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**Turkey's Foreign Policy towards Israel after the
Abraham Accords**

Between Ideology and Pragmatism

Bachelor's Thesis

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Declaration

At this moment, I declare that this thesis, *Turkeys Foreign Policy Towards Israel after the Abraham Accord: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*, is solely my work. I have written it with the help of cited sources and literature.

V Olomouc, on 25th April 2023

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Name and Last name

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Introduction

The Middle East is a vastly complicated and exceptionally dynamic region, which is projected in its politics of power contention. Turkey and other states in the region emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne marked the creation of the Turkish state under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who promoted a policy of secularisation. After the Second World War, Israel became a part of the region in 1948. Already a year later, its existence was acknowledged by Turkey and for a long time it remained the only state with a Muslim-majority population that legitimised the Jewish state. Since its inception, Turkey has undergone internal political changes, affecting the direction of the republic in foreign policy. Initially, Turkey was characterised as a parliamentary, unitary, and secular republic, with efforts to get closer to Western states, corroborated by its entry into NATO in 1952. Israel was a like-minded actor, sharing similar interests with Turkey in diplomacy, security, and the economic sector. The Turkish-Israeli partnership experienced a golden period, when the shared interest in cooperation was at its highest, but also more challenging times. Disagreements between states have arisen largely because of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Arab-Israeli wars, reflecting the mood of Muslim countries and their dissatisfaction with the Israeli presence in the region, destabilised the Middle Eastern region even more. During that time, several coups d'état took place in Turkey, which brought their politics closer to a military, authoritarian regime. On the other hand, Israel has maintained good relations with the Western powers, as can be illustrated through their relations with the US, which have always been warm and positive. Thus, it can be said that where foreign policy is concerned, Turkey's approach towards Israel has been varied, while trade relations have, to a certain extent, been continuously kept functioning.

Turkish-Israeli relations began to gradually deteriorate in 2002, when the Justice and Development Party took control of the Turkish political sphere and remained in power up to the present. This political party characterises itself as a conservative-democratic party. On the left-right scale, it could be classified as a right-wing party. The leading representative of the party is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, first as mayor of Istanbul, later as prime minister of Turkey and now as president. He is one of the politicians who supported Palestinians rather than the Israelis, a stance underpinned by his continuous promotion of political Islam and pan-Arabism. Although trade and economic ties to Israel persisted, political affection for the Jewish state began to fade with the rise of the Justice and the Development Party and R. T. Erdoğan. Turkey and Israel did not engage in any direct physical conflict until 2010, when the Mavi Marmara

Incident occurred, and Turkish activists died. It was the first clash between Turkey and Israel and aggressive rhetoric on the part of Turkey escalated. Despite the efforts of the American administration and the restoration of diplomatic ties, a warmer attitude from both sides did not appear. Turkey's regional position in the Middle East had always been stronger than Israel's because of the issue of Palestine, which has been an unrelenting problem since the late 1950s.

Turkish-Israeli relations stagnated and Ankara, led by President R.T.Erdogan, was focused on its political goals, often seen as anti-democratic by the West. Turkish support for the Palestinians and volatile Israeli-Palestinian clashes, culminating in the American embassy transfer to Jerusalem in 2018, only deepened the already palpable antagonism between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Even though the situation was not favourable, Turkey stood as a mediator between the Arab States and Israel until the signing of the Abraham Accords. These agreements signed in 2020 caused a shock to Turkish politics for several reasons. The Abraham Accords normalised relations between Israel on the one hand and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan on the other, with the support and, above all, mediation by the US during the Trump administration. The agreements meant the creation of diplomatic relations between states and cooperation in agriculture, renewable energy and mainly in economy and security. Turkey has made no secret of its disapproval of these agreements. However, the Turkish government's initial opposition to the agreements has been replaced by more moderate rhetoric. It could be understood that Ankara saw the Middle Eastern Muslim states turning to face new economic opportunities alongside Israel and the US. At the same time, Turkey, as a regional power, was not involved in the negotiations. Turkey's change of attitude can also be underlined by the economic crisis that culminated in 2022 when Turkey experienced the highest inflation rate since the Justice and Development Party (further AKP) came to power. However, Turkey's domestic policy seems to no longer have the same influence on the Middle East as before the Abraham Accords. The treaty forced Turkey to review its own actions, despite the ideological barriers that the AKP and President R.T. Erdogan have created towards Israel.

The topic of this bachelor's thesis is Turkish foreign policy towards Israel after the Abraham Accords, with the subtitle between ideology and pragmatism, reflecting urgency and importance, as witnessed in the dynamic shifts in the Middle Eastern region. This thesis will examine how Turkey changed its narrative towards Israel after signing the Abraham Accords. It will try to explain if those changes reflect an ideological change or a pragmatic accommodation.

The research questions of the thesis are “*What are the observable changes in terms of Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel after the signing of the Abraham Accords?*” and “*What*

are the key elements of forcing the revision of the Turkish foreign policy approach in the post-Abraham period since 2020?''. This leads to the following hypotheses: *H1: Israel becoming a dominant player in the Middle East after signing the Abraham Accords forced Turkey to change its narrative towards Israel*, and *H0: The change in Turkish foreign policy is more influenced by ideological change than pragmatic accommodation*.

The time frame of this work will reach back to the foundations of Turkish-Israeli relations in 1949 and will continue to the present. The main reasons for choosing this topic are the current nature of the theme itself and a general interest in analysing the changes that Turkey experienced after the Abraham Accords came to be. At first glance, it may not appear as an essential document for Turkey. However, a more thorough analysis of Turkey's current situation may reveal and point to the critical essence of the Abraham Accords for the existence of Turkey as a whole.

The work will consist of four chapters. The first part will explain the theoretical framework for which the neorealist approach was chosen and will be further divided into three sub-chapters. The first subchapter will look at the neorealist approach's basic characteristics and the feasibility of using this theory to explain Turkish foreign policy towards Israel. Next, the development of Turkish statements after the signing of the Abraham Accords will be presented. This part will show Turkey's rhetoric changes from a theoretical perspective. The last subchapter will be focused on Turkish interest, once again taking the neorealist point of view into account. The entire second chapter will discuss Turkish-Israeli relations from a historical perspective and will be divided into several sections to maintain clarity. A historical portion is an inevitable part of this work, in order to understand the complex interrelationships at play. The main events and twists in the Turkish-Israeli partnership will be discussed. The aim of the third chapter is a detailed analysis and summary of the interests that led individual states to sign the Abraham Accords. In the same manner, in one of the subsections, the role of the USA as a mediator of the Accords will be observed, and the positions of other essential actors in the Middle East will be brought to the forefront. All three chapters will lead to the final fourth chapter, which will analyse Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel after 2020 and will consist of three sub-sections. The last part will aim to investigate Turkey's interests in restoring and improving relations with Israel with information from available sources. The main focus will be on the possible benefits Turkey could gain from joining the Abraham Accords coalition.

A considerable amount of literature has been published on Turkish-Israeli relations. Primary sources will serve the purpose of the primary literature in this thesis. Publications from academic journals and analyses of political scientists and experts on the given topics will ap-

pear. To adequately introduce and explain the neorealist theory, a book by Kenneth Waltz from 1979 entitled *Theory of International Politics* will serve this purpose. This is the first publication of the neorealist theory, selected as framework for this work. Kenneth Waltz was an international relations theorist who devoted his career to explaining how the international system works. As a substantial creator of neorealist theory, Waltz is essential here in explaining the theory and correctly placing it within the topic of this thesis. For a better understanding of the neorealist theory a book titled *Power and Interests in the International System: Processes, Actors, and Issues in the Inter-national Relations* by Czech scholars will also be used. This book will aim to expand on the basic definitions of the theory. The official statements of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will also be used. They will serve as informative statements and opinions, from which the development of the Turkish attitude towards Israel should be discernible. A part of Shira Efron's book *The Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations* will serve to summarise the historical part. Efron is an expert on Middle East politics and national security strategies. Academic publications will serve to complete the picture of the bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel. Three more essential authors complete the historical puzzle. First, the author Ofra Bengio and her article *Altercating interests and orientations between Israel and Turkey: A view from Israel* and then Alon Liel's article *Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations* will complete the view from Israel's perspective. Ofra Bengio focuses on the Middle East region, specifically on topics related to Turkey and the Kurds. As a follow-up, Alon Liel is a diplomat who was an emissary in Turkey at a critical time in 2010, meaning his written experience from the diplomatic field will enhance the Israeli perspective in this matter. Ilker Aytürk will complete the Turkish side of things with the journal publication *The Coming of an ice age? Turkish-Israeli relations since 2002*. Because the selected bachelor's topic also deals with the present, using academic publications for some parts is impossible. Therefore, the information will be supplemented from the sources of press or newspaper agencies. Official documents on the US Department of State, Abraham Accords' official website and other statements from this website will serve as additional sources. An analysis of Turkey's economic situation is an additional key aspect which will be explored. Available data from the International Monetary Fund and other sources will be used for these purposes.

1 Theoretical Framework

1.1 Neorealist Approach to Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Israel

The neorealist theory was developed based on the international relations theory - Realism. Elaborating on the concept of realism, neorealism, as described by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979, is widely considered to be the first neorealist account. Waltz described that conflicts at the international level arise because of the structure of the international system. For that reason, neorealism is also called structural realism. States act as self-interested actors, trying to gain as much power as possible for their own survival. This action is also called a self-help system. Compared to the power of the state in realist theory, the basic unit of neorealist theory is an interest of a state in the international system. It is essential that neorealist theory works with the fact that the system, structure of the international environment, and interest of the state, determine how states will conduct themselves and make decisions. The main principle that determines the organisation of states is anarchy. Anarchy in the international sphere tells us that states have no higher authority. The system is absented the most important actors who would determine the functioning of the system, and so states are forced to compete for power and position in the system. In other words, each state strives to be the strongest player while competing for power. At the same time, each state has its own sovereignty and therefore stands on the same level. In connection with classical realism, Waltz describes the state as a sovereign unit that at the most basic level strives for survival, and at the highest for dominance (Waltz, 1979/2010, pp. 116-128).

Each theory aims to explain a complex reality through the factors that are analysed, and based on their results, the given issue can then be presented. The factors for each theory are different, and in the case of neorealism, it is a system that forces states to revise their positions within their own interests. One of the factors neglected by neorealism that may be important to other theories is domestic politics¹. Neorealism does not consider domestic politics as an essential factor in understanding the international system but sees it as an irrelevant figure. Relating neorealist theory to the topic of Turkey's foreign policy after the Abraham Accords, it is necessary and logical to remove Turkey's domestic politics from the equation (Krpec et al., 2015).

Until 2020 and the signing of normalisation agreements, Turkey acted according to its ideological principles and beliefs. This policy was mainly promoted by the AKP and President

¹ Diplomacy, politicians, political parties, presidents, prime ministers, and statecraft are part of domestic policy, which neorealism does not attach importance to.

R. T. Erdogan. For this reason, it is logical to look at Turkish politics until the Abraham Accords from the perspective of internal determinants. However, Turkey's domestic policy was overshadowed by the shifting system in the Middle East caused by the signing of the Abraham Accords. The pressure was exerted on the domestic policy led by the president, which forced the Turkish representatives and the government to act according to the new rules of the system set by the agreements in which Turkey did not participate.

As neorealist theory specifies, states are forced to adapt to the changeability of the international environment for their survival. Waltz (1979/2010) describes this behaviour as: “*The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system*” (p. 126). The first changes in Turkish behaviour are closely associated with the signing of the Abraham Accords. First normalisation agreements were signed between Israel on the one hand and Bahrain, the UAE, and Morocco on the other in 2020; after a while, Sudan joined the signing in 2021. The United States of America moderated the entire process during the presidency of Donald Trump. The third chapter is devoted to this topic, as a better understanding of the Abraham Accords is essential. It is not an understatement to say that the Abraham Accords are documents influencing the new dynamics of the Middle East.

The Abraham Accords have become agreements highlighting economic, environmental, energy, defence, trade, agriculture and diplomatic cooperation over Middle Eastern countries' internal politics and ideological perpetuation. According to neorealist theory, Middle Eastern states were influenced to revisit their statements because they were forced by the system where all states find themselves—in this particular case, speaking about Turkey. Prior to the signing of the Abraham Accords, the Turkish Republic held a unique position in the Middle East. It mediated between the Muslim and Western worlds. The main dispute accompanying the Turkish-Israeli partnership was the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, associated with Turkish anti-Zionist rhetoric, in recent years pro-Islamic thinking and acting. The historical background and development of Turkish-Israeli relations are explained in the second chapter.

A gradual change in Turkish rhetoric towards Israel can be clearly seen by observing Turkish statements. Ankara was overly critical of Israel's actions before the announcement of the Abraham Accords. An example of such conduct is the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official statement expressing their disapproval over Sheikh Ekrima Sabri being banned from the al-Akqa Mosque in January 2020 by Israel: “*Such practices evoking fascism, that are not experienced even in dictatorial regimes, reveal the true face of the Israeli leadership with all its clarity*” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2020c). In another statement from February 2020, Turkey reaffirmed its support for the Palestinians: “*Palestinian territories belong to the*

people of Palestine. The occupier mindset shall never change this reality.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2020b). Turkey showed its support for Palestinians and continued its narrative against Israel.

Turkey immediately reacted to the announcement of the UAE-Israeli and Bahrain-Israeli normalisation of relations. It was described as a betrayal of the Palestinians, as an action denial of the Arab Peace Initiative. They claimed that: *“UAE has no authority whatsoever to negotiate with Israel”* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2020a). Turkish President R. T. Erdogan proclaimed: *“The move against Palestine is not a step that can be stomached. Now, Palestine is either closing or withdrawing its embassy. The same thing is valid for us now”* (Butler et al., 2020). Ankara also criticised the involvement of the US in the process. Turkey condemned Bahrain's recognition of Israel and remained steady in its pro-Palestinian support by adding the following statement: *“Lasting peace and stability in the Middle East can only be achieved through just and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian issue in accordance with international law and UN resolutions”* Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2020e). The Turkish Foreign Ministry continued to draw attention to the Palestinian issue, pointing to the illegality of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and attacks in the Gaza Strip. Reports and statements about Palestinian deaths and the Israeli occupation of Palestine, as well as other announcements by Turkey were regularly published on the official sites of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, n.d.).

This part is devoted to Turkey's inconsistent and dynamic rhetoric, not the agreements' description. The Abraham Accords are described in the third chapter. The signing of the Accords took place in September 2020. In October, Turkey commented: *“We will continue to stand side by side with our Palestinian brothers and defend the Palestinian cause.”* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2020d). Statements on a similar wavelength were published until the end of 2020.

1.2 Development of Turkish Statements after the Abraham Accords

In January 2021, Sudan partially joined the Accords. Turkey did not criticise this fact and, on the contrary, was pleased with the US decision to withdraw Sudan from the list of countries supporting terrorism. The US did this precisely in exchange for Sudan normalising with Israel. Suddenly, four Muslim countries recognised the existence of Israel. Control over the Middle Eastern dynamics found itself in the hands of the US rather than the Turks. In February 2021, Ankara voiced apprehension about the Kosovar decision to open an embassy in Jerusalem, then as the first Muslim-minority country to do so. In response to Israel's settlement of the Palestin-

ian territory, Turkey voiced strong objections in March, targeting the international community with: *“Show solidarity with the Palestinian people against Israel's expansionist policies.”* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2021a). However, Turkey gradually began to reduce the number of speeches regarding the Turkish-Palestinian Brotherhood. Even speeches aimed directly at Israel became more moderate. In the following two months, Turkey referred more to international law and the international community, putting its position towards the Palestinian issue slightly into the background. In June, Turkey commented on Israel's actions as well as disagreed with Honduras' decision to open an embassy in Jerusalem. With this step, Honduras, as well as other countries led by the USA, attributed a particular state of legitimacy to Israel over Jerusalem. In the subsequent month, Israel demolished some Palestinian houses in the West Bank with the vision of new Israeli residences in this area. Turkey commented on this situation. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained silent about Israel from August to December, with the exception of October. The announcement made in the Turkish press release from 2021 reacting to the construction of new buildings in the West Bank and Israel's decision to allow Jews to silent prayers in the Al-Alqa Mosque, one of the holiest Muslim sites, was as follows: *“We call on the international community to take action to ensure the protection of the Palestinian territories and the rights of the Palestinian people, in order to achieve lasting peace and stability in the region in the long term.”* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2021b).

The year 2022 began with Turkey's statement on drone attacks in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where a number of civilians were killed. The Turkish Foreign Minister flew to the UAE in March, indicating Turkey's interest in maintaining good connections. Right after the signing of the Abraham Accords, Turkey emphasised that the close relationship between Israel and the UAE could damage Turkish-UAE ties. This has not been confirmed. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) clashed with the Palestinians in the forthcoming month. The death of the Palestinians caused a reaction in Turkey. In Press Release No: 125 Regarding the Killing of a Palestinian Civilian by the Israeli Forces in Bethlehem (2022), the following was announced: *“We call on the Israeli authorities to investigate the incident impartially and thoroughly, bring those responsible to justice as soon as possible and take the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of such inhumane actions.”* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2022). In the ensuing months, Turkey communicated dissatisfaction about Israeli-Greek cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea, specifically in Cyprus. The northern part of Cyprus is under the rule of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognised only by Turkey itself. Ankara warned against provocation, leading to possible disputes. They both have claims on the significant gas deposits in the Mediterranean. In October 2022, the Maritime boundary Delimitation agreement between

Lebanon and Israel was announced (US Department of State, 2022a). The agreement enjoyed a warm response from Turkey. It was said that this could be a good example for resolving Turkish-Greek relations in Cyprus.

Palestinian-Israeli confrontations continued throughout the year and were unremitting in 2023 as well. At the end of 2022, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs dropped its report on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, saying: “*Measured as a monthly average, 2022 has been the deadliest year for Palestinians in the West Bank since the United Nations started recording fatalities systematically in 2005.*” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2022). Even though there were more Palestinian casualties than in previous years, Turkey has been more lenient in its behaviour towards Israel since 2005, when the UN reports were regularly issued. In the Turkish reports by the Ministry of Affairs, there was restraint in the statements, less aggressive rhetoric, and passages about the unwavering support for the Palestinians and their claim to the illegally occupied territories were omitted.


In January 2023, Turkey and the US announced a new strategic plan aiming to modernise the Turkish air force. Turkey and the USA are essential partners within NATO, agreeing to fight counter-terrorism and leaving the door to NATO open for possible new partners, Finland, and Sweden. Both sides have also committed to bilateral cooperation in trade. Turkey is focused on establishing closer relations with the US. Compared to the criticism regarding the Abraham Accords, Turkey seems to be trying to tighten cooperation with the Western countries (US Department of State, 2023).

1.3 Turkish Interests from the Neorealist Perspective

The official statements in the previous paragraphs prove the change that foreign policy has undergone. When analysed based on the neorealist approach, it is observable that Turkey has changed its pattern of expression during the last three years. In 2020, Israel was the enemy disrupting the Middle Eastern grid. Two years later, Turkey is already restoring diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. According to the chosen approach, the driving force that caused this divide would be the pressure exerted on Turkey. The Abraham Accords became a document that forced Turkey to revise its stance towards Israel, as well as the UAE and the USA. The states also represent economic partners for the Turks. Turkey's main interest is to maintain itself in a system from which it was threatened to be expelled precisely by its behaviour. Turkey had to seek partnerships with a vision of a stable economy, which Israel, UAE, and the US offer. The data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) showed a visible decline in Turkey's

GDP between 2013–2020 when it reached a low point. The country was experiencing an economic crisis accompanied by high inflation, rising unemployment, and additionally burdened by its political leadership. However, the economic output immediately increased in 2021. The prediction shows that Turkish GDP is at a level which has been steadily increasing, as is apparent from *Figure 1* (O'Neill, 2023).

Figure 1



Note. Turkey: Gross domestic product (GDP) in current prices from 1987 to 2027. Adapted from *Statista*, by O'Neill, A. Retrieved 2023, February 3 (<https://www.statista.com/statistics/263757/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-turkey/>)

From the neorealist theoretical perspective, Turkey sees its economic interests as more crucial than the Palestinian issue, which Turkey has always referred to in its disagreements with Israel. Ankara does not pay much attention to religion when fighting for its position in the international community, mainly Middle Eastern. The system itself is forcing actors within it towards neorealist thinking.

2 Historical Background of Turkish-Israeli Relations

Turkish-Israeli relations officially began with the Turkish recognition of Israel in 1949. The development of bilateral relations had difficulties. The individual twists and turns resulted from the state's domestic policies, as well as from the international situation that prevailed in the Middle Eastern region. In the beginning, Turkey stood as a supportive partner of Israel, which started to change for many reasons. One of the most important causes that influenced the Turkish political direction was the influence of the Arab states, acting and participating in conflicts connected with Israel, i.e., with the partner of the Turkish Republic. The Arab-Israeli wars, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but also the influence of the Iranian Revolution and American involvement in the region played a fundamental role in the development of Turkish-Israeli relations (Efron, 2018, pp. 5-10).

Turkey's hesitant position and the resulting Israeli-Palestinian conflict worsened and deepened the disagreements between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Turkey and its rapprochement towards European states and the USA changed, culminating in 2002, when the AKP of the current president, R. T. Erdogan, took control of the Turkish parliament. Turkey, which before the rise of the AKP was moving towards secularisation and westernisation, began to turn even more towards the Arab states and the traditions associated with Islamic politics, ideology, and economy. Nevertheless, it was not anything that was not already discernible before the AKP, emphasising that Turkey intended to build a strong position as an influential Middle Eastern state, indispensable for their Middle East and the North African countries (further MENA) colleagues. On the other hand, Israel saw Turkey as a beneficial trade and military partner that could provide Israelis with a certain form of security in a region where stability has always been fragile (Efron, 2018, pp. 5-10).

This chapter will briefly and clearly summarise the shared history of Turkey and Israel. It is essential to emphasise important facts and events that took place until the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, in order to properly comprehend the current situation between the states and Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel.

2.1 Bilateral Relations Between Turkey and Israel from 1948 to 2002

Turkey recognised Israel in 1949 as the first Muslim-majority country. The Turkish Kemalist government saw the potential of cooperation between the states. The first years of partnership are described as "Honeymoon years", meaning the states deepened their economic, cultural, and military ties. This situation lasted until the mid-1950s when the Suez Crisis happened in 1956. The Turks recalled their ambassador and in reciprocity, the Israelis did the same.

Restoring the situation and re-establishing diplomatic ties took thirty years (Bengio, 2009, p. 54). Turkey slowly turned its orientation to the Arab countries. The real complications came in the 1960s. More aspects contributed to the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. The main ones being the Cyprus domestic conflict between 1963 and 1964 and the Six-Day War in 1967. Turkey, on the side of the Arabs, demanded Israel's military withdrawal from the areas gained during the war. The aggravation between the Middle Eastern states came in the next decade in the form of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, as well as the energy crisis triggered by this conflict. In 1979, Yasser Arafat, a leader of the Palestinian Liberalisation Organisation (PLO), came to Ankara for the opening of the first official office in Turkey's capital. US, Israel, and other states deemed the PLO to be a terrorist organisation. This event showed the development of Turkish-Palestinian relations, which did not help settle the issue with Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations. The diplomatic ties between the Turks and Israelis were at a bare minimum. Finally, the end of the 1980s brought new chances. The end of the Cold War and the Madrid Conference in 1991 represented a vision and willingness of the Middle Eastern states to negotiate with Israel. The situation switched from having *chargés d'affaires* to ambassadors, meaning they re-established better diplomatic relations. The same shift happened in the Turkish-Palestinian situation when PLO opened an embassy in Turkey (Efron, 2018, pp. 5-6; Liel, 2017, pp. 1-2).

The period from 1992 to 2002 can be described as another honeymoon period for Turkey and Israel. Simultaneously, military, and public cooperation was strengthened. The states moved from economic cooperation to a security partnership. Turkey, in the 1990s, was eager to modernise its military structure and purchase new weapons, while Israel seemed to be the perfect partner for this type of business. It represented a relatively lucrative proposition for Israel, where it could offer its defence technologies. Before the millennium, Turkish-Israeli relations experienced the peak of their partnership. Israel became one of Turkey's closest partners after the devastating earthquake of 1999 damaged Turkey severely. There were fundraising programmes to aid the victims. Israelis supported such programs, which were met with warm responses and deepened bilateral relations even further (Kanat, p 114-116, 2013).

The Second Intifada in 2000 caused public deterioration in the Turkish-Israeli partnership. The public sphere was shaken by images of Israel's military attacks against the Palestinians; withal, the Turkish leadership became more sensitive to Arab countries' opinions and moods. However, military agreements continued even after the rise of the AKP in 2002. As R. T. Erdogan has held the leading position as the prime minister of Turkey, he managed to become one of the most crucial determining factors in Turkish politics until now (Liel, 2017, p. 3).

2.2 Bilateral Relations Between Turkey and Israel from 2002 until 2020

The failure of the Camp David talks, followed by the Second Intifada in 2000, were predictors of the increased communication between the Turks and Israelis. The rise of the AKP party in Turkey caused a ripple effect of change in domestic as well as foreign policy. Turkey has become a key player in the region thanks to its position as a transcontinental state. Thus, Turkish policy was seen as a ground for a possible connection between Western democracy and the politics of Eastern political Islam. This proved to be an incompatible vision for the future. Turkey's open support for the Palestinians, based on their shared cultural and historical legacy, has led to increasing conflicts between Turkey and Israel, destabilising the Middle East even more (Alsaftawi, 2016, p. 4).

Since 2002, the AKP has won consecutive parliamentary elections, gaining the majority of seats necessary for government formation, either by themselves or in a coalition. Three major actors decided on the Turkish foreign policy. These were the Prime Minister, the head of a parliament supported by the Foreign Minister; the President, essential in his constitutional role, depending on who is in the position of president; and the military, being the last indispensable piece (Alsaftawi, 2016, p. 9). After the elections in 2007, the political system changed, following the decisions of the AKP. In 2018, the same party pushed through a legislative act that transformed the existing parliamentary system into an executive presidential system. Recep Tayyip Erdogan first became president in 2014 and then in 2018, building on the role of the prime minister, which he had previously held since 2003. However, the legislative change accepted in 2017 abolished the position of Prime Minister, meaning that the Presidential seat became the highest official position that is now able to control all aspects of the Republic (Demirel, 2018).

Although the president became an even more crucial figure, the Middle East started to change in front of R. T. Erdogan's eyes as MENA states negotiated with Israel without Ankara's assistance. When speaking about Turkish-Israeli relations in incompatible periods, these two states always maintained ties in the military area. When Turkey and Israel share interests, they are close, but if interests are lacking, the states move away from each other based on the pragmatic position of the AKP.

2.2.1 The Rise of AKP and the Declining Turkey's Support for Israel

The party won the general elections in November 2002, and the new Prime Minister, R. T. Erdogan, expressed his discontentment with Israel. The escalation of the whole situation culminated two years later when Israel eliminated Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the Palestinian leader

of Hamas. Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan described this situation as a terrorist attack and publicly stated that Israel committed state terror on Palestinian territory. However military and trade facilitation continued. Turkish government bought military aviation equipment and security surveillance systems in exchange for better protection of borders. Israel tried to maintain a partner in the Middle East, while Turkey took advantage of the partnership with Israel when it was necessary to lobby in Washington for Turkish matters (Efron, 2018, pp. 7-8). A warning signal from the Turkish side appeared when Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan visited Israel in 2005 to ensure that Israel's commitment to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Northern West Bank would be undertaken in seriousness. Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his enormous Turkish delegation visiting Israel declared the importance of this task. The official visit showed that withdrawal could lead to the stabilisation of Turkish-Israeli matters (Liel, 2017, pp. 3-5).

During the first half of the 2000s, Turkey tended to Syria primarily because they sought another ally in the Middle Eastern territory. Secondly, Turkey and Syria were dealing with the Kurdish minority demanding increased rights. Syria's problem with the Kurds led to Turkish-Israeli cooperation against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Thus, it helped suppress the Syrian Kurdish block², and Syria became one of the closest Turkish allies. Thirdly, Turkey gained the role of mediator in the Middle Eastern area. Turkey could be considered a unique state in these matters, as no other state wanted to stand in the mediatory position, not even the US, despite the fact that it was actively involved in the events of the region and led its own missions there. Turkey led its diplomacy in a direction where it envisioned the involvement of all Middle Eastern states, including Syria, Iran, and groups such as Hamas, in the negotiations, to not exclude anyone³. With this position, Turkey gained international power. The trust in Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations was on the rise for some time, while Israel even trusted Turkey with sensitive matters, such as disputes with Syria. R. T. Erdogan, personally, did not sympathise with Israel, as Turkish-Israeli cooperation was rather pragmatic (Aytürk, 2011, p. 676; Bengio, 2009, pp. 50-51).

2.2.2 Gaza War as a Determinant of Decreased Trust

The combination of unsuccessful Camp David talks, the Second Intifada, growing Turkish-Israeli alliance was supported by the reality of the Turkish switch in domestic policy when

² The suppression of Kurds in Syria, in combination with the Arab Spring in MENA, led to the Syrian Civil War. Turkey and Russia mainly supported the Syrian Government, while the US assisted the Kurdish groups (Hale, 2019).

³ In contrast, the Bush administration, led the war on terror, which was undoubtedly supported by the actions of 11th September 2001, which means that the US at the time was not interested in a mediator's role in the Middle East.

AKP was elected both in 2002 and 2007. The secular military regime aimed to lean towards an Islamic ideology-oriented policy, standing on the side of Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. All these factors complicated bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel accumulated even more (Aytürk, 2011, pp. 676-677).

Hamas's victory over its long-term opponent Fatah and rise into a position of leadership in the Gaza Strip in 2006 led to an outbreak of violence. The Turkish government and R. T. Erdogan supported the Palestinian group, describing it as a non-terrorist organisation⁴. The collapse of Turkish-Israeli relations came at the turn of 2008 and 2009, after the operation Cast Lead in Gaza (Aytürk, 2011, pp. 677-678; Liel, 2017, p. 4).

As was written above, Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, helping to better relations with Turkey. After 38 years of occupation of Gaza, Israel recalled their units from the territory. Nevertheless, Palestinians pointed out that Israel was still in charge of controlling traffic and utilities. The Gaza Strip has been ruled by Hamas since 2006, and conflicts between Israeli and Palestinian forces have been exacerbated⁵. Operation Cast Lead started in December 2008 when Israel invaded Gaza. The duration of the operation was from December 21 to January 18, 2009. There were around 1,400 Palestinian victims of the conflict, while Israeli losses amounted to approximately 13 people, including 10 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. (Johnson, 2011, pp. 95-97, pp. 120-121)

The Turkish response to the operation was unmistakable. Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan felt betrayed by not being informed of the operation, compounded by public protests by Turkish society that responded to the large civilian losses during Operation Cast Lead. Israel's operation ended all Turkish mediation in the ongoing Israeli-Syrian talks⁶, followed by R. T. Erdogan's speech at the Davos conference⁷, where he spoke about a consequential disagreement with the operation. Turkish public opinion turned anti-Israel and partly anti-Semitic. After the speech in Davos, Turkish-Israeli relations worsened as the states' leaders were unwilling to make contact (Bengio, 2009, pp. 52-53). The operation stopped the negotiating process, and Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel was antagonistic.

⁴ Hamas is by US and EU considered a terrorist organisation. (Council of the European Union, 2009; US Department of State, n.d.)

⁵ Before Operation Cast Lead broke out, Israeli and Palestinian forces fired hundreds of rockets at each other. Israel warned that the worsening conflict could lead to open conflict.

⁶ Turkey was in the process of mediating the Syrian-Israeli talks, which at that point had been going on for eight years.

⁷ Prime Minister Erdogan gave a speech at Davos Conference, reacting on Operation Cast Lead, saying he does not understand how Israel can still keep its seat in the UN. Later saying "Thou shall not kill", commenting on Israel's behaviour (Aytürk, 2011, p. 677).

2.2.3 Mavi Marmara Incident – The First physical clash between Turkey and Israel

The first physical clash, after sharing diplomatic history for 60 years, between the modern Turkish Republic and the State of Israel occurred in 2010 during the incident known as the *Mavi Marmara incident*. This incident was an escalation in the operation named Gaza Freedom Flotilla. A part of the flotilla was the Mavi Marmara ship, aiming to break Israel's blockade on Gaza. The ship, carrying a pro-Palestinian activist, was sailing in international waters towards the Gaza strip when Israel's naval commandos assaulted them and killed eight passengers. The Mavi Marmara incident was associated with controversy. The UN released a report in 2011 questioning whether Israel's blockade was legal, if the shooting was necessary, and placing focus on the purpose of the flotilla. The report showed the blockade's legality from Israel's side and essentially did not designate either state as the culprit of the incident. Turkey's dissatisfaction with the report consequently led to a recall of the Israeli ambassador, marking the second occurrence since the establishment of bilateral relations (Efron, 2018, pp. 9-10; Palmer et al., 2011, pp. 3-6). The diplomatic and political relations were brought to a standstill, but trade and tourism were not suspended. However, the hostile atmosphere among the Turks and Israelis decreased general interest in travelling, as negative feelings took priority. (Liel, 2017, p. 5).

The Turkish government considered the Mavi Marmara incident to be one of the worst attacks by foreign troops on the Turkish civilian population. The Turkish government, especially Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan, escalated the crisis, while the Israeli position was silent and non-reciprocal, hoping another crisis would cover the ongoing one. The arrival of the Arab Spring at the turn of 2010 and 2011 bound Turkey even closer to the Muslim states of the MENA region. At that time, Turkey was ready to sacrifice its relations with Israel in order to strengthen its bond with the Islamic world, which brought closer economic cooperation, i.e., trade that has been growing in recent years. Turkey's position, standing against Israel and supporting Muslim countries, was also reinforced by the third consecutive re-election of AKP and R. T. Erdogan as Prime Minister, later becoming president (Alsaftawi, 2016, pp. 6-9).

2.2.4 Re-establishing of Diplomatic Relations

The re-establishment of relations between Turkey and Israel was gradual. In 2010, immediately after the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey announced the demands Israel was meant to meet, as a means to help restore the relations. Firstly, a formal apology for the Mavi Marmara incident was necessary. Secondly, total financial compensation for the victims of the incident was required and lastly, most crucially, Turkey asked for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza. The US had been pressuring Israel to restore relations during US President Obama's visit

to Israel. Two out of the three requirements were upheld, wherein Prime Minister Netanyahu apologised to R. T. Erdogan and the financial compensations were fulfilled. Despite the speculations over the possible re-normalisation of Turkish-Israeli relations, no such steps were taken in 2013. The apology given was insufficient, as the obstructions between the states were far more complex and comprised of many disagreements. Public support for reconciliation was also greatly lacking (Aytürk, 2011, p. 680).

The transforming environment of the Middle East, influenced by the budding Arab Spring movement, caused destabilisation of the region. Turkey was forced to revisit its position towards Israel, which remained one of the few stable states amidst the Uprisings. There were several reasons for the revision of Turkey's policy, such as the deteriorating politics of the Middle East, the unsuccessful attempts to establish political Islam in the revolting countries, or the appearance of ISIS as a new international threat. Furthermore, the emergence of Turkish-Russian tensions and the military attempts to overthrow the Syrian government played a role. From Israel's point of view, maintaining diplomatic relations with a Muslim country with international reach, such as Turkey, is the goal of Israel's foreign policy. The Turkish-Israeli normalisation came in 2016. It has been confirmed that Turkey is willing to sacrifice its ideology in exchange for achieving its national interests, for the Gaza siege was ongoing at the time of normalisation (Alsaftawi, 2016, pp. 6-13).

Peace negotiations stagnated, and the Obama administration pressured Israel to apologise to R. T. Erdogan and mend relations. Tel Aviv refused to apologise, saying it was unwise to apologise to someone like Erdogan. On the other hand, Erdogan's government had to concentrate on domestic affairs due to the instability that was manifesting throughout the Middle East region. The negotiations continued to be delayed, and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts continued⁸. Eventually common interests emerged, facilitating joint action. Both states expressed an interest in stabilising Syria while still projecting their own interests. Turkey was primarily concerned about the Kurds who controlled the northern part of Syria. This demonstrated R. T. Erdogan's fear of the potential threats that a Kurdish rebellion in Turkey could create, possibly even resulting in the formation of a Kurdish state. Secondly, there was also the unrelenting threat of Iran, seen as a disseminator of Political Islam and nuclear threat. The situation was propelled by the United States' withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal with Iran, meaning their presence in the Middle Eastern region diminished, leading to a deeper unbalance in political power. In

⁸ Cast Lead Operation in 2008, followed by the Pillar of Defense Operation in October 2012, manifesting another Gaza War in 2014, and other combats between Israel and Palestinians in Gaza did not help bring Turkey and Israel closer together.

addition to security threats, Israel's interest in selling gas and developing trade remained, which also helped Turkey diversify their gas supplies⁹. The official reconciliation came in July 2016 (Efron, 2018, pp. 11-14). Turkey gained additional financial indemnification for the Mavi Marmara Incident. Both sides agreed on the support of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip, meaning the reparation of damaged infrastructure and material aid. The Hamas leadership perceived Turkey's actions as a capitulation to Israel. This treaty between the two Middle Eastern powers was not seen as a new beginning. It was about shared interests and pragmatic behaviour, not displays of affection (Amidror, 2016, pp. 1-3).

2.2.5 US Embassy in Jerusalem and the Consequences on Turkish-Israeli Relations

The optimistic period after signing the settlement on restoring diplomatic relations was temporary. An exchange of ambassadors followed the deal immediately. However, in May 2018, the US decided to move their embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which caused an international response. Some countries followed the US decision and moved their embassies as well, to the displeasure of others. Turkey opposed this decision, as did the Palestinians. Protests on the Gaza border with Israel cost Palestinian protestors' lives after the clash with the IDF. In response, Turkey recalled its ambassadors from Israel and from the US, prompting Israel to act in reciprocity. The recall of the ambassadors came later as an official statement. The two states lacked diplomatic representation compared to previous situations in 1956, 1989, and 2011. It was a sign of another impending crisis. Israel's reaction was different this time. They did not try for conciliatory talks with Turkey, pointing to Turkey's actions in Cyprus¹⁰ and northern Syria¹¹ instead. Common interests faded away or were side-lined¹². Both states focused on their own interests since there was no political agreement. They did, however, remain connected through the economic sphere. Using each other's ports for oil imports, Israel's routes substituted certain transit paths lost during the Syrian War. Turkey profited from increased tourist visits from Israel and vice versa, but neither Israel nor Turkey wanted to start the talks about a possible political truce (Lindenstrauss et al., 2018, pp. 1-3).

⁹ Turkey used to take 60% of its gas from Russia, but as disagreements between the powers emerged in 2015, Turkey sought other options for gas supplies.

¹⁰ Cyprus is divided into the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkey is the only country recognising its existence). The division arose in 1974 after the Turkish military invaded and occupied approximately one-third of the land. The problem is ongoing (US Department of State, 2021).

¹¹ In 2019, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring in northern Syria. According to Turkey, they aimed to expel Kurdish forces further from the Syrian-Turkish borders, claiming Kurds were a threat to Turkey. Approximately 30 kilometres wide zone was taken.

¹² The gas pipeline leading from Israel to Turkey has been only a proposal. The projects in Gaza for its restoration are stagnant. Turkey has interests in northern Syria, while Israel is focused on southern Syria (Stewart, 2022).

The dynamic between the two states keeps repeating itself. Israel is adapting to the conditions of the Middle East and is managing to establish trade and friendship agreements with other states in MENA, which is not particularly to Turkey's liking. On the other hand, Turkey is trying not to make Israel's situation easier on the international scene, citing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The narrative is starting to change lately, as Israel signed normalisation deals with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. Turkey is concerned over losing its mediatory position, gained through Israel's conflicts with other states in the region, but more importantly is fearful over its political and general role in the Middle East.

3 Abraham Accords Declaration as Normalisation Document

The Abraham Accords are documents normalising diplomatic and economic relations between Israel and the following states. The first formalised documents were signed between Israel on one side and Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other in September 2020 in Washington DC under the administration of US President Donald Trump. Soon after, in December 2020, Morocco joined the normalisation declaration, and Sudan followed the lead in January 2021. States that signed the Accords committed to exchange embassies and ambassadors (US Department of State, 2020).

Turkey was the first country to recognise the existence of Israel in 1949. Under the circumstances of the newly developed Turkish republic with a secularised system, the acknowledgement and support for Israel were less critical than for other Middle Eastern countries. Some simply did not agree with Israel's existence while others waged war against the new state. After the Arab-Israeli conflicts¹³ that brought instability and violence to the region, peace treaties were confirmed between Egypt and Israel in 1979 and Jordan and Israel in 1994. Bahrain, UAE, Morocco, and Sudan were subsequent states to recognise Israel's existence in the region. The Accords have caused, not only diplomatic and economic consequences, but also a shift in geopolitical order. Each state has its determinants, leading to notable changes in perspectives on Israel (Liel, 2017, p. 1).

The Abraham Accords did not suddenly happen out of nowhere. The possible partnership between Israel and conservative Middle Eastern states became an essential question in 2011 after the Arab uprising in the MENA. The states were facing another consistent threat in the form of Iran. The Middle Eastern situation is now divided into two blocks. One leader is represented by Iran and its allies; with Saudi Arabia and its allies, supported by Israel and the US, playing their counterpart. These challenges forced states to cooperate, even though the cooperation of conservative Muslim states and a Jewish Israeli state was unimaginable in the past (The Abraham Accords: Israel–Gulf Arab Normalisation, 2020).

The Abraham Accords treaty represents the changing of Israel's position in the Middle East. Turkey was an active mediator between Israel and the Muslim states in the MENA before the agreements, which means that this is also an intervention into Turkey's role as mediator, given they were used to leading the talks on the situation in the region. Turkey's rhetoric was

¹³ Arab-Israeli wars are series of military conflicts in the Middle East area between Israel and Arab forces. The main cause, playing the role, was the establishment of Israel and the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most significant conflicts happened in 1948-1949, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 2006.

subject to change, depending on the contents of the agreements, which has the potential to debilitate and undermine their position.

3.1 US as a mediator of the Abraham Accords

The United States of America played a significant role in the negotiations. During the prolonged US presence in the Middle East, they also attempted to help safeguard the region against terrorist organisations. Their overall interest however, was to secure the Middle East and, more importantly, to have allies who could superintend over the area and maintain it in the position the US wanted. This could allow them to withdraw their military units and leave the responsibility of ensuring peace on the shoulders of the states involved (Singh, 2022).

US President Donald Trump, whose administration finalised the treaty, described the Abraham Accords as: *“The dawn of a new Middle East”*. Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who signed the Abraham Accords for the State of Israel, emphasised Trump’s effort towards the deal. Netanyahu said it could lead to more Arabic countries following the UAE and Bahrain, which was confirmed when Sudan and Morocco joined the treaty. Trump also predicted that there would be negotiations regarding the question of Palestine. Nevertheless, another problematic situation arose when Trump recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital city and moved the US embassy there. It gave the impression of Trump’s determination to recognize Israel’s dominance over the occupied Jerusalem. The Holy City was meant to stay neutral, according to the Partition Plan adopted by the United Nations on the base of Resolution 181 (Forgey, 2020; United Nations General Assembly 1947).

Current US President Joseph Biden and his team are more pragmatic about the deal, encouraging the international environment to consider possible solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as the US policy agenda wishes for a secure Middle East. However, the Biden administration clarified its position when it stipulated the importance of securing the MENA through the Abraham Accords. They also referred to the importance of remembering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as there is a chance it could be put aside or downplayed (Khalid, 2022).

3.2 Israel’s Motives

The deal opened a new door to Middle Eastern cooperation for Israel. Its good relationship with the US allows other states to pursue better connections with them as well. The situation in MENA is dynamic and, in some ways, unpredictable. The normalisation process is a long-term issue, also because of the Palestinian problem, which has long since alienated the

entire international society. It is Israel's priority to cooperate with the Middle Eastern countries to develop trade, economy, and renewable energy, and ensure its safety in the region.

The normalisation Accords overshadow the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian problem is a tight spot for Israelis. Netanyahu's right-wing government is currently separating the Arab-Israeli conflict from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was the core problem for Muslim countries, stopping them from normalisation deals with Israel before the Israeli-Palestinian issue was solved. Nevertheless, with the withdrawal of the US from the Middle East and the US's tighter connections with Israel, Arab countries changed their position towards normalisation to leave the door to Washington open (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2020b, pp. 4-5).

Israel is well-versed in military, economic, technological, and cyber-security expertise, which it offers to Middle Eastern states through the Abraham Accords. Given their recently strengthened cooperation with the USA, Israel has reached the position of an essential player in the region, and the MENA states are aware of it (The Abraham Accords: Israel-Gulf Arab Normalisation, 2020).

3.3 United Arab Emirates Motives

The vision for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is to be seen as the "*Singapore of the Middle East*". Their interests are focused on international investors and constant economic growth with this aim in mind (Tsukerman, 2023). The UAE are more assertive in their rhetoric about pan-Arabism and were not directly militarily involved in the Arab-Israeli conflicts. This fact helped shape their foreign policy towards Israel in the last few years. The small country with enormous economic potential seeks to collaborate with the US and Israel predominantly on security matters. The changing atmosphere between the UAE and Israel became clearer in 2015 when Israel opened an embassy in Abu Dhabi to attract new investors to the field of renewable energy and sought to deepen and strengthen coactions in cyber security and high technology matters.

UAE and Israel share a ubiquitous set of contemplations, according to the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. The main points are: The danger posed by a democratic transition in the region; Iran as a primary enemy in the area; Urgency in the reduction of Turkish influence; Concerns about the Islamic movement's expansion; And cooperation to decrease the American influence in the region, to avoid certain select US actions that could possibly destabilise the Middle East even more (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2020a, pp. 1-3).

UAE and Israel are committed to cooperation in the areas of security, environment, sustainability, agriculture, science, and technology, and also have shared economic interests. The security matters are based on the Iranian peril, whereas the region as a whole must deal with climate challenges. The collaboration brought former Israeli president Isaac Herzog to the UAE in January 2022 for his first diplomatic visit. These two countries increased their trading levels, and their GDP increased in turn (Holleis, 2022). UAE and Israel's relations are moving forward the fastest out of all the Abraham Accords signatories. According to the Abraham Accords Peace Institute (further AAPI), the UAE was among the most well-prepared for the treaty. Furthermore, the 2022 AAPI Annual Report recognises an increase in the value of exchange of shared interests between these two states, wherein trade, investment and tourism saw the highest margin (2022 Annual Report, 2023, pp. 31).

3.4 Bahrain's Motives

Bahrain was in a similar situation to the UAE. Another small country in the MENA seeks security insurance and a warm relationship with the US. Bahrain and UAE wish to accomplish their needs through Israel's help. Bahrain has a small community of Jews, which in theory compels them to closer cooperation with Israel. Another reality is that Bahrain did not take an active part in the Arab-Israeli military conflict, which made it easier to reach a treaty (The Abraham Accords: Israel–Gulf Arab Normalisation, 2020).

Not all Bahraini residents are supportive of the deal with Israel. The primary reason is the Palestinian cause, as Bahrain describes the main issue for their foreign policy towards Israel. Bahrain's government is trying to point out that the threat of Iran is more critical and it is necessary to have a warm relationship with Israel due to security matters. Herein lies the disagreement between Bahrain's government and the opposition. The AAPI Report states that the cooperation is slower and less progressive than the Israel-UAE partnership. As we look closer, the report also shows that the Israel-Bahrain tandem was on zero-level cooperation before the Abraham Accords, meaning it was a fresh start for trade and investment. It is significant to note that Bahrainis' support for the deal is lower than in 2020. Nevertheless, the communication on government level continues, supported by the reality of Israel's president and prime minister visiting Bahrain in 2022 (2022 Annual Report, 2023, 46-56; Cafiero, 2022; Bateman, 2022).

3.5 Morocco's Motives

Morocco was the third Middle Eastern country that recognised Israel as a state and fully established diplomatic relations like Bahrain and UAE did. In exchange for Morocco's open

diplomacy towards Israel, US President Trump promised to recognise its sovereignty over the Western Sahara region. Even though Western Sahara established its own government, Morocco claimed the territory on historical background. With the signing of the Accords, the area became part of Morocco's territory.

The North-African state has a large community of Jews living on its territory. The treaty now allows unprecedented movement of people between Morocco and Israel, as well as creates opportunities for tourism or student exchange programs. The deepening of cultural and academic ties is closely related to an economic advantage that may arise as a result of increased freedom (2022 Annual Report, 2023, 57-67; Lynfield, 2022).

Morocco has an excellent geographical position due to its closeness to Europe and its placement in northern Africa, acting as a gate to developing countries. This advantageous position also benefits Israel and facilitates trade among the nations. Morocco has a structural plan for its economy and social and environmental policy, which could attract investors from Israel and the UAE. Israel-Morocco potential also lies in renewable energy technologies, tourism, and security (Boyfield, 2022).

3.6 Sudan's Motives

Sudan's situation differs from Bahrain and the UAE's, when it comes to the state's motives and the normalisation part of the deal. Sudan's motives for joining the normalisation deal with Israel can be described as the state's difficult economic situation, the need for regional stability, unilateral foreign policy, and an attempt to gain America's support. Sudan agreed to cooperate with Israel in exchange for being withdrawn from the US list of states supporting terrorism. This removal means that Sudan can receive financial support from international donors, dominantly from the USA. It guarantees a financial budget that should help stabilise the economy and, most importantly, as Sudan is hoping, strengthen and restore the army system (Hendawi, 2021).

On January 6th 2021, Sudan signed the declaration of the Abraham Accords. However, the corresponding main part of the document relating to the actual normalisation of relations with Israel still needs to be signed. The negotiations are currently ongoing. Sudan is now focused on rapprochement with the Gulf countries and the US, in contrast to its earlier tendency towards an alliance with Iran. That also corresponded with the Sudanese domestic policy based on the support of Islamist and jihadist movements. The Sudanese administration experienced changes at high posts. The Accords though, did not enjoy the full-fledged support of the

population or the Sudanese opposition. In April of the same year, Sudan annulled the document¹⁴ that boycotted the economic relationship between states. Sudan-Israeli cooperation could lead to benefits on both sides. Sudan gets financial, military, and political support, and Israel will have an ally along the Red Sea (El-Gizouli, 2021; Spyer, 2023).

3.7 Other Muslim States' Position Towards Abraham Accords

For a comprehensive overview of the situation in the MENA region, it is essential to point out that other states, although they did not sign the Abraham Accords, play a significant role in the relations between Israel and Turkey. Each state has its own motive to want to attain or not to pursue a peace with Israel. Some pro-Abraham states' motives come from the economic and security advantages of the deal.

Kosovo is the first Muslim state to open its embassy in Jerusalem, following the US and Guatemala. Honduras is currently the fourth country to have an embassy in Jerusalem. (Embassy Pages, 2023) Other states had opened special missions there and planned to move their embassies to Jerusalem. Most embassies are located in Tel Aviv, as it is the capital of Israel. Kosovo established diplomatic relations with Israel in February 2021, seeking to have their own sovereignty, based on the 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, validated in exchange. It became the first Muslim-majority country to acknowledge Jerusalem, de facto, as a capital despite the area also being claimed by Palestinians¹⁵ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2021; Simon, 2021; Zhinipotoku & Semini, 2021).

Oman decided not to sign the normalisation deal with Israel, proclaiming complete satisfaction with the form of relations and diplomacy between them. Oman's former sultan died in 2020 and his successor moved the state closer to Iran, despite previously advocating willingness to continue in his predecessor's steps. Oman-Israeli relations began in the 1970s, and, given the current discourse, the likelihood of them unofficially continuing in the same vein as before is high. Oman's leader wants to solve the problem of Palestine first. Another critical factor is Iran's foreign and domestic policy, which plays an essential role in Oman's decision. Oman does not want to antagonise Iran, and the same position is held by Qatar (Barrington, 2021; Klien, 2023).

¹⁴ The document was created in 1958 by Sudan's government. The law banned any future relationship with Israel, mainly in the diplomatic and economic areas, meaning no imports and exports between the states. (Sudan's cabinet votes to Repeal Israel boycott law, 2021)

¹⁵ Israel annexed Jerusalem in the 1967 war, and the city became a disputed territory. A proposed framework, the Two-state solution plan, was meant to solve the Israeli-Palestinian question. (Two-state solution, 2023)

On the whole, Qatar is supportive of Palestinians when it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and is also actively involved in financing Hamas. Qatar maintains the necessary contact with Israel to continue the dialogue on aid to Palestine. The Emir of Qatar informed that the monarchy is not interested in participating in the Abraham Accords on account of not seeing enough Israeli commitment to a two-state solution plan. Additionally, Qatar is maintaining a form of relationship with Iran as well which, to a certain extent, shapes its foreign policy towards the Middle East and Israel. Another key issue is the general lack of public support for the “friendly” veneer of the Abraham Accords, as is evident in other MENA states. Governments wish for the benefits the agreement could provide in terms of economic and structural security questions, but public opinion presents an obstacle.

Iran is seen as a threat by many countries in and outside of the Middle East. With its nuclear arsenal and aggressive, anti-western rhetoric, the tension in the Middle East does not grow weaker. Iran-Israeli relations have had complicated development. From Iran’s recognition of Israel and the establishment of relatively friendly ties, to a turn for the worst during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when Iran denied Israel’s existence itself, their relations cannot be explained in simple terms. Iran’s influence is crucial in understating MENA states’ relationships, including Turkish-Israeli relations, as the whole area is connected (Bermant, 2023, p. 5; Kaye, Nader & Roshan, 2011). Iran also deepened its connection with Russia, seeking to balance the Arab-Israel-US order, primarily started by the signing of the Abraham Accords. (Heiran-Nia, 2023).

Israel’s desire was to sign a peace deal with Saudi Arabia, one of the most dominant states in the area. Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that Saudi Arabia is not planning to join the Accords, building on the fact that the Saudis had come an agreement with Iran about restoring diplomatic relations between them, a deal that was signed in February 2023 in Beijing. The future development between Saudi Arabia and Israel is dependent on financial support from the US as well as Iran’s position in the region (Baker, 2023; Crowley et al., 2023).

3.8 Turkey’s Position on Abraham Accords

Turkey’s initial reaction to the Abraham Accords was widely negative. Turkey condemned the decision of the UAE, describing it as a betrayal of the Palestinian nation and its peace initiatives in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, eliminating the Arab Peace Initiative¹⁶. The

¹⁶ The Arab Peace Initiative is a proposal by Arab states to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The proposal was introduced in 2002 by the League of Arab States, which now has 22 members. Abraham Accords states (Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates) are also members, but Turkey is not.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs even announced its support for Palestinians (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2020a). In the beginning, Turkey was stumped by the decision of the UAE and Bahrain, later followed by Morocco and Sudan. This was made clear by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's rhetoric disapproving of MENA's efforts to reach diplomatic and trade agreements with Israel, as well as pro-government media reports in Turkey claiming that the future normalisation of the Middle Eastern states and Israel is directed primarily against Turkey. From this perspective, it is apparent that Turkey's support was directed towards the Palestinians during the time of the first news about normalisation (Butler et al., 2020; Coskun, 2020). However, after just one year, in 2021, the rhetoric regarding Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel began to change, as described in the first chapter. Turkish interest was directed to maintaining a privileged position in the Middle East.

4 Turkey' Foreign Policy after the Abraham Accords

Turkish-Israeli relations last worsened in 2018, when Turkey responded to the killing of 60 Palestinian protesters on the Gaza-Israel border. This situation occurred following the US decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Back then, Ankara stood behind the Palestinians, rejecting Israel's reaction to the protests. It could be argued that the deterioration of relations occurred because of the issue of Palestine, an emerging part in the background of Turkish-Israeli relations. Support for the Palestinians increased with the rise of the AKP, but it is not the only trend that can be observed. With the rise of AKP, the Turkish foreign and domestic political orientation started to lean more towards the Arab states and turn their back on Israel, supporting Palestinians even more. Ankara balanced on the border between Western and Muslim space while trying to maintain its relevance in the international political field. Turkey began to find itself in regional isolation, and with a combination of economic crises, Turkey ostensibly revisited its attitude since it found itself in a difficult position. Inflation was high, and Ankara was trying to conclude new agreements that could ensure a safer and, above all, more stable situation. During such a compromising turn of events, stability of the domestic market would have meant an advantage, and agreements with other economically growing states would have also ensured a possible correction of the international reputation that had been undermined through Turkey's policies.

As described in the first chapter, recent developments are characterised by changes in Turkish behaviour not only towards Israel but also towards the US, Middle Eastern states, and other potential partners. The position of the AKP and the degree to which it is now essential in determining and directing Turkish foreign policy remains somewhat controversial. The ideology and opinion of this right-wing party, with a neo-Ottoman mindset leaning towards political Islam, were suppressed to a certain extent. This chapter will outline the Turkish development after the Abraham's agreements, especially in relations with Israel, but other essential partnership states for Turkey will not be omitted.

4.1 The Turkish Interest – Economic and Strategic Agreements

With the signing of the Abraham Accords, the prestige of Turkey's 1949 recognition of Israel was diminished. Turkey had a unique position until the Abraham Accords, despite Israel's peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt¹⁷. After signing the Abraham Accords, Bahrain, UAE,


¹⁷ Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Jordan relations did not develop as smoothly as relations with Israel's relations with Turkey.

Morocco, and Sudan gained a unique position towards Israel and USA, benefiting from it. Looking at the position of the UAE in the Middle East more closely, it is perceived as a Turkey's competitor thanks to its growing economic status, as well as the fact that Abu Dhabi and Dubai serve as new transfer hubs on the way from Europe to Asia. UAE partially took over the position that was previously held by Turkey's Istanbul in this matter. The eventual establishment of deeper UAE-Israeli ties in the energy sector also threatened Turkey, as these sectors remain one of the most important to Turkey's economy. In retrospect, Turkey's reaction to the signing of the Abraham Accords by the UAE was harsh, as they threatened to withdraw their diplomats from the Emirates. With the deepening of Turkey's regional isolation and the election of the new US President, Joe Biden, Turkey would have had to sacrifice too much if it stood up to the various threats it was facing. It likely would have had profound adverse effects on the Turkish economy (Daniel et al., 2022, pp. 96-97). Instead, Turkey started with more moderate positions towards all states, sensing the dynamic change of the Middle Eastern political system. Several economic and trade agreements were signed, building new ties. Turkish efforts to balance power in the region resulted in talks with Iran. At the end of 2021, Tehran and Ankara announced new cooperation proposals to deepen mutual relations. This was confirmed by the mid-2022 announcement of an effort to reach \$30 billion in bilateral trade. Turkey's leaning towards Iran has driven the Abraham Accords' states, mainly the UAE, in an effort to bring Turkey closer to cooperation with Abrahamic states (Baycar, 2022).

In March 2023, Turkey and the UAE signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement to increase trade to 40 billion dollars in the next five years, focusing on renewable energy, agriculture technology, and food security. Before the agreement, Turkey and UAE had already signed a series of economic accords and agreed on bilateral defense cooperation in 2022. From the UAE's side, the 2023 agreement is a vision to reduce Turkey-Iran efforts to strengthen their mutual trade ties. The United Arab Emirates are gradually becoming an influential economic partner, trying to boost their position within the Middle Eastern rivalry with the support of the USA. Thanks to the unfavourable Turkish economic situation, aggravated by the devastating earthquake at the beginning of 2023, Turkey is looking for financial injections. The countries of the Persian Gulf, led mainly by the UAE and Israel, seem to be optimal and willing partners to provide Turkey with the necessary finances. The influx of new investment could help Turkey recover from a massive 2022 devaluation of the Turkish lira, the highest since the AKP came to power in 2002, as visible in *Figure 2* (Republic of Türkiye, n.d.). As described in the first chapter, Ankara reduced support for Palestinians, represented by the Hamas movement. As a proxy for the Abraham Accords, UAE considers Hamas and groups like

the Muslim Brotherhood as disruptive elements to the stability of the Middle East. The UAE hopes Turkey's financial support will force Ankara to keep its support for these groups to a minimum. Focusing on renewable energy, agriculture, food security and more, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement points to the importance of the Abraham Accords countries, which are gaining more political and economic power (Alqarout, 2023).

Figure 2



Note. Republic of Turkey inflation rate since 1980. Adapted from *IMF*, by International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 2023, April 22 (<https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/TUR#countrydata>)

Turkey's economic agreement with the UAE is an essential component in Turkey's plan to improve their economic situation. Turkey also achieved another success in the form of the US-Turkey Strategic Statement from January 2023. Turkey is, in the long-term, interested in closer cooperation with the US as a global power. The statement reflects the needs of both

Turkey and the US. The main points concern the deepening of security cooperation and strengthening of the defense partnership (US Department of State, 2023). The improvement of relations between the USA and Turkey is accompanied by a revision of the Turkish view of the current situation in the international environment. Turkey wants to stand on the side of strong states in order to secure its position next to the US, the Arab states and also next to Israel. From the neorealist approach described in the first chapter, Turkey aims to survive and fit into the new Middle Eastern political order. US-Israeli relations have always been favourable, and the US is among Israel's supporters, which was declared by the Abraham Accords and mediated by the US government. Turkey tried to use the US-Israeli friendship to have an open the door to the US. The Turkish-Israeli warming of diplomatic ties preceded this US-Turkish rapprochement.


4.2 Turkish-Israeli Normalisation Steps in 2022

The announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey took place in March 2022, after a meeting of foreign ministers in Ankara. Compared to the 2018 normalisation, Turkey has been more open to the normalisation processes, which is a claim supported by numerous high-level visits between Turkey and Israel starting in 2022. As previously stated, 2022 was not an easy year for Turkey regarding economic stability. The Ankara government found itself in partial political isolation and an economic crisis and observed from afar how the Middle Eastern states are converging and deepening their economic, trade and security ties. Turkish non-participation in the normalisation processes between Israel on the one hand and selected states on the other has deepened Turkish dissatisfaction. The Turkish-Israeli normalisation process and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the countries seem to be more necessary for Turkey than for the Israeli side at the moment. Israel no longer found itself in complete isolation, and the recognition of its existence by the four MENA states raised its political prestige even further. The positions of Turkey and Israel slowly began to turn. The Abraham Accords proved that Israel did not need Turkey for its integration into Middle Eastern politics. The new Middle Eastern environment forced Turkey onto the bandwagon strategy. Turkey and Israel's reconciliation is more about overcoming old grievances. On the part of Turkey, it is obviously more about pragmatic adaptation to conditions than an internal change of the ideological line within the state (Daniel et al., 2022, pp. 97-99).

4.3 A Possible Scenario of Turkish Accession to the Abraham Accords Alliance

The next step that could be presumed as logical, is the inclusion of Turkey in the Abraham Accords states coalition, which would ensure a Turkish-Israeli partnership framed by the treaty. Over the past two years, Turkey has begun to cooperate with the UAE, renewed its diplomatic relations with Israel, and at the same time, is steadily getting closer to the US. First, there is an economic perspective that needs to be looked at. It is apparent that exports from Turkey to Israel and USA are increasing, and a similar situation is occurring in the case of the UAE. Available data from OEC remark that in January 2023, in a year-by-year report, Turkey's fastest-growing export market led to the USA (OEC, 2023). The analysed data are shown in *Figure 3*. Accession to the Accords would only bring additional benefits from the coalition to Turkey.

Figure 3



Note. Turkey's export in % from 2017 to 2021. Adapted from *OEC*, Retrieved 2023, April 23 (<https://oec.world/en/profile/country/tur>)

The second perspective offering cooperation is in the field of energy. Turkey and Israel share common interests in the field of liquefied gas, seeking to be compensated by the EU for gas losses from Russia due to the current international situation¹⁸. There is a possibility for

¹⁸ Russian aggression in Ukraine, which started in March 2022.

Israel to transport natural gas through a pipeline through Turkish territory. Turkey hopes the move would give it more control over disputed territories in the Aegean Sea. This dispute is between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey (Pacheco, 2022).

Thirdly, a security perspective is offered. Turkey, as a member of NATO, together with the USA, shares standards and obligations that must be fulfilled within the framework of the partnership. In recent years, Turkey sought to purchase F-16 fighter jets, but the US Congress, which approves these purchases, has become relatively reserved to the proposal. The prospect of Israel sharing security ideas in favour of Turkish interests with the US could help Turkey with this matter. Jewish organisations in Washington have a strong lobbying influence on the US government. Possible Turkish membership in the Abraham Accords would bring benefits to all parties. It would be about ensuring greater regional security within the Middle East. Turkey's ties with economically and politically growing states within the region would be strengthened, and similarly, the US interest in cooperation with Turkey could potentially rise (Pacheco, 2022).

Conclusion

Turkish-Israeli relations clearly cannot be described in one word. The complexity of the mutual relationship rests on the current situation in the Middle East region. Israel was a country looking for a partner that would provide a specific form of security and strategic and economic cooperation. On the other hand, Turkey was influenced by its neighbouring Muslim states, which, in most cases, opposed Israel. Turkey was forced to balance on the border of two contradictory worlds. Until the signing of the Abraham Accords, Turkish foreign policy towards Israel was based on national and ideological beliefs. These ideological differences between Ankara and Tel Aviv have deepened with the rise of the AKP led by current President R. T. Erdogan. Turkey started its aggressive rhetoric and leaned to the side of the Palestinians, who played an important role in this case. After Abraham's agreements, however, Turkey began to find itself in isolation, also contributed to by the deteriorating economic situation and the influence of domestic political actors weakening.

This work aimed to name, evaluate, and analyse the changes in Turkish foreign policy after the signing of the Abraham Accords. As explained in the thesis, it can be said that the critical economic situation, isolation, American influence in the Middle Eastern region, and the formation of the Abraham Accords was an irritating combination for Turkey, leading to a revision of its position. At the same time, Turkey moderated its rhetoric due to its vested interest in the economic sector, which exceeded its interest in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A year after the signing of the Abraham Accords, it began to seek rapprochement with Israel, the UAE, and the USA. These three states represent important partners for Turkish trade and export, which could further develop in security and strategic cooperation. Revision of Turkish foreign policy was inevitable. If it did not happen, Turkey would have gradually excluded itself from the system it wished to remain in. To survive, states need partnerships with fellows who can provide some insurance, in the case of Turkey, particularly financial support. Turkey's pragmatic approach was a reaction to changes in the Middle East region that Ankara was unable to influence.

Abraham Accords push all the actors to neorealist thinking. We cannot say if the cooperation between them will be a success or not, but it forces states to revisit their actions and statements. The Abrahamic partnership is about mutual interest. In this case, ideological as well as religious differences were put aside. In the end, it came to the point where even Turkey had to deny its ideological convictions in order to achieve cooperation with the new growing powers of the Middle East, which are Israel and the UAE. This newly created system forces Turkey to

think realistically, which means that it must adapt to the conditions that have arisen. In the same way, Turkish interest is directed towards the USA. As described in earlier chapters, Turkey is trying to acquire new partners and renew old partnerships that appear to be beneficial, which is the example of Israel.

However, a relatively small number of studies have been published on the chosen topic. In order to see the apparent effects of the Abraham Accords on Turkish-Israeli relations, it is necessary to look at the issue from a broader perspective. For this reason, data related to Turkish exports, GDP and inflation rate up to the present time were also used in this work because even in the relatively short time that has passed since the signing of the Accords, developments in the Turkish economy as seen in attached graphs can be seen. The subject of the Abraham's agreements in connection with Turkey was not exhausted by this work by any means. What further effects this Arab-US-Israeli cooperation will have on Turkish and Middle Eastern politics is unclear. Nevertheless, as this work has suggested, changes are happening across the MENA landscape. Previously, the recognition of the existence of Israel by Muslim states seemed like an unattainable goal without first resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This new beginning shows that states may be willing to abandon certain, previously seemingly deep-rooted, convictions to protect their interests in the long run. How the ramifications of these agreements will play out will be clearer over the course of the next few years. We also have yet to see how the upcoming presidential elections, that will take place in Turkey in May 2023, will be impacted. From the neorealist perspective, Turkey adapting to the new political games enabled through the signing of the Abraham Accords was inevitable.

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Abstract

Turkish foreign policy towards Israel has seen its bright moments, but also difficult times. Cooperation between the states persisted at least on the economic level, however, their opinions diverged in the areas of security, and especially foreign policy regarding the Middle East region. In 2020 the State of Israel signed an agreement establishing diplomatic relations with four Arab countries – Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, following Sudan, and Morocco in 2021. The normalisation deal is called Abraham Accords. The agreement was signed with the great support of US former president Donald Trump, who described it as a deal of the 21st century. Israel attempts to connect with Arab countries, but Turkey stood sideways and watched the dynamic changes in the Middle East.

Lately, Turkey started diplomatic talks with Israel as well as with other actors in the region as they fear lose control over the situation in the area. This thesis will examine how the Turkey changed its narrative towards Israel after signing the Abraham Accords, but especially how Turkey was forced to change its foreign policy toward Israel. The observation of the change's clashes between ideology and pragmatism.

Key Words

Turkey, Turkey's Foreign Policy, Israel, Abraham Accords, Middle East, USA, Morocco, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Sudan

Abstrakt

Turecká zahraniční politika vůči Izraeli zaznamenala svoje světlé chvíle, ale i těžké časy. Spolupráce mezi státy přetrvávaly alespoň v ekonomické rovině, nicméně jejich názory se rozcházel v oblastech bezpečnosti, a především zahraniční politiky, týkající se Blízkovýchodního regionu. Rok 2020 přinesl dohodu ustavující diplomatické vztahy mezi Izraelem na jedné straně a čtyřmi arabskými státy na straně druhé, jimiž jsou Bahrajn, Spojené arabské emiráty, které následovalo Maroko a Súdán. Normalizační dokumenty s názvem Abrahamovy dohody byly podepsány s podporou bývalého amerického prezidenta Donalda Trumpa, jenž je popsal jako významné dohody 21. století. Izrael navázal kontakt s arabskými státy, ale Turecko stálo stranou a pozorovalo dynamické změny na Blízkém východě.

V poslední době se Turecko otevřelo diplomatickým rozhovorům, jak s Izraelem, tak s dalšími aktéry v regionu, protože se obávalo ztráty kontroly nad situací na Blízkém východě. Tato práce si snaží objasnit, jak Turecko změnilo svůj narativ vůči Izraeli po podpisu Abrahamových dohod. Hlavně jde ale o examinaci toho, čím bylo Turecko donuceno ke změně politiky vůči Izraeli, jež jsou závislé na změny v politice blízkovýchodní států, zda jde o ideologické či pragmatické změny.

Klíčová slova

Turecko, turecká zahraniční politika, Izrael, Abrahamovy dohody, Blízký východ, USA, Maroko, Bahrajn, Spojené arabské emiráty, Súdán