

**Report on “Justification of Political Authority and the Political Position of the Non-Philosophic Citizen in Plato’s *Republic*”**

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I am fully satisfied that the above thesis meets the criteria for the award of the doctoral degree (subject to some minor corrections; see below). It reflects substantial engagement with Plato’s *Republic* and the wider field within which it is situated, as is fitting to three years of study. An impressive range of ideas are brought into fruitful dialogue with one another, interweaving discussion of ethics, politics, epistemology and metaphysics. The argument is novel in places and makes a genuine contribution to the study of the *Republic*. There are parts that will doubtless be controversial to some scholars and areas that could be clearer; but nonetheless this bold thesis opens new avenues of inquiry, which any reader of Plato’s *Republic* will want to address. Some chapters have already been accepted for publication, thus showing the value of this thesis.

The thesis takes issue with a standard view of the worth of non-philosophical citizens in the *Republic*. According to this view, non-philosophic citizens (producers) are excluded from politics because they are “morally incompetent, intellectually handicapped, and politically inept” (p4). Since they lack (metaphysical) knowledge of the good, they are reduced to a position of servitude and the relationship between ruler and ruled is that of master to slave (p10). The thesis argues that the central claim from which this position takes hold is the “metaphysical view” according to which the justification for philosophical rulership is metaphysical *ἐπιστήμη*; since other people lack this, they are excluded from politics. The thesis takes issue with this position and offers an alternative justification for political authority, in the form of the “naturalistic interpretation” (inspired by Book 2, which it integrates fully). According to this view, “the realisability of the eudaemonistic goals of both the individual and the Kallipolis supervene upon the cooperative interactions between the rulers and the ruled, qua significant partners, relative to their natural aptitudes and epistemic competencies” (p4). Emphasizing the natural aptitudes of each class involves showing a variety of ways in which non-philosophic citizens are epistemically competent; as a result of each citizen seeing the worth and value of one another, there can be friendship, partnership and harmony in the city, thus fulfilling the ideal set down at the end of Book 4.

In defence of the naturalistic justification, four logically connected theses are defended: (1) all citizens are to focus on professions in which they can function optimally. Therefore, if ruling is the prerogative of philosopher-rulers it is *because* they can function optimally in governance. (2) Other citizens are excluded from politics *because* their natural aptitudes and training enable them to attain efficiency in their respective professions. (3) One's ability to function optimally in a given profession depends on one's natural aptitude and cognitive competence. Defending (3) requires an account of the cognitive competence of the non-philosophic citizens, which is one of the most novel (and controversial) parts of the thesis. It is then argued - (4), that the realisability of the eudaemonistic goals of *both* the individual and the polis supervene upon the cooperative interactions between the rulers and the ruled, relative to their natural aptitudes and epistemic competencies. The upshot is that the politics of the *Republic* is less objectionable than has previously been supposed by scholars working in the liberal tradition; 'Plato's social justice defends the worthiness of every person in Kallipolis' (p11); they are not, as Popper argued merely 'cogs' in the machinery of the state.

The argument is set out clearly and is well-structured, with frequent signposting in the form of section headings to guide the reader. Methodological and interpretative issues are laid out clearly in the introduction, and the author's own methodology is made explicit (pp16-18). For example, the thesis explores the deep continuities between ethics originating from Plato's psychology, and which reflect Socratic ethics, and a theory of ethics developed in Platonic metaphysics, which is evident in the *Republic*.

The argument turns first to the central role of Book 2, which is often neglected in studies on Plato's politics. The thesis could have supported the novelty of its position here by including those scholars (e.g. Annas (1981) and Barney (2000)) who marginalize the 'city of pigs', though a more recent paper has argued for its importance (Sara Diaco, 2021, "Socrates' First City: Pleonexia and the Thought Experiment", *Apeiron* 54 (4) 473-491). Two key principles are identified and shown to be operative in the Kallipolis. These are (a) mutual needs, namely the fact that individuals are not self-sufficient and need to live together (*Rep.*, 369b-d); and (b) a difference of aptitude, namely, that different people are good at different things, and it is best for all that each focus on developing what they are good at doing (*Rep.*, 370a-b). These two principles hold that each individual in Kallipolis is endowed with some natural aptitudes and qualities. This grounds an important claim that the happiness of *each individual*, as well as the flourishing of society at large, relies on the development of these natural aptitudes.

Though scholars are inclined to emphasize the inferiority of non-philosophers, the thesis argues that this requires careful handling, given the importance of these two principles. They may be cognitively *inferior* (comparatively speaking), but they are not cognitively *inept*. Each class in the city has a distinctive mode of excellence, and following the works of scholars such as Santas, Hall, and Piechowiak, it is argued that there is a mode of attaining ethical excellence, which involves practical ethical reasoning, and which does *not* require the possession of metaphysical knowledge of the Good. So much is not controversial. It is conceded that non-philosophers have a weakness, in respect of their pleasures and desires, for example (p23); certain characters have a mistaken view of happiness. Crucially, though, this conception of happiness is based on reasoning in each case, though it is mainly ‘utilitarian’ in the lower two cases. The central point is that it is not mentioned anywhere that those who pursue these two desires, and care less about philosophy, lack the capacity to reason or live virtuously (p26). After all, everyone has a tripartite soul (p31), and can exercise some degree of rationality (p28). A key difference between philosophers and non-philosophers concerns the ethical priority of reason in a person’s life, and this point is not designed primarily to exclude other persons from rationality *tout court*. Further, the argument here is not metaphysically grounded, but based on competing conceptions of pleasures and desires. Vlastos, Popper, Taylor and Klosko, it is argued, exaggerate the moral neediness of non-philosophical citizens (p37-9) and place too much emphasis on metaphysical *episteme*; but the point here is simply that individuals cannot lead the life they want, and to which they are best suited, if they fail to use reason.

Though all individuals have reason, and all citizens have the capacity for moral competence and the potential to live a good life, it is clear that some of those people need guidance to do so; such types must ‘follow reason’ (586e3-587a8). This claim is crucial for the standard view, which uses this passage to argue that non-philosophers have *slavish* reason. The key question identified, though, is what it means to ‘follow’ reason and how this informs the ‘service conception of political authority’ (p31). Resisting the standard view according to which this passage is evidence that the relationship between ruler and ruled is that of master to slave, careful interpretative work shows that the reference to slavery is dialectically motivated and returns to a claim made by Thraymachus in Book 1 (p40). Close attention to the Greek shows that ‘follows’ need not entail anything objectionably slavish. It is conceded that the individuals in the crucial passage have failed to exercise reason properly, but they do have it, and the task of ruler, qua lawgiver, is *to foster* that reason; for qua ruler, one works for the good of the subject, and this involves fostering their reason, albeit through external agency (p33-4). The

ruler, it is argued, has a similar responsibility to nurture good character, as parents and laws. It is for the sake of the individual themselves (and not some larger organic whole ‘the state’, as Popper argues) that this ‘following’ is encouraged, which directs the individual to make the right choices. This does not increase the authority of the polis and the external agent, but rather the individual, for whose sake the external agent acts (p35); the purpose is to empower the individual. How else would *homonoia*, in line with the Book 4 passage be achieved if producers did not develop their reason such that they can appreciate the optimum functionality for themselves and the philosophers, if the latter rule and they produce? If that is the role of the external agent, this blunts the force of the ‘slave’ reference, and Popper’s claim that this work is in service of a larger whole: the primary function of the law is to promote the just life *in individuals* in whom the philosophical part is weak.

Since Chapter I has argued for the importance of ‘naturalistic justification’ as a mode of justifying political authority, by which is meant that everyone in Kallipolis possesses some kind of natural aptitude which conduces to that individual’s good, as well as to society at large, Chapter 2 explores Plato’s political naturalism. Two naturally grounded principles make society possible: (a) mutual needs—individuals are not self-sufficient and need to live together (*Rep.*, 369b-d); and (b) difference of aptitude: different people are good at different things, and it is best for all that they focus on what they are good at doing. The ‘principle of insufficiency’ (p53) grounds the co-operation of all citizens. If this framework for society is taken seriously, as the thesis urges, this makes it clear that the good of the polis is designed to serve the life of its members and not the other way around (as Popper and Vlastos claim, p56). Further, a key claim is that members in the ‘primal, agrarian polis’ have the rational capacity to enter into partnership to meet their needs, and the polis arises from this. One might object that these individuals mainly possess and use ‘prudential rationality’ (p59-60), given that this reasoning is deployed for the sake of self-preservation, but nonetheless each of them is rationally capable of recognising his fellows as a social and rational being and this grounds their co-operation with one another (“for each supposes that this is better for himself”). Each sees that the quality of their relationships with one another determines their wellbeing. Against a Hobbesian view (p60), and with MacIntyre, it is argued that “for Plato, the need for man to be morally rational is strongly grounded in his vulnerability, his insufficiency”. This encourages Plato to create a “positive dependency culture”, where some virtues arise naturally and are not reducible to the content of legislation.

A further claim is identified, which becomes important to the later attempt to bolster the cognitive competence of all citizens. The principle of ‘optimum functionality’ where each does what they can do *well*, does not entail that each cannot do other things *at all* (p66), and so this claim does not come with the view that non-philosophical citizens are rationally *incompetent*; the claim is just that there are other things that such citizens do *better*. Further, the claim that the polis originates to serve the natural needs of individuals shows that it is designed to promote the good of the individuals and not the other way around.

The central point of this chapter is that Plato does not justify political authority on metaphysical grounds. This is crucial because it is the metaphysical claim that leads to “punishable consequences” for the citizens, namely that they are considered slaves. Rather, happiness has to do with social function, which is based on the natural aptitudes of each person and which ensures that each is a significant member of the polis (p69-70). The political authority of the guardians is a ‘logical consequence of these natural principles’ (p70). This view was fruitfully positioned against Popper and Vlasto (p70), though it was less clear whether this view was also at odds with Taylor’s paternalism. Also, taking issue with Piechowiak who argues that the ruled must recognize their inferiority, the thesis argues that the positive terms of address used by the citizens towards one another shows that each is valued, albeit in distinct spheres of action. These terms of address draw attention to the respect towards every kind of profession one finds in the polis (p72).

The central task of the next chapter is to show that there is not just a positive relationship between ruler and ruled, grounded in their mutual dependency, nor just a recognition of the the worth and value of each; rather, each individual can pursue their happiness in this way, based on their cognitive capacities. So, the thesis takes an epistemological turn here, which opens us “conceptual space” for this possibility.

It is argued that those who defend the “metaphysical view” do not only disregard the principles of partnership and optimum functionality; they also take it that metaphysical *ἐπιστήμη* is a sufficient condition for ruling, imply (erroneously) that philosophers need no other epistemic competence to rule, and leaving no conceptual space for other forms of epistemic competence. So, the chapter begins by taking issue with the claim that philosophical knowledge entails or involves political knowledge (p80). I think more could have been made at this point of the work of Vasiliou (2008/2015) who has argued forcefully (in a way that supports the thesis) that

it cannot be the case that knowledge of the form of the good is sufficient for ruling because this view cannot explain why spontaneously generated philosophers (those who are not educated in Kallipolis), who also see the form of the good are not required, and do not rule. This shows that this knowledge is not sufficient for ruling.

After debunking the view that metaphysical ἐπιστήμη is a sufficient condition for ruling, the chapter argues that further ‘epistemic competencies’ are required, such as practical reason and experience. “By cognitive competence, I mean that the philosopher-rulers possess the highest achievements in the triadic modes of cognition: metaphysical knowledge, practical knowledge and experience” (p87). The overall claim was persuasive, but more precision would have helped in the execution of this idea. For example, it is hard for anyone to deny this view put as such, since it is clear that the philosophers require experience to rule:

“Is it enough if they devote themselves to argument, and nothing else, continuously and energetically, in a training equivalent to their physical training in the gymnasiums, only twice as long? ...You will have to make them *go back into the cave we were talking about*. You will have to *compel them to hold military command*, and another other position which is suitable for the young, so that others will not have an advantage over them *in practical experience*. And even in these positions *they must be on trial*, to see if they will stand firm when they are pulled in different directions, or if they will to some extent give way” (*Rep.* VII 539d-e). This passage, though, suggests that experience comes *after* knowledge is achieved (after they have come out of the cave), and is concerned specifically with the issue of applicability. This is different, then, from the passage cited from 408c-409b, where a good judge is someone who has knowledge *based on experience*; this person is not using experience to apply knowledge, but seemingly to acquire it. So, the specific claim, I take it is twofold. The first passage (539de) shows that more is required than metaphysical knowledge for the philosophers to rule, and that Plato values experience as well. The second shows that there is a kind of knowledge gained from experience. It is helpful to put these two passages together, I think, to locate the different roles for experience in the text. (I also wondered whether clarifying this issue would help with the passage discussed on p113 (T13). I did not see what the difficulty was here: making no use of perceptibles refers to how understanding is achieved, whereas T13 is about the application of that understanding, once achieved. So, I see the force of the claim on p114, namely that “What Plato insists actually is that, unlike the sight-lovers, one must not rely on sense perception and perceptibles matters as medium and objects of attaining the highest epistemic competence: ἐπιστήμη. He never says that one cannot have knowledge about perceptibles,

especially in the determination of their natures”). A recent paper by Swhab “Understanding *Episteme* in Plato’s *Republic*”, OSAP (2016) may be helpful here.

I also think a self-standing section on practical knowledge might have been helpful and is something that future work could explore. It remains a point of controversy whether Plato distinguished between practical and theoretical knowledge, and if he did whether *phronesis* indicates the former, as the thesis argues (p104, n.207/8. This position has been difficult to sustain because a number of works appear to use *phronesis* and *sophia* interchangeably (e.g. *Phaedo*). I think this material was fascinating, though, and is worthy of pursuing in future research: does the *Republic* commit Plato to the view that there is such a distinct form of practical knowledge. If so, is *phronesis* supposed to indicate that domain? And, is this practical knowledge informed by theoretical knowledge (i.e. does it come *after* the philosopher has seen the forms), or is there a form of practical knowledge which is distinct from this (suggested by the good judge passage, 408c-409b)?

I would also like to know more about practical governance and the grounds for calling this a ‘science of politics’ (p93), especially if it concerns ‘concrete perceptible matters’? If this scientific knowledge is like carpentry, what general principles would it refer to, that would be explanatory and so on? On p98 for example, it is argued that ‘the optimal aim of every τέχνη is that of producing something good on the basis of a paradigmatic model’; what is the model for political *technē*, if it does not involve metaphysical *epistēmē*?

Though this chapter raised numerous questions, it was very interesting and did support the overall line of argument that there are epistemic forms of competence in the polis that are not concerned with metaphysical *epistēmē* (e.g. the fact that Socrates says there are ‘many knowledges’ in the polis), and this does open up the ‘conceptual space’ to explore whether non-philosophical citizens can have such forms of epistemic competence too. (This, I take it, was the point of the observation on p87 that “This observation strengthens my argument that there is hardly any textual evidence to support the view that the non-philosophic citizens are slaves because they lack knowledge of the Good”. I would make it clearer, though, how this claim follows. I take it that the point is that an inadequate and unduly narrow account of philosophical competence blocks the possibility that other may develop/show cognitive competence).

Chapter 4 considers the implications of the previous chapter since “conceptual space” has now been opened which enables better appreciation of the cognitive competence of non-philosophical craftsmen. It is argued that the cognitive competencies of the craftsmen with some τέχνη can plausibly fall under the rubric of scientific knowledge, and this is a sort of knowledge which shares the domain of the intelligible world with knowledge of the Good and the Forms. It is argued that the non-philosophic citizens’ cognitive competencies amount (or is related) to scientific knowledge (thought- *dianoia*) i.e., a kind of knowledge which involves observation of concrete phenomena, a thorough study of the observed phenomena, and drawing deductive or inductive conclusions using sense perceptible matters. The chapter takes issue with a range of literature on this topic (e.g. Moss, p117, who is mistaken when she takes the many kinds of ἐπιστήμη as non-metaphysical or loose). There was an interesting reading of **T15**, too (p118). Perhaps the emphasis falls here on the whole city, where the claim means that the whole city would be wise because of the smallest part, but this does not mean that individual bits cannot be wise in virtue of something else? Is the salient contrast here between what makes the whole, as opposed to a particular domain, wise?

The central question is ‘how can our non-philosophic craftsmen who lack metaphysical ἐπιστήμη claim authoritative certainty about their crafts’ (p120)? It is conceded that it is true that the non-philosophic craftsmen do not possess the natural qualities to grasp the Forms of their various crafts, relative to Socrates’ grand scheme of the philosopher-rulers’ epistemic capabilities (p121); yet they can function optimally in their various crafts. The thesis then argues that “non-philosophic craftsman’s cognitive competence can be classified as thought (διάνοιαν) or, more mildly, can be said to oscillate between belief-formation (δόξα) and thought (διάνοιαν).” The salient sense of scientific knowledge is this: ‘we are using scientific knowledge as an umbrella term to capture the sense of ἐπιστήμη acquired through thought, using sense perceptibles as the premises’ (p129). So, the differences Socrates strike between ἐπιστήμη of the philosophic craftsman and non-philosophic craftsman are two. First, we saw in Sections 3.2 and 4.2 that former judges about the whole while the latter judges about particular craft. Second, the former could grasp the highest level of ἐπιστήμη, i.e., the Good and the Forms (p124). From this, it is argued that attaining the just polis “supervenes upon the cooperative interactions between the various epistemic competencies in Kallipolis: it is the collaborative effort between scientific and philosophic ἐπιστήμη”.



The last two chapters have defended the claim that the realizability of the eudaemonistic goals of both the individual and the polis supervenes upon the cooperative interactions between the rulers and the ruled, relative to their natural aptitudes and epistemic competencies. The defence was crucial to showing the political worth of the non-philosophic citizens. Chapter 5 now argues that “there is an ‘epistemic balance’ between the philosopher-rulers and the non-philosophic citizens in terms of epistemic cognitive competence in the performance of one’s duty” (p133). This ‘balance’ arises because the philosopher’s knowledge cannot be rated superior to other forms of knowledge (which the previous chapter has outlined) because “every kind of knowledge belongs to a different domain with its standards of assessments”. One kind of knowledge can be rated as having a higher premium of value over another *only in relative terms*. The cobbler cannot rule because ruling falls outside the domain of his epistemic competence; the philosopher-ruler can rule because Plato claims the philosopher has the best model of a just polis in his soul. Therefore, it is only relative to the art of ruling that the cobbler’s epistemic competence becomes useless, just as the philosopher’s epistemic competence is irrelevant for the art of cobblery. I think the thesis has shown that *kallipolis* is a city of mutual interdependence, a ‘positive dependency culture’ where each cannot function and flourish without the support of others. My concern is that the philosophical life does seem to be ranked as *the best kind of life* (end of Bk 7), and with the most pleasure and so on. So how is it the case that there isn’t a hierarchy of some kind (p133). Or is the point that this hierarchy needs to be differently conceived?

The chapter ends with the theme of friendship, thus bolstering the way the thesis has supported the ideal articulated at the end of Book 4, where harmony and friendship between soul parts and so classes in the city, is the cherished ideal. It is argued that this view of collaboration is grounded in the recognition of the various epistemic competencies of each, and their worth and value; thus showing that “there is a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements” (p141). Citizens are not slaves, but *philoï*, as indeed, the vexed ‘slavery passage’ in Book 9 had already intimated.

Overall, I found the thesis persuasive, particularly (a) the use of book 2 and the naturalistic justification for rulership; (b) that claim that all members of the polis have natural aptitudes, which require developments of different kinds for their flourishing; (c) the claim that though metaphysical knowledge is required to *develop* a philosopher’s natural aptitude, this does not *justify* their political authority (and the exclusion of others from this task). Their authority is

grounded in the fact that they are naturally best suited to do this and will flourish if they do so; other members of the polis are not well suited to ruling, will not flourish and be happy and so should not rule – not because the state will not flourish if they do this (which may also be true) but because *they as individuals* will not flourish if they do so, and the purpose of the state is to enable each individual to be happy in accordance with their natural aptitudes. I was persuaded by this argument, and by arguments which showed the implications of this view, which is that Plato's politics in the *Republic* is not as politically objectionable as Vlastos and Popper have argued; rather, it is a 'positive dependency culture'.

### **Typos/Issues for Correction**

p35: "Plato does not false the philosophic life on anybody"; 'force' for 'false'?

p48 bottom of page: italics for 'Republic'

p57: This paragraph needs to be clarified:

"On the last statement, recall our argument in the previews chapter that Plato does not prescribe any mode of happy life for the non-philosophic citizens (Rep., 421b); and even if he does, the money-makers and honour-lovers remain unconvinced that the philosophic life can secure them the truest pleasure possible. Therefore, I find it unconvincing that Plato subordinates the individual's good to the good of the polis. Plato makes it clear that happiness cannot be the content of human legislation. Based on this conclusion, I take issue with the following position of Piechowiak. I agree with Piechowiak that the happiness of the state is recognised as an aim of laws. It deserves mention that even though the polis is a product of human nature, it makes sense that the lawgiver can determine the content of its good through legislation, since the good of the polis is not natural. But since the good of the individual precedes the coming into being of the polis and is natural, and no human legislation can claim to capture the full sense of what constitutes human happiness, it cannot be the content of legislation".

p58: This paragraph could also be clearer:

"Consequently, if the polis results from man's intelligent and excellent usage of his arms he is equipped at birth, it only means that the polis begins and ends with man's thinking capacity. In this regard, caring for the good of the polis depends solely on man. Second, Plato will agree with Aristotle that, among other animals, "it is a characteristic of man that he alone has a sense

of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state” (Aris. *Pol.* 1253a14-17). Plato’s agreement can be seen in his view on partnership. For instance, in the *Gorgias*, we are told that “an undisciplined man could not be dear to another man or a god, for he cannot be a partner (κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος), and where there’s no partnership there’s no friendship. [For] wise men claim that partnership and friendship...hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and that is why they call the universe a world order and not an undisciplined world-order” (Grg. 507e-8a). If the inception and destruction of any organised human society depend solely on man, then it is true that Plato, like Aristotle, holds a balanced view of human nature”. What balance do you have in mind here exactly?

p60: add references for the *Statesman* passage: ‘Plato conceives the polis not as a mere aggregation of individuals but a functional constitutive entity, wherein each member of the polis is a significant constituent member, a leitmotif repeatedly mentioned in the *Statesman*’.

p62 note 118. I do not mind at all (!) but I think the scholarly convention is to use the surname, so change ‘Frisbee’ to ‘Sheffield’?

p63 the following sentence was unclear: ‘if there is any reason why I think Plato is not a contractarian it is not because the non-philosophic citizens lack knowledge of justice to enter a contract—they do’. Do you mean: they do lack knowledge, or they do have knowledge?

p63: rework the following sentence: “This is meant to prepare us to appreciate that even though the philosopher-rulers will surely perform a moral function, and they must acquire knowledge of the Good to perform this function. However, Plato’s justification of their political authority has less connection with his metaphysics and ethics than is usually assumed.” Perhaps this (?) “This is meant to prepare us to appreciate that even though the philosopher-rulers will surely perform a moral function, and they must acquire knowledge of the Good to perform this function, Plato’s justification of their political authority has less connection with his metaphysics and ethics than is usually assumed”. Does that capture the sense?

p64 ‘pleonexia’ in italics for its second and third occurrence.

p64 Rachel Barney should be cited here on city of pigs; for the argument of the thesis, unlike Barney, takes this first city seriously: Barney, R., 'Platonism, Moral Nostalgia, and the City of Pigs', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 17 (2001), 207-36.

p66 pleonexia in italics x2

p68 T7 in bold for the second occurrence.

p75, something has gone wrong with this sentence: "The argument that governance requires knowledge features prominently discussed in Book IV". Should this be: 'features prominently in the discussion of Book IV'?

p76 page number for Parry quote in the note and not just date.

p77 check the *Timaeus* quote: 'But were he to look at a think'; 'thing' for 'think'.

p78 note 140: 'Argument I' is not referenced until two pages later (top of p80), so add 'see below' or ideally specify here.

p81 when you refer to 'both kinds of epistemic competencies' you need to spell out the other kind. I had to go back a few pages to discover what this might mean. Does this refer to practical reason and experience, as you put it a few lines later? It was not until p87 that there was a clear statement: "By cognitive competence, I mean that the philosopher-rulers possess the highest achievements in the triadic modes of cognition: metaphysical knowledge, practical knowledge and experience." So put some reference to this earlier on, perhaps.

p82 there is no note 45, just blank text.

p82 it would help to unpack the motivation claim a bit. What are we looking for here exactly? The philosophers are not 'eager' (no *eros* for ruling; it is not *kalon*); but they are 'willing' to rule?

p113 italics for 'Theaetetus'

p114 typo 'perceptibles matters'; do you mean 'perceptible matters'?

p119 'philosopher' change to 'philosophers'

p122 change 'as mention above' to 'as mentioned above'.

"As is evident, Socrates outlines two main differences exist between the scientific ἐπιστήμη and metaphysical ἐπιστήμη; insert 'that' before 'exist'?

p123: 'the aim at the Form'; should this be 'they aim'?

p124 'T9' in bold.

p125 'But the significant point is for us is that philosophy is charged' cut the first 'is'?

p132 note 243 'Mills' should be 'Mill'

'Republic' in italics.

p133 'Republic' in italics.

p134: "when people become friends based on either pleasure or utility, they do not value themselves as much as the pleasure or utility the friendship affords; such friends are useful to each other only because of the pleasure or utility they derive from the friendship". Should 'themselves' be 'each other'?

p135 just before note 248 it is not clear where the quotation ends.

p136 'Frisbee' should be 'Sheffield'.

p137: 'are expressions of philial'. Should this be 'expressions of a philial bond'?

p140: 'pragmatic step Plato adopt to promote virtue', change 'adopt' to 'adopts'?

'pleonexia' in italics

p138 on *homonoia* you might want to return to the book 4 passage you cited earlier on friendship and *homonoia* in the soul as *sophrosune* to support your argument here that this is clearly an ideal for the soul, and given the analogy between city and soul, we expect this to obtain in the city too.

p142 'Plato remains non-committal to the view that only philosophers can be morally rational'. Should this be 'Plato is not committed....'?