

Palacký University Olomouc

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International Development Studies



**The analysis of conflict in Somalia with a focus on
migration consequences**

**Analýza konfliktu v Somálsku se zaměřením na migrační
konsekvence**

Bachelor Thesis

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Olomouc 2017

Declaration of Authorship

I do solemnly declare that I have written the presented bachelor’s thesis. The analysis of conflict in Somalia with a focus on migration consequences and that it is entirely my own work except where otherwise indicated. All sources that have been used are stated in the references section.

In Olomouc (date): Signature:

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Cílem bakalářské práce je analyzovat dlouhotrvající konflikt v Somálsku, zvláště se zaměřit na migrační důsledky, které jsou s tímto konfliktem spojeny.

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Abstract

This bachelor thesis focuses on the conflict in Somalia and the migration consequences that were caused by the prolonged crisis. It is divided into chapters, starting with introduction of Somalia as a state, its population, social structure and political situation in the country. This chapter is followed by analysis of the conflict. It begins in the times of colonialism when the colonial powers divided the country and forced on their own practices instead of the traditional ways. It continuous to times of independency, dictatorship and finally the state collapse and civil war. After the conflict has been properly explained, the thesis moves onto its next focus, that is the migration consequences. The paper explores the data available from UNHCR and well as World Bank and other international organisation with a purpose to illustrate how the migration situation in current Somalia looks.

Key words

Somalia, Somaliland, Siad Barre, civil war, Al Shabab, clans, refugees, IDPs

Abstrakt

Tato bakalářská práce se zaměřuje na konflikt v Somálsku a migrační konsekvence, které vznikly právě kvůli dlouhotrvající krizi v zemi. Práce je rozdělena do kapitol, začínaje s představením Somálska jako země, populace, sociálního uspořádání a politické situace v zemi. Tato kapitola je následována analýzou konfliktu. Začíná v časech kolonialismu, kdy koloniální mocnosti zemi rozdělily a namísto tradičních způsobů vládnutí v zemi nastolily své způsoby. Práce pokračuje dobou nezávislosti, diktátorstvím a nakonec občanskou válkou. Poté, co je konflikt dostatečně představen, se práce posouvá k dalšímu podnětu, na migrační následky způsobené konfliktem. Jsou zkoumána data dostupná z UNHCR, Světové banky a dalších mezinárodních organizací s cílem představit, jak vypadá současná migrační krize v Somálsku.

Klíčová slova

Somálsko, Somaliland, Siad Barre, občanská válka, Al Šabab, klany, uprchlíci, vnitřně vysídlené osoby

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List of abbreviations

AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
EU – European Union
ICU – Islamic Courts Union
IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP – Internally Displaced People
IOM – International Organization for Migration
LDS – Least developed countries
NSC – National Security Courts
QRF – Quick Reaction Forces
SNL – Somali National League
SNM – Somali National Movement
SRC – Supreme Revolutionary Council
SYL – Somali Youth League
TNG – Transnational National Government
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
US – United States
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF – United Task Force; Operation Restore Hope
UNOSOM I – United Nations Operation in Somalia One; Operation Provide relief
UNOSOM II – United Nations Operation in Somalia Two;
USP – United Somali Party
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Methodology

This thesis is based on information and data already available that were taken as they were or taken and further edited and processed. At first, there was a substantial research made about the issue that also served as a base for the part of this thesis where the conflict is introduced and analysed as well as for all the theoretic parts and some of the figures. The used sources are available online as they are both the best accessible and also from foreign sources as the problematic of Somalia is often dealt with by either international agencies or foreign authors and researchers. The data that were further used and processed were taken from two sources – UNHCR databank and the World Bank. These are two international agencies. UNHCR – United Nation Refugee Agency, is a global organisation focusing on refugees and displaced persons (UNHCR, 2017a). The World Bank is a global partnership that focuses on reducing poverty in developing countries (World Bank, 2017a). The data from UNHCR are collected by three main providers: governmental agencies, UNHCR field offices and NGOs, additionally in cases of refugees, administrative systems. The accuracy of the data their limitation, especially concerning Somalia, where there is no possibility to, for example, arrange a proper census or administration of the refugees outside the camps. Therefore, it must be noted that the data are limited by the fact that they are often only estimated. Last census in the country was in the year 1975 and ever since, only estimated data were released (UNICEF, 2015; UNHCR; 2017b). The World Bank data uses data from several different, generally official, sources that are carefully compiled together (World Bank, 2017b). The figures used for the chapter about Internally Displaced People are taken from IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, as the primer data cannot be extracted but the figures are available to work with at their open online Global Internal Displacement Database (GIDD). Their data are coming from monitoring and estimation based on the ground of what is learned from the monitoring. They also collect data from different partner sources as are for example national and subnational government authorities, UN agencies and other international organizations (IDMC, 2017a, b)

The data used from UNHCR are available only until the year 2013, that is why the data end with that year. These data were also used as they focus on refugees who are those affected by war, as there is also migration caused by natural causes. There is number of concepts that ought to be specified. The following terms are defined by UNHCR, as their data are the ones used and as the other institution follow the definitions of UN as well.

Refugees: Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. In the absence of Government estimates, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in 24 industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual refugee recognition. (UNHCR, 2014)

Internally displaced persons (IDPs): People or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population only includes conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. Since 2007, the IDP population also includes people in an IDP-like situation. (UNHCR, 2017c)

Returned refugees: former refugees who have returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion but are yet to be fully integrated. Such return would normally only take place in conditions of safety and dignity. (UNHCR, 2017c)

Furthermore, there are definitions by World Bank, as their data were used in the cases these terms are present.

Net migration: Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. Data are five-year estimates. (World Bank, 2017c)

There is also one procedure as it is the most suitable for this case to be used while comparing the progress in numbers called fixed base index: *For this type of index, the value in any specific time period is based on the value in the initial time period and this base remains unchanged throughout the index. This is different from a chain base index in which values in any period are based on the preceding time period. (Nasdaq, 2017)*

Literature review

While doing research for this thesis, many articles, studies, reports and more were examined. The best source for historical context, process and duration of the conflict were the articles and studies that consider the current situation through examining the roots of the conflict. These are for example the book from Afyare Abdi Elmi (2010) *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration* where is devoted a whole chapter called *Understanding the Sources of Somali Conflict* where is very well describes what according to Elmi brought Somalia to the state is today. The chapter looks into the problem from more perspectives and does not omit the consequences of the colonial times, international involvement and also examines why the peace negotiations failed. It is very solid work that provides relevant and comprehensive insight into the situation (Elmi, 2010). However, the reports are very resourceful as well, they are processed very coherently and serve to pass information, not digging deeper, which can be both advantage and disadvantage, depending on the reader. The best source found when it comes to clans and clan structures appeared to be the report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation (2009). This report very clearly described and explained the clan system in Somalia that is otherwise extremely complex but needs to be understands, as the clans played significant role throughout the conflict and do until now (ACCORD, 2010). On the other hand, it does not explain exactly this link. That is better explained in the other chapter of the Elmi book *Clan Identity and Implications for Peacebuilding in Somalia* as well as in the article by Markus V. Höhne (2006) *Political identity, emerging state structures and conflict in northern Somalia* which both explore links between not only the duration of the conflict and clans but also the potential these clans have for building peace in the country. Höhne looks at the fighting as a certain expression of identity and its conflict with the government. The paper presents as the way out of conflict by limiting the influence of the central government that the politicians are trying to achieve. Höhne is not the only author bringing up the thought that the way towards peace lie in the clans and speaks of the importance of national and clan identity in many aspects (Höhne, 2006, see also for example Leeson, (2007) *Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse*). Concerning migration, the most useful resources are the reports from and for international organisations operating in Somalia, providing humanitarian. These are very informative when it comes to migration, the refugees and IDPs. For example, the reports from organisation as are IOM or UNHCR are the most up to date and cover broad area of topics. These reports were the main

source of data and information about displaced people in this thesis. In this case, websites of these and other organizations were searched and found to be very useful sources of data as well. Nonetheless, the limitation found is that these are very much concentrate on the Horn of Africa and the other countries seems to be pushed into the background. The other focus given often is the interventions and involvement of the international forces. Brian J Hesse (2014) writes in the article *Two Generations, Two Interventions in One of the World's Most-Failed States: The United States, Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia* about forces deployed into Somalia as a mean of hope but also as a political tool. Hesse's approach is very intriguing in the sense that he considers the involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia next to the US (Hesse, 2014). That is not usual, as more often the US and UN interventions are places above those from different countries and are focused more on.

Overall, there is quite a good number of articles, studies and reports focusing on the topic of Somalia. There are some gaps thought. When talking about the conflict, often the colonial times are either hardly at all or very little considered and it is not often reported what deeper consequences the times had on society. The same goes for the times of Second World War and Cold War. These are just a fraction of the resources used in this thesis, nevertheless, they served as a ground for the research of the key aspects of the crisis. A lot more materials were used as the topic is very complex and broad and with all specific aspect more resources were added.

Introduction

For the past few years, our world has become much more violent and unstable. The words refugee and migration crisis is constantly on everyone's mind. This thesis serves to remind of the most prolonged and dire refugee crisis in the world together with the causes of it – long standing and ongoing conflict in country that didn't see peace and freedom for almost a half a century. First, there was a dictatorship, then a civil war followed by the rise of warlords and terrorists. Since 1988, the county is constantly in a state of conflict and almost as long without functional central government (UNDP Somalia, 2017). Somalia is in an extremely complex state of affairs with no clear or easy solution. The political, economic, security and development situations are so bad that it came to the point that the state is likely to harm their citizens rather than to protect them. The people live in poverty, constant threat of violence, fear and insecurity that resulted from the conflict. What is more, over the years of conflict, the country was hit by famine two times, the second time just a few years ago. The most affected area being those most vulnerable in the centre of conflict – the south of the country. As a result of all these factors, but primarily due to the never-ending conflict and violence, people are fleeing from their home in large numbers, as it is impossible to live under such poor conditions. The aim of this paper is to introduce and explore the long-standing intricate conflict in the collapsed state of Somalia, as one of the biggest political, humanitarian and migration crisis in the modern world. It is also to find out and question what it is that caused this status quo, in which, despite the efforts of international community, there was no such progress made that the conflict in coming to its end. Finally, through the description of the conflict, the thesis will show the circumstances in which the people are living in and thus show the context from which and why they flee. Following this, the refugee crisis will be more explored in numbers as well as in theory, as the migration consequences do have effect not only the states surrounding but also the whole world. This thesis will sequentially introduce the background – population, social context, importance of the clans, political situation and how the country is divided. It will be followed by analysis of the conflict, that is its short history which shows the roots and causes, colonial times and what remained after the colonizers, continued with the time of dictatorship, where the grounds for the now occurring civil war and migration crisis were laid down. Finally, when there is enough information given for a good idea of the situation, this thesis will move onto the migration consequences, focusing on refugees outside the country as well as on internally displaced people.

In the conclusion, some ideas of steps that could be further taken will be given. It is an acute theme, as the crisis has been in the country so long that it has become irresolvable problem that is rather not spoken about among broad public. Therefore, this thesis is aimed to remind the dire situation of the country, its roots and complexity as well as the consequences.

About Somalia

The situation in Somalia as for today is many things but new. It is ongoing and prolonged status in which the country remains for more than 15 years. They do not have an effective central government as the state collapsed in 1991 and has not been properly re-established ever since. Even though there was some progress made and the government of Somalia is in fact recognized internationally and has diplomatic relations, it functions only on paper. Normally, the government is responsible for the wellbeing of the society and citizens. Unfortunately, Somalia is not the case. It is not unusual in developing countries that more than one ruler uses the means he has as a leader for his own good, benefits and intentions. When this is the case the state is not only failing in its purpose but can become the prime reason why it is so. Somalia is no exception in this matter (USIP, 2017; Al Jazeera, 2017) Peter T. Leeson (2007) goes so far in his article *Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse* that he claims that after applying 18 different indicators allowing pre- and post-stateless welfare comparisons, Somalis would in fact be better off without any regime than it is now, under the government. And as is said in the article “*Somalia therefore provides an interesting natural experiment to explore the hypothesis that if government is predatory enough, anarchy may actually prove superior in terms of economic development*” (Leeson, 2007) Unfortunately, what can be seen so far is not refuting this theory.

Through this chapter and the chapter following, this paper will explain how it is that Somalia got into this situation that will be further more examined. It is crucial to understand where the state stands to comprehend the main consequence upon this paper will focus – migration, as over one million people is displaced just inside Somalia, due to the decades of conflict (UNDP Somalia, 2017). To see the linkups and connections we first should explore the great diversity of the society and its complexity which will help to understand the reasons of the conflict that will be more described in the chapters following about history and the roots of the conflict and about the conflict itself.

Geography

Country called Somalia (in Somali language Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka ee Soomaaliya), is an easternmost country of Africa, situated in Sub-Saharan Africa, the so called Horn of Africa, that consist of Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, with whom the country also borders, together with Kenya. It has a good geopolitical position – right between sub-Saharan Africa and the



Figure 1: National park and mountains of Somalia (source: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012)

countries of Arabia and southwestern Asia with a capital city of Mogadishu, located on the shore of Indian ocean and is divided in 18 regions. The land extends from south of the Equator northward to the Gulf of Aden. Somalia has few geographical extremes, with a mainly broken into plateaus, plains and highlands, dry and hot climate with seasonal monsoon winds, depending on the region and landscapes of thorn bush savanna and semi desert. The land is mostly flat (which is important for local people as it means good mobility for nomads and their livestock) with an exception on the coastal zone in the north that is mountainous, where also the highest peak lies – in the Cal Madow mountains, the Shimbiris (2,416 m), the lowest point is the Indian Ocean at 0 m. Somalia has also the longest coastline of all in Africa – 3,025 km long. (Janzen and Lewis, 2017; Sunderhaus, 2014)

Government and society

Government

Officially federal republic with two legislative houses, but as will be shown later, the regime is not properly effective. The Federal Government of Somalia was established in 2012 and ended the interim mandate of the Transitional Federal Government, that was, in fact, officially functioning democracy that did not exist and had no power over the country. The head of state is currently Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, previously prime minister and his term has just newly begun as he was inaugurated on February 22nd (Janzen and Lewis, 2017; Al Jazeera, 2017)

Population

Their official language is Somali and Arabic, official religion being Islam. Population estimated for around 10 to 11 million people in the whole country, including the autonomous and semi-autonomous parts (13 to 14 million Somali, if those living outside the country are counted in). Most of the people live in rural areas (urban: 38.4%, rural: 61.6% - both for 2012) The life expectancy is, although unsurprisingly, very low – 49.9 years for men and 54.1 for women as for a 2015. Literacy is also very low, for what is known – male 25.1 % and female even less – 3.1 %. (Al Jazeera, 2017; Janzen and Lewis, 2017; UNDP in Somalia, 2017). Sixty percent of the population are of nomadic nature, the rest are farmers living where the most fertile land is – between the rivers Juba and Shebelle. This way of life is very insecure as crops and livestock grazing depend on rain cycles. This is one of the reasons why the population is so vulnerable (more developed later in the humanitarian situation section). There is also growing urbanisation which brings on more risks, as there is no such a thing as urban planning. (Kaplan, 2012; Sunderhaus, 2014; Almansa, 2015)



Figure 2: The growth of Somalia population (source: tradingeconomics.com/World Bank, 2017)

The fertility rate for 2017 is 6.51 – it has been for three years now. Compared to previous years, it is decreasing – in 2010, it was 7.1, in 2000 7.7, therefore, the population is now not expected to grow as fast as it used to, current growth rate is 2.87% and forecast for the year 2020 is slightly below 12.5 million of people with fertility rate 6.12 and decreasing. Generally, the share of man and women is equal and the population is gradually growing, with current density 18 per km². (as seen in figures 2 and 3)




Figure 3: Population pyramid of Somalia (source: CIA, 2016)




Figure 4: Population density by regions (source: Perry-Castañeda Library, 2002)

As said, the urbanisation is increasing (also due to the inflow of IDPs, which will be focus upon in later chapter). Almost 42% of the population is urban and the largest settlements are Mogadishu (2 587 183), Hargeysa (477 876), Berbera (242 344), Kismayo (234 852) and Marka (230 100). In figure 4 can be seen the population density by regions, the highest density being around rivers in the south and central Somalia (Worldometers, 2017; World Population Review, 2017; Tradingeconomics, 2017).

Clan identity

While there is exceptionally homogenous composition when it comes to population it terms of religion, culture and language. Majority of the people are of Somali origin and of Muslim religion. However, it is important to mention the clan diversity that Somalia holds within (Elmi, 2010). There is no need to go deeper in this chapter as to analyse all the clan relationships (their role and part will be described in some details later on in following chapters) but there is a certain importance in knowing the about them for better understanding. The clans have complex bonds (whether positive or negative) not only between them but with to the government as well and do still play an important role in the whole process. The clans have a very strong position when it comes to decision making and ruling.

The voting process in Somalia




Figure 5: The clan-based voting process in Somalia (source: Al Jazeera, 2017)

The figure 5 shows very important information. That is the executional structure in Somalia. As has been said and can be seen on this figure of governmental structure, the highest position when it comes to the decision making, the clan elders are on the top of it and do in fact elect those electing the president and are those who held the actual power in their hands. In fact, many scholars, analysts and writers argued that clan identity of Somalis is the prime cause of everything that their system is irreconcilable with the state system needed for a properly functioning state government and some also claim that

he only path to peace is the return to the traditional, pre -colonial political system, where the clans and ethnic communities ruled, is the key and right step towards the peace. (Elmi, 2010; Fatah, 2002). As was already written, this will be elaborated later on.

Humanitarian situation

Somalia is among the least-developed countries (LDS) in the world and local development indicators remain among the worst on the world. With an estimated 10 - 11 million Somalis, there is a 73% poverty rate with approximately 875 000 people that require urgent and life-saving assistance and 2 million needs continued livelihood support, as there is a lack of employment and food insecurity is no exception. In addition, there is more than 2 million displaced who are very vulnerable as in human rights violation, sexual and gender based violence and more. In total 5 million people is in need of emergency food aid, according to U.N. agencies. When speaking about save environment, it is rather possible to manage the risk connected to delivering assistance, not to avoid them. (USIP, 2017; Leeson, 2007; UNDP Somalia, 2017). The growing number of people fleeing out of the country as well as being displaced in the country is unsustainable, not to mention that development of any kind in the country is nearly impossible. The situation for NGOs is not very safe as well. In the first two months of 2017, 16 incidents occurred to NGOs, “*meaning both criminal and conflict related events; serious (i.e. killings/abductions) and non-serious (i.e. threats, petty robbery) incidents;*

and occurrences of both direct, indirect and/or accidental/collateral involvement” (INSO, 2017). One life of NGO worker was lost and two NGO workers were abducted. (INSO, 2017)




Figure 6: Fragile States Index 2016 (source: Messner and Haken, et al., 2016)

Current situation

FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2016	TOTAL
SOMALIA	114,0
SOUTH SUDAN	113,8
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	112,1
SUDAN	111,5
YEMEN	111,5
SYRIA	110,8
CHAD	110,1
CONGO (D. R.)	110,0
AFGHANISTAN	107,9
HAITI	105,1

FIGURE 7: FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2016, TOP TEN (SOURCE: MESSNER AND HAKEN, ET AL., 2016) INDEX PRODUCED BY THE FUND FOR PEACE¹

Political and conflict overview

Before moving to the more detailed analysis of the conflict, it is essential to look at a short overview of the situation so it is later easier to see and know the context throughout the text.

¹ „The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace’s proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, data from three primary sources is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Fragile States Index. Millions of documents are analysed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of painstaking expert social science research. The 2016 Fragile States Index, the 12th

Last year – 2016 – the country experienced not only increase in conflict events but also in fatalities (by 48% in 2016). That is a mainly the result of clashes between Al Shabab and state forces, or external militaries active (as are forces from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the United States). This brings us to the final purpose of this chapter – to explain how the situation actually looks like now. It is certainly not the only country in the region having problem, although it is the one where the crisis remains most acute and active. For better perspective – the violence in Somalia is three times as frequent than in other states and equals to the violence in Libya, South Sudan and Nigeria combined. It is also on the top of Fragile State which officially confirms the severity of the situation Somalia remains in as there was at least 14 attempts to reconstitute state authority (Carboni, Kishi and Raleigh, 2017; Messner and Haken, et al., 2016; Zapata, 2012).

Overall, there is a very complex situation when it comes to political, security, and development environment. With a support of international supporters, there was some progress made since the collapse of the central government in 1991 – the state structure and institution are being re-established since 2012 and the country held its first presidential elections (in government, as they were not able to hold direct vote due to the circumstances) since 1969. This brings hope as well as concern as it raises the question whether the violence will increase or decrease because the state is in constant dissent with the extremist group Al Shabab, due which most of the violence continuous and that has been even reinforced by the addition of ISIS to those opposing the government. Hence the question, because Al Shabab attempt to dismantle any sign of functioning central or regional governance. Together with the corruption and regional and clan disputes, the government has in fact very hard task ahead – in fact, it is an important news that Mohamed Abdullahi, the newly elected president, is ready and willing to talk to the Islamist al-Shabab militants. (Carboni, Kishi and Raleigh, 2017; USIP, 2017; BBC, 2017). It is even more difficult task due to the fact that the country in not unitary, hence the regional governments and the fact that there, despite the progress in re-establishing government in Mogadishu, is no central government in Somalia that controls all of Somalia. That is because of two self-proclaimed

edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2015 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2016 are not covered by the 2016 Index. Fragile States Index scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater instability “. (Messner and Haken, et al., 2016, p.3)

autonomous units – Somaliland and Puntland which will be shortly introduced as they will be featured later on. Carboni, Kishi and Raleigh, 2017)

Somaliland and Puntland

Over the two decades of conflict, big part of the country's structure was destroyed. Even though the events were mainly concentrated in southern Somalia, the conflict raised a wave of crisis of national identity. For the people in northern Somalia was the solution following - the region of Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and the region of Puntland followed the creation of the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalia in 1998. (UNDP in Somalia, 2017; Höhne, 2006). The Republic of Somaliland was proclaimed in May 1991 in the north-western region of the country and represent



Figure 8: Map of division of the country (source: Slattery, 2011)

around a quarter of Somalia's territory. They „*may be the most stable, tranquil, and smoothest functioning democracy that officially does not exist*“ (Slattery, 2011) as they are not officially recognized even though they are widely recognized and rather functioning state with their own functioning government and currency² In the north -eastern region is situated the autonomous state of Puntland. It is in a similar situation as is Somaliland, it's also functioning. Local government provided a proper social structure to its people and has been successful from the political standpoint. And still – it is not internationally recognized autonomous unit. (Slattery, 2011; Carboni, Kishi and Raleigh, 2017; National Geographic, 2017)

Now when the context was introduced and the background to the situation is clear, this thesis will move on to describing the causes, the roots of how Somalia get to the state it is now as it is crucial for understanding not only the complexity of the situation but also the situation itself. It will be done by looking the history and considering the links and the causes leading to this point and followed by more detailed analysis of the conflict. As the situation in the country may seems

² 1 U.S.\$ = 7,500 Somaliland shillings (Carboni, Kishi and Raleigh, 2017)

hopeless it is not so, hence we need to understand the sources of the conflict to see the possibilities in the future. (Zapata, 2012)

Path to the conflict

Colonialism (1840 – 1960)

The history of Somalia as we know it begins with a coming of colonial countries, more precisely two which were the most influencing – Great Britain and Italy. Before that, the country was mostly of a nomadic nature and migration of Somalis in mid of 19th century, before the colonial partition of the country. Even before that, social structure based on clan dominion was created, through cooperation of Somali clans in 16th century, when they joined for the first time for a common cause (Ahmed and Green, 1999). In the pre – colonial time, there cannot be much said about nationalism, as the identity was based on belonging to the certain clan and the unified Somali identity arose from the common culture, religion and language. Only after the people went through the experience of colonialism, the nationalism arose and was strengthened by a joined discrepancy with the colonialists. Still, the nationalism came from the traditional culture and belonging and was built upon that, not the other way around (Lewis, 2004)

Clans in Somalia

As I.M. Lewis well said “the kinship groups or lineages that are, as we shall see, the basic building blocks of Somali” (Lewis, 2004, p. 491). Clan is an agnatic lineage structure and belonging is based on one’s ancestors. Somali society consist of many clans, sub-clans, lineage and blood groups. Clan is where the real power lies and from what the social and the political structure arise. They have always played important role, whether it as before, during or after colonialism, conflict etc., and it is very useful to understand them in order to comprehend the Somali legal, political and social structures (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Höhne, 2006).

As is described in the section about colonial administration, it is clear that all dealing went through clan families and that the main focus was not to the state but especially to the clans that did represented the clans. It is often mistaken that the colonial powers created this system of clan grouping for their administrative purposes but it is a wrong assumption, this structure existed and was functioning before their arrival. If anything, the colonial powers threaten and weaken the structure through forcing different administrative and cultural rules (e.g. In language). (Lewis, 2004)

Organisation of the clans

The families subdivide into clan families, sub-clans, and 'diya-paying' groups (also called mag-paying). The highest-level distinction is between two clan families - 'Samaale' and 'Sab' where the family can be traced up to one common ancestor. The differences are cultural, linguistics and in the way of life with Samaale being nomadic pastoralist in the north and Sab agro-pastoralist in the south. These two clan families divide further into clans and each clan divides even further more (see figure 9) – Digil and Rahanweyn are Sab, Dir, Darod, Isaq and Haiye then Samaale (see figure 10) (Lewis, 2004). As can be seen in figures 10 and 11, there is a variety of sub clans under the main clan families. The figure 11 can also serve to show the basic layout of the groups

Clan itself (around 20 generations) can be sort of political unit with exclusive territory though the belonging comes from a common ancestor, not location. They do tend to have some head of the clan and the prime lineage (6-10 generations) but there is no central government and they mainly serve as judges, not politicians.

The diya (or also called mag) paying group is the most functional lineage which descent to a common ancestor (4-8 generations) and is very numerous (up to few thousand men). It functions as a community with shared responsibilities when it comes to its members, whether it is share payments and loans, collective responsibility for deeds done to or by its members (e.g. they collectively pay 100 camels for a homicide) as well as mutual help during the times of crisis. The rights do not come automatically with being member of the clan, the conditions are negotiated and agreed upon. As the




Figure 11: Somali's clan families and major sub clans (source: Perry-Castañeda Library, 2002)

head of the clan functions council of elders and thanks to the system is much more effective and resilient to crisis. (Ahmed and Green, 1999; ACCORD, 2009)

There are also the Somalia minorities which are outside dominant clans and have significantly worse position in society and are discriminated. The group lacks the same rights and obligations as the clans and are as a result disadvantaged and segregated. Minorities are often economically deprived, with low social status and excluded from all decision making, sometimes even usurped in the sense that their land and position is confiscated. They are one of the most, if not the most, vulnerable groups in Somalia (UN OCHA – UN, 2002)

The law – “xeer”

In other words – the Somali customary law. Even though the clans evolve, grow, split or unite, one always remains and that is the law and hence the system that governs them. It is the set of law by which the action in diya groups are conducted and the role of the elders is to make sure that the rules are honoured. The law is capable of constant evolving and is currently most important in rural areas where the state administration does not reach, especially in North Somalia then, as 80-90% of all disagreements are dealt with according to xeer. However, that does not mean that it exists only there. It is still very important also in urban areas where local administration function, it is the first resource by which is certain conflict of interests dealt with. In Southern Somalia is less dominant as there is a very widespread radical Islam which applies strict Sharia and the traditional xeer law recedes into the background. Nevertheless, its great significance is unquestionable. The rights and obligation are not protected or guaranteed by state, they are merely sustained due to tradition and threat of force as a coercive measure. There is a certain rule in power hierarchy in the sense that group is as strong as it is big. That means that if there is a small clan it is probable they will have some sort of agreement with a bigger, hence stronger, clan and will be under their protection. This is how clan coalitions are created. (ACCORD, 2009)

Even though it may seem that there is too much relevance given to the clans in this paper it is just the opposite. They are the building bricks of the society. The truth is that the structure is too often simplified and generalised and Somalis are considered as a homogenous unit which they surely are – but just in some cases, as was mentioned before. Their religion, and thus social values, are Islam



Figure 12: Colonial division of Somalia
(source: Jannah, 2015)

and they do share more less the same culture, tradition and language which makes them exceptionally homogenous in these terms to a certain point, especially compared to other African countries (as has been even more before the time of colonialists). But it is a misconception that they belong under the same clan. Therefore, it is important to understand this clan division so there can be understanding of the complexity when it comes to the ending of the conflict and peace solutions. Especially since the state collapse in 1991 they gained even more importance in decision making and peace and

security building capacity, which will be further elaborated in following chapter. (Ahmed and Green, 1999; ACCORD, 2009)

Colonial administration

As the Britain and Italy came, they divided the country into individual units according to their convenience, not really minding the traditional borders. The British Somaliland Protectorate was established in the north and Italian Somaliland in the South³. This division played its part also later when the country was divided again, by its own people this time, as will be elaborated later. In 1887, the Protectorate of British Somaliland was officially established in the North, today's Somaliland. Even though Somali Italiana was created later, in 1905 in the South, the Italians were signing protection treaties with the clans already in 1888⁴. How the country was divided by the colonist shows the figure 12. This map is good for later comparison with current map and the division of today's Somalia.

³ Colonial countries actually divided Somalia into five parts, Great Britain had two parts, Italy one and France and Ethiopia were present as well, although there were not the prime powers, they had one smaller part each (the French Somalia and the Ethiopian Ogaden). Nonetheless, the biggest parts belonged to Great Britain and Italy, that is why this the text concentrate on those (Lewis, 2004)

⁴ These territories were held till the independence was declared apart from the years 1940 when Italians occupied British Somaliland and 1941 when British occupied Italian Somalia (BBC, 2016)

The rule of Britain over their territory was not very coherent and therefore allowed the clans to continue ruling from a bigger part, although not intentionally. There were number of steps taken toward having more control over them. That had the consequences of not only weakening the clans in their authority but also dividing the power between the clan families and colonial state – situation that endured to this day. During their time, they have introduced a central power, competition for superiority and colonial law, they subjected the clans to their own authorities. The practice of Italy was clearly focused on weakening the traditional social structures thus the clan authority. The rule was clearly central, even fascism, with a strong focus on modernization of the territory and bringing on the Western style of government. All land belonged to Italians and they had a trade monopoly, all economic activities were solely to the profit of Italy and all administration was taken off the Somalis. Precolonial African politics did not know what state central government is. Only after the practices colonialists implemented, the power began to shift away from the clan families. What is more, it inflicted disputed amongst the clan families, as some profited and some became marginalized. This is one of the aspect when and why the current disorder began as the style and level of centralization of the colonial powers very much influenced the establishment of state structures later build (Rýdlová, 2007).

The clan families also fought back which brought about not only the first encounter with a modern warfare but also more layers of conflict and bigger vulnerability to violence. The long-standing resistance mainly against the British was led by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, religious and nationalist leader and poet, for 20 years. His main mean of opposition was through, sometimes fanatical, religion. Due to this time, the Somalis United in Muslim brotherhood which rose above clan relations and is said to be the beginning of modern Somali nationalism. This is an important change as it means that the people, the movement was politicized at this very moment for the first time in history. The Somalis joined as a force in their fight against colonialists and created something that transcended the clans – nation that has been developed over the whole period of colonialism. (Britannica, 2000; Lewis, 2004; Elmi, 2010).

Somalia before state collapse

Before independency

The path toward independence began with an anticolonial struggle in the beginning of 20th century. The colonial powers grew weaker in their authority, protection treaties once signed were no longer credible and the opposition significantly grew. The culmination of that happened in 1905 when Sayyed Mohamed Abdulle Hassan seized control over a territory in North-eastern an eventually was given full political authority over it by British, Italian and traditional authorities. This was the first glance of a state, as it as its elements – government and army. Most importantly, it was ruled over authoritarian by Hassan himself without any elders. He was followed by people from many different clans, lineages and groups. What connected them was religion and the anti-colonial struggle, thus nationalism. Although it did not last and never was formed into state, his unit was the first that had the potential not only outgrew the clans but even replaced. However, the customary model structure and procedures were too strong and so the state creation failed. (Rýdlová, 2007)

In the last years of colonialism, there was also a serious conflict between the two major stakeholders occupying the territory. Italy unsuccessfully invaded the British Somalia in 1940 and Britain answer by invading the Italian Somaliland, which they held under their administration until 1950. As a result of being on the losing side in the War World II and signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947, Italy lost all its colonies, including Somalia. However, the winning parties weren't particularly sure what to do with those territories so they handed the problem to UN. In the year 1950, Italian Somaliland became an UN trust territory under Italian control („The United Nations Trust of Somaliland under Italian Administration”) for ten years, in which time Italians were supposed to prepare the country for independence and in the same year took over the British authority as well. Six years later, in 1956, the territory was renamed as Somalia and granted internal autonomy. In 1959, Italia petitioned to give Somalia independence the following year which came as bit a of surprise to UN. The state still wasn't in a good shape and properly developed to become self-dependant. There was widespread poverty, illiteracy limited resources and clan disputes – some traditional, some because of colonialism. When it comes to politics, there was newly established Legislative Assembly/Territorial Council in 1956, consisting of traditional and newly created authorities. The Somali Youth League was one clearly dominant political party. It started as a movement in 1943, in the time of occupation. Their goal was to unite the Somali state and be independent.

By the year 1954, twenty-two political parties existed and by 1958 just five. The same year, Somali Youth League won 83 out of 90 seats. However, that does not mean there was no political competition. They had an opposition with whom they led political disputes despite the fact that the country was in an economic despair. That might have come from the fact that most politicians were concerned more about local matters than the state-nation itself. July the 1st of a year 1960 was the year when the United Republic of Somalia was created, by the merging of British and Italian parts. The boundaries that were once drawn into a map without any consideration of clan relations and division were erased and the country became one. Somalia became officially independent and Aden Abdullah Osman Daar was elected first president (Reyner, 1960; Rýdlová, 2007; BBC, 2016; CNN, 2017).

Independency (1960-1969)

As Anthony Rayner (1960) says in his article *Somalia: The Problems of Independence* when independent Somalia was created -

„Independent Somalia presents a distressing picture. Its economic and commercial potential is bound to remain low because none of known resources can be developed quickly and easily. Plans to convert the nomad to sedentary farming have failed. Stock remains the best hope for long range development, if human factors permit.

Substantial intensification of farm production beyond the present artificially irrigated areas is unlikely. The reason is too obvious to discuss: there is no money. A loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is out of the question, for the time being at least.

Outright grants seem to be the only answer to Somalia's plight, even though financial rather than technical assistance is preferred. For a few years after independence annual subsidies will come from the United States via Italy under the Somalia Development Fund Agreement. It is to be hoped that their use may be more important than their amount.

Participation in the European Common Market may bring Somalia additional income, though hardly any permanent large-scale foreign investment. At the same time, any reduction in subsidies to independent Somalia will necessarily lower the present standards of administrative, educational and social services. The union with British Somaliland will hardly improve the economic situation” (Reyner, 1960, p.255)

Rayner also mentions the interclan disputes over the natural resources (water) and the possibility of a growing tension between Somalia and neighbourhood Ethiopia (which were already tense, as Ethiopia attacked the country many times during the colonialist era) and growing influence of the Iron Curtain countries and the United Arab Republic for the possibility of their support. What Rayner gives us is a very good image of the situation where Somalia was at its very own beginning. Colonial powers never had much interest or will to develop the country during the occupation⁵. It is more than clear that the situation, whether political, economic or social, was quite bad and that the country had not much of an outside support, whereas being itself internally riven with not very promising prospects for the future. The state was in a bad position not only when it comes to preconditions above. The colonialists left behind a substantial damage in society. The traditional way of government was corrupted by the artificial borders that took no consideration whatsoever on the clan ties and were made only in the sake economic interest. There was a fragmentation in the Somali society and internal conflicts. The colonialism made Somalis fight against each other for the interests of each colonial power. All this and more made the state-nation very vulnerable and prone to violence (Reynes. 1960; Rýdlová, 2007)

And so, Somalia gained independence even though they were not ready. It was given to them by international society and thus the country was recognised without having to prove its legitimacy anyhow. They had the juridical sovereignty without the capacity to maintained it properly. The answer for the unpreparedness was mixing together post-traditional (clans), modern (state), and postmodern features. The new government was democratic and the legal system was a combination of Sharia, traditional and customary law. The clans were weakened, they still had a very strong position in society⁶. When it came to building the state, Somalia, same as other African countries, tried to go with the more „modern “solution, taken from the colonial times. Instead of going back to the traditional way of ruling and structures that formerly worked, they started to apply colonially inspired political framework, elections and the political and leadership competition. What does that meant for Somalia was a serious misfortune. It allowed the rise of authoritarian regime and violence (done by the state and non-state actors). At this point, the country barely managed to maintain balance and the possibility of solving the country’s many problems was out of question. (Rýdlová, 2007)

⁵ It’s ought to be mentioned that in this matter, Italy was definitely the one that did more for the country. They build schools, hospitals and infrastructure. It had the effect that the former Italian territories were more developed and in much better shape than the British territory, which further deepened the differences between the two entities (Rýdlová, 2007)

⁶ For example, with elections, there was a distinct voting system for pastoralists who voted in according to clan voting system (Rýdlová, 2007)

As the year 1960 came, it brought new elections. The winner was the Somali National League (SNL), created in 1935 and their goal was to unite both British and Italian territories. They won the majority of the seats - twenty. Other twelve seats were won by the United Somali Party (USP) and only one to the Somali Youth League (SYL), that was on the lead only two years ago. The results again turned when SYL won the elections held in 1964, heavily supported by Darood clan, strong Southern clan that held important position in Somali police. The Somali Youth League grew in power and influence after this till the 1969. (Lewis, 2004; Rýdlová, 2007)

This was also the beginning for the breakup of the country. Not only the two former territories were very different, traditionally and as a consequence of colonialism, and were not ready to unite, there were not very enthusiastic about it neither. The South had way better conditions than North due to the approach to governance that Italians had compared to Englishmen. They both had their ways of ruling and the North was used to have traditionally quite a strong position but South dislodged from political processes, as for example while preparing the constitution. Hence when the South got the majority of seats in the parliament and thus power, with an addition of South being more developed and in better economic state, it was an unfavourable situation for the North. Regardless to the traditional clan and social ways that were dominant primarily in the North, the power became centralized in Mogadishu. However, they were still numerous local deals that continued to function. Although the regime was proclaimed democracy, most of the people were not involved in the political framework because of the distance of the North which for meant partial isolation and also the traditional way of governance was still deeply rooted in people that has always worked for them. With the addition of that the state was not much functional in ensuring security thus his people were not too inclined to it. (Rýdlová, 2007)

It is clear from the description above that at this moment the situation was very uneasy. Main problem laid in the governance, as they haven't had the capacity to build a state and did not adequately nor involved nor integrated the traditional structure of government, which didn't gain them the level of support they could have hoped for. This was not a good starting point, especially with the state of the government. There was undergoing political struggle and unequal division of power. Some groups were using their position only for personal gain, no matter the state in which the country was. Over the nine years of independence, there was only one party that really ruled - the SYL, which had the strongest ties with the Darood clan. All parties were more based on the clan kinship of its members and clan representation which only grew during the short period of time. Government meant resource for the clans of the politicians, not for the people. Alongside, big

corruption was gradually developed. Later on, this proved to ruin the state. Internal disunity was not the only obstacle. As was said, there was previous conflict with Ethiopia which was still fresh. In 1963, Somalia had border dispute with Kenya, in 1964 dispute with Ethiopia that erupted into hostilities. To ensure security meant building an army. This is when an international society comes in again but this time with an aspect of cold war. Somalia turned to West for help in building the army but they did not offer enough for Somalia. Whose offer was more that generous for them was one given by Soviet Union (USSR). With their help, they built fifth biggest army in Africa with air force and navy. Along with a huge debt (52 million dollars). At this point, Somalia was one of the zones where West and USSR led their proxy wars. USSR provided resources for the Somali army, West, at this point also operating within the country despite the previous disagreement, provided equipment and training to the Somali police force. In addition, in the home government, political party SYL grew very significant and decided to proceed with its vision of Greater Somalia, which meant oppression of anybody else and use of any tools necessary, violence included. The country became more militarised and prone to violence than ever before. (Rýdlová,2007; BBC, 2006)

The time of independence was slowly ending. The state was corrupted and in debt to the USSR, the government was considered as a good place to gain some money for your clan, the army and police force were very favoured with the government and hence prioritized. They served as an excellent coercive mean. The relations among politicians were very competitive, as the traditionally clan discrepancy moved to the political grounds. In just nine year of independence, the country was in very bad state and was not functioning or developing. (Rýdlová, 2007)

Dictatorship (1969–1991)

In 1967 former prime minister Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke beat Aden Abdullah Osman Daar under who he previously served as a prime minister (1961– 64) in elections for president. In the 1969 election, there was nine political parties involved, with the SYL was currently clearly dominant till now. With them, the idea for Greater Somalia persisted. In its sense, it included Somalia with addition of what is today Djibouti, eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya (Elmi, 2010; BBC, 2009). But in the 1969 elections, their power was significantly weakened when they fell from having 120 seats (out of 123) to having only 46 seats in the Legislative Assembly. This caused that they declared the elections rigged and did not accepted the outcome. With that, the party was a substantially tied to the military and always had a strong support from them, the events had fast gradient. But first, unexpected and unplanned thing happened. On October 15,

1969, President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was shot by his own bodyguard⁷ while his prime minister Mahammad Ibrahim Igaal was out of the country. Prime minister Igaal returned to the country and his task was to select a new president. He himself was from a Isaaq clan family, yet he suggested candidate from the Darood clan – the same clan former president Shermarke, as it was the strongest clan in power in government (since they supported the SYL). However, it provoked disagreement in the government. Igaal's choice was supported by the Assembly but group of members - army officers did not share their opinion. And so, on October 21, six days after the assassinations, military coup began. On that day, army units with the cooperation of the police seized strategic positions in Mogadishu and along with that rounded up government officials and other important political figures. They detained all leading members of the democratic regime, even prime minister Igaal. Together with the coup the parliament, executive and jurisdiction organ were dissolved and new political party was established, which stood as the new government, called Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). (UN Somalia, 2017)

Mohammad Siad Barre

One of the actors and supporters of the coup was army commander Major General Mohammad Siad Barre. He must not be mistaken for the architect of the coup as he was merely one of the implementers at its beginning. At first, he was in the head of the military officers who deposed the civilian government. Nonetheless, after the situation settled, Siad Barre was appointed by the Supreme Revolutionary Council as a president of country. He was born in Italian Somaliland to the Darood clan. He joined the Somali police when he was young, in his early twenties, and rapidly rose in rank. Later on, he was sent to military academy in Italy but by 1960, the year of independence, he was back and joined the Somali national army. Shortly after that, in 1966, he gained the rank of major general and had become commander in chief. Only three years later, he seized the power and became president. His rule was autocratic – he was the executive body: head of state, chairman of the Council of the Secretaries of State whose responsibility was day-to-day government operation, commander in chief of the armed forces, and president of the SRC. Despite his positions, he maintained the power through personality cult. He had remarkable personal authority for which he was recognized. (Metz, 1993; Britannica, 2016)

⁷ The bodygourd acted, according to his testimony ,because he was treated wrong by the president. He was later tried and excicated by the revolutionary government (UN Somalia, 2017)

Supreme Revolutionary Council

SRC consisted of twenty-four officers and functioned as a centre of all power – they were the executive and jurisdiction authority. Below them, there was the fourteen-man Council of Secretaries of the State (mentioned above, as the head was Siad Barre) made up of civilian administrators and technocrats picked by the SRC. Their main purpose was to deal with ordinary matters of state bureaucracy. They banned all political parties other than SRC, abolished the Assembly and constitution. They supported Somali unification and national movements, as their goal was to end tribalism and any misrule and the country was renamed the Somali Democratic Republic.

Those in charge of regional and district affairs were replaced by military officers that were accountable to SRC, thus most of the key ministries were led by military officers and civilians were without any possibility of opposition. Even though actions of the SRC were supposedly led by majority vote, almost no records have been issued from the meetings. The democracy was only a name and any power that people might have had was taken from them by the government. (Samatar, 1989; Metz, 1993; UN Somalia, 2017).

The legal system was subjected to newly established National Security Courts (NSC) that was also under SRC. Mostly, they served to deal with any crimes that were considered counterrevolutionary. By 1973, unitary civil code was introduced, that among other things, suppressed the sharia courts, excluded collective responsibility applied in diya groups and included death penalty. The goal of SRC was, along with the elimination of clan system, decentralization. They broke traditional regions into smaller units and thus made it impossible for the clan assemblies to have any influence over their old territories. Tribalism was declared crime against state, as it undermined unity and development in Somalia and thus made it officially outlaw. Head of clans were replaced by man picked and loyal to government, that further acted in their interests. They also imposed new rituals in place of the old ones (e.g. weddings). (Metz, 1993)

Also in 1970, Siad Barre declares Somalia a socialist state and nationalises most of the economy. His ideology was called Scientific Socialism. It is a Marxist theory, “*a form of socialism based on an empirical and historical analysis of the economic and political factors necessary for social change*” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2017).

The Scientific Socialism was developed and distinguished as a contrast for utopian socialism. The idea is that capitalism was ultimately replaced by socialism. It was introduced in Russia in the late nineteenth century and later became part of the official ideology of USSR. This went hand in hand with the fact that Barre strengthened relations with the Soviet Union⁸. (Encyclopaedia of Russian History, 2004; Britannica, 2016)

In 1974 Somalia joined the Arab League and in 1974-75 disaster happened - severe drought hit Somalia and caused widespread starvation. In 1977, Somalia invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, inhabited by Somalis. Reason for this goes back to the idea of unity and Greater Somalia, that would have been today's Djibouti, eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. On this, general Barre followed the ideology and decided to gain the territory. Some may call it the early beginning of the end. Ethiopia fought back Somalia suffered around 25,000 casualties in less than a year, lost the war and Somalia's forces were significantly weakened. By 1978 the Somali forces were defeated and forced out of Ogaden⁹. Ethiopia had help and military support from the USSR, which meant breaking the relations with the USSR and expelling of Soviet advisers. All of this caused a lot of resistance and simultaneous growth of opposition of the Barre regime (Hesse, 2014; BBC, 2016, CNN, 2017).

Even though that Barre himself promoted literacy with and introduced Roman alphabet to Somalis, the regime built many of schools, infrastructure and more, it abused human rights, freedom and had repressive tactics backed up by military. The regime did no longer followed socialism by 1980 and had no plan for development what so ever. The economy was in dire state after serious economic crises. Rural economy, especially the dominant pastoral economy, where more than 80 % of population gained their livelihood from, suffered from the government policies. They put too little importance and expenditure to it. Crop yields and livestock were vulnerable and dropped very low. The government kept the prices on the market of these components low and the people were slowly losing their livelihood and food production has decreased significantly. Local black markets were flooded by food coming as foreign assistance, meant for refugees of draught and war. Gradually, Somalia became almost dependent on imported food. By the mid-1980s, the crisis intensified to the point of no return - the government was not able to even to manage and certainly not solve the economic crises.

⁸ These ties were later broken and he tried to make good with U.S., and even though due to his regime and human right violation was the international society, U.S. supported him. (Britannica, 2016; BBC, 2016)

⁹ Peace with Ethiopia was later signed in 1988 (CNN, 2017)

Thus, the collapse of economic institutions came long before the collapse of the regime (Mubarak, 1997; Elmi, 2010; BBC, 2016)

Due to the steps taken by the state government, substantial opposition rose up. As was mentioned above, the regime suppressed and outlawed the clan traditional structures. Consequently, number of clan armed groups formed organized opposition and rebelled against the state, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the Somali National Movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement, Somali Democratic Movement and the United Somali Congress. There were attempts to overthrow the regime but they were answered with brutal suppression, the killing of civilians connected to the clans involved, mass abuses, and the destruction of areas. With these events, more and more clans joined the opposition and state started to be more and more abusive, brutal and repressive as an answer, killing innocent civilians and murdering people without purpose, just as a revenge and presentation of their power. This was a next step taken towards the demise of the regime. In 1981, the opposition became international as he excluded all Mijertyn and Isaay clan members from the government and handpicked members of his own clan in their positions. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was established in London, led by Isaaq clan members. By 1990, economy was close to a total collapse, state and its people in horrible condition and fighting between clan militias and the government was so strong, Siad had no choice but to promise reforms, including free elections. Subsequently, Siad Barre was forced out of the presidential office in January 1991 and the following year went to exile in Nigeria, where he died in 1995. The country was in terrible state after brutal and bloody dictator regime in which Somalia remained since 1969. Human rights organizations estimated than in the two decades, more than 50,000 people were killed in conflicts between clans and government (Mubarak, 1997; Elmi, 2010; BBC, 2016; Britannica, 2016).

The civil war (1991 – present)

After being Siad Barre overthrown in January 1991 by opposing clans, the question of leadership arose and with it violent upheavals. The government failed to replace him which only encouraged the already rival clans in the struggle for power. There was no clan, no person that would have the power to dominate over all the clans, not the United Somali Congress, the ones who ousted Siad Barre into exile. Negotiation also failed. Most of the institutions, including judicial and executive authorities, were destroyed. The once united state was fragmented and ruled over by different bodies. The country was without any leadership or law and the country found itself in the middle of clan warfare fighting for dominion, control over territories, resources or even just for survival. And so began the prolonged state of war and anarchy (Elmi, 2010; UNDP Somalia, 2017)

Somaliland

Not long after the regime fell, the country held together by force started to fall apart. On May 18th of the same year, 1991, the north-western region on the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden proclaimed unilateral independence on territory corresponding to the former British Somaliland with a capital city of Hargeisa, representing a quarter of Somalia's territory. It was a result of clan based reconciliation process, as the North and South were always in dispute. In 1993, in the Boroma Conference took place, where Mahamed Haji Ibrahim Igaal, former prime minister of assassinated president was himself elected as a president of the Republic of Somaliland. Currently, as Gram Slattery states in his article, "*Somaliland may be the most stable, tranquil, and smoothest functioning democracy that officially does not exist*" (Slattery, 2011). Somaliland had an exceptionally functioning democracy compared to the sub-Saharan Africa region. There are predominant clan policies but the government is elected by its 3.5 million citizens. The prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali in 2012 stated that he has in fact no objections to Somaliland and Somalis recognize the rarity of properly functioning government. It is clear that people of Somaliland are better off with their government than are people in South Somalia. They have effective bureaucracy, army and police forces, control over territory, relative peace, their own currency and even foreign contracts and diplomatic relations with the UN, the Arab League, the EU and some of western countries. Nonetheless, the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, yet functioning, fairly

stable and operating as independent, is not internally nether internationally recognized as a sovereign territory. The case on Somaliland is not unique in Somalia as will be elaborated later. (Slattery, 2011; Economist, 2015; UNDP, 2017; Carboni, Kishi and Raleigh, 2017; Ismail, 2017)

International interventions

Meanwhile, in South Somalia, fighting continues. Clan militias fighting for control over resources use any means necessary, including plundering and more. Their actions led in 1992 to devastating famine lasting until 1993. Due to these events and the devastating photos of starving and dying Somalis, the UN Security Council and United States decided to take action. They established the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in 1992 and the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in May 1993 and additionally the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the US with a goal to restore enough order to make possible food distribution to the Somali people. Hence, US Marines arrived ahead of the UN peacekeepers coalition forces in 1992 to Somalia, near Mogadishu, in order to stabilize and prepare the ground and safeguard relief supplies sent to Somalia as a support to the famine victims. And so, the later infamous operation Restore Hope began. (BBC, 2016; CNN, 2017; UNDP Somalia, 2017)

In that time, the security situation in Southern Somalia only gradually worsened and the warlords did not even accept the international humanitarian help. They attacked the convoys and even blew up the ships carrying supplies. The country was hit by famine and the western media were overflowed by photos of starving people and armed men. This called for the action of international society. (Hendrickson, 1995)

UNOSOM I

Operation Provide Relief - the first operation of UN was passed in April 1992 as UN Resolution 751. The operation lasted since August to December and was tightly linked to U.S. The goal was to provide military assistance, humanitarian relief, food delivered and support the peace in Somalia. During its period, 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies were delivered. Unfortunately, it was not enough. Large amount of the material was seized and looted by the militias and warlords, thus distribution was made impossible and the supplies never got to those in need. (Hendrickson, 1995; CNN, 2017)

UNITAF

Intervention also known under the name of the mission – Operation Restore Hope. It started based on the initiative of the UN to US at the same time as UNOSOM I, in August 1992 and consisted of 3,500 UN peacekeepers and 500 Pakistani men, all led by the US. There was one success – Envoy to Somalia mediated cease-fire between two most powerful clan leaders/warlords Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohammed and even their cooperation. Americans seized port, airport, and former American Embassy and ended the despair in the heart of the famine, city Baidoa. At this point, the mission looked promising and successful. By March 1993, acute starvation was over, much of the fighting stopped and security situation was fairly sufficient. Therefore, the mission was success as the UN had a clear path for distribution and provision of assistance and indeed, in May, the UN took over the relief operations. (Hendrickson, 1995)

UNOSOM II

Operation Continue Hope was established by UN Security Council Resolution on March 26th, 1993. It had several goals – to disarm the Somali clans, help rebuilding the political institutions and create stable environment in the Country, including Somaliland. US was still present at this moment with its forces. Even though it seemed that UNOSOM II will be success, there was distrust between Aidid and UN which gradually led to open conflict. That consequently caused the cooperation of rival clans outside the UNOSOM II, early departure of UNOSOM II and death of 24 UN Pakistani soldiers killed by Aidid's forces. The situation slowly worsened and the relations with Aidid were ultimately broken off and proceeded in hostilities which also escalated the violence between UNISOM and Somali factions. UN Forces officially launched manhunt for Aidid with a special unit focusing on this task - US QRF (quick-reaction forces), the same unit that is infamous for accident that took place in Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993, The Battle of Mogadishu. Two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down over Mogadishu, during a raid carried out by QRF on Aidid, by rebel Somali factions. The troops fought their way through the city, during which 18 American soldiers were killed and hundreds of Somalis. This accident had a significant impact on similar future actions taken by US and resulted in Operation Quickdraw of US forces from the UNOSOM II. US troops complete their withdrawal on March 25, 1994. The UN troops followed them after a year, and on March 2nd

1995, the last of the UN peacekeepers were evacuated, not successfully completing their mission (Hendrickson, 1995; BBC, 2016; CNN, 2017).

The international intervention left the country without achieving its goal and bringing peace to Somali people. The country was in state of permanent war. In August 1998, second territory declared independence. This time, it was the north-eastern region of Puntland that followed in steps of Somaliland¹⁰. Puntland State of Somalia, unlike Somaliland, functions as semi-autonomous state, as its government is for the idea of unification of the country and the state remains part of Somalia. Two years after, the first steps are taken toward reconstruction of the state political institution and government. In August 2000, Transitional National Government (TNG) is formed and Abdulkassim Salat Hassan is elected by the clan leaders as president of Somalia, the first since 1991. Even though he was eagerly welcomed in Mogadishu by the people, united government is failed to be reinstated because the Somali warlords refuse to support the government. The TNG is later reformatted in 2004 as a 14th attempt to restore the central government since 1991 and was supposed to function as the new government in the next five years due to international mandate with and as a leader elected Abdullahi Yusuf, the president of Puntland. However, this attempt also failed because of first, during their return to Somalia, they had disputed over where the new parliament should sit and second, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), comprising Mogadishu's seven Islamic courts. About a year later after the new TNG returned to Somalia, March till May, 2006, most violent conflict took place in almost ten years, as rival militias fought in Mogadishu. Dozens of people were killed and hundreds injured. Militias loyal to the ICU and so ICU took control over Mogadishu and then during few months extended their power over most of South Central Somalia, after defeating the ruling clan warlords. Nonetheless, they are defeated by the transitional government with a support of Ethiopia¹¹ by 2007 and president Abdullahi Yusuf enters Mogadishu for the first time since taking office. The same year UN Security Council authorised six-month peacekeeping mission

¹⁰ There were two additional secessions following after these two. One, third in a row occurred the same year as Puntland, in 1998. It was a declaration of the state of Jubaland, which is now encompassed by the state of Southwestern Somalia and its status is unclear. The fourth was set up in 1999 along the lines of the Puntland and reasserted in 2002, which led to the autonomy of Southwestern Somalia (UN Somalia, 2017)

¹¹ Somalia and Ethiopia have a complex relation. Some conflicts were mentioned above. They did not support Somalia until Abdullahi Yusuf became the president in 2004, as he was Ethiopian ally and warlord. Since then, they aided him and Somali government in controlling Mogadishu. They had troops permanently present in 2006 in Somalia and ICU declared "holy war" against them and fighting continued throughout 2006 -2008. Last Ethiopian troops left Mogadishu in early 2009 but Ethiopia is still claimed to be involved in the fighting, but denies the claims (BBC, 2009).

on which ground troops of the African Union arrived in Mogadishu and joined the fight between Islamist insurgents and government forces, the international mandate to government is extended by two years and new president is elected - moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Powerful newly emerged player on the scene was the Al-Shabab militia. (BBC, 2016; UNDP Somalia, 2017; UN Somalia, 2017)

Al Shabab

Meaning “The Youth” in Arabic, the group was formed in December 2006, developed as a former military wing of ICU and is active ever since to present with estimated size 7,000-9,000 in 2015 (BBC, 2016). It is an Islamic militant organisation based in Somalia and also largest, fighting against government with the aim to remove the government in Mogadishu, seize control over Somalia and implement strict Sharia law. Al Shabab had good relations and was closely linked to Al Qaeda, as they had similar ideology, tactics, joined training and targets (e.g. foreign and primarily US and Ethiopian personal). They used guerrilla and terror tactics and throughout 2008 gained control of most of southern Somalia and by 2009 also parts of Mogadishu. They declared allegiance to Al Qaeda the same year. In the territories under their control, inherent governing structures are applied, following the Sharia law, which caused them the loss of support from people. In 2010, they were reinforced by formerly rival group of Hizbul Islam. In 2011, they withdrew from Mogadishu and between 2011 – 2012 lost control over number other territories as the government gained supported from AMISOM and Kenyan forces




Figure 13: Somalia political map (source: BBC, 2011)

(Kenya got involved due the security and refugee situation that will be elaborated in the last chapter). They are currently not as strong as in previous years but they are still active and the biggest, most powerful and most feared opponent of the government, who controls most of Somalia's southern and central regions, as shown in the figure 13 on the political map where is also possible to see the division of the power and who controls which territory in Somalia. From the map, it is clear that the central government controls just small fraction of the country. (Stanford.edu, 2016)

Meanwhile, three southern regions of Somalia were hit once again by famine which directly affected 750,000 people, according to the UN Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit report. It was in year 2010-2012, in which nearly 260 000 people died consequently, as stated by the UN. The numbers were so high also because in 2010, UN World Food Programme had to withdraw from the territories in south Somalia controlled by Al Shabab, as the local security situation was too dangerous for the staff to remain, even though Al-Shabab partially lifted ban on foreign aid agencies that they held over their territories. A huge amount of aid flows to Somalia, especially from the US. In 2012, first stable formal government in two decades is formed and first presidential election in 45 years. Parliament member, academic and activist Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is chosen to lead the country by. The following year, US recognises Somalia's government for the first time since 1991. Attacks of Al Shabab continued, whether it was on government, army or even Christian schools and other civilian buildings, killing numerous of people. US is strongly involved in the conflict as a part of their war against terrorist, often using the tactics of air and drone strikes. (BBC, 2016; CNN, 2017)

Even though the central government in Somalia holds control over Mogadishu, the security situation is overall in deplorable state. The relatively still state in the capital city is very fragile and often impaired by terrorist attack by Al Shabab. The group is also behind much of the conflicts and fighting most of which takes place in the south of the country. In 2010, they even shortly controlled Mogadishu. The year 2014 was the worst in four years in terms of terrorism, as the violence increases each year. The same year started military Operation Indian Ocean that is focused on the fight against Al Shabab. It involves the Somali military, the African Union and the US military. Somalia currently ranks seventh on the Global Terrorism Index¹² and the impact of terrorism in the country is very high. The year 2015 was one of the worst in Somalia

¹² Global Terrorism Index is produced by the by the Institute for Economics and Peace and provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 16 years, covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2015 (ReliefWeb, 2016)

recent history when it comes to death caused by terrorism even though there was an 18% decrease of terrorism, compared year before. In the figure 14, a graph created by the Institute for Economics and Peace shows the main targets and the share of the various groups on the victims. It is obvious that Al Shabab is accountable for most deaths (IEP, 2016; EASO, 2016)




Figure 14: The targets and victims of terrorist attacks source: (EASO, 2016)

The security situation differs considerably varies by region. As was said, the situation in Central and South Somalia is the worst from all of the regions, as a result of from inter and intra clan fighting and Al-Shabaab attacks. Although it is unlikely that they will be able to gain control over the city again and the number of attacks in Mogadishu is decreasing, it is still being often targeted by Al Shabab and the incidents are on a weekly basis. Situation in Puntland is not as acute but is still worse than in Somaliland, where the situation is considered to be most stable (EASO, 2016).

As a result of prolonged ongoing fighting in the country and the unstable security situation, there is a strong flow of refugees moving within the country as well as behind the borders. This is what the following and last chapter will focus on – the migration caused by the conflict.

Migration

The situation of the citizens, mostly civilians, of Somalia can easily be read from the previous chapters, wherein is also described. The political, security, economic and humanitarian situation caused by the subject of this thesis, the conflict, is not in favour of the Somali people. Due to the living condition caused by these affairs, there is a high number of migration in the countries as well as those fleeing the country and it remains to be one of the world's longest and worst refugee crises (UNHCR, 2012). People are trying to escape to safety from the fighting, warlords and terrorist. As Elusive Jannah (2015) said in the book *The Somali Diaspora and a Borderless Muslim Identity* – „*When a country is in crisis, its people are in crisis*“ (Jannah, 2015, 31). Therefore, it is important to know the context of the country, as it is crucial for being able to comprehend the situation, the vicious circle and all relative circumstances, as they are the prime cause for the migration. It is a very current and important topic, that is being neglected by the public. It is a long-standing situation – the crisis last for three decades now and third generation of refugees is being born in exile. It is estimated that one million people are remaining the neighbouring countries and other 1.1 million is displaced within the country - Mogadishu alone hosts almost 400,000 IDPs. However, due to the situation and absence of any political or legal institutions, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate data (UNHCR, 2017d, e)

Fleeing the war

Migration

Migration is most definitely not a new phenomenon. Mobility represent human freedom and chance to improve one's living standards, when it comes to health, education of safety. It has been part of human history from the start and is a big part of today's world. It can be defined as *“a process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. Encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants”* (IFRC, 2012). It has been present everywhere, all around the world in all times. It has a link to many things, as a cause as well as an effect. It might be caused by numerous reasons and can be causing as well (e.g. there is a strong linkage between migration and development). The number of people on the move is increasing, especially in the last few year and as an aspect of globalization, it gains a whole new proportion. The reasons are many - economic, political, humanitarian and more –

those are the push factors that motivate people to leave their homes. (IFRC, 2012; IOM, 2017; OHCHR, 2017).

Types of migration

That brings us to the types of migration. There is a several types of migration and migrants. First, there is a voluntary kind – orderly or regular migration. It is a voluntary movement during which the person entering the country follow all the rules and regulation of the destination country. This can be labour migration or migration of skilled persons. The other type is involuntary migration. Usually being irregular and those in movement are not acting in




Figure 15: Types of migration (source: UNDP, 2010)

accordance with the country’s entry laws and regulations. This can be refugees or displaced person. More details can be read from the figure 15 that illustrated further the types of migration and migrants. The types in concern of this thesis are those forced to migrate.

Forced migration is, a IOM defines it „a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects) “(IOM, 2017). Excluding the chemical or nuclear disaster and development projects, taken by the conflict and conditions described in previous chapters, this definition fits precisely on the situation in Somalia, which is also as a country assumed to be one of the important factors driving irregular migration, in this case its people in search for temporary protection outside the conflict regions in time of war. (Cummings at.al., 2015)

Historically, the forced migration in Somalia is directly connected to the conflict, specifically the year 1977, when the Ogaden war took place. Once the war with Ethiopia was lost, it had an immediate effect on the inflow of refugees to Somalia. Before 1970s, Somalia was experiencing significant inflow of refugees, around 1,3 million refugees were officially on the country, but in 1980s, the outflow of people was increasing and escalated during the 1990s, due to the war combined with famine and natural occurrences as is drought. After the collapse of Siad Barre regime in 1991, war between clan warlords began all over the country. That had even more devastating effect on the people than the authoritarian regime of general Barre. The estimations made by UN Committee for Refugees, during this time, some 800,000 Somalis became refugees - 400 000 went to Ethiopia, 200 000 to Kenya. In 1999, at least 50 000 people were displaced due to the violence, also to Ethiopia and Kenya. In 2000 as the TNG was re-established and the militias became most active in recent years, addition of 25 000 people was displaced from central and southern Somalia into Kenya. (Griffiths, 2003)

As can be seen in the figure 16 showing the base index of the flow of Somali refugees out of the country, it follows the course of the conflict. There was not much of migration before the year 1978 when the war with Ethiopia occurred. Even until 1986, the migration was not that significant as the dictatorship of Siad Barre held strict hand over the country. The closer to the state collapse the bigger number of refugees can be seen. Finally, in 1991, the year when the regime fell, there is a steep spike in the numbers. It is gradually falling and stagnates until recent years, when the violence and the activity of Al Shabab began to rise once again. The numbers rose several thousand times more than they were just 30 years ago and are now estimated to be around one million refugees outside the country.

The next figure 17 shows the proportion of Somali refugees on the total of refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa. There is nearly the same course, the proportion rose as the violence rose, although the line is influenced by the events affecting migration in other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The graph serves to imagine how big the proportion actually is. The line showing proportions follows the course of the conflict, therefore the spike around the year 1991. Also, the proportion grew significantly, only confirming the worsening of the situation in the region.




Figure 16: Fixed base index of Somali refugees, 1975 – 2013 (source: UNHCR, 2014)




Figure 17: The proportion of Somali refugees on the Sub-Saharan refugees between 1990-2013 (source: World Bank, 2016)

Main destinations

There are over one million refugees from Somalia registered throughout East Africa, but when it comes to the main destination where the Somalis flee and concentrate, as can be seen from the numbers above, the most affected are the countries in the closest proximity, that is Kenya and Ethiopia. In Kenya remains more than 50% of refugees registered in East Africa the most affected location is North-eastern region, known for the Dadaab refugee camp located 100 km from the Kenya–Somali border. It was established in 1991 to serve as a safe place from Somalis fleeing the country after the Siad Barre regime fell and anarchy along with the war between clans, government and more arose. Its initial capacity was 90,000 people and was under UNHCR. Currently, the camp is inhabited by more than 249 000 registered Somali refugees (UNHCR, 2017f). The region is strongly affected, as there is an enormous pressure when it




Figure 18: Main areas of origin of the Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya (source: UNHCR, 2017,a,b. Edited)

comes to all sorts of resources, capacities and the cohabitation of host community residents and refugees. (Kumssa et al., 2014). Ethiopia remains also a huge receiver of Somali population. They are hosted in camps in the Dollo Ado regions that borders with Somalia and several hundred kilometres to the north. The Dollo Ado region hosted five camps in 2012 and the largest refugee group

are Somalis, being the world's second largest refugee complex, according to the UN refugee agency. According to the same agency, the Dollo Ado complex currently inhabitants around 209 000 registered Somali refugees and the country hosts some 245,500 registered Somali refugees, with new still arriving and the majority of them being children and women (UNHCR, 2012; Tekle, 2012 UNHCR, 2017g). It can be seen from the figure 18 that the main flow of refugees comes from the same three most affected regions in the west and south parts of Somalia.

These two countries were the most frequent destination since the migration started and grown in numbers. In the year 1987, Kenya had already 60 000 Somali refugees present in the country whether Ethiopia had only 140. Kenya had significantly more refugees coming in until the year

1992, the year after the state collapse, when both the countries had over 250 000 refugees incoming, although Kenya had still more – over 400 000. It is clear that the flow of refugees is directly connected to the situation in the country. When it was more stable, the numbers of refugees in both countries settled on around 220 000 with Kenya still having more refugees in. This changed in the year 2001, when Ethiopia had the higher number of Somali refugees for the first time – 144 349 while Kenya “only” 67 129. The further development can be seen in the figure 20 showing the changes in numbers in both countries.




Figure 20: Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya during the years 1987-2013 (source: UNHCR, 2014)




Figure 21: Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa and Yemen
(source: UNHCR, 2016)

The figure 21 shows other destinations and host communities of Somali people. It clearly confirms the information above but also shows the stress upon other countries. There is a significant number of refugee in Yemen for example. Smaller number is in Djibouti but we should consider the size ratio of the country compared to the other. The figure shows the Horn of Africa and Yemen, where are big communities of Somalis present. But there are also other parts of the world, where Somalis live.

The Somali diaspora

There are several countries where significant number of Somalis reside. As was said and showed in the figure, it is Ethiopia and Kenya with enormous refugee camps, Yemen, Djibouti, and Uganda. However, in addition to those, in Libya and North America, there are also big communities of Somalis established. United States has more than 85,000 Somali Americans living there and the biggest Somali community is hosted by Minneapolis. Concerning Europe, UK is the leading country in number of Somali residents although historically, it used to be Scandinavian countries. (Griffiths, 2003; Jacobs and Yuhas, 2016)

In the figures 22 - 26 can be seen the proportions of Somali refugees in the world. This is a proportion from the total number of refugees as in the year 2013, 100 % = 1121772 per the data from UNHCR used.

Worldwide	
Country	Proportion
1. Kenya	33,85%
2. Ethiopia	31,23%
3. Yemen	13,82%
4. Djibouti	3,69%
5. United Kingdom	3,13%
6. United States	2,70%
7. Netherlands	1,75%
8. Sweden	1,18%
9. South Africa	1,00%
10. Canada	0,82%

Figure 22: Somali refugees worldwide (source: UNHCR, 2014)

Europe	
Country	Proportion
1. United Kingdom	3,13%
2. Netherlands	1,75%
3. Sweden	1,18%
4. Denmark	0,73%
5. Italy	0,70%
6. Norway	0,65%
7. Switzerland	0,41%
8. Germany	0,23%
9. Finland	0,18%
10. Malta	0,17%

Figure 23: Somali refugees in Europe (source: UNHCR, 2014)

Figure “worldwide” show where is the most refugees on the global scope. It confirms what was shown above – that the biggest proportion of Somali refugees remains in Kenya and Ethiopia. These countries are followed by Yemen, although the situation in Yemen is more complicated, as elaborated below. The cases of the proportions in other countries are compared to the first three very small but still significant.

The figure above also shows that as the first European country ranks United Kingdom with 3,13% of Somali refugees. The Somali diaspora in UK is not new, there are certain historic links, not mention that Britain is in fact one of the countries that colonized Somalia. However, majority of the current Somalis in UK as well as in Europe are cause of the Somali Civil War. The main destination within the country are Cardiff, Sheffield, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds,

Leicester, Manchester, and the inner and outer boroughs of London (IOM, 2013). UK is followed by the Northern countries, that, as was said, used to be the primary destination of Somalis in earlier years.

Asia	
Country	Proportion
1. Yemen	13,82%
2. Syria	0,20%
3. Pakistan	0,08%
4. Turkey	0,06%
5. India	0,04%
6. Kuwait	0,04%
7. Malaysia	0,03%
8. Sudan	0,02%
9. Saudi Arabia	0,02%
10. Iraq	0,02%
Figure 24: Somali refugees in Asia (source: UNHCR, 2014)	

When it comes to Asia, there is not such a big proportion in any of the countries, except for Yemen. The situation in Yemen itself is not safe. Since 2015, the country itself is in Civil War and the situation is worsening as the fighting intensifies and the violence is growing. Somali refugees live either in urban areas or in the only refugee camp in Yemen – Khazar camp, both in dire conditions. Somalis are fleeing the conflict in Somalia and are returning back to war torn Somalia. Since 2015 – 2016, 29,505 individuals (89% Somalis; 10%

Yemenis, 1% other nationalities) fled to Somalia. (UNHCR, 2016a). Similar situation happened to Somalis in Syria who escaped the Somali civil war to Syria in 1990s. In recent years and events, they found themselves in different country as well as in different civil war and many of them are forced to leave Syria the same way, as Syrians are. Some Somalis in Syria are returning to Somalia into the still difficult situation. Unfortunately, as will be said in the following part, Somalia is not ready for repatriations and therefore this only worsen the situation of already displaced people in Somalia. (Abdi, 2013)

When it comes to back to Africa, there is no surprise. The most affected countries are those around. As was said, Kenya and Ethiopia, followed by Djibouti, small country bordering with Somalia, respectively Somaliland, in the North of the county.

Africa	
Country	Proportion
1. Kenya	33,85%
2. Ethiopia	31,23%
3. Djibouti	3,69%
4. South Africa	1,00%
5. Egypt	0,63%
6. Uganda	0,63%
7. Eritrea	0,38%
8. Libya	0,24%
9. Zambia	0,18%
10. Botswana	0,05%
Figure 25: Somali refugees in Africa (source: UNHCR, 2014)	

USA		
Year	Number of refugees	The proportion of refugees
1997	22613	3,72%
1998	24419	4,38%
1999	27874	5,78%
2000	34005	7,15%
2001	33750	7,67%
2002	28693	6,64%
2003	25421	6,32%
2004	31110	7,99%
2005	34207	8,65%
2006	72546	15,63%
2007	12224	2,68%
2008	10154	1,82%
2009	7112	1,05%
2010	4513	0,59%
2011	2996	0,28%
2012	2412	0,21%
2013	2310	0,21%

Figure 26: Somali refugees in USA in the years 1997-2013 (source: UNHCR, 2014)

The sixth rank worldwide is held by the US. In the figures 26 and 27, it is shown how the number and proportion of refugees in US changed in the last 20 years and during the biggest boom around the years 2004 - 2006 as well as map conducted after the US census in 2012 of where the Somalis concentrate.




Figure 27: Somalis in the US (source: Bryan Nicholson / cartoMission, 2012)

The biggest numbers are in Minneapolis, Washington state and Ohio. Most of the incoming are young uneducated men with a Muslim religion. The reason for so many refugees from Somalia in US is that US was always friendly country to come in in term of politics. During the Obama administration, more refugees from Somalia was admitted into US than from Syria. The number were growing and according to the State Department's refugee database, 20 065 Somali refugees was accepted into US, more than half of which in 2016. This will all change with the with the advent of President Donald Trump, as he released executive order to stop the refugee flow into the US for a minimum four months. Moreover, the return for Somalis from US is even more difficult, as they are afraid of the Al Shabab thinking that did or will hand information to Americans. (Horowitz, 2016; Rush, 2016; RPC, 2017; Gettleman, 2017)

Internally displaced people

As was said, the crisis has a serious impact on the lives of Somali people. But not only for the absence of government, the direct effects are many. It begins with the worst – the loss of life itself, but it's not where it ends. People are losing their homes and livelihoods. Militias often took what they want, seize or kill livestock, destroy the water sources and leave burnt out villages after them. Many markets were lost and there are often mines laid down on the transport routs, which made it impossible for people to trade and make their living. Destruction of the livelihood of opposing clan became one of the favourite tactics of the conflict. These are some of the more material matters but the consequences are also rural. Above, the diya paying group system was shortly described. It is an important part of the social structure of Somali people, where majority lives in rural area and they base their only economic and law system of those rules. The conflict made it impossible for the community to continue live by their tradition. Additional effect on clan system and social structure was that during the regime of Siad Barre and vice versa. The displaced clan members concentrated on certain location which later led to the creation of opposition (for example the Isaq clan, the creators of the SNM that significantly attributed to the fall of the regime). At the peak of the conflict, the United States Committee for Refugee estimated number of IDPs was 2 million and a quarter of a million people searched for the refuge in camps Mogadishu (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Griffiths, 2003)

On a bigger scale, it was already stated that the conflict had contributed to two big famines, in which hundreds of thousands of people died. Together with the constant sense of insecurity and fear, many people leave their home in a search for better life. The was created huge displacement of people, nationally and internationally (Ahmed and Green, 1999) .According to

the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Internally Displaced People (IDP) are those „persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border“ (IOM, 2017). According to UNHCR, there is currently over a 1.1. millions of IDPs in Somalia (1 106 751 as for 30th November 2016) (UNHCR, 2016b). IDP are most likely to reside nearby city as are Hargeisa in Somaliland, Bossaso in Puntland, and the capital Mogadishu. The living conditions are rueful. Only was people can make living is to beg or through occasional work. High level of undernourishment, disease and human rights violation are reported, as they lost protection they originally had from their clan, there are no means for their defence and protection. The most vulnerable group are the women and girls. They face serious discrimination and abuse of their right, especially in IDP camps, including sexual violence, domestic violence, robbery and economic discrimination. Other problem in Mogadishu is forced eviction. UN reported that only in the first eight months of 2015, more than 116,000 people were forcibly evicted. What is more, the humanitarian assistance designed to help to IDPs is often diverted by government. (Migri, 2016)

Below, the figures 28 and 29 created by IDMC and UNHCR can be seen. What these figures show it the change in the number of IDP in Somalia who are displaced just because of the conflict. Even though the total number is lower than in 2009, the number of IDP is growing since 2014, meaning that the situation is worsening and drives more new people out of their homes.




Figure 28: Total number of IDP in Somalia (source: IDMC, 2015)

Repatriation and resettlement

The repatriation of refugees is an ongoing process. The return is either facilitated or unaided, the latter tends to be higher in numbers. UNHCR has a special programme focused on return of refugees from Kenya. Since its start in December 2014, a total of 44,982 Somalis returned to Somalia. For example, during January 2017, 5,086 refugees have been voluntarily repatriated. Although it is a good news, as it is considered to be the one of only three durable solutions the returnees mostly concentrate in urban areas, same as IDPs which contributes to above mentioned problems. The other concern is that there is lack of any kind of state institutions, from health, education to water supply and roads. When the people return, there will be no security provided for them and so it will only lead to more displacement. The other possibilities are integration into the host nation or resettlement to a third country, which are both extremely difficult. Somalia is not ready to welcome its people back and provide safe life to them, as the country is still torn by conflict. Overall, it is not recommended to support resettlement in larger numbers. (Griffiths, 2003; GISR, 2013; Jannah, 2015)

Incoming

Although it may seem contra productive, Somalia not only produces refugees but also receives them. In the previous section, it was said that Somalia used to be primarily receiving country which changed with the crisis. In the figure 31 can be seen the fixed base index of incoming refugees since 1978 and below it, in the figure 32, the net migration starting from the year 1962. Both graphs rise around the year 1980. In Ethiopia was a very repressive regime and in the year 1977-1978 it had a period called the Red Terror, with addition of the Ogaden War in a combination with 1978 drought in eastern Somalia caused substantial refugee flow from Ethiopia into Somalia which actually contributed to the end of the war and the loss of Somalia, as it made Somalia dependent of humanitarian help because the country didn't have the capacity to cope with such number of people in need while its own people lived in poor conditions. There were more than 700,000 refugees reported in 26 refugee camps with no sanitation and almost no food, mostly inhabited by women and children. In 1980s, the oppressive regime in Ethiopia continued and together with drought and famine contributed to the refugee crisis. Due to the diplomatic, political and domestic changes, the numbers decreased. There is a definitive fall in the year 1993, already in time when the state was collapsed (Ofcansky and Berry, 1993; Global Security, 2017). Finally, in the figure 33 can be seen the list of countries and their

number of refugees in Somali as well as the proportion on the number, that is in the year 2013. The leading country was and still is Ethiopia, with a large majority above 90%.




Figure 31: Fixed base index of incoming refugees, 1978-2007 (source: UNHCR, 2014)




Figure 32: Net migration of Somalia, 1962 – 2012 (source: World Bank, 2016b)

Country	Proportion of refugees	Number of refugees
1. Ethiopia	95,05%	2305
2. United Rep. of Tanzania	2,60%	63
3. Eritrea	1,57%	38
4. Bangladesh	0,21%	5
5. Yemen	0,21%	5
6. Dem. Rep. of the Congo	0,12%	3
7. Sudan	0,12%	3
8. Uganda	0,08%	2
9. Various	0,04%	1
Total	100%	2 425

Figure 33: Incoming refugees by country of origin in the year 2013 (source: UNHCR, 2014)

Conclusion

The crisis in Somalia was introduced and described in its whole complexity and difficulty. The roots of the conflict, the parties and the important events leading the country to the state it is now, which allowed the reader to comprehend what is it that makes the situation so impossible to solve and improve easily. It also explains why the conflict lasts so long without any side really winning or any solution being made. What was found it that the social and political structures based on clans are crucial in the restoration of the government and the peace in the country. The clans are where the roots of all lie. Beginning with belonging to clan and not to the country with nationalism that grown only as a resistance to colonialism, their fight against the dictatorship and contribution to Siad Barre's overthrow, to the factions, militias and scramble for power after the state collapse and during the 90's until the coming of bigger player, the Al Shabab. To this day, the clans hold a significant role in the political structure as could be seen in the figure showing the voting system in Somalia. Clan system obviously worked in Somalia both historically before the colonialism, as the country was stable and the traditional ways functioned, as well as in modern world, as can be seen on the case of Somaliland, where the clans and clan elders have significantly more power than in Mogadishu government. One of the things that contributed to the fact that the country is so violent is the time of Cold War, shortly mentioned in previous chapters, when US and USSR lead proxy wars in Africa and provided weapons and resources to Somalia that were needed to start and maintain the civil war. It would be a good topic to further explore.

The consequences of the conflict on Somali people are enormous, as was seen in the chapter about migration. Through the refugees, the whole world is affected, especially the neighbour countries, Kenya and Somalia, that host the most Somalis. The refugees as well as IDPs are living in dangerous and poor conditions because the government does not have the capacity to help them. The NGOs providing help in the country are the best hope for IDPs (and other people in need) whereas there is no indication that the situation would considerably improve in the near future, quite the contrary. Despite all the efforts to rebuild functioning central federal government, Al Shabab, warlords and militias remain a major obstacle to achieving this goal.

In current global events and situation in the world, it is interesting to observe the shift in incoming people to Somalia. The numbers are too subtle to be seen in the fixed base index above but in recent years the numbers of refugees coming to Somalia is growing, especially

than to Somaliland. For example, for Syrians, it is the only acceptable destination in proximity as there are restrictions and many obstacles to get into Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and further to the whole EU and with the Trump administration, the US as well. Yemen has been currently in war since March of 2015 and Somaliland is becoming the one safe haven in the region (Riordan, 2015). Making this point, it would be very interesting to further explore the phenomena of Somaliland as a hope for the future of Somalia. The whole country seems to be in constant and irresolvable conflict, in vicious circle of failing government, warlords, clans, militias and terrorist organizations, whereas Somaliland manages to be relatively stable despite all obstacles and odds. Maybe there lies the solution that will resolve in peace in Somalia. There are in fact several topics that could build upon this work and be further developed. Concerning Somalia, it would definitely be the matter of IDPs and refugees returning from abroad back to Somalia. In the conditions as they are now in Somalia for the people, it is not possible to live safe life and certainly not full-fledged with the livelihood opportunities and chance to fulfil their potential. It would be interesting to explore the possibilities for building safe environment for IDPs as well as returned refugees, or even to think about means to improve their lives whether in refugee camps or in the urban areas, for example in the crucial, packed and dangerous surroundings of Mogadishu. In the light of today's events in the world it would be also intriguing and maybe even beneficial to compare the case of Somalia to the one of Syria and their similarities, as both of the countries fell into war and chaos after the fall of the dictatorial regime with many groups involved but not one clearly leading or able to rebuild the county or even restore peace. Therefore, in both countries alike, the intervention and help from international society is insecure as the results are unpredictable and it is very difficult to choose party to support. The idea that Syria could turn into Somalia was already suggested by Lakhdar Brahimi, former Algerian diplomat and a peace negotiator, even before the peace talks in 2013. Therefore, Somalia can also serve as a prime example of a cautionary case but also as a good basis for finding a possible solution for other conflicts worldwide. (Baker, 2013)

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