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Comparison of funding in UN systems between Japan and Europe - Optimising crowdfunding campaigns in different cultures-

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Abstract and Keywords

Countries, citizens and organisations of all kinds around the world are currently working together towards the common good, the Sustainable Development Goals, as advocated and monitored by the United Nations. People in Western industrialised countries, known as the Global North, are expected to play a major role. However, recent international problems, such as pandemics, wars in Europe and refugee crises around the world, have severely hampered cooperation towards the SDG goals.

The UN system, which sounds the alarm on crises at the global level, is also facing economic difficulties. For much of its funding, the UN relies on voluntary contributions from developed governments in the global North. As Western democracies are accountable to their citizens for the expenditure of public funds, the understanding and cooperation of their citizens is essential for the sustainable operation of the UN as the governing body of the SDGs.

The starting point for this study was the question of how to maintain and improve the voluntary financial contributions from developed countries on which the UN depends. Focusing on two regions - Europe, a normative force in the world, and Japan, which has the potential to further increase its contributions - the study sought to explain the phenomenon using the methodology of social constructivism in international relations. As a result, it has been possible to articulate a cultural difference in the context of these two regions, which share values in some respects and contrast sharply in others. The contribution of this study is that it has brought a step closer to the shape of European civilisation, which has a lot of internal diversity, by contrasting it with Japan, which is one of the Western countries but has a different historical background from Europe.

Furthermore, the study used the methodology of cross-cultural psychology to test whether the behaviour of the smallest cultural actors, the individual, has the same constructs as those found in the methodology of international relations among European students and young Japanese of similar age with a bachelor's degree. The general preference for European norms among them and the finding of three specific intercultural ideas strongly suggested the usefulness of the interaction between European and Japanese studies and between international relations and psychology as a methodology.

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Keywords: Social Constructivism, Cross-cultural Psychology, UN, EU, Japan Word count: 29,863 Words

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Introduction

The UN system, the operational entity of the SDGs, is facing an unprecedented shortage of funds; in 2018, Secretary-General Guterres remarked that it was "running out of cash".¹ More recently, in May 2023, following the UN Secretariat's Special Report on SDG Progress, the Secretary-General made an urgent appeal to the world, and developed countries in particular, to close the financing gap for the development of developing countries, especially in light of the regression of indicators for the achievement of the SDGs in developing countries.² Specifically, humanitarian funding needs have risen sharply since 2015 to \$19.3 billion and are expected to double to \$38.6 billion by 2020, according to the UN Coordinated Appeal.³ At the same time, despite the net increase, the UN system's coverage of these needs remained at around 60 per cent from 2015 to 2019, eventually falling to 47 per cent in 2020, partly due to the impact of Covid-19.⁴



Figure 1. Total Requirements and funding for UN-Coordinated appeals, 2021-2020⁵

¹ United Nations, 'Guterres Sounds Alarm over Worst Cashflow Crunch in Years'.

² Guterres and UN Headquarters, 'Secretary-General's Remarks to Launch the Special Edition of the Sustainable Development Goals Progress Report | United Nations Secretary-General'.

³ Willitts-King and Spencer, 'Reducing the Humanitarian Financing Gap', 16.

⁴ Willitts-King and Spencer, 17.

⁵ Willitts-King and Spencer, 17.

The UN system's financial revenues are divided into assessed contributions as mandatory contributions by governments, voluntary contributions by governments, organisations and the private sector and other revenues ⁶. The share of assessed contributions has declined year by year since 1990⁷, while the more volatile voluntary contributions have become increasingly important: in 2021, USD 13.6 billion of the total UN system's budgetary revenues came from mandatory contributions, USD 46.9 billion from voluntary contributions and USD 5.40 billion from other revenues. ⁸




Figure 2. UN Revenue Ratio, 2021⁹

The reliance on voluntary contributions has destabilised the operations of the United Nations, the main implementer of the SDGs, including humanitarian assistance, and it is increasingly important for UN Systems entities to be able to convince governments and their citizens, the main donors, about their activities and achievements¹⁰. In addition, while there are no documents available that distinguish between public organisations and private or individual donors of voluntary contributions in the UN System as a whole, the proportion of private donations in FY2020 at UNICEF, which

⁶ Bayram and Graham, 'Financing the United Nations', 422.

⁷ Bayram and Graham, 'Financing Global Governance: Explaining Donor Funding Patterns at International Organizations', 1.

⁸ Secretary-General & Coordination, Budgetary and financial situation of the organizations of the United Nations system, 13–14.

⁹ Secretary-General & Coordination, 13–14.: Figure created by YOSHIOKA

¹⁰ Bayram and Graham, 'Financing the United Nations', 36–37.

does not receive mandatory contributions, was just 21%¹¹, while UNHCR, which relies on mandatory contributions of less than 2% of its work, received approximately 10% of its income from private donations¹², thus the importance of private donors is not small.

The increasing reliance on voluntary contributions has led the UN to look to digital transformation for solutions, with the launch of the Digital Financing Task Force's report 'People's Money' in 2020¹³. The report expressed the view that strengthening digital technology is essential for financing the achievement of the SDGs. Crowdfunding has attracted attention as one form of digital fundraising¹⁴. Indeed, several UN system agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR and WHO have launched crowdfunding campaigns. UNDP also offers its own crowdfunding platform called Digital Good¹⁵. In addition to digital crowdfunding being seen as a new means of fundraising for the Corona Disaster, the crowdfunding campaign itself is expected to generate publicity marketing about the organisation and its activities to the public¹⁶. International organisations may therefore appeal to a much larger donor base - governments for voluntary contributions - than the amount of money they receive from crowdfunding itself. While Micklewright and Wrigh show a positive correlation between donations from small donors, small individuals to UNICEF, the UN agency where private donations are most prevalent in working papers submitted to the UN, and voluntary contributions from national governments, they conclude that "even if the total is relatively minor compared to the need, private donations play an important psychological role. Individuals' example may encourage governments to be more generous." and described the usefulness of citizen crowdfunding for UN development agencies.¹⁷ In fact, in recent years, governments in developed countries have launched campaigns to match private sector crowdfunding with public funding for UN projects.

¹¹ UNICEF, UNICEF Annual Report 2020, 46.

¹² United Nations, 'Voluntary Funds Administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2021', 11,171.

¹³ United Nations, 'Digital Financing Taskforce'.

¹⁴ Scataglini and Ventresca, 'Funding the UN Sustainable Development Goals', 2,23.

¹⁵ Scataglini and Ventresca, 26,38.

¹⁶ Allegreni, 'Crowdfunding as a Marketing Tool', 90.

¹⁷ Micklewright and Wright, 'UNU-WIDER', 20.

Regional differences in donation culture may lead to differences in the implications of crowdfunding for citizens¹⁸. Donation cultures differ due to the combined influence of cultural factors such as local religions and history, and environmental factors such as economic wealth and taxation systems¹⁹. However, few studies have been seen to examine the impact of culture on the effectiveness of crowdfunding. According to the Charitable aid foundation's 2022 survey, Japan is the third largest GDP country in the world, but its citizens rank 103 out of 119 in terms of their donation behaviour, which is low compared to European countries²⁰. Japan's mandatory and voluntary contributions to the UN Secretariat headquarters and peacekeeping operations rank third in the world in 2021²¹, but its contribution to the UN system as a whole, including specialised agencies such as UNICEF, ranks fourth, behind second-place Germany and third-place Sweden, which have smaller GDP scales than Japan²². The European Union is counted as a separate donor from the governments. Consequently, at this stage, a potentially larger market can be expected to Japan in terms of financial contributions with civil understanding to the UN system, compared to Europe. The European Union is the world's largest contributor to the United Nations system and the world's largest donor of official development assistance (ODA), surpassing the United States of America when Member States' contributions are combined.²³ Voluntary contributions to the United Nations system by institutions of the European Union alone are the most enormous voluntary contributions by organisations other than national governments in terms of amount, exceeding the voluntary contributions by the Government of Japan.²⁴ Therefore, at this stage, Japan may have a larger market to look forward to than Europe in terms of increasing citizenunderstood financial contributions to the UN system. Note that other income refers to

¹⁸ ONISHI, 'Japanese Fundraising', 218–19.

¹⁹ Charities Aid Foundation, 'CAF World Giving Index 10th Edition-Ten Years of Giving Trends-', 3,6,11. ²⁰ Charities Aid Foundation, 'CAF World Giving Index 2022', 23. Results of questionnaire-based interviews with approximately 500-2000, depending on the population. Sample is based on statistics. Donation behaviour refers to the behaviour of whether or not donations were carried out, not the amount donated.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Diplomatic Bluebook 2023', 231.

²² United Nations - CEB, 'Revenue by Government Donor'.

²³ OECD, 'Development Co-Operation Profiles: European Union Institutions'.

²⁴ United Nations - CEB, 'Revenue by Government Donor'; United Nations - CEB, 'Revenue by Entity'.

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'income from interest and foreign exchange gains'.25

Government donor	Assessed contributions	Voluntary core (un-earmarked) contributions	Voluntary non- core (earmarked) contributions	Revenue from other activities	Total
United States of America	3,285,353,170	574,169,621	8,572,407,077	64,508,477	12,496,438,347
Germany	853,789,268	511,498,958	4,695,371,057	51,985,980	6,112,645,264
Sweden	128,169,941	1,247,708,159	1,456,393,065	19,829,089	2,852,100,255
Japan	1,174,935,702	203,156,674	1,278,790,972	51,097,198	2,707,980,548
United Kingdom	709,813,361	367,865,495	877,351,561	38,408,745	1,993,439,163
China	1,798,818,474	40,626,915	137,047,961	1,247,599	1,977,740,952
Canada	386,676,761	135,362,737	1,168,572, 4 21	11,123,685	1,701,735,606
France	695,987,693	198,608,582	411,533,480	3,559,849	1,309,689,606

All values are in USD.

Table 1. Top countries for the UN contribution, 2022²⁶

Donor	Entity	Amount
European Union	-	3,500,733,076
World Bank Group	-	945,699,310
Multi Donor Trust Funds	-	907,630,514
UN OCHA	-	677,218,432
The Global Fund	-	674,579,112
Private Donors	-	618,663,550
Gavi Alliance	-	581,839,374
Global Environment Facility	-	533,594,030
USA National Committee	-	483,682,367
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	-	457,942,593
Total	-	9,381,582,362

Table 2. Top entities except state governments for the UN contribution, 2022²⁷

The research question of this paper is therefore to focus on voluntary contributions from European and Japanese governments, which are important for the sustainable funding of international organisations, and to understand cross-cultural factors in the contribution behaviour of these organisations towards international organisations. In doing so, it is expected that a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon can be achieved by focusing in parallel on digital crowdfunding as a direct contribution

²⁵ United Nations - CEB, 'Revenue by Government Donor'.

²⁶ United Nations - CEB.

²⁷ United Nations - CEB, 'Revenue by Entity'.

behaviour of citizens, the smallest component of national identity, and by understanding cross-cultural understanding of contributions to the UN from the dual perspectives of citizens and national governments. Specifically, with regard to direct digital crowdfunding from the citizens' perspective, we aim to confirm citizens' awareness as the smallest component of national identity by looking at the impact of crowdfunding appeals on donation behaviour rather than the amount of donations themselves. As many factors such as taxation and social conditions need to be taken into account in order to change actual giving behaviour²⁸, it is not realistic to include them in the study in this paper. Instead, it was decided to focus on the promotional effects on citizens' donation behaviour to UN operations, and the main contribution of this study is to strengthen the influence on citizens' understanding of UN operations tied to the government's Voluntary Contribution, which has a higher monetary contribution. In other words, the focus was on the crowdfunding performance as citizens' willingness to donate, which may influence voluntary contributions from governments, the largest source of budget in the UN system.

The reason for choosing Europe as a comparison for Japan is based on the hypothesis in the cultural self-construal theory of cross-cultural psychology that Japan, with its more interdependent self-construal, and Europe, with its more independent self-construal, are both economically advanced countries with opposing self-construal that create cultural differences, including environmental differences²⁹. In addition to the relative proximity of Japan and Europe in terms of per capita economic power, it is expected that the reactions of the crowdfunding campaign will be easier to interpret due to the west-east cultural differences, as several European states are used as within-subject factors. It is essential to have a structural understanding of Europe and its institutions, including the governments of the member states, in order to make comparisons with the situation in Japan. In this study, the Member States and their citizens are Germany, a country with a GDP,5313 billion US dollars in 2022, closest to that of Japan,5702 billion US dollars,³⁰ with a similar historical background of participation in the UN by a former enemy, and with a higher voluntary contribution than Japan alone.

²⁸ Charities Aid Foundation, 'CAF World Giving Index 10th Edition-Ten Years of Giving Trends-', 3,6,11.

²⁹ Markus and Kitayama, 'Culture and the Self', 224.

³⁰ 'GDP and Spending - Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - OECD Data'.

This research will use the framework of social constructivism, an influential school of thought in international relations. Social constructivism emphasizes the importance of non-material factors, such as ideology and identity, in shaping international relations. While material factors like power, money, and weapons can play a role, they are viewed as secondary to the ideas and norms that guide how states and other actors behave on the global stage.³¹ That is, the view that there is a current social structure as a historical outcome, and that changes in that structure in international relations are interpreted through changes in invisible factors such as norms and identities.³² Overall, adopting a social constructivist perspective will explore how the construction of ideas and identities affects phenomena in international relations, and to analyse the ways in which social factors shape the behaviour of actors in the global systems.³³ Therefore, a social constructivist interpretation of the historical background and factors leading to the current structure of voluntary financial contributions to the UN in Japan and Europe and its constituent country, Germany, is presented. Mock campaigns will then be set up to simulate a crowdfunding campaign by the UN system, and the responses of participants from several European countries and Japan will be observed and interpreted using crosscultural psychology methods. Specifically, subjects from several European countries, including Germany, and Japan were presented with a mock web campaign and asked to indicate their preferences, and the results were evaluated using psychometric methods. Several campaigns were prepared according to the hypotheses and subjects were asked which campaign they would actually like to allocate their budget of €9 to and to what extent. Alongside providing suggestions for solutions to the current crisis of financial instability to the operations of the UN system, the study aims to make clear European philanthropic values by comparing the donation cultures of Japan and Europe.

Since the 19th century, 'modernisation' in the outer regions of the European continent has generally referred to the acceptance of a culture and way of life born on the Europe. Even today, the EU, the consensus-building body of many European countries,

³¹ Oyane, 'コンストラクティビズムの視点 [Perspectives on Constructivism]', 2-4.

³² Oyane, 10–11.

³³ Oyane, 13–15.

has created policies and legislation that proactively approach current social issues such as GDPR, the AI Regulation and policies to prevent climate change, and the size of its market has made countries and companies around the world aware of their guidelines, either forced or understated.³⁴ The definitional exploration of what Europe is, therefore, continues to attract people's interest. However, because of the large inner diversity in Europe, a social science survey on Europe alone would not be able to capture its contours. It would be possible to examine the qualitative differences in the inner reality of the cultural societies of other regions, which have many formally common aspects, from the perspective as like of the mathematical proof by contradiction method. Japan, although isolated until its Europeanisation in the late 1800s, is well suited to this target as its political economy is generally understood today as a major western country.

Having rapidly 'modernised' in the 19th century, Japan was the only permanent member of the League of Nations before World War II other than those countries that are direct descendants of European civilisation, and is still known today as the only Asian country in the G7, the leaders' union of advanced capitalist countries. Political economy would be the accumulation of local histories. Japan, however, has naturally accumulated other histories, which have resulted in the present. Here, the qualitative differences in the internal reality of political economy are likely to paradoxically confirm the essence of Europe. Many other countries besides Japan have developed by accepting Western civilisation to varying degrees, but prominent are those that have a long history of political and economic structures built up by expatriate Western colonial bureaucrats, or have established political and economic systems that are too far removed from the West in the modern era, i.e. communist socialist systems. Therefore, Japan is an important comparative object for making European characteristics stand out from the perspective of more controllable surplus variables. This theme contributes to the Euroculture question of what is Europe, the mainstream - or at least a major contributor - of modern civilisation, by investigating the specificities of European citizens' understanding of international cooperation and philanthropy, in parallel with the research question of a step towards solving social problems by making proposals to support the sustainable operation of the UN organisation, the implementing body of the SDGs, from an economic perspective.

³⁴ Higashino, '対外支援 [Foreign Aid]', 104-106,108-109.

Literature Review

This section sets the stage for reading this paper by looking at previous studies that have touched on the current state of UN system funding and trends in international philanthropy, as well as identifying gaps in previous research that this study will address.

Significance of understanding different cultural societies

Much has been discovered in science that explores the inherent universality of human beings and the different tendencies of different cultures to behave differently. As an example of the scientist effort to find mankind universality, the psychologist Ekman identified the six basic emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise, and argued that these emotions and expressions are shared by all human species.³⁵ For example, the European Values Survey, initiated by sociologist Inglehard and others in 1981 and conducted roughly every five years, has become the International Sociologists' Global Values Survey, and the latest seventh wave in 2019 will continue to quantify differences in value trends for some 90% of the world's population.³⁶ Anthropologist Edward T. Hall defines culture and communication as high context, where the context of the message is important in structuring behaviour, versus low context, where the message must be more explicit, direct and elaborate.³⁷ Hall insisted on that the high-context culture is more in the group-dependent societies and the low-context culture is in the individualindependent societies. ³⁸ Hall, through Sapir-Whorf's work on the relativity of language, links language and culture, and explains that East Asian countries such as Japan and China, where long-standing relationships are important, are more likely to be high context, in Europe, France and Finland as high-context cultures, while the rest of Europe, especially the Germanic-speaking countries and America, which have historically intermingled well

³⁵ Ekman and Friesen, 'Constants across Cultures in the Face and Emotion', 124.

³⁶ 'WVS Database'.

³⁷ Hall, Beyond Culture, 55–56.

³⁸ Hall, 39–40, 54–56.

with multicultural peoples through trade, are low-context cultures.³⁹

In these cross-cultural comparative studies, Japan is often used as a representative of the East in comparison to the West, represented by North America and Europe, even though they are the same Western developed countries by contemporary standards.⁴⁰ Indeed, since the 1980s, Japan has consistently behaved as a member of the developed world in frameworks such as the G7 and economic cooperation with the EU, and is structurally a capitalist power with a democratic model.⁴¹ On the other hand, in qualitative areas ranging from domestic communication, such as political decision-making processes, to the specificity of inventions on the market, as well as in international cross-cultural surveys of citizens, such as the aforementioned values survey, Japan has shown many contrasting results with countries of European descent, such as Europe and the US.⁴² Moreover, in the above-mentioned value surveys and high-low context comparisons, Germany in particular is seen as a typical 'Western' culture, in contrast to Japan.⁴³

The qualitative peculiarities of the Japanese people and community are well known in the field of international politics. Although Japan has emphasised to itself and others that it shares 'common values' with the G7 and the EU⁴⁴, it is well known that Japanese citizens have a qualitatively different understanding, particularly in the area of human rights, which underpins Western values. Defined by the UN as "rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status", human rights are one of the raisons d'être that the UN is supposed to defend.⁴⁵ The EU Charter of Human Rights, in its various definitions, also defines human rights as rights to be respected and enjoyed by all persons. The German Basic Law of

³⁹ Hall, 213–15; Nishimura, Nevgi, and Tella, 'Communication Style and Cultural Features in High/Low Context Communication Cultures', 784–86.

⁴⁰ Kitayama and Miyamoto, '文化心理学と洋の東西の巨視的比較 [Cultural Psychology and Macroscopic Comparisons between the West and the East.]', 62.

⁴¹ Hijiya-Kirschnereit, 'Introduction', 503.

⁴² Hijiya-Kirschnereit, 507.

⁴³ Hall, *Beyond Culture*, 213–15; Nishimura, Nevgi, and Tella, 'Communication Style and Cultural Features in High/Low Context Communication Cultures', 784–86; 'WVS Database'.

⁴⁴ Delegation of the European Union to Japan Press Team, 'EU と日本、相互認証に係る第1回レビュ

ーを完了 | EEAS [EU and Japan Complete First Review of Mutual Recognition | EEAS]'.

⁴⁵ 'Democracy'.

Bonn, which has been amended several times, retains the first definition in its Article 1: "Human dignity shall be inviolable.⁴⁶ To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority", and which clearly states that it is one of the reasons for the existence of the state. On the other hand, the Constitution of Japan, which was drafted under the occupation of the UN (and especially the USA), states in Chapter 3, Article 11: The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be inalienable and inviolable rights of the people of this and future generations,"⁴⁷ which seems close to the other constitutions, but describes a different view of the nature of rights from other countries in Western Europe, saying that rights are granted and guaranteed by law. The cornerstone of this understanding is supposed to be the equality-oriented understanding given to citizens other than the monarch by the declarations made since the Meiji era.⁴⁸ In addition, the Ministry of Justice's explanation of the Human Rights Awareness Project states that its aim is "educating for all citizens to acquire a sense of compassion for others and the sanctity of life", which often emphasises the moral aspect rather than the European understanding which finds its legal principle in the absoluteness of human dignity.⁴⁹ The understanding of human rights is to have originated in resistance to government oppression, including the French Revolution in Europe. However, in Japan, which has modernised without a popular revolution, even today there is a general understanding among the Japanese people of 'the awareness that the government is the guardian of the human rights of the citizens and not a dangerous entity that could violate them'.⁵⁰ It is often pointed out that human rights education in Japan often teaches human rights as a moral and ideological concept of 'compassion' and 'kindness', which is a departure from the international understanding of human rights as natural law, natural and

⁴⁶ Currie et al., 'English Translation of Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany'.

⁴⁷ Japan Ministry of Justice, 'The Constitution of Japan (Constitution 1946) '.

⁴⁸ NAKANISH, ONOSE, and KUSANO, 'Formation Process of the Human Rights Articles, the Third Chapter of the Constitution of Japan (Part 1)', 1187–89.

⁴⁹ Japanese Ministry of Justice, '人権教室 [Human Rights Awareness Project]'.

⁵⁰ Ikuta, 人権教育の日本的性格と展望に関する研究[Research on the Japanese character and prospects of human rights education], 7–8.

inalienable rights.⁵¹ From this it can be argued that Japan's social structure is externally comparable to that of Western developed countries, but there are significant qualitative differences in its development and tolerance of the status quo.

⁵¹ Ikuta, 8.

International Relations and Social constructivism

International Relations is the study of events resulting from interactions between sovereign states. In the 20th century, the need to analyse the two world wars and the Cold War structures that followed led to the development of International Relations.⁵² Traditionally, it has been divided into realist and liberalist positions, each of which has been updated, subdivided and analysed in multiple positions. 53 Realism has seen international relations as the result of each country pursuing its own self-interest, while liberalism has analysed international relations from a more interdependent standpoint⁵⁴ These two main currents have in common that the object of analysis is material resources, such as military power and financial advantages.⁵⁵ Then, major problem of the end of the Cold War structure with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent restructuring of the international order made theoretical insights difficult.⁵⁶ Thus, in 1992, Alexander Wendt proposed social constructivism as a new perspective, according to which 'anarchy is created by the state', i.e. social phenomena are created by the interaction and reproduction of social structures.⁵⁷ Wendt argued that 500 British nuclear missiles pose no more of a security threat to the US than 5 North Korean nuclear missiles. In international relations, he says, it is the context that gives meaning, not the substance.⁵⁸

The analysis of international relations is wide-ranging, but fundamentally it sees the modern sovereign state, as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and the organisation of its constituent parts as the main actors.⁵⁹ The emergence of the concept of

⁵² Hara, 国際関係学講義 [Lectures on international relations], 5–6.

⁵³ Oyane, 'コンストラクティビズムの視点 [Perspectives on Constructivism]', 5-6; Hara, 国際関係学 講義 [Lectures on international relations], 6,10.

⁵⁴ Hara, 国際関係学講義 [Lectures on international relations], 25,29.

⁵⁵ Oyane, 'コンストラクティビズムの視点 [Perspectives on Constructivism]', 10.

⁵⁶ Hirata, 'A. ウェントの国際制度論 [A. Wendt's theory of international institutions]', 152–53; Shinohara, 'コンストラクティヴィズムと歴史研究接点あるいは親和性 [Constructivism, History and Common Context]', 4.

⁵⁷ Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It', 391.

⁵⁸ Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 74.

⁵⁹ Hara, 国際関係学講義 [Lectures on international relations], 4, 247.

'sovereignty' in Europe created a context in which each state was equally entitled to sovereignty as a supreme right, free from interference by other states. Even today, sovereignty and the state are considered to be one and the same, and with a few special exceptions, such as crimes against peace, sovereign states are not subject to trial by other states, and heads of state in the material form in which their sovereignty is embodied are also basically exempt from any form of judgement.⁶⁰ Prior to the twentieth century, the international order was based on complex bilateral relations between these sovereign states, but the collapse of this order due to the First World War led to the creation of the League of Nations as a multilateral platform.⁶¹ The non-participation of major powers as the USA and the Soviet Union, as well as the inadequacies of the League's own power structure, led once again to the global catastrophe of the Second World War, which gave rise to a new order, the United Nations, whose original members were the victorious countries of the Second World War.⁶²

The United Nations can be described as the system of international relations itself, and therefore a major subject of study in international relations.⁶³ Social constructivism is concerned with intersubjective ideas that flow between people.⁶⁴ Thus, while there are many studies of individuals, such as politicians, who can influence norms, ⁶⁵ however, there are few studies that directly link the intentions and ideas of citizens, the smallest unit of the concept of the state as an actor beyond government, to the international cooperation activities of the United Nations.

This study therefore analyses the structure of voluntary contributions to UN agencies, and the norms and identities that are supposed to go with them, as social phenomena that are examples of acts of 'international cooperation contributions by the community of nations', to determine whether they are shared by citizens.

⁶⁰ Škrbić, 'Immunity of Heads of State under Constitutional Law'.

⁶¹ Hara, 国際関係学講義 [Lectures on international relations], 247.

⁶² Hara, 49–50.

⁶³ Hirata, 'A. ウェントの国際制度論 [A. Wendt's theory of international institutions]', 50.

⁶⁴ Oyane, 'コンストラクティビズムの視点 [Perspectives on Constructivism]', 17–18.

⁶⁵ Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations, 9–61.

Cross-cultural psychology

International Relations is the study of intercultural understanding from a macro perspective, which considers collective structures such as states and organisations as actors and explains their environment, behaviour and the resulting social phenomena. In contrast, psychology is a discipline that takes a micro perspective, analysing the individual's environment as an external stimulus, the individual's behaviour and the resulting phenomena or trends. Cross-cultural psychology, which is the focus of this study, is a branch of social psychology that argues that differences in environmental factors due to different cultures and the cultures formed as a result of these differences influence individual behaviour and that cultures are reproduced as a result.⁶⁶ The prevailing view in cross-cultural psychology is that different cultural self-understandings of people lead to the reproduction of different cultures as a group.⁶⁷ Far Eastern countries such as Japan and China are thought to have an interdependent construal of the self, in which the subject of self-recognition is the public and the self is seen as part of the public, whereas Western cultures, especially those originating mainly on the Europe, have an independent construal of the self, in which the individual selves constitute the public.⁶⁸ This theory was initially supported by a simple experiment in which, when Japanese and Americans were shown several pens at an airport, most Japanese tended to choose the pen with the colour of the majority, while Americans tended to choose the pen with the colour of their individuality.⁶⁹ While the original framework has been criticised for its Western-centric perspective,⁷⁰ a number of accumulated studies have shown that this hypothesis is not significantly negligible in Western cultures, especially those from the Europe with its main streams in Western cultures, and those representing the Chinese, Korean and Japanese.⁷¹ The overall results have confirmed that there are significant, non-negligible differences between Western and Far Eastern cultures, and have led to richer findings,

⁶⁶ Yasuko, 'Psychological Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychology', 332.

⁶⁷ Shinobu, 'Cultural Views of Self and Psychological Processes(<Spcial Issue>Cross cultural psychology and cultural psychology)', 153.

⁶⁸ Shinobu, 154.

⁶⁹ Kim and Markus, 'Deviance or Uniqueness, Harmony or Conformity?', 785, 791–92.

⁷⁰ Hwang, 'Escape from Kantian Eurocentric Bias in Cross-Cultural Psychology', 863.

⁷¹ Nisbett and Miyamoto, 'The Influence of Culture', 467–68.

such as those shown in the following diagrams⁷², regarding the certainty of the theory and the psychological factors thought to be responsible for the different behaviours and reasons for them in each cultural sphere.⁷³




Figure 3, Mutually constitutive systems of self and culture in Japan⁷⁴




Figure 4, Mutually constitutive systems of self and culture in Europe and North America⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Kitayama and Miyamoto, '文化心理学と洋の東西の巨視的比較 [Cultural Psychology and Macroscopic Comparisons between the West and the East.]', 63. Figure 2-A, translated by YOSHIOKA ⁷⁵ Kitayama and Miyamoto, 63. Figure 2-B, translated by YOSHIOKA

⁷² Kitayama and Miyamoto, '文化心理学と洋の東西の巨視的比較 [Cultural Psychology and Macroscopic Comparisons between the West and the East.]', 63.

⁷³ Masuda, 'Culture and Attention'.

Connections between social constructivism in IR and cross-cultural psychology

In social constructivism, intersubjective ideas influence the state and the community as actors. Psychology sees human behaviour as a multiplication of human genetic and psychological factors and the environment. The usefulness of psychology as a measure of normative commitment has been argued in comparative political science. Social constructivism, which seeks to understand the world based on an understanding of structure and interdependence rather than a rationalist approach to international relations, would fit well with a psychology that discovers, measures and interprets collective belief factors, rather than assuming human cognitive constraints as positive, in order to understand the status quo and choices.⁷⁶

Although Wendt, a proponent of social constructivism, took a strictly positivist stance to explain the current state of international relations⁷⁷, there are also many studies that take an interpretivist position, presenting the phenomenon as a coherent narrative with a convincing understanding⁷⁸. This is because, in contrast to studies based on realist and liberal genealogies that seek theories and models that universally explain international relations in general, constructivism is oriented towards regional and temporal theories and model explanations that focus on changing intersubjective ideas or contexts⁷⁹, and has indeed produced a number of findings that complement materialist explanations of international relations⁸⁰. This paper interprets the historical context that led to the current social structure on the topic of donations to international organisations, focusing on Japan, which led to the current social structure, and Europe and Germany as a representative and indivisible part of it, and explaining the current situation with data from government publications and government statements. It then proposes the intersubjective ideas of international norms, identity and values, and empirically tests whether these ideas are rooted in the citizens of Europe and Japan, with significant scientific and statistical differences.

From a psychological point of view, the current social structure of UN donation is used as an environmental factor to test whether there are significant differences in the

⁷⁶ Goldgeier and Tetlock, 'Psychology and International Relations Theory', 67.

⁷⁷ ADLER, 'Seizing the Middle Ground', 329.

⁷⁸ Hollis, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 88–91.

⁷⁹ Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, 15–16.

⁸⁰ Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', 325, 346–47.

behavioural tendencies of people from different cultures in Japan and Europe. The effect of the international analysis of social structure on human behaviour will be examined to see if it is real and if the analysis is scientifically valid in terms of the choice orientation of individuals from each culture towards digital crowdfunding.

Structure of this research

Both International Relations and Psychology have often been criticised for being disciplines that promote Western-centric views, because their origins and growth as disciplines have been produced in a Western scientific environment.⁸¹ However, it would be impossible to have a scientific discussion without a framework. Jinno, a non-Western Japanese historian, argues that 'even if a concept is based on a Eurocentric view of history, if it is valid as an analytical concept, it is useful to re-examine the concept and continue to use it as an analytical concept'.⁸² Therefore, this study compares the current situation of the issue of donating to the UN in Japan and Europe from the perspective of social constructivism of international relations by analytically understanding the past literature in the big picture, and also confirms whether the norms and identities found there can be found in individual citizens or not by using the methods of statistical science and crosscultural psychology. In other words, the academic contribution is to ensure the scientific and replicable nature of the claims. Although there are several papers that claim to be able to reinforce each other, there are few studies that actually examine the same issue in one paper from the constructivist standpoint of understanding state intentions and from the psychology of citizens' intrinsic intentions in a complementary way. The present study may also be significant in that it actually reinforces the potential of these speculative and reinforcing relationships on the same issue.

Furthermore, a limitation of this study is that it only aims to analyse and interpret the overall historical structures that have led to the current state of UN giving, and therefore does not explicitly address tax systems or, more recently, the Corona disaster, which has had a global impact on philanthropy, except in the contextual interpretive explanatory part. Future rigorous empirical research is needed to clarify all social structures, as the aim is to discover the relative differences in motivation due to contextual differences.

⁸¹ Eg. Staeuble, 'Psychology in the Eurocentric Order of the Social Sciences', 183; Tolay, 'Inadvertent Reproduction of Eurocentrism in IR', 692.

⁸² JINNO, '日本の近代歴史学と概念化の問題——「封建制」概念をめぐって —— [Modern Japanese Historiography and the Problem of Conceptualisation: The Concept of "Feudalism".]', 461, 466–67.

1. Methodological framework

General Theory and Methodology

The aim of this study is an account of the current social structure of UN Voluntary Funding from Europe and Japan based on social constructivism. Social constructivism recognises material and ideational constructs in international norms that exist alongside social phenomena. While other theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism focus on the material dimension, social constructivism focuses on the ideational dimension. According to Oyane et.al, social constructivism has the following characteristics compared to other theories.⁸³

- (1) The first feature is that social interaction between actors creates and changes national/international ideas, and also interactively changes the identity of each actor.
- ⁽²⁾ The second feature is that actors and international structures act interactively. As long as actors follow the developed norms (the logic of adequacy), the international structure is stable. However, when actors deviate from the logic of adequacy, international norms change.
- (3) The third feature is the emphasis on conceptual elements, i.e. 'ideas'. Unlike neorealism and neoliberalism, which explain material social constructs such as weapons, funds and resources, constructivism focuses on the action of ideas (from the international to the nation) to generate top-down 1. regulatory action and 2. constitutive action.

This paper investigates the 'voluntary contributions' from both states that support the sustainable operations of the UN, one of the main SDG actors, focusing on Japanese and European societies as actors, investigating national policies and the social structures behind them.

Therefore, this paper focuses on 'ideas', which are subjective explanations of social

⁸³ Oyane, 'コンストラクティビズムの視点 [Perspectives on Constructivism]', 6-11.

structures in the respective cultural spheres. State actors are ultimately rooted in the accumulation of individual citizens, which gives rise to the conceptual constitution of each country. The state as an actor can be divided into two components: government and civil society. Civil society is understood as the basis of the market, which Adam Smith argued for in the late eighteenth century as an entity independent of the state, followed by the bourgeois civil society in the nineteenth century, and since the twentieth century has actually included individual citizens as the counterpart of public government, journalism as the normative entrepreneur (the actor as the driver of the emergence and evolution of social norms⁸⁴), composed of them, and NGOs composed of individual citizens and the counterparts of the public sector.⁸⁵

In the 21st century and beyond, profit-making enterprises as members of civil society can also become so-called normative entrepreneurs through Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR, management concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and interactions with their stakeholders, as example through their general profit-making activities, either through their corporate philosophy or, more recently, through the adoption of socially goodoriented accounting standards, which are understood to constitute the norms of international cooperation⁸⁶. In addition, the characteristics of the current 'voluntary contribution to the UN' discourse in the social construct as a subjective factor in each culture will be captured from a different citizen perspective. Furthermore, in order to test, even partially, the respective intersubjectivity explanations obtained here, a methodology other than social constructivism is used. The individual behaviour of donating to digital crowdfunding by citizens, the material end of each actor, is tested with the methodology of psychology as the material approach, i.e. the scientific interpretation of visible behaviour. From the results obtained, it is expected that the subjective and objective approaches will complement each other and that universality will be found. The process of description is to first identify the ideas between government (including integrated government in Europe) and civil society in each actor. The ideas as a state are seen as reflected in the official position of each government organisation, as expressed in its

⁸⁴ Hoffmann, 'Entrepreneurs and Norm Dynamics', 2.

⁸⁵ Sakaguchi, '市民社会 [Civil Society]', 148.

⁸⁶ UNIDO, 'What Is CSR?'

funding policy towards the United Nations and in one of its major development aid policy documents, and the discursive factors of civil society that constitute the state are deciphered.

In accordance with this theoretical framework, the social constructivist model of voluntary contributions to the UN in Japan and Europe (Germany), which is the subject of this study, is organised as shown in the diagram below.




Figure 5. Social Constructivist Model in UN Crowd Funding of EU and Japan, made by YOSHIOKA

Definitions

As a premise, the social constructivist factors analysed in this study are organised in the model above. The green arrows refer to ideas, the ovals to actors who may be normative entrepreneurs, and the grey qualifications to international social phenomena. Based on the definitions given here, the analysis of ideas as each interaction is described in this thesis in the numerical order of the arrows above.

Social Structure related with international development finance

The international social phenomenon and its conceptual social construction, which is the dependent variable to be explained in this thesis, is 'voluntary contribution to UN structures'. The definition of the international structure under study and the main analytical aspects are given below. In the following, the definition and the main analytical aspects of the international structure under study, which is shown in grey, are described with common prerequisite information with historical context for both actors, Europe and Japan. The detailed analysis described in Chapter 2 onwards will focus on the third and fourth levels with European (Blue) and Japanese (Red).

1st level- Development Support and/or International cooperation

It is development finance in the context of international cooperation. Modern international cooperation in the form of cross-border aid and cooperation activities has its origins in the activities of the Red Cross in the 19th century, but was first implemented in earnest at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 with the War Recovery Plan for Europe. In 1960, the United Nations, originally and primarily an intergovernmental security framework, proposed the UN Development Decade. Since 1970, the 0.7% ODA target has been universally agreed by developed countries within the UN membership and has been maintained. Every ten years, the UN updates its statement of development goals for all member states. Particularly in recent years, the idea of the SDGs, a developmental update of the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2013, has been at the heart of the overall plan involving member states, agencies and commercial non-profit organisations outside the UN structures, agreed by member states and the main agent of progress in implementation. The development policies of member state governments through the UN, which are the main focus of this study, are analysed in terms of the national development policies of the member states concerned and their reporting documents on their progress towards the SDGs.

2nd level- UN Total Funding

The United Nations is financed mainly by assessed contributions, which are compulsory levies from Member States, and by voluntary contributions from Member States and other organisations and individuals. Other amounts account for about 1 per cent and are based on interest and foreign exchange gains within UN structures, sales of small items by agencies, etc. All funds are spent on administrative costs, development costs in operational peacekeeping and development agencies, and various projects. Due to the wide range of UN agencies and expenditure items, this study will not go into detail due to space limitations, but will focus on development-related content.

3rd level- UN Voluntary Funding

Voluntary contributions from States, organisations and individuals to the UN have continued to increase since the 1990s. In addition, the specialised development agencies, notably UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, UNHCR and UNFPA, rely on voluntary contributions to finance most of their activities, as they do not operate on the basis of UN assessed contributions. For the UN and UN specialised agencies as a whole, assessed contributions, which are mandatory contributions, amount to about \$140 billion in 2021, voluntary contributions to \$470 billion and other contributions to \$50 billion, or more than 70 per cent of the total. Voluntary contributions to the UN have increased in both value and proportion over the years, but have clearly not kept pace with the UN's increased funding needs in recent years, including Covid-19.

The study, especially in chapter 2, will focus in particular on data on voluntary contributions to UN development agencies from the EU and Germany or Japan, the governments under investigation.

4th level- UN Digital Crowdfunding

Crowdfunding, the collection of charitable donations from organisations, including individuals and private companies, for a specific UN agency or project, has a long history, particularly as a modern digital finance solution to meet the UN's current funding needs, and was introduced in the UN 2020 Digital Finance Task. UNICEF, UNHCR and others have local public partner NPOs for crowdfunding and PR purposes in developed countries such as the US, Germany and Japan, and some UN agencies such as UNDP run portals for crowdfunding campaigns. Crowdfunding revenues are generally accounted for as voluntary contributions from the private sector within each UN agency, and contributions from the private sector currently account for

only 5 per cent of voluntary funding across the UN system. Even UNICEF, the most successful in crowdfunding, has a relatively small contribution of around 30%.

On the other hand, recent research suggests that the results of crowdfunding campaigns can be used as an indicator of public approval or disapproval of public investment decisions by democratic governments. Crowdfunding for joint investment by citizens and governments in public goods as public-private partnerships (PPPs) has also been used in practice by several governments for projects with partnerships to the UN. In other words, it is possible that the results of crowdfunding from citizens to the UN could be used in the future to obtain citizen input as one of the accountability mechanisms for the targets and amounts of voluntary contributions from governments to the UN for SDG operations, or for co-financing projects with citizens. The possibility of co-financing projects with citizens could also be considered to increase.

This study evaluates the democratic voting aspect of digital crowdfunding, treating the crowdfunding preferences of citizens of each country through the UN as an element of national identity in the social construction of each country. In other words, the mock digital crowdfunding campaign is used as a validation from the citizens' perspective that complements the results of the analysis of the interaction of the content of the voluntary contribution of each government unit as a social construction. The methodology of cross-cultural psychology, which compares human behaviour in different cultures, is used to conduct and validate the experiment. This level is the main target for the verification by psychological test on chapter 3.

Actors

Actor is one of the social constructivist factors and refers to an actor in international relations. In the past it was mainly concerned with the governments of sovereign states, but since the late 20th century it has been analysed in a broader

and more complex way, including non-state actors such as business and NGOs.⁸⁷ In this paper, the following actors in particular will be analysed and divided into state actors and civil society.

Governmental Entity

Defined as political entities, which, as governments, disburse international cooperation costs to the UN. Interpreted and analysed by following latest official documents on development and expenditure on the UN. This study focuses its analysis on Europe and its components, Germany, and Japan.

Europe:

EU Institution

-Development Co-operation Profiles: European Union institutions (2022)⁸⁸

-European Consensus on Development (2017)⁸⁹

German Government as an EU member state

-Development Co-operation Profiles: Germany (2022)⁹⁰

-Germany's Sustainable Development Strategy (2021)⁹¹

Japan: Japanese government

⁸⁷ Oyane, 'コンストラクティビズムの視点 [Perspectives on Constructivism]', 4–5.

⁸⁸ OECD, 'Development Co-Operation Profiles: European Union Institutions'.

⁸⁹ European Union, 'European Consensus on Development'.

⁹⁰ OECD, 'Development Co-Operation Profiles: Germany'.

⁹¹ 'German Sustainable Development Strategy - 2021 Update'.

-Development Co-operation Profiles: Japan (2022)⁹²

-Japanese development cooperation charter (2023)⁹³

Civil society

Defined as collective behaviours (for donation) of each cultural group. Observable representations are analysed and interpreted through cultural history academic books and psychological experiments.

Non-Government Organization (NGO)

National and international NGOs complement the UN-led SDGs with their expertise, field activities and funding. The term NGO was coined by the UN in 1945 to distinguish between governmental and private organisations. ⁹⁴ This study categorises representative European and German or Japanese NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace) and analyses their role. NGOs are part of another term, Non-Profit Organisation (NPO), which is understood as non-profit activities in support of social goals at a regional or national level. In this paper, organisations that are strictly understood as NPOs are also referred to as NGOs, as is the case in the reports of JICA, the Japanese government development agency.

Journalism

Journalism is a source of public discourse for citizens that underpins democratic societies. To this end, representative organisations

⁹² OECD, 'Development Co-Operation Profiles: Japan'.

⁹³ Japanese Cabinet Office, '開発協力大綱~自由で開かれた世界の持続可能な発展に向けた日本 の 貢 献 ~ [Development Cooperation Charter -Japan's Contributions to the Sustainable Development of a Free and Open World]'.

⁹⁴ Devaney, 'What Is an NGO'.

(newspapers, advertising, etc.) are categorised and their role in the social fabric is analysed in each country.

Ordinary Profit Organisations

In recent years, commercial enterprises have influenced social structures by adopting principles and accounting standards (e.g. impact-weighted accounting) that take into account social welfare and development, including SDG targets, not only in their CSR activities but also in their regular commercial activities.

EU, Germany and Japanese Citizen

The analysis is of the situation of the individual as the end substance of the state as actor. As for the culture of giving in Europe (Germany), it has a variety of presuppositional situations, which stem from various Christian traditions (e.g. tithe, Christmas giving culture, etc.). Although many previous studies have suggested that Japan is a 'no donation' culture, a universal 'theory of exchange' has been observed, with forms and mechanisms of giving found in all societies, as noted by the cultural anthropologist Marcel Mauss⁹⁵, with strong positive or psychologically coercive characteristics, especially in terms of giving back. Compared to Europe, Japan tends to have values that prioritise hierarchy and order, and it is assumed that, compared to Europe, Japan has a value system in which social good should be implemented on behalf of the upper echelons of society and the government, rather than by the general population themselves.

Ideas

When describing social structures, the definition from social constructivist

⁹⁵ Mauss, 贈与の文化論, [The Gift, Original title: Essai sur le don: forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques], 10–21.

theory of idea was split into norm and identity for analysis. Identity was also defined as consisting of value and interest.

(National) Norm

Standards of appropriate behaviour for entities with a given identity.

(National) Identity

Self-understanding as a national group, comprising the following values and interests.

(National) Value

Values as a nation. Sometimes stated explicitly. Ex. 'Free and Secure Justice Territory', etc.

(National) Interest

Specific interest targets of the state as a collective construct, including security.

2. Social structure to the voluntary funding to UN

The administrative documents analysed, as defined in section 2, and the numerical information on UN voluntary contributions are the subject of the analysis, interpreting the ideas and social structures of each. The documents are semantically analysed by the point of "(national) interest" and "(national) value", which constructs their respective identity.

2-1. Japan




Figure 6, Social Constructivist Model in UN Crowd Funding of Japan, a part of Figure 5

Social structure of the Japanese government's development assistance funding to the UN

This sub-chapter provides an overview of the historical formation process of the social construction behind Japan's voluntary contributions to the UN and the resulting social construction of contemporary Japan today, the OECD Development Co-operation Profiles (2022) for numerical information, and qualitatively, Japan's Development Cooperation Charter (2023), and identifies the current social constructivist factors visible in (1) and (2) from the model.

Historical structure of the Japanese Government

It is difficult to discuss the beginnings of the relationship between the Japanese government and its citizens in the contemporary sense because it depends on definitions. This is because the concept of the nation-state itself originated in Europe and is difficult to understand in the context of Japan's different historical background.⁹⁶ The beginning of the Japanese government in the form widely understood as a modern nation-state can be traced back to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when the previous federal territorial states of a military aristocracy supported by the authority of an emperor without real power was transformed into an imperial government of interdependence between the emperor and his subjects under the banner of "one sovereign, all people"⁹⁷. Moreover, it is generally accepted that the politics of the current constitution began with the surrender of the Imperial Government to the United States, and formally to the United Nations in particular, in August 1945⁹⁸. The major event in Japanese history, the subordination of the sovereignty of the Imperial Government the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo (GHQ-SCAP) following the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, is referred to in Japanese jurisprudence as the theory of the August Revolution, ⁹⁹ from the perspective that a revolution took place in which sovereignty was transferred from the Emperor to the people. The following June, under the influence of the GHQ-SCAP, the constitution granted by the Emperor was fully amended and approved by the Imperial Diet, and the Constitution of Japan was promulgated in its present form, unchanged word for word to this day as of August 2023. There, the Japanese national identity based on the relationship between the Imperial Family and the subjects, which had been shrouded in a veil of historical mystery and for which even the year of its origin was unclear, was clearly transformed into a parliamentary democracy with a sovereign people with the Emperor as its symbol.

⁹⁶ Zachmann, 'Does Europe Include Japan?'

⁹⁷ Takahashi, '「日本型市民社会」は世界の模範たりうるか [Can "Japanese Civil Society" Serve as a Model for the Rest of the World?]'.

⁹⁸ '国際協力とは? 日本はなぜ国際協力をするの? [What Is International Cooperation? Why Does Japan Cooperate Internationally?]'.

⁹⁹ Zachmann, 'Does Europe Include Japan?'

Historical structure of Japanese civil society

The definition of civil society in Japan and its origins are also difficult because civil society, like that of the polity, is a word defined by European history. Even the definition of civil society itself is not academically agreed upon¹⁰⁰, but here it is understood as citizens and communities of citizens whose aim is to pursue movements in pursuit of social goals¹⁰¹. When studying Europe, civil society is often seen as an independent movement separate from government or royal authority¹⁰², leading some scholars to argue that there was no civil society in Japan until the birth of the new Japanese government after World War II. However, it would be impossible to say that civil society itself did not exist, given that political advocacy by civil society groups in the pre-war Imperial government led the Imperial government to change its policies and enact the first modern constitution in the East Asian region.¹⁰³ In other words, Japan's pre-WW2 civil society was characterised by a weak civil society in which the public and citizens complemented each other, based on the framework of the state. These political movements by citizens and civil society groups were influenced by journalistic discourse, as has been assumed and supported in the West: even before Japan became a nation-state in 1868, it was supported by a journalism known as 'kawaraban (瓦版)', which, partly because of its relatively high literacy rate, has been a major force in modern Japan, with several major newspaper publishers operating nationally from early on.¹⁰⁴ The pre-war Imperial Constitution granted freedom of publication, assembly and association through a system of notification, and it could be argued that the tension between the government's will to dissolve the society made it an inert civil society subject to the will of the government.¹⁰⁵

The case of donations to the 1906 San Francisco earthquake is presented as an example of the impetus for an international social giving movement, which is the focus of this paper. San Francisco was hit by a major earthquake and a huge fire that destroyed 80%

¹⁰⁰ Oyane, Constructivism's theory in International Relations.

¹⁰¹ Hendrik Sprotte, 'Civil Society as a State Event? - A Search for Traces in Pre-1945 Japan -'.

¹⁰² Takahashi, '「日本型市民社会」は世界の模範たりうるか [Can "Japanese Civil Society" Serve as a Model for the Rest of the World?]'.

¹⁰³ Zachmann, 'Does Europe Include Japan?'

¹⁰⁴ Hendrik Sprotte, 'Civil Society as a State Event? - A Search for Traces in Pre-1945 Japan -'.

¹⁰⁵ Hendrik Sprotte.

of the city and killed about 3,000 people. Of the city's 400,000 residents, at least 225,000 were left homeless and 28,000 buildings were destroyed¹⁰⁶. Although the US government at the time had a policy of refusing foreign aid, the Japanese government was the first in the world to receive donations from Japan, as the Japanese government showed a strong willingness to donate to the city of San Francisco even if the federal government refused to do so.¹⁰⁷ Then, it was decided to donate 200,000 yen from the Emperor and a contribution of 150,000 yen from the Japanese business community. At the time, the total donation from Japan was calculated at \$246,000, accounting for more than half of all foreign donations. This movement of direct donations from Japanese civil society through the Japanese Red Cross Society to overseas disasters¹⁰⁸, starting with the 'Holy Will' of the emperor, testifies to the indivisibility of pre-war Japanese civil society and the Japanese government. However, many of these civil society NGOs were diverted from their original purpose by the wartime regime in Japan after 1940 - leaving behind the Boy Scouts and the women's movement for war advocacy and similar purposes - and their original activities were suspended until after the war.¹⁰⁹

The characteristics of the Japanese Red Cross Society from the perspective of Japanese civil society deserve special mention. The Japanese Red Cross Society is currently the direct Japanese affiliate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, founded in 1863)¹¹⁰. The origins of the Japanese Red Cross Society date back to 1867, when Sano Tsunetani, a local medical officer who visited the International Red Cross Society's exhibition at the Paris Exposition of 1867, founded " 博 愛 社:Hakuaisya'('Philanthropic Society'), a relief organization to provide medical assistance to wounded soldiers from both sides of the conflict.", .¹¹¹ During the civil war in Japan in

¹⁰⁶ Tsuchida, 'Two Disasters across the Pacific at the Beginning of the 20th Century: International Relations in the Wake of the Tōhoku Crop Crisis and the San Francisco Earthquake, 1905-06.'

¹⁰⁷ Tsuchida.¹⁰⁸ Tsuchida.

¹⁰⁹ Hendrik Sprotte, 'Civil Society as a State Event? - A Search for Traces in Pre-1945 Japan -'.

¹¹⁰日本赤十字社 [Japan Red Cross Society], '歴史・沿革 | 赤十字について [History | About the Red Cross]'.

¹¹¹日本赤十字社 [Japan Red Cross Society].

1877 (the Satsuma Rebellion), Sano wished to bring the Red Cross spirit of saving people regardless of side or enemy to Japan, and appealed directly to 有栖川宮熾仁親王: Prince Tharuhito Arisugawanomiya, commander of the civil war government forces, who granted him permission to establish the Society. With Japan's accession to the Geneva Convention in 1886, Hakuaisya was officially recognised as the Red Cross Society of Japan in 1887, where it has remained to this day.¹¹² It can be said to be representative of a civil society which, as noted above, was weak but did exist in Japan, in that its founding spirit was strongly influenced by that of Europe, and in that its key figures were Japanese bureaucrats who voluntarily sought official permission from the authorities to set it up. It was not set up by people sent from the ICRC headquarters in Europe, nor by the Japanese government in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

The war impoverished Japanese society, and the country was able to receive donations from the United Nations and foreign NGOs such as the Red Cross.¹¹³ Immediately after the war, civilian property was completely destroyed due to war damage and property taxes for reconstruction purposes. Funding from pre-war philanthropists, charities and sponsors had ceased to exist, making a self-sustaining revival of NGOs and other organisations impossible.¹¹⁴ The domestic NGO sector was encouraged by the US government during the GHQ-SCAP occupation to 'revive' NGOs that had been dormant during the war, especially those that had originated in or had close ties to Europe and the US, in an attempt to create a momentum for youth volunteerism.¹¹⁵ Around the time of Japan's accession to the United Nations in 1956, the country's revitalised economic situation stimulated the activities of NGOs in Japan, both for domestic purposes and for charitable purposes in support of overseas aid. As of 2023, there are more than 400 Japanese NGOs engaged in international cooperation activities, providing development assistance in dialogue and cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) during the implementation period of the

¹¹²日本赤十字社 [Japan Red Cross Society].

¹¹³ Hendrik Sprotte, 'Civil Society as a State Event? - A Search for Traces in Pre-1945 Japan -'.

¹¹⁴ Hendrik Sprotte.

¹¹⁵ '国際協力とは? 日本はなぜ国際協力をするの? [What Is International Cooperation? Why Does Japan Cooperate Internationally?]'.

transitional measures of the Government of Japan.¹¹⁶ Japanese NGOs are heavily dependent on the Japanese government, both financially and technically, and are treated as subcontractors rather than partners. In this sense, the importance of cooperation between civil society and public authorities is relatively low compared to Western societies.

Historical structure of Japanese ODA

Japan's modern development cooperation is said to have begun with its participation in the Colombo Plan in 1954; in 1970, the Japanese government became a development donor through the United Nations and a major contributor; in 1989, it overtook the US as the world's largest donor, a position it held from 1991 to 2000.¹¹⁷ Japan's aid, which is discussed in more detail below, can be broadly divided into direct bilateral aid to developing countries and aid channelled through the United Nations. One of the reasons for the high level of direct bilateral aid, while maintaining "UN diplomacy as the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy", may be that Japanese development assistance was mainly intended as reparations for the victims of the Second World War.¹¹⁸ It is still mainly focused on Asia and remains so today. Unlike countries such as the UK and Germany, which have development agencies as part of a main government department, the Japanese government has a development implementation agency called JICA, but centralises the management of ODA policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ¹¹⁹ which is thought to emphasise the important role of development as an important part of foreign policy. In addition, the Japanese government is considered to promote the values of a 'peaceful nation' as part of Japan's internal and external identity, and is oriented towards

¹¹⁶ '国際協力と NGO [International cooperation and NGOs]'.

¹¹⁷ Japan International Cooperation Agency, '国際協力の目的について | ODA の基礎知識 | 国際協力・

ODA \mathcal{COVT} [About the Objectives of International Cooperation | Basic Knowledge of ODA | About International Cooperation and ODA]'.

¹¹⁸ HAYASHIDA, '国際機関等への拠出金・出資金: 拠出・出資の現状と監査等の制度 [Contributions and Funding to International Organisations: Current Status of Contributions and Funding and Systems for Auditing, Etc.]'.

¹¹⁹ Usui, '国際機関への拠出金に関する PDCA サイクルの強化 [Strengthening the PDCA cycle for contributions to international organisations]'.

ODA that does not rely on military aid, given the fact that aid was initiated for the purpose of rebuilding from war damage and the particular nature of Japanese foreign policy, which relies on the United States for military matters.¹²⁰

Identity as a Peace Nation

The war, which Japan started in the name of maintaining its own national system centred on the Emperor and building a new order in Asia centred on Japan, ended in an unprecedented tragedy, leaving many tragedies and scars inside and outside Japan and impoverishing the Japanese people for three long years, resulting in the loss of 3.1 million lives (more than 4% of the 72 million Japanese population at the end of the war), both military and civilian, the war dead in Japan and 41.5% of the country's wealth, and the ceding of 45% of the country's territory. Japanese central government was legally and bureaucratically retained to rebuild the state while maintaining the continuity of the Japanese state, which retained the 'Emperor' in Article 1 of the Constitution, Japan had to emphasise its new identity as a 'peaceful state' both domestically and externally. This situation was in contrast to the Germany, here the central government completely collapsed and the state had to move away from the absolute criminal Nazi group as its reason for existence. The implication of this peaceful state was not primarily as a peacekeeping entity, but rather, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution of Japan, "Trusting in the justice and faith of peace-loving peoples, we have resolved to preserve our security and existence", Japan itself would not take any action that would threaten the peace of other countries or its own, and on this premise other countries would do the same. It is also assumed that other countries will respect Japan's stance and not violate international rules unnecessarily. This is a unique situation for Japan, which despite being an economic superpower is dependent on the US for its military, but it is not without other examples. A similarly defeated country, Austria, which after the war was the frontline to the east but also the largest city in central Europe, has restored and maintained a western liberal state system, while providing a kind of buffer zone in terms of security by declaring permanent neutrality and making it clear that it will not join the western armaments in particular. Japan attaches great importance to the United Nations, which in this sense is itself the framework of collective security, and takes particular care to pay its obligatory dues and to send people in accordance with the size of the dues.

It should be noted, however, that the unchanging and strong post-war identity of peace is undergoing change. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2019, peacekeeping norms have changed significantly: in 2022, Japan decided and implemented for the first time, with strong public support, to provide military equipment assistance, including bulletproof vests, to Ukraine, a party to the conflict. The biggest conflict in Eastern Europe since the Second World War may now change the national identity and norms of Japan, as well as the European Union and other Western countries.

Norms of Self-help

From the first Charter for ODA¹²¹ of 1990s to the latest Development Charter of June 2023¹²², there is one word that is almost always mentioned with importance in government publications on Japanese ODA. It is "self-help" aid. The self-help philosophy, which is emphasised as a development norm in Japan, was clearly stated at a time when the amount of aid from Japan as an economic superpower was rapidly increasing, with the aim of responding to criticism from Western countries that Japan had no aid philosophy.¹²³ The social structure of the background was that Japan, which originally started ODA in the post-war reconstruction period, preferred to provide aid in the form of loans in order to make efficient use of limited operational funds. Until the 1990s, Japan's ODA was tied to Japanese companies, which in some cases led to profit incentives for Japanese companies.¹²⁴ Japan's official position is that the loan format helps developing countries to help themselves. The obligation to repay the loan can be an incentive for recipient countries to develop the operational know-how and efficiency to

¹²¹ Japanese Cabinet Office, '旧·政府開発援助大綱(1992 年 6 月閣議決定)[Former Charter of Official Development Assistance (Approved by Cabinet in June 1992)]'.

¹²² Japanese Cabinet Office, '開発協力大綱~自由で開かれた世界の持続可能な発展に向けた日本

の貢献~[Development Cooperation Charter -Japan's Contributions to the Sustainable Development of a Free and Open World]', 3.

¹²³ Japan Economic Planning Agency, 日本の顔のみえる自助努力支援を目指して [Towards face to face self-help support in Japan], 1.

¹²⁴ Yamaguchi, '国際開発援助における中国の台頭と日本の活路 —今こそ日本型モデルの積極的 提示を— [The Rise of China and Japan's Opportunities in International Development Assistance - Now is the Time to Actively Present the Japanese Model]'.

monetise and make effective use of the facilities built with aid. In addition, the recently independently developed Japanese knowledge and technology for large-scale infrastructure construction can be made available to developing countries through the exchange of personnel.¹²⁵

This norm of self-help aid, which explains the social structure of loans as a philosophical position, also had the effect of self-norming Japan as a responsible aid donor, which until the 1990s had been a quantitative aid powerhouse without Japanese aid philosophy or know-how. The general principles of aid, such as the preference for grants, which do not burden the recipient country's finances, rather than loans, and the preference for multilateral aid through platforms such as the UN rather than bilateral aid, which tends to concentrate power in the donor country, were rules developed by European countries.¹²⁶ More specifically, aid principles and norms were shaped by European countries that had gained experience in aid through the development of their colonies, with Germany, as a latecomer to the colonial empire, being no exception.¹²⁷ Japan was unable to internalise these Western norms, both during its colonial administration from the late 1800s- and after the war, as Japan itself was undergoing a process of modernisation from the bottom up. At the same time, Japan's success in developing itself strengthened its confidence as a Enjo-taikoku (援助大国), an aid-giving power, in its ability to provide practical development assistance from a different perspective than the West, especially Europe.¹²⁸ Colonial development means forcibly changing the social environment of aid recipients in a way that is favourable to the home country's economy, and the current situation of maintaining this context has also been criticised as an aspect of imposing European values on the recipients of development.¹²⁹

Since the 1990s, the concept of providing necessary assistance while maintaining the principle of non-interference in internal affairs has included human security, and Japan

¹²⁵ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, '援助形態別の概要・取組 有償資金協力 [Overview and initiatives by aid type, Loan-type financial cooperation]'.

¹²⁶ Yamaguchi, '国際開発援助における中国の台頭と日本の活路 —今こそ日本型モデルの積極的 提示を— [The Rise of China and Japan's Opportunities in International Development Assistance - Now is the Time to Actively Present the Japanese Model]'.

¹²⁷ Yamaguchi; Benedix, Global Development and Colonial Power, 15–16.

¹²⁸ Takahashi and Yamakage, 人間の安全保障 [Security for Human], 26.


¹²⁹ Higashino, '安全保障 [Security]', 30, 32-33.

has played a central role in making this concept an international norm. The normativisation of human security in Japan can be interpreted as an extension of the concept of self-help assistance at the infrastructure level, previously directed at the state or government, to individual self-help units. As the numerical information below show, this norm can be interpreted as preserving the specificity of the Japanese aid pattern from the more common European model, including some developments such as the elimination of aid tied to Japanese companies.

Numerical information on government contributions to the UN¹³⁰

ODA is divided into two categories: bilateral aid and multilateral aid to multilateral systems such as the UN. Japan has not yet fulfilled international commitment of GNI 0.7% for ODA.

Grants accounted for 41.7%, while 58.3% of Japan's ODA was mainly in the form of loans and other non-grant aid. The UN and other multilateral organisations accounted for 18.9% of this ODA, and of the remaining 81.1% as total bilateral ODA, 11% of the amount was channelled through multilateral organisations The top three UN recipients of Japanese aid were UNICEF (\$318.7 million), UNDP (\$236.5 million) and WFP (\$232.4 million).



Note: Data on ODA volumes (figure above) are in [USD] constant 2021 prices. Data for 2022 are preliminary. See the methodological notes for further details.

Figure 7. Japanese ODA volume, 2009-2022¹³¹

¹³⁰ OECD, 'Development Co-Operation Profiles: Japan'.

¹³¹ OECD.




Figure 8, Japanese Bilateral and multilateral ODA allocations, 2009-2021¹³²




Figure 9, Top 10 UN recipient agencies from Japanese ODA, 2021¹³³

¹³² OECD.
 ¹³³ OECD.

Interpretation for the numerical information

Japan's ODA has historically been bilateral and loan-oriented.¹³⁴ Indeed, while the Germany account for 42.8% of core contributions to and through the UN, Japan's is relatively small at 28% of the total. In addition, Japan's loans accounted for more than a majority of the total, at 58.2%, in contrast to 30.5% in Europe and 14.2% in Germany. This may reflect past research showing that Japan, through its own development agency (JICA), places more emphasis on loan support for infrastructure development, which is more likely to reflect Japanese intentions and to be financed in aggregate in large projects.¹³⁵ Japan's official position is that loan-type contributions are valuable in promoting self-help, a Japanese development philosophy, in that they create the need for beneficiaries to attempt to repay their funds and to create self-help in terms of management skills and economic self-sufficiency. The three main UN agencies to which contributions from Japan are same as EU and Germany, as discussed below. On the other hand, the fact that Japan is the largest contributor to UNICEF compared to Germany, which is the largest contributor to WFP, can be seen as an expression of Japan's structural identity, which is more focused on supporting education that promotes self-help than on food aid, which is a more immediate and transitory poverty alleviation issue.

¹³⁴ '日本の ODA—より良い援助とするために— [Japan's ODA - Making It a Better Aid]'. ¹³⁵ Huda and Ismail, 'INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF JAPAN'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)'.

Modern structure of the Japanese Government's position on contributions to the UN

Since 2005, Japan has published an ODA White Paper (from 2015, a Development White Paper) to explain to the public the content and significance of Japan's ODA. In 2005, the first edition of the White Paper was notable for the fact that, while the aim was to help people around the world enjoy the same benefits as the Japanese, it also specifically explained to the public: (1) the benefits to Japanese companies that receive infrastructure development contracts, and (2) the future of Japanese UN staff positions.

With regard to (1), the following wording emphasises its importance

(i) infrastructure¹³⁶

To create a desirable international environment for Japan and the world, to maintain and strengthen foreign relations based on trust, to ensure the peace and security of Japan and its people, and to achieve further prosperity through economic growth.

Japan's food self-sufficiency rate is low, at 38% on a calorie basis, and it relies on trade to import resources and obtain foreign exchange, as it is almost entirely dependent on overseas energy sources. The development of infrastructure and supply chains for developing countries is in the national interest of the security framework of the Japanese state as a whole.

(ii) Human resource development¹³⁷

The flow of new solutions and social values to Japan and the development of human resources for the next generation in Japan and in developing countries will lead to solutions to the economic and social challenges facing Japan itself and to economic growth.

¹³⁶ Japanese Cabinet Office, '開発協力大綱~自由で開かれた世界の持続可能な発展に向けた日本 の 貢 献 ~ [Development Cooperation Charter -Japan's Contributions to the Sustainable Development of a Free and Open World]', 3.

¹³⁷ Japanese Cabinet Office, 6,7.

In particular, the report emphasises the development of intellectuals as an asset for the present and the future, and the contribution to capacity building of the private sector and local governments in Japan in a reflux manner through development assistance. The concept of national interest can be seen in the idea that developing people is beneficial to national Self-help.

Here, the details of the social structure and social constructivism elements related to Japan's voluntary contribution to the UN in recent years, especially in the period 2020-2023, are deciphered from the Development Charter and the White Paper on Development as statements of state.

The most recent statement of state of the Japanese government for 2023, the chapter on development, clearly states that Japan's ODA is "aimed at the sustainable well-being of the world as a whole, targeting the SDGs agreed upon by the UN" and that it will implement "international contributions that are in the national interest of the country". In the case of ODA, the government also promises to implement 'international contributions that are in the national interest of the country'. This expression of 'national interest' does not appear in the previous 2015 Development Charter; according to Wakita, there was a great deal of controversy during the drafting process about whether or not to specify 'national interest', and it was decided to use indirect references such as 'the use of ODA will benefit Japan in various ways'. The 2023 national interest statement can be seen as a breakthrough as a national will on this point, and further analysis reveals that it aims to maintain and develop the same values and infrastructure for countries along the sea lanes that are unique to island nations with low food self-sufficiency and supply chains dependent on the sea, and emphasises the existence of energy resource-rich countries as targets for assistance. Both the White Paper and the Charter make little mention of the financial target itself, other than the amount of money in the budget, and the 0.7 % of GNI international pledge is explicitly described as keeping in mind but limiting as far as possible. From these points, the Japanese government's appeal to civil society can be interpreted to mean that support for Japan and the UN abroad is primarily aimed at maintaining and improving the interests of Japanese citizens.

Japanese culture of charitable donation

Looking at the concept of charitable giving among the Japanese citizens who make up Japanese civil society, the general consensus in international comparisons from the past to the present is that Japan is a country that generally tends to 'not donate'. In fact, according to the CAF survey, the ranking of Japanese citizens' donation behaviour in 2021 is 103rd out of 119 countries surveyed, making it a country that tends not to donate in terms of GDP.¹³⁸ On the other hand, the ranking of donation behaviour fluctuates from year to year and is characterised by relatively high rankings in the years following disasters in which many Japanese citizens were affected, namely immediately after the 2011 earthquake and just after the 2019 Corona disaster.¹³⁹

Records going back thousands of years suggest that one of the factors that led people to donate was a religious imperative. As evidence that religion encourages charitable giving, CAF cites Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia, which have very high levels of national religious beliefs, ranking first, fourth and sixth respectively in a 10-year follow-up survey conducted in 126 countries in 2019.¹⁴⁰ Marcel Mauss wrote The Gift, in which he argued that the culture of gift-giving or reciprocal exchange was a universal phenomenon in all societies and a cornerstone of economic society, contributing to the development of ethnography and cultural anthropology. Mauss explored the cause of this universality, and the answer was sought in the system of obligations; "1. the obligation to offer", "2. the obligation to accept" and "3. the obligation to return".¹⁴¹ Adding to it, the fourth obligation as "4. the obligation to give to the gods or to people who represent the gods" was described by Maurice Godelier.¹⁴²

The roots of the obligation to give to the sacred in Japan are examined historically from the perspective of the ancient social structure: in 645, the Taika Reform restructured the political system of ancient Japan. Under this system, the function of the government, which united the officials responsible for administration, was to organise the people's clan

¹³⁸ Charities Aid Foundation, 'CAF World Giving Index 2022', 23.

¹³⁹ 寄付白書発行研究会 [Donation White Paper Publication Study Group], 寄付白書 2021 [Giving Japan 2021], 28.

¹⁴⁰ Charities Aid Foundation, 'CAF World Giving Index 10th Edition-Ten Years of Giving Trends-', 7.

¹⁴¹ Mauss, 贈与の文化論, [The Gift, Original title: Essai sur le don: forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques], 17.

¹⁴² Godelier, *The Enigma of the Gift*, 108–9.

deities according to a hierarchy.¹⁴³ In other words, unlike in Europe, where the sacred and the secular were dualised, the sacred and the secular with which people interacted were defined in a hierarchical way by the central government. The sense of sacredness of government institutions is still shared by the Japanese, who refer to the government as "the higher ($32 \pm$)".

Japan's first recorded tax system, '<sup> ${
m H}$ </sup>', may symbolise the Japanese sensitivity to giftgiving. This Tax was institutionalised from the primitive ritual of offering the first ears of rice to the gods of the land for a good harvest. The amount was as little as 3% of the harvest. ¹⁴⁴ A peculiarity of this tax was that the obligation to pay it was waived if there was a loss of more than 5% of the expected yield of the entire field. ¹⁴⁵ Another example: in medieval Japan, offerings to the gods were often written in the form of a request: 'If my wish is granted, I will give you this item/amount of money'. In other words, in Japan, the obligation to make an offering to a sacred object is interpreted as first ensuring that the sacred offering has been recieved from Gods and then returning an appropriate amount of money as showing appreciation. ¹⁴⁶ This differs from the European sense of contribution as service to God, discussed later.

The sense of making offerings to sacred nobles and 'rare people $(\ddagger n \land)'$ is characteristic. From ancient times to the present, it has been considered honourable to make one-sided offerings to emperors and shoguns, who are noble by blood. A foreigner who visited Japan during the Meiji era claimed in his notes that 'the most gratifying thing for the Japanese seems to see that we, foreigners, are pleased to receive a gift from them'.¹⁴⁷ The 'rare people' religious view in Japan means people from outside were a kind of god.¹⁴⁸ This can probably be interpreted as a desire to establish a relationship with a higher sacred being at the top of the sacred and secular ladder, and would be closely related to the first and fourth principles of the obligation to give written earlier, the

¹⁴³ Sato, 文学にあらわれた日本人の納税意識 [Japanese tax awareness as manifested in historic literature], 38.

¹⁴⁴ Sato, 56.

¹⁴⁵ Sato, 58.

¹⁴⁶ Sakurai, 贈与の歴史学, 72.

¹⁴⁷ Yuasa, *贈与の系譜学* [Genealogy of giving], 84.

¹⁴⁸ Yuasa, 82.

'obligation to dedicate', 'to the gods and those who represent the gods'. Related to this idea is a myth that is representative of the Japanese sense of the culture of giving.

Emperor Nintoku (仁徳天皇), the 16th emperor believed to have lived in the 5th century in Japan, known as the Holy Emperor. The main idea of his famous charity story of the hearth is as follows.¹⁴⁹

When the Holy Emperor found that the town houses had no smoke and the people were so poor that they could not even cook rice, he exempted the whole country from taxes for three years. During this time, the emperor wore poor clothes, ate poor food and left his palace leaking; after three years, seeing that the country had become rich, the emperor ordered a further three-year suspension of taxes in order to make the people richer. This allowed the people to increase their savings, and after taxes were normalised, the people volunteered to donate money and goods to the government and cooperate with public works projects such as repairing the imperial palace and building roads.

Emperor Nintoku's decision not to collect taxes can be interpreted as a large charitable donation to his entire territory. The people were grateful for the emperor's kindness and repaid his generosity by doing what each of them could when alms were given. The Emperor's reign was regarded as a sacred time and a model for future generations. This story is still quoted in the Japanese Diet today, especially when discussing tax increases.¹⁵⁰ Looking at the citizens' position from this point of view, we can see two elements that overlap with the contemporary elements of social constructivism that we have been discussing. The first is the sense that charitable acts beyond one's immediate environment should be carried out not by individuals but by acts of public governance. This means that support for distant objects, such as foreign countries, is the exclusive responsibility of government and has nothing to do with the general public. The second view is that good assistance means helping people to help themselves.

These trends are consistent with the CFA's findings that Japanese people's low participation in donation culture, particularly their tendency not to 'help strangers', is

¹⁴⁹ Wakai, 仁徳天皇: 煙立つ民のかまどは賑ひにけり [Emperor Nintoku: the smoky hearth of the people is bustling with activity], 7–14.

¹⁵⁰ Sugawara, '平林剛 | 参議院本会議発言(全期間)[Tsuyoshi Hirabayashi | House of Councillors Plenary Statements (Full Term)]'.

literally the lowest among 125 countries.¹⁵¹ The report that charitable donations only increased during the 2011 earthquake and the 2019 corona compared to other years¹⁵² also supports the interpretation of a interdependent donation culture, where people want to support issues that are close to them in the hope of future benefits and good relations with themselves.

In Japan's donation culture, there seems to be a tendency, partly due to the influence of polytheism, to 'give back' to each donor the blessings and favours that are felt in tangible ways, to the extent that individuals are able to do so. This is why Japanese donation culture is triggered when issues become raw and close to home, as in the case of the earthquake and the coronas, and when people feel the need to give back in their own circumstances. A good way to improve Japan's donation culture would be to make each Japanese person feel connected to the world they live in and the people they donate to. In other words, to make them aware that the act of donation is a personal contribution through something sacred or that potential donors have a tangible debt to the recipient.

In the ethical education of Japanese children, the emphasis is on not bothering others.¹⁵³ This passive morality contrasts with the ethos of helping others favoured by Westerners.¹⁵⁴ The concept of self-help support - structural support for eventual self-reliance - seems to have become a strong and clear code of assistance because it fits with the historical structure of the Japanese people since ancient times.

¹⁵³ INADA, 'コラム 53: 迷惑はかけてもいい [Column 53: It's okay to cause trouble]'. ¹⁵⁴ INADA.

¹⁵¹ Charities Aid Foundation, 'CAF World Giving Index 10th Edition-Ten Years of Giving Trends-', 15, 25.

¹⁵² 寄付白書発行研究会 [Donation White Paper Publication Study Group], 寄付白書 2021 [Giving Japan 2021], 28.

Idea for Japan's financial contribution to UN

The foregoing discussion has shown that the distinctive ideas regarding Japan's postwar contribution to the United Nations can be broadly categorised as follows

The "norm of giving back", which recognises the need to give something back in return for the financial assistance received in post-war reconstruction; the "norm of self-help", which recognises the importance of creating an environment in which people can stand up for themselves rather than being given something temporary, based on the successful experience of Japan being able to stand up for itself; and, above all, the "norm of peace", which directly distances itself from the military. Accountability to the public as a matter of national interest includes a focus on resource security and infrastructure development with the ultimate aim of improving Japan's economic trade and human resource development in Japan and the countries to be supported. Other Japanese values include a sense of security in choosing prominent donors and the importance of creating situations that avoids ultimately making others feel inconvenienced.

2.2 Germany and European Union




Figure 10, Social Constructivist Model in UN Crowd Funding of Europe, a part of Figure 5

Social structure of the European institution and Germany government development assistance funding to the UN

This sub chapter provides an overview of the historical formation process of the social construction behind EU and Germany's voluntary contributions to the UN and the resulting social construction today, the OECD Development Co-operation Profiles (2022) for numerical information, and qualitatively, European Consensus on Development (2017) and Europe Sustainable Development Report (2022) in EU, and Germany's Sustainable Development Strategy (2021) in Germany, and identifies the current social constructivist factors visible shared between EU and Germany. In this document, unless otherwise stated when referring to history, Germany refers to the Federal Republic of Germany. As is the theme of this paper, it is difficult to mention Europe in parallel because of its great internal diversity. For this reason, Germany will be discussed first and then the European characteristics shared with Germany will be described.

Historical structure of the German government and EU institutions

Compared to Japan, where ancient continuity is a still important part of national identity, the formation of the modern German government is clear. And modern Germany has always been with the history of the European Union. In post-war Germany, coming

to terms with the past of two devastating world wars and war crimes is an important foundation of national identity. And the European Union has served as an answer to the so-called German question or problem, which is a potential threat to Europe's central location, largest population, economic wealth and multiple wars.¹⁵⁵

After the unconditional surrender of the military on 8 May 1945, the German central government could no longer effectively exist and was dissolved ¹⁵⁶. The occupied territories were divided and governed by four countries: the USA, the USSR, the UK and France. In the liberal territories of the USA, the UK and France in the western part of the country, the former state-based local governments continued to exist and in 1949, following the ratification of a provisional constitution by the states, the so-called Federal Republic of Germany, West Germany, was established with Bonn as its capital. This was followed by the establishment of the so-called East German Democratic Republic under the leadership of the Communist Party in the Soviet-occupied territories. The full restoration of sovereignty as a unified German state had to wait until October 1990, when the five East German states joined the West German government. In the post-war Federal Republic of Germany, national security as a land border with the eastern regions, the loss of sovereignty and integration into East Germany remained the main goals of the state, and the weak position of limited sovereignty meant that international cooperation was still necessary. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was considered a provisional constitution when it was first adopted, but it is still in force today, with more than 60 amendments, as a law that fulfils all the requirements of a constitution¹⁵⁷. The social constructivist structure of Germany can be seen in this Basic Law. Article 1 on human dignity and human rights and the form of the state as republican and federal, and Article 20 confirming that the title is of national origin and that the right of resistance is a permanent clause and cannot be changed. Article 23 was a preparatory article in anticipation of German reunification, but was deleted after reunification, thus confirming the renunciation of former territories, mainly Polish Russia.¹⁵⁸ It was also replaced by a description of the promotion of the European Union and the partial transfer of German sovereignty with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, which expanded the Union

¹⁵⁵ Steininger, 'The German Question, 1945–95', 9–10.

¹⁵⁶ Steininger, 13.

¹⁵⁷ 'Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany'.

¹⁵⁸ Steininger, 'The German Question, 1945–95', 18.

from the EC to the EU in 1992. Today, Germany is undoubtedly the largest EU member state in terms of population and economy, as well as the centre of the EU, which is regarded as the engine of Europeanisation in normative terms.

The European Union began in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community, based on the Schuman Declaration, which aimed to create a new order through economic integration in Europe after the Second World War, the world's most devastating war, with France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries as the original member states, and to share control of resources. [This was followed in 1958 by the parallel creation of the European Economic Community, which promoted economic integration between member states through a customs union, and the European Atomic Energy Community, which aimed to integrate the management of nuclear energy. These institutions were merged in 1967 to form the European Communities, which became the European Union in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht. The European Union was established as a special structure, also referred to as an unprecedented sharing of sovereignty, through the original common market policy, the liberalisation of internal borders through the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the adoption of the Erasmus programme to promote student mobility in 1987, the monetary union since 1999, and the establishment of the European External Action Service as the implementing body of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 2009. The European Union was established as a special structure, also known as shared sovereignty, which is unprecedented in the history of the world.

The history of the European Union has many aspects, but one of them is as a solution to the so-called German problem. The German problem is defined as ¹⁵⁹ 1: The destabilisation of Germany with its huge economic, industrial and demographic power in the centre of Europe, which threatens the security of the whole of Europe. 2: The structural question of Germany's economic revival is an essential element in the reconstruction of Europe as a whole after the world wars; 3: Nevertheless, as a frontline country in the Cold War, Germany has been divided between East and West since the world wars, and as a reflection of these two world wars, solving the German question was one of the most important issues on the agenda of European diplomacy. Germany used the framework of the European Union to compensate for the territorial and military power

¹⁵⁹ Steininger, 10.

it had physically lost in the war in the form of economic markets and common security, and once again became the largest economic power on the continent. In its political process, the European Union takes into account the current situation and the will of its member states and builds consensus. As such, it is seen as a normative force that promotes the idea of Europe among member states and the Europeanisation of countries. The relationship between Germany and Europe, with its particularly strong interaction of influences, has led to an interaction known as 'the Europeanisation of Germany and the Germanisation of Europe'. ¹⁶⁰

The concept of complementary sovereignty characterises the two structures - the federal state of Germany and the European federation of states. Germam constitutionally, the Federation and the Länder are autonomous from each other, leaving to the Ländesr the legislative areas outside those defined in the Basic Law. The European Union also creates European law as an international law that transcends the member states, but only within the framework of the sovereignty that the member states have explicitly transferred to Europe. In other words, in contrast to the vertical division of power in Japanese society, the relationship between Europe, Germany as a member state and Germany as a local authority of a member state is a horizontal division of power.

Historical structure of German and European civil society

Civil society has a long history in Germany. It existed as a separate body from government in the pre-medieval period, before the country was divided into nation states. The word "Deutsch" originally comes from the Old Germanic word "Volk", meaning people. In other words, "Deutschland" means "land of the people". This is in contrast to the etymology of the name "Japan", which refers relatively to the east of the Chinese world as the origin of the country's self-proclaimed name, i.e. "land of the rising sun" (eastern country). The guild culture of the Middle Ages, particularly in Germany, established a self-governing society of craftsmen and merchants in the cities. This gave rise to the concept of mutual aid, which from the early modern period fostered civil society in the modern sense. The influence of church organisations, which were rooted in

¹⁶⁰ Higashino, '安全保障 [Security]', 42.

all regions apart from civil society, and the formation of the concept of charity in their philosophy, would also not be ignored.

The 19th century saw the emergence of the concept of the 'Bürgerlichkeit', in which social groups formed around the city's productive economic class and the professional and entrepreneurial teaching class, who shared a unique culture, way of life and value system. There was an orientation towards civic participation in the very modern sense of the term, where citizens at the city level were expected to set aside their private interests in solidarity and pursue the public good for the common prosperity 'Gemeinwohl' of the local community. The 19th century also saw the introduction of the system of voluntary positions 'Ehrenamt' in municipal administration, which by 1906 accounted for more than three-quarters of Prussia's civil service. The volunteers were mainly active in the poor services. They regularly visited poor families living in their district, determined the type, amount and duration of assistance they needed, and personally provided them with cityfunded help and advice on all aspects of life. The existence of a code with these principles at its core, also based on the Christian tradition of charity, promoted the Weimar Constitution, the most progressive in terms of social welfare at the time. In the era of fascism, the state was called upon to fund charitable projects. A charity called Winterhilfswerk des Deutschen Volkes, run by the Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda, operated by collecting donations from the population on an almost compulsory basis.

In post-World War II West Germany, the tradition of the principle of subsidiarity, according to which the sphere of the state should be limited to actions that cannot be handled by private organisations and individuals, and developed civil society and NGO organisations. When discussing German NGOs in terms of donations, it is important to note the influence of religious organisations. In Germany, there is a system whereby at least 8% of income is paid as church tax to religions, which are the traditional and continuous bearers of social welfare. Also, and perhaps because of this, regular charitable giving in Germany is heavily weighted towards sudden events, with disaster relief and humanitarian aid accounting for 76% of all donations in 2020, of which 38% went to international projects. It is also estimated that the share of charitable giving during the Christmas season is three times higher than in normal times. Civil society in Europe, including NGOs, has a history as diverse as the number of Member States and regions,

but they all have historical strengths compared to civil society in Japan. The size and expected role of NGOs in international cooperation in Germany and Europe is incomparably larger than in Japan. In 2021, the Japanese government spent \$227.8 million, or 0.5% of its international bilateral aid, on NGOs, while Germany spent \$2.2 billion, or 5%, on NGOs, and European governments spent \$2.8 billion, or 11.3% of their total bilateral aid. Here we can see a strong historical context of civil society and an expectation of a role for independent partnerships that are not vertically dependent on governments.

In addition, it is conceivable that Germans expect economic rationality in a more positive sense when it comes to the economic contribution of citizens through civil society, compared to Japan. In Germany, there is a public auditing body for the use of donations by NGOs, and society as a whole is structured in such a way that it is desirable that this expenditure should not go unpaid. Tax deduction schemes to encourage charitable giving are common in Western countries. In Germany, up to 20% of income can be deducted as a charitable deduction, while in Japan the system is larger, with up to 40% of income deductible as a charitable deduction. However, only 12% (one in eight) of Japanese citizens who had donated used the tax deduction system. This suggests that German citizens are more economically rational in their giving.

Historical structure of German and European ODA

Germany's post-war ODA history is in many ways similar to that of Japan, which also began as a defeated country. Economic aid from the United States of America and the Marshall Plan helped stabilise the German economy, and the 1950s saw economic cooperation to develop foreign trade, mainly through the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Foreign Office. By 1960 a total of DM 500 million had been spent on bilateral development aid and DM 400 million on multilateral development aid, but this was done on a project-by-project and ad hoc basis, as there was no unified policy or direction for development aid. In 1961, the Federal Ministry for Economic Development was established as the first European development ministry, with the aim of reflecting on past colonial policies and rationalising the experience of the European Marshall Plan. In the same year, 1961, it joined the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) together with Japan as a group of development donors, and in the 1970s it became a major donor to UN agencies, a position it still holds today. Germany's aid focuses mainly on the least developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, but with the enlargement of Europe, it also makes a significant contribution to the least developed and potential member states of the EU, and operates in tandem with the European Union's foreign policy. Like Japan, it formulates and implements development plans based on the UN SDGs. In its ODA, Germany has various systems of international cooperation, such as partnerships at government and civil society level, and partnerships between the European Union and the United Nations. The BMZ therefore emphasises centralised management and economically effective aid, which is difficult to assess in terms of transparency. As Germany has become a major destination for refugees, the reduction of poverty as a cause of refugees through development cooperation is also explicitly stated as a national interest.

The European Union, together with its member states, is also currently a major donor of ODA, having provided assistance mainly through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), starting with the Kurdish refugee crisis in 1993. Its assistance is guided by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and is based on the European development consensus, in particular the SDGs. It is characterised by its focus on assistance through a so-called neighbourhood foreign policy, which promotes European norms and institutions to potential member states with economic cooperation.

German Identity as Human Dignity

Germany's post-war identity is one of reflection on the past and reconstruction. Although the post-war period in Germany and Japan both began with the devastation of war, there were differences in scale and quality. After the destruction of the continent, known as the War of Annihilation, Germany experienced more than twice as many deaths of its citizens as Japan and the collapse of its central government. Moreover, the Holocaust, a war crime of unparalleled brutality, was an unprecedented bureaucratic crime committed by the government not only against foreigners but also against its own citizens, who were supposed to be protected. The defeats in the two world wars also marked the end of a long series of wars within Europe for Germany, while for Japan it was the first experience of defeat in modern times. This impact can be seen in the preamble to the German constitution, which states the determination to be "responsible to God and man". It also places absolute emphasis on human dignity and fundamental rights as the first basic article, whereas the Japanese Constitution places the status of the Emperor in Article 1. Germany's new beginning as a new country can also be seen in its approach to war crimes. The fact that the German government established the Nazi Persecution Centre in 1958 and continued to prosecute war crimes on its own initiative contrasts with the Japanese government, which immediately after the peace treaty came into force in 1952 granted amnesty and restored honour to all, including those who had been sentenced to death. After reflecting on its past history and re-emerging with a strong national identity based on the absoluteness of human rights and the responsibility to defend them, Germany today remains a force behind the ideals of the European Union.

European identity as Normative Power and that National Aid

European identity as a normative force refers to the ability of the European Union to influence other states and international actors on the basis of its shared values, principles and norms. It refers to the EU's ability to project its self-image and normative framework onto the international arena, shaping the world order and promoting its vision of governance, human rights and international relations. In particular, rule-making in line with European values, from digital policy to a new generation of challenges such as climate change, has become a force that is effectively enforced as international rules on other countries, underpinned by Europe's attractiveness as one of the world's largest free markets. In other words, Europe's identity is, and will remain, an entity that promotes free and democratic principles that are self-identified as universal throughout the world.

5P Principles

The principles explicitly shared by the German Sustainable Development Strategy and the EU Development Consensus are the five Ps: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership. It is a partnership of all relevant actors, including international organisations, states, civil society and business, that places the highest value on human dignity, addresses challenges not only in developing countries but also on a global environmental scale, seeks human development without poverty and inequality, and reduces conflict and builds peace. In other words, working together for sustainable development on a global scale is the principle and norm for Germany and Europe.

Numerical information on government contributions to the UN

Germany¹⁶¹

In terms of specific overall figures, Germany, unlike Japan, has continued to meet its international commitment of an economic contribution to ODA of 0.7% of GNI in 2016 and since 2020. Grants accounted for 85.8%, while 14.2% of Germany's ODA was mainly in the form of loans and other non-grant aid. The UN and other multilateral organisations accounted for 23.5% of this ODA, and of the remaining 76.5% as total bilateral ODA, 19.3% of the amount was channelled through multilateral organisations. The top three UN recipients of German aid were WFP (\$1427.1 million), UNICEF (\$908.5million) and UNDP (\$701.3 million).




Figure 11. German ODA volume, 2009-2022¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ OECD, 'Development Co-Operation Profiles: Germany'.

¹⁶² OECD.




Figure 12, German Bilateral and multilateral ODA allocations, 2009-2021¹⁶³





Figure 13, Top 10 UN recipient agencies from German ODA, 2021¹⁶⁴

 ¹⁶³ OECD.
 ¹⁶⁴ OECD.

European Union Institutions¹⁶⁵

The EU has the largest share of total ODA from EU agencies and Member States combined, and provides development cooperation in all regions and in all sectors. As for EU institution, grants accounted for 69.5%, while 30.5% of ODA was mainly in the form of loans and other non-grant aid. The UN and other multilateral organisations accounted only for 0.1% of this ODA, and of the remaining 99.9% as total bilateral ODA, 21.3% of the amount was channelled through multilateral organisations. The top three UN recipients of German aid were WFP (\$1427.1 million), UNICEF (\$908.5million) and UNDP (\$701.3 million).



Note: Data on ODA volumes (figure above) are in [USD] constant 2021 prices. Data for 2022 are preliminary. See the methodological notes for further details.

Figure 14. EU Institution's ODA volume, 2009-2022¹⁶⁶

 ¹⁶⁵ OECD, 'Development Co-Operation Profiles: European Union Institutions'.
 ¹⁶⁶ OECD.




Figure 15, EU Institution's Bilateral and multilateral ODA allocations, 2009-2021¹⁶⁷




Figure 16, Top 10 UN recipient agencies from EU Institution's ODA, 2021¹⁶⁸

 ¹⁶⁷ OECD.
 ¹⁶⁸ OECD.

Interpretation for the numerical information

The basic stance of Western aid is considered to be multilateral and grant-oriented to ensure stable provision without placing a burden on developing countries. In fact, even in the EU, which can be said itself a multilateral organisation, 24.3%, and 42.8% of Germany's aid are provided through the core or through a multilateral organisation, while Japan's is relatively low at 28%. In addition, the grant accounted for more than a majority of the total at 75.8% from Germany and 69.5% from EU, in contrast to only 41.7% from Japan.

The three main UN agencies to which contributions from are same, however, the fact that the Germany's largest contribution is to WFP compared to Japan, which largest contribution is to UNICEF, may be seen as an expression of a more urgent and poverty reduction-oriented national identity, with an emphasis on organisations providing food aid that has a direct impact on poverty reduction. Moreover, while Germany contributes more than USD 600 million and the EU more than USD 400 million to each of these three UN agencies, Japan contributes less than USD 350 million to UNICEF, which is the largest contribution target, and considering that Japan has a higher GDP compared to Germany, its voluntary contributions to UN agencies are relatively small. This contrasts Japan's unique position as a Western donor, with its focus on bilateral aid and loan-oriented approach, with the practice in Europe and Germany.

Modern structure of the German Government and EU position on contributions to the UN

The German Sustainable Development Strategy, the German government's latest position paper on development cooperation, and the EU's European Consensus on Development decode German and European values and interests in development cooperation with the UN. In these two documents, the words UN or SDGs appear on almost every page, indicating that development for Germany and Europe is inextricably linked to the UN and working with UN values.

In terms of national interests, in contrast to the Japanese Development Charter, Germany was described in more carefully chosen words, thus avoiding a clear statement of Germany's own direct national interests. However, with the exception of specific details such as pandemics and the Ukrainian crisis, the repeated statements of Germany's position

throughout the text were (i) poverty reduction and (ii) migration management and the creation of inclusive societies in Germany and in the countries it supports. Notably, the following statement at the beginning of Germany's principles for the SDGs is a clear expression of German values.¹⁶⁹

In particular, the following statement at the very beginning of the SDG principles in Germany clearly expresses German values. For the German Government, following the guiding principle of sustainable development means working towards its policies meeting the needs of today's and future generations – in Germany and in all parts of the world – and allowing them fulfilled lives of dignity. This requires economically efficient, socially equitable and environmentally sustainable development, its absolute outer boundaries set by the limits of our planet, combined with the objective of a life of dignity for all (meaning a life without poverty and hunger, and a life in which all people can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality)

Here Germany's historical and constitutional emphasis on a life in human dignity is clearly expressed as a life without poverty. It is the direct support of the urgent need to reduce poverty that is the meaning of development for Germany. On closer reading, Germany's position can also be seen in previous studies on tackling the root causes of irregular migration through poverty reduction. The European Consensus, which makes the position more explicit, refers to the root causes of refugees as follows

Migration, sustainable development and stability are strongly interlinked. The EU and its Member States are committed to coordinated action to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, such as conflicts, state fragility, insecurity and marginalisation, poverty, food insecurity, inequality and discrimination, and environmental degradation, including climate change. They will promote human rights and peoples' dignity, democracy-building, good governance and the rule of law, social inclusion and cohesion, economic opportunities with decent employment and through people-centred businesses, and policy space for civil society.¹⁷⁰

In other words, addressing the root causes of irregular migration is expressed as a direct

¹⁶⁹ 'German Sustainable Development Strategy - 2021 Update', 14.

¹⁷⁰ European Union, 'European Consensus on Development', 37.

European interest in many areas of European development assistance.

Germany's most principled position - the emphasis on poverty reduction and human dignity - appears in the European Consensus in the form of a more explicit statement of values. The subtitle of the European Consensus is "OUR WORLD, OUR DIGNITY, OUR FUTURE". The first and second clauses of the Consensus state that¹⁷¹

With the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its core, the 2030 Agenda is a transformative political framework to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development globally. It balances the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, including the key issues of governance and peaceful and inclusive societies, recognising the essential interlinkages between its goals and targets... The 2030 Agenda aims to leave noone behind and seeks to reach the furthest behind first... This approach, based on sustainable development and human rights, is fully consistent with EU values and principles. The 2030 Agenda and its 17 SDGs are universal and apply to all countries at all stages of development, based on national ownership and shared responsibility. Multistakeholder partnerships are key to the implementation of SDG.

Here, as in Germany, the main objective of achieving a sustainable society through poverty reduction and inclusion is directly stated. The statement that this should be achieved through partnerships between different actors, with national ownership, is in line with the federal history of social structures in Europe and Germany and the history of civil society involvement to date. The advocacy and dissemination of EU values in development is mentioned 20 times in the text. Here we can see the position that the dissemination of values is in Europe's own interest.

¹⁷¹ European Union, 3.

European culture of charitable donation

The concept of charitable giving by German citizens, who make up German civil society, shows that Germany tends to give more than the European average in international comparisons from the past to the present; according to a CAF study, German citizens ranked 20th out of 126 countries surveyed in terms of their donation¹⁷². It should also be noted that this ranking does not take into account church tax, which is a permanent compulsory charitable expense. Taking church tax into account, German citizens are the most generous on the continent, ahead of the Netherlands, which leads Europe and is the third most generous country in the world.¹⁷³ In this respect, the country is representative of Europe's Christian philanthropic culture.

As in Japan, the anthropological values of giving in continental Europe, with Germany as its geographical centre, are examined on the basis of Mauss's obligations associated with giving, and Maurice Godrier's fourth obligation. There, the story of the Holy Kings of Europe, which was socially shared as a good deed as a Christian value in history, is used as a case study to interpret.

Semitic religions tell the story of a single God who created all things, and a people bound to him by a one-to-one covenant of faith who await judgement on the Day of Judgment.¹⁷⁴ Particularly characteristic of Western Christianity is the belief that Christ, the Redeemer, atoned for man's original sin by offering himself to God. The belief that Christ was man's saviour, the God-man and God himself was at the heart of shared European values.¹⁷⁵

In each Gospel, Christ emphasises the direct relationship between God and man, and the need to move away from worldly human interactions and to love and forgive others in relationship with Almighty God.¹⁷⁶ This is symbolised in the commandments to 'show no man as fasting, but show yourselves to your Father who is in secret, and your Father who sees in secret will reward you openly' and to 'love your enemies and bless those who curse you'. In Christianity, the fourth obligation, gift-giving, can be interpreted as the

¹⁷² Charities Aid Foundation, 'CAF World Giving Index 10th Edition-Ten Years of Giving Trends-', 23.

¹⁷³ Mitchell, 'In Western European Countries With Church Taxes, Support for the Tradition Remains Strong'.

¹⁷⁴ Woodhead, *Christianity*, 26.

¹⁷⁵ Woodhead, 32.

¹⁷⁶ Yuasa, 贈与の系譜学 [Genealogy of giving], 72–74.

continuous offering of one's whole being to God the Creator through the act of Christ, the God-man and God Himself, in order to pay off an enormous and unpayable debt and in anticipation of His second coming at the Last Judgment.

In the historical social structure of Western Europe since Christianity, or characteristic of the Christian world, two powers, sacred and secular, dominated society through the existence of the Church, the monotheistic medium of Christ's mercy. From the point of view of the people, there were two separate tax relationships, one obligatory to give gifts to the lords and the other as a sacred contribution to the Church.¹⁷⁷ Wealthy people, especially those with money to spare, were in the habit of making donations through the Church when a charitable need arose, even if it was for a stranger. In terms of the obligation to donate, this could be interpreted as an act of spiritual charity in which Christians made an offering to God, assuming a great debt of gratitude to God as a monotheist and a return of great future blessings. An example of Christian charity is the Christmas carol 'Wenceslas is a good king'.¹⁷⁸

King Wenceslas is Wenceslas I, Duke of Bohemia. The main meaning of the lyrics is as follows. On a holy winter's day, the good Christian King Wenceslas looks out from his castle lookout. Seeing a poor farmer gathering winter fuel in the distance, the king feels sorry for the farmer's holiday of misery and decides to go to him with his entourage to offer him a gift of goodwill. In a snowstorm that makes it difficult to walk, Page advises the king to give up, but the king cheers up and encourages Page to follow in his footsteps. The king, however, encourages him to perk up and follow in his footsteps. Page discovers the miracle of warmth by following in the footsteps of the holy king. Those who follow in the footsteps of the saint and give alms to the poor can be happy themselves.

Following the example of Christ the Saint, giving alms to a stranger is more than a gift to that stranger, it is an act of offering to something sacred, namely God. Therefore, Christians should give charity without distinction, even to people they have never met. Charity is something that each person, whether king or citizen, does in his or her own way and as a matter of self-evaluation.

The fact that citizens of secularised Western European countries such as Germany

¹⁷⁷ Daunton, '1. Introduction', 1–2.

¹⁷⁸ Odložilík, 'Good King Wenceslas', 121–24.

and the Netherlands still voluntarily donate to national and international charities, as well as to environmental causes, can be attributed to the deep internalisation of this Christian concept of giving. Research on religion suggests that even the descendants of secularised Western Christian societies have much to answer for.¹⁷⁹ It has been suggested that one of the pathologies of contemporary Western citizens is their shared and ever-increasing sense of exaggerated remorse for past actions, such as the environmental destruction caused by industrialisation and imperialist aggression, especially the Second World War for Germany.¹⁸⁰

In Western charitable culture, under the influence of Christianity as a monotheistic, secular, dualistic religion, the individual is in a one-to-one relationship with God the Creator and contributes to others, including in the unseen and distant realms, in the context of repaying an enormous debt to God and expected future favours. Even in secularised societies, patterns of thought shaped by this religious culture may be at work. From this it is possible to see the pursuit of ideals as the European norm and the belief in the universality of European values as its flip side, which can be rooted in the social constructivist arguments made in this study. This can be seen as the roots of a strong confidence from the past that the spread of European values would mean the spread of civilisation, and of civic values that are strongly oriented towards more direct help than more self-help, especially in contributing to the more urgent need to prevent poverty.

¹⁷⁹ Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe*, 142.

¹⁸⁰ Murray, 146.

Idea for German and European financial contribution to UN

From the above discussion, the distinctive German perspective on the European contribution to the post-war United Nations can be broadly categorised as follows.

'Norms of human dignity' to take responsibility for and break with a past of crimes against human dignity; 'poverty eradication norms' to act directly on those most at risk; and multi-layered 'partnership norms' that include civil society, including NGOs and local authorities, and any other actors. Accountability to the public as a matter of national interest could include foreign aid as a root cause of the migration problem and the diffusion of European values per se. The values of European citizens could also be seen as inclusive social commitment to uphold human rights and a financially efficient orientation.

Chapter conclusion

So far we have described, albeit diffusely, the social structures of Japan and German Europe in terms of their economic contributions and their relationship to the UN, and we have articulated and proposed the normative attitudes and identities that have emerged from these structures. Social constructivist factors consisting of these norms and identities interact with each other. It remains to be seen whether these invisible social contextual factors derived from previous research can be confirmed in the material agents, the citizens. In Chapter 3, we use the methodology of cross-cultural psychology to examine whether some of the multiple factors identified in Chapter 2 can be said to be particularly salient in practice.

3. Test the relationship between social structure and citizens' motivation to donate.

The main objective of this experiment is to ascertain whether national and international constructivist factors are shared as psychological factors within each culture by individual citizens.

3.1 Design and preparation

Prepare copyright-free photos related to the five content areas highlighted by Germany and Japan respectively in relation to development assistance, with the UN symbol and a simple catchphrase in line with the hypothesis. As far as the tagline is concerned, it should be in English in order to control the language factor. For the images, either (1) different photos are placed and the same catch copy is placed, or (2) the same photos are placed and catch copy are changed. (See Attachment 1, 4 and 5)

In psychology, the independent variable ¹⁸¹, psychological or environmental factors, are hypothesised as the cause of the dependent variable, the observed results, or in this study, the results of the questionnaire responses, to check whether the formula is statistically significant or not.¹⁸² If the independent variable does not have the effect as hypothesised, or if the factor of the extraneous variable is large, it is rejected as not producing a statistically significant result.¹⁸³¹⁸⁴ The assumption that there is more than a 95% chance that the hypothesis is false is called the null hypothesis¹⁸⁵, and the rejection of the null hypothesis is interpreted as statistically significant support for the original hypothesis.¹⁸⁶

Furthermore, in psychological testing, it is not possible to state the correct factor that determines the validity of hypothesis. It is possible that other factors could influence

¹⁸¹ American Psychological Association, 'Independent Variable (IV)'.

¹⁸² American Psychological Association, 'Hypothesis Testing'.

¹⁸³ 'Research Hypothesis'.

¹⁸⁴ American Psychological Association, 'Significance Testing'.

¹⁸⁵ American Psychological Association, 'Null Hypothesis'.

¹⁸⁶ 'Understanding P-Values and Statistical Significance'.

it, but by clearly leaving falsifiability as a scientific framework, it will stand up to future validation by scientists.¹⁸⁷ In this experiment, the statistical significance is questioned by assuming that each of the social constructivist factors found in the previous chapter is represented by the created image containing the catch copy.

Purpose

In this section, a cross-cultural psychological study of each culture's propensity to donate to UN agencies was conducted with Japanese and European (particularly German) citizens, with their respective background factors, to determine whether there are behavioural differences consistent with the social constructivist explanations outlined in section 4.

Hypothesis

The following hypotheses were made and tested for the European group (including the German group) and the Japanese group. Each hypothesis was presented to subjects in the form of a pair of crowdfunding campaign web pages comprising themes comprising current social constructive factors and donation motives.

Citizens with a European (especially German) cultural background would prefer crowdfunding campaigns with the following phrases;

- Q1: We are responsible in the history. Let's move forward for new generations!
- Q2: Experts knowledge and skill maximise Your Donation's Impact
- Q3: Minutes Make Lives
- Q4: Our civil community, NGO, operates the project!
- Q5: Each Donation for Each Life
- Q6: No one should be denied their Human Rights
- Q7: Good support will Stop Refugee Movement
- Q8: Let's expand the area of Freedom, Security and Justice
- Q9: Build sustainable communities to include people, with your donation!

¹⁸⁷ 'Research Hypothesis'.

- Q10: Donations for Peacebuilders
- Q11: Help improve agricultural technology to end hunger (With wheat fields and bread image)
- Q12: Let's bring back the beauty of nature (With green energy image)

Citizens with a Japanese cultural background would prefer images with the following taglines;

- Q1: In our grandparents' time, Recovery from War Started with Foreign Aid
- Q2: Mechanisms to monitor corruption Ensure that All of your donations are used in the field.
- Q3: Trigger their Self-Help
- Q4: United Nations operates the project!
- Q5: They made donation. Be a part of the movement!
- Q6: Let's help build societies that value Human Rights
- Q7: Good support will Create Future Friends for your country!
- Q8: Your donation will be used to build the infrastructure to export resources to your country
- Q9: Build education for people to stand up, with your donation!
- Q10: Your donation will Never be used for Military Purposes
- Q11: Help improve agricultural technology to end hunger (With Paddy and rice image)
- Q12: Let's bring back the beauty of nature (With Sea image)
- Q13:

These questions are presented in a random order and rearranged. The presentation is also adjusted so that the images of each hypothesis are half and half on the left and right. See Appendix 1 for the page order and left-right position of the pairs presented to the subjects.

The above hypothesis will be confirmed by the answers to the question "If you had $\notin 9$ to donate, which campaign/organisation would you donate the money to and to what extent?" The significant difference predicted by this hypothesis is that the cultural difference between Japan and Europe or Germany, the between-subjects factor as an

independent variable, will allocate more points to the side of the page that each group is assumed to prefer, the within-subjects factor as the dependent variable, meaning that there will be a significant interaction between the two factors.

In addition, the hypothesis shall be confirmed that, as a supporter of UN agencies, people are more likely to support the organisation with the highest percentage of news agenda in each culture, i.e. UNHCR for refugee aid in Europe and UNICEF for education aid for 'human development' in Japan.

Background of this Hypothesis

The hypotheses were developed by reflecting the current constructivist factors related to the motives of the Japanese group and the European group, including the German group, to donate to the UN, which have been analysed in the previous chapters, as their national norm and national identities consisting of national interests and national values. The aim of this survey is to determine whether or not the actual existence of the constructivist factors and the trends in the results of the analysis are significantly real in terms of the trends in the psychological motivational factors of citizens to donate.

Hypotheses Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, and Q6 verbalise the differences in norms on UN-related donations in the relationship between the respective governments and citizens. Hypotheses Q7 and Q8 verbalise the findings in the previous chapter on UN donations as a national interest. Q9 and Q10 described in simple differences the values in each country regarding contributions to international cooperation through the UN. Q11 and Q12 were not directly related to the social constructivist factors in this study, but were created as dummy questions to check whether the experiment showed statistically significant differences in the apparent cultural tendencies in each of the groups with Japanese and European culture as background factors.

In terms of social norms, Q1 confirms the preference for the necessity of donation as a general trend, including religious values. The Japanese group articulated the norm of reciprocity, while the European group articulated the norm of giving back for Christian sin as their responsibility.

As Q2, the accountability preference for money transfers, the European group assumed a preference for the invested money to be managed more effectively, while the Japanese group assumed a norm of greater preference for donated funds to reach as many sites as possible without indirect costs. As Q3, the European group emphasised support to overcome current and emerging difficulties, while the Japanese group emphasised giving as a priming mechanism to encourage self-help by recipients. Q4 It was hypothesised that people in European societies would act on the basis of the existence of a more active civil society, whereas in Japan there is a social construction that places more trust in the UN as a public institution. The phrase in Q5 emphasises the high value placed on the behaviour of the individual donor as a factor affecting the European group, while the other emphasises the follower aspect of the act of giving as a factor affecting the Japanese group. In Q6 it was hypothesised that with regard to the civic understanding of the concept of human rights, one of the fundamental values defended by the UN, the European group prefers an image that emphasises its natural law status as an inalienable right, while the Japanese group prefers an image that emphasises its moral aspect, that it should be more respected.

As points Q7 and Q8, we identified distinct cultural differences in donors' perceptions of the benefits of donating in the context of crowdfunding campaigns. In Q7, donors' position was linked to the migrant crisis that Europeans have faced in the recent past, reminding donors that they could become potential refugees if the situation is not changed. On the other hand, as an appeal to the Japanese people, we appealed that the beneficiaries could become future fans of the donor's culture. Q8 appealed on the one hand to European values of a free and fair society and the contribution to the spread of these values, and on the other hand to the specific benefit content of direct economic benefits for companies and people in the donor countries. With regard to Q9, which affirms the values, it is assumed that the European group will focus on supporting the development of sustainable communities as an approach to people whose human rights are at risk, while the Japanese society, which emphasises self-help and related, will focus on human capital empowerment, which mainly means educating the individual. Q10 In terms of the implications of achieving peace, we hypothesised that the European group would focus on peacebuilding per se, while the Japanese group would focus on nonmilitary aspects related to support.

To confirm the significance of this experiment, a dummy question Q11 contrasted wheat, a staple food familiar to Europeans, with rice, a staple food familiar to Japanese. Similarly Q12, the European group was asked about clean energy and the Japanese group was asked about protecting the marine environment, both of which are often associated with green aid.

With the exception of the dummy question, most of these hypotheses also confirm previous cross-cultural psychological differences in cultural self-perceptions. With one exception, Q9, which hypothesis that the norms of Japanese society, which emphasise 'self-help', which related with human capital empowerness, as a value, foster values that promote personal protection and empowerment on an individual basis, whereas the preferences of the European group favour the existence of an independent self-view, whereas the preferences of the Japanese group favour the existence of an interdependent self-view. This reflects the publicly documented explanation that the norms of Japanese society, which emphasise 'self-help' as a value, foster values that promote and support the sustainability of the (potential refugee-generating) communities themselves in Europe. This question confirms the possibility that currently constructed social factors may outweigh preferences based on the existence of a cultural self-understanding as a factor of the human mind, viz.

3.2 Implementation

Methods

The results of the responses to the stimuli on the questionnaire developed under the hypotheses in this chapter were reviewed and analysed for statistical significance using analysis of variance with culture (nationality group affiliation) as the main factor.

Participants

Fifty six students were recruited voluntarily from Erasmus Mundus Master of Arts: Eurocultre course and 23 Japanese citizen with undergraduate degree. During recruitment, it was emphasised that participation in the survey was entirely voluntary and could be stopped or withdrawn at any time before or during the survey. They consisted of 40 European Euroculture students (10 males, 30 females, and 25.1 ± 3.24 years-old, range: 22-36), including 10 German students (2 males, 8 females, and 24.9 ± 1.37 yearsold, range: 23-27), and 16 Non European Euroculture students (4 males, 11 females and 1 other, and 25.2 ± 2 . 16 years-old, range: 22-30), and 23 Japanese students (10 males, 13 females, and 29.7 \pm 3.24 years-old, range: 22-34) served as participants in the experiment. The decision to be inside or outside Europe was based on a self-assessment of whether or not the application process and tuition fees fell within the Euroculture criteria, which vary depending on whether or not the applicant holds an EU/EEA passport.¹⁸⁸ In order to match the participants with the Euroculture group, all of whom were postgraduate students, the Japanese group was limited to those who had completed a bachelor's degree or were in the process of graduating (had earned credits and submitted a thesis, but had not yet graduated for procedural reasons). In addition, the Japanese group was recruited with less than one year of cumulative experience abroad. With these controls, it was expected that the differences in response as a result of the experiment would be concentrated in Japanese and European cultural factors. Informed consent forms, based on the approval of the Ethics Committee of the University of Groningen (CETO)¹⁸⁹,

¹⁸⁸ 'Tuition Fees'.

^{189 &#}x27;Ethics and Research'.

application ID 95323889: Appendix 2, were distributed for participation in the experiment and all participants gave their consent. And then, the instruction was given in English to European subjects and in Japanese to Japanese subjects. (See the informed consent form and instructions in Appendix 3, 4 and 5). As main survey, participants were requested to fill in the short questionnaire in order to be identified basic background information (as for the detail questions, see Appendix 4 and 5). Participants were informed at the time of consent that their responses would be pseudonymised and statistically processed in a format where individuals would not be identified in the study results. As part of the main study, participants completed a questionnaire to obtain basic cultural background information and donation preferences.

Material Stimuli

An image of a mock digital crowdfunding page with catch copies was prepared on the questionnaire, as shown in the image below. There were 12 sets of mock digital crowdfunding pages, each with the relevant UN agency logo next to the UN logo. The images and logos were employed from the copyright-free websites¹⁹⁰. A list of these can be found in the appendix 1. The catch copies were written in plain English by the authors on the basis of the hypothesis. The 12 pairs of images were presented in the order in which they were presented using a random function in Excel. In addition, the pictures that were thought to be preferred by the European and Japanese groups were rearranged so that the number of pictures on each side was equal. (See Appendix 1).

¹⁹⁰ 'Vector Logos, PNG Images, Templates Free Download'; 'Free Vector Logos - AllVectorLogo.Com'; 'IStock'; 'Pixabay'.

Q1: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.



Figure 17. Stimuli example of the mock UN crowdfunding webpage

Apparatus

The survey was conducted using a paper questionnaire or an online questionnaire via Qualtrics¹⁹¹, a statistical research software package with an official comprehensive contract from the University of Groningen.

In the paper presentation, the picture stimuli were presented in an A4 colour copy, separate from the questionnaire with the answer section. In the online questionnaire, they were presented on the same page as the answer section (See Appendix 4 and 5).

In terms of language, the same English was used for all stimuli presented. However, the questions about cultural background were based on English, while Japanese was also used in the Qualtrics survey, which was completed by Japanese respondents.

Period and Place

Responses to the questionnaire were made between 27 June and 9 July 2023. For the paper questionnaire, it was conducted at Palacký University Olomouc, where the summer

¹⁹¹ 'Qualtrics XM - Experience Management Software'.

school for first-year students of the Master of Arts: Euroculture¹⁹² course takes place. The online forms were distributed in direct communication via the author's social network.

Missing Data

Apart from the 79 people who completed the questionnaire, 6 people from the M.A. Euroculture group and 3 people from the Japan group were excluded from the collected questionnaires. These questionnaires were not included in the analysis because they did not sign the consent form, did not answer the questions or did not follow the instructions for the questions to be analysed.

Analysis

Differences in cumulative scores for each unit of the picture page stimulus based on norms, interests, values and dummy hypotheses were calculated for each participant. In addition, the presence or absence of significant differences for each stimulus unit was determined. Each culture was used as the independent variable for the between-subjects factor, and the dependent variable for the analysis of variance (ANOVA) was the participants' assignment of a score between 0 and 9 to each stimulus. Each culture was first analysed at three levels: the Euroculture European group, the Euroculture non-European group and the Japanese group. As several significant differences were found there, they were analysed again at the three levels of the Euroculture German group, the Japanese group and the other groups to see if the dependent variable showed any cultural differences, especially between German nationals within the European group and Japanese. Analyses were conducted using HAD 18.0, (Shimizu, Murayama & Daibou 2006).

¹⁹² 'Euroculture'.

3.3 Results

Regarding the differences for the cumulative stimulus unit, an analysis of variance of the cumulative scores for the respective within-group stimuli for hypotheses Q1~Q6 on norms, Q7 and Q8 on interests, Q9 and Q10 on values, and dummy questions Q11 and Q12 showed significant differences between the Japanese and European groups for normative stimuli, and significant trends for hypotheses on interests and value. However, while the hypothesised difference in preference scores was found for norms and values, only the interest stimuli, Q7 and Q8, showed a preference trend opposite to that hypothesised. Looking at the specific stimuli, significant differences were found between the European and Japanese groups by culture for Q1 and Q3 of the normative image groups Q1-6, Q7 of the interests hypotheses Q7 and Q8, and Q9 of the values hypotheses Q9 and Q10. These significant differences in preference trends led to the hypothesised preference trends between the European and Japanese groups, except for interest Q7 on supporting for refugee sources. The same hypothesised significant differences were also found in the analysis of variance for the Japanese, German and other groups. For questions Q11 and Q12 as dummies, no significant differences were found in specific stimulus units, although the preference trends were as hypothesised for each. Overall, no significant differences were found by age and recognition of the role of the UN.

These analyses were designed to confirm the existence of factors other than the cultural difference hypothesis in image judgments, with cultural difference, gender difference, and each person's recognition of the role of the UN as between-subjects factors for the cumulative scores of the Norm, Interest, Value, and Dummy stimulus groups, and the allocation of cumulative scores to each stimulus set as a within-subjects factor. This was confirmed in a four-factor mixed design ANOVA with the allocation of cumulative scores to each stimulus set as a within-subjects factor. As indicated in the previous paragraph, a significant main effect was found for the allocation of points to the stimulus set, and a significant interaction between cultural difference and allocation of points to the stimulus set was found for all stimulus groups. In this case, Norm and Value showed differences in the distribution of scores as hypothesised (e.g. higher scores for the European group for images they were expected to prefer). However, the distribution of scores for Interest was opposite to the hypothesised result. In addition, a significant interaction between gender differences and the allocation of scores to the stimulus set was only found for Norm as an unhypothesised result. In particular, as no interactions were found for

recognition of the role of the UN and no three-factor interactions of the stimulus set factors with gender and cultural differences. Therefore, the analysis of variance was limited to the two factors of cultural differences and allocation of scores for the stimulus set in the analysis of the individual stimulus groups within Norm, Interest, Value and Dummy.

Results of the Norm Stimulus Cumulative Total

The results of a four-factor mixed design ANOVA with allocation to each stimulus set from Q1 to Q6 as a within-subjects factor, culture (Euroculture European group, Euroculture non-European group and Japanese group), gender differences and recognition of the UN role as between-subjects factors are shown below. The number of subjects who chose 'other' for gender (1 subject), 'Rule of Law' (3 subjects) and 'Development' (2 subjects) for recognition of the UN role was considerably smaller than the total number of subjects in the sample. 6 subjects were therefore excluded from the test, leaving a total of 73 subjects as the population.

The results of the analysis of variance on the cumulative scores of the normative image groups showed that the main effect of the allocation difference (variable name Norm) was significant [F(1,61) = 31.79, p < .001, partial η d2 = .34]. In an interaction between this allocation difference and gender [F(1,61) = 4.63, p = .035, partial η d2 = .07], and in an interaction with culture difference [F(2,61) = 4.04, p = .022, $\eta d2 = .12$]. (see Table N-1).

Table N-1: 4-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages												
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value			
Norm	2498.980	2498.980	78.617	.343		31.787	1	61	.000 ***			
Gender*Norm	363.777	363.777	78.617	.071		4.627	1	61	.035 *			
UNRole*Norm	8.805	8.805	78.617	.002		0.112	1	61	.739			
Group*Norm	635.644	317.822	78.617	.117		4.043	2	61	.022 *			
Gender*UNRole*Norm	123.303	123.303	78.617	.025		1.568	1	61	.215			
Gender*Group*Norm	116.288	58.144	78.617	.024		0.740	2	61	.482			
UNRole*Group*Norm	113.089	56.544	78.617	.023		0.719	2	61	.491			
Gender*UNRole*Group*Norm	117.248	58.624	78.617	.024		0.746	2	61	.479			
							note.+<	.10,*<.05,	**<.01,***<.00			





Figure N-1

Main effect of mean allocation to stimuli. The cumulative allocation to the normative image hypothesised to be preferred by the European group (variable name NormEU) was significantly higher than the cumulative allocation to the image hypothesised to be preferred by the Japanese group (variable name NormJP). (see Table N-1).





Females scored significantly higher on the cumulative allocation normEU for images hypothesised to be preferred by the European group, whereas males scored significantly higher on the cumulative allocation normJP for images hypothesised to be preferred by the Japanese group. (see Table N-1-1).




Figure N-1-1

European group (variable name Eu-Eu) distributed significantly more points in the cumulative allocation NormEU to images hypothesised to be preferred by the European group, and Japanese group (variable name Jp) distributed significantly more points in the cumulative allocation NormJP to images hypothesised to be preferred by the Japanese

group. Although significant interactions were found between the Japanese group and the European group, and between the Japanese group and the non-Eurocultural European group, no interaction was found between the European group and the non-Eurocultural European group within Euroculture. (see Table N-1-2).

	Table N-1-2: Post-hoc	Culture	interaction o	f 4-WAY A	AMOVA in	Normative pag	ges	
Multiple comparisons	(Adjustment me	ethod = H	olm method	Main p -value .020 *				
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value Ad	djusted p
Jp - Eu-Eu	4.694	1.916	0.901	8.488	2.450	122	.016	.047 *
Jp - Eu-3	6.400	2.685	1.086	11.714	2.384	122	.019	.037 *
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	1.706	2.508	-3.260	6.671	0.680	122	.498	ns
						note	e.+<.10,*<.0)5,**<.01,***<.001

A three-factor mixed design ANOVA was then conducted with culture (three groups: Japanese group, German group and others, with 10 German group members as an independent group from Euroculture) and gender as between-subjects factors and stimulus set scores as a within-subjects factor. As recognition of the role of the UN, for which no interaction was found, was excluded as a factor in the analysis, the population was 78 subjects, including 5 subjects who selected recognition of the UN in Development and The Rule of Law, while one other subject in Gender remained excluded.

The results of the analysis of variance on the cumulative scores of the normative image groups showed that the main effect of the difference in allocation was significant [F(1,72) = 41.82, p < .001, partial η d2 = .37]. The interaction with the between-subjects factor was significant only for the cultural difference (the variable name for the cultural difference that made Germany independent of the Euroculture Europe group in the previous analysis is JpGeCompe). [F(2,72) = 5.48, p < .01, η d2 = .13] (see Table N-2).

	Table N-2: 3-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages												
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2 95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value					
Norm	3160.076	3160.076	75.558	0.367	41.823	1	72	.000 ***					
JpGeCompe*Norm	827.705	413.853	75.558	0.132	5.477	2	72	.006 **					
Gender*Norm	47.595	47.595	75.558	0.009	0.630	1	72	.430					
JpGeCompe*Gender*Norm	313.550	156.775	75.558	0.054	2.075	2	72	.133					
						note.+<.	10,*<.05,*	**<.01,***<.001					




Figure N-2

The German group (variable Eu-Eu-Ge) allocated significantly more points to the images that the European group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation NormEU, while the Japanese group (variable Jp) allocated significantly more points to the images that the Japanese group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation NormJP. Significant interactions were found between the Japanese group and the German group, and between the Japanese group and the other groups, but no interaction was found between the German group and the other groups. (see Table N-1-2).

18	ible N-2-2: Post-floo	Culture	interaction of	J-WAI F	AMOVAILL	Normauve pag	ges	
Multiple comparisons	(Adjustment m	ethod = H	lolm method)		Ν	1		
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower9	5%Upper	t value	DF	p-value Ad	justed p
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	8.301	2.752	2.861	13.741	3.016	144	.003	.009 **
Jp - Other	3.932	1.657	0.657	7.206	2.373	144	.019	.038 *
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-4.369	2.641	-9.590	0.851	-1.654	144	.100	ns
						note	+ < 10 * < 0	5.**<.01.***<.001

Results for each normative stimulus

This section describes the results of a two-factor analysis of variance (N=79) for each individual hypothesised group of images from Q1 to Q6, with Japanese-European cultural differences as the between-subjects factor and allocation to the stimuli as the within-subjects factor.

In addition, differences in allocation to the Japanese, German and other groups were identified. The greater the number of factors, the larger the sample size required to obtain psychometrically accurate results. As the sample size of the German group was relatively small (10 participants), the significance level of each group was checked using the method of T-test (one-factor analysis of variance) without correspondence for each stimulus, as a reference result in comparison with the results for the Japanese group, the European group and the Euroculture non-European group.

Hypothesis 1: Norms on Necessity of donation

A significant interaction was found between the European and Japanese groups. There was a preference for pages that supported the hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: We are responsible in the history. Let's move forward for new generations!

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Our grandparents' time, Recovery from War Started with Foreign Aid


A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q1) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was significantly higher [F(1,76) = 4.81, p]= .03, $\eta d2 = .06$]. A significant interaction effect was also found in the difference in pages preferences across cultures [F(2,76) = 3.89, p = .03, $\eta d2 = .09$]. The mean scores for the preferences of each cultural group showed a significant difference towards the hypotheses, with significant differences between Europeans and Japanese [t = 2.77, Adjusted p = .02,d = 1.96]. (See Table N-Q1-1, N-Q1-2 and Figures Q1-1 and Q1-2).

		Table	N-Q1-1:2	-way am	OVA in Noi	rmative pages				
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	<i>p</i> -value	
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76		
Q1	70.086	70.086	14.544	.060		4.819	1	76	.031	*
Group*Q1	113.054	56.527	14.544	.093		3.887	2	76	.025	*
							note.+<.10	,*<.05,***	<.01,***<.(001

Table N-01-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Norm

Multiple compar	r (Adjustment m	nethod = H	lolm method	l)		Main p-value	.023	3 *
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p
Jp - Eu-Eu	1.958	0.706	0.563	3.352	2.774	152	.006	5 .019 *
Jp - Eu-3	1.033	0.878	-0.702	2.767	1.176	152	.241	ns
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	0.925	0.798	-0.651	2.501	1.160	152	.248	3 ns
						not	te.+<.10,*	<.05,**<.01,***<.00

Table N-Q1-2: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages





Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment between European and Japanese, significant differences to support the hypothesis were found between German and Japanese [t = 2.63, Adjusted p = .03, d = 1.96]. (See Table N-Q1-3, Figures Q1-3)

		Ta	ble N-Q1-3:	Culture in	teraction o	of T Test		
Multiple compar He	olm method					Main <i>p</i> -value	.002	**
Type of Test I	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	2.683	1.019	0.652	4.713	2.631	76	.010	.031 *
Jp - Other	1.478	0.687	0.109	2.847	2.151	76	.035	ns
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-1.204	0.939	-3.075	0.666	-1.282	76	.204	ns




Figure Q-1-3

Hypothesis 2: Norms on accountability

No significant differences were found to support this hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Experts knowledge and skill maximise Your Donation's Impact

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Mechanisms to monitor corruption Ensure that All of your donations are used in the field.

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q2) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was significantly higher [F(1,76) = 4.28, p = .04, $\eta d2 = .05$]. The mean scores of the preferences for each cultural group showed a relatively opposite trend to the hypotheses, but were not significantly different. (See Table N-Q2-1, Figures Q2-1 and Q2-2)

Table N-Q2-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages

Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	<i>p</i> -value	
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76		
Q2	48.938	48.938	11.434	.053		4.280	1	76	.042	*
Group*Q2	16.363	8.181	11.434	.018		0.716	2	76	.492	
							note.+<.10	,*<.05,**•	<.01,***<.0)01




Figure Q2-1




Figure Q-2-2

Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment, no significant differences were found, although mean scores were obtained that were opposite to the hypotheses. (See Table N-Q2-2, Figures Q2-3)

Table N-Q2-2: Culture interaction of T Test

Multiple compar	Holm method					Main p-value	.366	5	
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p	
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	-1.065	0.904	-2.866	0.735	-1.178	76	.242	2 ns	
Jp - Other	-0.630	0.610	-1.844	0.584	-1.034	76	.304	l ns	
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	0.435	0.833	-1.224	2.093	0.522	76	.603	s ns	




Figure Q-2-3

Hypothesis 3: Norms on preference for support purposes

A significant interaction was found between the European and Japanese groups. There was a preference for pages that supported the hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Minutes Make Lives

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Trigger their Self-Help

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q3) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was significantly higher [F(1,76) = 20.78, p< .001, $\eta d2 = .22$]. A significant interaction effect was also found in the difference in pages preferences across cultures $[F(2,76) = 5.02, p < .01, \eta d2 = .12]$. The mean scores for the preferences of each cultural group showed a significant difference towards the hypotheses, with significant differences between Europeans and Japanese [t = 3.11,Adjusted p < .01, d = 1.79]. (See Table N-Q3-1, N-Q3-2 and Figures Q3-1 and Q3-2).

Table N-Q3-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages

		Tuble	11 Q5 1. 1	- 11111 11111	0111110	mative pages			
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	<i>p</i> -value
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76	
Q3	201.617	201.617	9.706	.215		20.772	1	76	.000 ***
Group*Q3	97.381	48.691	9.706	.117		5.017	2	76	.009 **
							note.+<.10),*<.05,**	<.01,***<.001

Table N-Q3-2: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages

Multiple compar	r (Adjustment m	ethod = H	olm method)		Main p-value	.008	} **
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p
Jp - Eu-Eu	1.791	0.576	0.652	2.930	3.107	152	.002	2 .007 **
Jp - Eu-3	1.516	0.717	0.099	2.933	2.114	152	.036	ó ns
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	0.275	0.652	-1.012	1.562	0.422	152	.674	l ns
						not	e.+<.10,*	<.05,**<.01,***<.00





Figure Q3-1





Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment between European and Japanese, significant differences to support the hypothesis were found between German and Japanese [t = 2.63, Adjusted p = .02, d = 2.19]. There was also a significant difference between the Japanese and the others, which significantly supported the hypothesised preference of the Japanese group [t = 2.87, Adjusted p = .02, d = 1.61]. (See Table N-Q3-3, Figures Q3-3)

Table N-Q3-3: Culture interaction of T Test											
Multiple compar	Holm method					Main p -value	.007	**			
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p			
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	2.191	0.832	0.534	3.849	2.633	76	.010	.020 *			
Jp - Other	1.609	0.561	0.491	2.726	2.867	76	.005	.016 *			
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-0.583	0.767	-2.109	0.944	-0.760	76	.450	ns			




Figure Q-3-3

Hypothesis 4: Norms on preference of the operating organisation

A significant interaction were found between the European and other groups and between the Japanese and other groups. There was a preference for pages that partially supported the hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Our civil community, NGO, runs the project!


Page assuming a Japanese preference: United Nations runs the project!

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q4) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was significantly higher [F(1,76) = 5.32, p = .02, $\eta d2 = .07$]. A significant interaction effect was also found in the difference in pages preferences across cultures [F(2,76) = 7.45, p < .01, $\eta d2 = .16$]. The mean scores of preferences for each culture group showed a non-significant difference between the Japanese and European groups for supporting tendency to the hypotheses, and a significant difference between the European and Japanese and the non-European Euroculture groups. [t = 3.72, Adjusted p <.01, d = 3.11, t = 3.21, Adjusted p < .01, d = 2.44]. (See Table N-Q4-1, N-Q4-2 and Figures Q4-1 and Q4-2).

		Table	N-Q4-1:2	2-WAY AM	OVA in No	rmative pages					
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value		
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76			
Q4	70.192	70.192	13.191	.065		5.321	1	76	.024 *		
Group*Q4	196.551	98.275	13.191	.164		7.450	2	76	.001 **		
	note.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01,***<.001										

Table N-Q4-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages

	Table N-Q4-2: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages											
Multiple compar	r (Adjustment m	ethod = H	olm method)		Main p-value	.001	**					
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p					
Jp - Eu-Eu	0.668	0.672	-0.659	1.996	0.995	152	.321	ns				
Jp - Eu-3	3.106	0.836	1.454	4.758	3.715	152	.000	.001 **				
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	2.438	0.760	0.937	3.938	3.209	152	.002	.003 **				
	note.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01,***<.001											





Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment, a mean score difference with the same trend as the hypothesis was obtained, but no significant difference was found. (See Table N-Q4-3, Figures Q4-3)

Table N-Q4-3: Culture interaction of T Test										
Multiple compar	Holm method					Main p -value	.107			
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p		
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	1.543	1.036	-0.520	3.607	1.490	76	.140	ns		
Jp - Other	1.326	0.699	-0.065	2.718	1.898	76	.061	ns		
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-0.217	0.955	-2.118	1.684	-0.228	76	.820	ns		




Figure Q-4-3

Hypothesis 5: Norms on preference for the subjectivity

No significant differences were found to support this hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Each Donation for Each Life

Page assuming a Japanese preference: They made donations. Be a part of the movement!

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q5) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was significantly higher [F(1,76) = 92.01, p < .001, $\eta d2 = .55$]. The mean scores of the preferences for each cultural group showed a relatively supportive trend to the hypotheses, but were not significantly different. (See Table N-Q5-1, Figures Q5-1 and Q5-2)

Table N-Q5-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages

	Table N-Q5-1. 2-WAT AMOVA III Normative pages											
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value			
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76				
Q5	977.793	977.793	10.627	.548		92.012	1	76	.000 **			
Group*Q5	26.239	13.119	10.627	.031		1.235	2	76	.297			
	note.+<.10.*<.05.**<.001											




Figure Q5-1




Figure Q5-2

Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment, no significant differences were found, although mean scores were obtained that were supportive to the hypotheses. (See Table N-Q5-2, Figures Q5-3)

Table N-Q5-2: Culture interaction of T Test

Multiple compar	Holm method					Main <i>p</i> -value	.155		
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p	
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	1.548	0.868	-0.181	3.277	1.783	76	.079	ns	
Jp - Other	0.696	0.585	-0.470	1.861	1.188	76	.238	ns	
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-0.852	0.800	-2.445	0.741	-1.066	76	.290	ns	




Figure Q5-3

Hypothesis 6: Norms on recognition of Human Rights

No significant differences were found to support this hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: No one should be denied their Human Rights

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Let's help build societies that value Human Rights

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Harms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q6) as a within-subjects factor showed no significant differences in all main effects and interactions. The mean scores for the preferences of each cultural group showed a relatively supportive trend for the hypothesis, but were not significantly different. (See Table N-Q6-1 and Figures Q6-1 and Q6-2.)

Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	<i>p</i> -value
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76	
Q6	21.004	21.004	12.128	.022		1.732	1	76	.192
Group*Q6	21.202	10.601	12.128	.022		0.874	2	76	.421
							note.+<.10	,*<.05,***	<.01,***<.001





Figure Q6-1





Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment, no significant differences were found, although mean scores were obtained that were supportive to the hypotheses. (See Table N-Q6-2, Figures Q6-3)

Table N-Q6-2: Culture interaction of T Test											
Multiple compar	Holm method					Main p-value	.504	1			
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p			
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	0.452	0.939	-1.418	2.323	0.481	76	.632	2 ns			
Jp - Other	0.761	0.633	-0.500	2.022	1.202	76	.233	3 ns			
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	0.309	0.865	-1.414	2.032	0.357	76	.722	2 ns			




Figure Q-6-3

Results of the Interest Stimulus Cumulative Total

The results of a four-factor mixed design ANOVA with allocation to each stimulus set from Q7 and Q8 as a within-subjects factor, culture (Euroculture European group, Euroculture non-European group and Japanese group), gender differences and recognition of the UN role as between-subjects factors are shown below. The number of subjects who chose 'other' for gender (1 subject), 'Rule of Law' (3 subjects) and 'Development' (2 subjects) for recognition of the UN role was considerably smaller than the total number of subjects in the sample. 6 subjects were therefore excluded from the test, leaving a total of 73 subjects as the population.

The results of the analysis of variance for the cumulative scores of the Interest Image group showed a significant trend in the interaction between the allocation difference (variable name Interest) and the cultural difference [F(2,61) = 2.61, p = .081, η d2 = .08]. (See Table I-1).

Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial $\eta 2$	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value	
Interest	14.951	14.951	20.117	.012		0.743	1	61	.392	
Gender*Interest	14.951	14.951	20.117	.012		0.743	1	61	.392	
UNRole*Interest	0.113	0.113	20.117	.000		0.006	1	61	.940	
Group*Interest	105.227	52.613	20.117	.079		2.615	2	61	.081	+
Gender*UNRole*Interest	13.680	13.680	20.117	.011		0.680	1	61	.413	
Gender*Group*Interest	7.051	3.526	20.117	.006		0.175	2	61	.840	
UNRole*Group*Interest	13.202	6.601	20.117	.011		0.328	2	61	.722	
Gender*UNRole*Group*Interest	13.939	6.969	20.117	.011		0.346	2	61	.709	
note.+<.10,*<.05.**<.01										





Figure I-1

Main effect of mean allocation to stimuli. The cumulative allocation to the normative image hypothesised to be preferred by the European group (variable name InterestEU) was higher than the cumulative allocation to the image hypothesised to be preferred by the Japanese group (variable name InterestJP) but not significant. (see Table I-1).






There was a significant trend in the interaction between culture group and stimulus allocation as a whole, but no significant differences or significant trends were found for individual combinations. Furthermore, contrary to the hypothesis, the European group (variable Eu-Eu) gave significantly more points on the cumulative Interest-JP allocation to the image that the Japanese group was assumed to prefer, and the Japanese group (variable Jp) gave more points on the cumulative Interest-EU allocation to the image that the European group was assumed to prefer, but not significantly. (see Table I-1-1).

	Table I-1-1: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 4-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages										
Multiple comparisons	(Adjustment m	ethod = H	[olm method]			.077 +					
	Difference	t value	DF	p-value Adjusted p							
Jp - Eu-Eu	-2.111	0.969	-4.030	-0.192	-2.178	122	.031 ns				
Jp - Eu-3	-2.167	1.358	-4.855	0.522	-1.596	122	.113 ns				
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	-0.056	1.269	-2.567	2.456	-0.044	122	.965 ns				
						no	te.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01	,***<.001			

A three-factor mixed design ANOVA was then conducted with culture (three groups: Japanese group, German group and others, with 10 German group members as an independent group from Euroculture) and gender as between-subjects factors and stimulus set scores as a within-subjects factor. As recognition of the role of the UN, for which no interaction was found, was excluded as a factor in the analysis, the population was 78 subjects, including 5 subjects who selected recognition of the UN in Development and The Rule of Law, while one other subject in Gender remained excluded.

The results of the analysis of variance on the cumulative scores of the interest image groups showed that the interaction with the between-subjects factor was significant only for the cultural difference. [F(2,72) = 5.48, p < .01, $\eta d2 = .13$] (see Table I-2).

Table I-2: Post-hoc 3-WAY AMOVA in Interest pages											
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value		
Interest	5.689	5.689	19.306	.004		0.295	1	72	.589		
Gender*Interest	16.087	16.087	19.306	.011		0.833	1	72	.364		
JpGeCompe*Interest	161.930	80.965	19.306	.104		4.194	2	72	.019	*	
Gender*JpGeCompe*Interest	5.271	2.636	19.306	.004		0.137	2	72	.873		
note.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01											





The Japanese group allocated significantly more points to the images that the European group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation InterestEU comparing to Other group, and Other group allocated significantly more points to the images that the Japanese group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation InterestJP Although the overall interaction was significant, there were no other significant interactions between stimuli and cultural group units. (see Table I-2-2).

	Table I-2-2: Post-ho	oc Cultu	re interaction of 3-WAY	AMOVA	in Interest page	s	
Multiple comparisons	(Adjustment m	ethod =	Holm method)		Main p -value	.017	*
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower 95%Upper	t value	DF	<i>n</i> -value	Adjuste

	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower 95	5%Upper	t value	DF	<i>p</i> -value Ad	ljusted p
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	1.371	1.391	-1.378	4.121	0.986	144	.326	ns
Jp - Other	2.424	0.837	0.769	4.079	2.895	144	.004	.013 *
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	1.053	1.335	-1.586	3.692	0.789	144	.432	ns
note.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01,***<.001								

Results for each Interest stimulus

This section describes the results of a two-factor analysis of variance (N=79) for each individual hypothesised group of images between Q7 and Q8, with Japanese-European cultural differences as the between-subjects factor and allocation to the stimuli as the within-subjects factor. In addition, differences in allocation to the Japanese, German and other groups were identified.

Hypothesis 7: Interests on Benefits related to the recipient

A significant interaction was found between the European and Japanese groups, but was a preference for pages opposite to the hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Good support will Stop Refugee Movement!

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Good support will Create Future Friends for your country!

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q7) as a within-subjects factor showed that the Japanese preference assumption for stimuli was significantly higher [F(1,76) = 28.34, p < .001, $\eta d2 = .27$]. A significant interaction effect was also found in the difference in pages preferences across cultures [F(2,76) = 11.09, p < .001, $\eta d2 = .23$]. The mean scores for the preferences of each cultural group showed significant differences, contrary to the hypothesis, with the Japanese giving significantly higher scores to the page assumed to be preferred by Europeans compared to the European group [t = 4.63, Adjusted p < .001, d = 2.89] and the Euroculture non-European group [t = 3.12, Adjusted p < .001, d = 2.43], and the European group and Euroculture non-European group giving significantly more scores to the other page than Japanese group. No significant interaction effects in stimulus preference were found between the European and non-European groups within Euroculture. (See Table I-Q7-1 and I-Q7-2, Figures Q7-1 and Q7-2).

	Table I-Q7-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Interest pages										
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value		
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76			
Q7	322.878	322.878	11.394	.272		28.338	1	76	.000 ***		
Group*Q7	252.739	126.369	11.394	.226		11.091	2	76	.000 ***		
note $+ \le 10 \le 05 \le 01 $											

	Table I-Q7-2: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 2-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages										
Multiple compar	r (Adjustment m	ethod = H	olm method)		Main p-value	.419				
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p			
Jp - Eu-Eu	2.889	0.625	1.655	4.123	4.626	152	.000	.000	***		
Jp - Eu-3	2.427	0.777	0.891	3.962	3.123	152	.002	.004	**		
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	-0.463	0.706	-1.857	0.932	-0.655	152	.513	ns			
						not	e.+<.10,*	<.05,**<.01	,***<.001		




Figure Q7-2

Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment between European and Japanese, significant differences to opposite the hypothesis were found between Japanese and German [t = 3.94, Adjusted p < .001, d = 3.54], and Japanese and Other groups [t = 4.27, Adjusted p < .001, d = 2.58]. (See Table I-Q7-3, Figures Q7-3)

Table I-O7-3: Culture interaction of T Test

Table PQ7-5. Culture inclaction of 1 Test											
Multiple compar	Holm method					Main <i>p</i> -value	.000	***			
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p			
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	3.539	0.899	1.749	5.329	3.937	76	.000	.000 ***			
Jp - Other	2.587	0.606	1.380	3.794	4.269	76	.000	.000 ***			
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-0.952	0.828	-2.601	0.697	-1.150	76	.254	ns			




Figure Q-7-3

Hypothesis 8: Interest on Benefits related to donation behaviour

No significant differences were found to support this hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Let's expand the area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Your donation will be used to build the infrastructure to export resources to your country

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q8) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was significantly higher [F(1,76) = 9.51, p < .01, η d2 = .11]. The mean scores of the preferences for each cultural group showed a relatively supportive trend to the hypotheses, but were not significantly different. (See Table I-Q8-1, Figures Q8-1 and Q8-2)

Table I-Q8-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Interest pages

Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial $\eta 2$	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	<i>p</i> -value
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76	
Q8	122.284	122.284	12.859	.111		9.510	1	76	.003 **
Group*Q8	6.243	3.121	12.859	.006		0.243	2	76	.785
	note.+<.10.*<.05.**<.01.***<.001								






Figure Q8-1





Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and there was a significant difference for the three groups combined as a whole (p=.03). However, for each group combination, as in the previous two-factor experiment, a mean score was obtained that supported the hypothesis, but no significant difference was found. (See Table I-Q8-2, Figures Q8-3)



Eu-Eu-Ge

Other

2

1

0

JpGeCompe

4

2

0

JpGeCompe



Figure Q8-3


Results of the Value Stimulus Cumulative Total

The results of a four-factor mixed design ANOVA with allocation to each stimulus set from Q9 and Q10 as a within-subjects factor, culture (Euroculture European group, Euroculture non-European group and Japanese group), gender differences and recognition of the UN role as between-subjects factors are shown below. The number of subjects who chose 'other' for gender (1 subject), 'Rule of Law' (3 subjects) and 'Development' (2 subjects) for recognition of the UN role was considerably smaller than the total number of subjects in the sample. 6 subjects were therefore excluded from the test, leaving a total of 73 subjects as the population.

The results of the analysis of variance on the cumulative scores of the value image groups showed that the main effect of the allocation difference (variable name Value) was significant [F(1,61) = 6.36, p = .01, partial η d2 = .09]. In an interaction between this allocation, significant trend with culture difference was found [F(2,61) = 1.66, p = .08, η d2 = .08]. (see Table V-1).


Table V-1: 4-WAY AMOVA in Value pages

Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value	
Value	130.307	130.307	20.505	.094		6.355	1	61	.014 *	
Gender*Value	1.633	1.633	20.505	.001		0.080	1	61	.779	
UNRole*Value	34.032	34.032	20.505	.026		1.660	1	61	.203	
Group*Value	107.917	53.958	20.505	.079		2.632	2	61	.080 +	
Gender*UNRole*Value	41.243	41.243	20.505	.032		2.011	1	61	.161	
Gender*Group*Value	25.728	12.864	20.505	.020		0.627	2	61	.537	
UNRole*Group*Value	15.334	7.667	20.505	.012		0.374	2	61	.690	
Gender*UNRole*Group*Value	23.604	11.802	20.505	.019		0.576	2	61	.565	
	note.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01,***<.001									





Main effect of mean allocation to stimuli. The cumulative allocation to the value image hypothesised to be preferred by the European group (variable name ValueEU) was significantly higher than the cumulative allocation to the image hypothesised to be preferred by the Japanese group (variable name ValueJP). (see Table V-1 and Figure V1).






European group distributed more points in the cumulative allocation ValueEU to images hypothesised to be preferred by the European group, and Japanese group distributed more points in the cumulative allocation ValueJP to images hypothesised to be preferred by the Japanese group. Although significant trends were found for the three groups combined as a whole (p=.03). However, for each group combination, as in the previous two-factor experiment, a mean score was obtained that supported the hypothesis, but no significant difference was found. (see Table V-1-1, FigureV2).

Table V-1-1: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 4-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages										
Multiple comparisons	(Adjustment m	ethod = H	[olm method]	Ν	Main p-value .076 +					
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p		
Jp - Eu-Eu	2.106	0.979	0.168	4.043	2.152	122	.033	ns		
Jp - Eu-3	2.292	1.371	-0.422	5.006	1.672	122	.097	ns		
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	0.186	1.281	-2.350	2.722	0.145	122	.885	ns		
						not	e.+<.10,*	<.05,**<.01,	***<.001	

A three-factor mixed design ANOVA was then conducted with culture (three groups: Japanese group, German group and others, with 10 German group members as an independent group from Euroculture) and gender as between-subjects factors and stimulus set scores as a within-subjects factor. As recognition of the role of the UN, for which no interaction was found, was excluded as a factor in the analysis, the population was 78 subjects, including 5 subjects who selected recognition of the UN in Development and The Rule of Law, while one other subject in Gender remained excluded.

The results of the analysis of variance on the cumulative scores of the value image groups showed that the interaction with the between-subjects factor was significant only for the cultural difference. [F(2,72) = 5.11, p < .01, $\eta d2 = .12$] (see Table V-2-1).

Table V-2-1: 3-WAY AMOVA in Value pages									
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value
Value	212.986	212.986	20.738	.125		10.270	1	72	.002 **
JpGeCompe*Value	211.816	105.908	20.738	.124		5.107	2	72	.008 **
Gender*Value	5.882	5.882	20.738	.004		0.284	1	72	.596
JpGeCompe*Gender*Value	1.972	0.986	20.738	.001		0.048	2	72	.954
							note.+<	.10,*<.05,*	**<.01,***<.00





The Japanese group allocated significantly more points to the images that the Japanese group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation ValueJP comparing to German group, and German group allocated significantly more points to the images that the European group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation ValueEU There were no other significant interactions between other combinations. (see Table V-2-2).

Table V-2-1: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 3-WAY AMOVA in Normative pages									
Multiple comparisons	(Adjustment m	ethod = H	Iolm method)		Main p -value .007 **				
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower 9	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p	
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	4.400	1.442	1.550	7.250	3.052	144	.003	.008 *	**
Jp - Other	1.737	0.868	0.022	3.453	2.002	144	.047	ns	
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-2.663	1.384	-5.398	0.072	-1.924	144	.056	ns	
note $+ \le 10 \le 05 \le 01 $									

Results for each Value stimulus

This section describes the results of a two-factor analysis of variance (N=79) for each individual hypothesised group of images between Q9 and Q10, with Japanese-European cultural differences as the between-subjects factor and allocation to the stimuli as the within-subjects factor. In addition, differences in allocation to the Japanese, German and other groups were identified.

Hypothesis 9: Values on Instruments for the protection of human rights

A significant interaction was found between the European and Japanese groups to support the hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Build sustainable inclusive communities, with your donation!

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Build education for people to stand up, with your donation!

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q9) as a within-subjects factor showed that a significant interaction effect in the difference in pages preferences across cultures $[F(2,76) = 6.30, p < .01, \eta d2 = .14]$. The mean scores for the preferences of each cultural group showed significant differences to support the hypothesis with the Japanese giving significantly higher scores to the page assumed to be preferred by Japanese compared to the European group [t = 4.63, Adjusted p < .001, d = 2.89], and the European group giving significantly more scores to the other page than Japanese group. No significant interaction effects in stimulus preference were found between other combination. (See Table I-Q7-1 and I-Q7-2, Figures Q2-1 and Q2-2).

able V-Q9-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in interest pages										
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	<i>p</i> -value	
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76		
Q9	4.574	4.574	10.487	.006		0.436	1	76	.511	
Group*Q9	132.742	66.371	10.487	.143		6.329	2	76	.003 **	
note.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01,***<.001										

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Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial n2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76	
Q9	4.574	4.574	10.487	.006		0.436	1	76	.511
Group*Q9	132.742	66.371	10.487	.143		6.329	2	76	.003 **
							note.+<.	10,*<.05,*	**<.01,***<.001

Table V-Q9-2: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 2-WAY AMOVA in Value pages									
Multiple compar	r (Adjustment m	ethod = H	olm method]	Main p-value	.002) **		
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p	
Jp - Eu-Eu	2.115	0.599	0.931	3.299	3.530	152	.001	.002 **	
Jp - Eu-3	1.628	0.745	0.155	3.100	2.184	152	.031	ns	
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	-0.488	0.677	-1.826	0.851	-0.720	152	.473	s ns	
note.+<.10,*<.05,**<.01,***<.00									

Table V-Q9-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Interest pages	
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


Figure Q9-2

Then, t-tests were conducted on the European and Japanese preference hypothesis side, with the Japanese, German and Other groups each as a between-subjects factor, and a similar trend to the previous two-factor experiment between Europeans and Japanese was shown as a significant difference. In other words, significant differences were found between the Japanese and German groups [t = 3.09, Adjusted p < .01, d = 2.67] and between the Japanese and Other groups [t = 3.14, Adjusted p < .01, d = 1.83], supporting the hypothesis.

Table V-09-3: Culture interaction of T Test

	Table V-Q9-3: Culture Interaction of T Test											
Multiple compar	Holm method					Main <i>p</i> -value	.000	***				
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p -value	Adjusted p				
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	2.665	0.864	0.944	4.386	3.085	76	.003	.006				
Jp - Other	1.826	0.583	0.666	2.986	3.135	76	.002	.007				
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-0.839	0.796	-2.424	0.746	-1.054	76	.295	ns				




Figure Q9-3

Hypothesis 10: Value on Peace

No significant differences were found to support this hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Donations for Peacebuilders

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Your donation will Never be used for Military Purposes

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Holms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q10) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was higher with significant trend [F(1,76) = 3.31, p = .07, $\eta d2 = .04$]. The mean scores of the preferences for each cultural group showed a relatively supportive trend to the hypotheses, but were not significantly different. (See Table V-Q10-1, Figures Q10-1 and Q10-2)

	Table V-Q10-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Value pages											
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value			
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76				
Q10	66.160	66.160	20.005	.042		3.307	1	76	.073 +			
Group*Q10	3.891	1.945	20.005	.003		0.097	2	76	.907			
							note.+<.	10,*<.05,*	**<.01,***<.001			





Figure Q10-1





Subsequently, t-tests were conducted on the European and Japanese preference hypothesis side, with the Japanese, German and Other groups each as a between-subjects factor, and no significant trend nor differences were shown. (See Table V-Q10-2 and Figure Q10-3).

	Table V-Q10-	-2: Post-ho	oc Culture in	teraction o	f 2-WAY	AMOVA in No	ormative p	ages			
Multiple compar (Adjustment method = Holm method) Main p-value .506											
Difference S.E. 95%Lower 95%Upper t value DF p-value Adjusted p											
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	0.557	1.191	-1.815	2.928	0.467	76	.642	2 ns			
Jp - Other	-0.522	0.803	-2.120	1.077	-0.650	76	.518	3 ns			
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-1.078	1.097	-3.262	1.106	-0.983	76	.329) ns			
						no	te.+<.10,*	<.05,**<.01,	***<.001		





Figure Q10-3

Results of the Dummy Stimulus Cumulative Total

The results of a four-factor mixed design ANOVA with allocation to each stimulus set from Q11 and Q12 as a within-subjects factor, culture (Euroculture European group, Euroculture non-European group and Japanese group), gender differences and recognition of the UN role as between-subjects factors are shown below. The number of subjects who chose 'other' for gender (1 subject), 'Rule of Law' (3 subjects) and 'Development' (2 subjects) for recognition of the UN role was considerably smaller than the total number of subjects in the sample. 6 subjects were therefore excluded from the test, leaving a total of 73 subjects as the population.

The results of the analysis of variance for the cumulative scores of the Dummy Image group showed a significant trend in the interaction between the allocation difference (variable name Dummy) and the cultural difference [F(2,61) = 2.35, p = .100, η d2 = .07]. (See Table I-1).

Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial $\eta 2$	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value
Dummy	16.896	16.896	24.551	.011		0.688	1	61	.410
Gender*Dummy	4.172	4.172	24.551	.003		0.170	1	61	.682
UNRole*Dummy	52.381	52.381	24.551	.034		2.134	1	61	.149
Group*Dummy	115.404	57.702	24.551	.072		2.350	2	61	.100 +
Gender*UNRole*Dummy	0.006	0.006	24.551	.000		0.000	1	61	.988
Gender*Group*Dummy	185.361	92.680	24.551	.110		3.775	2	61	.285
UNRole*Group*Dummy	5.134	2.567	24.551	.003		0.105	2	61	.901
Gender*UNRole*Group*Dummy	25.774	12.887	24.551	.017		0.525	2	61	.594





Main effect of mean allocation to stimuli. The cumulative allocation to the normative image hypothesised to be preferred by the European group (variable name DummyEU) was higher than the cumulative allocation to the image hypothesised to be preferred by the Japanese group (variable name DummyJP) but not significant. (see Table I-1).




Figure	D-2
1 19010	~ -

There was a significant trend in the interaction between culture group and stimulus allocation as a whole, but no significant differences or significant trends were found for individual combinations. Furthermore, contrary to the hypothesis, the European group (variable Eu-Eu) gave significantly more points on the cumulative Interest-JP allocation to the image that the Japanese group was assumed to prefer, and the Japanese group (variable Jp) gave more points on the cumulative Interest-EU allocation to the image that the European group was assumed to prefer, but not significantly. (see Table I-1-1).

Table D-1-1: Post-hoc Culture interaction of 4-WAY AMOVA in Dummy pages											
Multiple comparisons (Adjustment method = Holm method) Main p-value .100 +											
	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	5%Upper	t value	DF	p-value	Adjusted p			
Jp - Eu-Eu	-2.283	1.071	-4.403	-0.164	-2.132	122	.035	ns			
Jp - Eu-3	-0.900	1.500	-3.870	2.070	-0.600	122	.550	ns			
Eu-Eu - Eu-3	1.383	1.402	-1.392	4.158	0.987	122	.326	ns			
						not	e.+<.10,*	<.05,**<.01,	***<.00		

A three-factor mixed design ANOVA was then conducted with culture (three groups: Japanese group, German group and others, with 10 German group members as an independent group from Euroculture) and gender as between-subjects factors and stimulus set scores as a within-subjects factor. As recognition of the role of the UN, for which no interaction was found, was excluded as a factor in the analysis, the population was 78 subjects, including 5 subjects who selected recognition of the UN in Development and The Rule of Law, while one other subject in Gender remained excluded.

The results of the analysis of variance on the cumulative scores of the dummy image groups showed that neither main effect nor interaction.

	Table D-2-1: 3-WAY AMOVA in Dummy pages												
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial $\eta 2$	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value				
Dummy	23.219	23.219	23.201	.014		1.001	1	72	.320				
Gender*Dummy	1.744	1.744	23.201	.001		0.075	1	72	.785				
JpGeCompe*Dummy	80.049	40.025	23.201	.046		1.725	2	72	.185				
Gender*JpGeCompe*Dummy	158.585	79.292	23.201	.087		3.418	2	72	.382				
							note.+<	.10,*<.05,	**<.01,***<.00				




Figure D-3

The Japanese group allocated significantly more points to the images that the Japanese group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation DummyJP comparing to Japanese and Other groups, and European group allocated more points to the images that the European group was hypothesised to prefer in the cumulative allocation DummyEU, but not significant at all. (see Table D-2-1).

	Table D-2-1: Post-h	oc Culture	e interaction	of 3-WAY	AMOVA i	n Dummy page	es				
Multiple comparisons (Adjustment method = Holm method) Main p -value .182											
Difference S.E. 95% Lower 95% Upper t value DF p-value Adjusted p											
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	1.162	1.525	-1.853	4.176	0.762	144	.448	ns			
Jp - Other	1.703	0.918	-0.111	3.518	1.855	144	.066	ns			
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	0.542	1.464	-2.351	3.435	0.370	144	.712	ns			
						not	e.+<.10,*<.	05,**<.01,**	·*<.001		

Results for each Interest stimulus

This section describes the results of a two-factor analysis of variance (N=79) for each individual hypothesised group of images between Q11 and Q12, with Japanese-European cultural differences as the between-subjects factor and allocation to the stimuli as the within-subjects factor. In addition, differences in allocation to the Japanese, German and other groups were identified.

Hypothesis 11: Dummy (not related with constructive idea): Food

No significant differences were found to support this hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Help improve agricultural technology to end hunger (With wheat fields and bread image)

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Help improve agricultural technology to end hunger (With Paddy and rice image)

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Harms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q11) as a within-subjects factor showed no significant differences in all main effects and interactions. The mean scores for the preferences of each cultural group showed a relatively supportive trend for the hypothesis, but were not significant. (See Table D-Q11-1 and Figures Q11-1 and Q11-2.)

	Table D-Q11-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Dummy pages											
Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value			
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76				
Q11	281.617	281.617	5.021	.111		0.757	1	76	.273			
Group*Q11	7.598	3.799	5.021	.020		0.757	2	76	.473			
							note.+<.	10,*<.05,*	**<.01,***<.001			





Figure Q11-1





Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment, no significant differences were found, although mean scores were obtained that were supportive to the hypotheses. (See Table N-Q6-2, Figures Q6-3)

Table D-Q11-2: Culture interaction of T Test											
Multiple compar Holm methodMain p -value.580											
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower9	5%Upper	t value	DF	p -value	Adjusted p			
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	0.726	0.851	-0.969	2.421	0.853	76	.396	õ ns			
Jp - Other	0.543	0.574	-0.599	1.686	0.947	76	.346	o ns			
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-0.183	0.784	-1.744	1.378	-0.233	76	.816	o ns			




Figure Q11-3

Hypothesis 12: Dummy (not related with constructive idea): Focus area

No significant differences were found to support this hypothesis.

Page assuming a European preference: Let's bring back the beauty of nature (With green energy image)

Page assuming a Japanese preference: Let's bring back the beauty of nature (With Sea image)

A two-factor analysis of variance using the Harms method with the European, Japanese and non-European Euroculture groups as between-subjects factors and the difference in allocation to stimuli (variable name Q12) as a within-subjects factor showed that the European preference assumption for stimuli was higher with significant trend [F(1,76) = 48.92, p < .001, $\eta d2 = .39$], but no interaction. The mean scores for the preferences of each cultural group showed a relatively opposite trend for the hypothesis, but were not significant. (See Table D-Q12-1 and Figures Q12-1 and Q12-2.)

Table D-Q12-1: 2-WAY AMOVA in Dummy pages

Variable name	SS	MS	MSe	Partial η2	95%CI	F value	DF1	DF2	p-value
Group	0.000	0.000	0.000					76	
Q12	446.161	446.161	9.121	.392		48.918	1	76	.000 ***
Group*Q12	2.579	1.290	9.121	.004		0.141	2	76	.868
							note.+<.	10,*<.05,*	**<.01,***<.001




Figure Q12-1




Figure Q12-2

Then, a t-test was conducted for each of the three groups (Japanese, German and other groups) as a between-subjects factor on the European preference assumption side and the Japanese preference assumption side, and as in the previous two-factor experiment, no significant differences were found, although mean scores were obtained that were opposite to the hypotheses. (See Table N-Q12-2, Figures Q12-3)

Multiple compar					Main p -value	.670)		
Type of Test	Difference	S.E.	95%Lower	95%Upper	t value	DF	p -value	Adjusted p	
Jp - Eu-Eu-Ge	0.570	0.808	-1.039	2.178	0.705	76	.483	ns	
Jp - Other	0.130	0.545	-0.954	1.215	0.240	76	.811	ns	
Eu-Eu-Ge - Other	-0.439	0.744	-1.921	1.043	-0.590	76	.557	ns	




Figure Q12-3

Discussion

General Discussion

Several significant differences supporting the hypothesis were found between the EU-Japan groups (Q1: Norms on Necessity of donation, Q3: Norms on preference for support, Q9: Values on Instruments for the protection of human rights) as differences in the allocation of image preferences for Norms and Values respectively. Q7: Interests on Benefits related to the recipient hypothesis showed significant differences opposite to the hypothesis. The number of people in the German group was small as 10 of 79 as whole, so the information was just used as a reference, but all significant differences found between Japan and the EU were found to be significant between the Japanese and German groups. This indicates a relative approximation of social constructivism ideas in the respective hypothesised areas of norms, values and interests in Europe and Germany when compared to Japan. As no significant differences were found in gender views and UN role views as between-group factors, it can be concluded that, with the exception of hypothesis 1, it is more likely that differences in subjective ideas in social constructivism are more likely to be rooted as a cultural difference factor for citizens than other factors for the stimuli presented here. Statistical hypothesis testing of the differences in the cumulative scores for the norms, values, interests and Dummy groups revealed significant differences in support of the hypothesis only for the norms, and only significant trends for the values and interests. This may be due to the fact that the number of hypothesised stimulus combinations with different connotations for norms was 6, while values and interests were only 2 each, and thus the number of stimulus combinations may not have sufficient statistical testing power. Therefore, the main focus of this discussion is on the presence or absence of significant differences and implications of the individual hypothesised stimuli. As the dummy group showed no significant interaction between the cumulative total and the individual stimuli, whereas there was a significant difference or trend for each of the social constructivism hypotheses, it is possible that each hypothesised factor arising from the social constructivist interpretation of the status quo is more relevant than for the hypothesised group without that factor. suggesting relatively higher stimulus discrimination from responders. This result also provides supporting evidence that a clear relative difference in Norm and Identity, consisting of Value and Interest, was observed between Japan and Europe (Germany), especially for Q1Q3Q9, where statistically significant differences supporting the hypotheses were observed. In addition, the fact that mean scores supporting the hypotheses were obtained for each of the social constructivism ideas hypotheses from Q1 to Q10, with the exception of Q2 and Q7, indicates that more hypotheses could have been significantly different if the statistical testing power had been strengthened by increasing the number of experimental subjects with regard to this significance. Further validation based on the results of this study is expected. In addition, eight out of ten main effects were found for within-group preference for the stimuli themselves, excluding Dummy, and seven were for stimuli for which a Western preference was assumed. This provides material for stimulus appropriateness as for comparing between Japanese and European by indicating a high degree of stimulus discrimination, and also suggests the predominance of Western UN donation values as a universal social constructivism factor shared by the subjects.

Norms

The significant interaction of the cumulative scores of the six norms stimulus groups in favour of the hypotheses strongly suggests that the different norms of giving to the UN in Japan and Europe on each hypothesis may exist among real people Q1: Norms on the Necessity of Giving, as explained in Chapter 2, suggests that the differences in the respective post-war beginnings between Europe and Germany and Japan remain in the social structure as norms. It would also suggest that the norms of post-war responsibility and responsibility towards developing countries are stronger in Europe than in Japan, since the Japan preference hypothesis emphasises the rewarding nature of giving and, according to Morse, the rewarding nature of giving is a universally observed phenomenon. Interpreted in terms of the cultural self-construal of cross-cultural psychology, it can be seen as a focus on independent views of self in European societies and a focus on social interaction from and with others in Japanese inter-dependent views societies. With regard to gender factors, the results showed that women chose more European-preferred hypothesised images, i.e. images of the norm of responsibility, which supports several previous studies showing that women tend to feel more responsible than men in terms of norms of sociability and views of social responsibility. [In addition, the significant withinstimulus main effect shows that the description of 'social responsibility' is generally preferred as a motivation for giving by participants overall, suggesting that European development norms are stronger in general.

Q2: The hypothesis on accountability norms was not supported. Although there were no significant differences, the mean scores for the European and Japanese groups also showed the opposite trend to the hypothesis. As there were no significant differences, it can be argued that relative cultural differences could not be observed for this norm. The contrast between Europe, with its greater emphasis on professionalism in accountability in the Development Charter and SDG reports, and Japan, with its inclusion of the phrase 'accountability to taxpayers', can be considered to have not reached the level of a norm for citizens in each country. In addition, the significance of the main effect within the stimulus indicates that the explanation of 'maximising the amount spent as a donation' was generally preferred as a motivation for donation by participants as a whole over the accountability of 'not wasting donations', suggesting that European development norms are strong.

Q3 : Regarding the preference for support purposes, significant results in favour of the hypothesis were found for Japan-EU, and Japan-Germany, and Japan-Other. This is particularly the case in Japan, where 'self-help' has long been a strong theme of Japanese development assistance. Interpreted in terms of the cultural self-perception of cross-cultural psychology, the reciprocity-focused Japanese group would naturally require more effort from the recipient in providing assistance, whereas the European group, with its interdependent self-perception, would place more emphasis on self-subjectivity in problem-solving. The significant intra-stimulus main effect shows that the 'need for immediate support' explanation is generally preferred by all participants as a motivation than giving to promote 'self-help', suggesting a strong European developmental norm generally.

Q4: With regard to the norms on the preference of the operating organisation, there were no significant differences between the Japanese-European group in support of the hypothesis. On the other hand, donor support through 'civil society' was significantly preferred to donor support through the UN by non-European students other than Japanese and Europeans. This can be seen as a possibility that civil society may be more trusted in terms of the international image of the UN, compared to previous findings that European societies in general are more positive¹⁹³ and Japan, where trust in public organisations is

¹⁹³ Fagan and Huang, 'United Nations Gets Mostly Positive Marks from People around the World'.

higher.¹⁹⁴ The significant within-stimulus main effects also suggest that there is a generally stronger European development norm favouring giving through trusted civil society.

Q5: With regard to Norms on Preference for the subjectivity, no significant differences were found to support the hypothesis. This hypothesis was for comparison with Japan, which has historically placed more emphasis on celebrity donation behaviour, and Europe, where more proactive behaviour is considered from an independent view of the self. It is possible that the depiction of the US celebrity as a third party celebrity in both Japan and Europe was not recognised by the subject, especially for Japanese. It is also possible that subjects just not preferred the people on the page because some of them had mixed good and bad reputations by news, for example, there was a technical failure of Twitter after owning by Elon Mask, one of the illustration.¹⁹⁵ The significant within-stimulus main effect suggests a generally strong European developmental norm favouring more individual subjectivity in donation.

With regard to Norms on recognition of Human Rights, no significant differences were found to support the hypothesis. There have been significant changes in the understanding of human rights over time, and it is possible that the concept of human security, as espoused by the current Japanese government, may have altered the normative differences between the Japanese and the West in general, as analogised in previous studies. The fact that the main effect of stimulus discrimination was not significant suggests that there were not enough differences between the recipients to make each stimulus page attractive. As the mean itself supported the hypothesis, it is expected that future studies will revalidate it, either by increasing the number of participants or by increasing the relativity of the stimulus pages.

Interests

For the cumulative scores of Interests, which make up Identity, there was a significant tendency for the mean score to be opposite to the hypotheses. This may mainly mean that

¹⁹⁴ 'Public Trust in Government in Japan and South Korea: Does the Rise of Critical Citizens Matter? On JSTOR', 601–2.

¹⁹⁵ Rubin, 'Opinion | The Demise of Twitter — Er, "X" — Proves Capitalism Is Alive and Well'.

the number of stimulus combinations was 2, which is too small to define 'Interests' as an integrated variable, and that the stimuli did not reflect the hypotheses with regard to Q7. It could be tested in the future by changing the content of the stimuli to be more in line with the hypotheses and by increasing the number of stimuli.

Q7 Interests on Benefits related to the recipient showed significant differences opposite to the hypotheses. The mean scores of the Japanese group for the Japan preference hypothesis Good support will stop refugee movement and of the European group: Good support will create future friends for your country. There were similar points allocations of Japanese as 4 points each to the pages, while European group showed a significant difference with a very large distributional difference of 6 points for the Japanese preference hypothesis and 2 points for the European preference hypothesis. Some subjects gave verbal feedback after the experiment that Stop Refugee Movement, a part of the phrase, was capitalised and bold and they did not see the words Good support will, and that they thought they were being asked about intolerance of refugee movement within Europe, which was the intention of the hypothesis, and that local development aid may not have evoked the European government's national interest claim of preventing the refugee problem as a root cause, from arising in the first place. This happened because the easier vocabularies and sentences were considered while selection of catch-phrases, but this phrase then may not be appropriate and would be better to use words which making clear the meaning related with root cause of irregular migrations. Paradoxically, this suggests that the European group may be more sensitive to refugee issues, while the Japanese group may be relatively unaware of them.

Q8 : For Interest on Benefits related to donation behaviour, the mean scores for each group followed the hypothesis, although there were no significant differences to support the hypothesis. The choice of stimulus was based on the assumption that the very familiar self-themes of European governments, in particular 'area of freedom, security and justice', would be highly evocative to Europeans, but as a phrase it is universal in liberal democracies and therefore may not have been discriminative in cross-cultural group interactions. This is analogous to the fact that the main effect of the stimulus itself is significant in Europe, suggesting that European developmental norms are universally stronger. For the Japanese group preference hypothesis, infrastructure development, the mean score was highest for the Japanese, but there were no significant differences. From

this, it is possible that the Japanese preferred more normative value benefits over the practical benefits of infrastructure development.

Value.

There was a significant trend for the cumulative scores of the interests that make up Value to have a mean that suggests the hypothesis. This may be due to the small number of stimulus combinations as 2, which suggests that the statistical power to define 'Value' as an integrated variable is weak. This could be tested in the future by increasing the number of stimuli.

Q9: Values on instruments for the protection of human rights shows significant differences between the Japanese and European groups in support of the hypothesis. This supports the existence of a relative difference in preferences between the European group's preference for an inclusive and active civil society and the Japanese group's emphasis on self-help efforts through education.

Q10: Although there were no significant differences in peace values to support the hypothesis, the means for each group were consistent with the hypothesis. The significant trend of the main effect within stimuli suggests a general familiarity with European development norms that favour more positive peace contributions over stimuli that emphasise non-military use in terms of peace-related giving objectives. This result may have been influenced by the global coverage of the war in Ukraine that began in 2021, which prompted a review of peace donation practices in Japan, including government publicity and discussions about the implementation of support for some military purposes. In other words, although it is not possible with the present methodology to go back and verify the past, it is possible that a change in Japanese identity has been just observed due to a situation in which the basic idea of social constructivism is that social structures are changing from moment to moment.

Dummy

No significant differences were found for stimuli selected by geographical factors (food and priority policies) without considering the social constructivist factor. This suggests the relative importance of hypotheses Q1~Q10, which include the social constructivist factors. The reason for the lack of a significant difference between Q11 and Q12 could be that Q11 although the geographical factors were divided into Europe and Japan, there are some areas (e.g. Italy) where rice cultivation is more common, which was assumed by the verbal feedback from European subjects. The image of picking up rubbish from the sea, which is a Japanese preference hypothesis, was preferred overall more than the image of clean energy. This could be because the familiar donation amount of \in 9 may have led subjects to spend it on social good at an individual level rather than on policy.

Conclusion

Statistical hypothesis testing suggested the existence of three Japanese and European group preference factors out of ten hypotheses related to social constructivist factors. This is the main contribution of this study as a partial validation of the existence within citizens of the social constructivism factor in international relations, which, unlike material factors, is an invisible contextual factor. While previous research suggests that psychological findings, such as learning about the process by which organisational bodies learn norms from cognitive psychology models, can be useful for understanding international relations ¹⁹⁶, the results of this study mean that the usefulness of psychological methodology for international relations is not limited to model formation alone. The study shows the potential value of using psychostatistics as one of the means of validation in the field of international relations, adding a new methodology to the field.

The contribution of the research was to articulate the possibility that there are qualitative differences between Japan and Europe as well as Germany, a culture inseparable from Europe, and two areas with formally close values as liberal democratic societies. In particular, in Chapter 2 we argued that while Germany and Japan share the experience of a brief recovery to non-military regional economic power after a devastating defeat, there are differences in the structural context of their economic contributions to the UN. In Chapter 3, we tested in a simple experiment whether the social constructivist factors described so far could actually influence citizens' giving decisions, and found three cases that significantly supported the hypothesis. Including these three cases, eight out of ten cases were as large or small mean scores as hypothesised for the Japanese and European groups and for the Japanese and German groups. A limitation of this study is that we were unable to determine whether these five social constructivist factors for which we did not observe significance were missing as relative differences or whether statistical power was simply low. It is expected that this will be tested in further ways in the future as this current limitation of the simplicity of the stimuli and the number of participants. In terms of the main effects of the stimuli, we found that 8 of the 10 social constructivist factors were preferred on average to the side with the assumed European preference, and 7 of these were significantly different or significantly trended by the European group preference hypothesis stimulus, but this was not the case for the targeted Euroculture and

¹⁹⁶ Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', 344.

This suggests that the social constructivist hypothesis of Western values in the broad sense is preferred as a motivation for giving by Euroculture and Japanese subjects. This could be seen as confirmation with the individual as the agent unit, of the mainstreaming of Western norms and identities in international cooperation, especially in Global North societies and educational settings.

There are many factors of social constructivism that have yet to be discovered, and IR study would be a discipline that unearths them.¹⁹⁷ The focus here is on Germany, and Europe is discussed in the narrow context of its economic contribution to the UN. Although Europe is a union of 27 member states with a unique history and influence, and therefore requires research from other perspectives, the contribution of this study is that it has been able to find a constructivist element in Europe from this fixed perspective. Also, as social structures change from moment to moment, the three results and the many social constructivist factors examined here are only factors that can be found at the moment and in some educated students. However, several of the donation preferences found here strongly suggest the existence of norms and identities within the public regarding cooperation with the United Nations in support of sustainable development, and that strategic publicity and marketing appealing to these can contribute to the UN's work for the social good by generating more financial or cooperative will.

¹⁹⁷ Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 1,5.

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Appendix 1. List of URLs of websites with graphics and logo citations of the presented stimuli as well as general information (Hypothesis number and place of order)

			Та	ble: List of URLs of websites with graphics and logo citations of t	the presented stimuli as well as general information. Access Date	2023/07/21
Q	Related agencies	elated Presente Side of European Presente Preference		Logo Link	EU page parts Link	Japan page parts Link
N/A	UN	N/A	Hypothesis presented N/A	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/247981/united-nations	N/A	N/A
1	UNDP	12	Right	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/322648/undp	https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/%E3%82%B1%E3%83%AB%E3%83 %E3-%E7%88%86%E6%92%83-%E7%A0%B4%E5%A3%8A- %E6%88%A6%E4%BA%89-63176/	Same as EU page
2	IMF	7	Right	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/70704/imf	xxcbx88%xA9%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%x4%	Same as EU page
3	WFP	9	Left	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/319344/wfp-world-food- programme	https://pixabay.com/ia/photos/%E6%A5%AD%E7%95%8C- %E5%AE%9F%E6%A5%AD%E5%AE%86-%E7%94%87- %E3%83%A1%E3%83%B3%E5%82%BA%E3%82%B9%E3%83% BC%E3%83%A4-2633879/ https://pixabay.com/ia/photos/%E6%85%A5%E5%9C%B0- %E3%82%B0%E3%83%AC%E3%83%BC-%E6%B3%A5- %E5%89%82%E3%82%B0%E3%83%AC+1836537/	Same as EU page
4	UNOPS	10	Right	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/146128/unops	https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/%E7%BE%A4%E8%A1%86- %E4%BA%BA%E3%60%85- %E3%82%B7%E3%B3%AB%E3%B2%A8%E3%83%B3%E3%83% &%E4%BA%BA-2718833/	Same as EU page
5	WHO	11	Left	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/152701/who-world-health- organization	https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/covid-19- %E3%83%91%E3%83%83%83%87%E3%83%9F%E3%83%8 3%E3%82%AF-5053095/ https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/%E7%94%B7- %E3%83%9B%E3%83%8C%E3%83%AC%E3%83%AC%E3%82% B9-%E8%B2%A7%E5%9B%B0-1550501/	https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/covid-19- %E3%83%91%E3%83%83%E3%83%87%E3%83%9F%E3%83%9F%E3%83%8 https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/%E7%94%87- %E3%83%98%E3%83%8b2%E5%83%A0%E3%83%AC%E3%82% B9-%E8%82%A7%E5%9B%80-1550501/ https://pixabay.com/ja/vectors/%E3%82%B2%E3%83%AC%E3%83 3%88-%E6%98%8E%E7%B4%B0%E6%9B%88- %E6%8A%80%E8%A1%93-7584115/ https://pixabay.com/ja/vectors/elon%E3%83%9E%E3%82%B2%E3 %82%AF-%E5%8A%955%E8%B3%87%E5%AE%B6- %E7%99%BA%E6%98%8E%E8%80%85-6082845/ https://pixabay.com/ja/llustrations/%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%8A%955%E8%83%87%E5%AE%B6- %E7%99%BA%E6%98%8E%E8%80%85-6082845/ https://pixabay.com/ja/llustrations/%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%8A%95%E8%83%90%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%8A%95%E8%83%90%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%8A%95%E8%83%90%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%8A%95%E8%83%90%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%82%AA%E3%83%90%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%82%AA%E3%83%90%E3%83%90%E3%83%A9%E3 %82%AF-%E5%82%AA%E3%83%90%E3%83%90%E3 %82%AF-%E5%82%AA%E3%83%90%E3%83%90%E3 %82%AF-%E5%86%85%B5%E8%82%A83%90 %E6%94%BF%E6%82%B8%E7%9A%84-1087032/ https://www.shutterstock.com/cs/image-vector/cotober-28-2016- vector-illustration-showing-505724167
6	OHCHR	6	Left	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/35792/ohchr	https://pixabay.com/ia/photos/%E4%86A%BA- %E9%80%9A%E4%BF%A1%E7%856%82- %E7%A4%BC%64%BC%9A%E7%9A%84%E3%81%AA%E3%83% A1%E3%83%87%E3%82%A3%E3%82%A2-3108155/ https://pixabay.com/ia/photos/%E6%89%88- %E3%83%61%E3%83%EC%E3%83%A0- %E3%83%A6%E3%83%86%E3%83%A2 %E3%83%A6%E3%83%86%E3%83%A2 %E3%83%A6%E3%83%86%E3%83%A2	Same as EU page
7	UNHCR	5	Right	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/327109/unhcr	https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/%E5%AE%B6%E6%97%AE- %E6%97%A5%E6%B2%A1-%E5%A5%B3%E6%80%A7- %E5%AD%90%E4%BE%9B%E9%81%94-%E7%88%B6-3347049/	Same as EU page
8	World Bank Group	8	Left	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/307468/world-bank-group	https://www.istockphoto.com/cs/fotografie/leteck%C3%BD-pohled- shora-kontejnery-lodn%C3%AD-n%C3%A1kadn%C3%AD-obchod- obchodn%C3%AD-obchodn%C3%AD-om1454531939- 4901584537utm_source=pixabay&utm_medium=affiliate&utm_cam paign=SRP_photo_sponsored&utm_content=https%Sa3%2F%2Fpixa bay.com%2Fja%2Fphotos%2Fsearch%2F%25E8%25B2%25BF%25 E6%2598%2593%2F%3Fpaq%3D3&utm_term=%E8%B2%8F%E6 %98%25	Same as EU page
9	UNICEF	3	Right	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/144977/unicef-cyan	https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A6%BA%BA- %E8%81%B7%E6%A5%AD-3706725/	Same as EU page
10	UN-DPO	2	Left	https://www.pngwing.com/en/free-png-vszjt	https://pixabav.com/a/photos/%E39&82%B5%E39&83%E3%E3%E3 %AF-%E8%B8%B0%E9%9A%8A-%E6%88%A6%E4%B4%89- %E59%81%B4%E6%A3%84%E3%81%95%E3%82%8C%E3%81%9 F-1063755/	Same as EU page
11	FAO	1	Right	https://allvectorlogo.com/food-and-agriculture-organization-of-the- united-nations-fao-logo-vector/	https://pixabay.com/ja/photos/%E5%B0%8F%E9%BA%A6- %E3%83%95%E3%82%A3%E3%83%BC%E3%83%AB%E3%83%8 9-%E6%97%A5%E6%B2%A1- %E5%9C%B0%E5%B9%B3%E7%B7%9A-640960/	https://pixabay.com/i/a/photog/%E3%B3%93%95%E3%83%94%E3%83%94%E3%83%94%E3%83%94%E3%83%94%E7%94%B0_ batad-3806979/
12	UNEP	4	Left	https://seeklogo.com/vector-logo/349495/the-united-nations- environment-programme	https://www.istockphoto.com/cs/fotografie/elekt%C5%99ina-ze- sof%C3%Alrm%C3%ADch-panel%C5%AF-p%C5%99ehrad-a- v%C4%99Btrm%C3%ADch-turb%C3%ADn-koncepce- obnovitelm%C3%A9-am1335671721: 417259371?utm_source=pixabay&utm_medium=affiliate&utm_cam paign=SRP_photo_sopnosred&utm_content=https%3A%2F%2Fpixa bay.com%2Fja%2Fphotos%2Fsearch%2Fgreen%2520energy%2F8u tm_term=green+energy	https://pixabay.com/ia/photos/%E7%B1%B3- %E3%81%94%E3%81%AF%E3%82%93- %E3%83%A9%E3%82%A4%E3%82%B9- %E9%A3%9F%E5%93%81-67411/

Appendix 2. Letter of approval for distribution of the questionnaire from the Ethics Committee of the University of Groningen (CETO)





commissie ethische toetsing onderzoek (ceto)/ research ethics committee

Prof. dr. Roel Jonkers ceto@rug.nl

To Whom it May Concern

Date 21 June 2023

Dear Sir/Madam,

The Research Ethics Committee (CETO) of the Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen has reviewed the proposal '*Comparison of funding in UN systems between Japan and Europe - Optimising crowdfunding campaigns in different cultures-*' [ID 95323889] submitted by Haruka Yoshioka. The CETO has established that the research protocol follows internationally recognized standards to protect the research participants. We therefore have no objection against this proposal.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. dr. Roel Jonkers

Appendix 3. Information letter and consent form provided to subjects (paper version, English only)

INFORMATION ABOUT THE STUDY: 'COMPARISON OF FUNDING IN UN SYSTEMS BETWEEN JAPAN AND EUROPE - OPTIMISING CROWDFUNDING CAMPAIGNS IN DIFFERENT CULTURES-'

• Purpose of the research project

This questionnaire explores cultural comparisons (between EU and Japanese citizens) of individual attitudes towards donating to international organisations. The United Nations is one of the main global organisations pursuing the global social good. Therefore, its financial stability is very important. The statistical processing of your responses will lead to the accumulation of academic knowledge about the different views on donating to UN development agencies in different regions, and recommendations for measures to improve the donation experience in the future.

• Procedure

You will be asked to complete a 5-15 minute questionnaire about your social background and your knowledge and preferences about donating, either online or on paper. The information you provide will be statistically processed and pseudonymized as part of a larger data set, which ensures that your answers will not be identified in the paper.

• Possible risks or discomfort

With regard to background information, some sensitive information such as country of origin, country of residence, age, gender and religious affiliation will be requested in order to identify statistical trends and differences. In addition, people with particular personal impressions or past experiences of donating may be offended by the information that is evoked.

Voluntary nature of participation

You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and for any reason without adversely affecting the research or otherwise. You can cancel your participation at any time before submission.

Confidentiality of the research data

The results of this study will be treated as confidential and will be stored in a secure manner. Your data will only be processed using a participant number. This number will be kept separate from your personal details such as name and address. In addition, after the completion of the research, that is, after the examination of the master's thesis, the raw data on which the statistical processing is based will be completely shredded and deleted. However, the signed informed consent form will be scanned and the data stored on the University of Groningen's servers.

Further information

If you have any questions about this study, you can ask them now. If you have any questions after participating, you can contact the responsible researcher: Haruka YOSHIOKA, haru-yoshioka-pc@suou.waseda.jp. For any complaints about this study, please contact the Research Ethical Review Committee (CETO)

[ID 95323889] of the Faculties of Arts, Philosophy, and Science and Engineering of the University of Groningen, e-mail: <u>ceto@rug.nl</u>

INFORMED CONSENT

I

The signed participant

consent to participate in a study conducted by *Haruka YOSHIOKA, h.yoshioka@student.rug.nl*

I am aware that participation in this study with the title 'Comparison of funding in UN systems between Japan and Europe - Optimising crowdfunding campaigns in different cultures-' is entirely voluntary. I may withdraw my participation at any time.

The following points have been explained to me:

1. The purpose of this study is

to examine the differences in financial contributions from Japan and the EU to UN development agencies and the cultural factors behind these differences.

2. I will be asked to

complete a 5-15 minute questionnaire about my environmental background and my knowledge and preferences about donating, either online or on paper.

3. What the potential risks or inconveniences are

Some sensitive information, such as country of origin, country of residence, age, gender and religious affiliation will be requested in order to identify statistical trends and differences. In addition, people with particular personal impressions or past experiences of donating may be offended by the information that is evoked.

4. The entire duration of my participation will be approximately *5-15*

minutes.

5. The data obtained during this study will be processed confidentially and will be securely stored.

6. The researcher will answer any questions I have about this study, now or at any time while the study is ongoing.

7. I have been provided with the contact details for the researcher

Date:	Researcher's signature:						

Date: Participant's signature:

For any complaints about this study, please contact the Research Ethical Review Committee (CETO), [ID 95323889], of the Faculties of Arts, Philosophy, and Science and Engineering of the University of Groningen, e-mail: ceto@rug.nl

Appendix 4.Questionnaire and experimental stimuli presented to subjects (paper version, English only)

Questionnaire

These are a few questions on your personal information. This personal information will be handled with care and will be securely stored. Thank you for your understanding and cooperation!

1. Are you a Master of Arts: Euroculture student? Yes (As Europe citizen) , Yes (As 3rd country citizen) , No 2. What is your nationality? 3. What is your age? 4. What is your mother tongue? 5. What languages do you usually speak in your social life? 6. In which country were you born? 7. If you lived in a country different from your nationality for more than 6 months, please give the name and the period. (e.g. USA (7 months)) 8. What is your mother's nationality? 9. What is your father's nationality?

.....

10. Which religi	ous group (or env	vironment) do you belong	to (ir	ndicate the correct answer)?
Christian (Cath	olic Protestant	Other())	Islamic
Jewish Bud	dhism/Shinto	Other()	No religious
11. What is you	r dominant hand	(indicate the correct answ	ver)?	
Left	Right	No preference		
12. Your prefera	able pronounce is	?		
He/him	She/her	They/their	Othe	er ()
	e following do yo e only 1 option.	ou think is the most impo	ortant	aspect of the UN's international mission?
Peace and Secu	rity			
Human Rights				
The Rule of Lav	N			
Development				
Other ()			
-		e, how much money wo 9 Euro ? (eg. WFP 3euros	-	ou allocate to which of the following UN ICR 4euros, FAO 2 euros)
WFP (World Fo	od Programme),	UNHCR (UN High Com	missi	oner for Refugees) ,
UNICEF (UN Int	ernational Child	ren's Emergency Fund),	WHC	(World Health Organization),
FAO (Food and	Agriculture Orga	anization), UNDP (UN De	velop	oment Programme), Other ()
below. (This	is really helpful f	or my research.)	·	estions, please feel freely to write it down

16. Suppose you are preparing to donate €9 to a UN agency campaign. Please look at another 12-set mock crowdfunding campaign page and divide the money so that the total is €9 for each of the left and right sides and circle the number below. Each of the 12 trials is labelled with the logo of the relevant UN agency. Please make sure you complete the questions in the correct order.

Q1. FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

Left: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Right:	€ 0, 1	, 2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q2. UN-DPO: the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations										
Left: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Right:	€ 0, 1	, 2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q3. UNICEF: the United Nations Children's Fund										
Left: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Right:	€ 0, 1	, 2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q4. UNEP: the United Nations Environment Programme										
Left: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Right:	€ 0, 1	, 2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q5. UNHCR: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees										
Left: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Right:	€ 0, 1	, 2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q6. OHCHR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights										
Left: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Right:	€ 0, 1	, 2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q7. IMF: International Monetary Fund										
	D . 1 .			•		_	~	_		

Right: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Left: € 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Q8. The World Bank

Left:	€ 0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9	Right:	€	0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q9. W	Q9. WFP: World Food Programme																					
Left:	€ 0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9	Right:	€	0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q10.	Q10. UNOPS: United Nations Office for Project Services																					
Left:	€ 0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9	Right:	€	0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
Q11.	WHO: Y	Woi	·ld ŀ	leal	th (Orga	aniz	atio	on													
Left:	€ 0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9	Right:	€	0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
012.	UNDP:	Uni	ted	Nat	tion	s D	eve	lop	mer	nt Programm	e											
Q12.		5.11	.cu																			

Left:	€ 0, 1,	2, 3,	4,	5,	6, 7	7, 8,	9	Right:	€	0,	1,	2,	3,	4,	5,	6,	7,	8,	9
-------	---------	-------	----	----	------	-------	---	--------	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	---

Q1: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.





Q2: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.




Q3: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.





Q4: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.





Q5: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.





Q6: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is** \in **9.**



Q7: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is** \in 9.





Q8: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is** \in 9.






Q9: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is** \in 9.





Q10: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is** \in 9.



Q11: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.



Q12: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.



Appendix 5.Information letter, consent form questionnaires and experimental stimuli presented to subjects (online version, Japanese only (stimuli is in English only))



日本語	~

Demographics

研究についての情報

日本と欧州の国連システムにおける資金調達の比較 -異なる文化におけるクラウドファンディング・キャンペーンの最適化について-

- 研究プロジェクトの目的

このアンケートは、国際機関への寄付に対する個人の意識について、文 化的な比較(EU市民と日本市民の比較)を調査目的としています。国 際連合は、グローバルな社会的利益を追求する主要なグローバル組織の ひとつであり、その財政的安定性は重要です。本調査における回答を統 計的に処理することで、国連開発機関への寄付に対する地域ごとの考え 方の違いに関する学術的知見の蓄積と、今後の寄付経験向上のための方 策の提言につなげます。

- 手続き

あなたの社会的背景、寄付に関する知識や嗜好について、オンラインまたは紙で5~15分のアンケートに答えていただきます。提供された情報は統計的に処理され、より大きなデータセットの一部として仮名化されるため、あなたの回答が論文で特定されることはありません。

- 起こりうるリスクや不快感

背景情報に関しては、統計的な傾向や差異を特定するために、出身国、 居住国、年齢、性別、宗教などの機密情報が要求されます。また、特定 の個人的な印象や過去の寄付経験をお持ちの方は、その情報が喚起され ることで不快感を抱く可能性があります。

- 参加の任意性

この研究への参加は、研究等に悪影響を及ぼすことなく、いつでも、ど のような理由でも、自由に中止することができます。しかしながら提出 後はあなたの回答が仮名化されており、あなたの回答を特定することが できないため、回答の取り下げをすることができないことにご留意くだ さい。

- 研究データの機密性

本研究の結果は機密情報として扱われ、安全な方法で保存されます。あ なたのデータは参加者番号によってのみ処理されます。この番号は、氏 名や住所などの個人情報とは別に保管されます。さらに、研究終了後、 つまり修士論文の審査終了後、統計処理のベースとなった生データは完 全にシュレッダーにかけられて削除されます。ただし、署名されたイン フォームド・コンセントはスキャンされ、データはフローニンゲン大学のサーバーに保存されます。

- その他の情報

この研究に関して質問がある場合は、いつでも質問してください。参加 後に質問がある場合は、責任研究者:吉岡悠、

h.yoshioka@student.rug.nlにご連絡ください。本研究に関する苦情 は、 フローニンゲン大学文学部、哲学部、理工学部の 研究倫理審査委 員会 (CETO) [研究ID 95323889]、e-mail: ceto@rug.nl までご連絡 ください。

私 署名を行った参加者は

吉岡悠、h.yoshioka@student.rug.nl による調査に参加することに同意します。

私は、以下の研究に参加します。日本と欧州の国連システムにおける 資金調達の比較-異なる文化におけるクラウドファンディング・キャン ペーンの最適化について-と題する本研究への参加は、完全に任意であ ることを理解しています。回答中、私はいつでも参加を中止することが できます。

以下の点について説明を受けました:

1. この研究の目的は、

日本と欧州からの国連開発機関への資金拠出の異なりと、その背景にある文化的要因を検証すること。

2. 回答内容は、

私の環境的背景、寄付に関する知識と嗜好について、5~15分のアンケ ートに答えること。

3. 潜在的なリスクや不都合は、

統計的な傾向や差異を特定するために、出身国、居住国、年齢、性別、 宗教など、一部の機微な情報が求められる。また、特定の個人的な印象 や過去の寄付の経験がある場合、喚起される情報によって気分を害され る可能性があること。

4. 参加する時間は、

約 5-15 分を予定していること。

5. 本調査で得られたデータは極秘に処理され、安全に保管されること

6. 研究者は、この研究に関して、現在あるいは研究進行中いつでも、 私の質問に答えること。

7. 私は研究者の連絡先を知らされていること。



国籍をお答えください

年齢をお答えください

あなたは大学の卒業者ですか?

○ はい

○ いいえ

その他

母国語をお答えください

社会生活で使用する言語をお答えください

累計で6カ月以上、国籍と異なった国で生活をしたことがある方は、その国と期間とをお答えください。(例:アメリカに7カ月)

お母さまの国籍をお答えください

お父さまの国籍をお答えください

どの宗教グループ(または環境)にあなたは属していますか? キリスト教 (カトリック)
キリスト教 (プロテスタント)
イスラム教
イスラム教
ム教/神道
その他
無宗教

利き手をお答えください

○ 左手

○ 右手

○ 両利きまたは利き手無し

性別をお答えください。

Ο	男性	
Ο	女性	
0		その他

国際連合が促進する最も重要な要素は以下のうちどれだと思いますか? 1つだけお答えください。

- O Peace and Security
- O Human Rights
- The Rule of Law
- O Development

\bigcirc	その他

あなたが900円を以下の国連関連機関に寄付すると仮定してください。 合計額が900円になる様に、機関を選択して金額を100円単位で記入し てください。(例:WFP 300円、UNHCR 400円、FAO 200円)



これらの質問について、何かアイデア、ご指摘、ご懸念がありました ら、ご自由にお書きください。(私の研究にとても役立ちます!)。

あなたは、以下の国連機関の寄付キャンペーンに900円を寄付する準備 をしているとします。 下の12組のクラウドファンディング・キャンペ

ーンの模擬ウェブページを見て、それぞれ合計が900円になるようにチ ェックしてください。尚、これら12組のページにはそれぞれ関連する国 連機関のロゴが記されています。

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。 合計が900円になるように左右それぞれチェックしてください。

Q1: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.



Ql. FAO: 国連食糧農業機関

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥O	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
0	¥300	\bigcirc
0	¥400	\bigcirc
0	¥500	\bigcirc
0	¥600	\bigcirc
0	¥700	\bigcirc
0	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

合計が900円になるように左右それぞれチェックしてください。

Q2: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.



2

Q2. UN-DPO: 国連平和活動局

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥O	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q3: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.



3

Q3. UNICEF: 国連児童基金

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥O	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q4: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \in 9.



4

Q4. UNEP: 国連環境計画

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥Ο	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥ 900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q5: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is** \in **9**.



5

Q5. UNHCR: 国連難民高等弁務官事務所

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥Ο	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q6: Assuming you would donate \in 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is** \in **9.**



6

Q6. OHCHR: 国連人権高等弁務官事務所

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥Ο	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q7: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.



7

Q7. IMF: 国際通貨基金

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥0	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q8: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.**



8

Q8. The World Bank: 世界銀行

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥Ο	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q9: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.**



9

Q9. WFP: 国連世界食糧計画

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥Ο	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q10: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.**



10

Q10. UNOPS: 国連プロジェクトサービス機関

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥O	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q11: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.



11

Q11. WHO: 世界保健機関

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥O	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

あなたが下記のページを見て寄付をしたいと思ったと仮定してください。

Q12: Assuming you would donate \notin 9, please allocate how much money you would donate to the fundraising campaign in the image below. **Please circle the number in the separated questionnaire so that total is \notin 9.**



12

Q12. UNDP: 国連開発計画

左の画像		右の画像
\bigcirc	¥Ο	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥100	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥200	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥300	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥400	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥500	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥600	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥700	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥800	\bigcirc
\bigcirc	¥900	\bigcirc

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