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Pakistan As a Case For Social Constructivism

Bachelor's Thesis

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I hereby declare that this Thesis is solely my own work and I have written it with the help of cited sources and literature.

Olomouc, 9th April 2013

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INTRODUCTION

South Asia is considered a region of great importance in the world. One reason for this statement is the fact that it comprises two geo-politically important countries – India and Pakistan, which have very difficult mutual relationships. The Indo-Pakistani conflict started in 1947, when the two countries separated, though they had both originally belonged to one state called British India. The political unrest between the newly established countries has not been properly resolved ever since. Although at present the two states are not in a state of open war, their relations are still tense. The ruling elites on both sides of the border employ the policy of blaming and shaming, and the rivalling people tend, in most cases, to share their political representatives' view of the problem. There have been four wars between Islamabad and New Delhi and a number of border skirmishes since the partition. The inability to solve this stalemated conflict often results in recurring war atrocities and innumerable casualties.

The diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan should be of grave concern not only because their conflict has lasted so long, but mainly because both are nuclear powers with very high population densities. A potential nuclear war or even a nuclear accident would thus lead to severe consequences. Pakistan is commonly not considered a very trustworthy state on the international scene.¹ Despite its official status as the US's ally, Pakistan is often accused of providing safe haven to terrorists. Since its actions are essential to the stability of the region, it is necessary to understand where such political behaviour stems from. Pakistan has been under protection of the US for a long time, and has played an important role as an officially befriended state of the US in the war on terrorism. Islamabad has made clear however, that this friendly status is in fact of only an official character, while the actual moods in the country are not unanimously pro-western, but rather the opposite.

In order to explain the Indo-Pakistani conflict, many scholars tend to use classic rationalist theories; neo-realism in particular. This Thesis' aim is to find out whether a reflectivist approach, namely the social constructivism (henceforth shortened to 'constructivism') is applicable instead, and whether it can explain Pakistani behaviour in

¹ GOLDBERG, Jeffrey - AMBINDER, Marc: *The Ally From Hell*. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 308, No. 5, 2011, p. 48-64. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=1f71f93a-114c-4948-8740-486f273cbe3c%40sessionmgr14&vid=7&hid=18&bdata=Jmxhbmc9Y3Mmc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=a9h&AN=67244950>

this deadlocked conflict with India. To support this Thesis' hypothesis, two case studies were carried out. They treat two main issues within Indo-Pakistani relationships, which, amongst others, exacerbate tension between the two countries: the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan's nuclear armament. The Kashmir dispute is a highly specific case, but crucial to the relations of India and Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear armament, though at first sight an obvious case, presents a great challenge in constructivist application. With a new approach towards this situation, many facts might be seen in a different light, and thus serve as an encouragement for the usage of new policies in attempting to solve stalemated conflicts.

This Thesis focuses primarily on the territory of Pakistan; proceeding in both case studies from the very beginning of the conflict, i.e. from the partition of British India up to the present. In its first part, thorough attention is paid to the constructivist approach itself, and to the aspects of identity. The remainder applies constructivism on events which have occurred in the long-lasting Kashmir dispute, and on Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons.

The main research question is: “Is it possible to apply social constructivism on Pakistani behaviour in Indo-Pakistani conflict?” The related hypothesis envisages the possibility for constructivism to explain Pakistani behaviour in the Indo-Pakistani conflict.

An empirical-analytical approach is used throughout the Thesis for testing the theory of constructivism. The analytical method is used to verify whether constructivism is applicable on the Pakistani case, whilst the descriptive method is used in both case studies to outline the events crucial to this research.

The Thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter is a theoretical framework into which the Thesis is grounded and introduces constructivism as an approach in international relations with all its benefits and deficiencies. Advocates as well as critics of this approach, with their principal positions, are introduced in this chapter in order to better understand the core of constructivism and against what it defines itself. Considerable space is dedicated to identity and the role it plays in constructivist approach, as a significant amount of literature used in this Thesis highlights importance the concept of identity.

The second chapter relates the Kashmir dispute case study. The territory of Jammu and Kashmir is a crucial thorn and lies at the root of the discord between Islamabad and New Delhi. The region, with a majority Muslim population that has long been used to Hindu rulers, is constantly claimed by both countries. The dispute has been very costly for

both Pakistan and India; nevertheless, neither of the adversaries is willing to back down. Kashmir presents an important symbol of Pakistani identity, and, as is shown in the second chapter, identity matters in Pakistan. This fact was already noticed in the early fifties by Josef Korbel, a Czech diplomat working at that time as a Chairman of the UN Commission on Demarcation for Kashmir whose ideas have also been incorporated in the Thesis. The chapter is divided following the conflict's main milestones, with an emphasis on the key participants in the discord, their speeches and the course of actions they decided to take. A descriptive method is used in this chapter to present the important stages in the discord as they took place since the countries' independence, whilst analysis is employed to explore the applicability of the constructivist approach.

The third chapter presents a case study on the nuclear armament of Pakistan, which is of a great concern not only to the USA, but most of the world. Pakistan's reasons for deciding on becoming a nuclear power are examined through the constructivist lens and contrasted with the traditional neorealist approach. The same procedure as in the first case study is followed to enable a relevant comparison.

As the conflict has lasted for many decades, it has begot a very broad literature. Although constructivism is a relatively new approach in the field of international relations (IR), many scholars have decided to apply it on the situation; either directly, as the main theme of their academic contributions, or indirectly, by mentioning factors of constructivist nature which may have contributed to the course of events in Pakistan and India. One of the most recent works, *Security Community in South Asia* by Muhammad Pervez, employs constructivism as a theoretical framework in order to explain the discord between Pakistan and India. This monograph was unfortunately not available for the purposes of this Thesis, but it is at least mentioned here so as to provide the overview of literature written on the topic. All key events are described in detail in a vast number of studies; published solely on the conflict in Kashmir or nuclear Pakistan and written by scientists from both sides of the barrier as well as from the rest of the world. Data on military equipment are available in *Military Balance*, a series published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Data on the level of corruption appear on *Transparency International's* web pages.

One of the Thesis' substantial resources: *Explaining India's Nuclearization: Engaging Realism and Social Constructivism*, an article written by Runa Das, compares how nationalism, national identities and perceived (in)securities were articulated by

the leaders of the new Indian state in connection with India's nuclearization.² In her article, R. Das notices the weaknesses of realist's explanations of India's nuclearization, and draws her attention to the importance of identities, discussed later in this Thesis.

The concept of identity is further examined and draws on information from *Pakistan, A Hard Country* by Anatol Lieven. He is a policy analyst, an expert on terrorism, and places a great emphasis on the Pakistani feeling of identity and the indivisible kinship which forms the very core of Pakistan. Although R. Das deals in her article with India, not Pakistan, both countries have a lot in common (e.g. the history of once being one country and therefore both bearing the burden of a British legacy, a high level of corruption³ and enormous social disparities). In A. Lieven's words: "*Pakistan is in fact a great deal more like India – or India like Pakistan – than either country wishes to admit.*"⁴ Therefore it is worth researching whether constructivism can be applied on the Pakistani case as well.

Further inspiration was drawn from K. Alan Kronstadt's doctoral Thesis: *What drives Subcontinental Insecurity: A Multitheoretical Examination of the India-Pakistan Conflict Dyad*. Kronstadt, a specialist in South Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC, focuses mainly on regional nuclearization and the Kashmir dispute and argues that constructivism provides valuable underpinnings of the conflict.⁵

Josef Korbel's monograph: *Danger in Kashmir*, was a beneficial source on the dispute's commencement in 1954. Although his remarks fit a constructivist approach rather well, it did not exist as such at the time when IR was still dominated by realist theory. Half a century ago, the diplomat J. Korbel was already aware of a great danger being born in Kashmir in which the identities of the local inhabitants played a crucial role.

The constructivist approach used for the analysis of Pakistan's nuclearization as distinct from the typical realist approach may also find support in the essay called "*Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb*", written by Scott Douglas Sagan, professor in Political Science at Stanford University. Professor Sagan in his work, which is now considered a classical contribution in the field of IR, introduced

² DAS, Runa: *Explaining India's Nuclearization: Engaging Realism and Social Constructivism*. Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2008, p. 33-70. <http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v32n1-b.pdf> (19.10. 2012)

³ Transparency International stated these figures for Corruption Perceptions Index in 2011: India (rank 95/183 and score 3.1/10) and Pakistan (rank 134/183 and score 2.5/10). *Corruption By Country/ Territory*. Transparency International. <http://www.transparency.org/country> (26.9. 2012)

⁴ LIEVEN, Anatol: *Pakistan, A Hard Country*. London 2011, p. 21.

⁵ KRONSTADT, K. Alan: *What drives Subcontinental Insecurity?: A Multitheoretical Examination of the India-Pakistan Conflict Dyad*. Doctoral thesis, Faculty of the USC Graduate School, University of Southern California 2009, vi. <http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/assetserver/controller/item/etd-Kronstadt-3390.pdf> (27.1.2013)

three models, which aim to explain the reasons why states seek nuclear armament. He explains that although the answer to this question seems obvious, i.e. states aim to become nuclear when they feel threatened and do not see any other option, the reality is more complicated.⁶ He presents his arguments and challenges the conventional approach by saying that “*nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity*”⁷ This is in compliance with constructivism, which gives importance to identity and the way actions and beliefs of actors are interconnected and shape the reality.

Owen Bennett Jones provides in his monograph *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, a very useful survey of the Pakistani state, drawing on his own experience as a BBC correspondent there. O. Bennett Jones details the course of events in the process of constructing the nuclear bomb and the dispute in Kashmir, underpinned by critical comments. His monograph has therefore been an important source of facts for both case studies.

This Thesis lends support to recent research in the field and provides encouragement for using less usual IR approaches. As a bachelor's Thesis however, its scope is quite narrow; relying primarily on secondary literature written by other authors and putting their findings into a new context. It would be surely beneficial to process a more extensive research with primary data from the field, which was not possible at the time of writing this work.

⁶ SAGAN, Scott Douglas: *Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb*. *International Security*, Vol. 21, No.3, 1997, p 54-86.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 55.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The first chapter is divided into two parts; in the first one constructivism is introduced as an approach in the field of international relations. The main features of constructivism are here pointed out along with varied views of social scientists engaged in the topic. The second part deals with a concept of identity, which is an integral part of constructivism. Where possible, the Pakistani case is referred to.

1.1 Social Constructivism

Petr Drulák, Director of the Institute of International Relations in Prague, while speaking on constructivism, stated that there are serious disagreements about it in the field of IR. These are based on the question whether it is a theory as such, or rather an analytical framework, or as the case may be, an approach. As it is a quite new way of thinking in IR (arising in the late 80s), some claim its identity is not still very clear.⁸ However, “*most IR theories involve some level of commitment to the proposition that international politics are socially constructed. Almost no theorist believes that international political outcomes are the inevitable consequence of the nature of things rather than subject to historical and agentic contingency.*”⁹

A well-known American scholar, Alexander Wendt,¹⁰ attempted to elevate constructivism as a theory, or rather, as a form of systemic theorizing. His book: *Social Theory of International Politics*, introduces constructivism as an IR theory. On the other hand, various constructivists maintain, that it is not a substantive theory of politics, but rather a “*social theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and social change,*” as constructivism is composed of a very broad field of thoughts and trends.¹¹ Not negligible critique of constructivism is provided in Maja Zehfuss¹² monograph, beside

⁸ DRULÁK, Petr: *Teorie mezinárodních vztahů*, Praha 2003, p. 125.

⁹ JACKSON, Patrick Thaddeus. – NEXON, Daniel H.: *Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?* International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, p. 337-341.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2004.419_2.x/full (26.10.2012)

¹⁰ Alexander Wendt is an Associate Professor at the University of Chicago. He has previously taught at Yale University and Dartmouth College. He is the author of several articles in leading journals on international relations theory. WENDT, Alexander: *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge 2003.

¹¹ AGIUS, Christine: *Social Constructivism*. In. COLLINS, Alan (ed.): *Contemporary security studies*. New York 2010, p.50.

¹² Maja Zehfuss is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Warwick. She has contributed articles to *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* and the *European Journal of International Relations*. ZEHFUSS, Maja: *Constructivism in International Relations*. Cambridge 2004.

many others, *Constructivism in International Relations*. She illustrates in the beginning of her work; “*there is debate not only about whether constructivism is good for us but also, given the intellectual diversity of work labeled constructivist, about what it is in the first place.*”¹³

It is not a goal of this Thesis though, to decide about categorization of constructivism amongst other approaches in IR. Constructivism will be considered as an IR approach, notwithstanding a rich debate on its categorization, and its main characteristics follow now as understanding this approach is necessary for the further purpose of this thesis.

According to André Kukla, professor emeritus at the University of Toronto, virtually everybody is a constructivist about some things. He argues that certain social facts, more specifically facts about social institutions, languages, social classes, governments, legal systems, economic systems and kinship systems, are what they are by virtue of our actions, beliefs and intentions.¹⁴ Constructivism supposes that reality in IR is socially constructed whilst it is created and maintained via discourse and practice of IR actors. So it is not one objective reality forever.¹⁵ Speaking of Pakistan then, although being engaged in deadlocked conflict lasting decades, Pakistani attitude and policies towards India have evolved over time and the actors carrying out actions are not the same, nor is Pakistani society.

Constructivists support themselves by sociological theories and philosophical approaches, which see structure and actor as equal and show their mutual integrity.¹⁶ Constructivism emphasizes “*the importance of ideas, identity, and interaction in the international system, revealing how the human world is not simply given and/or natural but that, on the contrary, the human world is one of artifice; that it is “constructed” through the actions of the actors themselves*”¹⁷ The core constructivist technique is therefore to put into context actions, beliefs, and interests of actors and understand that the world they inhabit has been created and shaped by them and must therefore have a necessary impact on them.¹⁸ Understanding, what the society is like in a state, in this case Pakistan, and what its core beliefs and narratives, which shape thinking of people are, is thus important for constructivists and might provide an explanation where other

¹³ ZEHFUSS, M.: c.d., p. 1.

¹⁴ KUKLA, André: *Social constructivism and the philosophy of science*. London and NY 2000, p. 24.

¹⁵ DRULÁK, P.: c.d., p. 123.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 123.

¹⁷ AGIUS, C.: c.d., p. 50.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 50.

approaches/theories of IR fail.

Constructivism is a broad approach and must therefore be classified further as it will be applied on both case studies. A deeper understanding of constructivist IR views is thus essential. In spite of the fact that constructivism is not really one comprehensive school, all constructivists agree on three core ontological propositions concerning social life. First, constructivists deem normative and ideational structures as important as material structures because material structures have only meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded. Constructivists also highlight the importance of normative and ideational structures because they are thought to shape social identities of political actors. Second, in A. Wendt's words: "*Identities are the basis of interests,*" or in other words, identities matter. Third, it is the belief that agents and structures are mutually constituted. The meaning and identity of an individual actor or patterns of appropriate economic or political activity are defined by institutionalized norms and ideas.¹⁹

There are many different distinctions of constructivism and literature on this topic varies in distinguishing and labelling them. Among other classifications, constructivists are divided into two camps, which will be briefly described since one of them will be used for the purpose of this Thesis. The first group encompasses conventional constructivists. They accept "*key aspects of neorealist systemic theorizing, such as the centrality of the state and the importance of a scientific or positivist approach to comprehend phenomena.*"²⁰ A. Wendt belongs here and along with fellow conventional constructivists sees constructivism as a bridge between the rationalist and the reflectivist approaches, enabling both to benefit from the insight of the other. The second group encompasses critical constructivists who see reliance on positivism as problematic and argue that "*the distinction between the ideational and the material world simply reproduces the binary distinctions that characterize the positivist methodology (such as strong/weak).*"²¹ As examining the Indo-Pakistani conflict through rationalist lenses should not be radically denied, this thesis will test conventional constructivism as a method in studying Pakistan's situation.

¹⁹ REUS-SMIT, Christian: *Constructivism*. In BURCHILL, Scott et col. (eds.): *Theories of International Relations*. London 2001, p. 217-218.

²⁰ AGIUS, C.: c.d., p. 61.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 61.

1.2 Identity

The concept of identity is one of underlying factors of constructivism, as states, in constructivists' eyes, are kinds of entities to which identities and interests are attributable.²² As with the whole concept of constructivism, whilst writing about identity, it is also necessary to note that its role in international politics is subjected to debate. To Kenneth Waltz for example, the main representative of neorealism, identity is not an issue. All states share an identity as sovereigns and this sovereignty defines their large environment of anarchy. The term identity is used in a variety of ways and relates to a cluster of other categories, including discourse, power, interests, institutions, psychology and method.²³

While defining identity in broad terms and rather a philosophical sense, it could be said in A. Wendt's words: "*Identity is whatever makes thing what it is.*"²⁴ But as it is indeed a very broad definition, A. Wendt's definition specifies it further; he treats identity as "*a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions.*" "*This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings.*"²⁵ As A. Wendt adds though, identities are constructed by external as well as internal structures. It not only depends on how an actor perceives himself but also how others perceive him. He thus explains that two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, those held by the Self and those held by Others.²⁶ The concept of identity also assumes that multiple identities and changes between them are possible.²⁷

Identity presumes multiplicity, which K. M. Fierke, Professor of IR at the University of St. Andrews, demonstrates through the example of the United Kingdom. We can see that the UK's identity can be expressed in many ways – we can perceive it as a democracy, as a member of Europe in a special relationship with the United States, as leader of the Commonwealth, or as a formal imperial power.²⁸ As for Pakistan and the subject of this Thesis, the same approach could be applied. Pakistan can be seen for example as a nuclear power, a state with one of most powerful armies in Asia, a member of international organizations such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization

²² WENDT, Alexandr: *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge 2003, p. 224

²³ FIERKE, Karin Marie: *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Cambridge 2007, p. 75- 76.

²⁴ WENDT, A.: c.d., p. 224.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 224.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 224.

²⁷ FIERKE, K.M: c.d., p. 75.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 76.

(the SEATO) and the United Nations (the UN).

In his monograph *Pakistan, A Hard Country* A. Lieven explains that Pakistan as a state is weak, but the Pakistani society is strong.²⁹ In his work, A. Lieven draws attention to the fact that identities in Pakistan are of a vital importance. He explains that Pakistan cannot ever unite over any matter, as within its society there are various layers of identities, which combine, overlap and create the very state. “*All the same, with Pakistanis, there is usually a wheel within a wheel, an identity within an identity, which in turn overlaps with another identity*”³⁰ Kinship and its networks play a central role in shaping Pakistani politics; and according to A. Lieven this must be taken into account when dealing with Pakistan.

²⁹ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 12.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

2. KASHMIR DISPUTE

The first case study, the Kashmir dispute, is divided into three parts and draws attention on crucial moments in the stalemated struggle. The chapter focuses wholly on the “conflict of Kashmir” and leaving other inter-territorial conflicts aside. The important moments are regarded via a constructivist’s lens. With those cases where little correspondence to constructivism were found, space was given to neorealist theory.

For this chapter, the monograph *From Jinnah to Jihad* by Arvin Bahl provided very helpful insights. A. Bahl published a significant amount of writing on South Asian matters, and in above mentioned work he analyses the reasons why realism fails to explain Pakistan’s Kashmir quest. He argues that; “*the Kashmir Valley has little strategic importance to Pakistan, the costs of pursuing confrontation over Kashmir are enormous to Pakistan but not to India, the chances of obtaining control of the Kashmir Valley against a much stronger power are next to nothing and Paksitan’s survival as a state is threatened by such confrontation over Kashmir.*”³¹ Pakistan is a weak state and consequently also a state, where power is in the hands of a small group of elite. The elite, speaking primarily of the military and the civil service representatives, mainly take action in the interest of the Punjabi ethnic group, to whom Kashmir has special emotional importance.³² This emotional factor playing a role in the Kashmir dispute, goes contrary to rationalists’ beliefs, but does correspond with constructivism.

A. Bahl’s findings may be further supported by A. Lieven’s research in which he stresses the importance of identity and nationalism. A. Kronstadt also argues in his work that, while looking at the dispute through the lenses of realism, “*the myriad and oftentimes religious identities of Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris*”³³ cannot be simply explained. Numerous observers also see them as “*deeply and unavoidably implicated in the Kashmir dispute.*”³⁴ He then adds, referencing an expert on South Asian politics and IR Robert G. Wirsing: “*Like it or not, the Kashmir dispute is, in no small part, a dispute over religion.*”³⁵ Admitting this, a connection can be made with constructivism, as religion is an integral part of identity, which is an inseparable part of constructivism.

³¹ BAHL, Arvin: *From Jinnah to Jihad: Pakistan’s Kashmir Quest and the Limits of Realism*. New Delhi 2007, p. 16.

³² Ibidem, p. 18.

³³ KRONSTADT, K. A.: c.d., p. 300.

³⁴ Ibidem, p. 300.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 300.

Even older research bring very useful findings relevant at present. Josef Korbel saw the Kashmir conflict in his work: *Danger in Kashmir*, as a struggle far extending a territorial dispute. He argued: “*If the struggle for Kashmir were a struggle for territory, if it were a struggle for national resources, or for manpower, or for strategic position, or for any of the other prizes for which nations traditionally contest, it might well have been solved some years ago.*”³⁶ J. Korbel considered the conflict to be an ‘*uncompromising and perhaps uncompromisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organization, two scales of values, two spiritual attitudes, that find themselves locked in deadly conflict.*’³⁷ Notably, it has been highlighted that it is not a mere territory Pakistan would fight for. There are “*spiritual attitudes*”, as J. Korbel puts it, and values, which had been constructed in Pakistan long time before the present country was founded, and which urge the Pakistani state to behave in certain way.³⁸

India is indeed much stronger than Pakistan.³⁹ Nevertheless, Pakistan has never seemed to try to give up the quest entirely. The Kashmir dispute is generally regarded to be one of major problems in Indo-Pakistani relations.⁴⁰ Moreover, it often seems that other Indo-Pakistani issues stem from the fight over this former princely state under the Himalaya Mountains, or at least both countries claim it to be so. In order to provide just one example, General Pervez Musharraf can be cited here, while speaking of nuclear bomb tests: “*If the international community had helped resolve the Kashmir problem and ensured the security of Pakistan, we would perhaps not have tested.*”⁴¹ A. Lieven also sees the Kashmir dispute as a very sensitive issue and in his eyes the territory is even an obsession to Pakistan. He speaks of Kashmir at first in connection with the Pakistani military establishment, but then he links this dispute with most of Pakistani society. Although regarding the military in certain ways as an admirable institution, he notes that “*the military’s obsession with India in general, and Kashmir in particular*” has caused terrible damage to Pakistan and there have been moments when this could destroy Pakistan and its armed forces altogether.⁴² From this it can be clearly derived that Pakistan does not

³⁶ KORBEL, Josef: *Danger in Kashmir*. Princeton 1954, p. 25.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 25.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 25.

³⁹ In order to support this generally well known fact with reliable data, a publication *The Military Balance 2011* has been used. *The Military Balance 2011*. The International Institute For Strategic Studies. London, ISSN 2011, p. 237-242, and p. 263-266.

⁴⁰ INDURTHY, Rathnam: *Kashmir Between India and Pakistan: An Intractable Conflict, 1947 to Present*. http://www.muntr.org/v4/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Kashmir_Between.pdf (3.9. 2012)

⁴¹ KRONSTADT, K. A.: c.d., p. 331.

⁴² LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 186.

perform rational behaviour.

In the constructivist approach, narratives play a significant role. Speech acts can influence the thinking of thousands and therefore ought not to be underestimated. “*It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who once said that ‘Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning’, and Pakistani politicians share responsibility for encouraging ordinary Pakistanis to see jihad in Kashmir as legitimate.*”⁴³ This example not only illustrates how important Kashmir has been to the Pakistani leadership, but also that this conviction has been passed on to the ordinary Pakistani population – on soldiers who have fought at the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, on the soldiers’ families obsessed with hatred towards the adversary, and the Pakistani society in general, which regards the soldiers as heroes. Ramachandra Guha, an Indian historian and currently professor at New York University, notes in his monograph *India after Gandhi*: “*The dispute, for the Pakistanis, had started with the rebellion in Poonch,*⁴⁴ *which in India had been ‘largely and undeservedly forgotten.’ In Karachi and Lahore, the people were ‘completely sympathetic’ to the raiders from the frontier who, in their eyes, were fighting ‘a holy war against the oppressors of Islam.’*”⁴⁵

The belief⁴⁶ that democracy and resolutions issued by the UN Security Council are on Pakistan’s side is prevalent in Pakistan and reinforced by anger at Indian atrocities committed on Indian Muslims over the decades.⁴⁷ Alike is the core conviction of Pakistan that the Subcontinent is inescapably of two nations; Muslims and Hindus, whilst for India, there are no two nations as such. This view has been embedded in the very core of the conflict.⁴⁸

Before moving to more detailed analysis of the Kashmiri conflict, an important distinction needs to be made between the “conflict in Kashmir” and the “conflict of Kashmir”. As the focus of this chapter is primarily on the “conflict of Kashmir”, its meaning shall be explained further. The “conflict in Kashmir,” not tackled here in detail, represents the issues of Kashmir’s liberation and the creation of an independent state ruled by Kashmiri people.⁴⁹ The “conflict of Kashmir” is an interstate conflict, a dispute between

⁴³ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 186.

⁴⁴ Town located in the western part of Kashmir Valley.

⁴⁵ GUHA, Ramachandra: *India After Gandhi*. New York 2007, p. 53.

⁴⁶ The concept of belief is also important in the constructivist theory.

⁴⁷ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 187.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 187.

⁴⁹ SURI, Kavita – CHANDRAN, D. Suba: *J&K: From Militancy to Jihad?* In. CHANDRAN, D. Suba – CHARI, P.R. (eds.): *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008*. New Delhi 2008, p. 92.

India and Pakistan and can serve as a case study for testing social constructivism in the Pakistani case. It is also worth noting in the broader context beyond this Thesis, that the Kashmir dispute grew from a conflict over a border territory into “*a problem for subcontinent and the world*,”⁵⁰ as Sumantra Bose, an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, sees it. Therefore, the choice of this first case study is certainly justifiable.

2.1 Origins of the Kashmiri Conflict

In order to understand the Kashmiri conflict and provide its analysis, which should contribute to answering this Thesis' research question, it is necessary to explain what happened in Kashmir decades ago. “*The dispute (of Kashmir) is as old as the two states themselves, dating back to the circumstances of their independence from Britain and the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.*”⁵¹ Concerning the term “Kashmir”, nowadays it usually implies the Indian territory of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).⁵² It used to refer however, to the princely state Jammu and Kashmir, a much larger area, ruled by a dynasty of maharajas.⁵³ The original princely state consisted of Jammu, Ladakh, Baltistan, the Kashmir Valley, and Gilgit.⁵⁴ Over 500 princely states existed within British India. Kashmir was amongst the most extensive ones, bordering both the newborn states of India and Pakistan.⁵⁵

In 1947, the year of Independence and partition of British India, the autocratic ruler of Kashmir Maharaja Hari Singh had to face the same crucial decision as the rulers of the other princely states. The decision was indeed momentous, as they were deciding whether to join India's side or that of Pakistan. Kashmir was in fact never part of British India as London had granted certain major landholders on the Indian subcontinent a degree of autonomy. A third option, that of independence, was therefore open to the Maharaja, and one which he had originally favoured.⁵⁶

The delicacy of the Kashmir issue was already clear at the very beginning. Kashmir had a large population and its strategic importance, i.e. its proximity to China and Russia, could not be overlooked. There was also the religious matter to make the situation even

⁵⁰ BOSE, Sumantra: *Kashmir*. Harvard 2005, p. 43.

⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 2.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 2.

⁵³ Ibidem, p. 15.

⁵⁴ BENNET JONES, Owen: *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. Yale 2009, p. 77.

⁵⁵ GUHA, R.: c.d., p. 53.

⁵⁶ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 76.

more complicated. “Whereas the maharaja was a Hindu, over three-quarters of his subjects were Muslims.”⁵⁷ However, not only were they Muslims, they were mostly living in appalling conditions as well and were generally oppressed. As S. Bose writes, Kashmir was not the only princely state where a ruler would be of a different religion than his subjects, but in this case, “the distance between the privileged Hindu elite centred on the ruling family and their large majority of Muslim subjects was particularly vast.”⁵⁸ All these factors combined created a predisposition for the future conflict.

Given that such was the situation in Kashmir, i.e. its vast majority was Muslim and the land contiguous with Pakistan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah⁵⁹ felt confident. Having said at the time of partition “Kashmir will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit” he expected to gain the territory.⁶⁰ Similarly, India was also hoping to win Kashmir, considering the fact that the ruling dynasty of the princely state was Hindu and contiguous with India as well. Nevertheless, “the idea of independence had taken strong hold over the maharaja. He loathed Congress, so he could not think of joining India. But if he joined Pakistan, the fate of his Hindu dynasty might be sealed.”⁶¹ So in spite of the fact his princely state would become trapped between the two significantly more powerful neighbours, Hari Singh was still hoping for carrying out independent policies. Here, the concept of identities could be employed. Hari Singh might have seen himself as an independent ruler; feeling Kashmiri first of all and only then Hindu. But India saw him in the first place as Hindu, and consequently Pakistan primarily put emphasis on his princely state having a majority Muslim identity. Each actor therefore constructed his own vision of identity and behaved accordingly.

The course of events proved more different than any of the actors involved could have originally imagined. The Prime Minister of Kashmir, Janak Singh, sent on the eve of Independence two identical telegrams to the Indian and Pakistani governments where a Standstill Agreement was suggested. It meant in other words; “the existing arrangements should continue pending settlement of details.”⁶² Nevertheless, Pakistan did not acquiesce with this proposed strategy and decided to take action in order to secure Kashmir’s accession. Thus the conflict began.⁶³

⁵⁷ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 76.

⁵⁸ BOSE, S.: c.d., p. 16.

⁵⁹ Muhammed Ali Jinnah was a founder of independent Pakistan.

⁶⁰ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 76.

⁶¹ GUHA, R.: c.d., p. 53.

⁶² SURI, K. – CHANDRAN, D. S.: c.d, p.93.

⁶³ Ibidem, p. 92.

Uprisings against the Maharaja in the region of Poonch in 1947 preceded the actual outbreak of war. The local Muslim population rebelled against the Maharaja's taxation policy and was severely suppressed. In August 1947, right after the partition, the revolt renewed and this time it carried a definite pro-Pakistan character.⁶⁴ Taking a chance as the fighting progressed, the pro-Pakistan chieftains of the western Jammu districts "*proclaimed the formation of a provisional "Azad" Jammu and Kashmir government in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on 3 October 1947.*"⁶⁵ Meanwhile, in early September, infiltration of armed groups, crossing the border from Pakistan began. The militants were looting and attacking Hindu and Sikh minorities. Pakistan kept denying any support for these groups, but with the proclamation of Azad Kashmir, relations between Hari Singh and Pakistan broke down completely.⁶⁶

On 21 October, several thousand Pashtun tribesmen began an offensive into J&K and despite Pakistan denying it, the raid showed clear signs of organization and planning. Faced with this invasion, the Maharaja felt he could not do otherwise than turn to India for help, which was naturally conditioned by signing the Instrument of Accession. The Maharaja succumbed and signed. It was promised by the Indian Governor General, Lord Mountbatten, that "*once law and order had been restored and the invader expelled the accession should be ratified by a reference of people.*"⁶⁷ Indian troops hence crossed the border. Fully-fledged fighting broke out in November 1947 and lasted until December; when the Indian Cabinet decided to refer the case to the United Nations. On 13 August 1948, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution consisting of three major parts: ceasefire, withdrawal of Pakistani troops and withdrawal of Indian troops, while the future of Kashmir would be decided in a referendum. "*Except for the first part of the resolution, there has been no progress on its other provisions, despite a series of successive resolutions.*"⁶⁸ Since then, India and Pakistan have been deadlocked in this conflict without any significant changes being made.

The gravity of the conflict was at that time recognized by many. Henry Grady, United States ambassador to India, stated in January 1948 for instance: "*Kashmir is the one great problem that may cause the downfall of India and Pakistan.*"⁶⁹ Note on the one hand, that certain aspects of this conflict phase clearly carry signs of rationalist behaviour and

⁶⁴ BOSE, S.: c.d., p. 32.

⁶⁵ Ibidem, p. 33.

⁶⁶ Ibidem, p. 34.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, p. 34-36.

⁶⁸ SURI, K. – CHANDRAN, D. S.: c.d, p. 94.

⁶⁹ GUHA, R.: c.d., p. 96.

could rather be explained via realism. Given Kashmir's strategic importance, it is only logical that Pakistan pronounced its claim, because a strategic point in the hands of the adversary always means a threat. On the other hand, contrary to neorealists, who see all units (states) as similar, constructivists deny this with their credo "identities matter"⁷⁰ and they could object here, that not only Pakistan began the October offensive in order to pursue a strategic territory, but also to follow its idea of a Muslim state encompassing all Muslim brethren.

2.2 From 50s Till 80s

Apart for the loss to China of Aksai Chin, a desolate area in eastern Kashmir, in a brief war of 1962, India felt it was making progress in Kashmir and consolidated its rule.⁷¹ *"As far as Delhi was concerned, Kashmir had become an integral part of its territory and there would be no more talk of a plebiscite."*⁷² However, this presumption proved to be wrong. With India's increasing attempts to integrate Kashmir, Pakistan became more and more frustrated.⁷³ In 1963, theft of a Muslim religious relic from a shrine near Srinagar provoked a wave of social unrest amongst Muslims in Kashmir. Pakistan felt it was time to try its chances again, as they thought the Muslim population was certainly on the their side. In consequence, the 1965 war broke out. Pakistan felt confident, being in close relationship with the US and having well trained and equipped personnel thanks to American help. Young Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the head of Pakistan's Foreign Office, had focused on the Kashmir issue ever since he was appointed.⁷⁴ Since *"both UN resolutions and bilateral talks, he argued, had failed,"*⁷⁵ there was a need to take action. However, as O. Bennet Jones points out, *"the 1965 war between Pakistan and India was a particularly futile conflict. At the end of it the two sides agreed a ceasefire line identical to the one with which they had started."*⁷⁶ An agreement was reached during the Tashkent talks, which took place in January 1966 and resulted in the Tashkent declaration. *"For the Pakistani public it was a shocking and disappointing outcome."*⁷⁷

In 1971, a war between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh's Independence broke

⁷⁰ AGIUS, C.: c.d., p. 50.

⁷¹ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 92-93.

⁷² Ibidem, p. 93.

⁷³ INDURTHY, R.: c.d. p. 4.

⁷⁴ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.94-95.

⁷⁵ Ibidem, p.95.

⁷⁶ Ibidem, p.94.

⁷⁷ Ibidem, p.99.

out. It was nevertheless, with one exception, just of peripheral significance to the Kashmir dispute. In order to settle things down, Z. A. Bhutto met with his Indian counterpart, Indira Gandhi, in Simla in 1972, where they signed the so-called Simla Agreement. Apart from agreeing on settling disputes through bilateral negotiations and by peaceful means, they agreed on renaming the ceasefire line in Kashmir as the Line of Control.⁷⁸ Although it might seem insignificant, after Simla Z.A. Bhutto was often accused of “*having sold out Pakistan’s interests*”, no matter how much he later rejected this interpretation.⁷⁹ As S. Bose writes: “*No Pakistani regime or leader can or will accept turning the LOC into part of the India-Pakistan border as the starting point in a defining element of a political dialogue with India on Kashmir, since such acceptance would preempt the basis of the international dispute over Kashmir on India’s preferred terms.*”⁸⁰ That is indeed true. Constructivism states that “*social movements influence the state’s international affairs by mobilizing citizens to press their governments through appeals and measured proposals, to adopt a policy which they deem fit for their country*”⁸¹ This is a clear example of such a behaviour. No matter what any Pakistani regime or leader might want, there is still public opinion to deal with.

Despite the Simla Agreement and the Tashkent Agreement, nobody really paid attention to demarcating the border on the Siachin Glacier at the eastern end of LOC. The crises developed gradually and in 1984 it culminated, when India deployed troops on the glacier as a reaction to some recently published Pakistani maps showing the glacier under Pakistan’s control. “*The two sides have fought over the glacier ever since, although the severity of the climate means that more people die as a result of the cold than through military action.*”⁸² Siachin thus became a mutually hurting stalemate because neither country will let it go.

After the grievous defeat in 1972 and separation of Bangladesh, Pakistan felt shaken, because the lost war meant that India had blown “*a hole in the founding ideology of the Pakistani nation. To this there could be only one effective answer – to assist in the separation of Kashmir from India, and thus blow a hole in the founding idea of Indian*

⁷⁸ INDURTHY, R.: c.d. p.5.

⁷⁹ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 100.

⁸⁰ BOSE, S.: c.d., p. 179.

⁸¹ KHAN, A. Shamsad: *Media’s Constructivism and the India-Pakistan Peace Process*. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MediasConstructivismandtheIndia-PakistanPeaceProcess_skhan_020210 (16.10.2012)

⁸² BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.101.

secularism”⁸³ As India’s behaviour towards Muslims in Kashmir was anything but democratic and just, anti-Indian opinion steadily hardened over the 1980s and provided Pakistan the chance to support its major foe’s enemies. Several groups operated on the Kashmiri territory. Jammait-I-Islam (JII), composed of Muslim fundamentalists, was a branch of the Pakistani political party bearing the same name. A second group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), fought for independent Kashmir, and a third group: Jammu and Kashmir Peoples’ League (JKPL) was in favour of Pakistan.⁸⁴

In July 1988, Srinagar witnessed a series of explosions committed by the JKLF, who were assisted by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). ISI provided JKLF, amongst others, with weapons and military instructions, which resulted in an extraordinary level of violence. Casualty estimates vary; but neutral observers estimate 60 000 dead since 1988. Nevertheless “*far more people died as a result of this insurgency than in the wars of 1947 and 1965 put together.*”⁸⁵

2.3 From 1990s Onwards

JKLF’s activities were soon to be overridden by those of Hizb-ul Mujahideen, an armed wing of JII, as ISI became increasingly worried about JKLF’s independence course.⁸⁶ Hizb-ul Mujahideen replaced cries for freedom with those for jihad⁸⁷ and launched their attacks in Kashmir.⁸⁸ Their targets were mainly Kashmiri Pandits, Hindus by origin, but otherwise sharing the same culture with the Kashmiri Muslims. Not only because they were Hindus, but also because the militants regarded them as “*agents of a state that had long oppressed the Kashmiris*”⁸⁹, the Pandits had to pay a terrible price for an identity they had not chosen. At the beginning of the 1990s, an estimated 200 000 Pandits lived in the Kashmir Valley, whilst by the end of the decade, less than 4, 000 of them were left; the rest were either killed or took refuge in different parts of India.⁹⁰

ISI continued to provide thorough support for the Islamic militants. “*With ISI’s help, Kashmiri activists moved freely across the border, into India to kill or bomb,*

⁸³ GUHA, R.: c.d., p. 465.

⁸⁴ INDURTHY, R.: c.d. p. 6.

⁸⁵ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.103.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 103.

⁸⁷ Holy war.

⁸⁸ GUHA, R.: c.d., p. 641.

⁸⁹ Ibidem, p. 642.

⁹⁰ Ibidem, p. 642.

then back to Pakistan for rest and replenishment.”⁹¹ By the mid 1990s, hundreds of *mehmani* mujahideen,⁹² who owed allegiance to different groups based in Pakistan, joined the Hizb-ul Mujahideen. “Throughout the 1980s, the Islamization of Pakistani society had proceeded apace.”⁹³ By 2000, Pakistan had already 30,000 madrasas,⁹⁴ 58 Islamic political parties, and 24 armed religious militias. “The intensification of religious sentiment in Pakistan deepened its commitment to the “liberation” of Kashmir.” “Revenge is our duty.”⁹⁵ said the Chief of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, to an American journalist. Pakistan allowed this revenge as it let LeT, which promoted puritanical beliefs, to take over the militancy. The conflict therefore took on a jihadi streak and Hizbul Mujahideen became of secondary importance.⁹⁶

Because India had to react to the terrorist attacks, the federal government increased the number of troops deployed in Kashmir. These soldiers however, were oppressive in their behaviour towards the locals, who increasingly started providing refuge to the terrorists.⁹⁷ Pakistan not only let the jihadi militants take charge, it also initiated the Kargil⁹⁸ war of 1999, thus providing a new impetus to the conflict.⁹⁹ Pakistani troops, along with jihadi volunteers, crossed the LoC which evoked a massive Indian retaliation.¹⁰⁰

An interesting fact about this infiltration is, that it went unnoticed for an extraordinary long time. When the Kargil war was over, India established the Kargil Committee, which thoroughly examined the case and produced a report on it. The report noted, that given the extreme weather conditions in the area, even survival was a challenge, so nobody really expected such an intrusion. The report regards the Pakistani action as not rational at all and therefore not predictable.¹⁰¹ Even the Pakistani military regarded the operation as risky, but as it later proved, not enough. “The crucial question was whether India’s high command would order a repeat of 1965 and extend the conflict beyond Kashmir by launching an attack on Pakistan itself.”¹⁰² Even though this did not happen, the outcome can be summarized in O. Bennet Jones’ words: “Kargil was

⁹¹ GUHA, R.: c.d., p. 642.

⁹² Guest freedom fighters.

⁹³ Ibidem, p. 643.

⁹⁴ Religious school.

⁹⁵ Ibidem, p. 643.

⁹⁶ SURI, K. – CHANDRAN, D. S.: c.d., p. 95.

⁹⁷ GUHA, R.: c.d., p. 644.

⁹⁸ Kargil is located in J&K’s Ladakh.

⁹⁹ SURI, K. – CHANDRAN, D. S.: c.d., p. 95.

¹⁰⁰ BOSE, S.: c.d., p. 141.

¹⁰¹ *The Kargil Committee Report*. The Nuclear Weapon Archive.

<http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html> (16.10. 2012)

¹⁰² BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 112.

a disaster for Pakistan.”¹⁰³ After six weeks of fighting, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s Prime Minister at the time, was forced to back down and withdraw the combatants from India. Although, Kargil was carried out by the army and Sharif was not the main initiator, the debacle eventually brought down his civilian regime.¹⁰⁴

In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, seized power in Islamabad without changing the official Pakistani position towards Kashmir. As he clearly expressed himself: “*There is no other dispute.*”¹⁰⁵ However, the attacks on 9/11 changed matters. The chances that the US would perceive Kashmiri insurgents as akin to the terrorists who attacked America were very high. After a terrorist attack in December 2001 at the Indian Parliament, Indians were prompt to blame the ISI along with LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed. The Americans followed the Indian thinking and added the two groups to the list of terrorist organizations. This course of events put pressure on General Musharraf who had to back down and distance himself from backing the Kashmir insurgency. “*No organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir.*” he announced. Despite saying this and ordering Pakistani troops to fight the militants in Kashmir, Musharraf increased payments to the insurgents.

Musharraf gradually began to realize, that the Kashmir dispute could not be won by military means only. Pakistan's poor economic situation, the Kargil failure and the US’s suspicious eye were exacerbating Pakistan’s international profile as an “*insecure, unreliable, aggressive, unsophisticated and fantasist.*”¹⁰⁶ For these reasons, Musharraf started changing his policies towards India, but he had his limits, as he would never agree on the LoC becoming an international border. Although it seemed the Kashmir issue was improving, further unfortunate events were yet to happen. In 2008, Musharraf lost power and Pakistan again adopted a tough stance. Asif Ali Zardari, then new Pakistani president expressed his desire to communicate with India, however, being a civilian leader, he would lack the military's backing, which is what matters in Pakistan.¹⁰⁷

Latest developments in Kashmir confirm the situation remains stalemated, as it has been over last six decades. Disputes over the LoC continue with occasional firing. In 2011, the BBC reported that several Pakistani soldiers were killed in open fire across the LoC

¹⁰³ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 123.

¹⁰⁴ BOSE, S.: c.d., p. 141.

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem, p. 124.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem, p. 133.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem., p. 135-139.

with India claiming the Pakistani troops started the skirmish.¹⁰⁸ In his monograph, O. Bennet Jones provides an apt evaluation of the Kashmir dispute. He notes, while being in agreement with many other researchers, “*the fight for Kashmir has been hugely costly, and not only in terms of human life.*” Concerning Pakistan particularly, he adds “*the conflict has carried an especially high price. Not only has the Kashmir issue diverted attention from more important national objectives, such as reducing poverty, it has also contributed to a destabilizing radicalization of opinion among youths in Pakistan.*”¹⁰⁹ Therefore, considering all what was said above, many facts along with findings of respected political scientists speak in favour of constructivism.

¹⁰⁸ *Kashmir profile*. BBC. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-16069078> (16.10.2012)

¹⁰⁹ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 139.

3. PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ARMAMENT

The second case study explores Pakistan's nuclear armament whilst seeking, in contrast to a realist's nuclear deterrence approach, whether a constructivist's approach offers an explanation for Pakistan's behaviour. The chapter will deal with Pakistan's nuclear program from its very beginning and analyses particular steps, taken by Pakistan's leadership to obtain nuclear weapons, through a constructivist lens. As in the first case study, space will be given to neorealism when appropriate.

Professor Sagan distinguishes between three theoretical frameworks, or as he calls them “models” which explain why states decide to develop nuclear weapons or, on the contrary, refrain from this option. There is “the security model” which according to S. D. Sagan is parsimonious as it says that states choose to go nuclear in order to increase national security, mainly against foreign nuclear threats. Then there is “the domestic politics model” which mainly focuses on domestic political actors and envisions nuclear weapons as serving parochial bureaucratic or political interests, which could be very easily applied to the Pakistani case. The last model is “the norms model” stressing the importance of symbolic functions, which nuclear weapons can play in shaping a state's identity.¹¹⁰ Professor Sagan's findings will be further applied in this chapter where relevant, as especially the second and third models are of a constructivist nature. It is not a purpose of this case study though, to solely elaborate and apply only these researches. They will be used with findings of other authors in order to answer this Thesis' research question.

Duncan McLeod perceives India and Pakistan in his monograph: *India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals Or Enemies?* as two countries sharing Lockean anarchy.¹¹¹ D. McLeod explains; that “*having exhausted all peaceful political and diplomatic means to settle disputes at both national, regional and international levels, the risk of a resort to violence remains apparent...India Pakistan relations remain at a high level of ideological friction, then a further resort to military conflict and a continued nuclear escalation remains a certainty.*”¹¹² Thus the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan and the presence of nuclear weapons could prove to be a very dangerous combination. Study of the proliferation impact in the region and Pakistani behaviour in this matter could therefore

¹¹⁰ SAGAN, S.D.: c.d., p. 55.

¹¹¹ A. Wendt distinguishes between three types of international anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. The Lockean culture is based on rivalry, which is underlined by a right to sovereignty. Wars are accepted but at the same time limited. WENDT, A.: c.d., p. 247 – 283.

¹¹² MCLEOD, Duncan: *India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals Or Enemies?* Aldershot 2008, p. 102.

prove beneficial.¹¹³

R. Das asks in her work: *India's Nuclearization*, what explains India's nuclear tests. As is predominantly in the Pakistani case, she also admits that the prevalent view in this case is a realist one.¹¹⁴ Realism claims that states, being rational, rely on self-help in order to protect their national security, as it is the most pragmatic strategy.¹¹⁵ Nuclear deterrence would therefore be the reason for testing the bomb. To put it more precisely, "*deterrence produces security not by physically obstructing a certain course of action, as defence does, but by threatening a response that makes the action seem disproportionately costly and therefore unattractive in the first place.*"¹¹⁶ This statement corresponds to S. D. Sagan's security model. Here, Pakistan would even be considered "a strong state" doing what it can, which means obtaining a nuclear deterrent to balance its adversary India, although it is very costly.¹¹⁷ However, professor Sagan considers this model parsimonious. He explains that the common realist's approach is "*to observe a nuclear weapons decision and then work backwards, attempting to find the national security threat that "must" have caused the decision.*"¹¹⁸ But this is not enough and more serious analysis is required to understand how governments make nuclear decisions.¹¹⁹

R. Das also considers a realist's approach insufficient whilst explaining, that "*realism has paid scant attention to the subjective ways in which insecurity may be constructed in international relations and how policy makers' ideologies may define states' identities, (in)securities, and security policies.*"¹²⁰ She argues that in the Indian case, a political party following a religious identity has re-articulated Indian geopolitical space and "*drawn on "culturally-situated" logic of (in)securities to define the Hindu rashtra's nuclear (in)security/policy.*"¹²¹ Identity and political leaders could therefore play a certain role in Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear bomb, which is what S. D Sagan also relates in his "domestic politics model" where the domestic actors influence their governments in nuclear decision-making.

Employing constructivism further, a team of social scientists from the University

¹¹³ GANGULY, Šumit - KAPUR, S. Paul: *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*. New York 2010, p. 2.

¹¹⁴ DAS, R.: c.d., p. 34.

¹¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 34.

¹¹⁶ SHEEHAN Michael: *Military Security*. In. COLLINS, Alan (ed.): *Contemporary security studies*. New York 2010, p.50.

¹¹⁷ SAGAN, S.D.: c.d.: p. 58.

¹¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 63.

¹¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 63.

¹²⁰ DAS, R.: c.d., p. 34.

¹²¹ Ibidem, p. 40.

of South Africa and the University of Johannesburg argue in their article: *The International Politics of Nuclear Weapons: A Constructivist Analysis*, that there are two social facts which prevail in India's as well as Pakistan's position towards nuclear weapons. One of the facts are geo-political realities. The collective of authors see both countries as "being driven by the shared goal of being recognized as the dominant power in the region."¹²² Therefore their drive is to "maintain their social identity;" both countries consequently constructed inter-subjective realities.¹²³ This could mean uneasiness for Pakistan, or rather a fear of India's nuclear weapon's program.

The second social fact is the long-lasting conflict between Pakistan and India itself. "Each of these countries constructed an inter-subjective reality, i.e. a possible nuclear attack by the other. This determines their action and interaction with one another. For Pakistan, India's possession of a nuclear weapons capability, ... and its defeat by India in a number of wars, constitute grave social facts." Both states never signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT)¹²⁴ and show no intentions to do so in the future. "Here political tensions and proliferation are determined by divergent constructions of identities, interests and inter-subjective realities. This results in no cooperation between these states, or IAEA inspections and verifications."¹²⁵ As is obvious here, constructivists' lenses can provide a new insight into this traditionally realists' topic.

A. Lieven notes that considering how poor Pakistan is, it is remarkable it managed to achieve a nuclear deterrent. Arguing further, he says; contrary to the nuclear deterrence realists' view that the bomb "may also in certain circumstances lead to that state's downfall. This is obviously because of the risk of a nuclear exchange with India and the destruction; and perhaps more importantly because of the fears that Pakistan's nuclear weapons have raised in the US."¹²⁶ The US is a powerful, if not the strongest, player on the international field and its actions against Pakistan could certainly be harmful to the country, so the benefits of obtaining a bomb might be outnumbered by its disadvantages. Nevertheless, Pakistan still considered development of the bomb worth while and this is something realism fails to explain, though it is quite clear in S. D. Sagan's

¹²² VAN WYK, Jo-Ansie and col.: *The International Politics of Nuclear Weapons: A Constructivist Analysis*. Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007, p. 23-45.

¹²³ VAN WYK, J-A. and col.: c.d., p. 31.

¹²⁴ Non-Proliferation Treaty is an international treaty with the aim to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. International Atomic Energy Agency is in the responsibility of the safeguard system established by the Treaty. NPT was adopted on 12th June 1968 in New York. *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. IAEA. <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html> (14. 1. 2013)

¹²⁵ VAN WYK, J-A. and col.: c.d., p. 31.

¹²⁶ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 198.

“norms model”. This model explains an important role of nuclear symbolism and the role it plays for shared identities in a state, here Pakistan in particular.¹²⁷

However, A. Lieven came to the conclusion that no matter how much the “*rhetoric of an “Islamic bomb” reflects pride in Pakistan’s role (in this if nothing else) as the leading country of the Muslim world...*”¹²⁸ the driving force behind the intentions to obtain the bomb are different and in this sense quite realistic. Lieven spoke to a number of Pakistani soldiers and officials who all agreed they needed the nuclear deterrent at all costs for the same reasons NATO needed it during the Cold War.¹²⁹ Support for Lieven’s findings might also be found in Š. Ganguly’s research. He believes it was thanks to nuclear weapons that the regional security was stabilized in the past. He is also quite positive about the future relations between India and Pakistan.¹³⁰

The question remains however, to what extent is nuclear armament rational. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made it very clear in 1965, how important it was for Pakistan to obtain a nuclear weapon: “*If India build the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves; even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.*”¹³¹ Whether this behaviour is rationalist remains arguable, as ‘starving Pakistan out’ in order to match much stronger India does not necessarily have to be to the benefit of Pakistan’s citizens.

3.1 Pakistan Starts Seeking the Bomb

In order to understand the driving forces behind Pakistan’s efforts in obtaining the bomb, it is necessary to follow its nuclear race with India from the very beginning. Indian as well as Pakistani attempts to pursue a nuclear weapon can be dated as far back as the early years after the partition. No later than in 1954, did India set up a Department of Atomic Research. Pakistan followed soon after, establishing the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1957. Although PAEC was initially meant to focus on civilian nuclear power, a course change followed in the ensuing decades.¹³²

All Pakistani administrations, no matter whether civil or military ones, were involved in the nuclear program.¹³³ O. Bennet Jones remarked; Pakistan’s nuclear

¹²⁷ SAGAN, S.D.: c.d., p. 73.

¹²⁸ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 198.

¹²⁹ Ibidem, p. 198.

¹³⁰ GANGULY, Š - KAPUR, S. P.: c.d., p. 3.

¹³¹ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 181.

¹³² GANGULY, Š. - KAPUR, S. P.: c.d., p. 18.

¹³³ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 198.

armament is “*a story of personal rivalry and institutional division.*”¹³⁴ Whilst PAEC represents one side, Dr. Abdul Quadeer Khan, considered “the father of Pakistan’s bomb” and regarded as a national hero, stands for the other side.¹³⁵ Although A. Q. Khan should not be seen as a religious fundamentalist, it is necessary to see his motivation as stemming from a “*sense of victimhood that was shared by Muslims all over the world.*”¹³⁶ He was a Pakistani nationalist to the core who studied in the West, nevertheless despised it for underestimating Pakistan and for favouring India.¹³⁷

A. Q. Khan’s strong feeling of identity likely provided him with the motivation for what he did and presents a case for constructivism. He studied in Germany and Belgium and built himself a prestigious career. Nevertheless, he decided to return to Pakistan, contact Z. A. Bhutto and explain to him what he could do.¹³⁸ In this case, it might also be possible to presume that S.D. Sagan’s “domestic politics model” and “norms model” overlap. A. Q. Khan surely belonged to the state’s nuclear energy establishment, as he had control of information and could shape the nuclear weapon’s program.¹³⁹ Khan’s nationalist feelings on the other hand, correspond to “the norms model”. According to this model; “*individuals and organizations may well have “interests”, but such interests are shaped by the social roles actors are asked to play, are pursued according to habits and routines as much as through reasoned decisions, and are embedded in a social environment that promotes certain structures and behaviours as rational and legitimate...*” All of this seems to fit to A. Q. Khan well and demonstrate interconnection between the two.

Pakistan's continued nuclear efforts throughout the sixties were soon deemed as uncomfortable by the international community. In the beginning of the 60s, Pakistan was still supported in its nuclear efforts by the USA, which provided a \$350,000 grant, in order to help Pakistan with its first research reactor. This help was soon stopped though. In 1964, China was about to carry out its first nuclear tests, therefore creating a possible threat to India, where it was regarded as the main rival in strategic and emotional elements.¹⁴⁰ The Indian administration thus openly called for nuclear weapons. Pakistan then began feeling even more uneasy about the situation. Pakistan's President Mohammed Ayub Khan,

¹³⁴ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 183.

¹³⁵ Ibidem, p. 183.

¹³⁶ Ibidem, p. 182.

¹³⁷ Ibidem, p. 182.

¹³⁸ Ibidem, p. 187.

¹³⁹ SAGAN, S.D.: c.d.: p. 64.

¹⁴⁰ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 199.

feeling very concerned, and his Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto, thus decided to turn for help to China. And they were indeed not unheard; the meeting with the Chinese side took place in 1965 in Beijing and Chinese support for Pakistan was established to the delight of all participants.¹⁴¹

In terms of foreign policy, an interesting question occurs here: why did Pakistan feel threatened by India's nuclear deterrent, but not by the China's? In the constructivist's view, the answer probably offers an explanation working with identities and constructed threats. The social construct of Indian "Others", in this case meaning a possible Indian attack on Pakistan, was possibly stronger than China's. Though the Indian nuclear deterrent might not have been primarily aimed on Pakistan, they felt it that way and that was what mattered.

The problem with Pakistan is that, Pakistan's government refused to sign the NPT in 1968 (the same applies to India). This fact in practice means that Pakistan is free to develop nuclear arms.¹⁴² However, the real commencement of the nuclear armament in Pakistan dates back to Z. A. Bhutto's administration. Bhutto, who came to power in 1971, had strongly lobbied for the nuclear option when he had still been Foreign Minister. It was then for instance, that he publicly said his famous "*we will eat grass*" sentence.¹⁴³ So no matter how much the international community tried, Pakistan decided to go its own way.

Since the end of the Cold War, "*national identity and culture shape the domestic motivations and imperatives that now seem as or more important than international balance-of-power considerations in foreign policy making.*"¹⁴⁴ While inquiring into the belief systems of political leaders, political socialization of the leader absorbed in his national culture cannot be ignored.¹⁴⁵ Having been educated in the West, Z. A. Bhutto nevertheless felt Pakistani in the first place and also "a man of the destiny" as he was a noble family child.¹⁴⁶ It could then be presumed that all these facts influenced his demeanour. Concerning the nuclear program, he even wrote a book called *The Myth of Independence*, where he advocated his opinion on nuclear Pakistan. However, he had to wait several more years to put his idea into practice, to put it more precisely, to the time,

¹⁴¹ SUBLETTE, Carey: *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons*. Nuclearweaponarchive, 2002.
<http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakOrigin.html> (16.1. 2013)

¹⁴² SPECTOR, Leonard S – SMITH, Jacqueline R.: *Nuclear Ambitions*. Oxford 1990, p. 90.

¹⁴³ *Pakistan Nuclear*. Nuclear Threat Initiative. <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/nuclear/> (17.10. 2013)

¹⁴⁴ HUDSON, Valerie, M.: *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Lanham 2007, p. 103.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 103.

¹⁴⁶ SUBLETTE, Carey: c.d.

when he became the Prime Minister.¹⁴⁷

3.2 Constructing the Bomb and the Obstacles

After the war of 1971 was over, it was crystal clear to Pakistan that its martial superiority, which had been cultivated for so long in the years of Muslim military dominance, no longer existed. “*Militarily, psychologically, diplomatically, and politically, Pakistan emerged from the Bangladesh war badly weakened.*”¹⁴⁸ Pakistan had built its nationhood around the idea of the Muslim homeland, which was suddenly undermined by separation of the Bengalis, who placed importance on ethnic rather than religious identity, but Pakistan blamed India as the source of their own problems.¹⁴⁹ Once again, identity played an important role and things originally issues of a domestic character were constructed into another, international dimension where the Indian side was to be blamed.

Z. A. Bhutto had been observing India’s behaviour and already a year after the defeat, issued “*a directive instructing the country’s nuclear establishment to build a nuclear device within three years.*”¹⁵⁰ In fact, the beginning of Pakistan’s nuclear program can be dated quite precisely: 24 January 1972. This date is tied to the secret meeting in Multan where Z. A. Bhutto issued Pakistan to seek nuclear weapons.¹⁵¹ Although the Multan meeting was carried in an atmosphere of doubt and fears from lack of leadership and bureaucratic procedures, Z. A. Bhutto managed, thanks to his personal charisma, to motivate the group and got what he wanted, an enthusiastic response of assent. Here, S. D. Sagan’s model could be applied again, because Z. A. Bhutto would belong among “*politicians in states in which individual parties or the mass public strongly favour nuclear weapons acquisition.*”¹⁵² The problem was nevertheless, that Pakistan had almost no capacity to build the bomb. “*There was just one very small research reactor that had been partly paid for by the United States under its Atoms for Peace program*”¹⁵³ This situation was to be changed in the following years, though.

Pakistan meant its nuclear program decisions seriously and “*India’s nuclear test in May 1974 gave added impetus to the Pakistani program.*”¹⁵⁴ Z. A. Bhutto “*railed at the*

¹⁴⁷ SUBLETTE, Carey: c.d.

¹⁴⁸ GANGULY, Š. - KAPUR, S. P.: c.d., p. 15.

¹⁴⁹ KRONSTADT, K. A.: c.d.: p. 314.

¹⁵⁰ *Pakistan Nuclear* : c.d.

¹⁵¹ SUBLETTE, Carey: c.d.

¹⁵² SAGAN, S.D.: c.d.: p. 64.

¹⁵³ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.185.

¹⁵⁴ SPECTOR, L.S. – SMITH, J. R.: c.d., p. 90.

“nuclear blackmail” being perpetrated by New Delhi’s leaders”¹⁵⁵ and he promised Pakistan would match India in this matter. Who would resist this course of future action, would be seen as a traitor and not a right patriot.¹⁵⁶ “*Bhutto himself manipulated reaction to the Indian test to marginalize domestic political opposition and so advance his own political fortunes.*”¹⁵⁷ While in office, Bhutto played the whole time on the nationalist note and presented the national interest as the supreme one whilst the nuclear program was to be the symbol of resistance against both India, the traditional enemy, and the USA which had tendencies to mix up into Pakistan's internal affairs, as he saw it.¹⁵⁸

There were two potential ways Pakistan could choose to nuclearize. One of them would be a plutonium option. At first, Pakistan wanted to gather plutonium with an unintended help from France. The truth was that Pakistan had no obvious need for plutonium and as the Pakistani government kept claiming, their intentions were purely of civilian purposes.¹⁵⁹ The French were quite enthusiastic and a contract was signed.¹⁶⁰ It is necessary to admit that France insisted that all the provided assistance in the form of a large “reprocessing” plant would be placed under IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, Pakistan would still be able to accumulate plutonium. In 1976, concerns in the USA rose rapidly and resulted in a visit by Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, to Islamabad. To underpin the seriousness of the situation, the USA decided to cut off economic and military aid to Islamabad in September 1977. However, the embargo was revoked a year later because France stopped the contract.¹⁶¹ That was the end of the plutonium way and also “*a huge blow to Pakistan which, once again, complained that the West was singling it out.*”¹⁶² Nevertheless, Islamabad knew that it was not the only way how to reach the goal set by Z. A. Bhutto.

The second way Pakistan could follow, and indeed did, was the enrichment route. The key actor in this procedure was no one else than Dr. A. Q. Khan with his crucial knowledge from the Netherlands. And it was there, in the Dutch classified centrifuge enrichment plant in Almelo, where A. Q. Khan, in all probability, obtained the necessary plans and lists of component suppliers. He returned to his homeland in 1976, but Pakistan

¹⁵⁵ KRONSTADT, K. A.: c.d., p. 314.

¹⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 315.

¹⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 315.

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem, p. 315.

¹⁵⁹ SPECTOR, L.S. – SMITH, J. R.: c.d., p. 90.

¹⁶⁰ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.186.

¹⁶¹ SPECTOR, L.S. – SMITH, J. R.: c.d., p. 90.

¹⁶² BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.186.

already in 1975 started seeking technology which would enable it to enrich uranium.¹⁶³

The whole nuclear project was deemed a secret and therefore autonomous from the PAEC. *“In 1978, construction began at a pilot-plant at Sihala that was placed operational the next year, while construction also started on a full-scale facility at Kahuta.”*¹⁶⁴ The whole operation relied, for a big part, on the black market and smuggling hardware from a number of Western countries. Particularly one such a fraud was the smuggle of an entire plant from Germany, which was subsequently located in Dera Khazi Khan. As could easily be presumed, Pakistan also *“refused to place the Kahuta facility or the Dera Ghazi Khan plant under IAEA inspections and, indeed, has never publicly acknowledged the existence of the latter installation.”*¹⁶⁵

Already one year later, in 1979, Z. A. Bhutto said words which clearly lead to the importance of identity in the Pakistani case and as A. Kronstadt notes: *“some stark illumination to the ideational aspect of Pakistan’s national security perceptions and choices”*: *“The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have nuclear capability along with communist powers. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but the situation was about to change. What difference does my life make now when I can imagine eighty million of my countrymen standing under the nuclear cloud of a defenceless sky?”*¹⁶⁶ In the case of Pakistan, there is one significant difference with the Indian nuclear debate. In Pakistan, a broad national consensus on the need of nuclearization has been always present and has a lot to do with faith, whilst in India, the nuclearization matter has always been, to the contrary, a subject of an open debate.¹⁶⁷

Pakistani nuclear activities were naturally under close scrutiny of the US. The revolution in Iran had grave consequences for the US as they lost their position in the country and were forced to look elsewhere, more precisely, to Pakistan. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan began half a year later and Washington felt an even more pressing need of an ally in the region. It cannot be said that Carter’s Administration as well as Reagan’s subsequent Administration would not be concerned and disapproving of Pakistan's nuclear efforts, but all these events were taking place in the background of the Cold War and Pakistan was not considered as the main issue.¹⁶⁸

Pakistan was offered aid packages by the US, the 1981 package included

¹⁶³ SPECTOR, L.S. – SMITH, J. R.: c.d., p. 90.

¹⁶⁴ Ibidem, p. 91.

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem, p. 91.

¹⁶⁶ KRONSTADT, K. A.: c.d.: p. 313.

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem, p. 313.

¹⁶⁸ SPECTOR, L.S. – SMITH, J. R.: c.d., p. 91.

an agreement to sell Pakistan forty advanced F-16 fighter-bombers.¹⁶⁹ *In approving the aid in 1981 – by which time, U.S. listening posts had been relocated in China and American concerns were focused on meeting the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan – Congress granted Pakistan a six-year exemption from a U.S non-proliferation law, known as “Symington Amendment”...*¹⁷⁰ To help Pakistan to protect its national security, advanced conventional arms would also be provided in an aid package form. A broad debate then took place in the US whether this step encouraged Pakistani nuclear armament or rather slowed the process down.¹⁷¹

In 1984, Dr. A. Q. Khan announced that the Kahuta plant had succeeded in producing enriched uranium. This announcement was soon followed with assurance by President Zia that only material of non-military use had been produced. Half a year later, it was nevertheless obvious that Pakistani nuclear efforts had one goal - to obtain a nuclear weapon. Thus, since the mid 80s, it was more than clear, that in rapid time, Pakistan would be able to assemble a nuclear weapon in case of war, which made it a de facto nuclear weapon state.¹⁷²

3.3 Pakistan as a Nuclear Power

Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War turned a different light on Pakistan's nuclear efforts and completely changed the situation to its disadvantage. The US again became concerned about Pakistan's nuclear program and saw no need to keep their eyes shut anymore. *“After a ten-year interval brought about by Pakistan’s help to the US in combating the Soviet occupation, the US administration permitted the re-imposition of the terms of the Pressler Amendment¹⁷³, mandating sanctions against countries which could not certify that they were in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. These sanctions were imposed on both India and Pakistan, but hurt Pakistan very much more, given its smaller size and more vulnerable economy.*¹⁷⁴ However, the problem was, that it was too late anyway, although the Pressler Amendment was used in 1990 and was to be followed by Glenn Sanctions in 1998,

¹⁶⁹ SPECTOR, L.S. – SMITH, J. R.: c.d., p. 92.

¹⁷⁰ Ibidem, p. 92.

¹⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 92.

¹⁷² Ibidem, p. 92-95.

¹⁷³ The US Congress originally invoked the Pressler Amendment in 1985 in order to place restriction on Pakistan’s nuclear program. MAHMOOD, Tehmina: *Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Security Concerns*. Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47, 1994, No. 4, p. 97-107. <http://www.jstor.org> (18.6.2013)

¹⁷⁴ LIEVEN, A.: c.d., p. 198.

Pakistan had already been nuclear.¹⁷⁵

The important moment came in 1998 when, on 11 and 13 May, India carried out nuclear tests, which Pakistan decided to match on 28 and 30 May. Nuclear ambiguity around these two countries was thus brought to an end, and both countries started to be seen as nuclear powers to be reckoned with.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, till nowadays, *“the only formally pronounced form of Pakistani nuclear doctrine is the organization of the National Command Authority, which lays out the chain of command and control, and its constituents, e.g. the Employment Control Committee, the Development Control Committee, and the Strategic Plans Division.”*¹⁷⁷ As Zafar Iqbal Cheema notes the reason for this sort of Pakistani behaviour is *“to maintain a level of deliberate ambiguity, but Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making echelon seems to be unaware that ambiguities can be maintained even in copiously written documents.”*¹⁷⁸

It should also be taken into account, that right after India made its test, a fierce debate followed in Pakistan whether to respond in kind or not. Some important personalities of the decision-making elite stood against testing, as navy chief Admiral Fasih Bokhari pointed out, this time Pakistan would have a chance *“to claim the moral high ground”* or the army chief Jehangir Karamat who advocated the strategy of waiting. J. Karamat was nevertheless told by the minister of religious affairs Raja Zaffar ul-Haq this: *“If he did not approve a test the army rank and file would think they had a leader who lacked the courage to stand up to India.”*¹⁷⁹ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif thus ordered to prepare, although at first he had seriously considered not testing.¹⁸⁰

S.D. Sagan’s “domestic politics” model and “the norms model” could be applied here once again. It seems moreover, that both models overlap. Admiral F. Bokhari along with the army's chief J. Karamat discouraged Pakistan's government from the testing. They were nevertheless defeated in their efforts by R. Zaffar ul-Haq who strongly played on the nationalist note, stressing the symbolic function of the tests and pressure of the public. He might however, have also behaved according to his own parochial interests.¹⁸¹

When the 1998 tests took place, A. Q. Khan was quite optimistic. He said: *“I never*

¹⁷⁵ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.190.

¹⁷⁶ RIZVI, Hasan-Anskari: *Pakistan Nuclear Testing*. Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2001, p. 943-955.
<http://www.jstor.org> (16.1.2013)

¹⁷⁷ CHEEMA, Zafar, Iqbal: *Nuclear Pakistan*. Karachi, 2011. p. 44.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 44.

¹⁷⁹ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 195.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 195.

¹⁸¹ SAGAN, S.D.: c.d.: p. 64.

had my doubts, I was building the bomb. We had to do it"¹⁸² Optimistic as he was, so was most of Pakistan. Prime Minister Sharif stated this while explaining his decision: "*pressure was irresistible at home. It was mounting on the government every day, every hour. The world outside is not aware of the emotional feelings of the people in this region*"¹⁸³ Pakistan thus became, at the end of May 1998 the world's seventh acknowledged nuclear state.¹⁸⁴

After the tests, Pakistan presented as its official policy the policy of minimum credible deterrence.¹⁸⁵ If some conflict were to happen, it could be almost sure that India would try preventing Pakistan launching a first strike. Therefore Pakistan wanted to keep the chance to launch the second, and possibly third attack, with all nuclear weapons aimed solely at India. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, according to all evidence, is dispersed in many locations. In 2005, President Musharraf announced that Islamabad possessed enough nuclear warheads for a minimum deterrence to be credible; nevertheless it is not really sure how many it represents. According to American TV station NBC, which quoted certain unnamed US sources in 2002, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal can be vastly superior to India's.¹⁸⁶

Islamabad continues with expansion of its nuclear weapon program and has returned to the plutonium way. The first plutonium reactor in Khushab was commissioned already in 1998 and by late 2009, a second reactor started working at the same place. A third plutonium reactor is under construction and it seems to be near completion. As the evidence shows, not only expansion, but also diversification of the nuclear armament is taking place in Pakistan. Moreover, in January 2011, Islamabad stood in opposition to commencing negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament.¹⁸⁷ It is obvious then, that Pakistan has decided to go its own way; motivated by a variety of factors including strong feelings of national identity and the importance of nuclear symbolism.

¹⁸² BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p.186.

¹⁸³ Ibidem, p. 197.

¹⁸⁴ Ibidem, p. 197.

¹⁸⁵ *Pakistan Nuclear*: c.d.

¹⁸⁶ BENNET JONES, O.: c.d., p. 199-200.

¹⁸⁷ *Pakistan Nuclear*: c.d.

CONCLUSION

This Thesis focused primarily on Pakistan and its behaviour towards its bigger and more powerful neighbour India. The development of Pakistan's deeds and course of actions towards New Delhi since the year of partition were analysed via a constructivist's lens and tackled in detail in two case studies, i.e. the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan's nuclear armament

The Thesis proceeded from the assumption and the generally well-known fact, that in order to explain the Indo-Pakistani conflict, realism and neorealism were prevalently used, and Pakistan's behaviour is even mentioned as a model example compliant with realism. Therefore a research question was raised whether a social constructivist approach could be applicable on Pakistan in the context of Indo-Pakistani relationships. The first part of the Thesis was devoted to the theoretical framework, and social constructivism was introduced as an approach, which might be useful in bringing new light on the conflict.

Many respected social scientists either directly or indirectly acknowledge that more than anywhere else, identity together with national and religious feelings play a crucial role in Pakistan and shape the course of Pakistani policies. A. Lieven, who has spent a significant amount of time in Pakistan, testifies this question in his remarkable monograph *Pakistan, a Hard Country*, which has been a very beneficial resource for this Thesis. The monograph was useful not only because of the author's own findings and remarks on the topic, but also as it includes many direct quotes of important participants in Pakistan's political life.

The first case study, the Kashmir dispute, includes an analysis of the period starting in 1947, the year of Independence, whilst the events preceding this important milestone are also mentioned. A descriptive method was used in order to understand the very roots of the struggle 'of Kashmir'. Before the partition, Jammu and Kashmir used to be a peaceful region with a majority of Muslim inhabitants ruled by a Hindu maharaja. Nevertheless, after the partition of British India, both newborn states felt they had the sole right to make claim on the Kashmir region, and the situation, stimulated by mutual hatred and strong feeling of shared identity in Pakistan, went awry ever since. From the beginning, Pakistan's *raison d'être* was to create a homeland for Muslims and therefore provide a home to those in Kashmir as well. Hence it was unimaginable that they should let the region go, although this meant having to face much stronger India.

In the case of Kashmir, the application of the constructivist approach proved to work very well. A strong emotional factor on the Pakistani side is present in decision-making concerning Kashmir and, over the years, the dispute has cost Pakistan dearly. The gain of the Kashmir Valley with almost no strategic importance to Pakistan has been elevated by the Pakistanis to a matter of high importance, though this course of action does not seem very rational. The religious factor also is not negligible in Kashmir, as the clash between Hindu and Muslim religious views has escalated since the beginning of the conflict. Different religious concepts provide a link to the feelings of having different identities, which perfectly matches the constructivist pattern.

The widely spread belief in Pakistani society, i.e. that only Pakistan is in the right, also instigates the desperate situation in Kashmir. No matter how much political power is in hands of the political elite and the military forces, no Pakistani leader would ever dare to go against public opinion. That is also in compliance with constructivism and it explains the follies on the border in which Islamabad has been engaged over the years.

The second case study, which concerns Pakistan's nuclear armament, is more complicated. The nuclear threat posed by India, Pakistan's biggest adversary, is undeniable and surely created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty amongst the Pakistani people. On the other hand, pursuing a nuclear deterrent has proved to be very costly for Pakistan, given its capacity and the annoyance it has caused in the West, followed by sanctions.

However, it is not only the model of a rational state behaving rationally that can be applied here. S. D. Sagan's "domestic politics model" and "norms model" proved that many other factors play a role in states' nuclear armament, which is also true in Pakistan. Parochial interests of local elites as well as nuclear symbolism and norms, claiming that a certain course of action is legitimate and appropriate, seem to be deeply rooted in the Pakistani society. This proved to play a role of importance too. The response to the Thesis' research question is positive, as both case studies proved the applicability in the case of Pakistan, and thus the hypothesis has been confirmed.

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this Thesis is to find out whether constructivist approach could be used for the analysis of the Pakistani behaviour within the Indo-Pakistani relationships. Two case studies, i.e. the Kashmir dispute and the Pakistani nuclear armament, are analysed in the Thesis, whilst the constructivist approach is employed where possible. The Thesis elaborates on the presumption that the application of the non-traditional IR approach may cast new light on certain crucial moments concerning the two case studies analysed, and new links between them can thus be discovered.