currently, work on the Act is in progress, the official statement of Polish Aid (Polish Aid 2010) states the following: "Upon analysis of social consultation results, the draft version of the principles of the Act will be submitted for inter-ministerial consultations which are due to finish by the end of June 2010. ... It is expected that the final Government bill will be submitted to the Marshal of the Sejm in September 2010". On the contrary, the Country Strategy Papers represent a gap in the Polish legal framework of development assistance. Only one Framework Agreement with the Palestinian national authorities has been signed in 2009. Each year development priorities for each partner country are defined; however, it is not clear on what basis (Polish Green Network 2008). Lack of CSPs means limited predictability and planning of development interventions, not only for the Polish development institutions, but also for the recipient country. In the Independent Report of Non-governmental Organizations on Polish ODA in 2008 (Zagranica Group 2009), the Polish NGOs call on their government to „... develop, as soon as possible, country strategy papers for all Polish aid priority countries, including sub-Saharan Africa“. However, MoFA annually publishes a report on development assistance in the previous year, as well as short-term prospects for the upcoming years and other relevant information.

The official program of Slovak development assistance was renewed in 1999 with the government Resolution on the Concept of Development Assistance. In December 1999 the government approved another important document, Charter of Active Development Aid and Assistance of the Slovak Republic. However, a more complex and coherent program of development assistance was not established until 2003 when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a Medium-term Strategy for Providing Official Development Assistance in 2003-2008 (MoFASK 2003). In accordance with the strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was appointed as the coordinating body of ODA, however, other ministries were also engaged in providing development assistance. Moreover, two administrative and contracting units were set up – Bratislava-Belgrade Fund and Trust Fund.

On January 1st 2007 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Slovak Agency for International Development Assistance as the implementing body. In December 2007 the Parliament approved the Act on Official Development Assistance (Act No. 617/2007 Coll.), which entered into force on February 1st 2008, thus making Slovakia the first country in the Visegrad Group to have the appropriate legislation on development assistance. The Act established an official framework for providing Official Development Assistance.

A new Medium-term Strategy for 2009-2013 was approved by the government in March 2009 (MoFASK 2009). The concept identifies three new program countries for Slovak ODA (Serbia, Kenya and Afghanistan). However, CSPs are drafted only for Serbia and Montenegro. Each year the Agency publishes a comprehensive report on Slovak development assistance, as well as short-term prospects. Among the Visegrad members Slovakia has made the biggest progress in establishing a sound and transparent legal framework for providing ODA.

Progress on institutionalizing a legal framework for development assistance seems to be difficult. Each country among the Visegrad group is heading in the same direction and is dealing with similar problems. The work on the Act on Development Assistance is slowly finishing in Poland with the possibility of the Act being approved by the end of 2010. There is a slightly different situation in Hungary where lack of important information does not allow us to make any conclusions on future prospects. Although

Slovakia was not the first country to renew its development assistance programme, its development assistance legal framework was established two years before any other Visegrad member. Country strategy papers are almost completely missing in Polish ODA, however the Polish MoFA declared that work on CPSs is in progress (Polish Green Network 2008). There are similar problems in Slovakia, where CSP has only been drafted for one current priority country. It is difficult to assess the situation in Hungary, where theoretically all priority countries should have a CSP drafted; this however cannot be verified.

5. Motivation for Providing Development Assistance in the Visegrad Countries

The motivation and goals of official development assistance are important factors that affect the selection of the partner countries and priority sectors. They also influence other aspects of assistance such as the tying of aid and, to a certain extent, aid volatility. Eventually they affect the overall effectiveness of development assistance. Unlike traditional donors, the Visegrad countries' motives and goals in development assistance have not as yet been properly assessed; however, a few initial studies exist, which aim to cover the issue. In this part the work aims to analyze the different motivating factors and the goals of official development assistance of the Visegrad countries.

As mentioned previously, Szent-Iványi (2009) focuses mainly on the common historical background of the Visegrad group which greatly influences the current motives, goals and focus of ODA. None of the four countries has ever had any colonies and only Poland has had direct access to the sea, which is an important prerequisite for colonial expansion. After the Second World War all four countries became the satellites of the USSR and therefore did not have sovereign foreign policy. To some extent this explains the limited contacts of the Visegrad countries with the 'traditional' developing regions and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, South and South-East Asia. Nowadays relations with the developing countries are also shaped by trade and export partnerships with the Old Member States of the EU, and Russia, and less attention is paid to developing countries (mainly Sub-Saharan developing countries¹⁴). Illegal migration is currently not considered too big a problem for the Visegrad countries, as they are still

¹⁴ However, trade relations of former Czechoslovakia with selected Sub-Saharan countries were relatively significant especially during certain periods. According to Zidek a Sieber (2007) Czechoslovakia was already very active in South Africa before 1938. A separate Consulate for The Protection of the Economic Interests of Czechoslovakia was established in Cape Town in 1926. Substantial amounts of traditional Czechoslovakian goods (textiles, bijouterie, and essential chemicals for gold mining) were exported to South Rhodesia; exports to North Rhodesia comprised of steel, engines, lathes and other machine tools, hops, malt, shoes, and other textile products. After 1948 Czechoslovakia engaged in co-operation with the Republic of South Africa and this became an important source of foreign currency. Cooperation declined sharply after 1964 when the UN sanctioned South Africa. Czechoslovakia closes the South African Consulate and further focused on supporting antiapartheid movements through training and providing essential equipment.

transit rather than final destination countries for migrants. Similarly, the fear of terrorism is not as big within the Visegrad region as it is in Western Europe.

Secure and stable neighbouring countries belong, according to Szent-Iványi (ibid), to the top priorities of the Visegrad countries' foreign policies and also affect development assistance, mainly the territorial allocations of ODA. The Western Balkans, is considered by many to be a possible source of tension, and so significant volumes of ODA have long targeted this region. During 2004-2008 Serbia was the second top recipient of Czech ODA and ranked third among the top five recipients in Hungary (the first being Afghanistan, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina). According to the OECD DAC aid statistics, ODA to Serbia accounted for significant ODA volumes in 2004-2008 (excluding debt cancellation to Liberia and Sudan, Serbia would have most probably ranked the first recipient). In the 2003-2008 Serbia and Montenegro was the only programme priority country defined for Slovakia's development assistance.

Being the most distant and isolated out of the Visegrad group, in 2004-2008 Poland also provided quite significant ODA to Serbia and Montenegro, which have ranked fifth and sixth top Polish ODA recipients in the respective period. Poland much more emphasizes Eastern-partnerships with Belarus and Ukraine (MoFAPL 2009). These countries also ranked among top 5 recipients of Polish ODA in 2004-2008. Security issues are mentioned in the policy documents of Hungary and Slovakia (MoFAHU n.d.b; MoFASK 2003).

The category of "security goals" undoubtedly includes issues of illegal migration. Whereas immigrants in Western Europe come from former colonies, immigrants in the New Member States originate mostly in Eastern Europe. In the Principles for Providing Development Assistance approved in 1995 (Government Resolution 153) prevention of migration is stated as one of the main goals of Czech ODA. Currently no official documents explicitly mention the prevention of migration as a primary goal; however it remains an important issue for Czech ODA. Considering development assistance interventions, security issues and domestic market protection are preferred over (positive) effects of remittances on poverty reduction. Direct results are projects and programmes directly focusing on the prevention of migration in the migrants' countries of

origin (in 2008 these included Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova) administered by the Czech MoFA.

Security issues are not the sole factors of the proximity of many priority countries and top recipients of ODA of the Visegrad Four. Equally important are the economic interests. However, it is difficult to assess to what extent economic factors are affecting the selection of priority countries as well as the financial disbursements of ODA. Close neighbours are natural trade partners, although the volumes do not compare with Western partners. Many countries consider emerging markets as opportunities for their private sector activities and therefore many development interventions subordinate these interests. The economic interests of providing development assistance are openly mentioned in policy documents of the Visegrad countries. One of the negative effects of economic interests is tied aid and this is evident in the case of the Czech Republic, as calls for tenders for development projects (equally for provision of goods and services) are limited to Czech-only companies and NGOs, thus possibly resulting in less effective development assistance. On the other hand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary (MoFAHU n.d.a) openly admits that “Granting tied aid credit has played an important role in our development activity, and this is what we are planning to continue in the future as well”.

Cultural motives for providing development assistance are most evident in Poland and Hungary. Strategy for Poland’s Development Co-operation (MoFAPL 2003) explicitly states that Polish development assistance will be primarily provided to those countries „undergoing transformation with a large population of Polish origin“; both Belarus and Ukraine have a large Polish minority. According to Paragi (2008), supporting Hungarian minorities living outside their home country (in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and the countries of former Yugoslavia) was the primary aim of Hungarian ODA in the 1990s. Currently this goal is not explicitly stated in any official documents, however considering the top recipients of Hungarian ODA – in 2008, Ukraine and Serbia (countries with large Hungarian minorities) ranked second and third on the list – it is possible that this goal is still of high importance to the Hungarian government. The Czech Republic also supports small communities the Czech ancestors of 19th century emigrants in Moldova and Serbia.

Similarly, Slovakia supports Slovak speaking villages in the Autonomous Region of Vojvodina, Serbia. An interesting aspect with potentially unfavourable consequences for prospective co-operation among the Visegrad Four is the different (and sometimes contradictory) approach of each Visegrad member towards the Kosovo question. Whereas the Czech Republic as well as Hungary and Poland recognized the independence of Kosovo, and Kosovo ranks among the top recipients of Hungarian ODA (MoFAHU n.d.a), Slovakia is hesitant to do so. The main reason for this is the fear of possible attempts for autonomy by the large Hungarian minority in Southern Slovakia. So recognizing the sovereignty of Kosovo is considered a dangerous precedent in regards to Slovakia's territorial integrity.

A significant motive common to all Visegrad countries is their aim to comply with the agreed international commitments; evidence being the inclusion of Afghanistan and Iraq in ODA programmes (and also the military presence of the Visegrad countries in the conflict areas). Afghanistan is one of the few priority countries common to all four Visegrad members and receives the majority of ODA disbursements. In 2007 and 2008 Afghanistan was the top recipient of Czech ODA, while in 2008 ODA provided to this central Asian country was five times as much as for second ranked Serbia. In 2008, Afghanistan ranked third among Slovakia's top recipients, receiving 9% of ODA. It is also the top recipient for Hungary and only ODA of Poland was relatively lower compared to other Visegrad countries. Overall, in the five year period (2004-2008) Afghanistan received over 90 million US dollars from the Visegrad countries.

One of the goals frequently mentioned with reference to re-emerging donors in Central and Eastern Europe is the transfer of transition experience and knowledge gained in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Transition experience is considered to be a comparative advantage and an added value to be gained from the Visegrad countries' development assistance; the promotion of democracy being one of the specific areas. The theme of experience and knowledge transfer and democracy promotion is stated in the official documents of Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad countries and it is reflected in the selection of priority countries. Hungary identifies the support of democratic governance as a priority sector (MoFAHU 2003); Slovakia supports promotion of

democracy, legal state, human rights and good governance (MoFASK 2003); Poland refers to countries „implementing systemic transformations“(MoFAPL 2003:6) and the goals of the Czech Republic include the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and good governance in developing countries (Government Resolution 153, 1995). The goal of experience and knowledge transfer to the countries currently undergoing the transition process (mainly post-soviet countries and other Eastern European countries) diverts the focus from the least developed countries. This mainly occurs in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, which means that aid is mainly provided to middle income countries, as opposed to LDCs and LICs. The post-soviet countries are dominant priority countries with the highest proportion of ODA transfers from the Visegrad group. The transition experience focus is also reflected in the selection of priority sectors in the partner countries. Although the goal of democracy promotion is not only restricted to transition countries, projects focusing on the mentioned goal have not been implemented in any other regions besides the post-soviet bloc (or current socialist countries).

The last of the analyzed goals, and not the least significant, is the aim of poverty reduction. Although all members of the Visegrad group consider poverty reduction to be one of the primary goals of their development assistance (at least on paper), the insufficient representation of the least developed countries on the priority lists proves the very opposite. In general we can conclude that official goals are not reflected in reality. Concerning the volumes of ODA provided for development assistance, the data show limited support to the LDCs with the exception of Afghanistan, which might lead to the distortion of aid to the poorest countries. However, as already mentioned, the selection of Afghanistan was based on international commitments and the alliance with the USA, rather than an assessment of the selection criteria. Insufficient support for the least developed countries is, however, in contrast with other international commitments, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the European Consensus on Development. At the same time it is important to consider the potential focus and the added value of the Visegrad group in supporting the least developed countries. Isn't the Eastern-partnership exercised by the Visegrad Four more relevant to the V4 experience, while also being derived from the needs of the recipients? The answer to that question might have been given in the recently published OECD DAC Peer Review of Polish ODA

which acknowledged the possible contribution of Polish ODA “towards the development of its neighbours in Eastern Europe where it has a comparative advantage” (OECD DAC, 2010).

One of the elementary premises of the Visegrad countries’ development assistance is the consideration of development assistance as an integral part of the countries’ foreign policies. This approach is well documented by Horky (2009) giving the example of the Czech Republic and the use of development assistance for various foreign policy goals such as the support of Afghanistan.

There is no one single motivation for providing development assistance; it is always a composition of various motives and goals including historical relations, economical interest, geopolitical situation and foreign policy orientation. However, assessing the various aspects of the Visegrad countries it can be concluded that their goals and motivations overlap quite significantly in some aspects – support of democracy, while they might be contradictory in other areas – support of Kosovo.

6. Fragmentation and Allocation of Official Development Assistance of the Visegrad Countries

All four Visegrad countries derived the current development assistance systems from different (yet very similar) historical, economic and legislative backgrounds. Some have had very close ties to the developing world even during the communist period, while others started off only with limited contacts. Assessing the territorial and sectoral priorities of these re-emerging donors the thesis aims to analyze the fragmentation of ODA of the respective countries. This chapter is therefore divided into two sections, one focusing on territorial aspects, and the other on sectoral priorities.

6.1 Territorial Allocation of ODA

In analyzing the territorial aspects of the Visegrad Four's development assistance, the thesis aims to analyze the selection process for priority countries, the selection criteria and most importantly assess potential patterns in the provision of development assistance.

Firstly, attention is given to the criterion of urgency/necessity of aid measured by GDP per capita of the recipient countries. The data for GDP per capita (as of 2007) are taken from UNDP Human Development Report 2009.

Secondly, the analysis focuses on the criterion of democracy and good governance. Democracy is evaluated using the Freedom House comparative assessment of countries' political rights and civil liberties. The rating system is as follows¹⁵: 1-2.5 free, 3-5 partially free, 5.5-7 not free. The scores used for the analysis are as of 2007 (Report published in 2008).

The final assessment aims to evaluate to what extent the Visegrad Four support other countries undergoing the transition process. The state of transformation is assessed through the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) which is an international ranking of developing and transition countries. It aims to evaluate the political and economic situation of each country as well as the political management performance. For the purpose of the analysis only the Management index was used as it focuses on the aspect

¹⁵ Complete list of countries and their ranking can be found in annex 3.

of country management and transition processes. The ranking system is the opposite of Freedom House index, the higher ranking, the better situation in the respective country¹⁶.

Unfortunately, neither Freedomhouse nor BTI evaluate Palestine and therefore it had to be omitted from the analyses.

6.1.1 Czech Republic

The Czech Republic was among the first post-communist countries to renew its development assistance programme. At the beginning aid was provided to more than 40 countries, therefore the programme of development assistance was the most fragmented among the Visegrad Four. The Principles for Providing Development Assistance (Government Resolution 153, 1995) approved in 1995 established basic criteria for the selection of priority countries. These criteria included urgency of aid (necessity of aid), relationship between the recipient and the Czech Republic, level of democracy and human rights in the recipient country, and effectiveness of provided aid. However, in the following years, development assistance that was implemented was mainly in the form of isolated projects based on the interest of the implementing organization (donor-driven), and the programme was not at all conceptual. In 1996-2000 individual projects were implemented in more than 40 countries, thus having a negligible impact, considering the limited funds. The Concept (Government Resolution 91, 2002) acknowledged in 2002 lowered the number of priority countries to 20, however even that was too many. The selection criteria remained as previously defined; however, the final selection was significantly influenced by political decisions, as each line ministry promoted their interests and priorities. Such a process resulted in greater territorial fragmentation and lack of co-ordination among the line ministries.

With the entrance of the Czech Republic to the European Union, the government approved The Principles of Development Assistance of the Czech Republic after the country's acceptance into the EU which established 8 priority countries for a five year period of 2006-2010; these countries were Vietnam, Mongolia, Angola, Zambia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro¹⁷, Yemen and Moldova (Government Resolution 302, 2004). Besides the long-term priority countries two short-term priority

¹⁶ Complete list of countries and their ranking can be found in annex 4

¹⁷ After the separation of Montenegro in 2006, only Serbia remained as the priority country.

countries were defined reflecting international commitments – Afghanistan and Iraq. On the final selection of the long-term priority countries we can illustrate the influence of political interests. Four objective criteria¹⁸ assessed via nine concrete indicators were defined and each criterion assigned points. The table below shows the list of countries selected according to the defined criteria and the points received (column A); and the final selection of priority countries for the Czech development assistance (column B). Three African countries (Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Mali) all belonging to the LDCs group were completely excluded from the final selection. The highest ranked country, Ethiopia, was excluded due to a casual diplomatic incident (Horky 2009). On the other hand, both Zambia and Moldova were added to the final selection, although they were not at all rated.

Table 2: Selection of Czech Priority countries

Column A		Column B
Ethiopia	36	Yemen
Yemen	30	Angola
Angola	29	Vietnam
Vietnam	28	Mongolia
Mongolia	27	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mali	23	Serbia and Montenegro
Afghanistan	20	Moldova
Burkina Faso	20	Zambia
Uzbekistan	19	Afghanistan
Ukraine	18	Iraq
Bosnia and Herzegovina	17	
Serbia and Montenegro	17	
Nicaragua	17	
Kazakhstan	16	
Bolivia	15	
Lebanon	15	
Palestine	10	
Namibia	8	
Salvador	8	
Macedonia	6	

Source: Jelínek, P. 2005

In 2007 the OECD DAC completed a Peer Review of the Czech official development assistance as the first post-communist country and provided the following

¹⁸ The four assessed indicators included: urgency of aid, readiness of the partner country to receive aid, mutual relations of the donor and the recipient country, presence of embassy of the donor country.

recommendation concerning the number of priority countries (OECD DAC, 2007): “...the Czech Government should take the opportunity of the next Concept for international development co-operation to reduce the number of priority countries to enhance Czech ODA’s development impact. It should reassess its sectoral and thematic orientation with a view to concentrating on areas for which the Czech Republic has a clear comparative advantage and value added.”

As part of the transformation process a new category of ‘project’ priority countries was established, supplementing the 8 ‘program’ priority countries. According to Naprstek (2009) this category also includes the previous short-term priorities Afghanistan and Iraq, however Konrad (2009) still includes both countries under the category of programme priority countries¹⁹. Furthermore, the newly established group included Ethiopia, Cambodia, Kosovo, Palestinian Autonomy Areas and Georgia. The trend of increasing priority countries is contradictory to the OECD DAC recommendation and leads to greater fragmentation and proliferation of aid.

The new Concept for 2010-2017, which was slightly delayed due to the Czech presidency of the Council of the European Union, initially assumed a further decrease of priority countries (Horky 2009). The Concept (MoFACZ 2010) was approved by the government on May 24th 2010. Selection criteria remained more or less the same, adding the aspect of division of labour among the donor countries. The document decreased the number of programme priority countries to 5 countries – Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Moldova, and Mongolia. The category of project priority countries also remained and includes Georgia, Cambodia, Kosovo, Palestinian Administered Areas and Serbia. Furthermore, a new category of so called ‘phase-out’ countries was created. This category includes mainly former programme priority countries that are not in either category of priority countries for the upcoming planning period (Angola, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia). According to the Concept, the main purpose is to ensure sustainability of already implemented projects and eventually depart from the respective countries. However, as M. Naprstek (2010) noted another category of ‘phase-in’ countries might eventually arise. Assessing the approved list of countries for the next planning period only

¹⁹ M. Naprstek is the representative of the Czech Development Agency; M. Kondrad is the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

one African country has remained among both categories of priority countries and there are only three least developed country included on list, the rest of the aid will be aimed at lower and upper middle income countries.

Given the above mentioned data, clearly the Czech Republic rather increased the number of partner countries, although the number of programme priority countries declined to only 5 countries other categories of partner countries were formed. The picture is only complete when we look at the total number of ODA recipients in the past five years.

Table 3: Czech ODA - total number of recipients 2004-2008

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total number of recipients	86	88	93	97	105

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

As the table shows, number of recipient countries has been increasing year by year, so in 2008 the Czech Republic had a total of 105 recipients. This trend is again contradictory to the OECD recommendation of better focus of aid. A possible explanation of this trend might be the tendency to include as much as possible in order to increase ODA. This argument is even more supported if we look at the financial volumes received by the partner countries.

Table 4: Czech ODA received by partner countries

Number of countries which receive ODA	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
less than 1mil USD	81	79	84	84	89
less than 0.5mil USD	75	71	72	76	76
less than 0.25mil USD	67	56	58	60	58
less than 0.1mil USD	43	37	33	37	42

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Out of the total number of recipient countries majority of them receive less than 1 million US dollars. Even more worrying fact is that almost half of the recipients receive negligible 0.1 million USD or less. This leads to a major fragmentation of Czech ODA and most importantly to a diminishing impact of the implemented interventions.


Another significant aspect is the share of total bilateral ODA aimed at priority countries. This number has been increasing since 2005 and it reached 68% in 2008²⁰ (reaching 59%, 41%, 44%, 48% in 2004-2007 respectively). The growing trend can be

²⁰ However, it should be noted that Afghanistan received more than 50% of total bilateral aid provided to priority countries in the given time period.

classified as very positive, however eventually priority countries should receive around 75% of total bilateral ODA²¹.

The graph below shows financial volumes of ODA received by the priority countries of Czech Republic. As shown, all least developed countries (with the exception of Afghanistan) score among the last recipients in terms of volume. In 2008 least developed priority countries accounted for 40% of total bilateral aid provided (including Afghanistan); with the exclusion of Afghanistan it was only 5%.

Graph 3: Czech ODA Provided to Priority Countries 2004-2008




Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

An interesting comparison is the top 15 recipients of Czech development assistance in the respective period. As can be noted from the graph below, first five places of top recipients are the same as the priority countries top five recipients. The sixth place is taken by Ukraine, which received 12.81mil USD in the given timeframe. Other five priority countries rank among the top 15; however, there are only two least developed countries on the list (Afghanistan and Angola). In total ten priority countries rank among the top 15 recipients of Czech ODA, which can be considered as a positive result.

²¹ This percentage has been mentioned by the representatives of the MoFA and Czech Development Agency on several occasions.

Graph 4: Top Recipients of Czech ODA




Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

A very interesting picture appears when we assess Czech ODA per citizen of the recipient country in relation to GDP per capita. The highest share of ODA per capita is in case of Mongolia which, in the given period 2004-2008, received 7.185 USD per citizen, and thus being the top recipient of Czech ODA from this perspective. All other countries have received significantly less, as can be derived from the graph. For the same reason Mongolia has been omitted from the analysis as it would distort the rest of the data. On average, the citizens of the priority countries have received 0.68 USD per capita.

The graph clearly shows a linear regression with a coefficient of determination of 0.37, and a positive medium strength correlation with a coefficient of 0.6. Thus, it can be concluded that Czech ODA is increasing with the GDP per capita of the respective country. This supports the previous finding that LDCs are not priority for Czech ODA, and aid is mostly provided for middle income countries.


Graph 5: Czech ODA in relation to GDP



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and HDR 2009

As stated in many official documents of Czech ODA, promotion of democracy and support of democratic states is an integral part of Czech development assistance. This corresponds with the result of the analysis – the more democratic a country appears to be, the more financial assistance it receives. This conclusion is strongly supported by a very high negative correlation coefficient (-0.8) and 0.65 coefficient of determination.


Graph 6: Czech ODA according to state of democracy



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and Freedomhouse 2008

The last of the assessed aspects of ODA is the level of transformation of the recipient country. As with the case of democracy, the Czech Republic aims to focus development assistance on those countries in transition, and thus strives to transfer its own transition experience. The analysis below supports the argument. With a positive medium strength correlation coefficient of 0.52 and coefficient of determination of 0.27 it can be concluded that the higher the transformation, the more financial support for the partner country.

Graph 7: Czech ODA according to state of transition



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and BTI 2008

It can be concluded that the Czech Republic greatly contributes to fragmentation and proliferation of the Visegrad countries development assistance. However, the analysis confirms that aid is allocated based on criteria of democracy and transformation, which on one hand is less favourable towards LDCs, which tend to score low in both categories, but on the other hand enables Czech ODA to make use of comparative advantages acquired throughout the transition period.

6.1.2 Hungary

In the case of Hungarian priority countries, the situation is quite non-transparent. In 2003 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established 16 priority countries for the Hungarian ODA (MoFAHU 2003). These countries were further split into 4 categories of strategic partner countries (Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vietnam, Palestinian National Authority), other partner countries (Macedonia, Moldova, China, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine), least developed countries (Ethiopia, Yemen, Cambodia, Laos) and countries under international commitment (Afghanistan and Iraq). Considering the selection criteria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFAHU 2006:2) states that “ODA partners therefore have also been chosen from the LDC group²², whereas some Far-Eastern countries were included on the list due to the traditions of our bilateral relations and previous personal contacts, and the experiences accumulated in the course of the co-operation of the past decades”. Three years later, in 2006 the list was updated (ibid), although the defined categories remained, changing only the respective countries (excluding China, including Montenegro as a ‘new’ recipient). According to Paragi (2008) the update was conducted without prior consideration of selection criteria and without any public participation. Paragi further mentions that besides the official list of the priority countries, a second ‘unofficial list’ of 19 priority countries was presented by HUN-IDA. It was not possible to verify such information at HUN-IDA’s website, however HUN-IDA states that “Our cooperating partners have so far included the European Commission ... and the governments of 19 beneficiary countries” (HUN-IDA 2007), not being concrete about the respective countries. This is contradictory to the government documentation and only corresponds with Paragi’s conclusion of insufficient communication and unclear terminology between the government institutions in charge of Hungarian ODA.

According to Resolution 01/2008 of the International Development Cooperation Governmental Committee, the list as well as the categories was revised early 2008 and the new categories and countries (16, plus the Sub-Saharan region) were defined as follows (MoFHU 2008):

²² Reflecting the “main objectives of the European Community such as sustainable development, poverty reduction in partner countries, their integration into the world economy and promoting democracy, the rule of law and good governance” (ibid)

- partner countries based on medium-term Country Strategy Papers (CSP): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Palestinian Authority, Serbia, Vietnam;
- project-based partner countries: Africa (the region South of Sahara), Cambodia, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Yemen;
- partner countries based on international commitments: Afghanistan, Iraq;
- partner countries eligible for tied aid credit: according to the OECD DAC categorization.

The definition of the Sub-Saharan region is quite unusual, considering that the region is very broad and no concrete countries were defined. In 2008 only the Republic of South Africa and Kenya received any 'significant' funding from Hungarian ODA (amounting to 80,000 USD²³); DRK, Mauritius and Mauritania were being the only other recipients of Hungarian ODA in the African region, the amounts being negligible (MoFAHU n.d.a). Therefore only 0.65%, a fraction of bilateral ODA in 2008 was provided to Africa. Altogether it can be concluded that the selection criteria for Hungarian priority countries were very unclear, not only to the general public, but also to the non-governmental organizations and academia. Therefore the statement of the Hungarian government about 'consistency and clear targets' mentioned in policy documents (MoFAHU 2006) cannot be verified.

For the scale of Hungarian ODA, having 16 recipient countries is too many and only leads to greater fragmentation and proliferation. According to the Report on Hungarian Development Assistance in 2008 'Inspired by Experience' Hungarian ODA was provided to 46 countries all around the world, in most cases being negligible amounts, thus having an insignificant impact. However this number is different to that reported to OECD for the same time period; according to the database, only 36 countries were recipients of Hungarian ODA²⁴. This again supports the findings of non-governmental organizations that ODA figures differ department to department and they do not comply with the OECD recommendations (AidWatch 2006, 2007). Although the reported figures vary, for the purpose of the following analysis official figures of OECD DAC will be used.

²³ Calculated with an annual average exchange rate of HUF and USD for 2008 (171.8HUF/USD). The amount is also confirmed by OECD statistical database.

²⁴ In the report Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Kosovo, Mauritius, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, and Venezuela.

At first sight, it may appear that Hungarian ODA is less fragmented than Czech as the number of recipient countries was only 36 in 2008 (Czech Republic having 105). However, there is also an increasing tendency since 2005 when Hungary reported only 14 recipient countries.

Table 5: Hungarian ODA total number of recipients 2004-2008

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total number of recipients	29	14	16	38	36

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

A closer look reveals that volumes contributed to most of the recipients were negligible. Almost 90% of recipient countries received less than 1 million USD in 2008, and this figure has been quite constant also in previous years (with the exception of 2005). Even more important however is the fact that two thirds of recipients receive only 0.1 million US dollars or less. Contributing such small amounts, Hungarian ODA has very limited impacts in partner countries.

Table 6: Hungarian ODA received by partner countries


Number of countries which receive ODA	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
less than 1mil USD	25	9	15	34	32
less than 0.5mil USD	22	8	15	32	32
less than 0.25mil USD	18	7	12	27	27
less than 0.1mil USD	14	7	11	22	24

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Considering the share of total bilateral ODA aimed at priority countries the number has been quite high in four out of the five monitored years, reaching over 75% (88% in 2008). Nonetheless, this should not be surprising considering the high number of priority countries and relatively low number of recipients. On the other hand, in 2007 the share was only 42% which was caused by a debt relief to Mozambique accounting for more than half of bilateral ODA (see p. 78).

The above mentioned negligible impact of ODA is also well visible when assessing financial volumes provided for priority countries in 2004-2008. Only six countries have received any significant support, among them only two least developed countries, the remaining four LDCs find themselves at the end of the list.


Graph 8: Hungarian ODA Provided to Priority Countries 2004-2008



Source: author’s calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Comparing the priority countries with the top 15 recipients of Hungarian ODA we can see that most priority countries belong to the top recipients, with the exception of Palestine, Macedonia, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia. On the other hand another LDC appears among the top recipients – Tanzania. This is only due to debt cancellation which took place in 2005 (see p. 78).

Graph 9: Top Recipients of Hungarian ODA




Source: author’s calculation based on OECD aid statistics

While assessing Hungarian ODA per capita the top two recipients are from the Balkans – Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro – receiving 5USD and 4USD per citizen respectively. The average amount received by the citizens of Hungarian priority countries in the respective time period was 1USD, thus providing slightly more than the Czech Republic.

Hungarian ODA displays a high positive correlation coefficient of 0.74 and the coefficient of determination of 0.55. Thus, it can also be concluded, as in the case of Czech Republic, that partner countries with higher GDP per capita receive more aid, than countries with low GDP.


Graph 10: Hungarian ODA in relation to GDP



Source: author’s calculation based on OECD aid statistics and HDR 2009

Unlike in the case of the Czech Republic, we cannot conclude that Hungarian ODA increases with the state of democracy of the recipient countries. Both correlation and determination coefficients are very low in order to support this conclusion.


Graph 11: Hungarian ODA according to state of democracy



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and Freedomhouse 2008

The same conclusion holds for support of transformation. Although support of countries undergoing the transition process is mentioned to be a key aspect of Hungarian ODA, it cannot be confirmed.

Graph 12: Hungarian ODA according to state of transition



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and BTI 2008

6.1.3 Poland

Over the past five years Polish selection of priority countries has been quite unsystematic and non-conceptual. Poland defined 8 priority countries to receive development assistance for the year 2008: Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Palestinian Administered Areas, Tanzania and Ukraine (MoFAPL 2009). However, in the case of Poland, the list of priority countries has been changing frequently since 2004, which has had negative impacts on aid predictability. In 2004 Poland selected only 6 countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, and Vietnam), in 2006 and 2007 the number rose to 9, and it has been slowly decreasing since then; the main reasons being international security aspects (Iraq) or political aspects – as the Polish embassy in Tanzania closed in 2008, Tanzania no longer remained on the list of priority countries (Zagranica Group 2009).

The table below aims to give a comprehensive overview of Poland’s priority countries in the 2004-2009 time period.

Table 7: Polish Priority Countries 2004-2009

2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Angola	Angola	Angola	Angola	Angola	Angola
Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova
Georgia	Georgia	Georgia	Georgia	Georgia	Georgia
Vietnam	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus
Iraq	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine
	Vietnam	Palestinian Admin. Areas	Palestinian Admin. Areas	Palestinian Admin. Areas	Palestinian Admin. Areas
	Iraq	Vietnam	Vietnam	Tanzania	
		Iraq	Iraq		

Source: Zagranica Group 2009, MoFAPL 2009

The respective priority countries should be the primary recipients of Polish ODA, however not the sole ones. Besides the priority countries development cooperation is aimed at other countries mainly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and South-Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia) (Polish Aid 2008). The selection criteria are stated in the Strategy for Poland’s Development Cooperation (MoFAPL 2003) as follows:

- selected developing countries with which Poland maintains political, economic and cultural relations at a significant level,
- selected countries implementing systemic transformations, particularly in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe,
- selected developing countries and those undergoing transformation with a large population of Polish origin.

It is apparent that it is already a very concrete identification of particular regions rather than criteria for their selection, however it should not be difficult to derive the respective criteria. The Strategy explicitly states “countries undergoing the transition process in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe” and “countries with large Polish minority” (meaning Ukraine and Belarus). The given criteria do not at all consider the urgency of aid (e.g. least developed countries, or countries according to HDI). This is reflected in the selected priority countries, as only two countries (three countries in 2007 and 2008 - Tanzania) belong to the LDCs group, thus implying the motives and interests behind Polish ODA.

However, a recently published DAC Peer Review of Poland’s ODA supports Polish decision on the selection of priority countries. “Poland has an important and welcome contribution to make to international development co-operation, particularly the development of its neighbours in Eastern Europe where it has a comparative advantage” (OECD DAC, 2010).

Moreover, in 2004 the Small Grants Fund was established which enabled other developing countries with Polish representation to receive small funding for development activities (MoFAPL 2007). According to Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFAPL 2009) in 2008 the Small Grants funding was used in 36 countries for more than 140 projects. Assessing the number of recipient countries over the monitored period we can again see that the number has been increasing rather than decreasing (with the exception of 2008).

Table 8: Polish ODA total number of recipients 2004-2008

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total number of recipients	63	64	70	87	80

Source: author’s calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Despite the fact, that Poland is the biggest donor among the Visegrad Four, the number of recipient countries does not exceed the Czech Republic. However, similarly to

the Czech Republic, aid to more than half of the recipient countries amounts only to 0.1 million USD.


Table 9: Polish ODA received by partner countries

Number of countries which receive ODA	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
less than 1mil USD	59	58	64	80	72
less than 0.5mil USD	58	56	60	75	65
less than 0.25mil USD	56	53	56	67	57
less than 0.1mil USD	41	42	48	53	44

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Assessing financial volumes of Polish ODA to priority countries, all priority countries in the given timeframe were included. The final outcome might appear slightly surprising considering the above mentioned territorial priorities of Polish development assistance. However, it should be taken into account that Angola is the top recipient only due to a reported debt relief which amounted to more than 90 million USD (Zagranica Group 2007). Not including debt cancellation, Angola would have ranked third, receiving slightly more than Moldova. In comparison with the previous two countries, the focus of Polish ODA on Eastern Europe is significant. Even countries included based on international commitments receive relatively negligible amounts in comparison to the Eastern-European partners; which is not the case in Czech Republic and Hungary where Afghanistan ranks among the top recipients.

Graph 13: Polish ODA Provided to Priority Countries



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Assessing the top recipients of Polish ODA reveals even more aid inflation through debt relief but not only that. China is the second biggest aid recipient only due to “credits tied to Polish goods and services” (OECD DAC 2010). In 2005 these were in total approximately 5 million USD (Zagranica grupa 2007), in 2007 they represented 68 million USD and in 2008 almost 19 million USD (Wojczulis 2010). In 2008 Angola also received an extended loan of 6 million USD (ibid). In the monitored period Nicaragua and Ethiopia among others received substantial debt relief (see page 78).

Graph 14: Top 15 Recipients of Polish ODA




Source: author’s calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Therefore it needs to be taken into consideration that aid inflation is a major aspect of Polish ODA and all of the following analyses will be to certain extent distorted by the inflated data. However, it is not possible to work only with genuine aid data, as these do not exist, nor is it possible to omit the countries in question as there is a significant number of them. Debt relief and loans are main causes of extreme inconsistency of share of bilateral ODA. In 2004 bilateral ODA to priority countries reached a record low of 4%, increasing to an extreme high of 91% in 2006, declining again in 2008 to 56%.

Assessing the first aspect of ODA per citizen in relation to GDP per capita, as in the case of the previous two countries we can indicate a positive linear regression, thus

conclude that countries with higher GDP per capita receive more aid per capita (correlation coefficient being quite high 0.7 and coefficient of determination 0.5). This is however quite logical concerning the above mentioned territorial priorities. The two countries receiving the highest amounts of Polish ODA per capita were Angola and Belarus (receiving 5.7USD and 4.5USD respectively).


Graph 15: Polish ODA in relation to GDP



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and HDR 2009

Looking at the aspect of democracy, the result is the very opposite to that of the previous two countries. Although there is a very low correlation and determination coefficient, it may appear that Poland slightly inclines to support countries with less democratic regimes.


Graph 16: Polish ODA according to state of democracy



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and Freedomhouse 2008

However, omitting the two countries receiving the most per capita the picture changes completely. There is a much stronger correlation coefficient (-0.6) and coefficient of determination (0.35).


Graph 17: Polish ODA according to state of democracy (excl. Angola and Belarus)



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and Freedomhouse 2008

Similarly, looking at the state of transition of the recipient countries and ODA volumes, we can identify a medium positive correlation of 0.3 but quite low coefficient of determination of only 0.1. Angola and Belarus, countries with extremely high ODA per capita contributions have been omitted.

Graph 18: Polish ODA according to state of transition



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and BTI 2008

Overall, Poland is the largest donor among the Visegrad countries. Its contribution towards fragmentation and proliferation of aid is in line with the Czech Republic and other members. Polish focus of aid on priority countries is not abided and Poland's displays great volatility in this aspect. This also leads to low predictability of aid for the priority countries.

6.1.4 Slovakia

In 2003 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Slovakia approved the Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development Assistance: 2003-2008. This document set the basic principles of development assistance for the given period (MoFASK 2003). It also defined three selection criteria for the selection of priority countries. These criteria included political and economical aspects (policy coherence, comparative advantages, mutual cooperation etc.), logistical and practical matters (presence of the embassy in the recipient country, existing infrastructure, the history of relations with the Slovak Republic etc.), and general criteria of the recipient (urgency, state of democracy, and social and economic development). However, the assessment of each criterion is not specified, which means their relative significance is unable to be recognized. Despite that, Slovakia is the only country among the Visegrad group, which explicitly stated the selection criteria in a publically available document. Priority countries selected based on the defined criteria were divided into two groups of programme countries (Serbia and Montenegro) and project countries²⁵ (Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFASK 2009) states that program priority countries are long-term partners and therefore will receive substantial funding from Slovak ODA. At the same time the Ministry (MoFASK 2004) also expressed the aim to eventually lower the number of countries and acknowledged the EU recommendation to mainly support least developed countries. Unlike the other Visegrad countries, such a commitment implies a lower grade of fragmentation and proliferation, as well as a greater consideration of regions' needs (having an LDC and LIC as majority of program countries).

However, during the planning period of 2003-2008 the number of priority countries actually increased, rather than decreased (it might only appear it did so because a new category was created). In 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved a new list

²⁵ The list of project priority countries appears to have been quite dynamic in the respective period. In 2005 Cambodia was added to the list of project priority countries only for one year period (MoFASK 2005). In 2006 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFASK 2006) stated that 6 project priority countries will be preferred in 2006 – Kenya, Sudan, Ukraine, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan; the programme country of Serbia and Montenegro remaining. The same countries also remained for 2007 and 2008 (MoFASK 2007, 2008). In the National Programme of the Official Development Assistance for 2008 (MoFASK 2008) used three categories of countries – programme priority countries, project priority countries (Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kenya, and Ukraine) and other project countries (Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan).

of priority countries for the new planning period of 2009-2013. The new priority countries were defined as follows: programme priority countries – Afghanistan²⁶, Kenya, Serbia and project countries – Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The number of priority countries increased to 19 thus being contradictory to the government statement of eventual decrease of priority countries. Out of the 19 priority countries only 3 belong to LDCs (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sudan), 5 belong to the group of low income countries and the remaining 11 countries are within the group of middle income countries.

Although the list of countries was approved recently it will be used for the following assessment as it represents the most complete list of priority countries even during the monitored period. An interesting aspect of Slovak selection of priority countries are 4 regional clusters (Sub-Saharan Africa, Balkans, Central Asia and Eastern Europe). As the plan to form clusters is not stated in any official documents of Slovak ODA, it is difficult to say whether it was a coincidence (somehow conditioned by the criteria) or a systematic selection. Clusters can lead to increased effectiveness, mainly through lower transaction costs and they can contribute to greater transparency and visibility of the donor in the respective region. At the same time it also enables cross-border cooperation and easier implementation of joint projects and programmes. However, considering the relatively small contribution of Slovak ODA and the high number of recipient countries and formed clusters, it is not likely Slovakia was able to benefit in any aspect from the formed clusters. On the contrary, the high number of recipients resulted in greater fragmentation and proliferation which have increased the transaction costs for both the donor and the recipient country.

Similarly to all previous Visegrad countries, the total number of ODA recipients has been increasing on annual basis since 2005.

Table 10: Slovak ODA total number of recipients 2004-2008

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total number of recipients	38	17	19	20	22

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

²⁶ Similarly to the rest of the Visegrad Four, the main reason for including Afghanistan on the programme-countries' list was mainly the international security commitments rather than the aim of poverty reduction.

However, unlike with the rest of Visegrad countries Slovakia's contribution to the recipient countries accounts for more significant volumes. Although majority of countries received less than 1 million USD, only one third of countries received less than 0.1 million USD in 2008.


Table 11: Slovak ODA received by partner countries

Number of countries which receive ODA	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
less than 1mil USD	36	11	17	17	19
less than 0.5mil USD	36	7	13	15	17
less than 0.25mil USD	29	6	9	13	11
less than 0.1mil USD	15	4	6	9	6

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Assessing the financial volumes of Slovak's priority countries it needs to be taken into consideration that as in the case of Poland, Slovak's ODA has been inflated by debt relief (mainly Sudan and Liberia among others, see page 78).

Graph 19: Slovak ODA Provided to Priority Countries




Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Given the fact that during the monitored period the number of recipients of Slovak's ODA was around 20 (with the exception of 2004) and there are 19 priority countries, the list of top recipients will be very similar. The only difference being Liberia taking the second place with 25 million USD in debt relief; India, China and Iraq all three ranked among the top 15 ODA recipients. Another positive aspect can also be noted – all

Slovak's priority least developed countries are ranked among the top recipients (although this is again influenced by the inclusion of debt cancellation).

Assessing Slovak ODA according to per citizen share it becomes evident that unlike in previous Visegrad countries there are no extreme volumes. The top two recipients per capita are Serbia and Sudan, receiving 1.8USD and 1.2USD respectively. Unlike in the rest of the Visegrad countries correlation of ODA and GDP per capita is not as strong (0.39), but we can still indicate a positive linear regression, and thus conclude that also Slovakia tends to support countries with higher GDP rather than the least developed countries.

Graph 20: Slovak ODA in relation to GDP



Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics and HDR 2009

Slovakia does not display any even mildly significant correlation patterns in the area of democracy or transition, unlike the other Visegrad countries. This may be caused by a rather non-conceptual selection of the priority countries as both transition and democracy are important aspects for Slovakia's ODA. Similarly to Poland, share of bilateral assistance is greatly distorted by debt relief, especially in 2008, when bilateral aid accounted only for 16% of aid. However, in case of Slovakia this might be considered only an exception, as the previous years appear to be quite constant, reaching 80% in 2006 and 2007. Having stated all of the above, Slovakia's territorial fragmentation is much in line with other Visegrad members.

6.1.5 The Visegrad Group

In analyzing the ODA of the Visegrad countries the table below shows a complete list of programme and project priority countries of the Visegrad states and their ODA volumes in 2004-2008.

Table 12: Priority Countries and ODA (2004-2008) of the Visegrad Group

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Total
Iraq	35,78	69,37	-	-	105,15
Angola	4,72	-	99,95	-	104,67
Afghanistan	64,96	13,68	4,79	7,92	91,35
Serbia	36,94	18,57	-	9,25	64,76
Ukraine	-	11,73	39,78	1,4	52,91
Sudan	-	-	-	50,33	50,33
Belarus	-	-	43,99	0,42	44,41
Bosnia-Herzegovina	10,41	19,53	-	2,29	32,23
Mongolia	18,68	1,12	-	1,94	21,74
Viet Nam	13,35	3,15	-	0,1	16,6
Moldova	8,43	0,91	6,15	0,75	16,24
Yemen	4,25	10,78	-	-	15,03
Georgia	5,79	-	5,45	0,6	11,84
Palestinian Adm. Areas	6,28	0,71	2,1	-	9,09
Ethiopia	3,78	-	-	0,01	3,79
Montenegro	-	2,43	-	1,09	3,52
Zambia	2,73	-	-	-	2,73
Kyrgyz Republic	-	0,3	-	2	2,3
Kenya	-	-	-	1,73	1,73
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	1,62	1,62
Albania	-	-	-	1,49	1,49
Macedonia	-	0,43	-	0,98	1,41
Tanzania	-	-	1,29	-	1,29
Cambodia	0,79	0,4	-	-	1,19
Laos	-	0,77	-	-	0,77
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	0,61	0,61
Tajikistan	-	-	-	0,21	0,21

Legend

2	four V4 members present
7	three V4 members present
9	two V4 members present
9	one V4 member present

Source: author's calculation based on OECD aid statistics

Even a cursory look enables us to see the high number of priority countries for all four donors. Therefore neither country complies with the OECD DAC recommendation of 3-4 priority countries. A decrease in programme priority countries is compensated for by an increase in project priority countries. The argument of substantial financing will not succeed either. First of all, according to provided data, the Visegrad countries do not

respect priority countries when allocating ODA funding. Secondly, limited funding and negligible amounts provided to high number of countries only increase the transaction costs for both the recipient and the donor. The visibility of small development interventions is in general very low.

All four donors are characterized by unclear or even completely missing selection criteria for priority countries. Thus, the selection process can be more vulnerable to economical and political motives and interests rather than poverty reduction targets. The selection process is mostly exclusive of public opinion or development constituency in the respective country.

The geographical analysis of territorial focus of the Visegrad Countries ODA can be very interesting as it can help us answer the question of to what extent do the Visegrad Countries overlap in territorial priorities.

By looking at the maps (annexes 8.-11) it is evident that territorial priorities show similar patterns and also that to certain extent top recipients and priority countries overlap, however there is less LDCs among the top recipients. Szent-Iványi (2008) divided the priority countries into three groups (although as mentioned, there are exceptions not fitting into the categories). The first category is comprised of closely neighbouring countries, namely the Balkan countries and some post-soviet countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova). In this category Szent-Iványi also includes all member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, although many of these countries are situated in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan); Georgia being a specific case as it was also a member of CIS in the past, however currently it is in a strong opposition. This is also one of the reasons for a strong engagement of the Visegrad countries which themselves have experienced soviet occupation and military presence in the Visegrad territory. The second category includes Iraq and Afghanistan; countries included as result of international commitments, membership in NATO and expressed alliance towards the USA which represents some counterbalance to Russia. The third and last group of countries is the heritage of the communist era. Countries such as Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique and Laos have had either a socialist political system or were in favour of socialism in the past.

The similar territorial orientation of the Visegrad states is evident and is a prerequisite for better co-operation among the V4.

6.2 Sector Priorities and Comparative Advantages of the Visegrad donors

It can be assumed that, mainly due to very similar historical backgrounds and recent developments in the Visegrad region, these countries would have similar sector priorities and comparative advantages. In order to verify the assumption, strategies on development assistance, defined sector priorities and the implementation of projects and programmes by sector were assessed.

Most Visegrad countries have defined their sector priorities based on their comparative advantages at an early stage of the renewed development assistance programmes.

The Czech Republic defined its comparative advantages in 2004, under the Principles for Providing Development Assistance after Entrance into the EU. The document defines the following Czech sector priorities (Government Resolution 302, 2004): migration, industrial support, education, health care, agriculture, environment, and sustainable development. Furthermore, the document also describes the goals of Czech development assistance as including good governance, the reinforcement of human rights, and the introduction of legal principles, among others. According to the 2008 statistical annex (MoFACZ 2009) on development assistance, the major sector orientation was on social infrastructure (other than health, education and population), and this comprised 48% of the total bilateral ODA. The second sector of health, education and population comprised 12.5%, with economic infrastructure and industry together amounting to 15%. Even in the case of the Czech Republic the disbursement by sector lies within the defined areas of development assistance.

Hungary also bases the sector priorities on comparative advantages. Hungary has defined 9 areas of sector priorities for providing development assistance. These areas include sharing Hungarian experiences from the transition period, the transfer of knowledge, education and health care, agriculture and water management, infrastructure and logistics management, and environmental protection. According to a 2008 report on Hungarian development assistance (MoFAHU n.d.a) and an assessment of 6²⁷ priority

²⁷ Data is provided for the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia and Vietnam. Although some data seem to be miscalculated – in case of Serbia and Montenegro, total percentage does not account to 100%.

countries' sector disbursements; 26% of funds were provided equally for education and good governance, 12% for water and hygiene, 9% for agriculture and public services, 5% for the social sector and 4% for civil society. The remaining 9% of funds were provided for other purposes such as economic development, health and cultural heritage. However, the sector assessment based on the given data for 2008 was rather difficult as the report does not restrict itself to the defined areas, even though we can assume that ODA was mostly aimed at areas of comparative advantages of Hungary.

In the Strategy for Polish Development Cooperation, adopted in 2003, the Polish government declares their aim to support those countries in greatest need, and provide assistance mainly in the areas of comparative advantages of the Polish institutions. As the main priority areas, the MoFA (MoFAPL 2003) defines the following: health protection, education and science, access to potable water, protection of the environment, consolidation of local structures, support for democratic institutions, improvement of public administration efficiency, development of cross-border co-operation and sector restructuring. Furthermore, the strategy also defines supporting durable economic growth, respecting human rights and passing on the benefits of the experience gained during the transition of the Polish system among the main tasks for Polish ODA. It is not possible to assess the fulfilment or funding of sector priorities of Polish ODA as not all the data necessary for the analysis is available, in either of the published reports. However, assessing the defined sector priorities for each priority country in 2008 (MoFAPL 2009), they were in line with the defined sector priorities, thus it can be assumed that they comply with the defined priorities. However, financial distribution by sector is essential in order to fully verify this conclusion.

In 2002 the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs subcontracted an analysis on the potential and comparative advantages of Slovak ODA. The analysis was conducted by the Centre for Economic and Social Analyses and the findings were incorporated into the Short term strategy approved in 2003. The analysis defined 3 main comparative advantages of Slovak ODA (MESA 2003): 1) Developing democratic institutions and market environment; 2) Infrastructure (including social infrastructure, i.e. health care and education); 3) Landscaping, environmental protection, agriculture, food safety and use of raw materials. These were later defined as the sector priorities of the Slovak ODA programme. According to the 2008 annual report of the Slovak Development Agency

(SAMRS 2009), the majority of aid was aimed at the second sector of infrastructure which comprised 68% of total bilateral ODA. Sector one was allocated 20%, and the third sector only 2% of the budget. 10% was focused on humanitarian aid. According to the given data, Slovak ODA disbursement by sector complies with the defined comparative advantages, therefore we can conclude that the recipients of Slovak ODA have the potential to benefit from the best Slovakia has to offer in the field of development assistance.

The sector focus of all Visegrad countries is derived from a common history of undemocratic regimes and the subsequent transition to democracy, a market-oriented economy and related social changes. The aspect of experience transfer is mainstreamed into all sectors defined for co-operation. Although each donor uses a different methodology for sector reporting, which means that sector disbursements are not fully comparable, we can still distinguish several categories that are included in each country's sector priorities.

The common priorities relate to democracy/good governance, a focus on human rights, the provision of support in the transition towards democracy and the building of legal frameworks and democratic institutions. The sector focus on good governance is most apparent in the case of Hungary and also Poland, judging by the number of their projects with a good governance component. It is difficult to assess the portion of Czech ODA aimed at the issue as it is most probably included under the general category of Social infrastructure, which, while it does comprise almost half of the bilateral funds, also includes other aspects besides good governance. The second category focuses on infrastructure (including social infrastructure) with the Czech Republic and Slovakia having the majority of funds allocated for this sector. The third category is made up of environmental protection and agriculture (including rural development). Although financial disbursements for this sector were limited in 2008, it is a common sector for all Visegrad members. Finally, the category of economic development is also a common issue for the Visegrad Four.

7. Financial volumes of Official Development Assistance among the Visegrad countries

Over the past 60 years the international community has established many institutions and funds devoted to supporting the developing world, and agreed on many targets related to the provision of development assistance. In 1969, the Pearson Commission²⁸ recommended that the developed countries should provide 0.7% of their GNP for development assistance by 1975, if there is to be seen a sustained growth in the developing world. More than thirty years later only very few countries have managed to reach this target²⁹.

In 2005 the European Union member states have agreed on Barcelona II commitments for providing development assistance (Orbie 2008). In accord with the agreement the Old Member States were supposed to strive for an individual target of 0.51% of GNI for ODA by 2010, 0.56% collectively and to reach 0,7% by 2015. For the New Member States the targets were set for 0.17% of GNI for ODA by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015. Although financial volumes have been steadily growing for the past decade, in 2008 the Visegrad states were far from reaching the recommended volumes. However other European Union members were not reaching their targets either. The table below shows the official development assistance to gross national income ratio of the Visegrad countries and the DAC members.

Table 13: ODA to GNI ratio of the V4 countries and the DAC

Donor/year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Czech Republic	0.11%	0.11%	0.12%	0.11%	0.12%
Hungary	0.06%	0.11%	0.13%	0.08%	0.08%
Poland	0.05%	0.07%	0.09%	0.09%	0.08%
Slovak Republic	0.07%	0.12%	0.10%	0.09%	0.10%
DAC	0.26%	0.33%	0.31%	0.28%	0.31%

Source: author's assessment, OECD 2010


²⁸ The Pearson Commission was established under the auspices of the World Bank in 1968 with the aim to evaluate the state of development assistance and draw out recommendations for the upcoming decades. The produced report "Partners in Development" represents one the first complex and comprehensive studies of development assistance produced. (World Bank, 2003)

²⁹ Based on the OECD 2010 Development Co-operation Report, only Denmark, Luxemburg, Norway and Sweden have been continuously providing over 0.7% of their GNI for development assistance.

The data show a high level of volatility of aid among the Visegrad New Member States. It is mainly evident in case of Hungary, where aid increased to 0,13% of GNI in 2006, which was with high certainty mainly caused by debt relief, and it has been declining since then, thus not complying with the European commitments and being the greatest contributor to aid volatility in the Visegrad region. In case of Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland minor fluctuations can be noted, however in the former two countries ODA to GNI ratio in 2008 increased opposed to Poland where it has decreased slightly. Among the V4 countries the Czech Republic appears to have the most stable ratio, oscillating only centesimal per cent in the respective period. In most years, the Czech Republic was also a country with the highest ratio of ODA to GNI (except for 2005 and 2006, when it was in second place both years). Despite their commitments the DAC members have actually decreased their share of ODA to GNI in 2006 and 2007.

The graph below shows the financial volumes of development assistance of the Visegrad countries. It should be noted however, although the data was taken from official OECD Development Co-operation Report (OECD 2010) due to declining exchange rate of USD in the past decade figures are slightly biased.

Graph 21: ODA net disbursements of V4 and DAC³⁰



Source: author's assessment, OECD DCR 2010

Based on the graph we can see that ODA of the DAC had been decreasing for three consecutive years starting in 2005; unlike most V4 countries that have been increasing financial volumes of ODA in the respective period. The only exception here being Hungary which has decreased its ODA in 2007 compared to 2006; the decrease or rather the sharp increase in 2006 was most probably caused by debt relief (aid to Iraq increased to 67.15mil USD, compared to previous and following year when it amounted to 0.39mil USD and 0.02mil USD respectively). Reflecting the financial volumes the biggest donor among the Visegrad group is Poland, followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia; while the latter two have reached a very similar figure in 2008 (107mil and 92mil USD respectively). Looking back at the ODA to GNI ratio the results were quite different, with the Czech Republic being in first place, Slovakia second and Hungary last. However, the order changes again when we assess the growth rate of finances dedicated to

³⁰ - rem DAC net disbursements represent the net disbursements of DAC members in the respective period, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States

development assistance³¹. During the respective five-year period (2004-2008) Slovak ODA had grown 39% yearly on average, reaching 99% growth in 2005. Nevertheless, in 2006 Slovakia's growth rate decreased to negative numbers reaching -1.7% low, although rising consistently since then. A similar result was achieved by Poland with 36% annual average growth, the peak also being in 2005 (74%) and steadily declining since then (45% in 2006, 22% in 2007, and 2% in 2008). Hungary has accomplished the lowest average growth rate with only 16% annually, and the yearly growth rates again show the volatility of Hungarian ODA ranging from the highest growth of 49% in 2006 to the lowest of -31% in the subsequent year. The Czech Republic appears to have the most stable growth rate of ODA in the respective period. It has achieved 24% annual growth rate, reaching the highest growth of 39% in 2008 and lowest of 11% in the preceding year.

When assessing financial aspects of ODA it is important to take into account proportion of bilateral and multilateral ODA, as it demonstrates countries' engagement outside the mandatory contributions to international development and financial institutions. According to OECD DAC (Rusnak, U., Szep, A., Brzica, D. 2002) the recommendation for transition countries is to focus their ODA during the initial phase on multilateral cooperation as they do not yet have the essential capacities required for effective contribution to bilateral ODA. Analysis of ODA of most new member states of the EU supports this argument. Most Baltic countries as well as Romania and Bulgaria devote majority of their ODA to multilateral cooperation (Vencato 2007; AidWatch 2009).


Among the analyzed countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia reported similar figures for 2008 –45% for bilateral ODA; Poland reported 20% and Hungary only 15% contribution to bilateral ODA. In case of Hungary and Poland the proportion fluctuated extremely in the 2004-2008 period, which was most probably caused mainly by debt relief. In case of Slovakia and the Czech Republic the figures have been mostly consistent.

Assessing the collective contribution for development assistance of the Visegrad Four, it reveals the following results. Poland is the largest donor, providing almost half of

³¹ The data used for assessing the growth rates were also taken from OECD Development Co-operation Report 2010 and may be slightly biased due to the declining exchange rate of US dollar which is the official reporting currency.

ODA of the Visegrad Group. Czech Republic ranks second with slightly over one quarter of ODA. Hungary being in third place with almost one fifth and followed by Slovakia with 10% share of the V4 ODA. Among the Visegrad Four Poland (with 45%) is the highest contributor to the Visegrad ODA, Czech Republic accounting for 30%, Slovakia and Hungary 13% and 11% respectively. Nonetheless, even collective ODA of the Group represents only a fraction of ODA provided jointly by the DAC members.


Graph 22: Total ODA net disbursements of V4



Source: author's assessment based on OECD 2010

Assessing the development assistance of the Visegrad countries yet from another point of view gives us again slightly different data. The graph below represents official development assistance of the Visegrad Group but expressed as an individual share of the citizens of the four countries. Since 2004 the share of ODA per citizen has been constantly growing in the Czech Republic and it has been the highest and most stable among the V4 throughout the monitored period. On average the Czech citizen has had a share of 16 USD provided for ODA. The second highest share belongs to the Slovaks amounting to 11 USD and Hungary being only slightly behind with 10.5 USD. The last country in this category is Poland which has provided only 7 USD per Polish citizen for development assistance.

Graph 23: ODA per citizen of the Visegrad Countries



Source: author's calculation based on OECD DCR 2010 aid statistics and HDR 2009

Another finding which can be noted is the consistency of ODA per citizen. Only two countries – the Czech Republic and Poland – have achieved a continuous rise in ODA per capita in the respective period. On the contrary, Hungary and Slovakia have both experienced a decrease in development assistance per citizen in 2007 and 2006 respectively.

As already mentioned earlier, some of the given ODA figures are greatly inflated by debt relief. However, it is very difficult to acquire official data on debt relief. Since 2006 a platform of European NGOs has begun to publish an annual report focusing on monitoring development assistance of the EU member countries, currently known as the AidWatch³². These reports represent a valuable source of information on debt cancellation and aid inflation³³ in general in the Visegrad countries. The table below aims to summarize observations of NGOs and rather questionable aid increases which can be noted when assessing aid volumes of individual countries.

³² In 2006 the report was compiled by unofficial platform on NGOs joining only for this purpose. Since 2007 the report is being published by CONCORD, confederation of platforms of European development NGOs. The report is a joint endeavor of development NGOs from all EU member states as they all participate in collecting information and writing up their respective countries' part of the report.

³³ Inflated aid, as explained by the AidWatch initiative (AidWatch 2006), is development assistance that has been distorted by debt cancellation, refugees and foreign students' costs in Europe. Including these data results in the misinterpretation of aid provided for the developing countries. As the AidWatch report (2006) explains "While spending on foreign students and refugees in Europe is important ... they do not produce new aid for developing countries, and often fail to transfer any resources at all for poverty reduction", therefore, according to the NGOs, these costs should not be included in ODA statistics. The same reasoning holds for debt cancellation.

Table 14: Estimated debt cancellation of the Visegrad countries

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
CZECH REPUBLIC						
Iraq	13,66	8,13	11,8	1,2	0,99	35,78
NGO observations	<p>AidWatch 2006 "According to OECD figures €10 million of Czech ODA was spent on debt cancellation in 2005." AidWatch 2007 "The Czech Republic is a creditor to Iraq with claims of approximately €160 million. The government has agreed to cancel this debt on terms similar to the Paris Club agreement of end-2004. In 2006 the Czech Republic cancelled approximately €46 million of Iraqi debt. All or some of this may have been counted towards its claimed 2006 ODA figure. AidWatch 2008 "It is estimated that debt cancellation, refugee and student costs represented 15% of total ODA in 2007."</p>					
HUNGARY						
Bosnia-Herzegovina	18,63	0,06	0,05	0,32	0,47	19,53
Iraq	1,77	0,39	67,15	0,02	0,04	69,37
Mozambique				17,72		17,72
Tanzania		9,57				9,57
Yemen	0,37	10,03		0,15	0,23	10,78
NGO observations	<p>AidWatch 2008 "Hungarian NGOs are concerned that debt cancellation reported as ODA (mostly to Mozambique) will certainly contribute to the inflation of final official figures." AidWatch 2009 "Hungary has been reporting significant amounts of debt cancellation in the past, but this pump is now running dry. Last year Hungary cancelled a €5.1m debt to Ethiopia... This debt cancellation operation will probably be the last and is to be reported in 2009 ODA figures."</p>					
POLAND						
Angola	0,06	0,18	92,35	0,49	6,87	99,95
Ethiopia	8,7	0,01	0,05	0,16	0,45	9,37
NGO observations	<p>AidWatch 2006 "However, Polish NGOs highlight that according to their data, a significant part of official aid figures announced by the Ministry of Finance figures was spent on debt relief; an example is €8.7 million of Ethiopian debt." ³⁴ Polish Development Assistance Report 2007 (Zagranica Group) "In 2006, the debt of Angola, one of Poland's priority countries, was cancelled." AidWatch 2008 "In 2007, Poland spent €22 million on debt cancellation for Nicaragua. The amount of debt cancellation decreased by 33% from 2006, but it still accounts for 8% of whole ODA reported."</p>					
SLOVAKIA						
Afghanistan	0,38	4,41	1,54	1,33	0,26	7,92
Albania	0,21	1,27		0,01		1,49
Iraq	0,25	1,16				1,41
Liberia					25,07	25,07
Sudan	0,24	17,28	14,98	17,68	0,15	50,33
NGO observations	<p>AidWatch 2007 "Nearly one third of Slovak ODA in 2005 (€18 million) was made up of inflated aid, namely debt cancellation to Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Albania. In 2006 this figure declined, with €12.17 million going on debt cancellation to Sudan and Afghanistan. AidWatch 2008 "Slovak ODA was inflated by counting debt cancellation (€13.5million)..." AidWatch 2009 "Slovak ODA in 2008 was also inflated by counting debt cancellation..."</p>					

Source: author's assessment

³⁴ Although the report states the amount in Euro, the correct currency is most probably USD; as the volume is the same amount as reported to OECD DAC.

Assessing financial aspects of development assistance of the Visegrad countries from many different perspectives has shown the aid commitments have been gradually improving over the past five years. However, it is very unlikely that any of the Visegrad Four will reach the European Union Barcelona II targets of providing 0.17% GNI for ODA by 2010. Among the four countries the Czech Republic appears to show the lowest volatility of ODA to GNI ratio between 2004 and 2008. Considering only the financial volumes, the Czech Republic has been continuously increasing its contributions for development assistance, although in volume itself it has been exceeded by the bigger economy of Poland. It is the second biggest contributor to the joint ODA of the Visegrad countries and its share of ODA per citizen has surpassed all the other re-emerging donors. Poland is overall the biggest contributor among the Group. Its ODA to GNI ratio has been steadily increasing for the past five years, however it will not manage to comply with the EU targets. As for Slovakia and Hungary, both countries are showing progress in some aspects of ODA. Slovakia's share per citizen was the second best among the Visegrad Group members in 2008. Its ODA to GNI ratio also seems to be gradually improving and financial volumes growing continuously. Hungary among all the countries seems to have the most volatile contribution for ODA, oscillating greatly not only in ODA to GNI ratio, but also in ODA volumes and share per citizen. As already stated above, the Visegrad countries account only for a fraction of ODA provided by the DAC donors and by the European Union members.

8. Key Actors in Development Assistance of the Visegrad Countries

Development assistance is not only a government led strategy or a collection of policies; it is a co-operation of many different stakeholders ranging from international development organizations, local companies and non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, media and the general public. The scope of engagement of the particular stakeholders varies and a detailed analysis would be needed to comprehensively assess their activities; which was not the primary focus of this work. Therefore this part of the thesis aims to give an overview of key stakeholders which are active in the field of development assistance of the Visegrad countries and review public opinions on development assistance.

As was already mentioned earlier, development assistance in the Visegrad countries was at the beginning greatly supported by many well-established international donors such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Austrian Development Agency (ADA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) among others.

CIDA's project Official Development Assistance in Central Europe (ODACE) was one of the most significant interventions aimed at building up the development assistance structures in the Visegrad countries. The main project goal was "to help the aspiring EU members fulfil their commitment to develop and strengthen their own capacity to become bilateral donors and thus to increase the availability of Official Development Assistance (ODA) globally" (CIDA n.d.). As explained by CIDA (ibid), initially it was a 5-year project aimed at the Visegrad countries, however eventually Slovenia and the Baltic countries were also included, and the project was prolonged for one more year, thus lasting from 2001-2007. The project equally included two components: capacity building and trilateral co-operation. Within the capacity-building framework CIDA assisted in establishing ODA institutional structures (ODA departments, development agencies etc.), developing policy frameworks (defining strategies, CSPs), training of staff, creating financing mechanisms, raising both political and public support, and also enhancing capacities of other stakeholders such as NGOs, academia and the private sector. The main rationale of the trilateral programme was co-operation of CIDA, partner country and a

third (developing) country, where development interventions were implemented and financed by the ODACE project. During the course of the project 43 trilateral projects were implemented, however only three Visegrad countries participated in the framework – Czech Republic (4 projects), Hungary (8 projects) and Slovakia (25 projects; more than half of the total sum).

Perhaps the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund is an ideal example of donor co-operation and their involvement in the Visegrad region. The Trust Fund was established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia in close cooperation with UNDP (UNDP 2008). Initially, the Trust Fund closely cooperated with ADA, CIDA and the North-South Centre of Europe. All three institutions provided financial support which during 2003-2008 accounted for 10% of the Fund's budget (13.85 million USD), CIDA having the highest share.

Similarly, the Czech Development Centre (predecessor of the Czech Development Agency) was established as part of a 5-year long project 'Building National Capacities for International Development Assistance' funded by the UNDP. The project ended in 2004 as the Czech Republic ceased to be the recipient of ODA (CZDA 2008).

International development agencies played an essential role in setting up the development assistance systems of the Visegrad countries and building capacities of local stakeholders. It is hard to estimate what ODA of the Visegrad Four would look like now-a-days without their support.

Non-governmental organizations also play a vital role in establishing the development assistance activities in Central Europe. In the past ten years many new development NGOs emerged, their size and activities varying greatly. Just like international agencies played a key role in establishing the official structures, a TRIALOG project implemented by a consortium of partners including CONCORD, European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development and HORIZONT3000 – the lead agency, among others. TRIALOG initially started in March 2000, and currently the project is in its fourth phase. TRIALOG (TRIALOG n.d.) defines its main objective as "to contribute to the mobilisation of more public support in New EU Member States, Accession and Candidate Countries for actions against poverty and for equal relations between developing and developed countries through Civil Society Organisations as multipliers". Over the past ten

years TRIALOG has organized trainings, conferences, study trips, workshops and seminars in order to build capacities of NGOs in the NMS. It has also played an important role in establishing the national platforms of development organizations in the Visegrad countries.

The first national platform of development organizations established in the Visegrad countries was FoRS – Czech Forum for Development Co-operation which was founded in September 2002 by 15 NGOs. Gradually the number of member organizations increased and in early 2010 the platform had 37 full member organizations and 10 observers including universities, international organizations and foundations (FoRS n.d.a). The platform plays a key role in representing the member organizations in dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Development Agency and other relevant institutions in the Czech Republic, as well as on the international level of CONCORD. The platform defines three main areas of activities (FoRS n.d.b): information and education (organizing seminars and workshops for members, publishing reports etc.), coordination and dialogue (fostering dialogue among members, coordination of working groups etc.), and representation and advocacy of members' common interests (dialogue with key national and international institutions, monitoring and influencing legislation and financing of ODA). Naprstek (2009) states that in 2008 NGOs accounted for 22% of bilateral assistance, however, they were responsible for the implementation of half of the projects implemented.

A year later, in 2003, Hungarian development organizations founded HAND – Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid. Initially there were 12 founding member organizations and 5 observers and at the beginning the platform was also supported by the above mentioned ODACE project (HAND n.d.a). It is difficult to specify the number of member organizations at present as the information given by the platform vary. In the English version of the website, section 'About us' (ibid), the Platform states that by the end of 2003 the number of member organizations rose to 20, however, there are only 12 member organizations and 7 observers mentioned in the list of member organizations (HAND n.d.b), and 14 members are listed in the Hungarian version of the list (HAND n.d.c). Similarly to FoRS, HAND defines three main areas of activities (HAND n.d.a): representation of the development NGOs, awareness raising and

provision of services to member organizations. However, the accuracy of the information presented on the Platform website is rather questionable as the last information in the 'News' section was published in May 2009 (HAND n.d.d). The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFAHU n.d.c:9) acknowledges the participation of civil society organizations and states that "...it plays a fundamental role in implementing the development projects, increasing social awareness, strengthening civil control and securing the sustainability of development results".

Although the Polish platform Zagranica Group was officially founded in 2004, the history of NGDO cooperation started already in 1999 (Zagranica Group 2010a). The Platform agreed on the following activities (ibid): information-sharing among Polish NGOs working abroad, participation in influencing and shaping Polish development assistance, cooperation with authorities as well as other national and international platforms, disseminating information about activities of Polish NGDOs and raising public awareness about international development issues. Currently there are 46 regular members and 3 supporting members in the Platform and the Platform is also a member of CONCORD (Zagranica Group 2010b). The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PolishAid 2006) also acknowledges the work of NGDOs and states that "NGOs are one of the main partners of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the development and execution of annual assistance plans". The Ministry has also developed financing mechanisms directed to NGOs.

The Slovak national NGDO Platform was officially established by 15 founding members in 2003, although as in previous case, informal cooperation among non-governmental development organizations started already in 1998 (SKNGDO 2010). Currently, there are 21 full members and 8 observers participating in the platform. As in previous countries, the activities of the platform include the representation of common interests of the Platform's members, co-ordinating common activities and projects, co-operating with state administration bodies and raising awareness among the general public about development issues. Slovak Aid states that in 2008 NGOs accounted for 41% of total bilateral assistance provided (SAMRS 2009).

Despite controversial opinions on the engagement of private sector in development assistance, companies are essential mainly for implementation of infrastructural projects or projects aimed at environmental sanitation. These activities are very labour and technology intensive and thus cannot be implemented (in most cases) by non-governmental organizations. Information on the engagement of private sector in ODA is still very sporadic, only Czech Republic and Slovakia publish relevant data. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary does not mention private sector in any of the available documents; Polish MoFA states that “There are also plans for ... involvement of the private sector in assistance activities” (PolishAid 2006). SAMRS (2009) reported that private companies accounted for 29% of bilateral assistance provided in 2008, which is less than NGOs. It is the opposite situation in the Czech Republic where private sector accounted for 44% of bilateral ODA, however being responsible only for 31% of the projects (Naprstek 2009). In 2009 the Platform of Private Companies for Development Assistance was founded with the aims to increase participation of Czech companies in development interventions, support long-term investments in the developing countries that would be in favour of Czech companies, and support public-private partnerships in the field of development assistance (PPZRS 2010). Currently, the Platform has 19 member companies of various sizes, interests and experience in development assistance.

General public is very important for development assistance, not only for political pressure but also for their support of NGOs and development projects. Over the past several years development NGOs have been focusing on raising awareness on development issues among the general public as well as students of all levels of education, and also the MoFA of Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland allocate funds for development education and awareness. Public opinion on development assistance activities within the Visegrad group can be assessed in line with a public opinion poll conducted by Eurobarometer in 2007. National polls were carried out in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (in 2006, 2009 and 2009 respectively). However, the national polls used different methodologies and therefore the findings are not fully comparable.

The Eurobarometer (2007) focused on the motivation of the public of the 27 EU member states for providing development assistance. In some Visegrad countries the

security motive of development assistance is slightly more significant than in others and at the same time there are slight disparities within this category; 35% of Czechs, 34% of Slovaks, but only 26% of Poles and 14% of Hungarians consider development assistance important mainly for global security issues (the EU average is 28%). The prevention of migration motive is above average within the Visegrad Group as it was stated by 31% of Czechs, 30% of Hungarians, 24% of Poles and Slovaks (EU average is 20%). Economic interests have scored the EU average of 28% in all Visegrad countries. An interesting aspect is the low degree of support for democracy and good governance issues; in the case of the Czech Republic and Poland it was only 15%, Hungary 14%, with Slovakia giving it the highest importance among the Visegrad Four – 22% and corresponding with the EU average. The national polls in Poland³⁵ and Slovakia³⁶ show a similar result. On the contrary, the national polls show a strong support for social sectors (education and healthcare) for the respondents in both countries³⁷.

Among the Millennium Development Goals, poverty reduction is similarly assessed as the most important in all Visegrad countries. The lowest grade of support is in Poland and the Czech Republic (66% and 67% respectively), highest in Hungary and Slovakia (72% and 75% respectively). In all Visegrad countries the result is equal or higher than the EU average of 66%. The national polls reveal that the question of support of less developed countries is greatly supported. Providing development assistance is supported by 70% of Slovaks (PONTIS 2009), 83% of Poles (MoFAPL 2009b), and 82% of Czechs who believe that the Czech Republic should focus on countries where aid is needed, not those who 'are friends with us' (MoFACZ 2006).

³⁵ Only 18% of Polish respondents replied that Poland has most to offer to poorer countries in the field of democratic reforms. (MoFAPL 2009b)

³⁶ 15% of Slovak respondents replied that Slovakia has most to offer to poorer countries in the field of democratic and economic reforms.

³⁷ 63% of Slovak respondents consider health care and 51% education as the main areas of Slovakia's possible support to developing countries (PONTIS 2009). According to a Polish national poll 44% of respondents think that Poland has most to offer in improving the quality of education and improving the situation in healthcare systems - 34% (MoFAPL 2009b).

9. Impact of financial crisis

The financial crisis which hit the world economy in 2008 was mainly portrayed by the media as a 'developed-countries-only' problem. Meanwhile, the developed world is recovering and the developing countries are still experiencing the impacts. It needs to be underlined that only two years after the crisis it is still too early to assess the complete impact of the crisis and therefore sources of information are limited. Official OECD aid statistics of the Visegrad countries are not yet fully accessible and thus this part of the thesis is based on the AidWatch 2010 Report, OECD DAC preliminary data released in May 2010 and the very few information available in the Visegrad Four.

The AidWatch (2009) indicates several areas of impact of the financial crisis on the developing countries:

- Collapse in commodity prices and its consequence in increased unemployment;
- Decrease of export revenues;
- Decrease of Foreign Direct Investment;
- Decline of private capital flows to emerging economies;
- Decrease in remittances.

Although the financial crisis has begun in 2008, ODA budgets for that year were not significantly influenced as a result of the crisis because it was too late for the governments to react. However, concerning financial volumes Poland and Hungary have cut ODA by 10% and 9% respectively, compared to previous year (AidWatch 2009). On the contrary, the year 2009 was in light of budget cuts that were enforced even more after the Greek crisis. The 2010 AidWatch Report estimates that significant decrease of ODA was reported in 14 EU Member states, including Slovakia, where ODA declined by 18%. On the other hand, ODA in Poland and Hungary increased by 13% and 23% respectively. However, in both countries this increase might have been caused by debt relief (as mentioned earlier Hungary cancelled a debt to Ethiopia which would probably be reported in 2009 ODA figures).

Paradoxically, the financial crisis will have 'positive' impacts on ODA to GNI ratio in 2009. Although development assistance amounts decreased, the decline was not as high as the decrease in GNI. The Czech Development Agency estimates 0,13% or 0,14% GNI for ODA, therefore a 0.02% increase in relative terms, might be reported in 2009 (Naprstek 2010).

Considering the future declining prospects of Hungarian ODA in regards to the financial crisis, which has hit Hungary hard; it is not likely that cooperation will continue with all countries at the same pace. Kiss (2010) states that according to the approved budget for 2010, development cooperation will be aimed at international commitment countries, where two thirds of the funds were already allocated for development activities in Afghanistan, and only 23% of funds are available for other partner and project priority countries.

OECD DAC (OECD 2010b) estimates that in 2009 "total net official development assistance from members of the OECD DAC rose slightly in real terms (+0.7%) to USD ..., representing 0.31% of DAC members' combined gross national income ... Excluding debt relief, the rise in ODA in real terms was +6.8%". However, as the report continues the combined net ODA of the 15 DAC EU members decreased slightly by -0.2%, representing 0.44% of their combined GNI. The report also includes estimations on the New Member States and only confirms the estimations of NGOs. Both Polish and Hungarian ODA rose (in case of Hungary the OECD estimates an increase of up to 22% mainly due to increase in bilateral programmes, thus again confirming debt relief). On the other hand ODA of the Czech and Slovak Republics decreased by 5% and 19% respectively.

Although the post-crisis projections were not very optimistic concerning the future levels of ODA, it is evident, that aid levels have not dropped as badly as firstly expected. However, it is still too early to judge the full consequences and impacts as no complete data of the Visegrad countries is available and the question of debt relief is a major one. Whether these countries will meet the set Barcelona II targets of allotting 0.17% GNI for development assistance is still very unclear and rather unlikely. However, if they do, it will be an illusionary increase of relative ODA to GNI ratio which might lead to a potential decrease of ODA in real terms.

10. Conclusion and future perspectives

The aim of the thesis was to analyze different aspects of ODA of the Visegrad countries and identify similar patterns and overlapping areas of development assistance which would allow these countries to co-operate in providing development assistance in the future. Key findings show that major similarities do exist and prospective co-operation can be one of the tools for increasing effectiveness of development assistance of the respective countries. Finally, it can also be concluded that the Visegrad members are very much 'like-minded'.

Majority of partner countries of these Central European re-emerging donors either belonged to the socialist bloc in the past (even those situated in Sub-Saharan Africa) and thus experienced the socialist system or 'made friends' with their socialist counterparts. All four of them provided development assistance to certain extent even before 1989, Czechoslovakia being the biggest donor of development aid, but also having a significant impact on arms trade with the developing countries, through which it was supporting various revolutionary movement and countries' 'fighting against imperialism'. During the communist period thousands of foreign citizens have undertaken their studies or work training the Visegrad countries, thus learning their language and culture. Thousands of experts have been sent out on consultancies to Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such experience and relations with the developing countries greatly influenced the direction of contemporary development policies and strategies of the V4. Therefore it should not be surprising that major overlaps in countries' selection do exist.

Analysis of motivations uncovered many common areas of the Visegrad countries' ODA mainly in the field of transfer of transition know-how and experience gained during the period of vast social, political and economic changes after the fall of the iron curtain. This also might be considered as a certain solidarity with the countries currently undertaking such changes well-expressed by the statement 'others helped us before, we should be helping now'. Security and economic issues are also quite apparent in the Visegrad Four ODA, mainly in the territorial priorities and financial disbursements. All countries are committed to fulfill international recommendation and promises, therefore all four countries have included Afghanistan on the list of their priority countries. However, misalignments mainly in the field of cultural motives do exist. Although this

motivation is common for all four countries, the supported partner countries differ. A burning issue might also be the different perspectives of the respective countries towards minority issues in general (mainly referring to Hungarian minority in Slovakia).

Assessment of institutional and legal framework also shows common features in all Visegrad countries. Very recently, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland have implemented significant changes in their ODA systems. The former two countries already have Act on development assistance in operation, and so can be soon expected in Poland, where works on the Act should be finalized in 2010. One of the two institutional constituencies for ODA found in the Visegrad Four is a 'Policy ministry with separate implementing agency'; Poland and Hungary having a 'directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'. However, Hungarian development assistance, institutional framework as well as legislation is very unclear and ambiguous. There is not enough information provided by neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the 'maybe-existing' development agency HUN-IDA.

Analyzing the territorial priorities key similar patterns have been found. All four Visegrad countries increased number of recipient countries in 2004-2008, thus not following the OECD recommendation to provide ODA only to a small number of recipient countries. Majority of the recipients receive negligible amounts, therefore the development interventions implemented have an insignificant impact and diminishing visibility of the donor. Correlation of development assistance and three selected indicators clearly shows that the Visegrad countries provide more support to middle and upper income countries, rather than focusing on the least developed countries mainly in Africa. The Czech Republic and also to some extent Poland display other patterns concerning the provision of ODA – they tend to support countries with higher levels of democracy and higher levels of transition which is very much in line with their goals, motivation and sector priorities. On the other hand such patterns cannot be confirmed for Slovakia and Hungary. Both countries have selected a high number of priority countries and only very few of them receive any significant volumes of ODA. However, this also shows a very ad hoc selection of the priority countries, not following the stated criteria.

Only two priority countries are common to all four Visegrad members – Moldova and Afghanistan. However, 7 countries are common for three and 9 countries for two

members of the Visegrad Group. Only 9 of the 27 priority countries have only one donor present, and in most cases support to these countries is very limited. The map clearly shows that top recipients and priority countries overlap to some extent; however, major differences can also be found (e.g. China being among the top recipients). Nonetheless, aid inflation, mainly debt relief need to be taken into consideration when assessing financial volumes provided for ODA.

Assessing financial aspects of development assistance of the Visegrad countries has shown the aid commitments have been gradually improving over the past years. However, it is very unlikely that any of the Visegrad Four will reach the European Union Barcelona II targets of providing 0.17% GNI for ODA by 2010. This might be only happen as a result of the financial crisis. Among the four countries the Czech Republic appears to show the lowest volatility of ODA to GNI ratio between 2004 and 2008 and Poland has been the largest donor in real terms, providing almost half of development assistance from the group.

The situation in the non-governmental is also very similar, and so is the public opinion on development assistance where people tend to think positively about development assistance, however low awareness about development issues prevails in all Visegrad countries.

The analysis has clearly shown major similarities and overlapping territorial and sectoral priorities and therefore co-operation among the Visegrad members in the area of development assistance would be not only desirable but also useful. It would lead to greater co-ordination, donor harmonization, lower transaction costs for the donors but also the recipients, and most importantly to greater focus and effectiveness of aid. Establishing such co-operation might not be easy at the beginning but it will return the investment in longer term. The Visegrad countries should mainly focus on those regions where all four or three of them are present, Moldova possibly being a good model country. Co-ordination of aid should be in that case mandated to one country, most probably one with the highest share of funding (in case of Moldova – Czech Republic). Such co-operation would also simplify evaluation missions which could be carried out jointly. However, it would be advisable that the total number of priority countries is lowered and their future selection consulted with the other Visegrad members.

Furthermore, the Visegrad countries could also establish a financing mechanism which would support joint projects of NGOs, private companies and other stakeholders in the priority countries. This could either be administered by the already existing Visegrad Fund, or by a new institution. Co-operation among NGOs already exist as can be seen on the example of a joint AidWatch report 'Official Development Assistance in the Visegrad Countries' published by the Polish Green Network in 2008.

Already in 2004 the Visegrad members have agreed on greater co-operation with other countries. Development assistance provides the opportunity to do so as it would not only contribute to the stated security issues, but also to development assistance of both the donors and recipients. The main prerequisite for such co-operation is political willingness and active approach of at least one of the members. Challenges might be in foreign policy strategies and interests of individual countries which might be enforced more than poverty reduction.

11. Abstract in Czech and English

Comparative Study of Official Development Assistance of the Visegrad Countries

After the fall of the iron curtain the Visegrad countries have undergone vast changes not only in their domestic policies but also in their foreign relations, including development assistance. Today all four countries are members of international structures such as the OECD and the EU which implies their obligations to provide ODA. The thesis aims to analyze the historical background of ODA within the Visegrad group. As all countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – belonged to the eastern bloc their foreign relations were guided by the socialist ideologies. After 1989 all countries have undergone dramatic transition and they re-emerged as donors in late 1990s. Sectoral and territorial fragmentation of ODA both individually and collectively, legal establishment, relevant institutions in place, and motivation and goals for ODA are major points of interest. Furthermore, financial volumes; their structure and inflation of aid are assessed. As non-governmental development organizations as well as companies and general public are important actors in development assistance attention will be given to their engagement in ODA within the region. The work also aims to reflect to what extent ODA is solely an instrument of foreign affairs policies and what can be assessed as genuine aid. At last the thesis briefly analyzes the impact of financial crisis on ODA and the future prospects on development assistance of the Visegrad countries.

Komparativní studie rozvojové spolupráce zemí Visegrádské skupiny

Po pádu železné opony prošly visegrádské země rozsáhlými změnami a to nejen v oblasti domácích politik, ale i ve svých zahraničních vztazích, včetně rozvojové pomoci. Dnes jsou všechny čtyři země členy mezinárodních struktur, jako je OECD a EU, které předpokládají jejich povinnosti poskytovat ODA. Práce si klade za cíl analyzovat historické pozadí zahraniční rozvojové spolupráce v rámci Visegrádské skupiny. Protože všechny země – Česká republika, Maďarsko, Polsko i Slovensko – patřily k Východnímu bloku ve svých zahraničních vztazích byly vedeny socialistickou ideologií. Po roce 1989 všechny země prošly dramatickou změnou a znovu se stali dárci koncem 90. let. Sektorová a teritoriální fragmentace rozvojové spolupráce, právní zřízení, institucionální zajištění, motivace a cíle pro oficiální rozvojovou spolupráci, jsou hlavními body zájmu této práce.

Dále jsou posuzovány finanční struktura a inflace pomoci. Nevládní rozvojové organizace, stejně jako firmy a široká veřejnost jsou důležitými aktéry v oblasti rozvojové pomoci, pozornost proto bude věnována jejich zapojení do rozvojové spolupráce. Práce se také snaží zachytit do jaké míry je rozvojová spolupráce pouze nástrojem zahraniční politiky a co lze hodnotit jako skutečnou pomoc. Závěrem práce stručně analyzuje dopady finanční krize a budoucí vyhlídky pro zahraniční rozvojovou spolupráci zemí Visegrádu.

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Annexes

Annex 1. Schematic representation of DAC Members' organisational structures for aid management

Annex 2. DAC list of ODA recipients (2008 flows)


Annex 3. Freedomhouse ranking

Annex 4. BTI ranking

Annex 5.-8. OECD aid statistics for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia

Annex 9.-11. Maps of priority countries and top ODA recipients of the Visegrad countries

Figure 1. Schematic representation of DAC Members' organisational structures for aid management



DAC List of ODA Recipients

Effective for reporting on 2008 flows

Least Developed Countries	Other Low Income Countries (per capita GNI < \$935 in 2007)	Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories (per capita GNI \$936-\$3 705 in 2007)	Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories (per capita GNI \$3 706-\$11 455 in 2007)
Afghanistan	Côte d'Ivoire	Albania	*Anguilla
Angola	Ghana	Algeria	Antigua and Barbuda ¹
Bangladesh	Kenya	Armenia	Argentina
Benin	Korea, Dem. Rep.	Azerbaijan	Barbados ²
Bhutan	Kyrgyz Rep.	Bolivia	Belarus
Burkina Faso	Nigeria	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Belize
Burundi	Pakistan	Cameroon	Botswana
Cambodia	Papua New Guinea	Cape Verde	Brazil
Central African Rep.	Tajikistan	China	Chile
Chad	Uzbekistan	Colombia	Cook Islands
Comoros	Viet Nam	Congo, Rep.	Costa Rica
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Zimbabwe	Dominican Republic	Croatia
Djibouti		Ecuador	Cuba
Equatorial Guinea		Egypt	Dominica
Eritrea		El Salvador	Fiji
Ethiopia		Georgia	Gabon
Gambia		Guatemala	Grenada
Guinea		Guyana	Jamaica
Guinea-Bissau		Honduras	Kazakhstan
Haiti		India	Lebanon
Kiribati		Indonesia	Libya
Laos		Iran	Malaysia
Lesotho		Iraq	Mauritius
Liberia		Jordan	*Mayotte
Madagascar		Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of	Mexico
Malawi		Marshall Islands	Montenegro
Maldives		Micronesia, Federated States	*Montserrat
Mali		Moldova	Nauru
Mauritania		Mongolia	Oman ¹
Mozambique		Morocco	Palau
Myanmar		Namibia	Panama
Nepal		Nicaragua	Serbia ³
Niger		Niue	Seychelles
Rwanda		Palestinian Administered Areas	South Africa
Samoa		Paraguay	*St. Helena
São Tomé and Príncipe		Peru	St. Kitts-Nevis
Senegal		Philippines	St. Lucia
Sierra Leone		Sri Lanka	St. Vincent and Grenadines
Solomon Islands		Swaziland	Suriname
Somalia		Syria	Trinidad and Tobago ²
Sudan		Thailand	Turkey
Tanzania		*Tokelau	Uruguay
Timor-Leste		Tonga	Venezuela
Togo		Tunisia	
Tuvalu		Turkmenistan	
Uganda		Ukraine	
Vanuatu		*Wallis and Futuna	
Yemen			
Zambia			

*Territory.

- (1) Antigua & Barbuda and Oman exceeded the high income country threshold in 2007. In accordance with the DAC rules for revision of this List, both will graduate from the List in 2011 if they remain high income countries until 2010.
- (2) Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago exceeded the high income country threshold in 2006 and 2007. In accordance with the DAC rules for revision of this List, both will graduate from the List in 2011 if they remain high income countries until 2010.
- (3) At present aid to Kosovo is recorded under aid to Serbia. Kosovo will be listed separately if and when it is recognised by the UN.

Combined Average Ratings – Independent Countries

FREE

1.0

Andorra
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Barbados
Belgium
Canada
Cape Verde
Chile
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominica
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kiribati
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Marshall Islands
Micronesia
Nauru
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Palau
Poland
Portugal
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
San Marino
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tuvalu
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

1.5

Belize
Bulgaria
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Israel

Japan
Latvia
Monaco
Panama
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
South Korea
Taiwan

2.0

Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Benin
Botswana
Brazil
Croatia
Dominican Republic
Mauritius
Mongolia
Namibia
Romania
Samoa
Sao Tome and
Principe
South Africa
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Vanuatu

2.5

El Salvador
Guyana
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Lesotho
Mali
Mexico
Peru
Senegal
Serbia
Ukraine

PARTLY FREE

3.0

Albania
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Honduras
Macedonia
Montenegro
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Seychelles

Sierra Leone
Turkey

3.5

Bosnia-Herzegovina
East Timor
Guatemala
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Moldova
Niger
Philippines
Solomon Islands
Tanzania
Zambia

4.0

Burkina Faso
Comoros
Georgia
Guinea-Bissau
Kuwait
Malawi
Malaysia
Mauritania
Nigeria
Sri Lanka
Tonga
Venezuela

4.5

Armenia
Bangladesh
Burundi
The Gambia
Haiti
Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Morocco
Nepal
Singapore
Uganda

5.0

Afghanistan
Bahrain
Central African Republic
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Thailand
Togo
Yemen

NOT FREE

5.5

Algeria
Angola
Azerbaijan
Bhutan
Brunei
Cambodia
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Kinshasa)
Egypt
Guinea
Kazakhstan
Maldives
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Russia
Rwanda
Tajikistan
United Arab Emirates

6.0


Cameroon
Cote d'Ivoire
Iran
Iraq
Swaziland
Tunisia
Vietnam

6.5

Belarus
Chad
China
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Laos
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Zimbabwe

7.0

Burma
Cuba
Libya
North Korea
Somalia
Sudan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan



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Legend:

Status Index

The Status Index's overall result represents the mean value of the scores for the dimensions "Political Transformation" and "Economic Transformation". The mean value was calculated using the exact, unrounded values for both these dimensions, which, in turn, were derived from the ratings for the five political criteria (based on 18 indicators) and the seven economic criteria (based on 14 indicators).

Trend Indicator (2005 - 2007)

The trend indicator refers to the total score for the dimensions political and economic transformation. If the difference in score between the BTI 2005 and the BTI 2008 is at least 0.5, an improvement or deterioration is indicated. If the difference is 1.0 or greater, this is noted as a major change.

- ↑ strong improvement
↑ improvement
↔ no significant changes
↓ deterioration
↓ strong deterioration

Management Index

This Index evaluates management by political decision makers while taking into consideration the level of difficulty. The Management Index's overall result is calculated by multiplying the intermediate result with a factor derived from the level of difficulty evaluation.

The level of difficulty evaluation takes into account the structural constraints on political management. It is obtained by calculating six indicators that evaluate a country's structural conditions, traditions of civil society, intensity of conflicts, level of education, economic performance and institutional capacity.

All data in this table are rounded scores.

Main data table with columns for Status Index, Ranking (2008, 2006, 2005, 2008), Management Index, and Level of Difficulty. Includes rows for countries like Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, etc.

Criteria Management Performance

Table showing Management Index scores for countries like Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, etc.

Table titled 'Countries in alphabetical order' listing countries and their corresponding Status Index and Management Index scores.

CZECH REPUBLIC, OECD aid statistics

Time Period	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Recipient(s), ODA in mil. USD					
All Recipients	108,28	135,15	160,87	178,88	249,21
All Developing Countries	63,58	64,42	77,7	80,95	117,14
All Multilateral Recipients	44,7	70,73	83,17	97,93	132,07
Afghanistan	6,08	1,96	4,2	10,62	42,1
Albania	0,53	0,5	0,51	0,68	0,42
Algeria	0,02	0,2	0,17		0,11
Angola	0,26	0,33	0,79	1,47	1,87
Antigua & Barbuda					0,02
Argentina	0,12	0,09	0,16	0,19	0,16
Armenia	0,16	0,5	0,43	0,43	0,68
Azerbaijan	0,03	0,04	0,04	0,06	0,04
Bangladesh	0,22	0,01	0,07	0,17	0,01
Belarus		1,19	1,71	1,45	1,7
Belize				0,06	0,01
Benin	0,03	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,04
Bhutan				0,02	
Bolivia	0,16	0,14	0,14	0,23	0,13
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,03	1,34	2,13	2,61	3,3
Brazil			0,12	0,13	0,01
Burkina Faso	0,35	0,29		0,26	
Burundi		0,04			
Cambodia	0,17	0,03	0,31	0,1	0,18
Cameroon		0,04	0,05	0,06	0,05
Cape Verde	0,01				
Colombia	0,17	0,12	0,33	0,17	0,19
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0,07	0,09	0,16	0,33	0,56
Congo, Rep.			0,03	0,03	0,01
Costa Rica	0,07	0,08	0,09	0,13	0,18
Cote d'Ivoire	0,02	0,06	0,03	0,01	0,02
Croatia	0,13	0,11	0,5	0,39	0,45
Cuba		0,04	0,11	0,11	0,29
Dominica				0,06	
Dominican Republic	0,02			0,01	0,01
Ecuador	0,14	0,07	0,11	0,12	0,2
Egypt	0,1	0,1	1,35	0,17	0,19
El Salvador	0,18	0,23	0,04	0,1	0,17
Eritrea				0,01	
Ethiopia	0,69	0,77	0,61	0,5	1,21
Gambia				0,01	
Georgia	1,36	0,66	0,56	0,85	2,36
Ghana	0,06	0,06	0,12	0,22	0,11
Grenada	0,02				
Guatemala	0,02	0,12	0,04	0,05	0,05
Guinea	0,06	0,07	0,14	0,13	0,17
Guinea-Bissau			0,02	0,01	0,03
Haiti	0,02				0,15
Honduras	0,01	0,02	0,03	0,04	0,04
Chad	0,01	0,01			0,06
Chile	0,02	0,21	0,19	0,14	0,29
China	2,94	1,3	0,34	0,21	0,41
India	0,06	1,31	0,22	0,17	0,22
Indonesia	0,1	0,67	3,28	1,84	0,29
Iran	0,64	0,02	0,04	0,02	0,05
Iraq	13,66	8,13	11,8	1,2	0,99
Jamaica	0,35	0,17	0,22	0,49	0,53

Jordan	0,24	0,2	0,21	0,13	0,07
Kazakistan	0,17	0,45	0,9	0,41	0,52
Kenya	0,15	0,31	0,35	0,1	0,24
Korea, Dem. Rep.	0,2	0,08	0,11	0,23	0,46
Kyrgyz Republic	1,14	0,49	0,54	0,55	0,8
Laos					0,03
Lebanon	0,21	0,07	0,71	0,26	0,37
Lesotho	0,02	0,01	0,01		0,02
Liberia	0,13	0,11	0,28	0,41	0,38
Libya			0,01		0,02
Macedonia (FYROM)	0,2	0,35	0,21	0,34	0,39
Madagascar	0,02				
Malawi	0,07	0,07	0,08		
Malaysia				0,02	0,03
Maldives	0,02	0,02	0,01		
Mali	0,23	0,06	0,36	0,3	0,7
Mauritania				0,01	0,04
Mexico		0,22	0,01	0,01	0,01
Moldova	1,09	0,68	1,32	2,41	2,93
Mongolia	2,88	3,04	2,72	4,04	6
Montenegro			0,28	0,42	0,56
Morocco	0,1	0,25	0,02	0,02	0,03
Mozambique	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,06	0,01
Myanmar (Burma)		0,02	0,08	0,41	1,09
Namibia	0,79	0,47	0,54	0,95	1,06
Nauru				0,02	
Nepal	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,11	0,03
Nicaragua	0,96	0,13	0,23	0,08	0,75
Niger		0,21			0,01
Nigeria	0,02	0,3	0,31	0,44	0,32
Pakistan		3,7	0,61	0,23	0,15
Palau					0,03
Palestinian Adm. Areas	0,23	0,23	0,24	0,9	4,68
Panama	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01
Papua New Guinea					0,01
Paraguay	0,05	0,09	0,16	0,15	0,18
Peru	0,26	0,36	0,49	0,92	0,72
Philippines	0,63	0,38	0,25	0,42	0,29
Rwanda			0,01	0,02	0,02
Sao Tome & Principe		0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01
Senegal	0,01		0,03	0,07	0,38
Serbia	6,88	6,89	6	9,4	7,77
Seychelles	0,01				
Sierra Leone	0,02	0,02	0,06	0,05	0,05
Solomon Islands				0,02	
Somalia			0,06	0,03	0,34
South Africa	0,01				
Sri Lanka	0,45	0,24	0,27	1,16	0,26
Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec.	0,17	0,4	0,12		0,75
Sudan	0,44	0,09	0,23	0,56	0,37
Syria		0,08	0,06	0,17	0,6
Tajikistan	0,05	0,13	0,09	0,01	0,07
Tanzania	0,03	0,17	0,24	0,03	0,05
Thailand	0,03	0,08	0,19	0,07	0,06
Timor-Leste					0,04
Togo	0,01				0,01
Tunisia	0,01	0,01	0,02	0,01	0,01
Turkey		0,12	0,2	1,17	1,61

Turkmenistan			0,01	0,01	0,01
Uganda	0,07	0,04	0,33	0,09	0,05
Ukraine		4,62	2,69	2,3	3,2
Uruguay	0,01	0,01	0,01		
Uzbekistan	0,31	0,39	0,31	0,45	0,26
Vanuatu					0,03
Venezuela	0,03	0,03	0,06	0,06	0,08
Viet Nam	3,05	1,42	1,91	3,04	3,93
Yemen	0,27	0,32	0,92	1,36	1,38
Zambia	0,13	0,36	0,87	0,41	0,96
Zimbabwe	0,05				0,29

HUNGARY, OECD aid statistics

Time Period	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Recipient(s), ODA in mil. USD					
All Recipients	70,14	100,37	149,49	103,47	106,94
All Developing Countries	35,49	39,58	84,34	33,03	15,45
All Multilateral Recipients	34,65	60,79	65,15	70,44	91,49
Afghanistan	1,63	0,07	0,39	7,52	4,07
Albania	0,07		0,01	0,01	0,08
Algeria			0,01		0,04
Argentina				0,01	
Azerbaijan			0,01		0,03
Bangladesh					0,03
Belarus					0,08
Bosnia-Herzegovina	18,63	0,06	0,05	0,32	0,47
Brazil				0,02	
Cambodia	0,15	0,06		0,1	0,09
Colombia	0,02			0,01	
Congo, Dem. Rep.					0,01
Croatia	0,34		0,02	0,36	0,23
Cuba					0,06
Ecuador					0,01
Egypt				0,11	0,02
Ethiopia	0,05			0,02	
Georgia	0,05				0,27
Chile				0,01	
China	0,18			0,25	0,38
India	0,01			0,01	0,02
Indonesia				0,01	
Iran	0,12				0,01
Iraq	1,77	0,39	67,15	0,02	0,04
Jordan	0,01				
Kazakistan	0,05		0,08		0,03
Kenya				0,05	0,03
Korea, Dem. Rep.	0,05			0,02	0,08
Kyrgyz Republic	0,05	0,07		0,05	0,13
Laos	0,07	0,62	0,08		
Libya				0,01	
Macedonia (FYROM)	0,28		0,02	0,12	0,01
Mauritania					0,01
Mauritius				0,01	
Mexico	0,01			0,08	
Moldova	0,16	0,05		0,26	0,44
Mongolia	0,64	0,02	0,01	0,41	0,04
Montenegro				0,76	1,67
Morocco	0,05				
Mozambique				17,72	
Myanmar (Burma)					0,05
Palestinian Adm. Areas	0,39	0,03		0,22	0,07
Peru				0,01	
Serbia	3,25	10,29	0,11	1,16	3,76
South Africa					0,05
Sri Lanka	0,53				
Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec.			0,39	0,08	
Sudan	0,05				
Syria	0,07			0,01	
Tanzania		9,57			
Thailand			0,01	0,01	
Tunisia				0,01	

Turkey				0,09	0,02
Ukraine		6,93	0,08	2,37	2,35
Uruguay					0,01
Venezuela				0,01	
Viet Nam	0,94	1,06	0,31	0,55	0,29
Yemen	0,37	10,03		0,15	0,23

POLAND, OECD aid statistics

Time Period	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Recipient(s), ODA in mil. USD					
All Recipients	117,51	204,79	296,82	362,85	372,34
All Developing Countries	24,89	47,96	118,99	155,75	83,79
All Multilateral Recipients	92,62	156,83	177,83	207,1	288,55
Afghanistan	0,21	0,33	0,55	1,81	1,89
Albania	0,2	0,19		0,41	0,46
Algeria	0,02	0,02	0,02	-0,1	0,06
Angola	0,06	0,18	92,35	0,49	6,87
Argentina	0,01	0,06	0,02	0,05	0,02
Armenia	0,1	0,1	0,17	0,21	0,5
Azerbaijan	0,02	0,03	0,13	0,47	0,33
Bangladesh		0,01	0,02	0,3	0,07
Belarus		3,98	6,77	14,93	18,31
Benin				0,01	0,01
Bhutan				0,01	
Bolivia				0,01	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0,01	0,01	0,16	0,08	
Botswana					0,06
Brazil	0,05	0,14	0,05	0,2	0,15
Burkina Faso				0,04	0,02
Burundi			0,03	0,01	0,01
Cambodia			0,05	0,03	
Cameroon	0,09	0,07	0,05	0,12	0,18
Cape Verde					0,01
Chad				0,01	
China	1,55	5,34	0,51	67,21	18,56
Colombia	0,01	0,01		0,01	0,01
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0,09	0,06	0,14	0,09	0,3
Congo, Rep.	0,01		0,02	0,11	0,05
Croatia	0,03	0,01	0,01	0,09	0,02
Cuba			0,02	0,03	0,09
Ecuador	0,02	0,04	0,05	0,08	0,07
Egypt	0,05	0,03	0,02	0,02	0,04
Eritrea				0,01	
Ethiopia	8,7	0,01	0,05	0,16	0,45
Gambia			0,03	0,02	
Georgia	0,25	0,25	0,52	1,55	2,88
Ghana	0,02	0,02	0,05	0,02	0,23
Grenada				0,01	
Guinea	0,02	0,04		0,02	0,02
Guinea-Bissau	0,01			0,01	0,01
India	0,22	0,16	0,04	0,19	0,36
Indonesia	0,14	0,06	0,56	0,08	0,08
Iran	0,03	0,04	0,01	0,03	0,06
Iraq	0,14	0,33	0,47	0,45	0,75
Jamaica					0,03
Jordan	0,05	0,05	0,01	0,07	0,15
Kazakstan	1,32	1,38	1,06	2,51	0,54
Kenya	0,11	0,09	0,19	0,21	0,5
Korea, Dem. Rep.	0,01		0,01	0,08	0,08
Kyrgyz Republic	0,05	0,07	0,3	0,47	2,85
Laos	0,07	0,04	0,04	0,05	0,01
Lebanon	0,04	0,06	0,41	0,03	0,06
Lesotho					
Liberia			0,01		0,01
Libya		0,13	0,01	0,01	

Macao					
Macedonia (FYROM)	0,04	0,06	0,06	0,22	0,2
Madagascar			0,02	0,05	0,02
Malawi			0,09	0,03	0,09
Malaysia					0,02
Mali	0,01			0,01	
Mauritius					0,02
Mexico	0,01	0,01		0,18	0,07
Micronesia					
Moldova	0,27	0,56	1,25	1,76	2,31
Mongolia	0,23	0,19	0,04	0,27	0,4
Montenegro			0,09	13,23	3
Morocco	0,02	0,03		0,04	0,05
Myanmar (Burma)				0,03	0,2
Nepal	0,01	0,01	0,03	0,03	0,05
Nicaragua				30,57	
Niger		0,06			
Nigeria	0,14	0,2	0,03	0,15	0,18
Oman			0,01		
Pakistan	0,15	0,24	0,12	0,14	0,08
Palestinian Adm. Areas	0,11	0,12	0,48	0,76	0,63
Papua New Guinea				0,03	0,01
Peru	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,13	0,09
Philippines	0,01	0,01			
Rwanda	0,03	0,02	0,08	0,54	0,81
Saudi Arabia		0,03			
Senegal	0,03	0,02	0,16	0,29	0,15
Serbia	8,14	18,7	0,18	-3,3	-2,6
Sierra Leone			0,03		0,05
Somalia	0,03	0,01	0,02	0,02	
South Africa	0,01	0,02	0,01	0,07	0,1
Sri Lanka	0,16	0,02	0,01	0,13	0,09
St. Kitts-Nevis				0,03	
Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec.				0,06	
Sudan	0,23	0,03	0,06	0,8	1,29
Suriname				0,03	
Syria	0,11	0,13	0,03	-4,06	0,19
Tajikistan	0,01		0,03	0,05	0,11
Tanzania	0,03	0,06	0,07	0,8	0,33
Thailand				0,01	0,06
Togo			0,01	0,01	0,04
Tunisia	0,03		0,02	0,07	0,1
Turkey	0,03	0,04	0,03	0,03	0,07
Turkmenistan	0,04	0,04	0,05	0,12	0,17
Uganda		0,01	0,01	0,02	0,03
Ukraine		6,16	7,09	12,58	13,95
Uzbekistan	0,12	5,96	4,52	4,6	-0,09
Venezuela				0,01	0,02
Viet Nam	0,58	0,81	0,06	0,74	0,86
Yemen	0,06	0,02	0,01	0,03	0,04
Zambia	0,01	0,02	0,03	0,06	0,4
Zimbabwe	0,03	0,04		0,04	0,05

SLOVAKIA, OECD aid statistics

Time Period	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Recipient(s), ODA in mil. USD					
All Recipients	28,19	56,83	55,11	67,23	91,85
All Developing Countries	10,72	31,43	24,75	27,6	40,82
All Multilateral Recipients	17,47	25,4	30,36	39,63	51,03
Afghanistan	0,38	4,41	1,54	1,33	0,26
Albania	0,21	1,27		0,01	
Algeria	0,02				
Angola	0,02	0,02			
Argentina	0,01				
Armenia	0,08				
Bangladesh	0,26			0,08	
Belarus		0,08	0,07	0,07	0,2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0,2	1,39	0,13	0,01	0,56
Cambodia	0,2		0,45	0,07	
Croatia	0,04		0,02		
Cuba					0,09
Ecuador	0,01				
Egypt	0,01				
Ethiopia	0,01				
Gambia		0,01			
Georgia	0,47		0,01		0,12
Haiti					0,05
China					1,44
India	1,38	0,53	0,09	0,01	
Iran	0,13				
Iraq	0,25	1,16			
Kazakstan	0,22	0,88	0,34	0,11	0,07
Kenya	0,22	0,69	0,4	0,06	0,36
Kyrgyz Republic	0,22		0,55	0,56	0,67
Lebanon	0,01				
Liberia					25,07
Libya					0,09
Macedonia (FYROM)	0,21	0,17	0,17	0,04	0,39
Maldives	0,01				
Moldova	0,4		0,02	0,16	0,17
Mongolia	0,19	0,82	0,64	0,29	
Montenegro				0,64	0,45
Mozambique	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,14	0,15
Myanmar (Burma)					0,09
Pakistan	0,37				
Palestinian Adm. Areas	0,05				0,07
Peru	0,01			0,3	
Serbia	2,33	2,24	0,51	1,12	3,05
Sri Lanka	0,38				
Sudan	0,24	17,28	14,98	17,68	0,15
Syria	0,02				
Tajikistan	0,21				
Turkey	0,07		0,28		
Uganda	0	0,04			
Ukraine		0,34	0,53	0,05	0,48
Uzbekistan	0,23		0,03	0,1	0,25
Viet Nam	0,1				
Yemen	0,01				