

Rozvoj Kolumbie: dynamika nových válek, exploatace přírodních zdrojů a vliv na lidský kapitál

DEVELOPMENT IN COLOMBIA: THE DYNAMICS OF NEW WARS, NATURAL
RESOURCE EXPLOITATION AND THEIR EFFECTS ON HUMAN CAPITAL

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
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*You come here speaking of Latin
America, but this is not important.
Nothing important can come from the South.
History has never been produced in the South.
The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn,
crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo.
What happens in the South is of no importance.*

Henry Kissinger, 1969

ABSTRACT

Abstract: Amidst the peace deals with the FARC-EP in 2016 and the accession process to the OECD beginning in 2013, the future of Colombia's success is at a crossroads. This paper explores and describes the dynamics of the violent actors in the conflict during the 1996-2016 period, the role of the extractive economy and their effects on the Colombian human capital.

key words: Colombia, development, armed conflict, natural resources, oil management, human capital

word count: 20,599



Abskrakt: V roce 2016 byl v Kolumbii zahájen mírový proces s FARC-EP. Od roku 2013 se tato země snaží o připojení k OECD. Kolumbie se tedy nachází v klíčovém období, které ovlivní její úspěšné fungování v blízké budoucnosti. Tento článek zkoumá a popisuje dynamiku konfliktu v období 1996-2016, úlohu těžebního hospodářství a jejich vlivu na kolumbijský lidský kapitál.

klíčová slova: Kolumbie, rozvoj, konflikt, válek, přírodní zdroje, řízení ropy, lidský kapitál

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Ábstrac: Con la firma del acuerdo de terminación del conflicto con las FARC-EP en 2016 y el proceso de acceso a la OECD iniciado en 2013, el futuro de Colombia está en juego. Esta disertación pretende explorar y describir las dinámicas de los distintos actores violentos en el conflicto armado para el periodo 1996-2016, el papel de la economía extractivista y sus efectos en el capital humano colombiano.



Résumé: Entre les accords de paix avec les FARC-EP en 2016, et le processus d'accession à l'OCDE commencé en 2013, le futur de la réussite colombienne est à un tournant. Cet article explore et décrit les dynamiques des acteurs de la violence du conflit ayant eu lieu dans la période 1996-2016, ainsi que le rôle de l'économie extractive et leurs effets sur le capital humain colombienne.



AFFIDAVIT

I hereby confirm in lieu of an oath that my thesis entitled “*Development in Colombia: the dynamics of ‘new wars’, natural resource exploitation, and their effects on human capital*” or “*Rozvoj Kolumbie: dynamika nových válek, exploatace přírodních zdrojů a vliv na lidský kapitál*” in Czech, is the result of my own work and observations under the tutelage of supervisor Radovan Dluhý-Smith.

I declare, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that all used sources in any form cited have been acknowledged accordingly in the corresponding places in the thesis and in the reference list of literature.

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R u l e s f o r e l a b o r a t i o n :

Objective: this dissertation paper will try to explain how the aforementioned factors have directly or indirectly affected the human capital in Colombia.

Plan: 1. Explore theories which attempt to typify the origins of Colombian culture (of violence?) 2. Describe the impact of the armed conflict and the 'new wars' concept for the (1996-2016) period. 3. Review the role the extractive industries (oil) in Colombia's development 4. Carry out interviews with experts to complement research 5. Draw conclusions to confront the hypothesis

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- Bushnell, David (1993). *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, TRANSLATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACP	Asociación Colombiana de Petróleo <i>Colombian Petroleum Association</i>
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia <i>Colombian United Self-defense Forces</i>
BACRIM	Bandas Criminales <i>Criminal Bands</i>
CINEP	Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular Programa Por la Paz <i>Center for Research and Popular Education</i>
CMH	Centro de Memoria Histórica <i>Centre for Historical Memory</i>
COIN	Counterinsurgency
Colciencias	Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación <i>Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation</i>
Conservadores	Partido Conservador Colombiano <i>Colombian Conservative Party</i>
Convivir	Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada <i>Special vigilance and private security services</i>
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística <i>Administrative Department for National Statistics</i>
DAS	Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad <i>Administrative Department of Security (and Intelligence)</i>
DSP	Democratic Security Policy <i>Política de Seguridad Democrática</i>
Ecopetrol	Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos S.A. <i>Colombian Petroleum Company</i>
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional <i>National Liberation Army</i>
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación <i>Popular Liberation Army</i>
EPyL	Esperanza, Paz y Libertad <i>Hope, Peace and Freedom Movement</i>
Estado Mayor	Staff Command
FARC	Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común <i>Alternative Revolutionary Force of the Commons</i>
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias – Ejército del Pueblo <i>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army</i>
FDPs	Forced disappearances
Fedesarrollo	Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo <i>Higher Education and Development Foundation</i>
FF.MM	Fuerzas Militares de Colombia <i>Colombian Armed Forces</i>
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRPV	Human Rights & Political Violence
I+D	Investigación y desarrollo

	<i>Research and Development</i>
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCODER	Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural <i>Colombian Institute for Rural Development</i>
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LA	Latin America
Liberales	Partido Liberal Colombiano <i>Colombian Liberal Party</i>
MAS	Muerte a Secuestradores <i>Death to Kidnappers</i>
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OEC	The Observatory of Economic Complexity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RUV	Registro Único de Víctimas <i>Exclusive Registry of Victims</i>
SGR	Sistema General de Regalías <i>Royalties Management System</i>
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations Organization
UP	Unión Patriótica <i>Patriotic Union Movement</i>
US	United States of America
WB	The World Bank
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization

PREFACE

Living during the decade of Pablo Escobar's narco-terrorism in Bogotá, was not easy. Every day you could perceive the little value life had back then and how dangerous it meant to visit some places. To travel through Colombia was considered insane and abroad we had a notorious reputation for murder, bloodshed and crime which translated in an unwelcome sign in many countries.

Soon enough, I developed a deep interest in history of the great power centres such as the US, Europe, Central Asia and Russia. Plus the never-ending threat of terrorism and unstable international security became my passion, leaving behind the will to understand the causes of the protracted violence in Colombia. It was only until I moved to the Mid-Magdalena Basin in 2011, that I started to understand I had lived in a parallel universe compared to what really was happening in the rural areas.

Thanks to the synergy of the solid education I received at my university, and my experiences abroad, I decided to make an effort to understand the different actors involved in this conflict with the hope that understanding its origins, transformation and prospects, can give us better tools to contribute to a real consolidation of national identity. From my point of view, this task is paramount in order to find a consensus towards our common future.

By the time this paper will be completed, Colombia is going through pivotal presidential elections, where for the first time in many years, the FARC insurgency formally ceased to exist and no presidential candidate has been assassinated due to their alternative political views. Challenges ahead? All you can possibly imagine. However, there might be a remote possibility for Colombia to unravel its potential in Latin America and the world.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 'Pax' Colombiana

Colombia has been in the world's spotlight during the last two years thanks to a historic peace agreement signed in 2016 with the oldest Marxist guerrilla in the hemisphere, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*, or FARC-EP for its acronym in Spanish. This experience has further impressed 'The Economist' to name Colombia as 'the country of the year 2016', ahead of distinctive performances in Canada, Estonia or Iceland (The Economist, 2016). It also served to persuade Pope Francis to pay a visit in September 2017 to endorse the reconciliation process. Certainly, after 54 years of confrontations¹ with the insurgency, both the Government of center-right President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP's *Estado Mayor* represented by Rodrigo Londoño –better known by his *nom de guerre* 'Timochenko'– have agreed to bring the conflict to an end, and assure an "everlasting and durable peace"², as the text has been formally labeled.


Simultaneously, the homicide rate has plummeted to a 42-year record low of 24 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants (El Espectador, 2018) and according to the *Registro Único de Víctimas* (RUV)³, there are some remarkable reductions in homicides in traditional red-zone Departments⁴ which can be observed in **Map 1**. At the same time, **Figure 1** shows the national total number of victims per year between 1996 and 2017. Both map and figure were elaborated by the author using data-sets from the RUV.

¹ Setting the starting point of confrontations in Colombia is still question of debate (Lazzeri, 2005). Violence can be tracked down before with events such as: La Violencia (1948-1958), the Banana's Massacre in 1920, the establishment of the two-party system between *Liberales* and *Conservadores* during the XIX Century, the Thousand Days' War (1899–1902), or even with the post-Independence wars (1810-1819) confronting Santander and Bolívar.

² In Spanish: *Acuerdo General para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera*.

³ The RUV is the Colombian registry of victims of forms of violence: e.g. homicide, extortion, forced disappearance, threats, acts of terrorism, displacement, kidnapping, etc.

⁴ A Department is an administrative division similar in understanding to Province or State.



Map 1 | Homicide reduction in selected Departments. Elaborated by the author. Source: Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV, 2018)

Despite such a tremendous milestone reached in terms of homicides reduction, Colombia is yet to effectively move towards building the needed solid democratic institutions (De Soto, 2001) in order to consolidate better access conditions for the entire population. This task has proven to be quite challenging mainly due –but not limited– to structural economic problems such as: 1) a traditional dependence on one export-commodity (Bushnell, 1996), 2) low global-competitiveness levels (Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2016); which relates not only to 3) a recurring high-perception in corruption (Transparency International, 2017), and 4) an inadequate infrastructure, ranked 92nd out of 148 countries in 2013 (International Trade Centre, 2014), but also to 5) an almost non-existent investment of barely 0.27% of GDP in research and technology (Pardo Martínez, 2017).

This constitutes basically an extractive economy which has nurtured intertwined conflicts in terms of: 1) protracted polarization within the society

evidenced in the October 2016 plebiscite results (International Crisis Group, 2017), 2) a flamboyant income inequality (Monterrosa, 2017), whose GINI coefficient of 53.5 has remained unchanged (Alsema, 2016). Plus, 3) threatening illegal coca production clinching in 2016 a highest two-decade estimate of 188.000 hectares (ONDCP, 2017); (The Guardian, 2017), 4) a limited freedom press score (Freedom House, 2017) which is linked to 5) the systematic murder of social leaders (UNHCHR, 2018); (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2017), who often fight for 6) the unequal access to land (Richani, 2015), causing 7) more than 6.8 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) making it the world's largest after Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2017, p. 204), and today facing the challenge of welcoming Venezuelan refugees (O'Neil, 2018).

The list goes on if we consider the coexistence with far-right paramilitarism in the 'shadows'. Strident remains the 2006 'para-politics'⁵ scandal (Hanson, 2008); (Gill, 2016); (Lozano & Morris, 2010). Or even the infamous criminal enterprise of 1984-1994 between Colombian Armed Forces (FF.MM) and far-right paramilitary groups (Romero Ospina, 2011) to execute a political genocide of nearly 3,000 members⁶ of the *Unión Patriótica (UP)* and *Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (EPyL)*; two




Figure 1 | Total victims (1996-2017). Source: Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV)

⁵ Neologism adopted to describe the scandal involving several congressmen and politicians conspiring along with commanders of the AUC paramilitary group.

⁶ In April 1st 1994, Ms. Aída Abella, National President of the UP, denounced the assassination of 2.339 UP militants before the Human Rights Commission of the UN in Geneva. The list grows larger taking into account the forced disappearances, tortures, forced displacement and death threats.

promising⁷ alternative-left political parties created after signing the ‘La Uribe Accords’ (Dudley, 2008); (Cepeda Castro & Girón Ortiz, 2005).

1.2 The road to the OECD

Surprisingly and despite these grievous obstacles yet-to-be tackled, Colombia initiated an accession process in 2013 to become a full member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Now, Colombia is welcome to follow structural recommendations from 23 committees⁸, aiming to undergo in-depth reviews and adopt legislation reforms in order to align Colombia’s policies closer to the best practices from the organization (OECD, 2013); (Barreiro Jaramillo, 2018). Currently, the only Latin American OECD members are Mexico, since 1994 and Chile, joining in 2010. There is a mixed perception of the overall benefits becoming a full member could bring; besides the possibility of attracting foreign direct investment or the ‘pressure’ to Colombian Government to tackle problems such as water-access⁹, malnutrition and corruption in ‘La Guajira’ Department, argues (Pappier, 2017).

For Colombian scholar Julián López de Mesa (2017), the accession process is far from a promising sign as it reinforces the languid character of Colombian culture. Always trying to mimic foreign models and following blueprints, which ignore an overdue thorough hindsight assessment of Colombia’s own critical problems. In Lopez de Mesa’s own words:

“Following our un-reflexive imitative tradition, our characteristic short-term mindset, our easiness, our solid and ineradicable idea according to which we should search for solutions in others and not in ourselves, ignoring the causes or consequences, and waiting for others to resolve our own problems; our ruling leaders –the last generation which still today preserves the XIX epoch mentality, of low spirit and blinded by foreign trinkets– once more we have been seduced by the glare of the mirror merchant.” (López de Mesa, 2017)¹⁰

⁷ For the 1986 elections, the UP reached an unexpected record of 24 Deputies, 275 Councilmen 4 House Representatives and 3 Senators while the death toll was registering 300 militants murdered.

⁸ By the time of this paper, Colombia has got approval from 22 out of the 23 Committees.

⁹ During a 5-day visit to an indigenous Wayúu settlement in La Guajira, I could confirm the water-access problem, where only one bucket of water was available for daily use.

¹⁰ Original text in Spanish: “Siguiendo nuestra tradición irreflexiblemente imitativa, nuestro característico cortoplacismo, nuestro facilismo, nuestra acendrada e inextirpable idea según la cual debemos buscar soluciones en otros y no en nosotros mismos, sin tomar en cuenta ni causas ni consecuencias y esperando a que otros nos resuelvan nuestros propios problemas, nuestros dirigentes

For Catalina Barreiro, one of the Colombian National Contact points for the OECD guidelines, this process works similar to a ‘quality seal’ where the country can demonstrate a political willingness to evolve and embed the recommendations from the 23 committees in order to achieve better public-policy making. Likewise, it represents a good opportunity to show the world Colombia is a country with a decent economy which you can work with, says (Barreiro Jaramillo, 2018).

Indeed, Colombia has been classified as an upper-middle income country in the DAC List of ODA recipients¹¹. Plus, joining the OECD would imply becoming a member of a club which “benchmark[s] countries that set quality standards in different areas of trade and investment”, as OECD represents around 70% of the global market (Iglesia, 2015). But not only. Ms. Barreiro makes emphasis in the nature of the OECD as a place where you can share experiences and receive advice as well, no matter how developed the country is (Barreiro Jaramillo, 2018). In that sense, despite the deep inequalities in terms of income share in Colombia, where “the richest 1 percent or earners receive 20 percent of national income” (UNDP, 2015, p. 65), or the dependency on extractive industries and decreasing protracted violence, these shortcomings have not overshadowed Colombia’s overall perception, in order to be considered to participate in this accession process.

1.3 Colombia as a case study

These dovetailed contradictions only highlight the particular condition of Colombia. For historian Charles Bergquist, Colombia does not fit into the traditional stereotypes or models used conventionally to address Latin America¹². In fact, for Pamela Murray (2011), “despite its size, wealth and geographical and geopolitical importance, it is one of the countries less well-known and insufficiently understood in Latin America” (LaRosa & Mejía, 2013, p. 13). Certainly, Colombia ranked as the

-la última generación que aún preserva una mentalidad decimonónica, apocada y cegada frente al oropel extranjero- volvieron a caer en el deslumbramiento y en el hechizo del vendedor de espejos” (López de Mesa, 2017).

¹¹ Upper-middle income countries have per capita Gross National Income of \$4,126 - \$12,745 in 2013.

¹² Quoted by Bushnell, recalling an old conversation held with the historian. (Bushnell, 1996, p. 16)

40th largest economy in the world measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)¹³ or as the 29th when adjusting for purchasing power parity (PPP). It is the 2nd largest Spanish-speaking country below Mexico and above United States, Argentina and Spain¹⁴. The country spreads along unevenly settled 1.141.000km², as almost 650.000km² remain inhabited (Serrano, 2016, p. 14); (González, 2004, p. 11), thus creating a particular provincial mindset reflecting the fact that despite having two coastlines with access to both the Pacific and the North-Atlantic oceans, there has not been a meaningful policy to legally exploit this geographical advantage¹⁵.

These characteristics have shaped the dynamics both internally and internationally with historical examples. For instance, during the second half of the Twentieth Century, while military regimes were the common practice in Latin America: Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966 and 1976, Peru in 1968, Chile in 1973, or Uruguay in 1973 (Robinson W. I., 2008, p. 54), Colombia enjoyed a more or less stable democratic system¹⁶. Still, it is worth to mention that during the last century, the FF.MM seized power only once, when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew conservative President Laureano Gómez (LaRosa & Mejía, 2013, pág. 136) to try to end the partisan violence that arose since 1948 with the murder of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. In those terms, it could be said Colombia has shown a military dictatorship aversion¹⁷, demonstrated with the short period of duration of General Rojas Pinilla's military rule from June 1953, until May 1957¹⁸. In addition, "while most Latin American economies shrank during the debt crisis of the 1980's, Colombia has chugged along at an average annual growth rate of 3.7% since 1980. The fact that the

¹³ Although it may differ depending on whether data comes from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the CIA's World Fact Book.

¹⁴ Calculated by ascending sorting the countries' population where Spanish is the official language, but also including The US where there is a significant Spanish-speaking share of the population.

¹⁵ Despite almost 3.000 km of coastline, Colombia has few main trade ports, mainly in Barranquilla, Santa Marta and Cartagena in the Caribbean Sea, Buenaventura in the Pacific Ocean with a planned one under construction in Puerto Antioquia. Plus minor specialized ports for coal or hydrocarbons in Morrosquillo, Puerto Bolívar, Tumaco and Tolú.

¹⁶ Although there might be some controversies about the *National Front* policy, where during 16 years, both Liberals and Conservatives alternated power, creating exclusion for third-way alternatives.

¹⁷ Despite some rumors in the 1970's and 1990's, there has not been a clear threat of Coup d'état.

¹⁸ Later in 1974 Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, participating as a civilian would pose a true rival of Misael Pastrana Borrero (Conservative) during the last *Frente Nacional* presidency. In a still unclear development of events, Pastrana won by a short margin when the nation-wide feeling was that the elections were rigged, giving origins to the urban-nationalist guerrilla of M-19.

country never failed to meet its loan payments is still a matter of national pride” (The Economist, 1997) as there was not really a ‘lost decade’ for Colombia.

In that sense, how can a country with a long democratic tradition but with such deep-rooted inequalities and structural deficiencies be capable of pursuing the OECD membership? Conversely, how have the dynamics of the internal armed conflict transformed in the last twenty years? What has been the impact of the armed conflict in the last twenty years? Can the Colombian case study be explained through the ‘New War’ concept? What has been the role of the extractive industries in this plethora of factors? Is Colombia human-capital ready to ‘take-off’ (Rostow, 1956); (Rostow, 1959) and reduce its dependence on oil and coal? And finally, is it possible to associate these events in order to foresee what could happen in the next 20 years?

1.4 Paper structure

Given these circumstances, this dissertation-paper is an effort to explain how the dynamics of the conflict in one hand, and the extractive economy on the other, have affected the human capital. Yes, Colombia has improved in terms of security (Silva, 2015) and thanks to a sustained economic growth between 2002-2012 (World Bank, 2015) it “has cut extreme poverty rates by half between 2002 and 2014” (World Bank, 2016) including the in the main urban centers (see **Figure 2**), however, I will try to explore and describe the effects on the human capital of the dynamics of this ‘old’ new war in one side and the extractive economy on the other.

The *a priori hypothesis* is that these factors have directly or indirectly configured a systematic trap which has influenced the human capital in different levels but mainly reducing the capacities on innovation. Understanding there is a handful of problems one can address to explain the current situation in Colombia (see **section 1.1**), the effects of the conflict and the role of the extractive economy are considered as conclusive. For detailed information regarding the research question and the objectives, please refer to **Figure 3**.




Figure 2 | Poverty Levels in Colombia, 2002-2014. Source: DANE. Elaborated by (Silva, 2015) for Atlantic Council.

In the first chapter, as a brief opening to the study, I will try to culturally frame the population inhabiting Colombia to describe who the peoples we will refer as human capital are, and if the mere culture of violence can be a sole-defining factor in the proclivity to under-development. To do so, I will explore the existing hypotheses proposed by Bushnell (1996), Harrison & Huntington (1997), Mejía Quintana (2010) and Serrano (2016), in an effort to explain the Colombian so-called identity and culture –of violence, if there is any– and how this can be related to the development in Colombia.

Secondly, understanding this is not a historical revision of the conflict, I would describe the dynamics of the actors within, under the ‘new war’ theory for the 1996-2016 period. To do so, I will recall: Richani (2005), (2014) and (2015), Kaldor (2007) and (2013) Paul, Clarke & Serena (2014), González (2004), Rabasa, et al (2007), Gutiérrez (2006), Hristov (2009) and (2010), in order to understand the relation between the different categories within the old war and new war concepts and its integration within the war system theory.

The third segment will show evidence to portray what has been the role of the extractive industries in the Colombian context. The reader will find theoretical background to understand the role of natural resources (but mainly oil) and its

relation to development by going through the studies of Maher (2015), Larsen (2006), Gylfasson (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Venables (2016), as well as Collier (1999) regarding the natural resource curse and official reports from the Colombian Ministries and international agencies. As a complementary source, I will conduct an interview with Mgr. Juan Camilo Medellín, researcher at the *Fedesarrollo*¹⁹ think-tank.

Using the analysis of the two previous sections, I will gather evidence to find out what have been the effects of both the war and the extractive economy on the human capital, with a special mention of qualified capital and innovation. For this purpose, I will contrast the measurable effects from the data available from the RUV (2018), Colciencias reports, Acosta & Celis (2014), Oppenheimer (2010) and (2014), and Carvajal (2017). Finally, the reader will find the most relevant conclusions which could be used as prospects for the coming years regarding the transformation of the internal conflict, the transition of the extractive economy and the future for human capital.

Research questions and objectives

Research Question: How have the dynamics of the conflict and the extractive economy affected the human capital?

Hypothesis: The link between the dynamics of new wars and the extractive economy has configured a systematic trap afflicting the human capital in different levels but mainly reducing the capacities on innovation.

Aim: To explore the effects of the dynamics of the actors involved in the conflict, and the extractive economy to determine how these two have affected the human capital.

Specific Objectives:

1. To explore and briefly describe the cultural features of the population inhabiting Colombia.
2. To identify and analyze the dynamics of the actors of the armed conflict under the 'new war' concept.
3. To describe the relation of natural resource exploitation and development in Colombia.

Identify how the human capital has been affected by natural resource exploitation and dynamics of new wars.

Figure 3 | Research question and objectives

¹⁹ In Spanish: *Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo*. Official webpage: <https://www.fedesarrollo.org.co/>

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Research design

The **data collection** for this qualitative research was based on available secondary written sources as: books, academic journals, official governmental authorities, reports from international and non-governmental organizations plus media press publications and other complementary electronic material, where different scholars, experts, and journalists assess the researched topics, providing extremely detailed facts for this paper. The information gathered for this research paper has been taken from literature available mostly in Spanish and English but also in French languages. Nonetheless, when the written sources prevail; *observation* and *interviews* will encompass the primary sources. Previous *personal observations* documented on photos and daily life questions to locals in the oil-producing Mid-Magdalena Basin, mainly in Barrancabermeja, Sabana de Torres and Puerto Wilches in Santander, Puerto Boyacá in Boyacá, Cantagallo in South Bolívar, Yondó and Puerto Berrío in Antioquia (see **Map 2**). This was possible while working with Essential Energy Services (EES)²⁰, a Canadian oil services company engaging with labor unions, local communities and former violent actors between 2011 and 2013 through their field operations. At the same time, three years managing programmes for *Colciencias*, through *Colfuturo* between 2013 and 2016 have significantly influenced the author's perceptions and hypothesis building.

Moreover, *structured interviews* with open and follow-up questions with a young male Economics-researcher from *Fedesarrollo* (in English: Foundation for Higher Education and Development), and a female lawyer working as National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises in Colombia, should create different vantage points for a wider sense of deductive logic, thanks to their personal perceptions and area of expertise. These participants were chosen using *selective sampling* due to their distinctive backgrounds and level of acquaintance with the author which endorse confidence and confidentiality.

²⁰ In 2011, EES was considered one of the leading oil services in Western Canada. Today, even though the Colombian operations shut-down in 2013, the official website is available at <https://essentialenergy.ca/>

Transcripts will be kept out of these research, although the guidebooks can be found as **Annexes F and G**.

Additionally, during the **peer-review** within the Palacký University STAG database, the theses related to Colombia available in English were a Bachelor's thesis on "*Political Violence in Colombia with the Emphasis on the Current Situation*" from 2010 and, a Master's dissertation on "*United States Foreign Policy Towards Colombia: The Impacts and Motivations*" from 2012, both elaborated by Mgr. Jana Šrámková, the latter covering an extended focus on impact and critique of the Plan Colombia. Plus, there are three more titles available in Czech and Spanish²¹. When consulting the *Banco de la República* Virtual Library²², the search parameters for the words: 'war system', 'natural exploitation', 'new wars' and 'human capital', several titles regarding the Colombian case could be found with different specific case studies and approaches. However, the most related one was *Dispute over Natural Resources in Colombia: a dialectical relationship between natural resource extraction and armed conflict*, research done by Daniel Gómez Uribe in 2014 for the University of York. This work is focused in "examining the theories that explain the relationship between natural resource extraction and armed conflict and, [...] the role of natural resources in the production and reproduction of violence" (Gómez Uribe, 2014). On the other hand, the work of (Firchow, 2005) attempts to answer if the 'New War' theory applies to the case of Colombia, understanding Colombia as a weak state incapable of dealing with "unfamiliar manifestations of warfare", which focuses in the 1980's and 1990's, a previous period of time than the present paper.

The design of this analysis used **triangulation** "to overcome the problems of bias and validity" (Blaikie, 1991, p. 115) across the different stages (context observation, peer-review, literary review and interviews), hoping to achieve a higher degree on the validity in the conclusions. This methodology is desirable because

²¹ Other titles available include: "Vzdělávání dětí z etnických menšin" by Bc. Hana Plzáková in 2015, "Problematika ilegálního obchodu s kokainem v Latinské Americe: případová studie Kolumbie" by Mgr. Ivana Štramová in 2011, and "La representación de las desmovilizaciones de las autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) en la prensa colombiana" by PhD Radim Zámec, even though the STAG shows it as a successfully defended thesis, the text was not available online.


²² The Biblioteca Virtual Banco de la República is a national repository of journals, thesis and books in Colombia, available at <http://babel.banrepcultural.org/cdm/landingpage/collection/p17054coll23>

“when a hypothesis can survive the confrontation of a series of complementary methods of testing, it contains a degree of validity unattainable by one tested within the more constricted framework of a single method.” (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966, p. 174). Notwithstanding, mixed deductive inference using cultural determinism and the concept of new wars provide the grounded theory during the literature review.

It is important to mention the Colombian case is rooted in an overwhelming complexity of socioeconomic inequality with devastating effects on the civilian population (González, 2004, p. 10); (Lopez, 2011, p. 6), due to the interconnectivity of the heterogeneous factors that influence its current development. Therefore, for the aspirations of this paper, and aware there are other elements which could be analyzed, the author deliberately avoided studying thoroughly the influence of elements such as the cocaine drug trafficking (Holmes, Gutierrez de Piñeres, & Curtin, 2006), or the geographical reasons that could explain these outcomes along with the theories that focus on the inequalities on land distribution, land grabbing (Richani, 2015) and systematic corruption. For this reason, it is recommended to review specific books and research papers related to these particular topics. Likewise, I will not address the relations of Colombia with the US and the international arena, although it could be interesting to see the relation and influence of US foreign policy towards Colombia with regards to its general tolerance of far-right paramilitarism and despise towards leftist leaders and movements.

Finally, it is noteworthy to point that throughout the paper, both direct and indirect quotations have been used to differentiate the author's ideas from other resources. It will be common to find not only direct quotations inside quote marks but also indirect ideas which will be supported by the APA (American Psychological Association) 6th Edition citing style. In terms of translations, as some resources are in a different language than English, they will be translated by the author and quoted as a paraphrase. Whenever the text is long, the original text will be found as a footnote. Verification with authors was done when possible.

Map of the Mid-Magdalena Basin in Colombia



Map 2 | EES operations between 2011 and 2013. Elaborated by the author using Scribblemaps

2.2 Justification, motivation and ethics

Ethically speaking, this dissertation was conducted with no other purpose than to serve as an input for future post-conflict debates towards national identity consolidation and public policies regarding the improvement of the situation within the Colombian territory. My hope is to contribute to a better understanding of key

factors influencing a stagnated development, so the quality of future generations can be notably improved. It should serve also as an input for policy-makers and scholars who are interested in the Colombian case.

Given the above-mentioned structure, the purpose of this research paper is also to partially provide updated insights to the studies on development in the English language inside the European Union. Having first-hand experience and perception of the development of Colombia in the last twenty years, provides a better, or at least a different perspective of the situation and factors bolstering the so-called underdevelopment in Colombia. Consequently, this research will hope to strengthen the knowledge of development researchers and conflict researchers and its relation to the extractive industries and armed conflict dynamics.

2.3 Obstacles, challenges and limitations

The reader should acknowledge, this work is approached from a macro-level of reasoning, using personal observations, literary reviews and interviews. Thus, it should be considered merely as an input for feasible and future micro-level research. Using other types of research such as participatory or mixed methods, the conclusions hereby could be confirmed, complemented or overruled. That research could focus on a specific sector (oil, gas or coal), geography (department, region) or target population.

The main obstacle I found was not being able to travel to personally conduct the interviews or to travel to the area I used to work in the Mid-Magdalena basin to confirm the information gathered during previous personal observations. This was due to financial limitations. Withal, this was considered as non-significant for the author as interviews were conducted via Skype with Colombians aware of the topics discussed in the paper.

Finally, it is worth to mention this paper is far from a political opinion but an analysis using my best understanding of facts under a theoretical framework. Observations may differ according to the education, background and experience of the receptor, therefore one phenomena could be interpreted in a different way by different points of view (Blaikie, 1991, pp. 120-122).

3. 'RESPICE POLUM' CULTURE OF VIOLENCE & 'ARRIBISMO'²³

3.1 The origins of its people

Conventional knowledge depicts Colombia in a deeply rooted conflict, involving the disparities of the social classes, drug-trafficking and rampant homicides (Hudson, 2010). For historian E. J. Hobsbawm, “[t]he country has long been known for an altogether exceptional proclivity to homicide” (Hobsbawm, 1986). It was even considered a ‘failed state’ when measured by North-Atlantic standards (LaRosa & Mejía, 2013, pp. 23-24); (Bushnell, 1996, p. 13). Therefore, the idea of an inherent and deep-seated culture of violence has been fueled by the constant failures of peace accords recorded in Colombian history, says Correa (2013) in (LaRosa & Mejía, 2013, p. 17). Plus, there have been noteworthy attempts to try to explain the origins of this alleged culture of violence: David Bushnell (1993) *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself*, Marco Palacios (2001) *Colombia: país fragmentado, sociedad dividida*, Robin Kirk (2013) *More Terrible Than Death: Violence, Drugs and America’s War in Colombia*, Silvana Paternostro (2007) *My Colombian War*, Anthony McFarlane (2002) *Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon Rule* or Jasmin Hristov (2009) *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*, inter alia.

But, has this propensity to violence been inherent to Colombia? Or is it an overreaching thesis which has enjoyed mainstream support instead? In *¿Por qué fracasa Colombia?* Serrano (2016) readdresses this violent nature is not entirely true as he defends and demonstrates the Colombian character enjoys a peaceful quality. The newly-converted Christians coming from Toledo, Zaragoza, Córdoba or Sevilla –mostly Mozarabs- were prone to avoid strong confrontations, to prevent being prosecuted by the Spanish Inquisition (Serrano, 2016, p. 24). Bushnell (1996) shares partially the same, as for him “the majority of Colombians are peaceful, kind and aren’t involved any type of violent or criminal activities” (Bushnell, 1996). For Serrano, there is no denial in the role of violence, but still this is only an episode of

²³ ‘Arribismo’ is a Spanish expression that can be understood as the desire of rapid upward social-climbing or mobility. It is more precisely the mentality of pretending to belong to a higher nobility or a higher social status than the actual one possessed.

the history even comparable to other nations in transition to a chaotic yet urban modern society (Serrano, 2016, p. 15). Today, Colombia has experienced decrease on its rural population, registering an urban population of around 76.7%, quite above the world average of 54.3% (Word Bank, 2014).

Conversely, for Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), there has been a long history of extractive institutions since the nineteenth century in places like Argentina or Colombia where the institutions are rooted deep in the Spanish colonial rule. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 443). Now, without falling into the debate between the Rose and Black legends (Juderías, 1914); (Keen, 1969), one can say:

“[t]he vast majority of settlers were of Andalusian and Basque descent, as immigration of non-Spaniards was highly regulated. Otherwise, Colombia was not a recipient of large migratory flows between the 16th and 18th centuries. Immigration to Colombia remained limited following its independence in 1819. Over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, occasional migrant flows arrived from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Germany, Italy, Spain, France, and Japan, but Colombia did not experience the same large-scale immigration seen elsewhere in Latin America.” (Carvajal, 2017)

Today the pattern is still present. According to the United Nations, “133,000 immigrants lived in Colombia in 2015, representing [only] 0.2 percent of the population of 47 million” (Carvajal, 2017). In that sense, contrary to the common belief of Colombia as an heterogeneous nation, given the more or less homogeneous inflows of the people and the low rates of immigration different than the peoples from the South of Spain. Assuming Colombia is a –fragmented but– more or less homogeneous society with insignificant migration inflows, Mejía Quintana (2010) achieves an interesting summary of what can be defined as Colombian identity:

“Traditionalism, conservatism, authoritarianism [...] Catholicism and its values, the ‘Hispanity’ as a national ideal, the national symbols, the ‘*patria*’, expression of an intolerant feudal society, absolute denial of the liberal and socialist ideas. Religious and political intolerance and the ‘*respice polum*’, always looking to the North (to the US) in foreign policy as an expression of unconditional allegiance, demonstrated in the participation in the Korean War, by turning its back to Latin America, by being the only Latin American country who supported the UK in the Malvinas War. An excluding and restrictive democracy: with a 44-year long Conservative hegemony with all its exuberance and authoritarianism, which reinforced all these stigmata until our days.” (Mejía Quintana, 2011, p. 35)

Serrano sees Colombia is neither a planned nor a desired country, reason why it is a dull nation, equivocal and incongruent, but at the same time extremely cunning and

adaptable to changes (Guzmán Díaz, 2016). One might also mention how the role of the *'limpieza de sangre'*, or 'cleanness of blood', "which meant not just an European pedigree but freedom from any trace of Jews, Muslims or heretics in the family tree" (Hudson, 2010, pp. 9-10), was core part to access to higher education, and which also constitutes today a form of social discrimination which makes society value rapid social climbing, without regards of the means (Mejía Quintana, 2011).

3.2 Is culture a defining factor?

One might think the rugged geography (see **Map 3**) has played a major role in defining the Colombian character. Yet alone, the influence of the geographical factors cannot be considered as conclusive to explain the underdevelopment of some countries. Take for instance land-locked Switzerland or densely populated Japan; which rank among the wealthiest countries, also without significant access to natural resources. In that sense, there must be something else going on. For (Harrison, 1992), the cultural-ethnic background can be more determinant into the consolidation of a nation although "culture is not an independent variable" (Harrison & Huntington, 2000).

Just recently, after the publishing of the 2018 National Budget priorities, former Colombian National University principal, Moisés Wasserman, said "the only conclusion is that it would seem that Colombia has adopted underdevelopment as a career" (Vanguardia Editorial, 2017). This idea is complemented by Serrano when he argues "there is an institutionalized mediocrity, we are happy the way we are, even when that's not enough" (Guzmán Díaz, 2016).

For Moreno Durán, "in Colombia, politics corrupts drug dealing" (Robinson J. A., 2013, p. 44), idea developed by Mejía Quintana (2010), referring to 'mafia culture' as dominant and constitutive to Colombian national identity. He understands the synergy between drug cartels, politics and landlords as a milestone where the interconnectivity between the different spheres of influence end up in the State legitimizing the anti-values of mafia as means to an end (Mejía Quintana Ó. , 2010, p. 27). Sadly, it "is better to be associated with the mafia than to fight against it" (Molano, 2008).

4. THE DYNAMICS OF AN OLD 'NEW' WAR

4.1 Understanding the context

Albeit the aim of this paper is not to historically describe the evolution of the Colombian armed conflict *per se*, it is paramount to understand violence in Colombia has been categorized under 'conflict of classes', rather than a religious or ethnic clash (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003, p. 3). As a matter of fact, for Enrique Serrano the people who migrated and populated Colombia went through this unequal regional ethnic interbreeding –not as intense as in Brazil– but never through a truly cultural one (Serrano, 2016, p. 12), making it difficult for an ethnic-religious clash to flourish. Notwithstanding, most conflicts are far from binary, as they involve multiple parties (Richani, 2013, p. 194), and this is precisely what happens in Colombia where a plethora of different violent and non-violent actors²⁴ have shaped a unique dynamics-framework worth of studying.

Plenty has changed in the last twenty years (1996-2016). From the end of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels, to the expansion of the left-wing guerillas²⁵; from the modernization of the military, to the consolidation of the paramilitary forces. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the role of the struggle over land-ownership in breeding violent clashes. For Richani (2015), even when there have been laws²⁶ providing legal protection for underused or inefficient land-tenure, "the landed elite was successful in overcoming all attempts to break its monopoly" (Richani, 2015). In a simple thread of thought one could say land ownership became the foundational reason of the left-wing guerillas. Subsequently, this fueled the expansion of paramilitary groups, which displaced, dispossessed and concentrated land as well. To get an idea, "11,000 landowners succeeded in accumulating 67 percent of the most fertile land, while the remaining 38 percent of the land went to some 11 million people" (Richani, 2015).

²⁴ These include civil society organizations, peasants, human rights defenders, environmental activists, multinational corporations, land speculators, sovereign funds, financial institutions, etc.

²⁵ However, "in the beginning of the coca boom the drug lords and the guerrillas worked together. The guerrillas allegedly controlled many of the coca growing regions while the cartels managed much of the cocaine production and trafficking" (Šrámková, 2012, p. 40).

²⁶ For a study from the legal perspective, please refer to, Law 100/1944, Law 135/ 1961, Law 1a/1968, Law 4a/1973 or more recently Law 1448/2011, among others.

Thus, the Colombian conflict “is shaped by a complex history of tensions and struggles between armed groups and the state” (Lopez, 2011, p. 8), which has also influenced the intensity of violence and factors to vary according to the regions, just as the colonization of the territory has been done. The situation is so complex, the line separating the ‘legitimate’ and ‘criminal’ parties is surprisingly blurry, due to the blatant violations of human rights an international humanitarian law by all sides involved in the conflict (see Table 1).

Number of victims by responsible violent actor

<i>Responsible group</i>	<i>Na. of victims</i>	<i>% of total</i>
<i>Total public armed forces/paramilitary victims</i>	<i>2,158</i>	<i>67</i>
Public armed forces	1,523	47
Paramilitaries	474	15
Combined public armed forces/paramilitaries	161	5
<i>Total guerrilla victims</i>	<i>586</i>	<i>18</i>
FARC-EP	360	11
ELN	150	5
Guerrilla (unspecified)	76	2
<i>No information</i>	<i>371</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Other</i>	<i>108</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Total (all)</i>	<i>3,223</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 1 | Human Rights and Political Violence Victims by responsible actor 2001-2010.
Source: (Maher, 2015) using data from (CINEP, 2011)

4.1.1 The geography of violence

One of the factors which explain the dynamics of this old ‘new war’ is the fragmented geography (see Map 3). In general, the flora has configured a natural obstacle to human development in Colombia, or at least has limited contact with its neighbors (Serrano, 2016, p. 14). For instance, the borders with Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil share a difficult access (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003, p. 10) due to areas of dense jungles, swamps, rivers and mangroves which has hospitable to the flow of illegal trafficking, being drugs, arms or contraband (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 4). There is no denial the history of Colombia has been determined by the Andes mountain ridge (Bushnell, 1996, p. 19) which basically divides the coastlands or ‘hot country’ from the highlands or ‘cold country’ (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 418).

Another example is the Pan-American Highway, which was set to connect Alaska with Patagonia, but has one missing segment; precisely in the Darien Gap in the border with Panama.

Hence, the Colombian government has focused its economic development and governance on the cities in the Andean mountains (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003, p. 10), leaving the rural southeastern regions of the country barely populated, underdeveloped and limited to extractive industries. In terms of Robinson (2012), “the lack of state authority in many parts of the country persists over time because it is in the interests of part of the national political elite to allow it to do so, but the core state institutions are also strong enough to prevent this disorder from turning into complete chaos” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 443).

4.1.2 Geographical dynamics

For Fernán González, there are three differential dynamics in the geography of Colombia: national, regional and local. On the national level, “there is a dynamic that reflects the conflict over geographic corridors that permit access to economic resources, weapons, or movement from zones of refuge to zones of conflict” (González, 2004). Here, the areas can be distinguished as the north of the country, where the AUC achieved control in the Urabá-Antioquia and Córdoba and confronting the ELN in the south of Bolívar, like in Cantagallo. On the other hand, the southeast is the traditional FARC-EP strategic rearguard, and whose uncontested dominance was threatened by the massacres committed by AUC, in places as Mapiripán or El Aro in 1997, and the increased presence of the Colombian Army since 1999, complemented by the US involvement through Plan Colombia and its pressure for the eradication of illicit crops in the Department of Putumayo (González, 2004). On the regional level, the “confrontation between the guerrillas and the paramilitaries for control of strategic resources such as petrol, bananas or coca” (González, 2004, p. 15) and finally, on the local level dynamic approaches the conflict in the sub-regions, localities and sub-localities, reflecting the confrontation between urban centers –easily controlled by paramilitaries or the army– and the rural periphery, where guerrillas act more freely (González, 2004).

This triple dynamic meant nothing but a total uncertainty amongst civilians who were caught in a demeaning conflict which violated Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law causing a deep humanitarian crisis of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and death. The lack of the monopoly of the use of force, turned the Colombian state in just another actor interacting in the intertwined dynamics (González, 2004). And it is because of the loss of a fixed institutional reference with a monopoly use of force, the population is left “constantly exposed to reprisals by one armed group or another [...] situation exacerbated in a conflict described as a ‘war through third parties’, where opponents do not confront each other directly but instead attack the real or supposed social base of the enemy” (González, 2004, p. 15). In the following section, we will describe the structural causes that allowed and fueled the transformation of a ‘new war’ notion within an old confrontation.

4.1.3 Structural causes

Even when today the 77% of the population is urban, the historical roots of political violence are rural (Lopez, 2011). As mentioned at the beginning, the unequal access to land and natural resources have fueled the tensions. Estimates say “77.6% of land in Colombia is owned by only 13.7% of the country’s inhabitants” (Alsema, 2016); (Richani, 2015). Additional structural deficiencies are “institutional weaknesses of the state, and proliferation of the drug trade are all primary contributing factors that have influenced the conflict and the humanitarian crisis that exists in [Colombia]” (Lopez, 2011, p. 8). On the other side, political exclusion throughout history has favored economic elites and paved the way for insurgency. This recipe of abundant natural resources “transformed the rural areas into a battleground between guerilla and paramilitary groups” says Lopez (2011). However, one may add the State and multinational corporations serving trade interests as well.

The institutional deficiency can be connected to Serrano (2016) as the Colombian territory has been unevenly populated. This has brought rural communities in semi-isolation with a lack of state institutions throughout many remote areas configuring specific regional and local powers (Vásquez, 2014). Lopez (2011) mentions the inefficiency in tax collection, but one must add also the poor

capacity to monopolize market of violence and secondly, to the effective enforcement of the rule of law.

Map of the topography of Colombia



Map 3 | Colombian topography. Source: LaRosa & Mejía (2013)

Lopez (2011) also argues that because of the small tax base, there is a lack of resources affecting the military which is small by Latin American standards (Lopez, 2011, p. 9). On this matter, (Richani, 2013) confronts Lopez by demonstrating the military is extremely large in terms of both military and administrative personnel. In Colombia, the ratio of administrative logistical support to combat soldiers is 6:1, while the international ratio is 3:1 (Richani, 2013, p. 42).

Yet alone for Acemoglu & Robinson (2012), “Colombia is not a case of a failed state about to collapse [...] but it is a state without sufficient centralization and with far-from-complete authority over all its territory” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 423). It is because of this institutional deficiency, both guerrillas and paramilitaries explain their origin. In the first case, due to the incapacity of the State to fulfil economic, social and cultural obligations and in the case of the paramilitaries, due to the State’s inability to ensure the physical safety and the protection of the property of the citizens (Firchow, 2005).

4.2 Colombia and the ‘new war’ theory

Is the Colombian conflict just an old conflict *per se*, or is it possible to analyze it within the ‘new war’ concept of Mary Kaldor? That is the first question one must answer to then proceed to locate this case study within the theoretical framework. The concept of ‘new war’ was coined by Kaldor between 1997-2007 to refer to the new type of organized violence mainly happening in former Yugoslavia and the South Caucasus as well as Sub-Saharan Africa during the last decades of the Twentieth Century (Kaldor, 2007, p. 1). Although not considered in the case studies by Kaldor, the Colombian conflict can be explained partially within this framework.

To do so, one must “take into account the overall conceptual framework that relates actors, goals, methods and forms of finance” (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). For Kaldor, the new wars “involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation is low relative to the population, both because of lack of pay and because of lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties [...] battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions is common.” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 95). In addition, Mueller (2004) also describes

modern warfare as obsolescent, criminal and perpetuated by small bands or ‘residual combatants’ of greedy and predatory thugs (Mueller, 2004). For those reasons, in the following segment we will see how the ‘new war’ concept applies to Colombia.

4.3 Actors

For Professor Kaldor, the new wars are fought not only by the regular armed forces of states, but by a varying combinations of networks of state and non-state actors which include private security contractors, self-defense forces, mercenaries, paramilitaries, warlords, etc (Kaldor, 2007); (Kaldor, 2013). In the following sections the author will depict the most relevant actors for the 1996-2016 period: the guerilla insurgency, the Colombian Armed Forces, the paramilitaries (see **Map 4**), and an additional individual actor, Álvaro Uribe-Vélez²⁷, former Colombian President between 2002 and 2010, who acted as a pivotal-decisive actor in the dynamics of the conflict, which still today is subject of appraisal and controversy.

Violent actors such as the weakened *EPL*, decentralized drug-trafficking organizations and criminal bands (BACRIM), will not be considered in the study, due either to their lesser importance or distinctive interaction in the war dynamics. Withal, ignoring the international or transnational actors on the dynamics of the Colombian conflict would be negligent. However due to the extent of the topic, one should keep in mind the following:

“The most important international actors are the United States, which has provided critical assistance to the Colombian government; Venezuela; and, to a lesser extent Ecuador, Panama, and Brazil. Cuba has facilitated discussions between the Colombian government and the ELN, and some European countries have extended economic assistance to Colombia. Spain, France and Switzerland have engaged in diplomatic efforts to secure the release of hostages held by the FARC. The FARC has international connections with sympathetic governments and political actors and with other violent groups.” (Rabasa, et al., 2011, p. 44)

It is also irresponsible to overlook the importance of the Plan Colombia with its \$10 billion contribution from 2000-2015. But it is also hard not to debate about its deeper impact and unintended effects. This is why, this paper will address the plan as a tool

²⁷ With more than 276 investigations ongoing for a variety of allegedly committed crimes, current Senator Uribe (2014-2018, 2018-2022) enjoys widespread support by the Colombian citizens, which still consider his leadership and opinions as uncontested and factual.

or strategy which strengthened Colombian institutions and military forces, while failing to eradicate the coca production issue. Therefore, the only mention of the Plan Colombia will be in **section 4.6.2**, when describing the Colombian Armed Forces development.

4.3.1 Guerilla insurgency: FARC-EP and ELN

The left-wing insurgent guerillas have their origins in the period known as *La Violencia* (1948-1958), where they began as “a rural movement composed of a loose association of peasant self-defense groups” (Lopez, 2011, p. 7). Afterwards, were influenced by either the Communist Party for FARC-EP or the Theology of Liberation and Cuban Revolution in the case of the ELN. Nonetheless, it is since the VII Conference of 1982, the FARC-EP adopted the *Jacobo Arenas’ Master Plan*, in which the insurgents aimed to “combine all the forms of struggle” (Rabasa, 2007, p. 59). The aim, to procure and build a larger and more organized military force, following a larger and defiant presence around the capital cities, in addition to establishing a political party which represented their interests separating themselves from the Communist Party.

To do so, FARC-EP began a closer relation to the cocaine trade business – initially through taxation– even when it was considered counterrevolutionary (Raisbeck, 2015); (Rabasa, 2007). The more involved the FARC were into the production and trafficking of cocaine, the greater the recruiting capacity and therefore emphasis to the military dimension from FARC’s offensive (González, 2004, p. 14). In a matter of a few years, the rebel military *Frentes*²⁸ increased from around 20 to more than 60 (Raisbeck, 2015).

It was during the period of the second half of the 1990’s, the FARC-EP achieved their highest military success, just previous to the peace talks with President Andrés Pastrana (Echandía Castilla, 2011, p. 7). The FARC-EP insurgency “conducted an average of 1,035 military actions in the period 1997–2000 but conducted an average of 1,493 actions in the 2007–2010 period (Maher, 2015, p. 224).

²⁸ Insurgent military division which encompasses *columna*, *compañía* and *escuadra*.

Moreover, the FARC-EP “crushed the FF.MM in Las Delicias, Puerres, el Billar, Miraflores and Mitú between 1997 and 1998” (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003, pp. 5-6).

Alas, the conflict was degraded in part to the new terror techniques used by the FARC-EP, similar to the ones used by paramilitary units, in order to ensure strategic positions (Echandía Castilla, 2011). Nonetheless, it was only until the implementation of Plan Colombia and the first period of President Álvaro Uribe-Vélez (see **section 4.6.4**), the military actions carried out by the Colombian Armed Forces surpassed –for the first time– the subversive actions (Echandía Castilla, 2011, p. 8). This new configuration of dynamics, lead the FARC to retreat tactically to their strategic rearguard where they could defend themselves by the use of land-mines.

In the other hand, there is the university students based ELN with its Havana-line formation and “radicalized Catholic adherents of liberation theology” (Rabasa, 2007, p. 61). With a lower participation when compared to the FARC-EP, the ELN targets the oil industry infrastructure (mainly pipelines) in an effort to fight multinationals who are blamed for exploiting Colombia’s natural resources with a several detriment of local communities (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003, p. 6).

4.3.2 The Colombian Armed Forces: reclaiming legitimacy

The FF.MM include the army, naval force and air forces combined. Ever since the end of the presidency of Rojas-Pinilla in 1957, the military has enjoyed an autonomous character, which is not a unique characteristic to Colombia (Richani, 2013, p. 36). Yet, the fact they are not allowed to vote, has limited their political ambitions. Their role has been severely criticized not only because of their periods of inefficiency, but for their involvement in conspiracies, criminal enterprises and human rights violations, as if they had adopted the same modus operandi as FARC: to ‘combine all the forms of struggle’.

Prior to 2000, the FF.MM relied in ‘containment’ *in lieu* of elimination. The strategy was focused on “keeping the guerillas out of the strategic economic areas²⁹ and political centers” (Richani, 2013, p. 40), using the low-intensity conflict doctrine. The term “was coined during the Cold War period by the US military to describe

²⁹ More than 60% of military force is dedicated to protecting key economic sectors. (Richani, 2013)

guerrilla warfare or terrorism” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 2) which at the same time allowed an ‘uneasy coexistence’ with the insurgency (Richani, 2013).

For Richani (2013), the military enjoyed a ‘comfortable impasse’³⁰ allowing them to increase their influence and push their agendas when possible, even by using the ‘saber-rattling’ strategy to threaten for example, the infamous government of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998)³¹. Still, the panorama for the FF.MM during the second half of the 1990’s was dismal. In 1997, the number of soldiers amounted to 131,000, with less than 20% being professional. This meant “about 23,000 professional soldiers (out of an institution with 179,000 personnel) combating an insurgency that doubled its fighting force from 10,000 in the 1980’s to more than 20,000 rebels in the late 1990’s” (Richani, 2013, p. 43). Military defeats and captures by FARC were common as the professional soldiers were only “deployed for defensive purposes or in occasional incursions against the guerrillas” (Richani, 2013, p. 42).

It was only until the FF.MM “learned to combine air power with land forces, that they were able to stop and defeat FARC attempts to overwhelm local garrisons” (Rabasa, et al., 2011, p. 43), and subsequently push forward for the military defeat of the FARC. But even when the decay of the FARC units, which were significantly reduced, the military defeat of the FARC was far from possible because as security expert Molano-Rojas points out: the State military efforts are subdued to the diminishing returns inevitable law (Molano-Rojas, 2014, p. 5).

Side note: the US and ‘Plan Colombia’

Even though Colombia faced a panoply of security threats including insurgents, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers, the US focused its foreign assistance quite narrowly on the “war on drugs” (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 2) since the 1980’s

³⁰ Richani defines ‘comfortable impasse’ “as the ability of the contending parties to adjust to a low-intensity war given their military incapacity for an outright decisive victory coupled with their success in acquiring a positive-sum political economy that outweighs the cost of their war” (Richani, 2013, p. 196)

³¹ In 1995, Samper was accused of receiving \$6 million from the Cali Cartel to fund his presidential campaign. This caused a scandal which made Bill Clinton decertify the country in 1996 and 1997, harming legal exports and inflows of aid. (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014)

(Hanson, 2008). The US strategy assumed “drug money feeds the guerrillas, whose attacks give rise to self-defense groups –the paramilitaries. If the money from drug production and narco-trade went away, the guerrillas could not afford military campaigns against Colombian state and society, and would become less threatening” (Marcella, 2002).

Thus, Richani (2013) divides the role of the US military aid in two: before and after the inception of Plan Colombia. As he argues more in detail in Chapter 9 of his 2013 book; before 2000 the US believed more in ‘containment’ as “pursuing a more aggressive military strategy would be more costly and less feasible due to the deficient structure and poor armament of Colombia’s military” (Richani, 2013, p. 196). The second –and defining moment- was the implementation of the Plan Colombia, reinforced post 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ which merged with the war on drugs, creating what the author calls a ‘hypersecurity state’ (Richani, 2013, p. 197). And since 1995 the FARC-EP was piling up several military successes, the US feared “a FARC victory would send the message that an armed leftist group can achieve political gains that otherwise could not have been obtained through the “bourgeois” democratic means” (Richani, 2013, p. 200). Certainly, Plan Colombia not only modernized the FF.MM but also integrated the operations in Joint Task Force Omega including intelligence-sharing in real-time among the FF.MM (Rabasa, et al., 2011) and the US. This allowed to locate and neutralize historical FARC commanders as Raul Reyes, ‘Mono Jojoy’ or Alfonso Cano. (Richani, 2013, p. 201). By 2010, the FF.MM finally gained the upper hand once and for all (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 9).

4.3.3 The Paramilitary Self-Defenses: legalizing their transformation

Understanding the origins of Colombian paramilitaries using Kaldor’s theories can be challenging. By name, they are called United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. For Kaldor “self-defense units are composed of volunteers who try to defend their localities [...] such units are very difficult to sustain mainly because of inadequate resources” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 100). Additionally, for Kaldor “[t]he most common fighting units are paramilitary groups, that is to say, autonomous groups of armed

men generally centred around an individual leader. Often these groups are established by governments in order to distance themselves from the more extreme manifestations of violence [...] Often, paramilitary groups are associated with particular extremist parties or political factions” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 98). In this way, the Colombian case can constitute a conceptual hybrid between ‘paramilitary’ and ‘self-defense’ units.

The origins of the modern paramilitary forces can be traced to Puerto Boyacá in the 1980’s³², when “landowners, politicians, military personnel, ranchers, businessmen and a large oil-company formed the group ‘Death to Kidnappers’ (MAS), in response to guerrilla kidnappings” (González, 2004, p. 13). Later on in Antioquia, during the early 1990’s a vigilante group called *Convivir* was created and promoted by the Governor of that time, Álvaro Uribe-Vélez. Soon after being revoked³³, these armed actors came under the umbrella group of Castaño brothers’ United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), uniting different groups from across the country who “sought to protect their own interests—whether land, a business, or political office. Most also operated under the ostensible ideological banner of combating members of the leftist guerrilla” (Hanson, 2008).

The AUC enjoy(ed) a different status than the insurgency as they were not actively anti-state. Whilst the FARC and ELN are considered as actively anti-state insurgency, influencing the level of threat perceived by authorities (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014). As a consequence, “when the land-owning class built its own self-defense militias or when the narco-bourgeoisie built its paramilitary organization in rural areas, the army had no trouble in building alliances with these groups to fight the main enemy of the social order: the guerrillas” (Richani, 2013, p. 51). By the end of the 1990’s, “at the height of its power, the AUC was strong enough to displace both the FARC and the ELN from territory that had been traditional strongholds” (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 5).

³² Although “with Decree 3398 of 1965 and Law 48 of 1968, it became legal to create civil defense groups to confront guerrillas privately and to support the army in COIN efforts” (Holmes, Gutierrez de Piñeres, & Curtin, 2006, p. 168)

³³ In August 1998, just after the *Convivir* decree was abolished, more than 200 members of these associations joined the illegal AUC.



Map 4 | Areas on dispute by violent actors in 2005. Source: Le Monde Diplomatique

4.3.4 *The 'Álvaro Uribe-Vélez' factor*

For almost two centuries, the ruling power in Colombia was shared between the two traditional political parties: *Conservadores* and *Liberales*. However this division only exacerbated social and economic inequality, which often led to violence (Lopez, 2011). This *statu quo* was challenged in an overwhelming victory of independent Álvaro Uribe Vélez³⁴ in the 2002 elections, when he won in the first round after gaining 53% of the votes with the promise '*en finir avec la guerre*' (Lemoine, 2006). How can a barely known politician achieve such a devastating result? For a start, Uribe had something in common with the Castaño brothers: his father was also killed by the FARC-EP in 1983. Kaldor recalls Van Creveld, arguing that "it is 'preposterous...to think that just because some people wield power, they act like calculating machines that are unswayed by passions'" (Kaldor, 2013, p. 11). Indeed, this fueled a presidential campaign which in Richani's words "was chiefly based on launching an all-out war against the insurgents, which resonated with the general malaise in the country generated by the failure of the peace talks between FARC and the Pastrana government. [...] The strategy was one of warfare that had as a goal the co-optation of the states' competitors (the paramilitaries) and the elimination of its challengers (the insurgency)" (Richani, 2013, p. 201).

His Democratic Security Policy³⁵ (DSP) aimed "to generate a virtuous cycle in which increased security produces confidence and stability, which in turn creates an environment favorable to private investment³⁶ and economic growth. Economic growth generates greater tax revenues, which permit investment in social development programs and meet the population's needs" (Rabasa, et al., 2011, pp. 45-46). Being paramount to DSP success, the 'state-coercive apparatus' (Hristov J. , 2009) was consolidated during the Uribe administrations. In fact, the FF.MM increased almost 50%, from 158,000 soldiers and 104,000 police personnel in 2002 to 267,000 and 137,000 in 2009 respectively (Rabasa, et al., 2011). While Uribe's stark

³⁴ Although he has formed as a 'liberal' (1977-2001).

³⁵ The five goals of the DSP: territorial control, protection of the population, banning the commercialization of illicit drugs, enhancing the dissuasive power of the state, and accountability. (Richani, 2013, p. 202)

³⁶ FDI stock increased from US\$11.2 billion in 2000 to US\$95.7 billion in 2011, accounting for 27% of Colombia's GDP (Maher, 2015, p. 222).

policies weakened the FARC and provided an incentive to the AUC to demobilize, they failed to stop the transformation of the armed actors into criminal bands or BACRIM (Stone, 2011), linked to the drug-trafficking business in areas previously influenced by the paramilitaries (Rabasa, et al., 2011, p. 47).

Unfortunately, in their recent book, *Ejecuciones Extrajudiciales En Colombia, 2002-2010*, Rojas & Benavides conclude that from the 16,724 combat kills reported by Colombian security forces, approximately 10,000 were civilians (Rojas & Benavides, 2017). If the data is true, it would mean during the administration of Álvaro Uribe-Vélez, this criminal enterprise was practically institutionalized.

4.4 Goals

Kaldor sets the 'goals' category as subject to identity, whether is ethnic, religious or tribal (Kaldor, 2013). As discussed in **section 4.1**, Colombian conflict does not fall under the ethnic-religious categorization, however identity can take many forms. Conversely, when it comes to 'old wars', the goals are geopolitical or ideological. Some elements can be analyzed under this variable as "political mobilization around identity is the aim of war rather than an instrument of war" (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). In the Colombian context, "the violence does not revolve around a single clearly defined polarity, with a specific core of economic or ethnic conflicts, but is instead related to various dynamics and different historical processes which are reflected in more fluent identities and produce frequent changes in territorial control" (González, 2004, p. 11). This paper has identified vindication, containment, elimination and deterrence as the main identity goals.

In the FARC-ELN scenario, "[t]he central objective of revolutionary warfare is the control of territory through gaining support of the local population rather than through capturing territory from enemy forces. The zones under revolutionary control are usually in remote parts of the country which cannot easily be reached by the central administration" (Kaldor, 2007, p. 103). This can be confronted by the fact that the guerilla is similar to a living organism which adapts according to their environment. In that sense, they have had periods of containment in the past, but post 1982 and until 2001 moved to effectively capture and control territory not only

in the rural areas but also threatening Bogotá in 1994 by reaching La Calera, 18km away from the capital city (Raisbeck, 2015).

In the case of the FF.MM the goal has been to regain legitimacy using two strategies: containment and offensive. If containment served well prior 1996, it was not effective due to the increasing victories of the insurgency. It was thanks to the US assistance and the rise of Álvaro Uribe “By 2004, the Colombian government was able to meet its goal of establishing a presence in every one of the 1,098 (now 1,122) municipalities, a critical component of the territorial recovery strategy” (Rabasa, et al., 2011, p. 46) that they were capable of take the lead in the COIN and achieve the upper hand. The aim of ‘*Plan Patriota*’ was to conduct a full offensive in the south of Colombia, in Putumayo and Caquetá (Lemoine, 2006).

Vindication can be seen in the creation of the AUC. In 1981 the FARC-EP kidnapped a dairy farmer, Jesús Castaño, who lived in the northeastern region of Antioquia. The FARC demanded a US\$7.500 ransom, forcing the family to mortgage the farm. After payments done twice, the corpse was found anyway chained to a tree. This was enough motive for the three Castaño brothers, Fidel, Vicente and Carlos to found a paramilitary group called “*Los Tangueros*”. Their goal, to hunt down members of FARC and avenge their father (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 419). Soon they united nearly thirty thousand similar self-defence forces in what in 1997 was meant to be known the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC). If vindication was the initial goal, for the studied period, the paramilitaries had turned to an elimination strategy, which threatened not only the insurgency, but the population suspected to collaborate with them.

During his presidency, Álvaro Uribe-Vélez demobilized nearly 31,671 paramilitary units in a process criticized over the high levels of impunity granted to paramilitary war criminals (Gill, 2016). Unfortunately, during the process taking place in 2006, the Justice and Peace Law (Justice and Peace Law 975/2005) not only failed to deliver the truth, justice and reparations to the victims and their families (Lozano & Morris, 2010), but sadly served to maintain paramilitary impunity and thereby ensure their power remains intact (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 17). Key leaders were extradited to the US to face charges of involvement in drug trafficking, giving no

further testimonies under the Colombian Law (Moor & Van de Sandt, 2014, p. 8). Additionally, ever since the process culminated, “more than a 100 (former) congressmen have been investigated and more than 40 were sentenced to prison for using paramilitary intimidation and funds to get elected into Congress” rigging the 2002 and 2006 elections (Gill, 2016). It can be inferred the Colombian peace process was not merely a failure but a pure farce (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 14).

4.5 Methods

Professor Kaldor makes a distinction between the role of battles in old and new wars, by arguing that in new wars, battles are rare between actors and territory is captured through political means, through control of the population, using for example population displacement: “violence [is largely] directed against civilians as a way of controlling territory rather than against enemy forces” (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3), “[t]his is why the main method of territorial control is not popular support, as in the case of revolutionary warfare, but population displacement – getting rid of all possible opponents” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 104)

When referring to insurgent warfare, Kaldor says “it involves decentralized dispersed military activity, with a great emphasis on surprise and mobility. But a key feature of revolutionary warfare is the avoidance of head-on collisions which guerilla units are likely to lose because of inferior numbers and equipment. Strategic retreats are frequent [...] although, of course, terroristic methods were also used” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 103). Nonetheless, since 1995 the FARC-EP conducted a national campaign to gain territorial domain through battles which ended up in casualties, war prisoners, and establishment of FARC-EP control³⁷. Also for Richani, “after 1995, the civil war increasingly shifted away from a low-intensity war to a higher level of warfare underlying higher levels of violence” (Richani, 2013, p. 54). Another example of full escalation of warfare can be found when President Uribe “increased the size of the army from 203,000 soldiers in 2002 to 283,000 a decade later” (Robinson J. A.,

³⁷ At the highest point of territorial control of the FARC-EP, they were controlling almost 500 towns out of 1,122 Colombia has in total.

2013). For this reasons, Kaldor's concept of new-war must take into account that in the Colombian conflict the two versions of war coexisted for the period 1996-2016.

The FF.MM, pressured by the goal to claim legitimacy and demonstrate victories, saw some of its officials involved in one of the worst criminal enterprises known in the Western hemisphere, known as '*falsos positivos*' (Human Rights Watch, 2015) in which 3,512³⁸ civilians were systematically assassinated between 2002 and 2010 alone (Córdoba, 2018), and then presented as casualties during combat against insurgents and paramilitaries (see **Annex B**). Additionally, the FF.MM have been infamously involved in allegedly planning or facilitating high profile assassinations such as journalist and satirist Jaime Garzón Forero (1999), and previously: presidential candidates Luis Carlos Galán (1989), Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa (1990), Carlos Pizarro Leon-Gómez (1990) and conservative Álvaro Gómez Hurtado (1995). These events have stymied the efforts do find a clear division between criminal and legitimate factions.

Parallel to the increasing power if the left insurgency, the AUC, managed to use land dispossession and illegal appropriation in order to deny the insurgency its peasant base of support. Such phenomena is indisputable in the Middle Magdalena, South Bolivar, Montes de Maria, Meta, and Arauca (Richani, 2015). Indeed, there is strong evidence to say the paramilitary blocs systematically used terror against population through massacres and forcibly displacing thousands of families to "clear" the lands of population who was suspected of collaborating with the insurgency. Back in 2011, the first thing I asked when I moved to the Mid-Magdalena region was if the area was safe. Locals had no other answer than: "yes of course, the paramilitaries cleared this area some years ago".

The unlawful tactics demonstrated by paramilitaries where a direct disregard for norms of international law, alas their legitimacy was just barely undermined. If the initial goal of the AUC was to fight against the FARC-EP, they soon started to murder innocent civilians, terrorizing and displacing hundreds of thousands of people. This increasing targeting of civilian population from 172 to 436, also produced a change in the public's perception of a conflict once considered distant

³⁸ Although some other sources claim 4,382 assassinations (BluRadio, 2014).

from everyday reality (González, 2004, p. 11). In Puerto Boyacá for example, I could read the welcome sign (See **Annex C**) to the town saying “Welcome to Puerto Boyacá. Land of Peace and Progress. Anti-insurgency Capital of Colombia”³⁹. Common is to find threats (see **Table 4**) in leaflets, or emails claiming:

“our homeland no longer wants to have any knowledge of guerrilla groups, the FARC or ELN, or anything else that resembles left, socialism or disguised communism [...] we are making clear to you the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia were our base and have completed one phase of their service to the people of Colombia, and once the process of demobilization have been completed we are now the present and future of the Colombian states, for years to come...We are present in twenty-one rural and urban areas and we operate in a variety of forms” (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 157)⁴⁰

Using these methods, all violent actors have fallen into human rights violations to affect a higher number of civilians murdered (Rojas & Benavides, 2017), displacing population reconfiguring territorial control. This has even made the International Criminal Court to warn Colombia that unless military commanders are called to justice they could be prosecuted in The Hague. And here is the problem: when you find similar methods with distinctive goals which collude: “...protection rent-seekers range from multinational security companies to military, paramilitary, and guerrilla groups” (Richani, 2013, p. 50).

4.6 Forms of finance

In the old wars, financing the war effort comes from States through taxes or outside patrons (Kaldor, 2013). This applies perfectly to Colombia in the sense of the role of the war-tax implemented by Álvaro Uribe-Vélez during his first administration 2002-2006 and evidently the Plan Colombia which helped to modernize the FF.MM. Indeed, “military expenditures increased from 1.2 percent of the GNP in 1985 to 2.16 percent in 1996, to 3.5 percent in 1999. [...] This was in addition to more than \$600 million in debts, which constituted one-third of the total public debts incurred in 1997” (Richani, 2013, pp. 42-43).

³⁹ In Spanish: “Bienvenidos a Puerto Boyacá. Tierra de Paz y Progreso. Capital antisubversiva de Colombia”.

⁴⁰ Taken from a threatening email sent in May 8, 2006 by paramilitaries to José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective with copies to the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia, the NGO Latin American Institute of Alternative Services, the Central Union of Workers (CUT) and, the Colombian Platform of Human Rights, Democracy and Development.

On the other hand, the arrange of sources of income for the new wars include activities such as kidnapping, drug-trafficking, smuggling, private support, etc., creating a ‘mutual enterprise’ where it is “difficult to distinguish between those who use the cover of political violence for economic reasons and those who engage in predatory economic activities to finance their political cause” (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3).

Indeed, both FARC and ELN funded their activities through “narcotics smuggling and trafficking, extortion of both local government and other drug traffickers, investments in front companies, and money laundering” (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 5). It is common to see “[k]idnappings and extortion (including protection payments extracted from the oil industry) account for most of the ELN’s income, but some more “pragmatic” sectors of the group have become involved in the drug trade” (Rabasa, 2007, p. 61). It also was common for cattle ranchers or rural landowners to pay the ‘*vacuna*’ or vaccination, meaning you have “to vaccinate yourself against being murdered or kidnapped by paying off some group of armed thugs each month” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 419).

The AUC was more directly involved in the drug trade: from production taxation, cocaine laboratories, protecting trafficking routes and smuggling the drugs themselves (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 5). Through threats and massacres, they “became some of the wealthiest landowners in Colombia, with estimated holdings of between 3 million and 5 million hectares, worth approximately \$2.4 billion” (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 5). Strikingly, “within three years of its formation, the AUC’s numbers had doubled (to roughly eight thousand combatants) and it had made significant inroads into the cocaine trade. It tapped fuel pipelines to sell oil on the black market” (Hanson, 2008). Nevertheless, there are more than 48 firms and businessmen under investigation for contributing to the AUC such as: Chiquita Brands⁴¹, Termotasajero, Ecopetrol, RCN television, plus other cattle-ranchers and banana exporters in Urabá and Catatumbo, among many others (Flórez, 2016).

⁴¹ The firm calculated their contribution in U\$1.7 million under alleged pressure, which resulted in a U\$25 million fine.

These payments from multinational corporations were in exchange of private security and ending the labor unions (Lozano & Morris, 2010).

4.7 The new war system⁴²

Given the previous elements, Kaldor argues “new wars can be described as mixtures of war (organized violence for political ends), crime (organized violence for private ends) and human rights violations (violence against civilians)” (Kaldor, 2013, p. 6). Moreover, as irrational as the conflict might seem, “these wars are rational in the sense that they apply rational thinking to the aims of war and refuse normative constraints” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 107).

This can be quite accurate when you take a look at the actors’ political motivations, involvement with drug-trafficking, illegal acquisition of land, and human rights violations. For example, “[b]etween 1990 and 2000 there were 26,985 civilian murders related to the armed conflict whilst there were only 12,887 fatalities in military operations” (González, 2004, p. 10). As Richani’s war system, it is “precisely because the new wars are a social condition that arises as the formal political economy withers, they are very difficult to end.” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 117).

In tackling the insurgence threat, “the [Colombian] government has attempted to deal with rebel forces using its own military and the assistance of paramilitary groups” (Lopez, 2011, p. 6) this has resulted in a “collusion between paramilitary commanders and Colombian security services, military commanders, and high-ranking politicians” (Hanson, 2008). For instance, in 2002 several of the leaders of the AUC organized a meeting with politicians in the town of Santa Fé de Ralito in Córdoba. The document known as ‘Pact of Ralito’ called for the ‘re-founding of the country’ and was signed by important paramilitary figures such as: Salvatore Mancuso, Jorge 40, Don Berna, Diego Vecino and politicians from the Córdoba and Sucre departments such as: Salvador Arana, Miguel de la Espriella, William Montes among fifty others. Due to the paramilitary power, it has been demonstrated that for the 2002 elections

⁴² Resulting concept after joining ‘New War’ and ‘War System’.

(and later in 2006 as well) almost one-third of the congressmen were elected thanks to paramilitary support in the regions.

Additionally, it has been demonstrated that “[t]he landed elite has organic ties with paramilitaries and a marriage of convenience with the narco-bourgeoisie” (Richani, 2015) a term that was upgraded by murdered famous satirist Jaime Garzón into the ‘lumpen-bourgeoisie’ (Garzón, 1993). Now, to complete the plethora of actors, Chiquita Brands admitted in US court that it paid nearly \$1.7 million to paramilitary group over eight years. Other corporations including Coca-Cola and Drummond were also under investigation. (Hanson, 2008). This marriage is dreadful as per according to Human Rights Watch, the paramilitaries commit about 80% of all human rights violations against civilians in Colombia (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 12); (Maher, 2015, p. 226). The lack of action against paramilitary forces allowed them to execute 8,903 selective murders, 1,196 massacres with a 7,160 death toll, 13,562 forced disappearances, 1,530 victims of torture, 344 cases of rape only until 2012, according to the *Centro de Memoria Histórica* (Saavedra, 2017). A key element for Kaldor is that “[r]ather it depends on continuing fear and insecurity and on the perpetuation of hatred of the other. Hence the importance of extreme and conspicuous atrocity and of involving as many people as possible in these crimes so as to establish a shared complicity, to sanction violence against a hated ‘other’ and to deepen divisions” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 105).

By the end of 2016, with the dismantling of the FARC-EP and transition into a political life under the *Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común* party, the longest insurgency in the hemisphere ceased to exist formally⁴³. Nonetheless, “[t]he various factions continue to avoid battle mainly in order to conserve men and equipment” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 104). Kaldor argues “[f]ear, hatred and predation are not recipes for long-term viable polities; indeed, this type of war economy is perennially on the edge of exhaustion.” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 118). True, the FARC-EP were cornered by the military offensive beginning in 2004 and ideologically their goals had suffered a profound transformation. But did the paramilitaries cease to

⁴³ Although there will be some dissident movements who will survive and either conform new criminal groups or join existing ones.

exist also after their demobilization? “In 2001, the U.S. government designated the AUC a foreign terrorist organization. By 2003, when Uribe signed a peace deal with the AUC, it had penetrated over 700 of Colombia’s roughly eleven hundred municipalities.” (Hanson, 2008). Kaldor again argues “[i]n new wars the sides need an incompatibility in order to justify their existence” (Kaldor, 2013, p. 7), and it is precisely this incompatibility –at least in their motivations- that has fueled the survival of the paramilitary mentality.

4.8 Para-transformation in the new war system

As mentioned in **section 4.3.3**, the status of the AUC has always differed from the FARC-EP. This is complemented by the fact public disapproval towards the guerillas is higher than to the paramilitaries or armed forces. However, this upheaval with the left-wing insurgency has evolved through time. There is a widespread feeling in which the regular citizen in Colombia blames the FARC-EP for the victims of the conflict whereas almost 40% of the surveyed by researcher Alexandra García responded paramilitarism it was a ‘necessary evil’ (García, 2016). Furthermore, in her PhD thesis “*The texture of Ideology: Demonstrating Bias in the Representation of the Internal Conflict in the Colombian Press*”, García demonstrates through newspaper headlines how the mass media refers to the massacres and murders perpetrated by the guerrillas, using direct subjects. Instead, when the violence is committed by paramilitaries, the absence of the subject, decreases the direct responsibility of the paramilitaries (García, 2012).

In addition, after the controversial demobilization of the AUC, Hanson describes three types of armed groups: “paramilitaries that did not demobilize; groups in collusion with drug cartels; and criminal gangs that have arisen to fight for a share of the drug trade [...] the new groups, however, do not seem to have infiltrated regional politics to the same degree as the paramilitaries, and lack a strong command structure or ideological bent” (Hanson, 2008). As a result, for Hristov:

“reorganization of paramilitary groups in the post-demobilization period, together with the implementation of the Justice and Peace Law as an instrument for perpetuating impunity, the camouflaging of the military and economic networks of

the paramilitary (through mock confessions, the disappearance of evidence, and the extradition of top paramilitary chiefs), and the blurring of state and paramilitary power—in addition to the existing penetration of major state institutions by paramilitaries—indicate that any true dismantling of paramilitary organizations is highly unlikely to take place” (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 19).

Besides, “it is necessary to consider that gangs do not have the kind of solid relationship with judicial, political, and military state institution that is necessary to secure impunity for their crimes and the conversion of the illegal into legal” (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 19). At the same time, street criminals fall short to expect formal “collaboration from state institutions like the military, police, DAS (today dismantled), or INCODER to provide them with the security and legitimacy that ensure their operations’ success. These connections, and the benefits they offer, are available only to right-wing paramilitaries, who in this new era have achieved near total institutionalization, together with the legalization of their principal driving force –capital accumulation through violence” (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 19).

Through all these instruments, paramilitary capital and ideology has been effectively ‘laundered’, causing any resemblance or persistence of violence to be blamed on the FARC dissidents, other guerrillas or on criminal gangs (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 18), even by labeling the new formed illegal groups BACRIM (in Spanish *Bandas criminales*), the philosophy behind the paramilitary modus operandi still goes on.

Recap: prior to 1996 the FF.MM and FARC-EP enjoyed a ‘comfortable impasse’ which allowed them to forcibly coexist. However, this situation was subverted when the expansion and military successes of the FARC-EP made the US to intervene through ‘Plan Colombia’ in an uneasy cooperation with the rising AUC paramilitaries. Through the 1996-2016 period whether the ideology was strong in all sides, the elements of the ‘new war’ concept compelled the violent actors to adapt in their goals, methods forms of finance and patterns of violence creating a hypersecurity state coercive apparatus fuelled by mutual (criminal and profit) enterprises.

5. THE 'CURSE' OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN DEVELOPMENT

5.1 Natural resources and development

The idea of using subsoil assets such as hydrocarbons or minerals as a means to promote economic development seems rational. Especially, when a country is lagging behind in terms of human or physical capital (Venables, 2016, p. 161). It would also be reasonable to think “that a country endowed with larger quantities of natural resources has an advantage and has to grow faster than resource poor countries” (Polterovic, Popov, & Tonis, 2010) –*ceteris paribus*. However, the correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth is still discussed. For instance, in the 1960's, oil-rich Venezuela and Norway had a comparable GDP per capita (Sánchez, 2016). Alas, it was Norway who was able not only to avoid the 'Dutch disease', but to effectively keep a significant growth and become one of the wealthiest nations in terms of GDP per capita (Gylfason, 2001). The same comparison can be made between Nigeria and Indonesia, sharing similar per capita incomes in the 1970's. Now, “Indonesia's per capita income is four times that of Nigeria”⁴⁴ (Stiglitz, 2004). More successful examples include Botswana, Chile, Malaysia and Thailand, countries which achieved high economic growth and diversified their economies beyond commodities (Brandon, Cunha, Freije-Rodríguez, & Marchesini, 2015).

5.2 When oil is not enough

Natural resources abundance is not enough. It can even have no impact on the economic growth, when in the absence of complementary sound policies which can turn these riches into an unambiguous blessing (Gylfason, 2001). Moreover, if a wealth of a nation was determined by the ratio between available natural resources and the size of population, Colombia would be one of the richest countries in the world (Harrison, 1992); (Lange, Wodon, Carey, & Editors, 2018). The relation is more complex and it is linked with the type of institutions that guarantee an inclusive access to prosperity. For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) “[n]ations fail today because

⁴⁴ Although, for 2017 Nigeria's GDP per capita (PPP) was U\$5,900 while Indonesia's was U\$12,400, making it a little more than two times larger.

their extractive economic institutions do not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest and innovate” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 413). Later on, the same authors argue that extractive economic institutions are “structured to extract resources from the many by the few and fail to protect property rights or provide incentives for economic activity” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 471).

5.3 The curse and the disease

From the government’s perspective, the extractive industries constitute ‘easy unearned-rents’ in the form of royalties for example (Cante, 2018), “which reduce incentives for economic reform and diversification [which also leads] to high public consumption than investments” (Hamilton & Ruta, 2006, p. 24). There is no uncontested direct linkage between natural resources and wealth, although the interaction between government policies or behavior and natural resource wealth can be the key to understanding this relation.

The term ‘resource curse’ paradox was coined by Gelb (1988). Both the curse and the disease have their origins in sudden resource wealth. Larsen mentions how Sachs (1999) and Warner (2001) among others have shown the detrimental effects of newfound riches on economic growth in terms of a negative relationship between resource wealth and economic growth (Larsen, 2006, pp. 605-606). However neither of them shall be strictly associated with the inevitable but negative outcomes. Nevertheless, this can be the result when attributed to unwelcome array of institutions or inappropriate policies (Larsen, 2006, p. 610). The essence of the Dutch Disease is:

“...linked to a factor movement effect, a spending effect, and a spillover-loss effect. The factor movement effect is the reallocation of factors of production such as capital and labor from other activities to resource extraction. The spending effect arises from the increased aggregate demand created by resource receipts, which if converted to domestic currency may create periods of excess demand in the economy. The spillover-loss effect lies in the loss of positive externalities associated with the (crowded-out) non-oil traded goods sector” (Larsen, 2006, p. 608)

This negative relation should not be deterministic though. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) found that the countries which “escaped the resource curse used resource

rents as a source of investment rather than a source of public expenditure” (Hamilton & Ruta, 2006, p. 26). Examples of negative outcomes: Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola; while there are some examples of better management: Norway, Canada, Botswana⁴⁵, and Bolivia to some extent (Barría, 2017). According to the UN (2005), “escaping the trap requires: a big push of basic investments between [2005] and 2015 in public administration, human capital (nutrition, health, education), and key infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, water and sanitation, accessible land for affordable housing, environmental management)” (UN Millenium Project, 2005, p. 19). On the other hand, the curse can be boosted when:

“[e]xtractive political institutions support these economic institutions by cementing the power of those who benefit from the extraction. Extractive economic and political institutions, though their details vary under different circumstances, are always at the rood of this failure. In many cases, for example as we will see in [Colombia], this failure takes the form of lack of sufficient economic activity, because the politicians are just too happy to extract resources or quash any type of independent economic activity that threatens themselves and the economic elites” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 413)

There is extensive literature about these effects, however **Table 2** summarizes their characteristics.

Effects of a Resource Curse and a Dutch Disease			
		Resource Curse	
		No	Yes
Dutch Disease	No	Overall growth and diverse export base	Stagnant growth, but diverse export base
	Yes	Overall growth, but strongly contracted manufacturing	Stagnant growth and strongly contracted manufacturing

Table 2 | Effects of the resource curse and a Dutch disease. Source: (Larsen, 2006)

⁴⁵ By keeping a sharp focus on the fiscal aspects of natural resources, Botswana has achieved remarkable economic performance (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001).

5.4 Colombia and oil

In the case of Colombia, oil was discovered as back as 1537 by Don Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, although this European discovery was in reality a confirmation of what the natives had known for years (Greiss, 1946, p. 245). In the modern era, the importance of oil dates back to the 1920's, when exploiting concessions were awarded to the foreign Tropical Oil Company, Shell Oil Company and Texas Petroleum Company; prior to nationalization of the resource. Since 1948, *Ecopetrol* has been in charge of the development, exploration, production and distribution of oil in the country, but it also concedes exploitation rights to foreign oil companies (LaRosa & Mejía, 2013, p. 135).

Today, one hundred years later, oil represents the main export of Colombia with 32.5% of the exports (OEC, 2017), making it not an 'oil-rich-country' by any means, but a 'country with oil' or even an 'oil-dependent' country as expressed by (González Santana, 2017). It is interesting though that for Venables (2016), Colombia does not qualify as an oil dependent country using IMF classification which is based on a country deriving at least 20% of exports or 20% of fiscal revenue from nonrenewable natural resources (IMF, 2012).

In words of (Venables, 2016), "an economy with substantial exports of natural resources can become overly dependent on a single volatile source of income, and this volatility can destabilize the macro-economy", as it happens to be with Colombia where the natural resources exports (see **Figure 4**) account to nearly 55% of total exports⁴⁶ (OEC, 2017). In addition, Colombia's nearly 2 billion barrels in oil reserves have been projected to last for five more years⁴⁷ (Murphy, 2015). Overshadowed by neighboring Venezuela who has proven reserves of 302.24 billion barrels, lasting 200 years more, and accounting for 24.8% of OPEC's share (OPEC, 2016) and almost 33% in comparison to the world (see **Annex C**). With no considerable discoveries since 1992, Colombian reserves are falling drastically (Echeverry, Navas, Navas, & Gómez, 2009), as observed in **Table 3**.

⁴⁶ Crude petroleum 28%, refined petroleum 5.1%, coal briquettes 16%, gold 5.9%.

⁴⁷ In the case of natural gas, the reserves are estimated in 160 billion cubic meters, sufficient for 12.8 years of production (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2014, p. 6).

Far from encouraging, Colombia reached its oil peak around 1999 (López de Mesa, 2017), increasing the costs of producing oil, but also bringing to the table alternative initiatives such as non-conventional hydraulic fracking⁴⁸ which causes controversy due to the massive damage to water resources, its human induced seismic activity among other environment and health harming effects (Hoffman, 2012).




Figure 4 | Exports of Colombia. Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2016

Notwithstanding, the Colombian oil sector attracts the largest proportion of FDI in comparison to other sectors (Maher, 2015, p. 218). Thanks to oil, “[a]nnual inflows of FDI [...] have strongly increased from \$521 million in 2001 to \$1.2 billion in 2005, \$3.4 billion in 2008, and \$5.4 billion in 2012” (Maher, 2015, p. 223). Without being too simplistic, the horizon has changed dramatically ever since. For instance for 2012, the sector received 34% of the total FDI, reaching \$5.4 billion US dollars, followed by the mine and quarry sector with 15% of the share, meaning \$2.3 billion US dollars (Maher, 2015, p. 222).

5.5 An economic transformation

The productive apparatus of Colombia deeply transformed from 1990 to 2012. Twenty eight years ago, agriculture represented 16.7% of GDP, followed by manufacturing 20.6%, industry (mining, electricity, trade and transportation) represented 17.3% and services 45.4%. (Ferrari, 2014). In 2016, it transformed into 7%

⁴⁸ In the Mid-Magdalena Basin alone, Ecopetrol estimates Colombian oil reserves could increase in 2,000 and 7,000 million barrels. (Sánchez, 2016).

in agriculture, 33% in industry, 13% in manufacturing and 60% in services. To understand the trend, according to the World Development Indicators from the World Bank, in 2016 agriculture represented only 4% of the World Gross Product, industry 27%, manufactures 17%, and services 70%. (World Bank, 2017). Due to this reconfiguration, the exports also experienced some change. If in 2000 hydrocarbons and coal represented 43.8% of total exports, in 2012, they accounted for 70.7% (Ferrari, 2014). On the contrary, manufactured goods exports contracted from 32.5% to 17.5% and agriculture products from 36.1% to 9.2% in the same period (Ferrari, 2014), something which can be described partially as ‘Dutch disease’ following the parameters of **Table 2**.

This new setting allowed Colombia to exhibit “strong economic growth during the 2000s, when GDP per capita grew at an average rate of 2.5%, compared to 1% in the 1990’s” (Maher, 2015, p. 222). Then, between 2004-2009⁴⁹ growing “at an annual rate of 4.6 percent, compared with 3.6 percent for the whole [Latin American] region” (Andrade & Cadena, 2010, p. 2), and soon after the 2008-2009 global crisis, recovering steadily in 2010 and 2011, “exhibiting GDP per capita growth rates of 2.6% and 4.5%, respectively” (Maher, 2015, p. 222). Greatly thanks to the commodities share.

Additionally, one can see that being capital intensive, the extractive industries represented only 0.9% of the total employment for 2010, while the agriculture and manufacturing sectors employed 21.16% and 9.7% respectively (Andrade & Cadena, 2010, p. 3). In that sense, there is a misleading idea about the path of growth within resource rich countries which includes Colombia. Exporting oil, coal, precious metals or even manufacturing goods is not guarantee of prosperity, it is actually a deception often defended by Latin-American presidents (Oppenheimer, 2014, p. 51). Furthermore, the “recent economic growth is unlikely to be sustained due to the low prices of commodities, particularly oil and coal” (Silva, 2015).

⁴⁹ Even during the 2008-09 global recession, Colombia performed better than the rest of Latin America, never growing below 0%.

Apparently, this problem has already been detected and through two important reforms, the Government has tried to tackle the issue, says (Medellín, 2018). In one hand, through the royalties' reform of 2011 in which the revenues coming from the oil, would be distributed equally among all Departments whether they were oil producing regions or not (Medellín, 2018). In second place, the reform aiming to prevent over-spending, in which every year there is a limit for public spending, preventing the spending effect (Medellín, 2018).

For instance, by channelling royalties from the oil revenues to the Sistema General de Regalías (SGR), in which citizens are encouraged to participate in forgivable loans to pursue Master and Doctoral studies in Colombia and abroad in specific strategic areas of knowledge in order to strengthen the qualified human capital of the different regions. Some of these initiatives are currently managed by Colciencias⁵⁰, through Colfuturo.

Key indicators of oil and gas in Colombia 2004-2013

Indicator	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Reservers										
Oil: Proved Reserves (Thousand million barrels)	1.48	1.45	1.51	1.51	1.36	1.36	1.90	1.99	2.20	2.38
Oil: Incorporated Reserves(Thousand million barrels)	128	0.17	0.25	0.04	0.52	0.57	0.36	0.54	0.46	0.44
Gas: Proved Reserves (Thousand million barrels)	4.20	3.99	4.34	4.41	4.38	4.74	5.41	5.46	5.73	5.73
Production										
Oil: Production (Thousand barrels daily)	528	526	529	531	588	671	786	915	944	1,004
Natural Gas: Production (Billion cubic feet per day)	0.61	0.65	0.68	0.73	0.87	1.02	1.09	1.06	1.16	1.22
Consumption										
Oil: Consumption (Thousand barrels daily)	225	230	235	234	233	239	250	269	285	297
Natural Gas: Consumption (Billion cubic feet per day)	0.61	0.65	0.68	0.72	0.73	0.84	0.88	0.86	0.95	1.04

Table 3 | BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014; ANH Informe de Gestión 2013.
Source: (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2014)

5.6 Oil management

How to divide the revenues from the natural resource exploitation can be challenging (IMF, 2010); (Drysdale, 2007) and for (González Santana, 2017) oil can bring revenues, development, but countries should know when to break away from

⁵⁰ Overall information with the calls and projects financed can be found in Colciencias website. Please refer to Reference List for URL (Colciencias, 2018).

it. Ever since oil has been a part of Colombian economy, it has been “an important contribution to the income of the National Government” (Greiss, 1946, p. 252). Still, the priority of “investing in the domestic economy needs to be directed to high social return projects, but these may be difficult to identify and to implement” (Venables, 2016, pp. 161-162). Thanks to the commodities boom (see **Figure 5**), “oil production has increased from an average of 525,000 barrels of crude oil per day (bpd) in 2005 to 944,000 bpd in 2012” (Maher, 2015, p. 223) but slowly dropping to 886,198 bpd in 2016 (ANH, 2016).

According to (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2014) and (Medellín, 2018), there is no denial on the importance for revenue, taxation and royalties for the national budget. Indeed, the oil boom has boosted FDI, economic growth and government revenues. But it also hit Colombia nominally by the appreciation of the exchange rate, agrees (Medellín, 2018), which may have undermined the competitiveness of other sectors. Moreover, “as extractive activities are often capital intensive, the boom did not lead to the direct creation of many jobs” (Brandon, Cunha, Freije-Rodríguez, & Marchesini, 2015), except from those associated to oil producing regions, such as Barrancabermeja and Puerto Boyacá.

Conversely, between 2013 and 2015 only, Colombian government experienced a cut of 60 percent in oil revenues, due to the sharp drop in crude prices, which results in a reduction in the oil industry’s tax and royalty payments (Murphy, 2015). This is alarming if you consider oil accounts for about 20 percent of government revenue. Here, it is important to understand that “[e]ven though oil is only 5 percent of GDP the income from oil is very important to our fiscal accounts” Colombian Minister of Finance, Mauricio Cárdenas, adding “[f]or each dollar that the oil price falls, the government loses about \$120 million in revenue (Murphy, 2015).

Overall, this boom has had shortcomings when translated into a general well-being of the citizens. The reforms that were aimed to have a better management and distribution of the oil wealth “arrived late, almost at the end of the boom cycle and could have had a larger impact if implemented on time”, says (Medellín, 2018). However, the public spending in mega projects such as 4G highways are well thought, or even that for the first time in many years, the national budget for

education 15% surpassed the defense budget 13% (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2017); (Medellín, 2018). In today's world, the overall prosperity of the countries depend less and less on their natural resources and more often in their educational systems, their scientists and innovative sector (Oppenheimer, 2014, p. 11).




Figure 5 | Oil production and prices 1997-2017. Production in blue and prices in red.
Source: (Peak Oil Colombia, 2018)

Natural resource abundance should not be treated as an inevitable curse *per se*. Instead, the efforts should be directed at increasing the ability to manage those revenues or dividends effectively in order to achieve long-term growth (Brandon, Cunha, Freije-Rodríguez, & Marchesini, 2015), which benefits a larger share of the population. Colombia has reacted somehow late to this challenge, and the results are yet to be measured when an impact evaluation is made with the qualified human capital who has been financed through the SGR.

5.7 Violence and natural resources

According to (Collier, 1999), a civil war lasting 15 years reduces per capita GDP by 30%. But that's not the case of Colombia. Oil has served all actors in a different way. For the government it allowed an inflow of revenues to support social and education programs. The FARC-EP, has "used profits from drug trafficking, kidnapping,

extortion, and natural resource exploitation to finance their fight” (Carvajal, 2017). For the ELN it served as an excuse to justify their insurgency and as a means of finance through extortion and terrorism. The ELN has been traditionally linked with the attacks on oil pipelines and oil infrastructure. For instance, “[i]n 2001, there were 263 attacks on the oil pipelines in Colombia, thereof 170 were directed on the *Caño Limón Coveñas*, which is jointly owned by the Colombian Ecopetrol, and the Occidental Petroleum. During the first three years after the US involvement in the Plan Colombia initiative, the attacks have decreased impressively, mainly as regards the *Caño Limón Coveñas* pipeline” (Šrámková, 2012, p. 96). However, Ecopetrol estimates that for 2017 alone, 1.6 million barrels were lost due to persistent terrorist attacks on the oil infrastructure (Sáenz, 2018).

The lucrative link for the AUC is less obvious, as their main goal was initially to ‘clear’ the areas of insurgency presence. In that sense, they “displaced large populations from areas of strategic economic or military importance –including fertile land, areas with valuable natural resources such as gold and other minerals, oil, or precious woods; areas used by the guerrillas as transportation routes; and fields of illicit crops –in the departments of Antioquia, Córdoba, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Caldas, Chocó, and Bolívar, and the Urabá region. (Hristov J. , 2009, p. 18). Although in **section 4.6** Hanson (2008) recalled the illegal tapping of fuel pipelines to sell oil on the black market.

On the bright side, the relation of conflict and oil exploitation has produced in the population a strong opposition towards resource exploitation. In addition to high production costs and security challenges, oil exploitation is facing a growing opposition from the population through referendums⁵¹ that aim to ban crude exploration, drilling and production. Examples can be found in 44 towns including Sucre, Santander, Arbeláez, Cundinamarca, Pijao, Quindío, Cumaral, Meta⁵² or Cajamarca, Tolima⁵³ where South Africa’s AngloGold Ashanti had ‘La Colosa’ mining

⁵¹ Which the Constitutional Court in Colombia have granted legally-binding status, causing the oil and mining companies to withdraw from their projects in the areas where the ‘against’ vote wins.

⁵² In Cumaral, Meta for example 7,475 votes against exploitation and only 183 votes in favor Expelling, Mansarovar Energy, a joint venture between India’s ONGC-Videsh and China’s Sinopec.

⁵³ The 97.92% said no to mining projects in Cajamarca (Arenas Jaimes, 2017).

project (BBC Mundo, 2017). According to the CPA (Colombian Petroleum Association), 20 more are scheduled (Reuters, 2017).

6. THE DISTINCTIVE EFFECTS ON HUMAN CAPITAL

6.1 Intangible capital

In previous sections there has been an allusion to Colombia as a special case study. Indeed, “[e]ven during conflict, the country has grown more than the Latin American average, and has cut extreme poverty rates by half between 2002 and 2014 (Silva, 2015). More than 6 million people left poverty and, for the first time ever, more Colombians are considered to be middle class than in poverty” (World Bank, 2016). But there is more. Changing Wealth of Nations 2018 analyzes data from 1995 to 2014 and in the Latin American region, Colombia is ranked as the third wealthiest nation. However, this changes when measured in terms of per capita. This analysis is more comprehensive than the traditional GDP, as it encompasses the wealth produced by natural resources, by human capital and by foreign assets as well.

For many decades now, “[t]he preponderant form of wealth worldwide is intangible capital –an amalgam including human capital and the quality of formal and informal institutions” (Hamilton & Ruta, 2006, p. 25). In that sense, “[a]chieving sustained growth entails managing a complex portfolio of assets, in which the elements are not just buildings and machines, but natural and human resources as well [...] resource policy, fiscal policy, political factors, institutions, and governance structure all have a role to play in transforming them into sustained growth” (Hamilton & Ruta, 2006, p. 25). On this chapter we will see the measurable effects of the armed conflict and the extractive economy in the different spheres of human capital.

6.2 Effects of the conflict

Collier states that “the most obvious way in which civil war damages the economy is through the destruction of some resources.” (Collier, 1999, p. 169) People who are killed, could constitute labor force; bridges or pipelines blown up are physical goods who harm the infrastructure. Likewise, “[a] second effect is the disruption caused by warfare and the often concomitant social disorder. For example, some roads become unsafe and so extra costs are incurred in achieving the same outcome” (Collier, 1999, p. 169). In Colombia’s conflict, battle deaths hit a peak of 3,131 in 2007 (Lacina &

Gleditsch, 2005); in the same year, 305,966 people were forcibly displaced (Maher, 2015, p. 221). Colombia has the “dubious distinction of hosting the most IDPs in the world, with 7.3 million individuals registered as of 2016” (Carvajal, 2017) –nearly 15 percent of the total population. When looking at the data registered at the RUV, the total number of victims of the conflict only between 1996 and 2016 sum up to 8,282,902 (RUV, 2018). This alarming figure includes crimes such as homicide, forced disappearances, kidnapping, victims of terrorist attacks and forced displacement among many others. **Table 4** shows specific categories portraying the magnitude, and intensity of the registered cases for the 1996-2016 period alone. These categories are considered by the author as the ones which directly affect the human capital by reducing it, or affecting its potential due to physical affliction.

Victims registered in RUV 1996-2016 - Selected categories

Year	Homicides	FDPs	Kidnappings	Death Threats	Total Victims
1996	37,862	5,742	973	5,646	181,995
1997	45,274	6,208	1,451	8,164	300,637
1998	39,757	6,890	2,181	9,235	290,937
1999	43,624	8,499	2,428	10,454	332,932
2000	6,085	11,726	3,313	17,780	681,095
2001	69,058	12,259	3,642	15,080	746,303
2002	78,077	15,572	4,143	20,184	862,691
2003	61,285	12,422	2,822	14,400	537,525
2004	48,889	9,612	2,025	12,319	482,314
2005	38,324	6,962	1,316	10,808	530,049
2006	32,474	4,551	944	8,631	502,151
2007	29,782	5,025	799	7,289	521,021
2008	22,721	3,245	689	7,185	459,993
2009	16,429	2,394	515	6,995	276,161
2010	12,598	1,400	494	8,814	218,161
2011	12,546	1,275	617	14,200	258,926
2012	12,007	1,274	939	42,007	265,462
2013	6,366	499	455	40,535	276,204
2014	3,072	231	258	41,783	259,770
2015	149	122	146	30,711	192,665
2016	955	70	91	20,255	105,910
	617,334	115,978	30,241	352,475	8,282,902

Table 4 | Victims registered in RUV 1996-2016. Elaborated by the author.
Source: (RUV, 2018)

One of the causes of this escalation is the ‘hypersecurity state’ needed for the DSP (see **section 4.3.2**). It involved a full offensive that began in 2004 through the Patriot and Shield operations. This task demanded also the involvement of one million of ‘informants’ and several thousand “soldats-paysans” or peasant-soldiers (Lemoine, 2006), causing the increase of the involvement of human capital in the conflict directly. Today, Colombia “is more militarized than at any time since” (Richani, 2013, p. 203), becoming the largest employer in the country and equaling a military that of Brazil growing to 447,408 military units by the end of 2011 (Richani, 2013, p. 206). But what happened with the human capital capable of ‘breaking away’ from violence?

6.3 Migration and brain drain

As discussed in **section 3.1**, Colombia is not prone to migration. Therefore, it “experienced little immigration during the 19th and 20th centuries as a result of conditions including political violence, recurring economic crises, excess labor, and poor infrastructure” (Carvajal, 2017). However, the OIM estimated that for the 1996-2001 approximately 1.2 million Colombians migrated to neighboring countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador, although many have migrated to Europe and North America. Noteworthy, “most Colombians who migrate to Europe and North America are urban, middle-class people who fear -or [had] already been subjected to- kidnapping or extortion, primarily by the guerrillas” (Ruiz, 2002). Yes, in 2001-2002 there were more than 10 kidnappings per day but remarkably, they dropped down 92% by the end of 2016 with 91 cases (RUV, 2018).

This emigration of middle-class Colombians, involve a more dramatic effect, the brain drain. Almost 30% of immigrants living in OECD countries in 2011 are “college-educated professionals. Spain, the United States, France, Germany, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina have been the leading destinations for highly qualified Colombians. Those with postgraduate or doctoral degrees in engineering and science are particularly likely to emigrate” (Carvajal, 2017). Aware of this issue,

Colciencias designed the scheme ‘*Es Tiempo de Volver*⁵⁴’ in 2015. The aim of this policy was to summon 140 Colombian scientists in diaspora to return home (Colciencias, 2015). Unfortunately, “the lack of a comprehensive plan guaranteeing employment, competitive salaries, and further investment in science and research discourages the return of many” (Carvajal, 2017).

A different situation is when related to internal movements, which to the eyes of Senator José Obdulio Gaviria (2014-2018), should be considered as ‘internal migrants due to guerilla and paramilitaries’, but never as forcibly displaced (El Tiempo, 2008). However, for this paper they will be considered as IDPs, whether directly or indirectly forced to move. In that sense, **Figure 6** shows the behavior of persons expelled, received and declared as IDPs. The total varies according to the measure, but for analyzed period, there were 7,702,554 officially declared IDPs.




Figure 6 | IDPs in Colombia 1996-2017. Elaborated by author. Source: RUV (2018)

6.4 The effects of an extractive economy

Slow or negative economic growth associated to the exploitation of a valuable extractive resource is a phenomenon called ‘resource curse’. Interestingly enough,

⁵⁴ In English: ‘It’s time to come back (home)’.

Colombia has not registered negative growth rates since the boom started. Colombia's macroeconomic policy has been considered the 'crown jewel' in words of (Medellín, 2018), whereas the other effects such as the movement effect, the spending effect (Sáenz, 2017) and the spill-over effect, have been experienced in some levels in Colombia. And here is the link, for Oppenheimer (2014), "the lack of good education in mathematics, science and technology, have contributed to the technological lagging of Latin America, to the excessive dependence on the primary resources exports and in the second half of the XXI Century, economic stagnation" (Oppenheimer, 2014, p. 57).

Important also to consider, the fact that 'rentier' economies are characterized by an extreme concentration of land and wealth in the hands of the upper centile of the population (Richani, 2015), which creates high and concentrated rents (as well). Now, "[i]f rents are not well redistributed and invested by the government, these activities can worsen the already unequal distribution of wealth" (Brandon, Cunha, Freije-Rodríguez, & Marchesini, 2015, p. 49).

Extractive industries need very little innovation capacities as the job is mainly done by technicians and operators usually raised from empirical experience rather than actual university studies. Yes, there are engineers required to design and to make the seismic studies, the calculations for new oil wells, however the contribution of technicians is larger as my observation showed in the Mid-Magdalena basin. For instance, for a 'workover rig' you need one or two petroleum engineers, and 24-man crews of operators and hands usually running three 8-hour shifts during the day, or a 'rod rig' which requires only an operator, derrick hand and two floor hands. Plus, as the locals would say: "in the oil sector, everybody knows everyone".

6.5 From 'manual' work to 'mental' work

For Larsen (2006) Norway succeeded in oil management as they effectively minimized rent-seeking activities, limited the factor movement effect, curbed the spending effect, and dealt with the spillover-loss effect (Larsen, 2006, pp. 608-609). In our modern economy, scientific and technological change plays a key role in

determining the productivity that leads economic growth (Acosta & Celis, 2014). According to (Oppenheimer, 2010), only 2% of the world's investment in research and development takes place in Latin America and the Caribbean. Conversely, Asia holds 28%, Europe 30% and the United States 39%.

Even smaller countries such as South Korea or Israel register more patents than all the Latin American countries put together. Fifty years ago, South Korea had a GDP per capita below almost all Latin American countries, yet today it produces 12,400 patents per year, while Latin America barely climbs to 1,200 (Brazil 660, Mexico 230, Chile 140, Colombia 80 and Argentina 26) according to the World Intellectual Property Organization-WIPO (Oppenheimer, 2014, p. 52). This problem is also linked with the fact that in Colombia, there are barely 5 new PhD graduates per million inhabitants every year; compared to 63 in Brazil or 259 in the UK (Acosta & Celis, 2014). To get a picture, in 2003 the number of researchers in Colombia was 109, while in Chile was 444, Brazil 323 and in South Korea 3,187 (Vesga, 2008).

However, thanks to the oil revenues, the Colombian Government launched the '*Generación del Bicentenario*' programme, where researcher scholarships increased six-fold, from 395 funded researchers in 2006 to 2,429 in 2010. The recognized research groups also increased 60 % from 2,356 to 4,076 (Colciencias, 2010). For year 2015, the total investment in all activities related to science technology and innovation measured as a percentage of GDP was calculated in 0,627%. The goal is to increase it to 1.0% between 2015 and 2018. However, the investment for I+D alone was 0.239% (Colciencias, 2016, p. 13).

If Colombia is to succeed in entering the knowledge-based economy, it is due to increase its number of PhD holders (Acosta & Celis, 2014). A country can make a 180 degrees turn in 30 or 40 years. Just take a look at Estonia or Korea. For instance, in the 1960's, Norway lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbors in the aggregate value of economic production per capita, however, by the 1990's, Norway had caught up with and forged ahead of Denmark and Sweden (Larsen, 2006, p. 605) by properly managing its oil revenues.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The first section of the paper (**chapter 3**), served as an introduction to have a reference of what the peoples inhabiting Colombia may refer to. It was paramount to see how the influence of geographical and culture factors cannot be considered enough to explain the underdevelopment of some countries, but yet, can indirectly be connected to some extent in an effort to explain the behavior of some segments of the Colombian population.

As a consequence, Colombia has been proud to label itself as one of the longest democracies in the Western Hemisphere with solid macro-economic policies avoiding the negative implications of the different world crises. The progress made in terms of security and poverty reduction the last 20 years has been remarkable and now the country is on the verge of becoming member of the OECD. Nonetheless, the protracted armed conflict has affected dramatically the human capital potential. In 2000 alone, “more than 4,000 Colombians were victims of political homicide, 300 “disappeared”, 300,000 were displaced by violence, 1,500 were kidnapped by guerrillas and paramilitaries, and torture was a commonplace” (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014, p. 6).

Reason why in **chapter 4**, the identification of the main violent actors using the ‘old’ new war system concepts, brought a plethora of dynamics in terms of goals, methods, forms of finance and patterns of violence creating a hypersecurity state coercive apparatus fuelled by mutual (criminal and profit) enterprises. The analysis showed how the degradation of the conflict made it difficult to make a clear division between the legitimate and illegal violent actors.

Alas, the intervention of the US through ‘Plan Colombia’ and Álvaro Uribe-Vélez presidencies brought not only a stark hand but more human capital to the conflict. His DSP saw the FF.MM increasing the number of professional soldiers to 70,000, adding a new category of 20,000 peasant soldiers (Paul, Clarke, & Serena, 2014). Overall, Colombia’s military increased almost 50%, from 158,000 soldiers and 104,000 police personnel in 2002 to 267,000 and 137,000 in 2009 respectively (Rabasa, et al., 2011) creating an hyper-security state or a state-coercive apparatus in

words of (Hristov J. , 2009) which gained the upper hand against the insurgency once and for all.

The following **chapter 5**, showed that even when Colombia does not qualify as a resource rich country, the revenues coming from oil constitute an important share of the national budget. The oil sector brought inflows of FDI, which helped the country to keep growing above the Latin American average. Thanks to sound macroeconomic policies Colombia has been able not only to prevent the external shocks, but also pass reforms to redistribute oil revenues and to halt the excessive public spending, mitigating deeper Dutch disease symptoms. There is no denial though, that the economic transformation of the economy and the commodities boom altered the economic apparatus, reducing the agriculture and manufacturing sectors while favoring the industry sector (not to mention the services sector). Likewise, the country felt the appreciation nominal shock after the boom.

The effects of these two factors on the human capital were analyzed in **chapter 6**, where dramatic numbers showed how devastating the conflict was in the 1996-2016 period alone. Data from the RUV keeping registry of homicides, forced disappearances, threats, IDP's, among others, showed that at least 8,282,902 people were victims of violence, causing a direct diminish in the potential of the human capital in Colombia. Additionally, highly educated middle-class Colombians fled the country causing the Government to launch a programme to call on the 'scientific' diaspora. On the other hand, the extractive economy boosted by the boom, aimed to strengthen the qualified human capital in the regions via the SGR, in addition to the modernization of the roads into 4G highways.

Now, even when the a priori hypothesis suggested that the link between the dynamics of new wars and the extractive economy had configured a systematic trap afflicting the human capital in different levels but mainly reducing the capacities on innovation, the results can partially confirm this idea. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that Colombian authorities have managed to avoid the resource curse in many ways and contain the effects of the Dutch disease through important reforms and strong macroeconomic policies. By creating the SGR, oil revenues aimed to strengthen the qualified human capital, whose impact should be

monitored properly in a separate study. From the conflict perspective, the fact that the FARC-EP ceased to exist formally, is reflected on the reduction of victims of violence in the last years of the 1996-2016 period (see **Table 4**). Nonetheless, the violent actors have demonstrated an ability to transform and adapt according to different externalities, which may be the case in a post-FARC scenario.

7.1 Prospects on conflict transformation

The FF.MM and the guerrilla insurgency enjoyed of a more or less uneasy coexistence also referred as a 'comfortable impasse'. However, the increase of territorial control of the FARC, jeopardized the stability of Colombia, altering the statu quo. The irruption of the paramilitaries and the aid of Plan Colombia resulted in a game changer for the dynamics of the war with consequences still visible today.

According to Molano-Rojas (2014), there is a relatively wider range of studies and experiences in transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes (e.g. Czech Republic). Yet, the availability of studies and experience in transitions from internal conflicts within a more or less democratic regime, as it happens to be the case of Colombia (Molano-Rojas, 2014, pp. 6-7).

Having signed the peace deal with the FARC-EP is a first step but it is far from achieving peace. In 2009 Molano-Rojas said: "you cannot compare the ending of a conflict with the achievement of peace nor the reestablishment of the optimal security conditions" (Molano-Rojas, 2009, p. 11). Medellín (2018) agrees by pointing out "Colombia is still far from a post-conflict scenario, due to the fact that [the ELN], the second largest guerilla in Colombia is still active". Nevertheless, "we are moving towards that end", he adds (Medellín, 2018). Even when the violence reduction statistical numbers are promising, the bases of peace rely heavily on the success of the Government and the state to offer different ways to demobilized insurgents and paramilitaries.

At the same time, the transformation of the AUC has proven to be very difficult to track down and combat. These criminal forces, have transformed in different armed groups which profit from the drug-trafficking, preserving the paramilitary mentality. From my point of view, as long as the Colombian society

keeps to legitimize the existence of paramilitary forces, the hope for reconciliation will be distant from achieving. One of the most challenging threats to be tackled is the different perception towards the left insurgency *vis-à-vis* the right-wing paramilitarism. There is still influent people in Colombia that admire Carlos Castaño, belated commander of the extinct (sic) AUC (Londoño Hoyos, 2006); (Sepúlveda, 2018), (Velásquez Vásquez, 2018).

One could agree with Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) when the embroiled array of factors affecting Colombian development “is itself a consequence of dynamics mirroring the vicious circle: political institutions in Colombia do not generate incentives for politicians to provide public services and law and order in much of the country and do not put enough constraints on them to prevent them from entering into implicit or explicit deals with paramilitaries and thugs” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 424). In this case, the Colombian State needs to keep trying to regulate the violence market. The containment of violence and reestablish coexistence is paramount to begin the process of peace-building (Molano-Rojas, 2014, p. 6).

7.2 Prospects on natural resource exploitation

The Colombian authorities conducted two important reforms to tackle the overflow of cash due to high prices of commodities: the fiscal rule and the royalties’ reform of 2011. Notwithstanding, these reforms arrived late, from the point of view of (Medellín, 2018), who considers these reforms would have helped a wider portion of the population, if implemented 2 or 3 years earlier.

The inevitable decline in the oil reserves and production poses a threat in terms of revenue, that’s why so important to promote a diversification of the economy relying on alternatives, such as developing qualified human capital. In terms of (Cante, 2018), without hydrocarbons extraction, there is room for alternative economies which will mean also future for life and other activities which guarantee the preservation of forests and precious water resources.

The examples mentioned in **section 5.7**, demonstrate how Colombian towns are voting firmly against oil exploitation and mining projects. Considering the peak oil was reached already some years ago and the oil reserves are decreasing steadily,

Colombia has a unique opportunity to shift to alternative sources of energy using its geographical advantages and qualified human capital. Colombia is a powerhouse in terms of water and clean energies which should be encouraged using incentives to promote human ideas and own development, without following blueprints.

There should exist no logical explanation to the situation in La Guajira, where the largest coal open mine runs in 'El Cerrejón' at the same time that malnutrition is common and there is shortage of electricity in a semi-arid region receiving constant sunlight almost all year long. "The solution to the economic and political failure of nations today is to transform their extractive institutions towards inclusive ones. The vicious circle means that this is no easy. But it is not impossible, and the iron law of oligarchy is not inevitable (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 444).

7.3 Prospects for human capital

There have been important efforts to push the science and innovation sectors, but this has not been enough. In words of Oppenheimer, the state must consider the importance of education as paramount to the consolidation of democracy in Colombia. Indeed, the budget for education is now larger than the budget for defense and there is a close-up monitoring of these funds in different regions. However, Medellín (2018) agrees the ideas sector has a less promising future. Colciencias has had eight different directors in the last four years, reducing its capacity to consolidate long-term policies.

Side note: the bilingual factor

One interesting factor to consider for the prospects of human capital, is the bilingual deficiency. Colombia has a worrying performance in English language proficiency. In 2014, the young population reaching B1 level was only 1% (Semana, 2017). For 2016 the percentage grew to 5.6%, which still is considerate very low when compared to Latin America and the world. According to the World Economic Forum, "speaking more than one language can boost economic growth" (Hardach, 2018).

Withal, Colombia has joined the acronym world by been considered as a TACTICS⁵⁵ country, which means nothing else but a country which could become ‘new education superstar’, due to the following factors: “ GDP is below US\$15,000 a head, yet at least half the youth population is enrolled in higher education. Participation grew by 5% or more between 2010 and 2014; their research output is growing from a base of at least 30,000 papers a year; and they have at least one university in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings.” (Parr, 2016). In sum, if Colombia is able to keep growing with the absence of oil and coal, this could mean a prosperity transition avoiding the highly concentrated rents of extractive economies. Focusing efforts in diversifying the productive apparatus as done with the oil revenues, should strengthen the qualifications of the human capital. Perhaps joining the OECD could bring an external pressure to Colombia to pursue better public policies. After all, Colombia has always looked up to the North.

⁵⁵ Acronym gathering Thailand, Argentina, Chile, Turkey, Iran, Colombia and Serbia.

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
ANNEX A

Administrative map of Colombia
 Source: International Crisis Group (2017)



ANNEX B

Brigades prosecuted for allegedly committed '*falsos positivos*' Source: Human Rights Watch (2015)



NOTA: El total de presuntas ejecuciones indicado para cada brigada corresponde al período 2002-2008 y está basado en la cantidad de casos que están siendo investigados actualmente por la Unidad de Derechos Humanos de la Fiscalía General de la Nación. Representan apenas una fracción de la cantidad real de presuntas ejecuciones extrajudiciales perpetradas por soldados del Ejército. Los fiscales de la Unidad de Derechos Humanos están investigando casos atribuidos a otras 30 brigadas durante ese período, y muchos casos de ejecuciones están a cargo de fiscales locales o de jueces militares, sin intervención de la unidad. Los cuadrados en el mapa indican el lugar donde tienen su sede las brigadas, y el tamaño de los círculos rojos corresponde al número de ejecuciones, y no al área total en la cual tienen jurisdicción las brigadas ni los sitios donde ocurrieron las ejecuciones. Los nombres debajo de cada brigada hacen alusión a la ubicación (ciudad/pueblo y departamento) de la sede de las brigadas.

ANNEX C

Welcome sign in Puerto Boyacá circa September 2011
Photo Credit: Fabio Iguavita Duarte



In Spanish: “Bienvenido a Puerto Boyacá. Tierra de Paz y Progreso. Capital Antisubversiva de Colombia”

In English: “Welcome to Puerto Boyacá. Land of Peace and Progress. Anti-insurgency Capital of Colombia”

ANNEX D

Top 50 countries – Crude Oil Proven Reserves (in BBL)

Source: World Factbook (CIA, 2017)

1	Venezuela	300,900,000,000
2	Saudi Arabia	266,500,000,000
3	Canada	169,700,000,000
4	Iran	158,400,000,000
5	Iraq	142,500,000,000
6	Kuwait	101,500,000,000
7	United Arab Emirates	97,800,000,000
8	Russia	80,000,000,000
9	Libya	48,360,000,000
10	Nigeria	37,060,000,000
11	United States	36,520,000,000
12	Kazakhstan	30,000,000,000
13	China	25,620,000,000
14	Qatar	25,240,000,000
15	Brazil	13,000,000,000
16	Algeria	12,200,000,000
17	Angola	8,273,000,000
18	Ecuador	8,273,000,000
19	Mexico	7,640,000,000
20	Azerbaijan	7,000,000,000
21	Norway	6,611,000,000
22	European Union	5,600,000,000
23	Oman	5,373,000,000
24	Sudan	5,000,000,000
25	India	4,621,000,000
26	Vietnam	4,400,000,000
27	Egypt	4,400,000,000
28	South Sudan	3,750,000,000
29	Malaysia	3,600,000,000
30	Indonesia	3,230,000,000
31	Yemen	3,000,000,000
32	United Kingdom	2,564,000,000
33	Syria	2,500,000,000
34	Uganda	2,500,000,000
35	Guyana	2,500,000,000
36	Argentina	2,185,000,000
37	Colombia	2,002,000,000
38	Gabon	2,000,000,000
39	Australia	1,821,000,000
40	Congo, Republic of the	1,600,000,000
41	Chad	1,500,000,000
42	Equatorial Guinea	1,100,000,000
43	Brunei	1,100,000,000
44	Ghana	660,000,000
45	Romania	600,000,000
46	Turkmenistan	600,000,000
47	Uzbekistan	594,000,000
48	Italy	556,700,000
49	Denmark	490,600,000
50	Peru	473,000,000

ANNEX E

Top 20 oil fields in Colombia

Source: (El Tiempo, 2017)

No.	Oil Field	Location (Town, Department)	Daily production in barrels 2016
1	Campo Rubiales	Puerto Gaitán, Meta	132,000
2	Campo Castilla	Castilla Nueva, Meta	121,363
3	Campo Chichimene	Castilla Nueva, Meta	74,052
4	Campo Quifa	Puerto Gaitán, Meta	46,557
5	La Cira-Infantas*	Barrancabermeja, Santander	32,902
6	Pauto Sur	Yopal, Casanare	26,553
7	Caño Limón	Arauquita, Arauca	20,930
8	Yariguí-Cantagallo*	Cantagallo, Bolívar y Puerto Wilches, Santander	16,644
9	Moriche*	Puerto Boyacá, Boyacá	14,781
10	Costayaco	Villagarzón, Putumayo	12,840
11	Avispa	Cabuyaro, Meta	11,625
12	Ocelote	Puerto Gaitán, Meta	11,228
13	Casabe*	Yondó, Antioquia	10,765
14	Chipirón	Offshore, Arauca	10,359
15	Tuá	Tauramena, Casanare	9,709
16	Guando	Melgar, Tolima	7,787
17	Jacana	Villanueva, Casanare	7,477
18	Moqueta	Mocoa, Putumayo	6,730
19	Floreña	Yopal, Casanare	6,434
20	Cupiagua	Aguazul, Casanare	5,358
Total production			586,094

*Oil fields known by the author.

ANNEX D

Guidebook Interview No. 1 OECD National Contact Point - 9 duben 2018

Interviewer: Fabio Iguavita Duarte
Interviewee: Ms. Catalina Barreiro Jaramillo
Language: English
Transcriber: Fabio Iguavita Duarte
Software: Mp3 Skype recorder
Date: April 9th, 2018
Location: Bogotá (Colombia) and Olomouc (Czechia)
Duration: 0:28:48
File Name: 2018 04 09 21-01-43 iguavf Outgoing to catalinabarreiroj.mp3

DISCLAIMER

Before we begin, I must inform you this interview is being recorded. The following questions are meant to have some insight on your perceptions regarding Colombia's accession process to the OECD. Your answers will be registered for academic purposes only, under the Master Studies thesis: "Development in Colombia: the dynamics of new wars, natural resource exploitation and their effects on human capital".

Please note that your statements might be used in direct quotations with the proper referencing. Unfortunately, for the validity of this research paper, we cannot preserve the anonymity. However, rest assured your answers will be not shared with any other intention than to pursue an academic discussion within the stated framework. If you agree with these conditions, please say yes in order to begin.

The interviewee agrees with the stated conditions:

QUESTIONS

1. Please briefly introduce yourself, tell us about your background.
 2. Which area are you in charge of specifically?
 3. Talking about the committees you are in charge of within the Ministry, since when do you work in this area?
 4. Given your background, qualifications, and area of expertise, what do you feel it represents for Colombia being part of the OECD?
-

-
- 5.** What is Colombia supposed to do is to fulfill legally all these parameters or to fulfill all these committees? Or what is it specifically the process of accession is about?
-
- 6.** Colombia faces structural problems such as: 1) a traditional dependence on one export commodity, 2) low global-competitiveness levels which relates not only to 3) a recurring high-perception in corruption and 4) an inadequate infrastructure, with poor rankings among the countries studied, but also 5) an almost non-existent investment in what it's understood as science, research and technology. In that sense, from your perspective and opinion, why do you think Colombia is still eligible to apply and to enter to the OECD?
-
- 7.** What is Colombia doing so well to be considered or to consider entering the OECD, what is your perception on this?
-
- 8.** For scholar Julián López de Mesa in Universidad del Rosario. the OECD accession process is far from a promising sign as it reinforces the languid character (and I'm paraphrasing right now), he says that reinforces the languid character of Colombian culture, which always trying to mimic foreign models and following blueprints, which ignore an overdue assessment of Colombia's own problems. He actually wrote in El Espectador:
- “Following our un-reflexive imitative tradition, our characteristic short-term mindset, our easiness, our solid and ineradicable idea according to which we should search for solutions in others and not in ourselves, ignoring the causes or consequences, and waiting for others to resolve our own problems; our ruling leaders –the last generation which still today preserves the XIX epoch mentality, of low spirit and blinded by foreign trinkets– one more time we have been seduced by the glare of the mirror merchant.”
- What is your opinion on this statement?
-
- 9.** Finally, with a global market share of 70%, OECD members become benchmark countries that set quality standards in different areas of trade and investment. Given the obstacles Colombia faces, but also our improvements, from your point of view and opinion, what do you think Colombia has to offer to the OECD as a best practice?
-
- 10.** Thank you very much it was very valuable for me as an outsider having your perceptions on this topic. If it is of your interest I can share with you the final document when it is finished.
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ANNEX F

Guidebook Interview No. 2
Researcher from Fedesarrollo - 10 duben 2018

Interviewer: Fabio Iguavita Duarte
Interviewee: Mgr. Juan Camilo Medellín
Language: English and Spanish
Transcriber: Fabio Iguavita Duarte
Software: Mp3 Skype recorder
Date: April 9th, 2018
Location: Bogotá (Colombia) and Olomouc (Czechia)
Duration: 0:21:32.677
File Name: 2018_04_10 23-28-43 iguavf Incoming from live-medallo_13_1

DISCLAIMER

Before we begin, I must inform you this interview is being recorded. The following questions are meant to have some insight on your perceptions regarding Colombia's current politico-macroeconomic situation. Your answers will be registered for academic purposes only, under the Master Studies thesis: "Development in Colombia: the dynamics of new wars, natural resource exploitation and their effects on human capital".

Please note that your statements might be used in direct quotations with the proper referencing. Unfortunately, for the validity of this research paper, we cannot preserve the anonymity. However, rest assured your answers will be not shared with any other intention than to pursue an academic discussion within the stated framework. If you agree with these conditions, please say yes in order to begin.

The interviewee agrees with the stated conditions:

QUESTIONS

1. Please briefly introduce yourself and tell us about your background.
2. Since when do you work with Fedesarrollo and, which topic(s) are you focused on?
3. Given your qualifications and area of expertise, what do you feel it represents for Colombia to enter in a post-conflict scenario?
4. What do you think are the (+/-) prospects for the country?

-
- 5.** Colombia faces structural problems such as: 1) a flamboyant income inequality, 2) unequal access to land 3) a traditional dependence on one export-commodity, 4) low global-competitiveness levels, which relates not only to 5) a recurring high-perception in corruption, and 6) an inadequate infrastructure, but also 7) an almost non-existent investment of barely 0.27% of GDP in research and technology, just to name a few.

In that sense, what do you think is Colombia doing well to tackle these obstacles?

-
- 6.** If the public spending problem is detected already, what is Colombia doing to solve this issue?

-
- 7.** Regarding the natural resource exploitation, one author named Venables says: “[A]n economy with substantial exports of natural resources can become overly dependent on a single volatile source of income, and this volatility can destabilize the macro-economy”. Today, almost 100 years after the first exploiting concessions were awarded to the foreign Tropical Oil, Shell Oil and Texas Petroleum Companies, oil represents not only the main export of Colombia with almost 32.5% of total exports, but an important source of revenue for the Government planning.

Considering Colombia is not an ‘oil-rich-country’ but a ‘country with oil’, or even an ‘oil-dependent’ country, how do you think Colombia should address this issue?

-
- 8.** Do you think the fiscal and public debt reforms could have caused a larger impact to the oil revenues management?

-
- 9.** I believe we agree that, in today’s world, the overall prosperity of the countries depend less and less on their natural resources and more often in their educational systems, their scientists and the innovative sector. According to Oppenheimer, only 2% of the world’s investment in research and development takes place in Latin America, and we are including Brazil, Chile and Argentina, so the Colombian. Conversely, Asia holds 28%, Europe 30% and the United States 39%.

What is your personal opinion on these facts and how feasible do you see for Colombia to effectively engage in the innovative sector?

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- 10.** Thank you very much for your participation. If it is of your interest I can share with you the final document when it is completed.
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