**Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci**

**Pedagogická fakulta**

**DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE**

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#### Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci

#### Pedagogicá fakulta

Diplomová práce

**Brexit and its implications for the future of the UK and EU economy, culture, and politics.**

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Ústav cizích jazyků

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## Abstract

The issue of the imaginary Brexit is omnipresent in Britain from the very entry into the European Community. This development is accompanied by several specific stages and elements of Euroscepticism that determined how Britain split in integration efforts with Europeans. The result of is aloofness towards the EU and the Brexit process, which continues to this day and will continue to persist not only in British politics, but also in the economy and culture. Furthermore, connected with the threats of current developments in the world order, thus indicating a clear imperative for close cooperation, in which Britain needs to be anchored even though it has left one. Therefore, it is not only a global development, but also a domestic one, as Britain is experiencing an unprecedented economic decline accompanied by political discontent. In the thesis, these aspects are described in the most fundamental areas and take into account the causes and consequences of that development. At the same time, it offers a possible implementation of the topic in ELT with a focus on the perception of populism and European identity.

**Key words:** Brexit, Euroscepticism, economy, politics, foreign affairs, Brexit in ELT, populismus

# List of Abbreviations

CEU – Council of the European Union

EC – European Council

EEC – European Economic Community

ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists

EPP – European People Party

CEU – Council of the European Union

EEC – European Economic Communities

EEA – European Economic Area

EFTA – European Free Trade Association

ERM – Europe exchange Rate Mechanism

FP – Foreign Policy

FTA – Free Trade Agreement

SEA – Single European Act

CW – Commonwealth

CEE – Central and Eastern European countries

PM – Prime Minister

QMV – Qualified Majority Voting

CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union

CAP – Common Agriculture Policy

CFP – Common Fisheries Policy

AUKUS – Military alliance between Australia, United Kingdom, and United States of America

G7 – Informal grouping of 7 most advanced economies

EU – European Union

USA – United States of America

PCR – Peoples Republic of China

TCA – Trade and Cooperation Agreement

LP – Lesson Plan

SM – Single Market

# Introduction

This diploma thesis focuses on the issue of Brexit and its development until today, it describes individual areas such as the economy and culture in Britain, as well as the area of politics that created the entire Brexit and accompanies it. The thesis will emphasize specific elements of the different historical development and animosities that shaped the British Euroscepticism. Subsequently, followed by its effects on the referendum and afterwards on Brexit progress and the mood in society and the atmosphere in politics. Furthermore, reflect on the ability of people to assign responsibility and consider the legitimacy of institutions in the area of significant decisions such as the referendum.

The diploma thesis will try to find the result of Brexit in the field of trade and politics. Additionally, take into account the influence of the media and the historical realities of Euroscepticism on the referendum. Subsequently, it will outline possible applications of the topic in ELT and expanding awareness of the EU.

Per se, the subject of Brexit has been constantly examined since the 2016 referendum and is touched upon by several academics and the entire scientific sphere, as well as those outside of it. Overall, it can be determined that the topic will still be relevant in the long term and its coverage is therefore very broad, and the contribution of the work will rather take into account the summary of those findings. At the same time, it will be using data to compare the mentioned negatives or positives of Brexit, that is why the thesis is designed more towards the economic-political consequences in correlation with historical realities so it would prevent only depicting established theories.

The thesis is primarily oriented towards usage of respected sources that are based on an academic basis and are published by experts in the field of international relations, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, and consequently their relations. Ultimately, the work will be centred on data from renowned institutions for collecting public opinion and economic development. For the second part of the work, related to the application of the topic, the literature on the methodology will be used. Likewise, the materials of the EU methodological portal for teaching these realities, identically from the portals dealing with British realities. The result of the used sources should be a synthesis of the current perception by experts and an established political theory that bears adequate applicability to the topic of Brexit.

The work is divided into five parts, in which the first four parts follow each other in the field of the development of the British attitude towards the continent and later the EU as such.

The first chapter is devoted to the historical development of British Euroscepticism and the role of gradually delayed integration, which eventually caught up with the British and caused Brexit. The chapter also provides a summary of the role of the media and populist groups before Brexit.

The second chapter is specifically devoted to the impacts themselves in the areas of politics, economy and culture. The impacts are based on data and reports devoted to the current development of the British economy and politics.

The third chapter tries to take into account the future development of Britain's foreign policy and its anchoring in the world order without the EU. This chapter is primarily based on reports and analyses that are current and offers possible solutions to the new position of Britain and its concept of Global Britain.

The fourth chapter follows on from all the previous chapters and considers all factors at once, whether it is economic development or individual failures during Brexit and their effects, as well as the very future of Britain or the EU. It looks at the relationship between the EU and Britain and how cooperation and politics between these entities will look, but especially in the case of Britain.

The last chapter deals with the application of the topic in ELT and what is the appropriate way of using the topic for lessons in which the European identity can be strengthened. The thesis thus presents a lesson plan whose content is based on the previous parts of the thesis and takes into account the educational aspects of RVP for appropriate implementation.

*The great disadvantage of our present electoral system is that it freezes the pattern of politics, and holds together the incompatible because everyone assumes that if a party splits it will be electorally slaughtered. (Jenkins and Lindley 1985, p. 17)*

# Causes of Brexit

This chapter is devoted to the causes of Brexit and its original and current form, namely Euroscepticism, which historically developed predominantly in British Isles, where there was a discernible manifestation of individual elements that had their origins in the specific geographical location of England (Keller and Habermann 2021, p. 23–26). This unique development from the continent, whether historical or political, created an ideal dividing line that acts as a division between British realities and continental ones.

The content of the chapter is a critical perspective on modern British history with an accent on the Eurosceptic perception of the continent and its resulting manifestation now known as Brexit.

## Isles and the rest

Britain's foreign policy has constantly been formed by a certain balancing of pragmatism and idealism, but always supplemented with aspects of well-defined realism, unlike the United States, which always tried to be the main actor on the world stage and promote ideas that would be overly idealistic for the rest of the world. This is how the British Prime Minister Edward Heath perceived it, whose idea was to promote the rule of law, which would eventually lead to closer cooperation between nations with the same principle[[1]](#footnote-1) (Heath 1969).

However, this foundation did not emerge during the 20th century, it is a long-standing principle whose beginnings date back to the period 16th century in which Britain anchored its position of power and stood for balancing the hegemons on the continent (Kissinger 2014, p. 43–45). Through this specific development that the islands went through, unlike the continent, whether it was the Magna Carta, the Church of England, or the Glorious Revolution, Industrial Revolution, and many others. The British were able to maintain the balance of power on the continent for generations and prevent the rise of a hegemon that directly threatened their islands. Creating this imaginary equilibrium helped the Britain to maintain her dominant position as the leading actor on the world stage into the 20th century (ibid, p. 43-58; Zakaria 1997). This is also due to the pragmatic inclinations and realities that have developed differently from continental ones during the past centuries. The British were thus undefeated for most of history and enjoyed their dominant position in the world order, but their few losses are fundamentally remembered (Bogdanor 2013a). Although, they can turn them in their favour, especially Henry VIII's circumvention of the rules of the Catholic Church by founding the Anglican Church. Later, as well as the 1066 victory of William the Conqueror, the result of which can be characterized by the interpretation of modern politicians as the export of tyranny from the continent (Keller and Habermann 2021, p. 28–34).

These heroic tropes or references to British history, in which the Britons have always played a critical role, have been taken over by today's populists or extreme conservatives. They are attempting to use British history as a weapon[[2]](#footnote-2) to create a fictitious cultural division between the Britain and Europe. For this, they use examples as Waterloo, in which they restrained the French hegemon, but they forget that they did not do it alone, but with the help of several other European nations (ibid, p. 26-35). The British are then depicted as especially the English as the first inventors of freedom and heroic struggle for their rights. Although some of these primacies really arose on the islands to a certain extent, it can never be stated that this is an independent phenomenon without external influences from other intellectuals on the continent (ibid).

The British and especially modern politicians as aforementioned are trying to create a significant dividing line between the British and the rest of the world. That difference does exist, but these differences are not big enough to force the abandonment of one of the most successful political projects of modern civilization.

Still, this was preceded by how the modern British citizen essentially became what they are today. For example, Edmund Burke contributed to this in his definition of British attitudes after the French Revolution, in which he criticized this sudden idealistic approach to change[[3]](#footnote-3), which does not belong to the British political world. Despite his affiliation with the Whigs, he was a moderate conservative whose views formulated the modern political system of Britain (Bragg 2010).

Jeremy Bentham further contributed to these ideas with utilitarianism, which further added pragmatic principle of ethics to the already decent foundations of human rights and inalienable natural liberties defined by J. Locke. Subsequently, they were supplemented with the political aspects of J. S. Mill, who tried to extend the right to vote for women, for example, and to make Britain truly the cradle of a modern state and the equality of its citizens (Driver 2022).

In the background of this unique development, which has its beginnings in several historical events, the industrial revolution was also born, which caused considerable inequality and a system in which aristocrats (with their own legislative body), or monarchy exists with non-negligible position within the political structure. That is why the period of industrial revolutions in Britain is referred to as the cradle of inequality, but rather economic than in are of human rights (Kubátová 2009, p. 15–18).

Using the theory of the prominent British author H. Spencer, it is possible to say that Britain went through a linear development of society, in politics and culture to a certain extent. Britain followed her tendency to some extent and gravitated towards empiricism or pragmatism rather than rationality as in Europe. It is therefore a natural and organic development of society according to Spencer's theory, which consists in constant improvement (Offer 2019). Unlike Europe, the British never had the need for *quête* as French or Germans[[4]](#footnote-4), but they naturally developed their system that is based on experience and knowledge, additionally reflected in their judiciary or political system in which institution as monarchy still plays a symbolic role.

The British still had to find some necessary identification distinction that would separate them from the *rest*, that was not similar to the Englishness that had been built over the centuries, but a real identity similar to a citizenship only for the British. This is the reason for which Britain owes the period after the Second World War, after which other nationalities from the Commonwealth attempted to reach the islands. In the beginning, this was something acceptable to a certain extent, but later the majority of Britons had a similar attitude as in 2015 before Brexit (Bogdanor 2013b).

For this reason, the then Labour governments in the late 40s and early 50s tried to create citizenship only for the Britons, which did not exist before and would give the British a clear opportunity to control who comes to the islands. Paradoxically, at the time, it was the Conservatives who wanted to preserve close relations with Commonwealth and maintain the empire and opposed immigration policy (ibid). Yet, the *zeitgeist* of the time was against imperialism and the role of the two superpowers in the world was decisive. Britain for the first time had to kneel and conform her former colony of which she had by then become a *protégé*.

From this point Britain had to begin to realize her new position within the world order, but that meant significant amount of self-reflection and humility on her part. Since supranational project was being created right across the channel which W. Churchill himself supported[[5]](#footnote-5), but he never wanted to bring her into Europe because of the unique realities of Britain. After the first accomplishments of European project, Britain tried to impair the project from the inside or partially participate[[6]](#footnote-6), but the continent was already determined to move on from their complicated history (Smith 1992).

However, Britain decided at that moment to stand completely alone with her disappearing empire, yet this act for short period proved as an unwise decision and she had no choice but to leave her foundation built on experience this time and participate directly in something with the Europeans. Harold Macmillan realized that the Labour governments after the Second World War were building a Britain that was unattainable (Gowland et al. 2010, p. 25–34).

In the same way, it was not possible to justify not participating in the project because of supranational principle or the argument of conservatives that there will be a loss of sovereignty. Macmillan therefore submitted the first application to the EC in 1961 and thus began a period for Britain in which it was indeed about bringing the islands and the continent closer (Steinnes 1998, p. 61–79). Perhaps, this time not only pragmatically but also ideologically and economically Britain needed to actively participate in European project, perchance it is also possible to mark this step as a *raison d’état*.

Followed by the rejection of two the British applications to EEC by Charles de Gaulle[[7]](#footnote-7) the British merely managed to get the chance under President Pompidou. Meanwhile, the European project took on a completely different development from the competing EFTA project in which the British were involved. The successes of the EFTA could compete with the project of founding the Six, whose project was based on the principle of supranational organization. The development of the six was therefore quite different and had the character of a partial forfeiture of powers in favour of supranational bodies[[8]](#footnote-8). The opposite of this was Britain's membership in EFTA, and therefore it happened that the six meanwhile determined the key problems of their political project and intended to solve them before enlargement (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 10–17).

When the British joined in 1973, they were already exposed to countless policies of the continent and had to accept and adapt to most of them, with the fact that the six built this market and project for themselves to suit the continent and not the islands. It is best described by Macmillan's conversation[[9]](#footnote-9) with Gaulle, when the British prime minister asks the French president to abandon policies that purely benefit the continent and greatly disadvantage Britain (Fromkin 1999). The setting of the system was therefore noticeably in contradiction with the British interests, whose contributions to the budget had been disproportionate and ultimately resulted in rebate returned negotiated by Margaret Thatcher. Moreover, Britain was not oriented towards strong industrialization like the Germany or towards agriculture like the French and Italians (Gowland et al. 2010, p. 85–101).

Consequently, the other policies of the internal market were also disadvantageous for them, in which the founding members had bonuses, and the British thus participated in the customs union rather lost in trade with CW countries[[10]](#footnote-10). The British were pressured into this decision not only by the Americans, but also by the situation of the bipolar world, the collapse of the empire and the growing trade balance with Europe, so it was a partially forced entry for several reasons, one of which was the feeling of losing importance on the world stage (Diebold 1962; Gowland et al. 2010, p. 19–36).

However, two years after the accession, Harold Wilson had to hold a referendum on staying because a certain part of the population was not satisfied with the involvement in the continental project, which made many things more expensive. Moreover, Wilson's cabinet was widely divided on the issue. Despite this, Britain survived in merit to a quality campaign and the participation of important politicians[[11]](#footnote-11), including the future PM Margaret Thatcher. Reconciliation of the British, in accordance with the absence of modern populism, kept the British in the project, but they were already marked and unwilling to accept greater integration than was necessary (Richards 2020, p. 31–65).

That's why this phenomenon continued even later with PM Margaret Thatcher who got the so-called British rebate and the British started to get part of the money sent back. Thatcher did not like the fact that the British pay French farmers and still contribute the most for participating in the common market (Gowland et al. 2010, p. 81–85). One of the integration efforts in which the British fully participated was the SEA or the creation of the SM, in which they saw significant advantages in contrast to other integration efforts, especially in the field of politics and culture. Yet no one anticipated that one of the conditions for the creation of a SM is the need to yield unanimity in favour of a QMV in the council (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 17–19). Later, at the time of the Lisbon Treaty, it was already evident that the use of the QMV will considerably benefit the large states in agreement with the medium-sized ones (ibid, p. 103-109).

In addition, the emergence of the Maastricht Treaty and the split in M. Thatcher's cabinet regarding the ERM were critical for future relationship with Europe and attitude toward integration (Richards 2020, p. 181–189). The Maastricht Treaty successively created the EU, and even then, the British had no idea what political project was in front of them, but the new structure of three pillars, the Single Market, Schengen and the ambition of integration gave them a clear excuse to be on the second and significantly slower track in this project (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, p. 257–278).

Additionally, the last milestone in Britain's disengagement from the European project was the introduction of the eurozone and single currency. This was originally the intention of Tony Blair's government, but it was abandoned based on public attitudes towards further integration (Gowland et al. 2010, p. 121–127). Not adopting the euro, they may have gained the fact that they did not leave the EU a few years earlier, because through the cabinet's control over the central bank, the British were able to tame the crisis faster than the eurozone (Kelemen 2013). Whether this decision was correct can be seen in the following years when the British felt that the pound did better than the euro and should not save other member states from their irresponsible management.

Tensions were high during the euro crisis because Cameron felt the growing influence of UKIP and his own backbenchers, then the opposition and citizens, and additionally pressure from the EU (Richards 2020, p. 341–349). Cameron tried a policy of *détente* by inviting A. Merkel to review some conditions of SM, but that did not work, and neither did Junker's helping hand for an agreement in London (Matthijs a Kelemen 2015).

Cameron found himself at a crossroads that looked more like a roundabout because every sensible decision still led to staying in the EU. In the end, the decision came down to a detour from which there will be only a difficult way back.

### **Integration development in Europe**

The table that follows considers the time milestones that preceded Britain's EC membership. Subsequently, also other important points of development during Britain's membership of the European project and their potential influence on detachment from integration. The table serves for simple orientation in the development of strong Euroscepticism and understanding the speed of development of integration which to certain degree is built on a neo-functional model (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 53–65). The table can serve to grasp the development of integration and the effect of spillover, which is a fundamental aspect of the EU. As well as the development of integration, which is based on output legitimacy and to some extent the rule of elites, as mentioned by Bulmer and Lequesne (2020, p. 10–44). Some stages are only superficially represented in the table, however, as Cini (2022) and Bulmer (2020) mentions, this is a neo-functional model operated by elites, which is why it is possible to achieve such a strong level of technocratic governance, at the expense of the absence of citizen involvement.

Still, this is an exceptional and unique grouping without precedent in history or anywhere in the world.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1944 | The Benelux states create an internal market among themselves, thus creating the first integration effort of three European states. |
| 1946 | Winston Churchill expresses his support for the creation of the United States of Europe in Zurich. |
| 1947 | The formation of the CEEC for cooperation in post-war Europe (later the OEEC). At the same time, the British are handing over to the US their commitments to Turkey and Greece in the area of support. This creates the Truman Doctrine. |
| 1948 | The creation of the Treaty of Brussels and the WEU. At the same time, a meeting of European federalists is taking place in The Hague. In this year India became independent from Britain (loss of important colony). |
| 1950 | First proposals from Monnet to create an ECSC. Pleven's plan to create EDC. The creation of the ECHR was proposed at the Council of Europe. |
| 1952 | The creation of the ECSC, in which the British were also supposed to participate. They wanted to remain independent for the sake of the commonwealth and further develop trade with the US. |
| 1953 | EPC proposals, creation of a unified policy in Europe. In 1954 it also failed with EDC. Security in Europe was primarily NATO. |
| 1955 | Spaak is making proposals for a possible common market based on the Benelux model. The British also participated due to the success of the ECSC. |
| 1957 | Origin of the Treaties of Rome. Creating a market among the founding six members. The British eventually withdrew due to fear of losing sovereignty and their position in the world. |
| 1958- 1960 | Creation of unified policies such as the CAP, also the creation of the ESF. At the same time, the EEA and the customs union are created. |
| 1961 | Market harmonization, Britain's first application to join the European Economic Community. The successful integration of Europe forced Britain to apply for entry. (In 1962, the Cuban Missile crisis also took place). |
| 1965-1967 | Merger Treaty, creation of the EC. In 1966, the crisis of seats, the reconsideration of voting in the highest bodies from unanimity to qualified majority. Britain applied for the second time to EC. |
| 1968 | Mansholt plan was supposed to strengthen CAP support and agriculture. The plan was very unpopular. These fundamental policies were decided among the six even before enlargement, consequently the British later had a significant problem with these proposals. |
| 1969-1970 | The Werner report and discussion on monetary union. Later, the strengthening of cooperation between France and the FRG in maintaining currency stability. In 1969 Britain applied for the third time to EC. |
| 1971 | Termination of the Bretton-Wood system. The EC began to deal with the support of poorer regions. |
| 1973 | Britain joins the EC. The oil crisis and the Yom Kippur war begin. |
| 1975 | Britain has a referendum on remaining in the EC. The EC creates the ERDF. |
| 1979 | Margaret Thatcher becomes Prime Minister, and the first EP elections are held. At the same time, British MP Roy Jenkins is the first president of the European Commission. |
| 1984 | British Rebate (Reduction of contributions to the EC budget) |
| 1985 | The Doogee report proposes the unification of the market and the creation of a political union. Continuously, also the creation of the Schengen area. |
| 1986-1988 | The emergence of the Single European Act (SEA), the removal of the veto in some areas and the creation of a market.  At this time, President of European Commission, Delors, also said that 80% of the legislation would be created in Brussels, which angered M. Thatcher at the time. |
| 1989 | Democratization of Eastern Europe. IGC preparations for Maastricht. |
| 1990-1993 | The end of M. Thatcher's government, the arrival of John Major and the withdrawal from the ERM (Black Wednesday).  The establishment of the European Union with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. |
| 1996 | The Treaty of Amsterdam, changing the pillars of the Maastricht Treaty and defining the democratic principles of the Union. |
| 1997 | Introduction of OMC, removal of veto and higher level of cooperation in JHA. Preparations for EMU. |
| 2000 | Britain gains an opt-out of CFR. Blair is aware that Britain will not participate in EMU. |
| 2001 | Treaty of Nice, setting criteria for future members from Eastern Europe. The future and goals of Europe and the possibility of CT. |
| 2002 | The beginning of the eurozone and the use of the euro, in which Britain finally decided not to participate after a long decision in the 90s. |
| 2004 | The largest expansion, the entry of eastern states into the EU. |
| 2005 | Draft CT and successive referendums that rejected it through dissent in France and the Netherlands. |
| 2006 | Bolkenstein directive proposing the harmonization of the market and services in the EU with the new member states from 2004. At that time there were great concerns about social dumping. Britain nevertheless welcomed this move to support its own economy. |
| 2007 | Rejection of the CT, then the proposal of the Treaty of Lisbon, which got rid of the constitutional elements and only defined the functioning of the EU and the future of the project. |
| 2008 | Proposals for changes to the operation of CAP, RDF and EMU solutions during the world economic crisis) |
| 2009 | The lowest turnout in the EP election. The most difficult period for the Eurozone and the ECB. Low popularity of the EU associated with the economic situation, as the EU operates on output legitimacy. |
| 2010 | Support from the IMF and the necessity to help Greece with its economic situation. Setting sustainable goals and the future of the economy. |
| 2011 | The creation of the ESM and the six pack, which was supposed to maintain stability and involvement in the economic situation of the union. |
| 2012 | Britain and the Czech Republic do not participate in the TSCG. At this time, the popularity of the EU in Britain is declining (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, s. 220–224). |
| 2013 | EUROSUR - establishing a common security and border policy. |
| 2015 | After the electoral victory of the conservatives, the possibility of a referendum was proposed. on remaining in the EU.  The outbreak of the migration crisis at the same time as the terrorist attacks in Europe. |
| 2016 | Concerns about the continuation of the EU, the temporary introduction of border controls. Cameron announced a referendum on EU membership, which ended in a victory for the Leave campaign with 52% of citizens in favour of leaving. |
| 2017 | T. May sends letter to Brussel to activate article 50. |
| 2018-2019 | This period saw most of the key negotiations on the TCA, which required numerous extensions and the subsequent failure to ratify the final treaty in parliament. May had to step down and Johnson completed a deal that required adjustments to the NI protocol. |
| 2020 | Britain left the EU. |

The above table represents only a few of the many integration steps, and essentially serves to point out the development of integration and the course of British reluctance to participate in it (Oxford Learner link 2022).

## Main differences between Britain and Europe

Trying to be an independent actor on the world stage in 21st century is venture in which the Britain cannot succeed unless she tries to change her approach to Europe and overlook all their previous disputes and differences that previously made them unique. Only in this way can both sides start over and achieve a better position in today's multilateral world.

However, their need to be unique in the world order, whether by culture or position, will impair them this time. Their sense of Englishness has been in their DNA since the days of Queen Victoria. Therefore, they often imagine that the export of their cultural values is beneficial for the world, after all, almost everyone in the current age knows at least a few English words (Rodriguez 2020). The British are thus afraid of Europe replacing their values for and impose theirs (Keller and Habermann 2021, p. 113–118). Nevertheless, the main division lies not only in cultural differences but in political ones, namely how different the political system in Britain is from the continent[[12]](#footnote-12), the same applies to the judicial system.

For this reason, British have always longed for a clear definition of the sovereign state, Thomas Hobbes already did this to a certain extent, but the true definition of the international system materialised at the Peace of Westphalia, where the definition of the state and its basic features were founded. At the same time, the position of the European system in which there is respect for sovereign ruling and non-intervention in their internal disputes (Croxton 1999, p. 569–592). After that, enacting *Casus Belli* had been relatively difficult based purely on religious disputes since they were no longer a reason for intervention within these boundaries.

Later, this sovereignty of the state was further elaborated by Abbe Saint Pierre, who proposed European order on eternal peace and cooperation between nations on the principle of intergovernmentalism, which suited the British beyond anything else (Roldan 2011).

Yet, the primary difference comes from the political system, which is majoritarian and is also sometimes referred to as an elective dictatorship according to Lijphart (2012, p. 13). Unlike a proportional system, it creates a majority cabinet[[13]](#footnote-13) and a model that is known as the *Westminster model* for the rest of the world, and it’s used in several former Commonwealth countries. This majoritarian model is the result of strong inequality, as the two parties in Britain always end up with 87% of the vote[[14]](#footnote-14), and it is customary for the majoritarian model to be practiced in homogeneous societies (ibid, p. 9–44). The question is to what extent modern Britain is homogenous today, as the data from Office for National Statistics (2022b) may indicate that the homogeneity of British society is not the same as it was a few decades ago.

In Britain, no one stands above the government, it has been the only sovereign ruler and possessor of power over its subjects for a centuries[[15]](#footnote-15). The only limitations to government are its will and reason. Consequently, the absence of a constitution is also an important element that relies on customary law, which is different from continental one (Lijphart 2012, p. 13–19). Since accession the European law has been superior to British law and supervised the compliance of minority rights, but after Brexit this phenomenon disappeared, and the supremacy of power returned to Westminster (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 188–202). With it perhaps also one of the largest centralizations of power in Europe. As local governments are a relatively new phenomenon in Britain and the role of subsidiarity has only been fully introduced by the EU (Lijphart 2012, p. 16–18). It will therefore be very difficult to give power back to the regions after Brexit and rejuvenate those efforts of EU to help poorer regions to be on a competitive level.

The majoritarian model thus *defacto* creates a fictitious majority and, to a certain extent, shows inequality in which minorities are not adequately represented (ibid, p.154-156), or as Tocqueville calls this phenomenon - the tyranny of the majority.

The consequence of this system is that even progressive parties can receive 20% of the vote, but their representation will be abysmal. For this reason, the majority can create the main topic in the public discourse[[16]](#footnote-16), and even non-minority groups can thus lose their valuable representation. It may be enough for one part of the government party to create a non-systemic message within the public discourse and fundamental problems will arise (ibid, p. 9–29). The British have been used to this system since its inception, but today it may appear inadequate, as the result of Brexit shows its inefficiency towards its own subjects.

Further, this distinction can be portrayed through Lipset's theory of cleavages. The theory is similar to the above-mentioned statements, especially because it describes the difference between the development of states in which democratic revolutions took place (mainly in Europe from 1848 to 1918) and Britain, where development was more linear and cleavages relatively occurred through the industrial revolution, which was an organic catalyst for the development of society. Differences and influences on society are therefore given directly by these cleavages that have existed for a long time and some really persist from the *ancien régime* (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, p. 36–41).

## David Cameron's stalemate – Brexit

Determining the cause of Brexit or defining its catalyst is still not unequivocally possible. It is a myriad of interrelated factors, the interlinking of which caused Britain's exit from the EU. Within this chapter, there will be a fusion of the above-mentioned British realities with aspects of 21st British Euroscepticism.

The 2004 enlargement had been significant not only for the EU but also for Britain. The expansion was welcomed by the British because of the potential dilution of power in European institutions and the possible slowdown of integration. Unlike other EU members, they allowed workers from the new member states to enter their labour market, which considerably helped their economy (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 265–277). However, this decision may possibly drive them later to unjustified Euroscepticism and irrational hostility towards migrants.

Though, Britain was still subject to Single Market conditions and sooner or later all member states will have access to its market. This fact could almost be overlooked from the beginning, due to the fact that the economy was doing fairly well, and the Labour government of T. Blair was to some extent oriented towards the policy of the third way. However, this economic boom, which was helped by migrants from Europe as well as increasing globalization, did not create equal growth throughout Britain, but only in some regions (Burton 2022, p. 5–12).

This is how the inequality created by globalization and the occupation of some positions for unskilled workers by those from EU member countries arose. The deepening of the differences between these regions and the prosperous ones was marked not only in finances but also in the education and age of the population. Consequently, this leads to the inability of Labour to capitalize on the boom up to the Eurocrisis, after which it became clear that the economy must fall into other hands, namely the Conservatives (ibid, s. 3–43). The absolutely critical aspect is therefore immigration to Britain and the failure of the fiscal policy during the Labour governments or the previous failure to join the eurozone, which was disincentivizing decision for almost every politician[[17]](#footnote-17) in Britain and even Europhile Tony Blair (Gowland et al. 2010, p. 167–171).

The result of this irresponsible fiscal policy was an even greater deepening of differences between regions. Globalization, aided by the Eurocrisis, delivered exactly what the British Eurosceptics, radicals, UKIP voters and other groups in opposition to the EU and wanted, thus gave them the opportunity to look for the wrongdoer. Followed by the conservative’s policy of austerity, which conclusively brought certain groups of the population to their knees. Meanwhile, CEE labours were still working as some positions could not be replaced by their vital nature for economy (Evans a Menon 2017, p. 22–29). Subsequently, the development of the economic situation during the Eurocrisis was very unpleasant for Britain, as already mentioned above, but not alike for some southern EU members.

Unlike the Eurozone, the British cabinet has power over the central bank (Lijphart 2012, p. 14–19), which to a certain extent saved Britain from bigger problems, while on the continent the ECB tried to do everything to save creditors in order to avoid the collapse of the already young project (Kelemen 2013). Nevertheless, there was a considerable rise of opposition to the EU corelated with the proposed plan by cabinet and its chancellor of the exchequer that defined an austerity measures that significantly burdened the above-mentioned regions and certain low-income groups of the population (Burton 2022, p. 11–13).

To explain how it affected an already Eurosceptic and poorly informed British society, it is necessary to consider the *grievance theory*. The basis of the theory is the creation of an imaginary grievance on the part of a subject who wants to capitalize on a certain group of citizens and will apply the grievance caused by the ruling subjects on them (Bláha 2021). UKIP used the theory and successfully fabricated a reason why system parties don't work.

Then won unprecedented support in the EP elections that gave Cameron the first check because UKIP's popularity was growing. UKIP was also taking on the issues of the Conservatives, and there was a strong fear of taking over the voter base[[18]](#footnote-18). Nevertheless, it would not mean the same as in a proportional system since UKIP would not come to power, but it could still ensure a Labour victory and Cameron could not overlook this (Outhwaite 2017, p. 9–23).

The second check was from the EU, the one that consisted of the fact that Cameron had an impression of considerable success in the field of compromises negotiated with the EU. The chairman of the commission, Junker, even offered Westminster options to adjust opt-outs, but not to leave out the undividable rules of the single market. Namely this would disrupt the functioning of the EU framework itself, which could cause disorder in the functioning of the Union. Part of this was also the Eurocrisis that posed a vital threat to the Union itself and maintain internal ties (Matthijs a Kelemen 2015). Finally, in 2014, Angela Merkel visited Cameron, which should have led to another series of discussions regarding exceptions to the indivisible values of the Single Market, especially the free movement of persons. Merkel finally assured Cameron in her speech that there will be no changes and that they cannot be negotiated, therefore she made it impossible to calm the uncertainty that was growing in society (Logan 2014).

Cameron had been forced to consider a referendum for a long time, the probability of which was imminent, especially because no fundamental treaty from the time when Maastricht entered into force had been approved by referendum. Already from the possibility of accepting the Euro, variants of a referendum were offered, but this never took place, and therefore this long-lasting bomb, which was passed from cabinet to cabinet, fell on Cameron. The referendum was supposed to be more of a symbolic aspect that may show citizen's satisfaction[[19]](#footnote-19) with the EU, but it came at the worst time, specifically after the Eurocrisis and during the migration crisis. The result could have been the only one considering Cameron's popularity and the influence of strong backbenchers and the Leave campaign (Outhwaite 2017, p. 3–19).

The controversial aspect of most Eurosceptic politicians is that their country participates in the European project anyway, and the legislation is approved there by its MEPs, or the directives are implemented by the member states. Criticism is therefore not appropriate because it is necessary to perceive that those states participate in legislation at several levels in the EU, despite the complicated nature of this process and its shortcomings (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, p. 4–7)

The third check is built on who gave legitimacy to the statements of Nigel Farage and his UKIP. It was Cameron's Conservatives like Boris Johnson who was not associated with the UKIP controversies and gave Eurosceptics a supposedly valid representation of their views on the EU. Similarly, Jacob Rees–Mogg[[20]](#footnote-20), who, with his statements about the EU, convinced citizens of the futility of EU membership. Cameron thus struggled almost even with his own party whose cabinet was in coalition with liberals who were clearly pro-European. His promise to call a referendum on remaining in the EU was conditioned on winning the election, which would give him a strong cabinet and hopefully get his backbenchers out of the voters' attention (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, s. 403–405; Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, s. 257–261).

Cameron found himself surrounded from all sides whether it was his own party or the growing preference of UKIP and additionally pressure from the EU. Dissatisfaction of citizens grew and when there was some stabilization of the economy not only in Britain but also in Europe, the refugee crisis came in 2015. Subsequently, Cameron found himself in a difficult negotiating position. The only option available was to call a referendum after the elections, as the dissatisfaction of the citizens continued to grow. Cameron thus got into a deadlock from which it was impossible to back out, perhaps only to constantly convince not only the voters but also his own party that the situation will improve and create sentiment for the EU (Outhwaite 2017, p. 3–29).

In this case, it is possible to look at the content of this chapter and conclude that it was an exceptional situation because the British have always believed in the sovereignty of the government, and it is competent to decide on almost any issue.

The situation called for a different solution, just like in 1975, to leave the decision to the citizens. In many ways, this could be characterized as irresponsibility because EU membership is a complicated topic even for experts. Thus, uninformed citizens decided the direction of Britain without enough critical information, education and quality long-term exposure to the subject. In this case, the *hoi polloi* really decided what Britain would look like for the next few years and maybe decades (Outhwaite 2017, p. 6–32; McNamara 2016).

The argument remains what options Cameron had because his situation was played on a chessboard full of Eurosceptics and a growing number of populist figures. Later he won only a small majority[[21]](#footnote-21), which could not ensure that the leaders of his party would not turn against him and therefore he was forced to keep his words. He kept his promise, but not his position as prime minister, the result of the referendum was already the imaginary *coup de* *grâs* for him.

## Where the European Union lost, and the British media won.

Analysis of the media's role in Brexit and British Euroscepticism is unequivocally fundamental. This stems from the very nature of the media's role in Britain and their perceived affiliation with the parties.

Before the analysis itself, it is necessary to concisely define how European integration works. It consists of the principle of neo-functionalism or the opposite liberal intergovernmentalism and these generate a potential spillover in which other states are subject to the nature of integration itself without necessarily being involved in it. However, this neo-functionalist project is still controlled by elites and lacks a greater degree of involvement of the citizens of the Union. Nevertheless, this principle takes away considerable power from the member states and gives it to the union, eventually the states become an extended arm of the EU (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020; Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022).

Nevertheless, Cini (2022, p. 67–79) argues that states behave pragmatically and act to maximize the benefit for themselves, as an example, this could be membership in the EU because its spillover in the field of economy had reached this pragmatic actor such as Britain in the past, especially demonstrated by request for entrance to EEA. Whether it is LI or NF, there has been always some level of integration that puts pressure on other members and their neighbouring states to adapt to those that are integrating, and Britain overcame this with it opt-outs or just made it very visible in its systematic Euroscepticism (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, p. 5–27).

One the many EU problems is that it lacks *démos* and common media, but the main one is its position on output legitimacy. Based on this, it can be assumed that the EU is evaluated on its accomplishments, especially on what it has achieved, and this can be a noticeable problem (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 124–136).

Now it is necessary to determine whether the process of Europeanization reached the British Isles in full, and the spillover of not only economic aspects had an effect on the citizens, i.e., especially the cultural ones. The issue is to what extent the British were Europeanized and ready to defend European values or at least perceive them.

The answer was additionally reflected in the outcome of Brexit, as Burton (2022, p. 25–27) states that only 5% of Britons really know the basic framework of the EU's functioning. This fact in itself is telling about the result of the referendum itself.

According to Rowinski (2017, p. 38-40), integration works the same, especially for those who want it, for that reason it is clear that Europeanization could not take place easily in Britain when he was never inclined to it, as this process also requires commitment on the part of politicians. However, the author (ibid, p. 30) additionally states that politicians relatively prefer to create their own agenda rather than reacting to social events or the media. The media subsequently began to deteriorate the public space and the number of Eurosceptic articles grew for the average reader. These articles subsequently began to overtake politicians in their hostile nature towards EU or migrants.

For instance, the London branch of the EU did not even have time to solve the so-called Euromyths when instead it was supposed to inform about events in the EU. The British media thus received a very strong position in which they set the pace of Eurosceptic sentiment in a country that had been nurtured for a long time and now had a suitable background with the migration or euro crisis (ibid, p. 160-161).

For the epistemically healthy politicians, this meant unequivocally standing up against Eurosceptic sentiment not only in the media, but also long-term shaped and reinforced across citizens. For this reason, Rowinksi (2017, p. 148-157) points out that politicians are the ones who give the perception of the EU, and they should change opinions with their approach or policy so that there is no "us and them".

However, none of this happened because this top-down process was created by politicians and their irresponsible approach to the EU. It is possible to observe this approach in statements that always have the character of winning over the EU and European regulations in general, and vice versa, pressure from Europe on the islands. The impacts of such an approach are difficult to quantify, yet it is possible to perceive that the media almost unequivocally controlled the public space and dictated the attitude of the population to the European question (Rowinski 2017, p. 52–55; Keller and Habermann 2021, p. 115–117).

This pandora's box was opened by Nigel Farage and weaponized for the success of UKIP and with the help of which he captured the left-wing electorate. In this case, the imaginary left, the Labour party, was not able to adequately offer older people and those affected by globalization an answer to their problems, and that is why there was an overflow of these votes (Rowinski 2017, p. 88–92). In addition, Corbyn did not know how to approach the issue of the EU, just because of the nature of British Euroscepticism[[22]](#footnote-22), it was not possible to plainly support one of the options, which fundamentally affected the valence. This move could indirectly affect the perception of the Labour party and go in favour of the Conservatives. Overall, there was a shift in cues because the fundamental questions of membership or the area of immigration were the most fundamental in the period before Brexit (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, p. 257–275).

Where the European Union really lost is in the area of creating at least an imaginary *démos* and a stronger Europeanization process, but most fundamentally in the revision of its functioning. This depends on one elected body, the EP, whose participation in elections is absolutely dismal. Overall, this project is rather led by the elites, as Cini (2022, p. 124-135) points out, still there are permanent representatives in the EC or CEU bodies, or members of the governments and prime ministers already elected in the respective countries venture there.

Criticism of EU integration is very simple, especially since it is still a young project, and the world does not yet know this principle of LI or NF. In contrast to this criticism, Kissinger perceives this political union as an incredible shift from the Westphalian system that Europe founded and to a certain extent abandoned to create a unique cooperation among state with similar history to develop prosperity among them (Ischinger 2015).

The problem is why the British media won over such a successful integration and political result. A possible explanation is that Euroscepticism is a persistent phenomenon in Britain that has been increasing. It was subsequently enriched by the politicians themselves with historical tropes that made the British a heroic nation as mentioned above. The British then lived in the reality of the English heroes of 1945, and the media really pushed society further towards Euroscepticism (Rowinski 2017, p. 150–152).

Hobolt (2014, p. 70-84) and Rowinski (2017, p. 28–30) points to the message in the newspaper as it plays a key role, since the message itself carries some implication from which the reader can further derive their own meaning. Language can carry ideologically loaded words and different connotations. The same applies to modal verbs or adverbials (ibid, p. 103-107). These forms indicate to the reader the degree of involvement, seriousness, and commitment of the actor in the given situation. It is additionally supplemented with various *topos* (authority, history, national interest and scepticism) which only develop the given message in the media with a critical aspect and thus the viewer already perceives the message with a certain connotation (ibid, p. 108-112).

Examples of commitment depicted in newspaper texts:

*’Downing Street may well be trying to cook up a fake row about something else like globalisation to distract from the enormous transfer of powers Gordon Brown is about to [sign up to]*[[23]](#footnote-23)*. ’*

*‘Gordon Brown is planning to [might]*[[24]](#footnote-24) *pick a fight with President Sarkozy of France at this week’s European summit as he tries to move the agenda on from demands for a referendum on the EU treaty’* (Rowinski 2017, p. 105–107).

Examples of headlines before Brexit:

1. *“On balance we believe Britain would be better off leading a renewed drive for reform within the EU rather than starting afresh outside it.” -***The Times**
2. *“a vote to withdraw would be irrevocable, a grievous blow to the post-1945 liberal world order.”* -**The Financial Times**
3. *“Once we have left and are no longer subject to the free movement of labour, popular worries about immigration will become a matter for the British government and for parliament,” -***The Sunday Telegraph** (Reuters 2016)

From these examples, it is possible to depict what weight is put on the reader and how they influence reader's perception and leave them with a significant burden in the area of attribution of responsibility for inadequate decisions or augmenting the reality that the media obscurely defines in these messages. The starting point is influencing those cues and the ability to make an adequate decision in elections. The influence of cues has a great impact on whether a left-wing voter is willing to support, for example, a populist group.

It is possible due to this aspect, there has been from a new wave of voters without the ability to correctly assign responsibility for their decisions, and this is perhaps the main problem because the media did not give them the opportunity to make a competent decision on this very issue; Hobolt (2014) deals with exactly with the voter's ability to assign blame and imaginary punish a politician for bad policies. The research finds that this cannot be achieved without quality media, and at the same time, her findings point to a lower level of Euroscepticism in contrast to other publications (ibid).

Hobolt (2014, p. 86-99) additionally states that in Britain the best exposure to quality news is only in serious newspapers, other types of media are insufficient or do not change the ability to assign blame correctly and change cues significantly. The result of her research is that more information means more support for the EU and the decline of populists, but this did not happen in Britain because the media, on the contrary, focused on simplified and ambivalent messages.

All this is further contributed to the portrayal of how politicians approach guilt. In most cases, they try to transfer the blame to another entity or limit their own share in it. In the opposite case, their share in the success is mainly presented as purely theirs[[25]](#footnote-25) (ibid, p. 101–103).

Consumers of media or newspapers therefore find it very difficult to blame a single subject or the EU when it comes to elections because there is no institutional clarity and citizens are incapable to distinguish how the EU works. Therefore, they cannot assign blame and choose other actors who will lead new policies. The author also mentions a phenomenon that is already common today, namely attribution bias, which consequently also controls how citizens perceive the guilt of a political subject and subsequently how they form their objective reality in which they assign blame to individual subjects (ibid, p. 105–116)

In conclusion, it is essential to clarify what these aspects meant for the year 2016, when Europe recovered from the eurocrisis and barely entered the migration one. The media and politicians themselves created and launched this process (top-down) which would hardly succeed in other political systems, but it was not an obstacle in the British one. History itself and the long-standing Euroscepticism of the British managed to influence even those who had no idea what they were actually deciding on.

# The consequences of Brexit on politics, society, and economy

This chapter will focus on the effects of the above-mentioned outcomes of citizens decision to leave the EU and the effects of this decision on me from 2016 until today. The chapter will focus on the spheres of politics, economics, and culture. Outcomes will be supported by data, yet clear conclusions cannot be drawn from the very nature of Brexit due to the interdependence of individual Brexit factors. The assessment is therefore based on current data and information from which it is possible to describe this constantly evolving phenomenon.

## Impact of Brexit on British politics

British politics underwent certain degree of polarization even before the outbreak of Brexit itself. This radicalization was latent from 90s up to UKIP success in EP elections when it became more obvious with tangible elements[[26]](#footnote-26). A manifestation of this radicalization is the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox. The reason was her support for the remain campaign and encouragement of participation in the European project, and indubitably her liberal views towards assimilation of migrants (Cobain and Taylor 2016). This division occurred in the 90s, when the first Eurosceptic entities that were not purely backbenchers began to appear (Gowland et al. 2010, p. 118–125). These entities developed latently for several years before the Eurosceptic parties emerged, such as the strong UKIP before the 2016 referendum.

Nevertheless, British society is generally bound by the monarch, and so it was until the death of Elizabeth II. This does not mean that social and cultural divisions did not exist before, however, there was a unifying aspect that reflected those British values. However, British society is built on these divisions, whether social or economic, and yet globalization has forced a certain group of residents to perceive their status differently (Fintan 2023). UKIP, led by Nigel Farage, is mainly to blame for this, which gave these people a reason for their antipathy towards migrants who took over their places in already poor regions[[27]](#footnote-27). This group of citizens, who are described[[28]](#footnote-28) as mainly less educated, manual workers and poor regions, could have had a reason to become radicalized (Sampson 2017). Additionally supplemented by the policy of conservatives, in which the mentioned citizens could felt that their problems were forgotten. Consequently, instead of supporting the Labour party with a strong ideological affinity for this part of the population, these people found a short-cut solution based on populism – UKIP. Later also supplemented by the above-mentioned myths about the heroic actions of the British throughout history and their current oppression by the EU. This is where the first step of the fundamental change in British politics comes from, which in the period before Brexit and even after British citizens stopped adhering to their proven political and cultural values[[29]](#footnote-29) (Evans and Menon 2017, p. 95–110).

The beginning of this failure of both fundamental political parties in Britain is possible since the 80s, since the harmonization of their political ideas. The two parties are beginning to meet each other more ideologically, and their politics is more of a reactionary tool for acute issues. This is a reaction to citizens' long-term lack of interest in politics and mistrust of politicians (Goodwin 2023). This is a long-term trend in which it can be observed from the data that citizens perceive:

* Distrust in the British government has continuously grown, with the exception of the period before and during the 2016 referendum. Unlike in 1986, when approximately 40% trusted the government, in 2019 it was in the range of 10-15%;
* Since 1973, there has been a growing trend in which there is a will for significant changes in the way of governance. In 1973, 49% wanted fundamental changes, and in 2019 it was 79%;
* Brexit has incited interest in politics. The data indicates a range from 36-43% of the population was interested in events during 2015 – 2019. Previously around 30%;
* Another factor is citizens' disinterest in which party is in power. This opinion is held by 18% of Eurosceptics;
* Distrust in the government and the perception of loss of touch MPs with their voters saturate between 20-30% of Eurosceptics. (Curtice et al. 2020)

These aspects show considerable dissatisfaction with the development of politics, but nevertheless there are shifts in the party's themes. Conservatives are now not only fundamentally right-wing, but also integrate centre-left themes. Nevertheless, in the Leave campaign, they met the most in terms of opinion with UKIP. The conservatives have considerable fragmentation within the party where certain individuals[[30]](#footnote-30) represent the consensus direction of the centre and others are fundamentally anti-migration and economically right-wing oriented (Fieldhouse et al. 2019c, p. 163–187).

Everything points to the fact that even before the referendum, British politics was in a position where the voters were not satisfied with the system. As Hobolt (2014, p. 9–26) states, they were not able to attribute the blame to politicians and transferred it to the referendum on remaining in the EU instead of the elections a year earlier. This is based on the degree of volatility of the electoral system in which (Fieldhouse et al. 2019c, p. 163–187) indicates that it is increasing and peaked in the elections in 2015. The data indicate that it can be assumed that the identification with the party decreases considerably, and voters do not vote based on ideological proximity, but on the basis of the strength of the party and whether it is Labour or Conservative (ibid).

Therefore, according to Cottam's (2016, p. 161–197) publication of political psychology, cues are no longer simply applicable. These short-cut and heuristic solutions when choosing a party are influenced today by several factors that still do not give a clear answer. According to the Clarke et al. (2017, p. 111–115), the valence policy allows voters to make decisions with the help of the evaluation of the overall abilities and competences of the opposite subjects. When comparing with Hobolt (2014), it is difficult to evaluate whether the voter can make a competent decision despite the relative comprehensibility of the majority system.

The result is therefore a significant division of the parties themselves internally, which is also reflected in their own voting during the Brexit transition period (Basile 2019). The cabinet itself has sometimes been closer to Labour than some of its party MPs. The report (Curtice et al. 2020) shows a long-term trend of a society dissatisfied with politics and a relatively worsening trend of its perception. The current YouGov polls also reflect the same, when in recent months between 2022 and spring of 2023 the cabinet had only been able to achieve support around 8-17%, which is alarming (YouGov [a]).

Conversely, this result was preceded by the period from the referendum to the withdrawal from the EU itself. Among which took place diplomatic battles between Britain and the EU where former partners and then rivals negotiated with each other, which could be symbolically described as a match between two different weights. In the meantime, not only was Britain subject to CJEU rulings, but it could not even participate in the politics of the union, and therefore produced an even greater deepening of dissatisfaction (Fabbrini 2020, p. 1–15). Remainers' antipathy towards the Leavers grew and vice versa, and the Conservatives did not take responsibility for the results of the referendum. Dissatisfaction grew on all sides and subsequently individual groups of the population began to perceive themselves through their position in the referendum, which further contributed to complicating an already complex situation. Both Labour and the Conservatives continued to fight within the party over Brexit and how it should happen. The result of this period was early elections in which the Conservatives lost a clear majority and constant delays in leaving the EU. (Fieldhouse et al. 2019b, p. 50–73; Menon 2022b)

Correspondingly, the culmination of everything was the resignation of Theresa May[[31]](#footnote-31) because she could not enforce the withdrawal agreement. Frustrated Britons had no choice but to elect the Conservatives in 2019 and end this complicated process in which Britain was losing her pride.

Furthermore, British politics had experienced a significant degree of volatility over the past decade, which eventually triggered the process of exiting the EU. The cause of this volatility can be long-term Euroscepticism, the media, the politicians themselves and also globalization. After the referendum, it became clear that the consequences in British politics cannot be overlooked. The result is the polarization of society, which is reflected in the above-mentioned aspects, and as author suggests, this phenomenon can be critical for the future development of Britain (Hobolt 2016b). The political system itself, which offers *defacto* only two parties and carries a considerable degree of centralization, thus creating significant divisions (Lijphart 2012, p. 9–20). Cini (2022, p. 403–419) points to the necessary shift in political culture that is occurring in Britain and awareness of the consequences of Brexit, which have changed not only the economy but also the perception of the EU. In the same way, it is possible to perceive a great influence, as stated by Cini (2022, p. 235–248; 409–419), of the impact of the ERDF on subsidiarity in Britain, which decentralized the power of Westminster as mentioned by Lipjhart (2012). Moreover, Rowinski (2017, p. 23) states that Britain is already Europeanized enough to not be able to simply leave the single market of the European Union without negative outcomes. Bulmer (2020, p. 301–331) adds to that Britain has Europeanized to a certain extent not only in institutions but also socially. The development in which this Europeanization is either erased or latently maintained in British society will be crucial. However, a more dominant effect is essential, and that is Euroscepticism, which originates from the system itself and can now continue unchecked when the British are not part of the EU, in which they would have a share in that criticism.

British politics, once highly respected, has recently been seen after Brexit as a major deviation from its norm, which it had been building for decades. The manifestation of this was Liz Truss losing against the cabbage in an internet show, Truss only lasted 49 days in cabinet (Detsch 2022). Politics may have become somewhat incomprehensible for British citizens, at the same time it gave them the opportunity to deviate from traditional realities and, moreover, it was difficult to distinguish what they stood for (Fieldhouse et al. 2019b, p. 50–73). Even more emphasized by distrust in one's own politicians, which is why, for example, in Italy there is weak support for domestic politicians due to low trust in them, that is why Italians are relatively less Eurosceptic because the EU offers the possibility of sharing responsibility. For them, the EU thus represents another layer of control or responsible politics and other elected representatives (Rowinski 2017, p. 146–150). However, the same does not apply to Britain where, on the contrary, due to the electoral system, this phenomenon is rather minimal, also through the fact that the power of the parliament is, as mentioned above, ultimate.

It may be summarized by current Guardian article dealing with the issue that people trust the EU more than Westminster now. Precise reason of this might be a long-term inconsistency in polices and all the difficulties associated with Brexit (Booth 2023).

The imperative for current state of British politics require to re-introduce a decent political culture of two major parties who need to prove to the voters what they can do for them because they need them more than the voters need them, as another UKIP may be around the corner.

## The economic consequences of Brexit – how the wallet of the ordinary Briton has shrunk

After the approval of the withdrawal agreement between the EU and the UK, it became clear that none of the previously laid out paths, also called the Norwegian or Swiss ones, would take place. The British completely decided, according to the nature of the contract, to strive outside the EU single market and conclude an TCA with the EU (Fabbrini 2020, p. 37–66). At that moment, it had been a major setback for most industries in Britain, but the most fundamental for the long-term built financial sector with a main impact on the British economy. The reason for this aloof approach to the SM is also its nature, in which four indivisible freedoms apply that guarantee anyone within the union to work in any member state. This was one of the primary reasons why Britain underwent Brexit. Based on this, it can be assumed that it was politically impossible not to fulfil requests from the referendum, which were about gaining back the power from Brussels back to Westminster (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, p. 257–275)

But with the return of power to Westminster, Britain's economic power is slowly fading. In this chapter, there will be an artificial answer to the economic impacts for Britain and partly also the socio-cultural ones.

The economic improvement in Britain is significant from the time of their accession in 1973, as indicated by the, from the OECD countries, the quality of life vastly improved as well as economy. It also made Britain a very attractive place for foreign investment through the deregulated banking sector from the 80s. During their membership, they had a long-term surplus in goods, and even now, but after leaving the SM, it became fundamentally more complicated to maintain the gain for British businesses. Aspiration for an independent possibility to create new trade agreements with other teams was one of the pillars of leaving SM (Sampson 2017).

However, this aspect did not materialize because the British economy gravitates towards Europe based on few reports (Sampson 2017; Ward 2022; Portes 2022). The FTAs were thus able to fulfil only 60% of the set goals, which ultimately caused the British economy to suffer since leaving the SM. Investments themselves fell by 10-18% and imports in the range of 10-20% (Tsoukalis and Spisak 2023). The paper from Sampson (2017) states that the effects of the referendum have reduced British salaries by almost 1.5% in the most optimistic scenario and by 2.5% in the most pessimistic one. In comparison with today's situation, when Britain is in a very difficult economic situation, in accordance with data from Statista (Clark 2023b), it appears that the difference between wages and inflation bears the same difference as after the referendum. This difference is noticeable to most Britons as their salaries are unable to compete with the current rate of inflation[[32]](#footnote-32).

According to just few current news coverages, it is quite clear that Brexit has had an absolutely fundamental effect on the poor regions. Hence, why it is also necessary to perceive that the voters from these regions voted for Brexit and are now bearing the consequences for their decision (BBC 2023; Channel 4 News 2023). The argument remains how capable and competent they were to make this decision, which according to YouGov data, 1 out of 5 who voted for Brexit regrets it, and overall, 56% think it was a wrong decision (Raven 2022). The competence of citizens to decide on such a complex issue lies in the previous chapter, which answers this problem through the lens of the media. Nevertheless, it is necessary to perceive that without EU cohesion funds, which introduced subsidiarity in Britain, these regions may experience even more economic downturn[[33]](#footnote-33).

The real impacts according to European Committee of the Regions (et al. 2022) are multi-sectoral and only few sectors are handling complications well after Brexit. The reason is according to above mentioned report, customs might further impend most of the business between the EU and Britain. Among the main ones, this is especially true for industries whose products cannot wait for customs checks.

Article from the Financial Times indicate cumulative GDP growth is in negative numbers and Sterling does have an unpredictable development according to the current downward trend. The article also points out that Britain’s growth had been considerably dampened, by this fact the economy might be vulnerable in future. As a result economy necessary requires growth and workers in specific sectors that are now mostly not attained by natural born Britons (Giles 2022). Similarly, other articles from the Financial Times show the critical impact on agriculture and fisheries[[34]](#footnote-34), both sectors suffered significant losses after Brexit and shortly after leaving the EU felt that they had been forgotten in the agreements. The impacts on agriculture are devastating as the British government plans to cut subsidies and it may become unsustainable to be a farmer in Britain (Evans 2023; Foster 2022).

The real problem for the British economy will be the absence of economic immigrants who had a vital role in critical sectors before leaving the EU. In particular, they worked in transport, manual labour, seasonal help and even in the NHS. This workforce is now lacking, and Britain is struggling to cope and will be for years to come (Dorling and Tomlinson 2019, p. 180–188). At the same time, according to the Shaw (et al. 2017), the main cause was precisely the uncontrollable influx of workers from the EU market, especially from Eastern Europe. Sampson (2017) states that migrants have a big impact on the British economy, even though the author put forward a possible hypothesis that low-paid have worsened for the British due to cheaper labour from Europe.

Yet, McNamara (2016) arguments that immigrants essentially do not receive more benefits that they are truly give away back to the system, therefore their economic benefit is definitely positive for Britain. Thus, post-Brexit Britain should attain same workforce as before Brexit, yet this might be a difficult task.

This in in accord with McNeil (2021), who states that Britain has not helped itself as the conditions for European workers are almost the same as for non-EU workers and the economy will suffer as a result. According to the survey, it also appears that 48% of EU workers go only for work, while the larger number of non-EU workers only immigrate for family reasons.

The research also shows that, with the exception of London, descendants of migrants make up a maximum of 6% of the population in each region. From this point of view, it is subsequently difficult to deduce the reasons why, according to the survey, the British were so incensed by immigration when EU permanent immigrants in Britain do not make up such a drastic number as non-EU one (McNeil 2022).

In line with the above information on immigration, it is necessary to conclude that these topics are fundamentally connected with UKIP. This, according to several sources (Scuira 2022; Hobolt 2016b; Outhwaite 2017) shows that the voters are mainly manual workers, less educated people from poor regions and also pensioners. From this it can be assumed that these groups will be affected the most by Brexit, and this has also come true. Research from (McNeil 2022) shows that these jobs were filled to a certain extent by non-EU migrants, especially in the NHS and manual jobs.

According to Dorling a Tomlinson (2019, p. 90–92), the Gini index in Britain is significantly worse than in the rest of Europe and the level of inequality is significantly more noticeable there, which is connected to the realities of the first chapter[[35]](#footnote-35). Subsequently, it is necessary to deduce from this what impact it will have on socially weaker groups. Additionally, according to older research (Sampson 2017), it can have an impact of up to 10% loss of GDP and in the same numbers also on the volume of trade with the EU. According to the same research, this will also affect wages in the range of 1.5–2.5% decrease. Furthermore, article by (Rees 2023) indicate that it can cost a citizen up to 1000 pounds per year, and in total taxpayers will pay 32 billion pounds annually for Brexit, compared to their contributions to the EU budget, which amounted to only 13 billion pounds (Shrimsley 2021; Fullfact 2019). In the period from January to April in 2023, YouGov polls show citizens' concerns about the economy up to 64% are worried, this is reflected in the level of willingness to vote for the current government, which is only 23%. The conservatives have not managed the economy, which is what 68% think, and therefore up to 46% would vote for Labour in the current situation (Paleckis 2023; YouGov [b]). Everything additionally stems from the absolutely gloomy economic situation in Britain, which manifests itself in the absence of goods in shops and enormous waiting times in hospitals (Edwards 2023).

The result of low migration and investment is possibly the impact on the poorest and their lives and may extend to other factors, therefore it is very essential for economic development (Posen 2022). This overlap may be indicated by example of data that indicate a growing number of people dependent on food banks (Clark 2023a). The story from Sky News (2023) in which a young person is depicted sleeping in a tent because he cannot afford housing is also indicative for a current economic situation in Britain. Brexit thus caused considerable instability and ultimately harmed those who were likely to be in favour of it.

According to Scuira (2022), Britain was always afraid of opening up to the European market, but at the same time it was inclined to do so, because it had been in her interest to have a single market with Europe. With this also came the aforementioned migration, which the British government was fond of during the CEE approach, but this changed very quickly during the world crisis after 2008. British continuously saw as necessary step for immigrants to assimilate to British culture because their presence essentially disrupts the very nature of British culture. To already stated information, it is necessary to add a correlation with UKIP and, as Scuira (2022) states, even the conservatives are reticent and unwilling to accept changes to this trend, and they had a significant share in creating this atmosphere in British society.

As current research shows, the conservatives used Brexit to legitimize their position and define themselves *vis-à-vis* the EU. Brexit is now to some extent an element that sets the main theme of the political discourse (Brusenbauch Meislová 2023).

The list of the above information indicates that Britain is still gravitating towards the European market, with which it has a deficit in goods and a surplus in services. From which it follows that customs significantly harms British businesses, and they received a record low market openness among the G7 (Tsoukalis and Spisak 2023). In agreement with Posen (2022) is similar to physical forces in this respect, it is impossible to fight against the gravity of the market, which Britain tried and this miscalculation still did not realize even with the new trade deal[[36]](#footnote-36) that it is the largest trading partner is the EU.

The economy has thus significantly deteriorated and because of this citizens perceive the Brexit process as unfinished. According to data from Tony Blair institute research, 60% see a worsening of the economy and 20% think that nothing has changed. The research also shows that 28% perceive a negative impact on their lives and 30% have not noticed a change. Most of the data also point out that people do not perceive Brexit positively, on the contrary, they associate significant economic difficulties with it. Then again, they don't even perceive the greater freedom of their own government in most areas. Overall, the trend is rather a perceived worsening of the situation for the average citizen. The research also defines the word association with the Leave and Remain campaigns, for Remain the most people associate the word – disaster and for Leave – freedom (Spisak 2022). From this it can be deduced that there is a significant polarization of British society which will probably persist for some time and therefore the task of the current and upcoming governments to find a solution for the social reconciliation of the two groups.

An even more detailed representation can be a report from the report from the EC, it is also clear that Britain's trade balance will be significantly worse even with its openness. The trend indicates long-term stagnation or fluctuation around very low numbers that can be damaging in the long run. According to the report, if the covid is omitted, it is very low in the long term compared to the pre-Brexit period, exports are also subject to complications, which reduces the traded volume with the EU (Freeman et al. 2022). As the author Khanna (2022) states in his article, industrial sectors moved to the East in the past, which caused the lower classes in the Western world to suffer, therefore it is now necessary to partially revive this sector and create strategic self-sufficiency.

O’Neil (2022) has a similar opinion on this, with an emphasis on regionalization and climate change, which will form economic blocs that will cooperate and, secondarily, trade with others.

It is also worth mentioning the articles from The Atlantic by McTague (2022) who, for example, contradict most of the data and states that this economic problem would have appeared regardless of Brexit, and it was mainly a culture war. The second article from The Atlantic article by Lewis (2022) sees Brexit as a catalyst and rather characterizes it as a failure of the elites and considers the poor economy as a cyclical phenomenon.

In the same way, Politico perceives a large share of the failure of the elites and the economy built against the people, from which the consequences arise (Whale and Lanktree 2022). Furthermore, the author Foroohar (2022) of the article After Neoliberalism additionally states that the world is moving towards deglobalization, and producing a surge of regional blocs with focus on trading with each other, hence is only rational to creating strong trade blocs which will conduct trade with each other.

Now it is all the more important that Britain does not seek its essence as an independent player on the world stage who will define its own future, because this way, on the contrary, it can only make things worse. It is now better for the British to play together with the Europeans than to wait for a leading role that does not exist for them.

## Impact on British society

The result of Brexit has not only economic consequences, but also social and cultural ones. The polarization of society outlined above is based on the nature of British culture and historical development, which, further amplified by populism, divided society into two groups. However, the division had steadily grown since the end of millennium and only before Brexit gain the proper momentum.

For the long period it has been the aforementioned division by education, occupation, age and place of residence. Previous chapters indicate that it was people with lower education and older age who voted for exit, so the argument by author Outhwaite (2017, p. 58–60) further points to deepening division that may create societal polarization since the dividing line is education and age. Considering the fact that older people are inclined to the populist tropes with which the established divisions are based such as the issue of globalization, immigration, culture and the general development of British politics, thus may produce an unstable long-term polarization on growing number of topics[[37]](#footnote-37).

Author Fieldhouse (et al. 2019a, p. 9–26) therefore states that earlier these[[38]](#footnote-38) would have been left-wing voters, but today they are more inclined towards populist subjects and, with regard to the British system, therefore towards electable parties such as the Conservatives, who were given the opportunity to redefine their priorities by Brexit. To what extent they are sustainable is a question of development for several years ahead, and it will probably not be the last metamorphosis of the conservative party.

Research from MacDonald (2017) shows the multi-sector impacts of Brexit on society. Among the most fundamental are the impact on education, culture and tourism. All of the areas mentioned are crucial to Britain's economic development and account for a significant share of GDP. The impact on education is sad because teachers from the EU will have a much harder time getting job opportunities and will not be subject to the support of EU funds or conditions for workers at SM. This results in a monetary loss that will probably have to be replaced by people from outside the EU, because operating without the support of European funds or workers will be challenging for the British education sector with a long-standing tradition. The impact will also affect research, which, however, is subject to strategic agreements and should not be so affected. Unlike Erasmus+, which the British government has committed to maintaining in an acceptable form. It also applies to tourism, before Brexit will have a very noticeable negative impact. British tourism brings in almost £22 billion and employs less than 10% of the population and will therefore bear the critical impacts of Brexit.

The loss of tourism from EU countries would have a negative impact on the British economy and could create a deviation in unemployment as can be seen, for example, during the covid-19 period when unemployment rose to 5.1% (Statista Research Departement 2023).

In consonance with Mattocks (2021), the cultural impact is even more noticeable because without EU funds and the possibility to operate in SM, there are significant complications for artists. Culture received €68 million from European funds during 2014-2020, now it will rely on the support of world organizations because the British government has not promised anything yet. Author also reports that a House of Commons survey concluded that up to 60% of musicians are considering changing careers due to complications. The impacts on culture and related sectors are noticeable and will most likely require meaningful attention in the future.

Overall, all the effects and factors of Brexit, it is evident that society is changing, and the younger generation will be affected by these decisions stemming from older generations and poorer regions.

According to Smith (2023) , it appears that society is showing a significant change in attitude and a turn towards sympathy for the EU. According to chapter 2.1, British politics still on the way to finding its position in the world and its relationship with the EU and an overall new approach after significant difficulties with covid or the war in Ukraine.

It therefore follows the necessity to focus on the positive impact towards society and to create a well-defined political atmosphere which is deficient at the moment. The British must realize where they are heading in upcoming years, since the decision of 2016 would be very short-sighted then unless it acquires degree of meaning for citizens.

Menon (2022b) emphasized that populism appeared as an inevitable step that culminated in Brexit. This was a long-term feeling fuelled by references to Britain's heroic history and the absence of an evaluation of integration that progressed too quickly and continues to correlate with the crisis of 2008. Hence, why Menon states that Brexit may have been negative in many ways, but it still managed to stop the growing populist and radical tendencies in Britain, so it served as a barrier.

It follows the major problem that remains in the current state of society throughout postmodern era, where social networks and the media have a great influence on people. This is a post-fact era in which, according to Garber (2023), it is no longer about consuming information to diversify our worldview, but about fulfilling our desire for entertainment. This cycle can have a dangerous impact on the generations that grow up on social networks, because the consumption of content based on an endless loop of frivolous news can create a deformation of society, the reverse phenomenon that Britain needs.

It can be concluded that governments need to assess their position and strive towards harmonization to prevent artificially[[39]](#footnote-39)created divisions; So that society can fight this phenomenon of obscurity and the unclear division between entertainment and important elements of democracy.

# Development of Great Britain outside the European Union in the background of international relations

The referendum on remaining in the EU was held during uncertain period in which several major events had occurred in the world. Whether it was the election of Donald Trump, the migration crisis or rising aggression on the northern part of Korean peninsula. The world order built on the principles of liberal democracy began to experience tremors in its foundations.

According to Cass (2021), this period was dominated by strong populism, but a new wave of new conservatism also began to spread, the appeal of which was to some extent associated with Donald Trump. Tendencies towards populism also appeared in Europe, whether it was Poland or Hungary, so it was obvious that there was a weakening of institutions and a certain inclination towards a more authoritarian form of governance. As the author of series Battle for Europe – Bennehold (2020) identified through interviews with people from these countries, it can be assumed that some residents are quite comfortable with it. The erosion of liberal values and the overall worsening of the situation in democratic countries is also indicated by research for democracies (The Economist 2017), in which the data confirm a degradation in the area of the media and the general evaluation of democracy.

Considering the first chapter with an emphasis on internal history, this chapter will thus create a basis for the perception of Britain as an actor in international order.

## Reinventing Britain’s Foreign Policy

After leaving the EU, the direction of British foreign policy found itself back in the hands of the British government.

Unlike the EU, where foreign policy is made not only by the member states, but also by the European Union, especially by the EC, and it even has its own representative. The complicated structure has its justification, however, it does not at all deprive the member states of their own engagement in the world, it only coordinates common interests and represents European values and policy abroad. Now that Britain is not subject to the system in which it determined common foreign policy with the EU (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 279–291).

Furthermore, it will have to find its own position in the world, although it will not be easy because the US has already made it clear several times that they want Britain in the EU, from where it will be easier to coordinate a common policy. In this regard, the US tried several times to dissuade the British from withdrawing from the EU because a united Europe is a priority not only for Europeans but also for their partners, especially for the democracies with which they share a cultural basis. The US has been perhaps the most important partner for the British since the last century, the essence of which is based on shared values (Prikhodko 2022). Nevertheless, when the results of the referendum were clear, Barack Obama strongly objected and said that he would negotiate with the EU first. Even after the exit, it was not easy to find agreements with the US because one country will have a hard time negotiating, unlike an economic giant like the EU (Asthana et al. 2016). This can be demonstrated by the effort to remove tariffs on steel, which they only removed through shared ambition of supporting the Ukraine, in order to unite their forces (Palmer 2022).

Accordingly, a certain balance of power is maintained in the world order. Thus, authoritarian regimes are more repressed into a reactionary-defensive mode than an offensive one in which they are prone to destabilize the liberal democratic system as its pose a vital threat to them.

An interesting demonstration in this case is the huge cognitive dissonance between the expressions of British politicians and their real actions towards their partners. An example can be the statement of Liz Truss, who shared on twitter her views on the formation of a democratic bloc to stop the rise of China as an economic hegemon (Liz Truss [@trussliz] 2023). Paradoxically, the solution to this problem is to join the world's largest trading bloc, as well as the political union they so vehemently abandoned. Politicians such as the above-mentioned Truss will be more aware of the consequences with the growing influence and economic power of China, which needs to be dealt with in a unified manner, not as a single country.

These conclusions are also presented by a group of specialists on British foreign policy The report shows the necessity to reset relations with China and achieve the resilience of democracy. It is necessary to consider China as a strong actor, however, primarily as a trading partner, not as a suitable co-actor in shaping the universal rules of the world order (Gaston 2021b). However, the contradiction is the attitude of Europe, from which the USA expects clear support in its attitude towards China. However, Europe partially defends its interests, which are built pragmatically on trade with China, but even these can to some extent worsen the position of the EU through dependence on the Chinese market (Lynch et al. 2023). Britain lies somewhere between two actors such as the USA, with interests in limiting China's efforts to become a world leader, and Europe, which tries to maintain her values, but nevertheless has to cooperate with China from an economic point of view (Paulson a Jr 2023; Fix and Benner 2022). Despite that, Britain has to decide on which side she will lean, since in manner of realpolitik, economy is rational choice, yet with debatable outcomes in long-term.

In the article by Vucjetic and Muttreja (2022), the nature of British foreign policy is greatly accentuated, according to him, this attitude comes from a certain distancing from others and asserting itself as a great power, which it objectively is no longer today. By this distancing and protectionism, the British maintained their position as a great power until the twentieth century, but as the last 70 years indicate, it is evident that this vision has failed[[40]](#footnote-40). The position, in which the British form an imaginary intersection of everything essential, was even then completely distorted and only confirmed the cultural stereotype of a powerful empire.

When compared with today, when they are trying to maintain the Anglophone-Saxon sphere, it is clear that this is a pragmatic step, this is also confirmed by the cooperation of AUKUS. The AUKUS grouping is built on the united cooperation of countries with the same cultural basis in matters of foreign policy with emphasis on security and trade. An example is the conclusion of the 2021 agreement, when cooperation has just shifted to limiting China's influence in the world (Ward a Mcleary 2021). Britain is thus trying to develop its foreign policy rather through the US and to maintain it on the basis of this strong partnership.

Although, British foreign policy is still to some extent conducted as if Britain were a key player in the world order, but according to Mazarr (2022), this idea is long gone. In addition, the Mazarr (2022) follows up on this by saying that states will become a great power and a middle power due to an internal crisis, i.e., a non-functioning civil society and a tendency to lose a unified goal. The problem of British foreign policy during the 20th century was to cope with the change in the world order and the new norms in which it began to operate. For the British, it meant the loss of colonies and with them leverage in foreign policy.

The British managed exceptionally to stand for a unified goal from the time of Queen Elizabeth and defeating Spanish Armada up to defending the isles from German blitz; after which they were gradually losing the unity and have been wandering in historical self-affirmation ever since.

The illusion of a powerful empire is still in the eyes of many Britons, but reconciliation with the real position is nowhere to be found. Today, the British do not dictate the main themes of the world order, and they do not have the final say in it either, yet they are an important part of it. Certainly, it would be better to strengthen their power and position through the EU in the world. This further points to Johnson, who has moved British policy towards the above-mentioned cooperation, but still refuses to admit that the US is more inclined to cooperate with a large political bloc such as the EU (Vinjamuri 2022a; 2022b).

An independent Britain balancing on the border between the USA and the EU thus produces considerable uncertainty through its internal polarization and the densest development in the post-Brexit era. The inconsistency of British foreign policy stems from its internal situation, in which prime ministers alternate without social consensus or elections. The result is uncertainty for Britain's partners, the weakening influence of the reach of its foreign policy and the lessening of British influence in areas of interest such as the Indo-Pacific region (Matthijs 2023b).

The current world order is passing through a new stage whose development will have an unclear outcome for some time. This result will be a kind of fusion of liberal democratic values and the presence of authoritarian ones, as they will be present for some time to come, as the Chinese regime at least suggests (Berman 2022).

Britain may now perceive that it has found its place in this order and will continue to strengthen it, but on the contrary the reality is that this system can increase with the growing influence of China and new actors with undemocratic tendencies, and therefore it is necessary for Britain to consider whether it is not better to be a part The EU did not want to operate outside of it. Through the EU, British values would have a greater reach and could become more resonant in the world order. Current threats, whether it is the war in Ukraine or China's tendency to intervene economically anywhere in the world and to expand its influence, indicate a clear imperative, namely that liberal democratic systems should unite, not divide.

## Producing the right foreign policy

The reason for finding a new foreign policy lies in the independent anchoring of Britain in a world order in which only strong actors such as the USA, China, Russia or alternatively, a political grouping such as the EU with a large reach and market have a chance to affect future world events.

The illusion of an independent Britain is somewhat unrealistic and does not correspond remotely to the Global Britain[[41]](#footnote-41) vision because the fulfilment of this idea can be achieved through strong cooperation with those powers. Nevertheless, the British will have to adjust their foreign policy not only because of their own interests, but also because of the guarantors of their position in the world, and thus especially the US through which they will assert their place in this order. That co-operation will fundamentally be based on British cooperation with the US, but also with other CW countries, whether former or current and certainly with EU even though they prefer transatlantic ties than the continental ones (Prikhodko 2022; Gaston 2021a).

The complication for Britain is the unstable US policy over the last decade and its potentiating volatility in the future. Donald Trump's disruption of foreign policy in the post-Brexit period has only worsened Britain's position in the world as they have not had an important transatlantic partner. In accord with the report by Gaston and Aspinall (2020) on US foreign policy with concern on transatlantic partners, Britain should not look for a central support in the US, but rather diversify its cooperation, although this would mean closer cooperation with Europe. Establishing relations with Europe on more than just the cooperation promised in the Withdrawal Agreement, but on one that ensures the important position of both parties in world order is absolutely fundamental. As report shows, Biden's current foreign policy is rather unclear because America does not yet know how to deal with a new dominant actor like China (ibid). For the US, after passing the most fundamental issue, that of Ukraine, it will now rather look back to the South Asian region and create economic cooperation as a deterrent to China. Europe whose interests lie in this region, are also trying to do something similar. It will be very difficult for Britain to rely on the US or AUKUS in the creation of its own foreign policy (Dubenko 2023).

Despite that, according to the report on support of Ukraine, Britain managed to increase its international position in specific areas. Mainly in supporting mentioned Ukraine, not only with military material but also with humanitarian aid. According to the report, citizens are in favour of this support for Ukraine and perceive it as a positive[[42]](#footnote-42) phenomenon for Britain's position in the world (Aspinall and Keogh 2022).

As stated by the report on annual views of foreign policy in Britain, the Britons mostly now perceive withdrawal from the EU as a bad step. The data also shows that Germany is for Britons a reliable partner and the USA is best long-term ally. The most important thing is the British perception of their relationship with the EU and the USA, in which, although the British find a greater cultural similarity with the USA, the greater weight of the partnership is with the EU. Additionally, they perceive the outflow of power in the world from the USA to China, and therefore perceive the necessity of a Global Britain with involvement in world politics (Gaston 2022). Summarizing[[43]](#footnote-43) the most fundamental views of British society, it can be concluded that they expect closer cooperation with like-minded partners, less involvement of the USA, support for Ukraine, transformation to a sustainable future, better coping with globalization and, overall, the creation of a more resilient system of cooperation between democratic nations. As stated by the report, the British only viewed humanitarian aid to developing countries negatively, which should be restored only after coming to terms with their own problems (ibid). Yet, as assertiveness on the part of China will only grow, it shall be necessary to build a solid community of nations with a common liberal democratic foundation. These communities will serve as a deterrent to China's economic or, hypothetically, military expansion anywhere in the world (Rudd 2022). According to Diamond (2022), democracy should be global, and America should try to support its development everywhere because only then will there be resistance to authoritarian threats.

The above-mentioned report demonstrates that Britain should similarly participate in this and, without a doubt, be involved in strengthening the system that will ensure stability and security not only for the British themselves, but also spill over into European security.

What follows from this for the creation of a new but at the same time proven foreign policy, the single-minded maintenance of engagement in the world and the reach of British values not only in the European but also in the world sphere. As authors Daalder and Lindsay (2022) states in their article on Last Best Hope, in which they points out the necessity of cooperation and the emanation of democratic values in places where not only China, but also other authoritarian regimes are now involved. According to Vinjamuri (2022b), Britain perceives itself as a global actor, and as state by the author it is no longer one, but according to the above-mentioned reports, it can at least try to do so and best achieve this through very close cooperation with the EU.

If Britain genuinely want to maintain her position, it will be necessary to engage in the priorities of Europe's foreign relations and help to fulfil common goals, as was the case in the past, for example, in the joint cooperation regarding the agreement with Iran after the withdrawal of the US or common policies for China and individual parts of the Asian region (Keogh 2023).

Additionally, cooperation in Africa or South America, whether humanitarian or other, should both engaged by Europe and Britain since they have their interests there, not only economic, but also political ones in the long term (Dubenko 2023). By summing up these factors, it is clear that Britain will have to balance on the level of transatlantic cooperation and European cooperation, because although they are no longer part of the EU, they are still at least part of NATO and participate in the G7 with some EU states; therefore, it will necessarily deepen its cooperation rather with Europe, as it was pushed to do so during the 60s of the last century.

For instance author Matthijs (2023b) indicates the same when he portrays a fundamental improvement in relations between the EU and Britain. The result in the long term can only be deepening cooperation, which the report above suggests that the British welcome and strengthen meaningful integration and give hope for re-accession to the EU in the future.

## Laying a solid foundation for an uncertain era

What lies ahead for British foreign policy and the very position of Britain in the world is its re-establishment of her role in the world as an important player based on universal rules founded in aftermath of World War II. The creation of this solid foundation must be based on coming to terms with the events before and after Brexit, so that not only citizens but also allies identify with the somewhat newly established Britain.

Shortly after Brexit, Britain ought to come with terms quickly with the reality of leaving the EU, accompanied by several important events not only on the domestic scene but also on the world stage. Based on this, it was essential to speed up the process of defining the post-Brexit Britain, but it has fundamentally dragged on, and countless extensions have cost the Conservatives confidence in competent leadership. The subsequent impact for common policy with Europe had a certain impact because Europe was not ready for deepening cooperation after the complicated and endless negotiations on the NI protocol (Gaston 2021a). Following on from that, the world took part in the covid pandemic, in which Britain wanted to show how it could cope as an independent state better than Europe. Nonetheless, it created an atmosphere and an imaginary space for cooperation since it was not possible to act alone, and cooperation was key in solving these problems (ibid). The reason is the joint defence of the value framework and its reach to other parts of the world with which it is necessary to establish cooperation and not rely only on America.

The space for Britain to prove that it is one of the important rule makers in the world is possible through close cooperation with allies, it is time for the superpowers to reduce their impact on the world and its direction, and middle powers such as Britain take over this imaginary vacuum. This rebalancing of forces will result in a greater degree of progress, for example in the area of climate progressiveness or the highlighting of key issues of globalization (Rodrik a Walt 2022). Although, the current situation in Ukraine will possibly reverse this change and power will be further consolidated in the hands of the already existing powers.

However, Britain should not be intimidated as a middle power to get involved in the decisive issues of the future order, which is beginning to lose its liberal aspect based on international institutions. Rudd (2022) states that the current China is not what it was a few decades ago, the current China will expand its influence and will want to build its own future by bending this functioning order. Xi sees China in the foreground as a major actor with the United States, and therefore a rebalancing of forces in the world is necessary. The scenario according to Brenes and Jackson (2022) indicates that the competition for world power between the USA and the PRC will be very counterproductive and may stop progress or threaten the existing functioning based on multilateralism and the intergovernmental approach. Britain should therefore, together with Europe, look for a solution to participate as much as possible, regardless of their still complicated relationship; the course of China's negotiations with the EU to date is absolutely essential not only for the economy but also for mutual influence and therefore Britain should clearly be part of these agreements and ask the EU for cooperation[[44]](#footnote-44) (Gaston 2021b).

Future governments in Britain will have to realize that the prospect of cooperation is not a *zero-sum game* with Europe, but with autocratic powers such as China and Russia or a growing power such as India. According to Ward a Mcleary (2021), the effort should be to involve Europe together to influence the area where China is involved if they want to punish Russia for the invasion of Ukraine, this is the global south. Even though efforts with important partners in the global south are not successful, it is still necessary to create incentives for key cooperation (Balingit a Tobin 2023). For this reason, Britain should be all the more involved.

In the same way, the contours of a closer cooperation between EU leaders and Sunak are emerging, which will deepen the necessary cooperation in the currently unpredictable world. Joint outreach to the global south could correspond to Albright's (2021) vision, which stressed that another wave of democratization and the restoration of order in the world would come. Arguably, this can be at least partly achieved in some parts of the global south with the help of Britain's alliance with Europe, but also with transatlantic partners as mentioned. The expansion of humanitarian aid or simply by increasing the investment of cooperation with these countries can therefore achieve considerable success for the rebalancing of forces in the world as Spektor (2023) perceives it as the only option is to engage the global south to universal order of the West before the authoritarian regimes manage to do this themselves.

In the future, the current world scene will be defined by the outcome of the war in Ukraine and economic conflicts between blocs such as China and America or the EU. The result will be greater polarization and, even greater unity between Western states and their partners will be necessary, even so, the war gave a definite effect of unity. It should lead to a unified stance on morally responsible issues throughout the world (Scholz 2022; Bremmer 2022).

The West[[45]](#footnote-45) noticeably has an important position that will continue to resonate in the world and should not be intimidated by, for example, China's economic intervention in Africa or their efforts to expand influence in the Middle East or even the escalation around Taiwan. According to authors Brands and Gaddis (2021), it is no longer possible to fail again as after the Cold War, when the democratic wave could have been much more broader and incorporate more states, further impose more democratic and moral values around the world. Now it is necessary to build an order applicable for the 21st century.

In sum, Britain's direction outside the EU should be oriented towards the maintenance of previous ideals and cooperation, but it should not only concern foreign policy because the domestic one is now in an internally unclear development. As indicated by tweets from the Home Office (Home Office [@homeoffice] (2023), for example, that Britain is fighting against illegal migration and suggests that the fight against people who need help has culminated in considerable polarization in society. Tweets from the Home Office and its ministers indicate a high level of opposition, with some drawing parallels with pre-war Germany pointed out by Gary Lineker (Abdul 2023). An example can be Sunak's tweet (Sunak [@RishiSunak] 2023), from which it can be deduced, even with a certain degree of vagueness, that illegal migrants will not be treated with much dignity.

On the contrary, this method may satisfy the already radicalized or those who are not yet convinced of radicalization, who may suffer in the current economic situation. It is one of the worst in Britain in the last few decades and was fundamentally helped by the decision to leave the EU.

The emphasis should therefore be on domestic politics as well, because according to Fintan (2023) there is a danger of Wales and Scotland seceding from the union. The consequences of the English approach to these units and the gradually unreasonable rule from London, which de facto shapes politics on the fly and solves crises as they come rather than preventively. The difference is deepening, and the political culture is very low, accompanied by a bad economic situation, there is a danger of a real division into individual units. Scotland has been proving this difference for a long time in the data, and their will to re-join the EU is completely different from the British countryside.

The direction of British politics must be clear to citizens in order to maintain a meaningful and coherent functioning of Britain in the long term. The Patient Diplomacy Report suggests strategic waiting and the search for suitable partnerships and the formation of a suitable policy for domestic development as well. This waiting can be dangerous in the long run and should rather be similar to how Britain is involved in supporting Ukraine, because according to the aforementioned survey, it has considerable support (Keogh 2022). Just as Mazarr (2022) stated, unity behind a national goal[[46]](#footnote-46) is essential for its future, it can thus produce a fundamental definition of the direction of its politics, at least create bottom-up effect to which politicians will ned to react.

For this time, Britain should not be an island as depicted in the well-known *Europa Regina* drawing but rather should have an outstretched hand and seek cooperation that will not be based on the pragmatic benefit of itself.

# The Consequences of Brexit and its long-term effects on the United Kingdom

The chapter is devoted to the fundamental consequences of Brexit in all areas and, especially, the direction of Britain now after two years outside the EU. Considering the fundamental economic issue that Britain is currently dealing with, subsequently also with the decline political environment in Britain. Based on this, thoughts arise about the state of British political culture, as well as about the phenomenon in some countries of the Western world, which is democratic backsliding. Britain now finds itself in a place where politicians are questioning some norms or threatening the institutional framework. Brexit has left some still unconvinced about its effects and therefore some are deliberately fighting against rational arguments and creating an alternative reality, thereby threatening democracy itself (Russell et al. 2022).

This also includes an inherent change in politics in which right-wing entities must adapt to the new conservatism. In recent months, the political scene and culture in the world have experienced significant obstacles, whether it is the definition of the Britain’s relationship with Europe or migration policy or even the budget. Conservative ideology deviates from its traditional framework and takes on a completely different basis that redefines the essence of the right-wing subject. Therefore, it is necessary to perceive where this nature of the new conservatives is heading, as it can go beyond the scope of objective reality[[47]](#footnote-47)(Cass 2021). For that reason, the conventional political division experiences considerable complications, as it is based on the above information, it is the poorer regions that will feel the current bad economic situation the most; the manifestation will again be an increase in support for the party or candidates with radical ideas.

For both the Conservatives and Labour, this means getting to grips with meaningful policy and ending manufactured disputes, as the situation in Britain points to considerable polarization. In the given situation, it is not an alternative to solve petty internal disputes when there is a war between Ukraine and Russia, China is setting its sights on Taiwan and its influence is expanding from the global south to the Middle East, and additionally the long-standing issues of global warming or food shortages.

The imperative is a clear internal policy for a resilient society and a coherent foreign policy that stands for cooperation with the EU. It is the European Union that is dealing with similar problems, yet it stands united and that is where its strength lies, and it only depends on how it approaches its position in the future. From which it follows that there is a need to better perceive the position of the EU and its policies now, as the following years will be crucial for its development. Therefore, this chapter will address both subjects equally and consider their positions in the future.

## The long-term consequences for Britain without the European Union

In the long term, Britain finds itself in a very complicated situation, which is based on its current economic situation, which is far from favourable for citizens, let alone for politicians. The current situation suggests that British citizens are beginning to perceive Brexit already in supermarket stores where food is often missing from the shelves or even according to DW News (2023), and the number of goods per person is limited in some stores. As the story from the BBC (2023) shows, it is clear that even the regions with strong support for Leave in the 2016 referendum are currently against the then decision and are feeling its consequences.

Data from the CEPR report indicate that this decline is clearly visible in the eastern-northern regions. Report further indicates a lack of manpower, expensive products and, in addition, complications for British companies to trade on the European market, as they are unable to be competitive against European prices. Cleavages have opened up more in these regions than before Brexit, and in conjunction with Britain's reduced trade openness, hence these are prone regions to stagnate in the future (Portes 2022).

Although Britain is trying to issue visas to skilled workers to support even more of its income-generating sectors, key areas such as agriculture, social services and manufacturing are being neglected. In particular, however, agriculture without CAP is at risk as it lacks up to 35% of the workforce[[48]](#footnote-48) and Britain cannot now rely on the common market it has left to ensure enough food (Portes 2022; O’Carroll 2022).

Visas for qualified workers are therefore important, but according to the report, sectors whose nature is also vital must not be neglected, because without a Single Market, European workers cannot go to the British one, where they held low-paid jobs before Brexit, but nevertheless vital for the economy. Britain has not systematically solved this problem, and according to the data CEPR report, it appears that a larger number of migrants are still arriving in Britain even after leaving the EU. These are mainly non-EU migrants who continue to hold positions in which these European workers previously worked (Portes 2022; Aghion et al. 2017). According to the article by Scuira (2022), there is an obvious feeling among the British that migrants should adapt to the British culture, moreover, they perceive it as if they are disrupting it.

In this way, it is possible to find a significant discrepancy between what is happening now, as non-EU migrants are coming to Britain for positions that need to be filled[[49]](#footnote-49) and between the British approach to these migrants. If it were European workers, it would at least be possible to find a significant cultural match, but even that might not help if it had already resulted in a mismatch with the British mood before the referendum.

At the moment, it is possible to see how the aforementioned Sunak deals with this problem and how British society reacts to it, especially young people are against a tougher migration policy and, conversely, older people are in favour (Keunssberg 2023). However, it follows from the data that Britain needs migrants to supplement the labour force, without which it will be difficult to maintain its advanced economy.

However, this approach to migrants is not unique until now, it is a long-term process that started in the 50s and culminated in the 70s with the era of Enoch Powell. For a long time, resistance to migration was thus maintained and gained a firm place in British culture, yet it is also a necessary element of the British empire that stood on it, the more special is this dichotomous turning away from its foundations, since British empire was to certain degree on migration and moving workforce. Therefore, ordinary Britons had been able to gain benefits out of their colonies, yet when it came to Single Market with Europe this turn out to be unviable (Bogdanor 2013b; Dorling and Tomlinson 2019, p. 55–70).

When comparing these realities with the CEPR report by Portes (2022) and Freeman (et al. 2022), it is clear that the British have always benefited from the benefit of foreign capital, workers, students and products, it is all the more difficult now that they have lost a large part of them and at the same time their biggest trading partner. Therefore, investments in the UK have significantly decreased, while in the past they formed a very fundamental aspect for the economy, Britain owes precisely to its deregulated financial sphere. This decline has an impact almost everywhere and especially in the labour market. The trade balance with the world and the EU has also fallen, which is a big problem for London, from where the majority of services go to the EU.

In line with the above-mentioned openness of the market, which fundamentally affects the economy of Britain, this report states that it has worsened by 6.2%, which, unlike the rest of the G7, has fallen significantly after covid-19 (Office for National Statistics 2022a).

Correspondingly the Econ (2023) channel, the problem with the British economy lies in productivity. It is incomparable to the other G7 countries and Britain is significantly behind. Productivity is a key aspect in determining a country's future fortunes and without improvements in productivity the UK economy will stagnate. As further specified by Econ, Britain has only two options, namely, to increase working hours, which may not mean an increase in productivity or to fill vacant positions with qualified workers. Britain, unlike Germany, lacks a strong industrial sector, which is why it should react more quickly in creating opportunities to increase productivity as quickly as possible in order to maintain its economic position.

The current world economy is experiencing unprecedented upheavals, whether it is bank failures[[50]](#footnote-50) or an information war in which microchips play a vital role, it is necessary to realize, that the world is reaching a point where the neoliberal approach ceases to function adequately. Based on this, regionalization will play a big role and economic units will trade with each other, so being an independent actor is very dangerous until the next uncertain era (Foroohar 2022; Schmidt 2023).

Instead, the potential of the EU lies in the expansion of the Balkans, in which it will gain even more political and economic power in the world. In accordance thus gain a degree of power to sway or influence other powers in the world to apply for conditions in the world’s leading market.

Fukuyama (2012) makes case for possibility that in the future, wealth will depend on its geopolitical location, yet it is clear that the middle class is suffering greatly and is even disappearing in some places, the consequences for society can therefore be very unfavourable. The decline of the middle class is also pointed out by Fukuyama and states that globalization fundamentally threatens the middle class and may not be able to handle it in the future, Britain thus must adapt to the upcoming changes.

However, with their withdrawal from the EU, the British have put themselves in a position where they will have to deal with these complications rationally and quickly.

For instance a story from the (Financial Times 2022), it is clear that Britain will continue to experience significant economic difficulties for some time to come, and companies will have to reckon with a large degree of market uncertainty. Subsequently, the economic forecast is clearly very unpleasant for the British and the Conservatives do not offer a very meaningful solution, an example was Liz Truss.

When emphasizing the long-term economic perspective of Britain, it is necessary to clearly draw a negative trend based on the given data. Reports by Aghion (et al. 2017) shortly after the referendum period already indicated conclusions regarding unfavourable economic development or long-term effects, but they did not take into account covid-19 and the war in Ukraine.

The economic impacts are therefore significantly greater, the predictions of the aforementioned reports and sources suggest a rather worse scenario in which Britain will stagnate or even lose for some time[[51]](#footnote-51). The solution is closer cooperation with the EU, but this would mean a considerable amount of humility and self-reflection, many politicians in Britain are not prepared for this, and neither is a dissatisfied part of society.

Their lives are most affected by globalization and the same applies to pensioners, although it is a strange paradox, because the report by Portes (2022) indicates that their pensions have risen rapidly, unlike, for example, the support of young workers or families. In the long term, this is unsustainable and greatly undermines the resilience of the economy in combination with the previous factors.

This is evident from an old report from a referendum period, it follows that British society carries elements of considerable polarization marked by this specific fact of globalization and its effects on British economy (Hobolt 2016a). However, globalization was not adequately used during the referendum, on the contrary, the common denominator became the European Union, which was supposed to symbolize Britain's problems, and the Leave campaign took full advantage of this by weaponizing the immigration topic. The British media took full advantage of this, and it was the same with the politicians, they used Europe to eliminate domestic problems and the top-down process in which the elites made themselves perfectly visible, Boris Johnson being a prime example. Immigration was just a ticking bomb in which the shortcomings of the European Union could not stand for the resentful British citizen (Hobolt 2016b). To emphasize the resentfulness, the politico article states that, according to expert research, the EU came out as incomprehensible and unfathomable to ordinary people, which is an enormous problem, especially when the EU is trying to create a bridge between citizens and institutions (Wheaton 2022). The same is stated by Bogdanor in lecture on Brexit (Yale MacMillan Center 2022), who says that the nature of the EU is so technocratic that it is incomprehensible to the British. That is why many citizens just decided to come out in 2016. In the period from 2016 to now, it is clear what consequences it had on polarization in society, the underlining is the difference in population groups, especially the young and the old.

In a Sky News interview Michael Heseltine suggests that it is a major setback in which the old have taken away the opportunity for the young to participate in the world of tomorrow, and as a result, the uninformed and incompetent have deprived the young generations of their future. Before Britain recovers, it will take a considerable time to re-join the EU and thus one generation will lose great opportunities and increase the polarization and dissatisfaction with politics in Britain (Sky News 2020).

This polarization continues, and accompanied by the current political situation in Britain, it is evident that there will be an even greater split and that cues to the parties will change. A change in cleavages may also be more problematic if the economy continues to deteriorate and.

Civil society in Britain is undergoing a significant test in which there is no simple answer as to who should bear responsibility for the Brexit process. As Hobolt (2014) points out, responsibility is difficult to determine if the line between responsibility and liability is blurred by who actually should have decided to stay in the EU. The question in the referendum about remaining could not be left to the people without a greater degree of information, today it is clear what the consequences are (Friedman 2015; Hobolt a Tilley 2014, p. 29–44). It is all the more complicated to assign blame in a majority system where the other party, i.e., Labour, takes power and it also bears a significant share in the result in 2016 and subsequently in negotiations from the EU, as their approach was to complicate everything for the conservatives. The current situation indicates a very dangerous period of instability, and Britain will have to cope with it not only because of its external position, but mainly because of maintaining the stable democracy it has been for several decades (Goodwin 2023).

This unique economic and political situation in Britain presents a challenge for politicians who will deal with the post-Brexit economy, negotiate with Europe on a common approach against Russia and, above all, how to help the struggling classes in Britain when most modern economies are beginning to turn to modernization and robotization. Current YouGov surveys indicate dissatisfaction with the Conservatives, but it is not a given that Labour will be able to bring about important changes in the future (Paleckis 2023).

The British must now see that their politicians perceive the world realistically and not let themselves be disheartened by some percentage of dissatisfied voters which parties they can lose and instead lead a hopeful policy based on cooperation and universal values of the 21st century. It is not possible to aspire to the idea of Global Britain when the nation itself is strongly polarized and individual countries are seeking a way out outside the union. Brexit did not end with the conclusion of the TCA; this process will continue for several more years and will evolve according to British policy.

## The British Government's ongoing task: extinguishing the ashes of Brexit

Britain now has to deal with what will plague it most in the coming years, and that is the consequences of Brexit. Either it will begin to see them as a permanent change in British politics and become part of the equation, and therefore all problem solving will include factors or consequences of Brexit. Alternatively, they can ignore them, although it is quite clear that a large part of British society probably cannot do this, at least from an economic point of view.

British governments, or rather the ruling elite, will have to learn to work in favour of foreign partnerships and at the same time emphasize important solutions for today's independent Britain. The current social atmosphere suggests a very unpredictable development and as the information above suggests, the British want back to the EU and this trend is likely to grow with the current economic situation in Britain (Raven 2022). It is essential now that the current government and the following ones are able to manage against those who do not want to return to the EU and are completely discouraged by the results of politics or their party in recent years. The result should thus be overcoming the *hybris* of 2015 and 2016 when British patriotism and antipathy towards the EU culminated. It will now be necessary to prepare citizens that humility towards Europe will be something new in British politics in the future, if Britain ever wants to return to the EU (Matthijs 2023b; Vinjamuri 2022b).

The biggest problem of the current Britain lies in the promises of Sunak, who himself was trapped in them. Previous PMs had a similar problem with this because Brexit cannot be separated from the existing problem which appears to be unrelated to it (Keunssberg 2023). The interconnectedness of events, whether only economic, limits the possibilities of the cabinet to make the desired independent decisions, although they are independent, yet limited by the tolerance of citizens or the state treasury.

In the future, the Cabinet will face continuous complications, which will be of a diverse nature, whether it is about foreign policy in an unclear world or how to help citizens in a difficult economic situation. As the video from tldr news states, the current state and future development is very unfavourable for young people who make up an important part of the economy (TLDR News 2023). Young people cannot afford to be weaned of and this brings complications to the ruling party, although this is only one of many emerging problems. Among the most important in the Sunak period will be migration, as people's dissatisfaction is noticeable (Mejias a Banaji 2017). However, Sunak has to deal with how many people it will allow because it needs to give visas to workers and at the same time it cannot afford to bring in people seeking asylum, even though there is a moral imperative; a significant part, as Goodwin states in the interview, would influence not to vote for the Conservatives in the next election (Goodwin 2023).

Sunak and his successors must realize that there is no *panacea* for British problems, because they arise from the current world order, internal politics and the consequences of leaving the EU.

According to the interview with Goodwin, it is clear that the current Conservatives are not the ones they used to be during the John Major period, on the contrary, they have taken on cultural issues that they largely avoided. In the same way, they also incorporated into their politics social liberal topics that they had not addressed before. These topics are trying to gain traction mainly because, they are close to educated and young people who are not mainly Conservative voters (ibid). They need them all the more to maintain the relevance of the party, which must also orientate itself, as author Cass (2021) states, towards social issues. Right-wing voters today are not only conservative-minded, on the contrary, they may originally be left-wing voters whose issues were not emphasized by the left. It is often associated with radicalization and a shift of a person's ideological position to a party (Goodwin 2023). Consequently, the author argues that these voters gravitate to the right to maintain their familiar system and preserve the status quo. The current society bears the major differences historically[[52]](#footnote-52), as the young part is very left-liberal, while the older generation has not adopted this ideological framework and does not want to. As stated in the previous chapters, society is now polarized like never before and further proves that this discontent leads to a certain apathy when none of the parties offers a real solution; possibly it is a state of limbo in which some voters have no one to vote for and in a majority system this is a fundamental problem (ibid)

Britain will be accompanied by a protracted cycle of coping with the post-Brexit period, including internal problems. The following period will require a fundamental calming down in British politics, as the overlap is drastic and manifests itself in society on the example of the current migration policy, the Lineker case, low salaries in the NHS, which have been a long-term problem since covid-19. Critical events are, for example, the completed agreement on Northern Ireland, which seems to have completed the process of the formal Brexit, not the socio-cultural one.

Nevertheless, it has been becoming prominent how Britain is widely divided how the axes of the Conservatives and Labour are rapidly changing, and preferences are turning to Labour after more than 13 years (YouGov [a]). If Labour wins, they will face a very difficult task, the nature of which will be to calm the atmosphere and anchor Britain in a unified direction; however, the complexity of the task will not be easy to handle, especially after the topics of Brexit are constantly revived.

A viable example is Jacob Rees–Mogg, who with the other backbenchers voted against despite the relatively successful deal regarding Northern Ireland. It is clear from his interview that he is trying to prove that it is primarily about preserving sovereignty (Walker 2023). Yet, on the contrary, as Menon (2022a) suggests in the lecture, this is a triangle in which the British can only choose two things after Brexit. These are leaving the EEA, a united Britain and no border in Northern Ireland. Even Boris Johnson understood that it is necessary to follow a path that partly suits the EU, when the *defacto* regulation of the market rests in the hands of Europe.

Britain is not alone in this perilous situation as problems occur everywhere in the EU[[53]](#footnote-53), but they are not so challenging because of the uniform approach and cooperation. At the same time, as Hobolt (2014, p. 140–155) states, the EU gives citizens the space to express dissatisfaction with the EU[[54]](#footnote-54) itself or the current government, it is another medium for expressing satisfaction with the ruling elites. Whilst Britain will now lack these crucial proportional elections and minority groups will not have a chance to get their views represented in EP. However, it is necessary to perceive that the EU won the Brexit process, and that unequivocally (The Economist 2023). It is impossible to fight a colossus that is bureaucratically set up even for such unpredictable situations. The result, on the contrary, was a strengthening of cooperation and consolidation of European identity and values that are important for the future (The Economist 2020).

## Leaving pride at both ends

As outlined in all the previous chapters, Britain has gone through a very different historical development, although not so different that it could afford not to participate in the European project. Nevertheless, it decided so in 2016, yet there is uncertainty to what extent the citizens were competent to decide on remaining in the largest economic and political bloc in the world. The problem is that the referendum has been haunting them since the 90s and its intensity escalated because it seemed like the only option to legitimately solve the problem and moderate the growing dissatisfaction with the government (Outhwaite 2017, p. 101–111). However, the fundamental problem is that previous proposals for referendums should have addressed treaties such as Lisbon or entry into the eurozone, not EU membership itself. By this handing over of the baton, British politicians created a problem that Cameron eventually had to address, but he succumbed to the pressure of several parties and let this culmination of sentiments last until the referendum on remaining in the EU. The nature of this referendum is highly questionable with hindsight, given the campaign in which the two sides were fundamentally unequal (Outhwaite 2017, p. 3–29; Clarke et al. 2017).

The Leave campaign basically had a proposal, it set the social mood and pushed Remain into a defensive position. In the same way, the government also had to protect itself against obvious misinformation that did not give citizens the opportunity to make an informed decision. The critical area of that referendum is now potential foreign influence and latent inclination towards populists ideas that targeted undecided voters (Clarke et al. 2017, p. 60–85).

In many respects, the citizens had no idea about the EU and did not even know how it works, therefore it is very questionable to what extent they were able to decide whether they should leave or stay in EU (Burton 2022, p. 24–30). Other worrying aspects are the very formula of the question in the referendum, which was so misleading and at the same time simplified that it is difficult for an uninformed citizen to judge the benefit of staying in the EU (Friedman 2015).

Other underlining aspects are the very formula of the question in the referendum, which was so misleading and at the same time simplified that it is difficult for an uninformed citizen to judge the benefit of remaining in the EU. It is necessary to take into account the nature of the British system as mentioned in chapter one in which it is stated that the nature of the sovereignty of power is in the hands of Parliament. Therefore, MPs should make an informed decision about the nature of membership, and if that had happened then, Britain would most likely be in the EU today[[55]](#footnote-55)(Financial Times 2017). The situation was very unclear, and the ordinary Briton was faced with a situation that was not the same as in 1975, when the campaigns had a well-defined message and the citizens only decided to remain in the economic union with the EC and the consequences of leaving would not be so noticeable (Dorling a Tomlinson 2019, p. 60–65). As polls indicate, many Britons today are already inclined to return to the EU, they even perceive the effects of withdrawal, and for that reason the cooperation outlined above is necessary to open the possibility of re-accession (Smith 2023).

That potential re-accession must have a completely different character than joining the EC in 1973. The EU must now take into account what accession meant for Britain in 1973 and how the continental association played its game, in which the British became rather bystanders. This time it is necessary for the EU to set the possibility for the British to accede without significant disadvantages and to accept them with open arms. Young generations of Britons should feel that the EU is part of their country and identity that they will further continue to build their own and the common future of Europe.

The EU must recognise that its stands at a crossroads and one of four paths awaits it. By interpreting these scenarios, it is possible to realize that only 3 of them are functional for the future of the EU. The fourth scenario refers to the disintegration of the EU and a shift towards multilateral cooperation across Europe (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 438–444). However, this will probably not happen, given that Brexit, on the contrary, strongly strengthened the EU and consolidated unity in a common goal. The EU is now more united than before with the help of a universal goal and that is prosperity for the future (Matthijs 2023a). Though, the remaining three scenarios depend on the degree of integration, i.e., from a federal Europe to a reactionary mechanism that has been operating until now with the limits of the shared powers of the EU and the state (Cini a Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2022, p. 440–445).

Whichever of the three it is, it is necessary for it to do so with the greatest involvement of all members and potentially everyone in Europe, including Britain. The search for a *Raison d’être* will be one of the necessary problems that the EU must solve and show its indispensability and then Britons may ultimately understand its nature.

Similarly, the future world order is unclear, and for this reason it is necessary to have strong entities such as the EU, into which the states of Europe and, potentially, Britain should be integrated in order to create the driving force of world politics and progress. However, for the future setting of cooperation between the EU and Britain, it is necessary to take fundamental steps in which Britain will receive a symbolic accession, something alike the founding six with the Treaty of Rome. Subsequently, it will not have to go through similar events such as the acceleration of integration under Spaak's proposal, the creation of all common policies, complex accession conditions, the creation of a single currency and integration on two tracks, one fast and the other slow. It also follows from this that on the other side of the channel, it will be necessary to abandon its historic pride in the past and find a new future in a united Europe.

It will not be possible to look for a future in Europe if Britain again plays only for economic benefits, which will still bring it to the point of strong integration. Such integration is inevitable, but if its participants are still in the past and are looking for the possibility of maintaining an imagined empire whose existence here is not more than one century, then it is completely dysfunctional (Martil et al. 2018). The future of the EU and Britain is built on joint cooperation and potentially within the EU itself, but it cannot work on a *quid pro quo* principle.

In the same way, the *status quo* is unsustainable for the EU either, so the way forward is built on the decision of the nation’s themselves to take away their sovereignty in favour of the Union or, on the contrary, to take away the powers of the Union and regain the power of the state. In both cases, it is a game in which sovereignty is the resource for trade in the EU and with the EU (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, p. 27–47). As a result, this imaginary resource shall play a decisive role because the states that have no choice but to be a member of the EU will willingly surrender it, while the larger ones will be very reluctant to join the community on the basis of federalism. In such a case, the smaller states would have relatively strong political weight, and the larger ones would have to realize that they function as part of a colossus (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020, p. 36–55).

An example of why this dual character of trade with the imaginary resource of independence should be considered because citizens are often distrustful of their own government and therefore prefer to be part of the EU, which offers another element of shared responsibility. For the British, however, this is not fully true because many of them are putting their trust in the parliament, which has all the authority to solve those problems (Rowinski 2017, p. 147–151). Based on this, it is necessary that future generations of Britons perceive the necessity of the European project and be willing to join the pooling of power (ibid, p. 38-40).

In the same way, the British should not become a Trojan horse in the EU if they are willing to step back, the character of their membership should be fully committed to integration.

Furthermore, inevitably of this progress, as the spillover cannot be stopped, and the EU is and will probably continue to be a bureaucratic-technocratic element within that integration (Bulmer and Lequesne 2020).

What young generations and future politicians should address is about how Britain will find itself again in the world, and how to deal with the fact that future generations of Britons will be born into a country with fewer opportunities than their parents and grandparents (Goodwin 2023). The rational option for Britain is re-joining the EU, which, as already mentioned, according to Cini (2022, p. 436-448), will have to be reformed. The British will either accept the character of a federal Europe or, on the contrary, a strong intergovernmental model.

The goal of all Europeans is then to show the British that they belong to the community with Europeans and only in this way will they achieve their ambitions of a Global Britain, since the EU will be an amplifier of possibilities for them. The important task is to prevent *Auld Lang Syne* from ever being sung again in the European Parliament and a person similar to Nigel Farage going on his *nostos* to Britain again.

An older article on topic of why Europe should be strong alone by Polyakova and Haddad (2019) suggests the unpredictability of the future arrangement of power in the world and unpredictability of their partners such as United States may lead to unifying behind common goal; hence being in strong partnership as EU. By defining the author's rational argument, it is possible to conclude that in order to secure and maintain universal values built on a strong moral foundation, it is necessary for there to be strong blocs such as the EU to exist.

This aspect can be seen more now during the war in Ukraine, when Olaf Scholz (2022) states in his article that a united and strong Europe is necessary for solving global problems. In this case, it can be stated from an objective point of view that, leaving economic factors aside, it is quite pragmatic for Britain to be in such a membership.

Nonetheless, the best summary of British disengagement is the mention of Joschka Fischer in his speech from 2000 about EU enlargement, which he considered imperative for the future of a federal Europe. In that speech, he said this part that accurately relates to Britain's decision to leave the EU and the very future of the project:

*'Quo vadis Europa? is the question posed once again by the history of our continent. And for many reasons the answer Europeans will have to give, if they want to do well by themselves and their children, can only be this: towards the completion of European integration. A step backwards, even just standstill or contentment with what has been achieved, would demand a fatal price of all EU member states and of all those who want to become members; it would demand a fatal price above all of our people.'*

In which he ultimately mentioned the very nature of British involvement in the integration effort as follows:

*'Permit me therefore to remove my Foreign Minister's hat altogether in order to suggest a few ideas both on the nature of this so called finality of Europe and on how we can approach and eventually achieve this goal. And all the Eurosceptics on this and the other side of the Channel would be well advised not to immediately produce the big headlines again, because firstly this is a personal vision of a solution to the European problems'* (Cini 2013, p. 35)

Britain wanted to reach back her historical peak, on which it stood for a long time, but it forgot that nothing lasts forever. As it once was the cradle of the values on which many democracies stand today, it should now arise to help defend those values and define them for the world of tomorrow, yet not alone.

# Application of topic in ELT

This chapter and its subsequent subsections are dedicated to the appropriate implementation of the Brexit issue in the school environment through the use of Lesson Plans. At the same time, it presents adequate materials for the proposed lesson. The chapter touches on the limits of the implementation, at the same time it establishes a suitable usage model. It also adds significant limits in the field of methodological verification of that implementation in class, as it is necessary to obtain objective conclusions. Therefore, the chapter only presents the most suitable proposals for verifying the effectiveness of LP, which should serve to verify the effectiveness, acquired knowledge and practical use. The application is exposed to several obstacles, as it first requires numerous uses in which it is possible to observe the adequacy of LP for students. Subsequently, either modify its form or preserve its structure with minor modifications and only subsequently begin to evaluate the process itself. When evaluating progress, it is possible to use several methods, which will be further developed in the sub-chapter, however, for an objective evaluation of the results, it is necessary to consider the nature of the topic with a representative large sample of several different students and schools. This should also include a pre-test and a post-test, which would really create a completely objective result of the implementation and acquired knowledge or values on the part of the students. For the possible drawing of conclusions, it is necessary to take into account validity, which will be difficult to achieve if the results from grammar schools were compared with other secondary schools. For this reason, it would be appropriate to adjust the LP based on the institution in which it will be used, the same applies to extracurricular organizations.

The primary goal of LP is to create awareness of European values, integration and to perceive the influence of populism on society, all while teaching English, thereby expanding knowledge in several areas.

## Lesson Plan – British realities, Brexit, and the relationship with the EU

The Lesson Plan will acquaint students with the British realities and with partial focus on the EU. In addition, it will give students incentives to compare Britain in the EU and without it. Students will look for causes and consequences of Brexit, try to find critical pitfalls of populism and threats to democracy. In the end, they will evaluate their state EU membership.

The intention is to create a framework for thinking about populism and other forms that threaten democracy. An example will therefore be Brexit in particular, the process of which continues to this day. This example can serve great as its process and results can be seen to this day, but at the same time it can also serve as a cautionary example.

Students will have the opportunity to explore a very specific topic and realize what exiting the EU means. All this with the help of British realities that will serve to explain that specific approach to European integration and the development itself anchored in differences from Europe.

The lesson plan is mainly oriented towards understanding the issue and therefore students will primarily look for practical examples and compare them with their own knowledge of politics and the reality in their country.

1. **Grade:** Primarily focused on final year students (high school)
2. **Materials:** PowerPoint presentation, worksheet, reading handout and video clips
3. **Time:** 90 minutes (with viable reduction to 45 minutes, and focus on main aspects)
4. **Level:** Intermediate
5. **Subject:** English (CLIL – with overlap to other subjects)

Notes: *The primary emphasis should be on understanding the issue of Brexit and the implications arising from it. Subsequently, what does it mean to leave the EU and what are the consequences.*

*The lesson plan requires adequate knowledge of the EU and the UK, and for this reason it is fundamentally oriented towards the last years of study.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Lesson plan aims:** To provide students with an understanding of the historical and political context of Brexit and the EU. To encourage critical thinking and reflection on the importance of democratic values and institutions. (Possibly explore concepts of populism and extremism) | | | | |
| Phase | Activity | Description of activity | Time | Aims of activity |
| 1. | Introduction | Welcome students and introduce the topic of the lesson: British Realities, Brexit, and EU.  Ask students to brainstorm what they know about these topics and discuss them with each other. | 10 m | Give a brief overview of the lesson objectives and structure.  To find out students' knowledge about the topic - to set the difficulty of the lesson |
| 2. | Teacher explanation and reading | Use the PowerPoint presentation to provide students with an overview of the history of the UK and EU relationship.  Divide students into small groups and give them a handout with reading materials and questions to discuss. | 30 m | To discuss the main reasons behind the Brexit vote and the political and social implications of leaving the EU.  Outline the essential historical milestones for Britain and the nature of integration from an EU perspective. |
| 3. | Analysing videoclip and group discussion | A short clip from the film *"Brexit: The Uncivil War"* (2019) to emphasize key aspects of populism. (Alternatively, speeches by Nigel Farage)  Discuss the main features of populism and extremism, and how they relate to the Brexit debate and the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in Britain. | 20 m | The aim will be students' discussion of video excerpts, what populism means and what are its threats.  The discussion should also focus on a comparison with their experience or knowledge of populism. |
| 4. | Worksheet and pair work | Students will work on a worksheet 1 or 2 (see below).  In pairs, students will look for the main advantages of EU membership with the help of the EUandME portal and also think about disadvantages. | 20 m | The aim is to make students think rationally about EU membership and consider how reasonable Brexit was. |
| 5. | Conclusion and Assessment | Summarize the key points of the lesson and ask students to reflect on what they have learned.  Encourage students to share their thoughts and questions. | 10 m | To summarize the key points of the lesson and ask students to reflect on what they have learned. |

## Reading part – Brexit

Brexit means the departure of Britain from the European Union, of which it has been a member since 1973 and participated in its direction despite all reservations or exceptions from key integration points.

However, this departure is the result of a referendum in which the citizens decided in 2016. The result was not at all decisive because, on the contrary, it showed the polarization in society due to the fact that only 51.9% were in favour of leaving. The interesting thing is that such a referendum was already held once just after their entry into the European community, but then the majority was in favour of remaining through the benefits that people knew about.

The referendum was initiated by the then Prime Minister David Cameron, who was somewhat pushed to it by circumstances. His conservative party lost preferences and more radical populists began to take over his topics. This was a deterrent not only for Cameron but also for a large part of society. That is why he promised to call a referendum if the conservatives win the election in order to take away the strong momentum of the populists. Subsequently, the Conservatives won the election and Cameron called a referendum, starting the Leave and Remain campaigns.

Both campaigns were evenly matched at the beginning, but later Leave began to gain an edge through its ability to mobilize undecided voters and the use of antipathies and themes that had persisted in society since the creation of the EU. The Remain campaign failed to make good use of the threat of economic loss, and therefore the Leave campaign used key themes such as migration and control. Independently of the Leave campaign, the populists themselves were still operating and spreading fictitious information and fabricating fear among the less educated who were not prepared for such a form of campaign.

The result of this process is the mentioned exit from the European Union, which is a political-economic project with an effort to integrate its member states as much as possible. The goal is thus to achieve a strong position in the world and prosperity, among the greatest achievements include, for example, peace on the European continent since the foundation of the community. Leaving the EU will make it more difficult for Britain to trade, travel and worsen its economy.

Overall, such long-term dissatisfaction resulted in a referendum in which people decided to leave one of the largest political units in the world, whether the citizens were competent to decide on this matter will remain a question for a long time (The Oxford Scholastica Team 2020).

**Questions for reading part**

What is Brexit and how did it come about?

What are some of the key economic, political, and social consequences of Brexit for Britain and the EU?

How can Britain and the EU work together to address the common challenges and opportunities they face, such as climate change, migration, and security? What are some of the factors that will shape the future of EU-UK relations?

## Worksheet – less difficult

1. **Think about these concepts, what do they probably mean and what is their function? Discuss in groups/pairs based on the information from the previous exercise or your own knowledge.**

NHS, Brexit, EU, Conservatives, Labour, Schengen, four freedoms, Single Market, Commonwealth, Euroscepticism, populism, role of media, referendum, tariffs, Erasmus, nationalism, sovereignty, immigration, borders, Englishness, euro.

1. **Read the tweet and summarize it in one sentence**

A screenshot of a person

Description automatically generated with low confidence

Figure 1-Twitter post by Guy Verhofstadt

1. **Read the excerpt from Margaret Thatcher's speech on European integration and think of a title for this passage**.

*“Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity.*

*We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. Certainly, we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose.*

*But it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers, and sense of national pride in one's own country; for these have been the source of Europe's vitality through the centuries”.* (Margaret Thatcher Foundation)

1. **Describe the image, what should it evoke in the reader?**

*Figure 2 Brexit bus - The Independent*

1. **How would you describe the situation in the picture in relation to Brexit?**

*Figure 3 Empty shops after Brexit - The Guardian*

## Worksheet – more difficult

1. **Instructions: Fill in the blanks with the appropriate words or phrases provided in the box.**

*referendum, Eurosceptic, immigration, EU, sovereignty, populist, trade, negotiations, border, leave*

In 2016, the UK held a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ on its membership in the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, which resulted in a narrow victory for the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ campaign.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ sentiment has been on the rise in the UK for many years, fuelled by concerns about \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and loss of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

The process of negotiating the terms of the UK's \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ from the EU has been complex and challenging, particularly with regard to issues such as \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

Brexit has led to the possible reintroduction of a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which has created political and economic tensions.

The rise of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ movements and politicians in the UK and elsewhere in Europe reflects a broader discontent with traditional political elites and a desire for more direct democracy.

*Key: referendum, EU, Leave, Eurosceptic, immigration, sovereignty, negotiations, trade, travel, border, populist*

1. **Do you know who is responsible for a certain decision, the EU, or the national state? Allocate key competences by writing either N (national) or EU.**

Setting tax rates and collecting taxes

Managing public health systems

Controlling borders and managing immigration

Coordinating foreign policy and international relations

Establishing minimum wage laws

Promoting and protecting human rights and democracy

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1. The UK's withdrawal from the EU | **A)** Has raised concerns over the potential impact on businesses, consumers, and workers, as the UK's future trade arrangements with the EU are uncertain and may involve new barriers, such as customs checks and tariffs. |
| 1. The Irish border issue | **B)** Include access to the EU single market, participation in EU policies and programs, and the ability to influence EU decision-making and standards. |
| 1. The UK's trade relations with the EU | **C)** Has led to negotiations over the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including issues such as trade, security, and regulatory alignment. |
| 1. The EU's institutional structure | **D)** Involves the EU institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union, which play a key role in shaping EU policies and regulations. |
| 1. The benefits of EU membership | **E)** Has been a contentious issue in the Brexit negotiations, as it involves the question of how to maintain an open border between Northern Ireland (which is part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (which is an EU member state) while respecting the Good Friday Agreement and the integrity of the EU single market. |

1. **Connect the answers from column A with the appropriate answers in column B**

*Key: 1-C, 2-E, 3-A, 4-D, 5-B*

1. **Will Brexit affect you in any way (such as travel)? What is your view of the EU? Discuss in a group and write down the main points of your discussion**

## Detailed analysis of the proposed lesson plan

The objective of this chapter aspires to apply the subject of Brexit[[56]](#footnote-56) and propose potential applications in the ELT. The chapter will draw on the information provided from the theoretical summary in the preceding chapters and proceed to utilize the information to create a framework compatible with the school environment. Given that the topic requires an essential understanding of the EU and British realities, the primary focus will be on secondary schools and grammar schools.

The previous chapters had defined the basic framework suitable for application in the teaching of the English language. Among these topics can only be the teaching of British realities and their specificity or unique nature from Europe. Subsequently, also topics related specifically to cultural areas or political areas. Specifically, it is possible to select specific aspects defined above, which include populism, the EU, newspaper analysis, attribution of responsibility, the economic effects of Brexit or the geopolitical side of the matter itself. The suggestions for the application are therefore primarily oriented towards CLIL methods, apart from the teaching of realities and culture, in which the orientation is primarily towards aspects of the English language.

The implementation itself has a primary focus on aspects of Brexit in addition to what leaving the EU shall mean. The application, throughout its entirety, focuses on the question of what it means for students to be EU citizens and the advantages they attain from it. Therefore, Brexit is a good illustration for the presentation of the unfavourable effects discussed in the earlier chapters and can be used to highlight the crucial effects on both the state and the citizens.

The implementation of the topic is mediated through the design of the lesson - lesson plan, which should contain critical passages dealing with Brexit, which will serve as a basis for further definition of topics such as populism or democratic values. Fundamentally, it will also focus on the European Union, which will carry an equally important part, because according to the report of European Commission (2021, p. 55–57) on education in the EU, the support of the Czech Republic among young people is only 43.8%. The report suggests a better integration of the EU into the teaching of other subjects, particularly the CLIL approach and the English language can therefore be a suitable subject. In terms of content, it is appropriate to approach this topic cross-curricular, as the implementation of the English language is ideal due to the nature of the topic such as Brexit and the socio-cultural realities themselves.

The Lesson Plan presented beforehand also utilizes interdisciplinary themes, in particular *Education for thinking in European and global contexts* and *Multicultural Education*. At the same time, it centres on key competences, essentially on civic competences and secondarily on social and communicative ones.

The lesson plan previously is a synthesis of several mentioned interdisciplinary topics and key competencies. Simultaneously, it presents the possibility for strengthening the understanding of the concepts of the EU or the history and culture of Britain. Research by O’Mahony (2020) indicate the necessity of teaching European identity at school for the future of the European project. The following is partially examined in the lesson plan that is being presented, but in a way that encourages student discovery of essential EU aspects.

The aim of the presented materials is therefore to strengthen the positive perception of the EU among students and the ability to form rational criticism, the nature of which is the correct attribution of responsibility. Additionally, the lesson plan and materials should use Brexit as a suitable example to present the consequences of leaving the EU and demonstrate the influence of populism. The summary should be the students' overall ability to reflect on EU membership and be able to distinguish negative elements from positive ones. The materials also have the option of being translated into the mother tongue, which means they can be effectively used in subjects other than English.

The practical application of the LP and its supplements entails two teaching sessions; however, it can also be condensed to just one lesson of 45 minutes provided as the fundamental structure of the nature of Brexit and the EU is retained. The teacher's introduction to the topic and stressing the purpose of the lesson are the two most important components. This decision will subsequently open subtopics whereby populism or the influence of the media will be discussed in addition to Brexit and the EU.

Additional materials and their use depend on the time commitment and the possible abilities of the students. However, in the ideal case, it would be advisable to use not only the reading part, but also the worksheet with more demanding tasks for full use of the topic. Although a modification is also offered to replace the video demonstration or reading with the use of newspaper articles from the time of Brexit, which would strengthen the students' literacy skills.

Potentially the most suitable substitute for both reading and watching a video demonstration could be Role-Play. This would consist in the creation of two groups, one of which would be the British side and the other the European side. Subsequently, negotiations would take place between the two parties on important aspects of leaving the EU, and both parties would thus try to defend their interests. The conclusion would be to evaluate how acceptable the proposals of both parties were and whether they were sustainable (Cohen et al. 2007, p. 448–454).

Nevertheless, it is clear that this activity is only suitable for some classes with an active and co-operative collective, at the same time it requires a retrospective evaluation of the activity itself, but it can bring the best results in the area of understanding the topic. It is also possible to use some of the games or quizzes on the European Union website, but in this case, it would be better to use these games to evaluate the success of the LP application.

Determining the correct methodology to use to verify LP effectiveness depends on class size and sample or setting. The most suitable way of verification for smaller groups would be the use of tests, according to Cohen (et al. 2007, p. 414–432), this would be a reliable quantification of the acquired knowledge. A possible problem that may occur is that the test is not always able to convey all the levels of the taught lesson and, if the questions are inadequate, it will produce an inaccurate result of the learned topic of the lesson. In the case of a test, it would also be appropriate to perform a pre-test and a post-test, which would furthermore take additional time beyond the defined 90 minutes. At the same time, it would also require a larger sample that would be genuinely representative for the objective derivation of results from which a general conclusion could be drawn.

Another option is observation, but this brings several additional drawbacks and may have many observational biases that could distort the observer's perception of LP success (Cohen et al. 2007, p. 396–410). Therefore, it would rather not be suitable for using the evaluation of the given LP.

A different possible option would be to use action research, which would require additional time beyond the scope of the lesson, or direct implementation into the lesson of editing the LP itself. Such a modification would require students to solve problems in five defined phases of action research as stated by Cohen (et al. 2007, p. 297–302). Thus, modifying the LP would require centralization around one Brexit problem that students would solve. A necessary element would be to show the students in a good way how they should work out the problem, since the assignment is essential in action research. It would be essential for the teacher to collect the developed solutions and the procedures for this solution, by which it would be possible to evaluate how the students managed to solve the problem and whether they understood the subject matter.

There is currently no research into the application of Brexit to the teaching of British cultural realities and language in relation to EU teaching. In 2017, the EP commissioned research into the teaching of common European values, and the Czech Republic received recommendations for better implementation. Other research in the field of teaching European values includes research focused during covid-19 on how to better create an environment for teaching those values. Based on this, a platform was created for teachers to teach European values and the EU itself, it focuses on students' digital abilities to obtain information in this environment (European Parliament et al. 2018).

The only research with a similar setting is research from Britain, which is a response to Brexit and sets a potentially necessary lesson about Europe. It focuses on a better awareness of the position of Britain and the perception of Europe as a valuable partner, at the same time it points to the answers of students who consciously perceive the division of society after Brexit. It thus sets the framework for changing the curriculum for future young generations who will necessarily have to understand what Brexit and the EU mean, potentially better perceive the importance of the alliance (O’Mahony 2020).

Nevertheless, no research is specifically devoted to the concrete implementation of Brexit within the framework of the English language in CLIL form. Only one research paper from Czech authors offers suitable points for the implementation of the LP contents which is oriented towards European identity and the perception of positive European integration. The research finds considerable support for the EU among pupils and teachers, but still takes into account a high degree of Euroscepticism. Precisely for this reason, as briefly mentioned in the research itself, it is possible to use Brexit to consolidate critical values related to the EU in the area of civic and social competences (Hubálek et al. 2018). The submitted LP thus contains a possible proposal for the implementation[[57]](#footnote-57) and use of the Brexit theme to strengthen the perception of the value of European integration, the threat of populism, the influence of the media and attribution of responsibility.

Implementation in school is the primary goal, as it appropriately uses the English language for teaching other subjects such as civics, but even so, the topic returns to the realities associated with the English language and students' ability to work with text. Nevertheless, there is the possibility of using it outside the school sphere, in cooperation with NGO’s, which are mainly supported by the EU. In this way, it is also possible to use the EU portal, which contains several methodological instructions and materials for teaching European integration. In addition, several games that students could appreciate and directly apply their knowledge.

# Conclusion

In the conclusion of the thesis, it is necessary to describe the reality of Brexit in concretely defined elements and to outline how the development will appear in the future. Among the essential conclusions, it can be stated that Brexit, based on the given data, had a primarily negative impact in most sectors and will continue to reduce the prospects of the British economy in the long term. It has also affected British citizens in several spheres, from economic to complications with travel or the now noticeably affected functionality of the NHS. There are also obvious effects on British politics, which has undergone a turbulent development since 2019, when Theresa May was replaced by Boris Johnson, and subsequently two other prime ministers took turns. Afterwards, this alone has created considerable apathy towards politicians and their ability to handle the important issues that Brexit has brought about. However, some mentioned sources indicate that Britain is changing and is gradually moving away from long-term Euroscepticism, but it required a great sacrifice to come to this realization. The topic for the future is how future generations will cope with the fact that their parents had more opportunities than them. This will also result in Britain's gravity in the world order, if it wants to continue acting independently as global Britain, it will hardly achieve her visions.

This thesis aimed to answer the effects of Brexit on individual spheres affecting politics and the lives of citizens in Britain. From the presented sources, an unequivocal conclusion can be drawn, in which Britain is economically weakened in the long term, as well as culturally due to the loss of opportunities for cooperation or easy access to EU countries, or vice versa. Evidently, however, in the field of politics, which has acquired considerable polarization despite the above-mentioned cohesion of the policies of both parties resulted in loss of affiliation for citizens with the party. The conservatives used the referendum to strengthen the election result, but they did not expect the given result that will accompany them to this day and in the future. Brexit gave them legitimacy as a government and offers them a certain operating space to be with the government despite all the failures, since it is their topic after all. Legitimation through Brexit, however, according to the mentioned polls, may no longer be certain for them, and furthermore because Labour popularity is growing, and their potential government may be looking for a different approach to the EU.

Additional aim of the work was to propose a possible form of the topic in ELT, which is carried out on the basis of lesson plans, which offers a summary of not only British realities but also the development of language skills or a multidisciplinary emphasis on elements of populism and European identity. The lesson plan includes suggestions for appropriate application and mentions the limitations of the application. To draw objective conclusions, the application would require a large representative sample targeted at secondary schools. At the same time, the research would require more methodological background in the field of implementation supervision and data collection before and after. For this reason, the proposed lesson plan remains at the theoretical level to prevent the generation of biased data and fabrication in the area of possible application.

These above-mentioned goals are based on the most up-to-date sources of an academic nature. Nevertheless, it is necessary to state that the complexity of the topic does not allow for self-evident conclusions, because Brexit as such is a means of investigation that will persist for a long time and the conclusions will change over time. The defined conclusions are a reflection of the used sources of the given time; therefore, it is possible that those conclusions will lose relevance in the future. As such, Brexit did not end with the withdrawal from the EU, on the contrary, its process has only just begun, and clear conclusions will only be possible in a few years.

Perhaps the best reflection is to look again at the historical development of relations with Europe, in which the British have always strived for equilibrium. The decision to leave this foreign policy, which was formed by generations of politicians and diplomats, to the people was very imprudent by British standards. Pragmatically, it can be said that the cost will be greater than the benefit and the search for a new foreign policy will be more difficult. Perhaps the best summary is to refer to the cultural aspect using the example of Sir Humphrey who could show the Prime Minister the folly of Brexit. It seems that the situation of the future generations of Britons will be best described by the lyrics from the song Time by the British band Pink Floyd:

*'Hanging on in quiet desperation is the English way'* (Pink Floyd 1973)

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**Resumé**

Diplomová práce se zaměřuje na dopady Brexitu v oblasti ekonomiky, kultury a politiky. Každá z těchto oblastí nese zásadní podíl na vzniku Brexitu, ale také i na jeho současném vývoji. Práce se skládá ze dvou částí, první část se věnuje výše zmíněným oblastem, které za pomoci aktuální literatury a dat analyzuje pro zohlednění negativních dopadů Brexitu. Druhá část se zabývá aplikační rovinou tématu v ELT, a také možným ověřením efektivnosti dané implementace. První část přináší možné dopady Brexitu na ekonomiku, ale i na vývoj politiky či spolupráci s dlouhodobými partnery a vývoj Británie na mezinárodní scéně. Dále také zohledňuje možné příčiny Brexitu, které mohou do budoucna přetrvávat. Výsledky proto ukazují, že brexit má značný vliv na obchodní vztahy mezi Velkou Británií a Evropskou unií, což má negativní důsledky na hospodářský růst a zaměstnanost. Práce zároveň ukazuje, že existují rozdílné názory na brexit a jeho dopady a že budoucí vztahy mezi Velkou Británií a Evropskou unií zůstávají nejisté.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
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| Rok obhajoby | 2023 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Název závěrečné práce | Brexit a jeho důsledky pro budoucnost ekonomiky, kultury a politiky Spojeného království a EU |
| Název závěrečné práce v angličtině | Brexit and its implications for the future of the UK and EU economy, culture, and politics |
| Anotace závěrečné práce | Diplomová práce se zabývá dopadem Brexitu v jednotlivých oblastech jako je ekonomika, kultura a politika. Zohledňuje dlouhodobý vliv euroskpeticimu, který ovlivňuje britskou politiku a byl jedním z hlavních příčin Brexit. Práce se dělí na dvě části, v první se nachází analýza dostupné literatury a dat k vyhodnocení dopadů Brexitu; druhá část se věnuje možné aplikaci tématu v ELT. |
| Anotace závěrečné práce v angličtině | The diploma thesis deals with the impact of Brexit in individual areas such as economy, culture and politics. It takes into account the long-term influence of Euroscepticism, which affects British politics and was one of the main causes of Brexit. The work is divided into two parts, the first deals with the analysis of available literature and data to evaluate the effects of Brexit; the second part deals with the possible application of the topic in ELT. |
| Klíčová slova | Brexit, euroskepticismus, populismus, zahraniční vztahy, politika, ekonomie, Brexit v ELT |
| Klíčová slova v angličtině | Brexit, Euroscepticism, populism, foreign affairs, politics, economy, Brexit in ELT |
| Rozsah práce | 108 stran |
| Jazyk práce | Anglický |

1. Even though Czechoslovakia was one of the most democratic countries in Europe with a strong rule of law, the British did not come to help after the occupation of the Sudetenland. From a pragmatic point of view, and because they did not yet know the young nation of Czechoslovaks. The result for the British would probably be worse than non-engagement. This rationalization of consequences is the long-term strategy in British FP (Ward 1943). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This turn in the British FP was perhaps against everything that the Brits would have adhered to. In this case, it would be better to stick to Lord Palmerston's statement:

   “*We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. When people ask me... for what is called a policy, the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the Interests of Our Country one's guiding principle”* (Kissinger 2014, p. 39). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. He made this criticism even though the British executed their king Charles I only 168 years earlier. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Unlike most European nations, the Germans had to define themselves even though they existed as the Holy Roman Empire for several centuries. This was the necessary condition or *sine qua non* for the future of this young country that was created in 1871. The British never had to go through this development and did not have much understanding for these sentiments, moreover, they were very afraid of the new hegemon because his nature arose from military power and industrialization (Thompson 1940). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. He showed his support in Zurich speech, in which he proposed the United States of Europe for future conflict prevention. This development on the continent was later similarly supported by the United States. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Engagement on the British side was rather insignificant, although they were given several opportunities to participate in the Messina Conference. They still had permanent representation within the Spaak commission, but rather to obtain information and create obstacles for the European project than participate (Gowland et al. 2010, p. 29–39). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Charles de Gaulle was afraid of the American influence that the British would bring to a purely European project (Shonfield 1963). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The two main differences between the EEC and EFTA from the beginning were in supranationalism (power given to superior bodies) and intergovernmentalism (power in the hands of actors and relying on bilateral agreements). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. What Macmillan said to Gaul: *"The Common Market is the Continental System all over again," the British prime minister told his old friend, the French president. "Britain cannot accept it," Macmillan told him. "I beg you to give it up"*(Fromkin 1999)*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The British used to import cheap agricultural products from CW, now they had to tax them through the customs union and therefore made them more expensive. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. At this time Roy Jenkins emerged as an important supporter of EEC membership and later even became President of the European Commission in 1979. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. However, when it came to Margaret Thatcher's speech in the United States, she tried to emphasize the clear difference in the foundations of Europe and the US, and even more so in the British ones. In her speech, she tried to define the difference which is based on the fact that Europe is built by history and America by philosophy (Hoover Institution 1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The cabinet is therefore formed of only one ruling party with full support in the lower house. Mainly represented by party members and especially by elected ones. An exception was David Cameron's coalition cabinet with the Liberals between 2010-2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Sartori (2005) points out inequality of the system by number of votes compared to mandates. In his example its 91 votes to 98 mandates. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Max Weber defined this phenomenon as the state's monopoly on legitimate coercion. By this he wanted to indicate absolute authority in the hands of those who are in power, whether legitimately or not (Kaminski 1983, p. 5–26). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Defined by J. Habermas as a space in which citizens and other subjects, including the ruling elite, exchange their opinions, regardless of their position within the discourse, thus influencing that space, both towards the citizens and the ruling elite. Furthermore, Dahlberg expanded it to include the space of the Internet and the ability of its participants to perceive the occurrences of that discourse and their position (Švelch a Vochocová 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. M. Thatcher's government collapsed under this problem in 1991 when sir G. Howe resigned from his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer in a disagreement over participation in ERM systems. It is therefore a long-term phenomenon in British politics, i.e., postponing Europe's integration efforts (ibid, p. 115-116) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Cameron tried to satisfy Eurosceptics by withdrawing Conservatives from the EPP to the ECR in the EP. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Known for his very eloquent speech and the use of Latin words (such as floccinaucinihilipilification) to indicate the EU's insignificance (BBC 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. His majority was only 4 mandates. A poor result was also recorded for the Labour party. However, the Scottish SNP could rejoice with a record 56 mandates (Bloomberg 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. It is very specific because most of it comes from England, where there is a greater preponderance of English identity than British (Corbett 2016). In addition, the author Rowinski (2017) mentions that the political system of Britain itself enables the emergence of that specific branch of Euroscepticism. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. unmodalised declaratives [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. modal–might [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. On the other hand, there is an exception such as Angela Merkel, who tried to extent the accomplishments as a collective work, hence also share the responsibility in case (Hobolt 2014, p. 113-115). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. There are only few examples in modern British history such as IRA or unrest during M. Thatcher rule, which however has a very different reason for radicalisation. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Alternatively, their positions disappeared, otherwise were replaced or moved to China through a process of social dumping [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Other authors also confirm these variables, they include Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Clarke et al. 2017; Evans and Menon 2017; Fieldhouse et al. 2019b) [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. The data in the publication suggests a convergence between the views of Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn, who are ideological rivals. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. An example can be the long-time Europhile by British standards Kenneth Clarke or Michael Haseltine. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Theresa May has experienced some difficult phases during her premiership. At first, she lost a clear majority, during which she had to stand on the stage with, for example, the comical candidate Lord Buckethead (Oliver 2018). Her own backbenchers complicated her negotiations with the EU. Additionally, up to several unenforced withdrawal bills. She was left with nothing but a *quid pro quo* when she offered her PM position to push the withdrawal bill (Richards 2020, p. 360–390). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. It is necessary to take into account the factors influencing the development of inflation growth, and this is especially the war in Ukraine and the consequences of the covid period. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. The aforementioned centralization points out that Britain does not allow a significant role for local governments. That's why the introduction of subsidiarity by the EU enabled significant development of the regions through the ERDF and cohesion funds. These changed the extent of the impact of globalization. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. It is important to mention that the British, since their accession, have criticized the CAP system, which was in favour of European farmers. Today, however, they can no longer buy cheap bread or butter from New Zealand (Diebold 1962). The level of Europeanization has reached the agricultural sector as well, therefore the hatred for CAP, which went through countless reforms, may have been beneficial in the end. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. One of the reasons is a significant division in the area of the social system, which is not similar to the continental one. An example is John Major's opt-out from the social charter, which was insupportable to the conservatives. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. A new trade deal called CPPT which will not be able to fulfil the volume of trade with the EU (Prime Minister’s Office 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. For example, legitimacy of Monarchy or House of Lords. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Leave voters (mainly older and less educated people or manually working class) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. An example can be the impact of Cambridge Analytica's activities, which played a significant role in a targeted campaign on undecided voters. The Leave campaign used this company for targeted analysis with the help of algorithms that provided absolutely essential information about the current mood in society. The information obtained was used as a weapon against undecided voters. The same thing happened during Donald Trump's campaign (Scott 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Even Churchill had to admit that Britain is losing its dominant position and will have to leave it to the US (Vucjetic a Muttreja 2022). Subsequently, during the 50s, Britain had to leave its foreign policy of maintaining stability in the Middle East to the US. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The ambition to still be a world leader and a key player influencing world politics with a large reach not only in diplomacy. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The cabinet also had similar support during covid for managing some areas. Later, however, a certain dark side of this period was revealed, which consisted of parties in number 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. With regards to report it shows that around 40% feels as global citizens, almost 50% of population feels European, more than 70% is interested in foreign affairs, around 50% consider leaving EU as negative aspect for Britain. Considering USA relationship around 50% feels ideologically aligned. Above all, most feel that there needs to be reduction or removal of trade barriers. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Britain itself will find it very difficult to deal with an economic power like China, since there is nothing left but to gravitate towards the EU and participate in similar projects due to the common nature with the Europeans. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. The West in this case is a representation of countries with a close community and a value framework built on the liberal-democratic principle. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. For example, Britain has always had a certain subversive element behind the queen who symbolized certain ideals, but after her death the question arose to what extent the monarchy is necessary for modern Britain. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. The best example is Donald Trump, who was able to mobilize the masses during the sixth of January who were willing to believe fiction and ignore the facts. These conservatives reject the facts and reality as it is and shape it for their supporters as they need it, thus creating that democratic backslide. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The report even suggests that migration to the UK by 2020 has even decreased compared to other developed countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Positions like nurses and manual labour, apart from nurses mostly low-paid jobs. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Whether the bankruptcy of Silicon Valley Bank or the bailout of Credit Suisse. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. According to an Independent article, the Labour leader suggests that the UK may be in the same position as Poland after 2030 (Forrest 2023). The paradox is that cheap labour went to Britain from Poland after 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Nevertheless, he states that this is a historical development when the ideologies of the parties, at least, the basic issues differed very little, and they included the ideas of the opposing party in their politics. This left the standard economic division, otherwise the parties are starting to get closer to each other because even the Conservatives have to win over voters they previously disappointed or convince new ones. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Leaving aside the war in Ukraine, there is currently very problematic development in France regarding the pension reform. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. However, this is a negative aspect because the result is low voter turnout and Eurosceptics in the EP [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. At the time, the Cabinet even issued a document stating the benefits of membership and, for example, later Prime Minister May was against leaving the EU. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Relationship of the United Kingdom and the EU [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. The student should really be able to perceive that in Europe, integration prevented any wars and allowed an immense amount of economic and human freedom. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)