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**The relationship between non-electoral participation  
and democracy in Europe**

**Dissertation**

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**OLOMOUC 2022**

## A NOTE ON AUTHORSHIP

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I hereby declare that this thesis is solely my own work. Selected chapters of this thesis have already been peer-reviewed.

Praha 7.1. 2022

Jakub Bakule

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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First and foremost, I would like to thank my loved ones for their everlasting belief that if I just sit down, I will finish my dissertation in no time. Without your support I would not be able to go even through my master's degrees. Kateřina, Radek, thank you!

I would also like to express my gratitude to the Department of Politics and European Studies, most notably to my supervisor Tomáš Lebeda for giving me the opportunity to pursue my passion in form of PhD studies both here in the Czech Republic and in Germany at Georg-August-Universität Göttingen.

Furthermore, I thank all my colleagues who helped me to more understandable, to improve my research and to grow as a person. I am also indebted to all the people I have not met, yet they influenced my work and me as a person. I thank to all the anonymous reviewers and all the scholars that advanced our understanding of democracy. Although I am not sure if I have seen further, I am convinced that I have been standing on the shoulders of giants.

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## Introduction: The Problem

The tale of democracy is a collection of stories on the various types of political participation. Some are positive, and others are rather uninspiring. As such, some theorists of democracy chose to tell the cautionary tales while others preferred a more optimistic approach. However, these stories rarely mix in one setting. The goal of this dissertation is to provide an analytical overview of both approaches to the political participation in democratic theory, utilize their strengths, and test their limits. The relationship between participation and democracy is not as straightforward as originally thought, and there is a need for a re-evaluation on multiple levels. Europe is an ideal place to start such an endeavor as it has hosted both successes and failures. Today Europe can help us again understand the role of non-electoral political participation (NEP) in modern liberal democracy and contemporary democratic theory overall.

Over the years, the study of political participation has focused on voting as the main mechanism of the liberal democracy. The studies of electoral behavior were able to paint a vivid picture of voters based on their sociodemographic and psychological traits. Nowadays, the institutional and sociological approaches provide a complex framework for understanding electoral behavior (see Arzheimer et al., 2016). Furthermore, there is an almost universal agreement that higher turnout is beneficial for democracy (see Machin, 2011, p. 103) as it shields countries in times of crisis (Czeńnik, 2006). As such, some advocate for the introduction of compulsory voting (Birch, 2009; Hill, 2006; Machin, 2011).

On the other hand, although free elections are necessary, they are not a sufficient condition for a liberal democracy (Zakaria, 2007). With the increasing electoral volatility and voters' dealignment in the past decades (cf. the studies in 1960s e.g., Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), it became clear that understanding voting is not enough to correctly analyze contemporary democracy. At the same time there has been an increase in political sophistication and proliferation of post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1971). Generational values have shifted in the direction of self-expression and emancipative values. Democratization and digitalization have then further widened the opportunities for citizens to participate outside the election. As a result, there has been a rise and expansion of NEP. Consider the variation in these acts:

- The anti-capitalism activists of Occupy Wall Street camp in New York. They have also circulated a leaflet urging their fellow protestors to show maximum restraint to stave off any potential unrest or violence (France-Press, 2011).
- In Charlottesville, white nationalists with torches protested the removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee. They shouted anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic and racist slogans. Some were dressed in full tactical gear and openly carrying rifles (Gunter, 2017).
- A ballot group submitted petitions to prohibit a second-trimester abortion procedure in Michigan. The Legislature had a 40-day window to pass the initiative, and the Governor could not veto it (Fox2, 2019). At the same time, the Bans Off My Body campaign gathered signatures for a petition and convinced nearly 140 musicians to join its campaign to battle restrictions on legal abortion (Garvey, 2019). Subsequently, the 200 US senators and congresspeople asked the Supreme Court to overturn the precedent abortion laws (Segers, 2020).
- A petition to abolish the House of Lords in the UK saw 100,000 signatures in two weeks following a scandal with political appointments (Read, 2020).
- After getting attention on Twitter, Yumi Ishikawa gathered 18,000 signatures on a petition she submitted to the labor ministry calling for a law that would bar employers from forcing women to wear high heels at work (Rich, 2019).
- Campaigners raised almost £18,000 for the inflatable helium-filled six-meter-high figure of Donald Trump depicted as an angry baby. London Mayor Sadiq Khan gave permission for the balloon to fly (BBC, 2018).

Over past three decades the body of literature devoted to such acts of NEP has grown substantially. Similarly, as with electoral behavior, we have a better understanding of what drives NEP. We understand that socioeconomic status (Verba & Nie, 1972) is only one of the key resources that help explain why some citizens participate and others do not (Brady et al., 1995). Researchers have also explored how changing civic norms translate in changing patterns of participation (Dalton, 2008; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Welzel et al., 2005). Overall, there is a substantial body of literature devoted to the differences among groups in the type of participation (Canache, 2012; Schlozman et al., 2010) or its amount both on the individual level



(Dalton 2008; Bolzendahl & Coffee 2013; Gherghina & Geisel 2017; Webb, 2013) and on the level of states (Vlachová & Lebeda, 2006; Vráblíková, 2013).

However, in comparison to voting, we are still not sure what effects NEP has on democracy. As diverse as they are both in form and preferred outcome, political actions citizens undertake outside the electoral arena influence the political system. NEP varies not only in type but also in transferred information (Schlozman et al., 2012). Citizens' participation can serve as a tool for empowerment (Arnstein, 1969) and better responsiveness (Pateman, 2012). On the other hand, NEP might immobilize the government with conflicting demands (Lijphart, 1989, p. 51) or even threaten the stability of democracy when non-democrats get involved (Dahl, 1956 p. 88–89). As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, p. 5) remarked, one cannot agree with the assumption that any participation of any sort is good.

The question about the effects of NEP is therefore not only theoretical, but it also has key practical implication for democracy. Larry Diamond (2007, p. 119) remarked that the specter haunting democracy today is bad governance and stresses the need a revolutionary change that would bring a better, more accountable, and more transparent form of governance. There is an agreement that low government effectiveness slowly turns into dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy which, over time, translates into low support for democracy as a system (see Dahl, 1971, p. 149; Easton, 1975; Lipset, 1959, p. 89; Magalhães, 2013).

The optimistic view of NEP argues that the mass involvement of citizens could improve the government effectiveness, most notably in the areas of responsiveness and accountability (see Chapter 1.4.3). Therefore, NEP should lead to an improved democracy. On the other hand, skeptics warn that excessive NEP is a potential threat, and it might incapacitate the government (see Chapter 1.3). This idea is, perhaps, best captured in the Charles de Gaulle rhetorical question about France: “How can you govern a country which has 246 varieties of cheese?” (Knowles, 1999, p. 255). Similar question is then haunting researchers who must first answer how to analyze the immense variation in NEP.

The latter quarrel about NEP then inevitably leads to the values and attitudes of participating citizens. Sceptics see NEP only as a tool without intrinsic values. NEP solely spreads the values and attitudes of participants throughout the society. As such they distance beliefs and actions (see Easton, 1975, p. 436). Skeptics fear that non-democratic values are

dormant in society and apathy of citizens serves as a containment. This idea comes from the structural-functionalist approach that was popular until the 1960s. It assumed that the elements of society such as norms and institutions naturally evolved to perform some function. The function of apathy in democracy was then to stop non-democratic values from spreading and shield the government from too many irreconcilable demands.

The optimistic view about NEP instead focuses on the action itself. The process of participation and deliberation endows citizens with civic competences and democratic values. More participation thus leads to more democrats with increased participation. In the end, NEP creates a better informed and more democratic public. Moreover, the vivid participation leads to a more responsive and accountable government. Policy articulation and implementation improve and more closely correspond to the needs of the public. Therefore, everybody should participate.

These disagreements have remained in discussion over the last 50 years. They have resulted in a situation where nowadays NEP is essentially the main differentiating factor among individual theories of democracy (Teorell, 2006). Thus, there is a need for new empirical evidence to settle the difference. First, it is necessary to examine the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness on the systemic level of states. Second, it is important to address the effect of individual democratic values on participation itself. Therefore, to understand contemporary democracy, three key questions must be answered first:

*(1) How does the overall level of non-electoral participation influence government effectiveness? (2) Does the impact of non-electoral participation on government effectiveness differ based on the motivation of participants? (3) How do individual democratic values influence non-electoral participation?*

The first problem researchers face when answering these questions is the discontinuity of democratic theory. The idea of widespread political participation gave birth to democracy. For a while, the concepts of popular political participation and democracy were inseparable. The notion that everyone could and should be involved in decision-making was crucial for Periklès as well as for the classical theorists who were certain about the benefits of popular participation. J.S. Mill praised its educational function and J.J. Rousseau saw it as the sine qua non of democracy. However, the experience with totalitarian regimes showed the potential

threat of mass participation. The collapse of inter-war democratic regimes led scholars to re-evaluate the relationship between mass participation and democracy. Researchers focused on the stability of regimes and left the participation on the periphery of interest rather than in the center of the theory. Although this omission was criticized, the role of political participation remained an unresolved issue in the theory of democracy.

For a moment it seemed that the unclear role of political participation did not matter much, and that the quarrel among theorists of democracy would soon fade. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of history (see Fukuyama, 1989, 2006), and democracy was on the rise. However, the recent failure of the two-decades-long process of democracy building in Afghanistan shows that it is once more necessary to ask what kind of democracy is desired. Individual approaches vary mainly in the reasoning if and why political participation is needed (see Dahl, 1956, 1971; Habermas, 1987; Pateman, 1970, 2012). Some see it as an opportunity for a better democracy (Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970; MacPherson, 1977; Barber, 1984), and others view this as a possible threat to the stability of the democratic system (Dahl, 1956; Sartori, 1987; Huntington, 1975). Where the participatory theory blames the lack of participation from preventing the emergence of a better system, the empirical theory takes some apathy as a precondition of the stability of the current one. The main conflict then lies within the quality of the status quo; whether contemporary representative democracy is the best system which cannot be improved and thus these efforts only pose a threat; or the representative democracy can be improved and attempts to make it more participatory should be made. Thus, the question can be restated as whether participation has a positive impact on government effectiveness, none at all, or can be potentially harmful.

The disagreement spurs from the gap between theoretical assumptions and empirical findings regarding the levels of participation. As a result, the theories of democracy are full of contradictions and paradoxes. Empirical theory of democracy focuses on the role of institutions and procedures. The attitudes and behavior of citizens often plays a marginal role and emphasis is on the structure of the whole system. In its pure form, empirical theory of democracy comes close to the political elitism of Mosca and Pareto (see Sartori, 1987, p. 157). As such it struggles with the question of legitimacy when it tries to explain the puzzle of representation without popular participation (see also Verba, 1996, p. 2). Moreover, often there is also only a loose connection between empirical practice and normative theory (McAllister, 2017, p. 10, 16-17;

Teorell, 2006). Ever since Shumpeter's (1947) writings, the focus is on the daily practice of democracy and not normative ideas about its function.

Correspondingly, the relationship between trust in government and action represents a paradox of its own. On one hand, trust is needed for the effective operation of government. On the other hand, citizens should remain cautious and control the government. The mixed civic culture seemingly cuts through the Gordian knot of trade-off between government effectiveness and accountability. However, it focuses only on the potentially active citizens, not their actual involvement (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 339–347), a mirage of accountability and effectiveness. In the end, the empirical theory of democracy sees participation mostly as a tool without an intrinsic value. Participation is perceived as an input to the system and therefore the focus is mainly on the representativeness of participating citizens (Dahl, 2006; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1987; Schlozman et al., 2012).

The theories of participatory democracy and deliberative democracy offer different takes which are supposed to improve the empirical theory of democracy. However, they are not without flaws. Both often disregard the initial values of citizens (Clark, 2014, p. 3; Berman, 1997; Chambers & Kopstein, 2001; Mutz, 2006). The participation of previously democratically educated citizens then supposes to have solely positive impacts and the more participation there is, the better democracy (Pateman, 1970, p. 105). However, the participatory democracy corner themselves by creating the paradox of the ideal citizen and vicious circle of participation. The problem is that the ideal participant can be only created through the educative process of participation itself in the first place (MacPherson, 1977). Deliberative democrats then focus on the process of deliberation as the solution to the legitimation problem of the empirical theory. Yet, it faces the same problems. It also relies on the procedural logic of the empirical theory (Bohman, 1990). Deliberation is supposed to be democratic process and thus it legitimizes the democracy through the process of discussion. All the outputs from deliberation are thus assumed to be automatically democratic.

The disagreement between the two approaches also reflects the socio-economic differences in society. This partly originated from the first post-war empirical studies showing that authoritarian-minded citizens were politically passive and came from the lower social strata (see e.g., Lipset, 1959a). Some therefore feared that excessive participation might lower the consensus on democratic norms within the civic culture as it brings new people in (Almond &

Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1956; see also Krouse, 1982). Participation serves as a medium through which harmful ideas enter the political arena. On the other hand, participation might not just educate citizens (Putnam, 1993) but also serve as a tool for empowerment (Arnstein, 1969). Therefore, it is important to re-evaluate not just the impact of different levels of participation on the government effectiveness but also the interaction between values and participation on the individual level.

After more than half a century, the debate continues. However, the world around us has changed. Nowadays, the threat of pure, authoritarian-oriented participation is admittedly less acute than in the first half of the 20th century. For a brief moment in the 1990s, it even seemed that democracy was the only game in town. Yet quite soon it became apparent that some citizens paid democracy only lip service (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003), and the understanding of democracy among citizens was not universal (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). The novelty of the situation is given by the range of regime preferences involved. There are both democracies with adjectives (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) and competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2002). These regimes have some democratic features but omit some of the core principles. Citizens' democratic values follow the same logic, and it is not possible to divide them into clear-cut democratic and non-democratic groups anymore.

The stability of democratic regimes still dominates the study of comparative politics (Stockemer & Carbonetti, 2010, p. 237), and the two schools of democratic thought presented in this thesis still represent the core theoretical framework. Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011, p. 591) remarked that most notably that the empirical theory of democracy is the driving force of research on political participation and comparative politics (see also McAllister, 2017). However, there are different threats for the democratic stability nowadays. In Europe we observe various forms of democratic malaise, and some of the post-communist states are showing a declining consensus on the liberal values (Dawson & Hanley, 2016). The counter wave to democratization does not come in the form of sudden rupture (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Instead, it comes in the form of weakening of democracy and often leaves just the shallow electoral democracies in place (Diamond, 1999). The debate whether there could be a deconsolidation in sight still rages on as shown by the lively debate in the *Journal of Democracy* (Foa & Mounk, 2016; Plattner, 2017; Foa & Mounk, 2017). Nevertheless, the continuous underperformance of government would be the first step (Lipset, 1959b, 1995).

Democratic values and their interaction with participation are becoming more and more important for democracy (see Kirbiš, 2013), and the role of NEP cannot be avoided (cf. Parvin, 2017). The activity of civil society plays a crucial role in democratic consolidation. It enables the functional accountability of institutions going beyond sole checks and balances (see O'Donnell, 1998; Lindberg et al., 2017). Therefore, NEP might help to stabilize democratic regimes and may strengthen the accountability of government and its responsiveness. The improvements in government effectiveness may lead to a better performance of democracy and provide a source of legitimacy for the regime.

Nevertheless, civil society can play a positive role in democracy only if the core democratic principles are accepted and known by most citizens. Otherwise, it can destabilize the democratic system. The constant involvement of groups which do not adhere to liberal democracy deteriorates the legitimacy of democratic regimes (Booth & Seligson, 2009). The “polyarchy latecomers” like the Czech Republic as described in Chapter 5 of this dissertation are among the most vulnerable (see O'Donnell, 1998). The growing gap between liberal and electoral democracy and the emergence of hybrid regimes returned the analysis of political culture to the center-point of the comparative study of democracy (Diamond, 1999, p. 162). Differences in citizens' values crucially influence their behavior. Yet, it is still not clear how much people really want to participate and subsequently what kind of democracy they prefer (see Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Moreover, the democratic preference now reflects more than clear-cut democratic or authoritarian options. For example, citizens might support democracy without its liberal core.

It seems that democratic theory is still catching up to the substantial political and social change that has occurred over the last three decades (see Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The democratization and rapid development of technology has brought new inputs (Barber, 1984, p. ix–xix). Civic norms are changing (Dalton, 2008; Dalton & Welzel, 2014), and the party systems cannot absorb these shocks as hoped in the 1980s. As a result, the role of political parties in representation is declining (Mair, 2005). Voting alone then cannot capture citizens' involvement in politics, and the former ways of civic participation are eroding (see Putnam, 2000). The need to analyze the role of NEP in the theory of democracy cannot be avoided any longer.

From the first part of the introduction, it might seem that the most acute problem researchers are facing while searching for answers is theoretical. However, it is also methodological. NEP offers more flexibility to citizens than voting. Through NEP, citizens can express their demands more freely, and researchers can analyze the relationship between values, attitudes, and behavior more closely. However, the variation in immediate motives of citizens related to action is too great for an analysis based on survey data. The specific motivation is almost impossible to decode. Still, as Van Deth (2014, p. 350) remarked, “[...] neglecting the goals or intentions of citizens as a defining feature of political participation would throw out the baby with the bathwater.”

Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, I instead utilize the more persistent values and attitudes as a proxy measure of citizens’ motives. Although they represent imperfect tools, they allow us to derive basic generalizations. The mysteries of contemporary democracy can be uncovered only through the combination of data about both the state and values, attitudes, and behavior of their citizens. Furthermore, it is now common knowledge that simple survey questions about democratic preference does not capture the intricacy of democratic values. Sadly, complex data about the democratic values are not broadly available and researchers must utilize more specific sources.

The last problem of this thesis was a choice of the appropriate sample for the analysis. Some early works in the field that helped shape democratic theory have been criticized based on their methodology. The main questions were whether their units of analysis were fundamentally comparable, or whether the generalizations could be based on a limited number of isolated cases. In the end, Europe is the best region for the revision of democratic theory. European inter-war democracies and their collapses were the key cases shaping the birth of the empirical theory of democracy. Mass participation in European totalitarian regimes further shaped the opinions of theorists in the first half of the 20th century. Europe also demonstrates the modernization of society and change in the behavior of its citizens. Methodologically, Europe is still a culturally homogeneous region yet with variations in civic norms and democratic preferences. It offers a great variation in both NEP and government effectiveness. Even though this dissertation focuses on the overall role of NEP in democratic theory, the analysis is limited to within the Europe borders. The systemic analysis is complemented by the individual level analysis of Czech citizens that is based on country specific datasets.

The general goal of this thesis is to add new evidence to the contemporary theories of democracy which are often based on examples dating back to the middle of the 20th century. The original empirical research is outdated. Though, one thing has not changed at all. The interaction between values and behavior remains as important as ever. This represents the key to decipher the enigma of participation. Civic norms were crucial for Almond and Verba (1963) more than 50 years ago and continue to play a vital role today. Outside the academic and philosophical debate, these norms influence the structure of civic education as the question of “What kind of citizen we need?” is directly linked to the normative expectations about citizens’ behavior (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). The same is true for the debate on the institutional setting of democracy or democratic innovations (Sousa Santos, 1998; Vráblíková, 2013). The motivation to explore this relationship between democratic values and participation is due to the fact that neither of the two major streams of democratic theory offer a satisfying answer.



## Introduction: The Thesis

Both main streams of the democratic theory were formed in a world which no longer exists. The Second World War and the following Cold War shaped politics and society. However, the modernization of society and the supposed “end of history” have brought new impulses for democracy as well as new challenges. Citizens have different values and new tools for public involvement at their disposal. Due to its origins, the empirical theory of democracy was cautious of widespread NEP and does not assign much value to active citizens. As a result, it is wary of citizens' involvement. On the other hand, strong democracy is based on mass public involvement and sees NEP as a positive phenomenon. Thus, new evidence is welcomed and needed to address the fears and hopes of the respective theories.

I argue that, in Europe, the quality of democracy and its performance are key for the stability of democratic regimes. Europe is the stronghold of contemporary democracy, yet the prolonged government ineffectiveness combined with fading consensus about liberal values are the basis of potential democratic deconsolidation. NEP then directly influences support for democracy in two conceptually different areas—specific and diffuse support (Easton, 1965). Although the concepts are connected, there is a need for a theoretical and analytical distinction (Easton, 1975). Furthermore, the individual theories present a complex chain of relationships that describes causal relations both from participation to democracy and from democracy to participation.

Therefore, the key assumption of this dissertation is the need for an analysis on two different levels—both analytically and theoretically. The empirical theory of democracy has some strong assumptions about the systemic effects of NEP and so does strong democracy. The macro-level with the unit of analysis of country-year can thus better explain the characteristics of the whole system (see the overview of macro-level hypothesis in the Table 1 in Chapter 3). The combination of cross-country time-series data for European democracies and the fixed effect models is then ideal. It focuses on the variation within one country over time. Therefore, the debate is not riddled with the effect of specific national cultures, history, or institutions—the issues of crucial importance for the theory of democracy yet often unsolvable by quantitative

analysis. The choice of the fixed effect is therefore not solely a methodological issue but rather a substantive one (Mummolo & Peterson, 2018).

Still, the macro-level analysis itself is not sufficient. It has a blind spot when it comes to the individual agency of citizens. Combined individual values have impact on the system. However, they also influence the behavior of individual citizens. Participatory theory of democracy is conscious of this fact, and the educatory function of participation is its key mechanism. Nevertheless, it fails to consider the initial values of participants. Deliberative democracy then seemingly bypasses the problem by relying on the democratic process to form the values. Nevertheless, it also needs to address the question of inclusiveness in the process itself based on individual values. These relationships can be only analyzed on the micro-level where citizens are the unit of analysis. The results of analysis in this dissertation are in line with these expectations. They show that NEP is best understood in its variety on both levels. Contemporary theory of democracy must first consider who and under which conditions participates before making the general claims about the effects of NEP on the whole system.

The first thesis of the dissertation is that mass NEP does not constitute a problem when it embodies a pro-democratic participation. As such, it does not decrease the legitimacy of a democratic regime nor the consensus on underlying norms. The relationship between the system and its people calls for the analysis on the macro-level of countries. Most of the research has been concerned with the equality of NEP, i.e., who takes part and who does not (Schlozman et al., 2012). I focus both on quantity and quality of NEP. The results show that the government effectiveness is positively influenced by NEP, and that the underlying values of citizens matter. Participants with democratic values have a positive impact on the government effectiveness while the citizens with non-democratic values do not.

The second thesis I pursue in this dissertation is that varying democratic values influence the actions of citizens. The proliferation of democracy is also accompanied by the confusion of the idea itself. After all, the democratic theory has been in constant disagreement over the last 50 years. The focus on free elections leads to a situation where some citizens do not consider the liberal rights as part of the core of the recent democracy. Moreover, there is still a group of citizens who do not support democracy at all. Europe might be democratic, yet all of its citizens are not. The post-communist states are the ones who are most prone to the varying understanding of democracy among its citizens.

The second part of the dissertation combines the debate on the citizens' concepts of democracy with participation by addressing the differences among individual groups. I argue that the varying difference found among some of the predictors of participation is given by the fact that the analysis often disregards group differences. Then the studies are mostly driven by the largest group of liberal democrats. If considered, the differences among groups regarding democratic values are often assumed to be a result of compositional effects. This analytic part seeks to uncover whether there are contextual effects at play as well. It is therefore needed to analyze other factors besides the socioeconomic differences. Only the first sentence of the famous quote from Verba et al. (1995, p. 221) spoke directly about resources when explaining that citizens do not participate, "because they can't, because they don't want to, or because nobody asked." The motivation and personal networks are other crucial factors. I argue that the democratic values of citizens influence under which condition they participate. However, to address this issue researchers must first more precisely identify the variation in the democratic values of the 21st century.

## Introduction: Dissertation Layout

Strong democracy presents a theoretical alternative to the empirical theory of democracy. Its proponents want to improve representative democracy. However, to show that the more participatory democracy is a viable option, strong democracy must cross two hurdles. First, it is necessary to provide evidence that NEP does not threaten the normal operation of the democracy, i.e., it does not decrease the effectiveness of government. The advocates of strong democracy claim otherwise. Yet so far, the arguments were mostly normative. Second, strong democracy must prove to be inclusive. Equality is one main principles of deliberative democracy, and the educatory function of participation cannot be utilized if some people do not participate.

For this reason, the general structure of this dissertation is built around the two-step re-evaluation of the current theories of democracy. The dissertation focuses both on the theoretical and methodological aspects of the analysis. The first part provides a thorough overview of the two general streams of democratic theory. It analyses the origins of the discontinuity in democratic theory and shows that the main schools of thought differ mainly in their evaluation of NEP. Chapter 1 analyses why one group sees NEP as a potential threat to the stability of the system, and the second group rather promotes NEP as an opportunity for a better democracy. Chapter 2 focuses more closely on the values of participating citizens and complements the theoretical framework from Chapter 1 that was built in between the 1950s and the 1980s with research conducted over the past three decades. Chapter 3 then brings all together the concept of the civic culture as a part of the empirical theory of democracy and the direct action as a part of strong democracy. It explains the combined effects of values and action.

Together Chapters 1, 2, and 3 provide a robust theoretical framework of the first part of the dissertation. They focus on the structural level of the democratic system and set hypotheses about the overall impact of NEP on democracy. The analytical Chapter 4 subsequently focuses on the macro level which can uncover the relationships that influence the whole system. However, the hypotheses on the structural level are also based on the set of assumptions about the behavior on the individual level. Chapter 5 therefore complements the macro-level analysis with a closer look at the relationship between democratic values and participation on the individual level. The macro-level first answers what impact does the participation of different

groups have. Then the micro-level analysis shows under which conditions these groups participate.

Chapter 4 utilizes cross-country time-series data of European democracies between 2002 and 2016. It combines datasets from the European Social Survey and the World Bank to present the macro-level analysis with the unit of analysis of country-year. The European region was chosen as the pooled research design used in this dissertation must first provide the comparability of individual cross-sections. The main concern should always be whether the units of analysis are fundamentally comparable (see Sayrs, 1989), and the basic homogeneity of the cross-sections on the dependent variable is necessary (see Stimson 1985). Second, Europe provides the required variation in the levels of NEP (see Figure 10 in Appendix) and levels of government effectiveness (see Figure 4 in Chapter 4.2).

Similar macro-analysis is common in the econometrics because of the large T datasets (for an example of interdisciplinary research see Gerring et al., 2005). It is less common in political science, yet political scientists are no strangers to the cross-country time-series analysis. However, in political science, such research is often challenged on the methodological grounds. There are important limits to the favorite method of the OLS regression with calculation of the panel-corrected standard errors. Chapter 4.1. therefore, provides thorough analysis methods and potential issues.

The macro-analysis uses the government effectiveness as a dependent variable. Chapter 4.2 specifies multiple models to test whether the original theories still hold. First, the overall levels of NEP or civic culture enter the models. Subsequently the effect of NEP is disaggregated to consider its type or values and attitudes of participating citizens. I combine the data from the World Governance Indicator with the aggregated data from the European Social Survey. The first provides the dependent variable and controls for various measures of socioeconomic development of countries, e.g., unemployment or years of democracy. The latter includes the key independent variables in the form of NEP and citizens values.

However, first part of the thesis clearly shows that the macro-level hypotheses are based on the micro-level assumptions. Focus on societal norms cannot disregard the individual agency of citizens. To substantially add to the democratic theory, Chapter 5 utilizes the micro-level with individuals as the unit of analysis. As such, it complements Chapter 4 on both the

theoretical and analytical level. The playing field of democracy has changed profoundly, and the individual level analysis can grasp these changes better. Chapter 5 argues that nowadays there are multiple groups when it comes to liberal democratic values that cannot be identified through one survey question. Chapter 5.2 therefore utilizes country specific questions in the 2014 Czech ISSP Citizenship Module IV survey concerned with different dimensions of liberal democracy. First it uses cluster analysis to classify citizens into groups based on their democratic and liberal values: Liberal Democrats, Liberal Non-democrats, Illiberal Democrats, and Xenophobic Democrats. Chapter 5.3 then provides theoretical arguments in favor of different participatory behavior of these groups and tests them empirically. The models show that these group not only differ in the amount of participation, but also the conditions under which they participate.

# 1 The vital question: How much participation is needed?

The idea of democracy is more than two thousand years old. No democratic theory was therefore created in a vacuum since ancient Greece. They all borrow from their predecessors or directly challenge them. On the other hand, the proliferation and sheer amount of political participation observed in the last decades has been unprecedented. The classical theorists of democracy surely could not have anticipated the complexity of modern democratic society, the communicational change brought by the internet and the variety of popular involvement in daily politics. As a result, “[t]here is little consensus on how much participation, and in which forms, is beneficial for democracy. There is even less agreement on how much participation actually occurs today” (Dalton, 2008, p. 22–23). Consequently, there is a little consensus on what form of democracy is best suited for the 21st century.

Teorell (2006) identified three roles of participation in democratic theory: participation as influencing attempts, participation as political discussion, and participation as direct decision-making. Each of these types is linked to a separate theory with diverging assumptions. Moreover, the methodological approaches vary as well. Participation as influencing attempts corresponds to the pluralism within the empirical theory of democracy which above all stresses the role of equal representation. Participation as political discussion is linked to the deliberative theory and participation as direct decision making is based on the theory of participatory democracy. It might seem that the two last approaches pose an alternative to representative democracy by stressing the direct involvement of citizens in decision-making. Yet, their proponents believe that they are complementary to representative democracy. They add the participatory mechanisms to the already pre-existing system, e.g., participatory democracy in the workplace (Pateman, 1970), local participatory budgeting (Sousa Santos, 1998), and deliberative polling (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005).

For the purpose of this text, participation as discussion and participation as direct decision-making are combined into the theory of strong democracy (see Barber, 1984).<sup>1</sup> Although there is a substantial variation both between and within both approaches, they in general perceive the higher involvement of citizens as a positive phenomenon. The following

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<sup>1</sup> To provide clarity throughout the text, I use the term strong democracy to refer both to deliberative and participatory democracy and differentiate between them when needed. For a closer explanation, see Chapter 2.4.2

chapter sums the core theory and expectations about participation of these competing concepts. It concentrates on the evolution of thinking regarding the role of participation in democratic theory. It analyses the historical origins of the division and shows that the debate is not over yet and theories built between 1940–1970 still live on in various forms. Moreover, the modernization of society following the “silent revolution” of late 1960s and corresponding academic work have brought new insights. Yet the field still has not converged into one theory. Therefore, it is needed to separately explore the two approaches: the skeptics and the optimists. Nevertheless, I begin with the reason to choose NEP over voting as a dimension of political participation. Then I summarize the origins of competing theories of democracy and their expectations regarding the impacts of NEP on democracy.

### 1.1 Difference between voting and non-electoral participation

When Verba and Nie (1972, p. 1) stated that “where few take part in decisions there is little democracy,” it does not spark any controversy. Most political theorists in general agree that democracy is the government of the people, by the people, and for the people. However, there is a disagreement on the meaning of the “by the people” part, especially when it comes to the practical aspects of democracy based on empirical experience. There is a clear gap in preference for electoral and non-electoral participation. While the former is universally accepted as a cornerstone of modern democracy, there is a striking disagreement on the latter (see Schumpeter, 1943, 2013; Dahl, 1956; Almond & Verba, 1963; Sartori, 1987, cf. Arnstein, 1963; Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Fishkin & Luskin, 2005).

The fact is that voting is the key mechanism of representation. It represents the first mechanism for participation and most of NEP is tied to voting. Without elections there would be no representatives to contact or freedoms to make a path for peaceful protests. NEP is thus additive to voting. Most of the characteristics are indeed shared between the electoral and non-electoral participation. Both are tools for government responsiveness and accountability. However, there is one crucial difference: the floor and the ceiling of participation (Lijphart, 1997). There is much more agreement about their low levels. Both low turnout and NEP represent negative signs of civic malaise and apathy (Putnam, 2000). The doubt of citizens whether they are heard might threaten the legitimacy of the democratic regime (Dalton, 2004). On the other hand, high voter turnout is almost unequivocally assumed to have a positive effect



on legitimacy and equality. It enhances the foundation of democracy. However, there is not an agreement on the effects of high NEP. It might be perceived as a sign of active and sophisticated citizenry or as a warning sign of discontent or even the proliferation of non-democratic values into the public sphere. High turnout provides greater legitimacy which shields countries in times of crisis (Czeński, 2006). Yet, high NEP is often seen as a threat to the consensus (Almond & Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1956; Lijphart, 1989).

There are several reasons for this divide based on the differences between the voting and NEP. Voting is structured by the party system and parties work as the gatekeepers. Even the less sophisticated citizens have a limited set of options which often prevents the ideas harmful to democratic norms. Furthermore, every electoral system has some threshold which filters out marginal ideas. And although elections might result in political fragmentation, the government formation represents a great tool to resolve conflicting interests and search for consensus. Voting is therefore less frequent, more structured, and more predictable in its impacts and outcomes.

On the other hand, NEP can express the intensity of preference which is an important part of minority rights (see Dahl, 1956). The intensity of preference also represents an important concept within pluralist theory.<sup>2</sup> Voting does not allow to show the intensity of preference because it is limited by the “one person one vote” rule (Quintelier et al., 2011, p. 398). It is thus more equal than NEP both for good and bad. The possible inequality in electoral participation is therefore seen as undemocratic. Abstaining means a lost opportunity to be heard and low turnout lowers the legitimacy of decisions made by the representative body (Dahl, 2006; Verba et al., 1995). Contrary to voting, the inequality in NEP is often taken as an empirical fact which has no easy fix.

As a result, there have been calls for the introduction of compulsory voting to correct for the inequalities in representation (Birch, 2009; Hill, 2006; Machin, 2011) and to fix the decline in voting and party membership among most European democracies (Gray & Caul, 2000; Rose, 2004). The debate on the role of compulsory voting continues. There are authors skeptical about its benefits. Saunders (2010) for example argued against compulsory voting on

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<sup>2</sup> Still, the focus of pluralist theory is rather on “taking turns” in participation than its overall levels. It assumes that different citizens intensively participate at different times, not that everyone is always active.

the basis of individual liberty not to vote and that greater turnout is not automatically more democratic (see also Machin, 2011; Lever, 2010). Lever (2010, p. 71) specifically mentioned top-down incentives in the form of public education or dialogue. Although there is some empirical evidence that it leads to higher turnout, it does not necessarily lead to equal participation (see Quintelier et al., 2011). Nevertheless, there is an agreement that “all things equal, more citizens voting is more democratic than fewer citizens voting” (Machin, 2011, p. 103).

Quite surprisingly most of the proponents of compulsory voting fail to consider NEP as an alternative for citizen involvement. The empirical theory of democracy crucially influences the debate and the impact of citizens agency outside the election is considered only minimally. The whole argument is posed as a choice between electoral participation and electoral non-participation. Quite typically the role of NEP is avoided, although it would represent a possible answer to some of the presented dilemmas. That is why in her thorough critique of compulsory voting, Lever (2010, p. 908) devoted just a little more than a mere three lines to other forms of political participation.

This one-sided focus seems to come from the rational choice theory which is still influential in voting analysis since Dawson’s (1957) seminal work. Olson (2009) criticized the rational choice theory and argued that the motivated minority will be more active and thus more influential. The passive majority must overcome the free-rider problem where most citizens will be incentivized not to burden themselves with participation and leave the delivery of common goods to the others.<sup>3</sup> These problems of collective action apply to voting less than to NEP because voting is more structured and equal. The fact is that when Dahl (1956) dealt with the problems of proper democratic setting, he focused on voting and was more concerned with the tyranny of the majority.

As a result, NEP is often seen as more passionate, unpredictable, and threatening; the individual values and attitudes are more pronounced. Nevertheless, the variation of citizens’ motives in NEP provides great opportunity for analysis. This dissertation focuses on NEP also for methodological reasons. It translates the individual values into public space more directly.

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<sup>3</sup> These ideas convene with the Schumpeter’s (1943, 2003, p. 283) notion about the inability of the electoral mass to pursue common interest. Therefore, parties are needed, and they exist not to pursue the general will of the people but rather the electoral victory.

During elections, parties serve as gatekeepers, and the party system itself might not allow for non-democratic issues to become salient. The mobilization patterns are therefore different. Moreover, with the declining role of political parties in representation (Mair, 2005), NEP is becoming increasingly more relevant. It allows for the support for distinct topics, while during election individual topics are banded together (Schlozman et al., 2012, p. 3). NEP, unlike voting, is not much influenced by institutional factors, e.g., type of the electoral system, timing of election as well as their schedule (cf. Vráblíková, 2013). It is thus more suitable for cross-national comparison. Nevertheless, the presented analysis still concentrates on NEP related to political institutions.

To summarize, the main topic of this dissertation is NEP. Voting as a form of participation is sidelined as it does not present the same dilemmas for democracy. The historical genesis of democracy as the antithesis of monarchy gave it a prime position in the temple of political participation. No one questions the role of voting in democracy as it does occur once infrequently and within the institutional setting. As such, it does not overload the system. Quite the contrary, it bolsters the legitimacy of democracy. Moreover, voting is structured by the political supply of elites. Although voting rights were not granted to all adult citizens until the first half of the 20th century, with the renowned example of Switzerland introducing the voting right for women in 1971, voting still precedes most of the contemporary forms of NEP.

On the other hand, the other variants of political participation therefore came under scrutiny later, and meanwhile, the rise of totalitarian regimes made scholars question their benefits. However, the rapid growth of variations of NEP in the last 30 years might not fit into older theoretical approaches. This is not to say that the public engagement was ignored in the past. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville closely observed the civic participation among Americans, and his theories later fueled the neo-Tocquevillian agenda concerned with the impacts of civil society on the government effectiveness (see Putnam, 1993, 2000). Yet, during the formation of the empirical theory of democracy, Dahl (1956, 1971) had just a limited source of inspiration when it came to NEP. The changes of the social and political structure in the last 30 years had an immense impact especially on the relationship between NEP and democracy. The re-evaluation is thus most needed. Furthermore, NEP enables better distinction between both approaches to democracy as they diverge more specifically on its role. And lastly, NEP is methodologically advantageous as it enables a closer focus on individual values. It gives

citizens the option to better express their values and attitudes. As such, NEP streamlines the analysis without the need to focus on intermediaries in the form of political parties.

## 1.2 Historical origins of contemporary theories of democracy

The democratic societies and the democratic theory itself saw a rapid development over the course of the last century. The “classical doctrine of democracy” became heavily criticized with the start of World War II (see Pateman, 2003). The collapse of inter-war democracies together with the mass participation of totalitarian regimes provided a strong argument in favor of rejection of the mass involvement in politics. Instead, the key research topics were the stability of democratic regimes and the process of how the best leaders are selected, respectively how it is possible to get rid of the bad ones. Instead of exploring the normative ideas and quality of democracy, the post-war period focused on the institution’s democracy needs (Dahl, 1956) and thanks to which it survives (Almond & Verba, 1963). The improvements to democracy were explored mainly through the different institutional setting, e.g., Lijphart’s (1969) consociational democracy.

Schumpeter (1943, 2013) first provided the basis of this critique when he condemned “the classical doctrine of democracy” as an unattainable ideal. Based on the observation of the nature of capitalism of that time, Schumpeter renounced the existence of the general will of people. He perceived people rather as being easily influenced by advertising and propaganda. These ideas circle back to the worry of Greek thinkers about the influence of demagogues, yet with different prescriptions for the cure. Schumpeter’s (1943, 2013) minimal definition of democracy is the foundation of the competitive elitist approach. Its main premise is the competition of elites among themselves for the popular vote. The competition is based on the principle of the free market. Schumpeter’s theory focuses solely on elections and mass participation in the form of voting. Democracy is then rather the government for the people instead of government by the people (Schumpeter, 1943, 2013, p. 256). Held (2006, p. 126–141) added that Schumpeter’s ideas were not that novel as Max Weber had already stressed the crucial role of leaders in contemporary democracy before. Nevertheless, the *demos* play only the role of a supporting actor in the theory of both authors and its role is to legitimize the regime through election and support for the leaders; for Schumpeter and Weber, people do not lead themselves.

Both Weber and Schumpeter paved the ground for the “empirical” approach to democracy. The empirical studies of political sociology after WW2 provided further ammunition for the critique of mass participation (see Skinner, 1973). The elite conception of democracy got backed by the findings that popular support for democracy has its limits especially among the less affluent citizens. Based on these findings, theorists of the empirical theory of democracy continued to claim that classical democracy is unrealistic. Instead, researchers focused on the institution of real-world democracy and their function (Dahl, 1956, 1971). Moreover, mass participation was sometimes even seen as a threat (Sartori, 1987). The empirical theory of democracy thus focuses on the institutions that keep democracy running. Normative assumptions were abandoned in favor of more descriptive empirical observations. Although its theorists do not limit democracy solely to the competition of elites once in an electoral cycle, the role of NEP remains vague, and it is not expected to be positive per se.

The experience with totalitarianism further shifted the focus from the quality of democracy towards the stability of the democratic system. Attitudes and democratic culture still played a central role. However, they were analyzed from the standpoint of their function in the system. Civic culture focused on the set of psychological qualities and attitudes necessary for the stability of the democratic system (Almond & Verba, 1963). Still, as Pateman (2003, p. 43) noted, the necessary proportion of population with these values, how these attitudes can be promoted, and the mechanism connecting the values and system were less clear. The trauma of the Holocaust shifted the focus and research on democratic values which was mostly focused on the other side of the problem—the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950, 2019; Lipset, 1959a). Overall, researchers rather analyzed the challenges of the totalitarian thinking poses to the normative assumptions of “classical doctrine of democracy” (see Arendt, 1951).

For these reasons, the theory of polyarchy focuses on the democratic regimes we observe. It sees democracy as a system of political equals with the checks against minority or majority rule and oppression (Dahl, 1971). It constitutes a system of constant negotiation of organized minorities within an uninterested majority and follows the thinking of Madison and Schumpeter. The role of institutions and processes enabling real-world democracy is crucial. The result is a “thin” perception of participation and democracy with sole focus on voting. As Krouse (1982, p. 443) noted, in contrast to “thick” theories, the early empirical models of democracy left NEP on the periphery of interest.

The participatory democratic theory tried to counteract this position and focus on ways to improve representative democracy. The debate started in the early 1960s on the left side of the political spectrum. The main motivation was to give voice to all citizens and empower especially the unprivileged (see e.g., Arnstein, 1969). The discussion in university clubs was followed in the 1966 second issue of the *American Political Science Review* between R.A. Dahl (1966) and Walker (1966a, 1966b) who criticized the implications of the empirical theory of democracy.<sup>4</sup> Dahl (1966) stressed that the main binding mechanism of empirical theory of democracy is the importance of representation as the center point of modern democracy on the level of national states. The ideals of the “classical theory of democracy” cannot be fulfilled, and Dahl stressed leadership instead (1966). The second main disagreement lies within the emphasis on the empirical vs. normative approach as the main principle of theory building. This corresponds to Walker’s (1966a) point when he criticized the empirical theory on the ground that it solely describes the recent system and disregards how it could and should be. It thus perpetuates the status quo. This debate also reflects the positivist vs. anti-positivist position towards the research in social sciences.

Inspired by Rousseau and Mill, the participatory theory further elaborated the critique of empirical theory. It stresses the educative influence of participation which is seen as a tool to actively promote democratic culture (Pateman, 1970). Instead of limiting the negative effects of non-democratic attitudes as in the empirical theory of democracy, participatory democracy expects to teach the democratic values through involvement in public affairs. However, its popularity and popularity of the democratic theory overall slowly faded away throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Pateman, 2012): this seems mostly because it criticized the connection of

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<sup>4</sup> Walker (1966b) originally termed the school of thoughts “elitist theory of democracy.” He admitted the term “elitist” carries negative, anti-democratic connotations, and Dahl (1966) is right that the “elitists” do not represent coherent school of thought. Still his critique of prescriptive implication of these theories remained unchanged. Throughout the rest of the text, I divide the competing notions of democracy into two, notably incoherent, schools of thought as well, i.e., the empirical theory and participatory theory. The advantage of grouping is the fact that it allows for the generalization of similar patterns within while contrasting these views with the other approach. Furthermore, most of the contemporary empirical literature on participation turns to the more general and abstract theory as well. It takes this generalization as a starting point of exploring more specific topics. The pieces of the underlying theory are often chosen ad hoc without resolving the fundamental division on the role of participation in contemporary representative democracy.

capitalism and liberal democracy from the left-wing positions. However, the 1980s were the times of dominance of conservatism and neoliberalism.

The participatory theory then passed the torch mainly to the deliberative theory (Pateman, 2012). The deliberative turn occurred mainly in between 1980 and 1983 and slowly evolved into a full-fledged theory of its own (Florida, 2018). It built upon the critical theory of the Frankfurt school and Rawls theory of justice. These ideas helped to better grasp the idea of deliberation as a tool for societal consensus. The legitimacy of the democracy then spurs directly from the deliberation. The new wave of deliberative democracy has found its place in political science as well. In similar logic as Dahl, the authors search for the practical instruments of deliberation in contemporary democracy (see Fishkin & Luskin, 2005).

Yet, the question of relationship between values and participation remained outside the agenda. The unanswered questions provoked the curiosity of researchers. When young Ronald Inglehart in 1968 in Paris observed the demonstrations, he found out that the empirical data contradicted the class conflict. Although the young protesters used the language of Marx, they in fact expressed their wish for the issues not related to the material side of politics (Inglehart, 2014). Instead, Inglehart (1971) hypothesized that there was a value change taking place. The research on pro-democratic culture then passed the torch to the research on newly emerging post-material values (Dalton & Welzel, 2014). Since then, the new values within democracy (see Dalton 2004, Hibbing, Theis-Morse 2002, Norris 1999, 2011) and new participatory behavior occupied a prominent role in research on the health of contemporary democracy. Correspondingly, there has been a revival of participatory democratic theory (Pateman, 2012) and an increasing focus on deliberative mechanisms (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005).

With the third wave of democratization and fall of communism it might have seen that the historical development was over. Democracy won and the threat of destabilization and the threat of degeneration to non-democratic regimes was over (Fukuyama, 1989, 2006). It seemed that democracy became a universally accepted value (see Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007, p. 638–639). However, quite soon it was clear that many paid only lip service to democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). Instead of getting rid of the authoritarian pole of the democratic-authoritarian continuum many regimes turned to subtle manipulation and different shades of non-democratic institutions (see Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002). Especially post-communist Europe is observing declining consensus on the liberal values (Dawson & Hanley, 2016). The illiberal

turn stresses the need to revisit the basic assumptions on the relationship among the values, participation, and stability of the system.

To summarize, the disagreement on the role of participation is driven both by the normative expectation and empirical evidence. The differences between Hobbes's representative democracy and popular involvement of Rousseau (see Avritzer, 2012) still live on in the aggregative democracy centered around election and more deliberative approaches stressing the crucial role of discussion and broad NEP (Perrot-Peña & Piggins, 2015). The next sections present a closer look at the two diverging approaches to the role of NEP.<sup>5</sup> They hold conflicting expectations regarding the impacts of mass participation on the stability of the system and government effectiveness. The first is rather enthusiastic about the prospects of NEP. The second sees it as a challenge. This latter approach is based on the empirical theory of democracy and constitutes the base of most of the contemporary empirical research on participation.

### 1.3 The skeptics: participation as a potential threat

The following chapter summarizes the reservations about the mass participation in public affairs. Although this school of thought originated from the Second World War, it stretches to contemporary thinking. The original arguments about potentially destructive impacts of mass participation were applied to modernizing societies, developed democracies, and later to transforming regimes. The key thinkers (i.e., Dahl, Almond, Verba, Huntington, and Sartori) shaped their fields and, as shown in the last section, are still impactful today. The empirical theory provides an ideal frame for comparison and insights for the role of the

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<sup>5</sup> It is important to keep in mind that they only represented generalizations around which are the approaches to democracy centered. There are many variations of these theories or concepts borrowing from both, e.g., the social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000). In this sense the competitive elitism and empirical democracy theorists belong to the aggregative camp interested in aggregation of individual interests through election. The participatory and deliberative democracy then form the other pole. See Held (2006) for an overview on varying concepts of democracy.



leadership. However, the question of effective participation remains unanswered.<sup>6</sup> First, I introduce the individual takes of the key figures on the role of participation within democracy. Second, I summarize the contemporary approaches to participation based on these individual theories.

The skeptical view of participation has its origins in the critique of the classical doctrine of democracy (Schumpeter, 1943, 2013). The ideal of citizen involvement suffered severely first with the Russian civil war and then with the emergence of totalitarian states. The equality of citizens in public affairs was criticized as an illusion (see Schumpeter 1943, 2013, p. 244–245) and pathed the way to the argument stressing less involvement of citizens. More citizens involved as a better expression of *volonté générale* lost its appeal when the general will of people seemed to demand crimes against humanity. Especially for Weimar, the republic was known for its mass participation during inter-war period. Lipset (1960, p. 189–190) among many others noted that the electoral turnout peaked in 1932–33 Germany just before the destruction of democracy.

Thus, for a while the totalitarian experience tipped the weights of democratic theory towards individual liberty instead the best approximation of the will of the people. Democracy was deemed to be only a method, not an ideal. Rational skepticism is best expressed by Churchill: “democracy is the worst form of government except all those others that have been tried from time to time.”<sup>7</sup> It also led some scholars to believe that there can be an excess of democracy going even as far as claiming that democracy kills itself this way (see Huntington, 1975, p. 113). These ideas tap into much older tradition taking inspiration from Plato’s fear of an uneducated mob. Plato was born just a year after Pericles died. Yet, his take on the role of citizens and democracy overall is quite different. His theory was once more shaped by his own experience of democracy: killing his mentor and family members being part of the bloody oligarchic rule. He views democracy as a rule of people overcome by their desires and led by men with few virtues. Therefore, only the virtuous, the philosophers should be politically involved. Plato expects that the excessive involvement of the poor in democracy would

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<sup>6</sup> The effective participation is one of five key elements of polyarchy; others are equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda, and the inclusion of adults (Dahl 2008, p. 222).

<sup>7</sup> The Churchillian definition of democracy is still used as a base to design survey questions on support for democracy all over the world.

eventually lead to tyranny. In other words, the ones without virtues, the mass, cannot rule effectively.<sup>8</sup>

The first empirical findings of the public opinion surveys after the Second World War further convinced scholars that there is indeed something rotten at the core of democracy, i.e., the mass participation. Dahl (1956) tried to reconcile the democratic ideals and practice. Madison's ideas represented the normative part and the political system in the USA, the empirical one. When he analyzed the difficult relationship between participation and democracy, Dahl turned to the contemporary data from the USA. He concluded that the

[...] current evidence suggests that in the United States the lower one's socioeconomic class, the more authoritarian one's predispositions and the less active politically one is likely to be. Thus, if an increase in political activity brings the authoritarian-minded into the political arena, consensus on the basic norms among the politically active certainly must be declining. To the extent that consensus declines, we would expect [...] that, altering some lag, polyarchy would also decline. (Dahl, 1956, p. 89)

Dahl was conscious that the assumptions are data driven and there is a need for further evaluation. Still, these assumptions shape the theory of polyarchy which is to a large extent avoiding the topic of NEP.

Almond and Verba (1963) were not dependent upon the case study. They were the first ones to utilize the cross-national public opinion data to analyze the differences in *The Civic Culture*. The publication provides thorough examination of citizens' attitudes and values. The theoretical background comes from the structural functionalist approach which views the society as one organism where various parts of society work together to ensure the stability of the whole system. As such, both authors focused on the constituting blocks of society, namely norms and institutions. The groups that did not endorse such norms or felt affection for the institutions represent potential threats. The structural functionalism was later criticized by Sartori (1970) who disagreed that every part of the system must have a function and often criticized the conceptual stretching which is the case of the civic culture.

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<sup>8</sup> Schumpeter (1943, 2003), on the other hand, based democracy on the capitalist model of the free market and stresses the division of labor in politics. Therefore, anything not associated with the hierarchical organization of companies is deemed ineffective.

Nevertheless, the orientations to political objects were key for Almond and Verba (1963). Without proper norms the relationship between citizens and democracy would be based solely on the benefits provided through the outputs of the system. Correspondingly, the main role of citizen's inputs is also the legitimization of the system. They expect citizens to be allegiant participants, i.e., to be positively oriented towards the political structure and its inputs. However, the allegiance itself is not enough to shield the system from instability. The balance between apathy and activity is then the cornerstone of a stable democratic system. It helps to overcome the tension among contradictory demands placed on the democratic system (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 343). The citizens just take turns in participation.

Ideal civic culture is thus a mixed culture. It is based on the example from the UK and USA (Almond & Verba 1963, p. 366) and it resembles Aristotle's preference for a mixed government (Almond & Verba 1989, p. 3). Furthermore, it shares some common ground with the "rationality-activist" model where citizens are expected to be active, involved in politics, and guided by reason. Yet, Almond and Verba appreciated the role of non-participation as well. The participatory behavior in civic culture is mixed with other norms, namely the subjects and parochial orientations (1989, p. 29–30). Such a theory is partly based on the empirical evidence that not all citizens are active and yet the British and American democracy prosper (Almond & Verba 1989, p. 338). There the structural functionalism shows its rationale. The inactivity is present so it must have some role. This empirical evidence therefore dictates the direction of analysis. Thus, the civic culture is a counterpoint to the normative "text-book" approaches (Almond & Verba 1989, p. 30).

The *subject* and *parochial* cultures within the civic culture serve as insurance. They modify the intensity of participation (Almond & Verba 1989, p. 339). However, Almond and Verba faced the question of democratic legitimacy. According to their assumptions the legitimacy of democratic regimes ought to be based on the inputs rather than on the outputs. Yet, the voice of one citizen is often negligible. Authors find the solution in the citizens' conviction that their voice matters more than it actually does. The high levels of subjective political competence<sup>9</sup> sustain the civic culture. This democratic myth of civic competence leads citizens to believe to be the effective participants. In practice they rarely participate to match

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<sup>9</sup> The subjective political competence is nowadays represented by the concept of the internal political efficacy.

the level of their perceived competence. Similar pattern emerges for the obligation to participate and participation itself (Almond & Verba 1989, p. 344–345). Almond and Verba’s citizens are not active citizens; they are rather potentially active.

Their view did not change much in almost twenty years after their publication. *The Civic Culture Revisited* offered similar recipes for stability. Lijphart (1989, p. 51) was still troubled by possible government immobility in the event of increased mass participation. If everyone would participate, the system might collapse under the sheer number of demands. The function of the apathy would be lost, and the democratic myth of the civic competence would end. Similarly, Dahl also still defined effective participation as mainly the opportunity to participate (Dahl 2008). Based on these assumptions, I hypothesize that:

*H1*: The underlying civic culture influences the government effectiveness. The level of NEP has no effect on the government effectiveness.

The effort of Almond and Verba (1963) to find balance between the power and responsiveness of the democratic system inspired others. The idea that participation and apathy are the key mechanism to do so took on its own life. Apathy of some citizens became normal and desirable. Still, Almond and Verba (1963) were only mildly skeptical about the role of participation. They considered some amount to be necessary to force elite responsiveness as the non-responsive system quickly loses legitimacy and collapses. However, they did not provide a guide on the necessary levels of participation and the empirical evidence is culturally driven by the Anglo-Saxon example.

Huntington (1975, p. 114) also assumed that “the effective operation of democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement of the part of some individuals and groups.” He stressed the role of culture in his work as well. However, participation plays a main role when he focuses on the role of government. As such, Huntington (1973, p. 1) came to the conclusion that in fact the governments Western democracies and communist countries are similar in terms of an institutional setting. They serve as a benchmark for Asian or African states. He argued that the USA, UK, and Soviet Union all have “a high degree of popular participation in public affairs” (Huntington, 1973). The quality of participation and the conditions under which it occurs do not concern him. The disregard for the differences in participation between democratic states and the Soviet Union was not given

by a lack of information. The book was first published in 1968 and Huntington had to be aware of the mechanisms of politics in the Soviet Union. The lack of differences is rather given by the fact that the participation is understood solely as a legitimization mechanism for both systems.

Huntington's (1973) reasoning was driven by his focus on modernization. In modern and highly institutionalized societies is the participation structured around the electoral cycle. In the praetorian society it revolves around strikes, demonstrations etc. (Huntington, 1973, p. 211–212). This distinction corresponds with the recent classification of NEP into conventional and unconventional types. To some extent it also corresponds with Plato's fear of an uneducated mob and is directly linked to the theories of mass society (Arendt, 1951). For Huntington, "in the mass society political participation is unstructured, inconstant, anomic, and variegated. Each social force attempts to secure its objectives through the resources and tactics in which it is strongest." It combines

[...] violent and nonviolent, legal and illegal, coercive and persuasive actions. Mass society lacks organized structures which can relate the political desires and activities of the populace to the goals and decisions of their leaders. As a result, a direct relationship exists between leaders and masses. (Huntington, 1973, p. 88)


The organized structured Huntington referred to are the political parties. The voting is again the desired participation.

The process of modernization therefore changes the type of participation. However, its main impact is the broadening of participation when more people enter the political arena on the state level. Huntington (1973) argued that the main threat for stability is the broader participation which is not accompanied by the appropriate political organization and institutionalization. Without them might some groups get involved outside the traditional institutions and be disruptive to the whole system (Huntington, 1973, p. 21-22). The "non-institutionalized" protest participation signals mass society. The increase in participation under these conditions might undermine the traditional institutions and result in political instability, disorder and potentially violence (Huntington, 1973, p. 47). Such argument corresponds to Almond and Verba's (1963) fear of decreasing consensus on the civic norms.

In short, there is a linear relationship between institutionalization and participation (see Figure 1). The non-institutionalized participation is characteristic for the less developed

societies. If the developing state is not able to develop the institutions corresponding to the increase in participation to accommodate the new demands, and they are not accompanied by the shifts in economic well-being, the result is political instability (Huntington, 1973, p. 56–57). Participation therefore needs moderation. It often undermines traditional institutions without developing the new ones. The result is a decay of the old order and prevention of the new one (Huntington, 1973, p. 85–86).

Figure 1 - Political institutionalization and political participation



Source: (Huntington 1975, p. 79); edited by the author

Huntington’s (1975, p. 53–56) causal chain of how participation leads to instability is more complicated. Political institutions are just one of two intervening variables influencing the stability of the regime. The second one is the lack of opportunities for social and economic mobility.<sup>10</sup> Modernization causes social mobilization, i.e., change of citizens' aspirations. Social

<sup>10</sup> The socioeconomic inequality is a driving force of the participatory theory. Yet participatory democrats see mass participation as a solution for inequality, Huntington saw the socioeconomic inequality as a cause of mass participation.

mobilization leads to social frustration if it is not accompanied by the appropriate economic advances. The result is social frustration. The opportunities for social mobility then determine whether the tension can be eased or results in participation. Citizens participate to advance their goals based on social frustration. And lastly, participation leads to instability if it is not accompanied by appropriate institutionalization. Although the *Political Order in Changing Societies* was written nearly 50 years ago, its premises again grew in relevance with the authoritarian backlash.

Huntington's focus on the changing societies and the role of modernization leads him to focus on the stability rather than the quality of the system. The stability is a fusion of legitimacy and effectiveness, the instability of frustration and participation. As a result, Huntington was less concerned with responsiveness and accountability (Huntington, 1975, p. 10).<sup>11</sup> This division is best expressed by his preference for the type of participant. Huntington stated,

political participation by illiterates, however, may well, as in India, be less dangerous to democratic political institutions than participation by literates. The latter typically have higher aspirations and make more demands on government. Political participation by illiterates, moreover, is likely to remain limited, while participation by literates is more likely to snowball with potentially disastrous effects on political stability. (Huntington, 1973, p. 49)

The preference for less educated participants poses a striking contrast to the participatory theory which expects educated citizens which further educate themselves through participation. Huntington instead focused on the aggregation of interests. Too many demands

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<sup>11</sup> Huntington admitted that the broadening of participation in democracies might “enhance control of the government by the people” and vice versa in totalitarian states. However, this argument is not about the increase in participation as much as about broadening of the base of possible participants. Therefore, it speaks about the inclusion of other groups, e.g., expansion of the electoral suffrage to all citizens. That is how Huntington distinguished modern democracy from older regimes. In contrast to the traditional societies, participation goes beyond the village or town and thus needs new institutions such as political parties to aggregate and channel the interests (Huntington, 1975, p. 34–36). Again, the participation is only potential not in practice.

can overload the government and decrease its effectiveness (Huntington, 1975, p. 114; see also Lijphart, 1989, p. 51). Based on his writing I hypothesize:

*H2: The protest participation decreases the government effectiveness.*

Governability and adequate institutions were also essential for the theory of democracy constructed by Giovanni Sartori (1987). He was inspired by Schumpeter and stressed the need for pluralism and political elites. Sartori (1976) was no less interested in the stability of democracy. His theory of polarized pluralism stressed the issue of instability when there are two anti-system oppositions present. In many ways it corresponds to the calls for the underlying agreement on democratic norms from the other authors. Sartori, being concerned with the practical application, focused on the party systems. The experience from his own country made clear that the stability is not enough. The stability of Italian democracy was given by negligible alternation in power throughout the Italian first republic. The elite competition was a second necessary component for a healthy democracy.

Although Sartori (1987) provided the recipe for the ideal theory of democracy both in theory and in practice, he left NEP largely aside. Sartori stated that

in present democracies, there are those who govern and those who are governed; there is the state, on one side, and the citizens, on the other; there are those who deal with politics professionally and those who forget about it, except at rare intervals. (Sartori, 1987, p. 280)

The question remains how the largely apathetic citizens produce good representatives. Nevertheless, Sartori did not limit participation solely to elections. He clearly stated that electoral participation is not sufficient and “[t]o speak of the sheer act of voting as participation is little more than a manner of speech and certainly leaves us with a weak and overly diluted meaning of the term” (Sartori, 1987, p. 113). Sartori was not skeptical about the individual participation per se and agrees that there are benefits of personal involvement. However, he was convinced that it cannot be implemented on the level of states. Therefore, the forms of participation he considers are participation in smaller groups, i.e., voluntary associations, unions, or parties (Sartori, 1987).



Sartori (1987, p. 111) assumed that the “[participation’s] intensity - namely, authenticity and effectiveness - is inversely related to the number of the participants.”<sup>12</sup> As such, it cannot be implemented on a mass scale. The question of participation is therefore the question of feasibility, respectively the question of levels. Sartori argued against the direct participation and says that “the democracy of the ancients is not the democracy of the moderns” (Sartori, 1987). It is ineffective and impossible in practice. Although he agreed that in principle it would be better to govern than to be governed, direct democracy was impossible on a larger scale. Moreover, the historical examples of lower scale direct democracies were quite unstable (Sartori, 1987, p. 280–283). This view corresponds to Huntington’s idea that the NEP is largely a thing of the past and belongs to the pre-modern societies.

Sartori’s skeptical take on participation was also largely driven by his opposition to participatory democracy. He defended the elite theory of democracy against the criticism of participatory democrats. For the most part, Sartori was vexed by the low clarity of the concept of participatory democracy. This corresponds to his broader critique of vague concepts (Sartori, 1970). Participatory theory cannot be traced to a coherent school of thoughts. And the classical democracy it often refers to is also incoherent. Furthermore, the participatory democrats do not clearly state their understanding of participation. Lastly, it does not represent an alternative to elite democracy as it assumes participatory elites. He summed his rebuke by stating,

Therefore, if the indictment of the participationist is that prior to the 1960s participation was a neglected part of the overall theory of democracy, this indictment is, as a matter of record, incorrect. If his argument is, instead, that participation plays no important role in the specific theory of the democratic state, this is correct - but is this a fault? (Sartori, 1970, p. 114)

The Sartori’s relationship to participation is thus threefold. First, I agree that it is desirable in small and intense groups. Second, he limited the groups by the electoral arena, work, and leisure. The political participation is then mostly tied to the representative institutions. Lastly, he specifically dealt with participation under the theory of direct democracy. He deemed direct democracy as impossible on the scale of national states. The

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<sup>12</sup> This assumption shares some similarities and logic with the problem of collective action (Olson, 2009).

question is to what extent was Sartori electing the strawman based on direct democracy instead of dealing with the vague concept of participatory democracy. Nevertheless, NEP does not get much credit in Sartori's theory of democracy.

The empirical research on participation became strongly influenced by these assumptions. Nowadays it is less oriented on the impacts of participation and more on its predictors. The empirical theory puts representativeness first and the predictors of participation can provide an insight into the inequalities in participation. In the absence of a clear normative theory behind the empirical work, the role of participation was bypassed by perceiving it simply as an input to the system, i.e., as a function of the democratic system with no pro-democratic effect. Participation, then, does not constitute the core of democracy, but it has been side-lined and serves solely as a tool for achieving greater legitimacy. Similarly to Hobbes, people are perceived as mainly concerned with their private goals. Such assumptions are based on rational theory of cost and gains and we can also later link them to the most prevalent analytical tool of resource model of political participation (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman 1995) which was focused on causes and not impacts of NEP. Participation in this sense does not contribute to the polity in Aristotelian logic of homo politicus, and has only some value in possible self-development (Krouse 1982: 448-449; 458) with no further specified connection to civic virtues of Greek political thought (Almond, Verba 1963: vii, cf. Putnam 2000). The main postulate of empirical theory of democracy is thus that:

*H3: NEP has either no impact or negative impact on the government effectiveness.*

The main concerns of the empirical theory of democracy have prevailed until today. The representativeness of participation attracts much of the attention while its absolute amount gets less. The underlying principle remains the equality of citizens' aggregated interests (Dahl, 2006; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1987; Schlozman et al., 2012). The actual number of citizens participating is not important as long as they constitute a representative sample of society. The good citizens of *The Civic Culture* are not the active citizens but the potentially active citizens (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 346–347). They should react to the competing political elite, not act on their own (Sartori, 1987). Inactivity is considered to be a permanent characteristic of most citizens and thus does not present a problem and to some it is quite contrary a prerequisite of a functioning system (Walker, 1966b; Huntington, 1975). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001) even

argued that most of the citizens prefer to be inactive anyway. They want their government to be largely invisible and pursue the course of politics they prefer without them being involved.

In the end, the scholars following in the Schumpeter's footsteps had a hard time to answer what to do with the activity of citizens. NEP has an especially peculiar position of both being praised and feared. It seemed like there should not be too few people participating nor too many. On the one hand, academics saw participatory culture as a crucial part of US democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963, see also Putnam, 2000) and praised high levels of political activity in America (Verba & Nie, 1972). Also, Dahl (1971, p. 4–16) argued that contestation and opposition are necessary for democracy; the more opportunity citizens have to participate, the healthier the democracy. On the other hand, many others fear that the excessive participation will lead to government immobility (see Dahl, 1956; Huntington, 1975; Sartori, 1987; Lijphart, 1989).

Not all authors focusing on real world democracy are as skeptical as the “founding fathers” of the empirical theory of democracy. However, the criticism of mass participation set participation aside the core of democratic principles. The best example is the well-known article *What Democracy Is...And Is Not* from Phillipe Schmitter and Terry Karl (1991). They defined democracy as “[...] a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 4). The participation is mostly limited to election and generally understood in terms of Almond and Verba (1963) as the potential rather than actual involvement. It is only an indicator of a specific type of democracy or one of many factors to evaluate the performance of the regime (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 12–13). The authors concluded that “to include them as part of the generic definition of democracy itself would be a mistake” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 13).

The negative or at least unclear role of broader participation in the empirical theory of democracy persists until today and influences a large mass of research. Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011, p. 591) reminded us that the empirical theory of democracy is a driving force of the research in comparative politics (see also McAllister, 2017). The debate on the disparity between normative ideal and practice continues (see Parvin, 2017). Most of the proponents of the empirical theory of democracy still argue that the participatory and deliberative democracy have too demanding expectations about participation that are not met in practice. Therefore,

researchers should rather focus on the *Democracy for Realists*<sup>13</sup> and some authors go even so far as to claim that even the electoral participation performs poorly in practice (Achen & Bartels, 2016).

The empirical theory of democracy as its name suggests is still largely driven by empirical research first (see Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. xiii). Correspondingly the main indices of democracy focus either on the potential right to participate, e.g., Freedom House. The Varieties of Democracy project emphasizes five different principles of democracy and participatory democracy is among them.<sup>14</sup> However, the definition of participation is akin to the classification by Sartori (1987), i.e., civil society, direct popular vote and local government. NEP is not directly included. Participation in the empirical theory of democracy is therefore considered mainly as a way to eliminate corrupt or ineffective leaders, not as a way to achieve good policy. The high electoral participation has at least legitimizing effects that limit the amount of necessary coercion from the government. However, NEP does not provide legitimization and its possible role remains unclear.

#### 1.4 The optimists: participation as an obligation

The previous chapter stressed the argument that participation as the “excess of democracy can undo the liberal institutions” (Barber, 1984, p. xxxi). Authors presented in this part of the dissertation share the counterview to this claim and stress the positive impacts of participation. Although the optimistic view of political participation is not a part of a unified school of thoughts it does represent a major point of agreement among multiple streams of democratic theory. This broad stream of literature combines the practices of participatory democracy as well as deliberative democracy. Both theories are so strongly related that they are sometimes even confused. They can also be read as a response to the empirical theory of democracy. Throughout the text I would refer to “strong democracy” as a unifying name for both the participatory and deliberative democracy.

This chapter sums the optimistic expectations about the role of participation as compared to the pessimistic view of authors introduced in the previous chapter. It starts with

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<sup>13</sup> An important note is that Achen and Bartels (2016) focused on the critique of direct democracy (populist model) in line with the path Sartori (1987) took.

<sup>14</sup> The V-Dem project is also including the deliberative democracy.

the description of the recent field, shows that democratic theory is again in the spotlight, and that the debate about the role of participation is not over. The chapter follows with the historical context to better understand the differences between participatory and deliberative theory and subsequently introduces the main ideas about the role of participation based on both theories.

Although the core literature introduced in the previous chapter is often more than 50 years old, the democratic theory is still a lively field. In this vein, Carole Pateman (2012), in her 2011 APSA Presidential Address, celebrated the heyday of the democratic theory and participatory practices. Especially deliberative democracy as a form of citizen participation has attracted plenty of attention in the last two decades. Both participatory and deliberative theory share the same assumption that the “solution to the problem of disenchantment with politics is deceptively simple. It is to expand the opportunities for citizens to have a say about the issues they care about” (Stoker, 2006, p. 190). Therefore, both theories aim to add new features to the already existing empirical theory of democracy that as Dahl (1956, p. 149–151) admitted was not designed as a description of the most desirable system, but rather of a practical one.

The only regret Pateman (2012, p. 7–8) seemed to express is the fact that the now popular deliberative democracy has a little interest in other participatory practices and thus it is replacing the participatory theory overall by its narrow definition. The deliberative turn occurred between the 1980s and early 1990s when deliberative democracy gained more solid foundations. Since then, the attention gradually shifted from participatory theory to the deliberative theory (Florida, 2018). Still, deliberative democracy is rather a working theory (see Chambers 2003) although the same applies to some extent to the participatory theory as well. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise when Goodin (2008, p. 263–266 especially p. 266) argued that the deliberative democrats are also participatory democrats (cf. Mutz, 2006). And Elstub (2018) called for the unification in the participatory deliberative democracy.

Deliberative democracy is taken as a specific case of participation for the purpose of this dissertation. It provides insight into the impacts of NEP as it often involves some deliberation directly or at least indirectly equips citizens to deliberate better. Moreover, both theories agree that the institutions of representative democracy are not sufficient for a proper democratic governance and they result in a democratic deficit. The role of participatory or deliberative theory is to supplement, although not supplant, these institutions (Pateman, 1970, p. 42; Goodin, 2008, p. 5–7). The dissertation focuses on NEP as a form of this supplement to

representative democracy. The goal is not to present a unified theory of participatory or deliberative theory. Both theories are rather used to provide an insight into the possible benefits of NEP and offer an opposing viewpoint to the empirical theory of democracy.

The truth is that both approaches involve rather a broad range of topics and it is difficult to pinpoint an exact overarching theory. For example, Menser (2018, p. 11) recently identified six different streams within participatory democracy. The fluidity of participatory democracy also certainly irked Giovanni Sartori (1970) who stressed conceptual clarity. Sartori (1987, p. 113) summed up his frustration by saying that, “having outlined the map of the well-identifiable and definable species of democracy, where should we place on such a map a participatory democracy? It is fair to reply that nowhere in particular and, to differing extents, everywhere.” Therefore, Sartori focused rather on direct democracy as a specific form of participatory practices instead. In a somewhat similar vein, I utilize deliberative democracy as a specific case of mass participation.

#### 1.4.1 Key role of political participation in the early democratic theory

This chapter introduces the take on participation of the ancient Greeks and classical theorists of democracy. Strong democracy is so tightly influenced by these ideas that it is necessary to briefly introduce them first to elucidate its position. While the empirical theory is based on the practice of the last century, strong democracy has a much longer tradition. Direct democracy dates back to ancient Athens. Although they are not the only “classical exemplar” of democracy (see Menser, 2018, p. 11–65), ancient Athens are certainly the most known example of a system dependent on popular participation and the typical point of departure both for deliberative and participatory theory. Thucydides summarized the Greek stance on the role of citizen through the Pericles’ funeral oration:

Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and, instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. (in Halsall, 2000, see also Harris, 1992; Bosworth 2000)

Two crucial topics emerge from this short excerpt: the necessity of both participation and deliberation. Both subsequently form the core of contemporary critique of empirical democracy.

The mass of Athenian citizens was a safeguard against the threat of oligarchy. However, these checks and balances of Athenian democracy were dependent upon the mass participation. The deliberation was necessary to prevent demagoguery as well as to build the virtues of individual citizens. Therefore, poverty was not considered to be an obstacle to the citizens duty to serve the community. The participation had not only a positive impact on the individual, but it was also necessary for the whole system. Under these circumstances, participation is inevitably seen as an obligation. The apathetic public is one of the biggest threats to the quality of democracy as it might lead to the dominance of privileged classes. All these assumptions are the antithesis of Plato's ideas as well as of the empirical theory of democracy which assumes that there are striking differences in citizens capabilities and apathy is welcomed.

Athenian democracy survived for a mere two centuries and with some minor occasions democratic ideas did not appear again until the Enlightenment. By that time the government moved from the local scale to national states and the direct involvement of most citizens was no longer needed to run the state. There were few practical examples of democracy when the idea of direct democracy emerged again in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Together with John Stewart Mill and George Douglas Howard Cole, these philosophers are the key inspiration of participatory theory.

Rousseau and Mill were also influential thinkers for deliberative democracy. Rousseau's emphasis on human interaction and formation of general will was akin to the arguments of deliberative democrats. Both assumed the existence of consensus and they also moved in the same direction on how to reach it. The interest in Mill spurs from the defense of free speech and discussion in his thinking. Most of the historical figures were therefore tied to both theories. Still, Simone Chambers (2018, p. 55–64) explained that some of these authors had an ambiguous role in the theory of deliberative democracy and different deliberative theorists subsequently stressed different aspects of their thinking.

Deliberative democracy therefore acknowledges the heritage of Athenian democracy and for example finds deliberative elements in Aristotle's theory. Yet, the Greek example

belongs rather to the core of the participatory theory (Chambers, 2018, p. 55). Rousseau's work then shows the multiple layers of the ideas of classical philosophers. It offers the theory of general will to the deliberative democrats. The participatory democrats then appreciate the individual sovereignty achieved through the participation and the establishment of the whole participatory system. Mill interests participatory democrats when he took the participatory practices to the state level and stressed the educatory function of participation which prepares citizens for the effective participation in government.<sup>15</sup> For the deliberative democrats, Mill was the advocate of the government by discussion. Although he defended plural voting and the role of experts, he also firmly believed that all citizens could be educated, and the interests of every citizen should be equally voiced (see Chambers, 2018, p. 59–60).

Therefore, the participation pertained to an important educational function in both theories as seen not only in writings of J.S. Mill, Rousseau, and to some extent Tocqueville, but also in their followers in e.g., Pateman (1970) and Putnam (1993). Their understanding of participation went beyond the pursuit of personal interest. It enriches the citizens personally as well (Pateman, 1970, p. 18). The amount of participation signals the health of democracy (Putnam, 2000). Hence, democracy is improved as the citizens are improved—quite a difference to the pluralist democracy of individual interests, apathetic citizens, and grim expectations about the citizens' sophistication.

#### 1.4.2 Non-electoral participation as a center point of the theory of strong democracy

The inspiration by classical thinkers and the positive view of the nature of men are not the only thing participatory and deliberative theory have in common. They both emerged as a criticism of empirical theory of democracy which assigns only a peripheral role to the participation. Therefore, the empirical theory takes away the sovereignty which is not transferable fully through representation. As a result, citizens are, as Rousseau would put it, enchained by the government. If Schumpeter (1943, 2013) developed his theory through the

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<sup>15</sup> For an overview of Rousseau, Mill, and Cole in the theory of participatory democracy see Pateman (1970, p. 22–44)



critique of “the classical doctrine of democracy,” the participatory theory of democracy subsequently emerged as a response. Pateman (1970, p. 16–21) argued that the existence of the “classical doctrine” was a myth anyway and in fact Schumpeter was using a straw man to attack the participatory practices. According to Pateman, the classical doctrine did not represent a unified theory and the writings of individual authors quite differ.<sup>16</sup> Nor did the classical doctrine demand too much from the citizens as Schumpeter claims.


The different expectations about citizens represent the core of the conflict between participatory and empirical theory. Empirical theory works with contemporary data and the world as it is. It generalizes the findings to the natural lack of interest or “virtues” of citizens, i.e., their natural lack of psychological or socioeconomic resources (Brady, Verba, & Scchlozman, 1995). In these terms, it follows the “homo homini lupus” of Hobbes and emphasizes the need for representation instead. Participatory theory works with the normative assumptions instead and focuses on how the world could be. The theorists of participatory theory assume that the lack of opportunity and proper institutions are the main obstacle to participation. The voting is not enough to encompass whole participation.

Over the years there have been plenty of models for different variations of both approaches. Still, Barber's (2003) distinction between “thin” and “strong” democracy summarized the difference the best. Barber understood the thin variation of democracy as based on conflict and checks and balances. Therefore, it produces passive and distrustful citizens. Their involvement in politics is delimited by the social contract and legality. Therefore, it stresses the potential (legality) to participate, not the actual participation. On the other hand, the strong democracy is based on active citizens. Their sovereignty is given by the participation itself which in turn defines citizenship. Citizens are not bound by the contract but by their search for the common solutions through the participation (Barber, 1984, p. 218–219; see also Figure 3 on p. 219 for a detailed comparison of models).

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<sup>16</sup> This claim represents a rare moment of agreement between Pateman and Sartori who stressed that there was no canon of the classical theory of democracy (see Sartori, 1987, p. 157–159).

Figure 2 - Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen's Participation



Source: Arnstein (1969, p. 217), edited by the author

The insufficient institutions for participation result in manipulation rather than into a democratic process. Arnstein (1969) explained that there is a hierarchy of involvement. The lowest level represents participation without real power and results in an empty ritual of participation. For the illustrative purposes Arnstein (1969) organized the levels of participation as shown in Figure 2. Citizens get increasingly involved in decision-making with each ladder. The low levels represent non-participation. In the mid-level is the voice of citizens at least to be heard and is akin to representative democracy. The top ladder is the strong democracy. The ladder of participation can also be understood through Rousseau's distinction between sovereignty and government. People can be sovereign and still be governed on the basis of the general will. However, the lower the rung on the ladder the lower the sovereignty and the more illegitimate “chains” are wrapped around citizens.

Overall, the main argument of the strong participatory democracy can be summarized: as:

The existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at that level, socialization, or ‘social training’, for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. This development takes place through the process of participation itself. (Pateman 1970: 42)

This excerpt shows three crucial points of participatory democrats; the sole representation is not enough; maximum participation is needed; and the necessary resources for participation are obtained by the participation itself.

Therefore, the main role of participation is its function as a Tocquevillian school of democracy. For Barber (2003) the key mechanism of strong democracy was deliberation. He (2003, p. 173) declared that “at the heart of strong democracy is talk.” Deliberation builds virtues and political knowledge (see also Pateman, 2012, p. 8–10). The talk is central for resolving the conflicts. It leads to consensus instead of eternal competition in pluralism (Barber, 1984, p. 174–178). The broader concept of participatory democracy is therefore closely connected to participation as a political discussion.

The foundations of deliberative theory also utilizes the democratic tradition. It can be traced as far back as ancient Greece mainly to the work of Aristotle who dealt foremost with the practical questions concerning rhetoric, decision-making, and rationality (Yack, 2006). The current theory of deliberative democracy is based on John Rawls’ concept of justice and the theory of communicative action of Jürgen Habermas (1987). Furthermore, participation as political discussion is set within the larger framework of the public sphere, civil society, and state, reaching beyond simple casting of a vote in elections. This fact, according to Habermas (1996), ensured the legitimacy of democratic system especially regarding its outputs. The deliberative mechanisms, such as the deliberative polling, bring the consensus and equal participation. Nevertheless, they are part of the participatory democracy (see Pateman, 2012, p. 8) and form the core of the strong democracy (Barber, 1984).

To summarize, strong democracy is not a coherent theory as presented in this text. It continues the tradition older than two millennia which necessarily creates a space for multiple interpretations. However, at its core the strong democracy shares multiple axioms. Proponents of strong democracy assume that contemporary representative democracy can be easily

improved by introducing participatory mechanisms. Pateman (1970) originally focused on participation in the workplace. Barber (1984) also focused on national referenda or the lower-level communities, e.g., local assemblies able to deliberate. Recently the most discussed tool of strong democracy is participatory budgeting (Sousa Santos, 1998, 2005) or deliberative polls (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Without participation the result would be only a thin, i.e., liberal representative democracy (Barber, 1984) or the delegative democracy of powerful leaders in the case of new democracies (see O'Donnell, 1992). Therefore, the democratic polity can exist only in participatory society (Pateman, 2012, p. 41). In practice participation can improve the government effectiveness. The next chapter analyses the positive impacts of NEP on government in depth and contrasts them with the assumption of the empirical theory of democracy if necessary.

### 1.4.3 Positive impact of the non-electoral participation on government effectiveness

Although, the contestation between empirical theory of democracy and strong democracy continues, the proponents of strong democracy managed to get a stable ground in the field of the quality of democracy. The end of the Cold War brought the renewed interest in the differences within democracies and not just between democratic and non-democratic regimes. The institution of free and fair election ceased to be the panacea for the accountability and responsiveness of government; a fact that many democratic theorists noticed soon after the spread of electoral democracy through the world (see e.g., Levitsky & Way, 2002; Zakaria, 2007). Pateman (2012, p. 41) claimed that “the existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy” seems self-evident nowadays. This chapter looks closely on the possible mechanisms of how NEP can improve the quality of government especially the government effectiveness.

Government effectiveness is one of the key indicators of the quality of democracy. The other two key components are the process of government formation including elections and the existence and general support for the democratic process and liberties (see Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Government effectiveness is then tied to the specific support for the regime that reflects government performance (see Easton, 1965). Government effectiveness in this dissertation combines both the quality of policy making and its implementation (see Putnam, 1993). As

such the government effectiveness is the representation of both responsiveness and accountability of government. The concept measures how well the government reflects the public interest during the policy formulation and the credibility of the government's commitment to implementation of the chosen policies. Government effectiveness is not a challenge just for democratic regimes (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 86, see also Huntington, 1973). Nevertheless, effective democratic government is based on the responsiveness and accountability. These traits distinguish the democratic regimes from the another. Moreover, the accountability and responsiveness cannot be delivered solely by the democratic elections themselves (Holmberg et al., 2009, p. 138–139).

The electoral accountability is the key concept of the empirical theory of democracy. The goal is to limit the tyrannical tendencies of the government (O'Donnell, 1998). However, in the last 30 years, the idea that there are additional relevant tools of control other than the competition of elites in elections kept growing (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, see especially note 3 on p. 15). NEP and civic participation have become the cornerstone of the debate on the health of modern democracy as well. Many perceive decreasing civil participation as a threat (Putnam, 2000), while others rather point to the changing nature of participation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Dalton, 2004, 2008). Nevertheless, the continuing responsiveness of the government to its own citizens is a key characteristic of democracy (Dahl, 1971, p. 1).

Simply put, elections are not enough to have a responsive and accountable government. Even Sartori (1987, p. 152–170), who is often taken as the champion of elite theory, acknowledged the necessity for responsiveness of government in between elections. The officials should pay attention to the voters the whole time. However, as O'Donnell (1998, p. 113) noted that elections occur only periodically. Their effectiveness in securing accountability is unclear based on the variation in party system and party volatility. For example, for a long time the small Christian democratic party in the Czech Republic successfully blocked the legislative allowance of gay marriage. The Christian democrats had a great coalition potential and spent most of the time before 2010 as a minor coalition partner. Although there was a majority support for the gay marriage among the citizens, the topic was successfully blocked. This seemingly fits the checks and balances of Dahl's (1956) theory where the motivated

minority should not fall under the tyranny of majority. However, one can argue that there was approximately the same size counter-minority motivated at least to the same amount.<sup>17</sup>

The new democracies especially provide an example of the limited nature of accountability through the election. Post-communist Europe after the transition to democracy was known for its chronic over-accountability in elections where the ruling party was often ousted out. Yet, the quality of the institutions and government did not improve immediately. Neither did the control of corruption. Evidence shows that corruption was not easily punished through elections (Choi & Woo, 2010; Ferraz & Finan, 2011, cf. Grzymała-Busse, 2006). Similarly, Mechkova et al. (2018) argued that the elections provide the lowest level of accountability and were less constraining for the politicians.

The accountability itself is a chameleon-like term synonymous to oversight, control, check, restraint, and even punishment and represents the ways of preventing and correcting the abuse of political power (Schedler, 1999; Mulghan, 2000). It represents the constraints on government (Lindberg et al., 2017; Mechkova et al., 2018). Yet again, the tradition of empirical democracy shifted the main focus towards the formal institutions. However, there are both formal and informal dimensions of accountability. Since the official institutional arrangement of democracy became universally accepted (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007, p. 638–639) the informal institutions matter more as they make it possible to manipulate and twist the formal institutions (Schedler, 2002). Lindberg et al. (2017) defined these areas as the *de jure* and *de facto* dimensions of accountability. They can be thought of as the institutional provisions for the accountability and the accountability in practice, e.g., the freedom of assembly and the actual use of it by the citizens.

Therefore, there are multiple dimensions of accountability. The vertical accountability represents the relationship between citizens and their representatives (O'Donnell, 1998; Schedler, 1999). The horizontal accountability focuses on checks and balances within the

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<sup>17</sup> The Christian democrats (KDU-ČSL) got 8.6% on average between 1996 and 2010 when it did not pass the electoral threshold of 5% (receiving the 4.39%). The pro-gay-marriage citizens had no institutionalized support in form of the political party. Mostly thanks the communist past, the overall utilization of NEP is rather low in the Czech Republic and thus the pro-gay-marriage movement did not use the tools of NEP enough to change the supply of political parties. Such example shows the limits of the norms in the civil society as well as the limits of electoral participation for the agenda setting.

system and on the relationships and oversight among the political institutions (O'Donnell, 1998). In the last twenty years, there has been an increased interest in NEP as the tool of accountability. It belongs to the diagonal accountability which through the media and civil society enables better control of the government outside the elections (Lindberg et al., 2017; Mechkova et al., 2018).

Figure 9 in the Appendix provides the graphical representations of individual dimensions based on their conceptualization of accountability. Notably the first two dimensions in Europe have been put in place both in reality and in practice.<sup>18</sup> The major difference lies within the third dimension of the diagonal accountability which includes NEP. Furthermore, Mechkova et al. (2018) showed that the development of effective horizontal accountability is dependent upon both vertical and diagonal accountability. After the transition to democracy there was a surge of mass participation in most of the post-communist states. In some the levels of NEP remained higher and in others faded. Then, the individual states went on different paths and their government effectiveness differs (Schmitter, 2004).

The individual actors often try to overstep their constitutionally demarcated boundaries in the post-communist Europe, e.g., when Czech president Miloš Zeman appointed a non-partisan government in the face of the new majority after the previous prime minister resigned.<sup>19</sup> This example shows that the checks and balances, e.g., constitutional division of powers, are also dependent on diagonal accountability. The responsiveness in between elections is often lower due the insufficient vertical accountability though election and low diagonal accountability due to low NEP.

Responsiveness as a stand-alone concept is mostly tied to strong democracy. The articulation of interests and agenda setting are crucial (Barber, 1984, p. 178–198) The responsiveness differentiates the democratic process from the manipulation (Arnstein, 1969) and represents a major area of institutional performance (Putnam, 1993). In these terms NEP is especially a key tool of responsiveness as it enables to articulate specific issues which otherwise

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<sup>18</sup> Although the surge of illiberal tendencies in post-communist area threatens to reverse this process (Greskovits, 2015; Merkel & Scholl, 2018).

<sup>19</sup> The president overstepped in his powers by abusing his de facto accountability to appoint non-partisan figures of his choosing instead allowing to the new government to be formed. The government lost the vote of confidence and still ruled for seven months until the snap election.

might get lost in the electoral supply. Nevertheless, it is also a part of empirical theory (Dahl, 1971; Sartori, 1987), yet often understood within the broader concept of accountability (see Mulghan, 2000, especially p. 556). Quite simply the difference between the two is that the accountability checks for the rules not to be broken and the responsiveness for the politics not to be made by a powerful minority.

Furthermore, Norris (2002, p. 42–44) argued that there is a ceiling effect of voting. Once it reaches certain levels, the increase in education and other resources does not matter. On the other hand, NEP allows citizens to express themselves more freely. They are able to stress specific issues and participate more often to show the intensity of their demands. New types of NEP allow new ways of holding the government accountable. NEP together with the free media is able to provide continuous accountability and hold the government responsible in between the elections. It enables one to articulate the specific demands regarding the government policy and thus control the work of government. The increase in NEP should be connected to the subsequent increase in the responsiveness of the government.

In sum the participatory theorists expect that NEP delivers better outputs than the sole representative democracy. The electoral participation is not sufficient for a strong democracy. NEP produces better citizens and an overall better democratic community. The deliberative mechanisms serve as an exercise in democracy. They produce more knowledgeable and tolerant citizens. Deliberation tames the conflict within society and helps to reach a consensus. This idea represents the counterargument to Huntington's (1973) theory of potential government overload. The deliberation instead serves as an intermediary between citizens and government. The civic engagement helps to mitigate the conflict. Overall, political participation leads to more democratic politics. The mass involvement of citizens should create overall better policy outcomes and a more responsive government. It empowers citizens on the way, and as a result, they can participate more effectively in the future and thus increases their capacity to influence government. And so, strong democracy assumes that the higher amount of participation the better:

*H4: NEP has a positive impact on the government effectiveness. Thus, the higher levels of overall NEP are associated with the higher levels of government effectiveness.*



## 2 The Goldilocks Conundrum: the connection between values and participation

Chapter 1 presented two sides of an enduring argument about the role of participation in democracy. Booth and Seligson (2009, p. 144) labeled it as the Goldilocks conundrum, “the question of how much and what kinds of participation are too much, too little, or just right.” The empirical theory partly disregarded the role of NEP as it focuses on Easton’s (1965) diffuse support for democracy. Therefore, it is more concerned with what democracy is than what it does. The strong democracy does not follow the same logic and focuses on the action.

Nevertheless, the main difference between the two approaches lies not only in the amount of necessary participation, but it also centers around the expectation about the citizens themselves. Both competing schools of thought offer imperfect answers. Strong democracy takes from the thinkers of classical democracy and presents mostly normative arguments in favor of citizens' values. Based on Mill’s writing, it assumes that it is possible to educate citizens to participate for a common good. The other stream of theory was built on the empirical experience between 1940s and 1960s and subsequently expects some citizens to be neither active nor have democratic values. As such the theories either assume society which is yet to be built or society long gone.

This chapter briefly summarizes the role of individual values in presented theories. Both empirical theory of democracy and the strong democracy try to circumvent the role of values in participation. Yet, it is necessary to explore their role to provide the full picture. The chapter also adds another piece of the puzzle in the form of values change occurring since the late 1960s. The last section provides arguments for the idea that the outcomes of participation differ based not only on its amount but also based on the values of participating citizens. The connection between values and action is an everlasting interest of political sociology and their combined effect can unify the theories of civic culture with the participation.

## 2.1 The role of the values and participation in the empirical theory of democracy

The research based on the empirical theory either stresses the values itself and the participation serves only as the medium without any effect. The main concern is thus with the division of values in society and subsequently with the amount of passivity of certain groups. If the more authoritarian citizens are also the more passive, the civic culture and overall democratic norms are not threatened as much. Most of the empirical studies showed that the more active citizens usually hold more democratic values.<sup>20</sup> Hence, there is no reason to call for an increase in participation. Instead, the focus often centers around the predictors of participation (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Verba et al., 1987; Vrábliková, 2013).

Consequently, there is now a good understanding of which factors predict participation in general. The literature well explains how the different attitudes influence behavior in the form of participation. The contemporary research focused on differences among groups in the type of participation (Canache, 2012; Schlozman et al., 2010) or its amount (Dalton, 2008; Bolzendahl & Coffee, 2013; Gherghina & Geisel, 2017; Webb, 2013). Much of the attention has also been devoted to the new forms of participation (Stolle et al., 2015). Yet, its impacts on democracy on the macro level are undertheorized, and the outcomes of citizen's actions are still not clear (Schlozman et al., 2012; p. 120; cf. Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). The best answer theories provide is: it depends.

The empirical theory of democracy contributes to the explanation by the concept of civic culture (see Almond & Verba, 1963). There, participation is represented not by the action itself but rather by the participatory values. The actual participation is important solely because it translates the values into the broader society and thus serves only as an intermediary. Participatory theorists would assume that in the scenario of two societies with identical norms

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<sup>20</sup> As already mentioned by Dahl (1956) or Almond and Verba (1963), these citizens are often more educated and more affluent. The causality one can assume is thus that they are more complacent with the democratic system that enabled them prosperity and utilization of freedom. As a result, these citizens are responsible for the stability of the democratic system. The socioeconomic model of participation has a direct connection with this theory.

the participatory one functions better. Still, Almond and Verba (1963) showed that the usual and appropriate scenario is the mixed culture including some apathy. Huntington also added that the civic culture does not influence the stability of regimes nowadays as much and that although the

systemic failures of democratic regimes to operate effectively could undermine their legitimacy. In the late twentieth century, the major nondemocratic ideological sources of legitimacy, most notably Marxism- Leninism, were discredited. The general acceptance of democratic norms meant that democratic governments were even less dependent on performance legitimacy than they had been in the past. (1991, p. 19)

Indeed, democracy in Europe seemed to have become the only game in town (Linz & Stepan, 1996). There is the belief in the legitimacy of democracy required for the stability of democracy not to be in immediate danger (Diamond, 1999, p. 168). However, within the rationale of pluralist democracy, the government effectiveness suffers if there is an active small group of anti-democratic citizens while the mass of pro-democratic citizens is apathetic. The empirical theory of democracy leaves the activity aside. Instead, it focuses on the concept of legitimacy that goes back to Max Weber's emphasis on the need of a supportive public for regime survival. Legitimacy is the "belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society" (Lipset, 1959b, p. 83). It is the key for the stability of democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Booth & Seligson, 2009; Norris, 2011; cf. Fail & Pierce, 2008) and for the democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1999). However, the belief is not directly influenced by the action.

The explanation of the effects of participation by the empirical theory of democracy only goes far to the idea that participation somehow amplifies the norms of the participants. It translates their values to the broader society. Therefore, the previously latent values become a salient issue in the society. The introduction of new and often non-democratic ideas to the public sphere threatens the democratic stability. Contrary to the expectation of the deliberative democrats, participation only translates these values and cannot serve as a tool for the resolution of conflict. Unlike the theorists of social capital, the school of empirical democracy does not expect legitimacy to be created through the process. Instead, legitimacy is present in the form of civic culture at the beginning of the whole process.

## 2.2 Role of the values and participation in the strong democracy

Participatory democracy is based on classical thinking which deals extensively with the individual values of citizens. Thus, one would assume that the individual values of citizens would be central to the participatory democrats. However, the main criticism of participatory democracy remains the omitted values of citizens and individual associations (Clark, 2014, p. 3). The participatory democrats seemingly solve the problem of individual values through the educational function of participation. The initial values of the citizens are less important as they get changed during the process, i.e., citizens get more virtuous. Pateman (1970, p. 105) stated, “if those who come newly into the political arena have been previously ‘educated’ for it then their participation will pose no dangers to the stability of the system.” In this statement Pateman assumes that the amount of participation is not a problem—the citizen’s values are. Nevertheless, the citizen’s virtues can be fostered through participation. As MacPherson (1977) noticed this constitutes a vicious circle; a paradox, where participatory theory needs educated citizens to participate, but their education can only be provided through participation. This chapter explains the dubious relationship between values and strong democracy.

Participation as a school of democracy is key for Tocqueville and subsequently for the neo-Tocquevillian school of thought. The resulting concept of social capital combines the values and action into broader understanding of civic culture (Putnam 1993, 2000). Similarly to Almond and Verba’s *Civic Culture* (1963), social capital is based on the interpersonal trust which fuels the formation of associations. Various clubs and groups are then considered necessary for well-functioning democracy. Putnam (1993, 2000) further stressed the activity itself. Active and trusting civil society should make government more responsive. Higher social capital increases the government effectiveness. It solves the dilemma of collective action and thus the government does not have to coerce citizens cooperation (see Putnam, 1993, p. 163–171). The social capital is obtained primarily through the horizontal networks of the civic engagement (Putnam, 1993, p. 171–175). These practices embody the civic collaborative norms and values of the community and contribute to the stability of democracy (Putnam, 1993, p. 89–91).

Overall participatory democrats solve MacPherson’s (1977) paradox of participation by focusing on the participation on the local level which subsequently supposes to influence the

macro state level. The initial values of citizens can be disregarded as they change through the process. However, the relationship might not be that straightforward. Van Ingen and Van der Meer (2016) provided evidence in favor of the fact that the intra-group trust might not be transferable to the higher level. Citizens might build trust for their own group but not for the outsiders. Furthermore, the supposed democratic benefits of civic engagement might be given by the sole self-selection of their members.

There are plenty of the “uncivil” associations as well gathering citizens for a common cause that does not fit into the pantheon of liberal democracy. Especially in the USA with the different take on the freedom of expression one would find plenty of anti-liberal or plain racist organizations. These cannot be expected to be the “schools of democracy,” quite the contrary. These “schools of non-democracy” do not help to increase accountability and lower the legitimacy of democratic institutions. In return they make the government less effective because it has to deal with the demands going outside the institutional arrangements of liberal democracy.

Simply stated, the benefits of political involvement disappear when people bring non-democratic values to the public arena. Berman (1997) analyzed how the vivid civil society contributed to the end of the Weimar democracy. The Nazi movement recruited the followers from these sections of active society. The example from the inter-war period is once again used against the participatory democrats. Yet, the examples of bad civil society are not limited only to this era. The Ku Klux Klan or various white supremacist movements might be among the more recent examples. The activity itself is not enough to strengthen democracy and bad civil society can even undermine it. The democratic civility is needed to promote democracy (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001).

The solution of strong democracy to increase the level of participation is therefore insufficient. This critique seems to cut through the heart of the strong democracy and follows the same rationale as the critique of the empirical theory. However, the indices seem to point to the role of citizen’s values instead of renouncing participation as a whole. Barber (2003, p. 145) on the one hand similarly argued that “the representative principle steals from individuals the ultimate responsibility for their values, beliefs, and actions.” On the other hand, he failed to address the values properly as well. At the beginning of *Strong Democracy* he (2003, p. xxxii) admitted that his goal is not to define the abstract concepts of truth or justice. rather focuses on

participation in practice. These parts express Barber's perception of values as a rather fluid concept. When society changes, so do the values. The justice from behind a Rawls's veil varies for different societies. Therefore, citizens need the participation to accommodate the new values instead of defining abstract concepts like justice with everlasting meaning (Barber, 1984). However, the disregard for the universal values would make strong democracy just another practical system to distribute power.

Correspondingly, the quality of participation was always crucial for the theories of deliberation. Yet, the deliberative aspects of strong democracy do not provide a satisfying solution as well. Barber (2003, p. 135–137) admitted that politics are not value-free. Yet, the legitimacy comes from deliberation not the initial values. The individual values are through this process reconstructed into the public norms. Thus, the values itself are legitimated through talk and so is democracy. This allows us to substitute abstract values for the practice of active citizens. The higher legitimacy of democracy when the deliberation involved (see Fishkin, 1995) neglects the question of legitimacy based on the underlying civic support for the system.

The deliberative democrats focus on the output of the whole process. Their main interest thus lies within the necessary environment which delivers the best deliberative outcomes. Thus, the only values that are important are the ones that allow the proper deliberation. The public sphere is supposed to be a space of its own with tolerant and critical debate (Habermas, 1987; Paxton, 2002, p. 258). After this positive output is generated, it is translated to the broader society. Because the results of deliberation are supposed to be democratic and consensual, the initial support for the regime is not important if it does not prevent deliberation.

### 2.3 New impulses thanks to the modernization and value change

The quarrel between the two approaches is nearly 80 years old. Although the general approach to the analysis remains the same, the underlying structure is different and new evidence might call for re-evaluation of the core theories. Liberal democracy lost its main ideological adversaries and has become the only game in town after the end of the Cold War (Linz & Stepan, 1996; see also Fukuyama, 1989, 2006). Howard (2003, p. 57) remarked that subsequently the quality of democracy became more important than stability of regimes. Instead of being one of the components of regime survival participation became the essential condition for the quality of democracy. On the other hand, the recent growth of illiberal democracy

(Zakaria, 2007) and threat of deconsolidation returned the stability of democracy once again to the center of interest.

The change of the underlying structure is well expressed by the individualization of politics (see Dalton, 1996). The cleavages that have been formed over the long period of time lost their power quite rapidly in the years following the first edition of Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* in 1963. The best example is the generational change and shift of the overall culture in Germany. The subject culture connected to the experience with the totalitarian regime is less pronounced in contemporary German society nowadays. Such change was more rapid than Almond and Verba assumed (see Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 369–373). The original sample from *The Civic Culture* does not represent a full picture nowadays. Though, it was questionable from the beginning. Mexico was introduced at the last minute to replace Sweden and it did not qualify as a full polyarchy at that time (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 48). The sample thus constituted one not fully democratic country, two most prominent examples of inter-war non-democratic regimes, and two “stable” Anglo-Saxon countries whose regimes were less internally affected by the Second World War or Cold War. Therefore, one of the critiques of *Civic Culture* has pointed to the culturally driven analysis.

The silent revolution of the late 1960s helped to erode the old cleavages and built new ones with a shift towards more self-expressive post-material values (Inglehart, 1990). These changes put different pressure on societal consensus. Putnam (2000) assumed that states create the stocks of a social capital. This economic term points to the accumulation over time. The social modernization and proliferation of post-material values has changed the way citizens engage and Putnam (2000) was therefore afraid that the social capital might be depleted, and democracy might be in danger. Still, the post-material values are supposed to be rooted in the nature of liberal democracy. Thus, they might not threaten democracy as Almond and Verba (1963) assumed earlier. Their sample did not provide much evidence about the democratic cultures where citizens were not supportive of the government and yet supportive of democracy. The concern with the stability and legitimacy of regimes lead to the perception of the non-allegiant culture as inherently unstable.

Dalton (1996) showed that the third wave of democratization has brought new topics for the democratic research. *The Civic Culture Transformed* demonstrated the recent shift from the allegiant to the assertive citizens who are critical yet still democratic. That is transformation

from culture consisting mainly of citizens with high affective, cognitive, and evaluative orientations towards political objects to citizens who are more demanding (Dalton & Welzel, eds. 2014). It follows the emergence of new post-material culture (Inglehart 1971, 2003) and brings increasing focus on NEP. Still, as Hooghe (2015, p. 170) noted once again, the *empiria* drove the theory and the mechanism of how the chronically dissatisfied citizens with low trust in government affect the stability of democracy was unclear. One of the reasons was that the main argument of the shift towards assertive culture was mainly longitudinal and not cross-sectional (Welzel & Dalton, 2014, p. 294; see also Dalton, 2008). Therefore, it focused on the changes within one state and not on the differences among multiple of them. The ideal amount and type of participation was not specified either. The new findings still progressed the research. Yet, the debate is far from over (Verba, 2015, p. 1086).

New inquiry in the political culture was able to capture the value change and the different levels of democratic legitimacy. It has a broader scope thanks to the democratization of a large part of the world since the 1960s and thus offers a new perspective. The key difference to the post-war period is the change in the social structure. Modernization and intergenerational change have brought the change of individual values (Inglehart, 1971). Strong democracy represents this change within the field of political science. Modernization changed the way citizens work, live, and engage in politics. Urbanization, industrialization, mass suffrage, and other changes gave birth to the post-material values which favor self-expression and non-material benefits. Post Materialists feel relatively secure about material needs and have a greater number of resources and skills. Therefore, they can invest their energy in more abstract concerns (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002, p. 300). Their activity is driven by self-expression and by their values.

Yet, the question is whether it can help to unravel the mystery of the role participation plays in modern democracy. The general idea remains more or less the same and researchers are looking for the necessary cultural traits of the stable democracy; or the cultural traits that influence the quality of democracy respectively. However, modernization has also broadened citizens' repertoire of action. Based on his observations of the social unrest in the late 1960s Inglehart (1971) already expected that there would be a rise of elite-challenging action. The modernization has brought the increasing cognitive mobilization based on the rise in education



and available information. It produces the necessary skills to both understand abstract concepts such as justice and to engage in their defense.

The empirical evidence continuously shows that the Postmaterialist are more likely to engage in unconventional and protest participation. The cognitive mobilization further increases the difference to the extent that the materialist with low levels of cognitive mobilization are six times less likely to engage than the post-materialist with high levels of cognitive mobilization where three quarters participated in this way (Inglehart, 1990, p. 361–362). These actions are thus accompanied by the post-material values and the protest might have different outcomes than Huntington (1973) expected. It might not threaten democratic stability. The change is so far reaching that “petitions, boycotts, and other forms of direct action are no longer unconventional but have become more or less normal actions” (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002, p. 300).

Dalton (2004) provided a similar perspective. He argued that the citizens' involvement and social capital were not decreasing; they were instead changing. The modernization and higher cognitive mobilization have brought rise in demands on the government. The higher expectations result in a more critical view of elites and institutions. Yet, the dissatisfied citizens remain democratic. They adhere to the democratic norms and even criticize the government for not being democratic enough. Thus, democratic legitimacy is not threatened by them and their protest participation.

This theory has its roots in the 1960s when Easton (1965) argued that the support for the system works on multiple levels. Similarly, Gamson (1968) argued that the trust works on different levels as well and therefore it has different outcomes based on these levels. The highest level is represented by the support for the system. Its outcome is then the stability of the system. The lower level is the support for government and elites and affects the effectiveness of government (see also Easton, 1965). The impacts of distrust differ by the level of institutions in the hierarchy on these different levels of trust leading to different outcomes. The immediate effect of NEP affects the lower-level institutions.

Norris (1999) and Dalton (2004) perfected this research to explain the recent changes. The rising expectation of citizens which are rarely met does not have to result in the overall decline in regime legitimacy. Dalton (2004) identified the group of dissatisfied democrats while

Norris (1999) focused on the critical citizens. Both terms address the same issue, the rising discrepancy between support for democracy and the evaluation of democratic performance. The question is whether these changes threaten the legitimacy of the democratic regimes. Norris (2011, p. 219–236) later argued that they influence the way citizens act. Although, there is still a debate whether these groups merge (see Fuks, Casalecchi, & Araújo, 2017), the general agreement is that these changes are not necessarily negative. Rather they can improve the effectiveness of government. These assumptions stand in a sharp contrast to previous research on citizens passivity. Huntington (1973, p. 106) followed the idea of allegiant culture and notes that the distrust of citizens is a result of growing demands.

Therefore, it should lead to the expansion of governmental activity but decline in its authority. However, Dalton (2008) explained that solely the duty-based citizenship is being replaced by the engaged citizenship and there is a corresponding change in the actions citizens take to influence the politics. By choosing when and why they participate, citizens can utilize NEP to expand their influence over the government (Dalton, 2008, p. 93). As a result, the government is better informed, more controlled, and overall works more effectively. Therefore, I hypothesize that the modernization has changed the impacts of the relationship between government effectiveness and participation:

*H2a:* The protest behavior is a form of elite-challenging action utilized mostly by citizens with post-material values. They can differentiate between various levels of legitimacy and hold democratic values. Therefore, protest does not represent a threat to democracy, quite contrary it increases the government effectiveness.

The hypothesis is based on two core assumptions. The first is that the types of actions have fundamentally changed in the last decades. Moreover, their impact has changed as well, and protest behavior does not represent a threat. It mostly does not constitute a protest against the regime rather against specific policy. The question remains whether the new type of protest is a useful input for the government effectiveness. Dalton (2008) and Norris (2002) pointed to the nature of the new participants and assume that they are educated and invested in democracy. Yet, it remains to be seen whether their participation improves the government.

### 3 Solving the puzzle: The values and action combined

First two chapters provided the similarities and differences between various approaches to the role of political participation in democratic theory. They showed that the role of participation is inescapably tied to civic culture as well. Part of the literature suggests that civic culture is the key to stable democracy (Almond & Verba 1963, 1980; Inglehart, 1990). Other authors focused on the benefits of participation without much concern for the initial values (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984; Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). They demanded a literal participatory culture, not a potentially participative one. Finally, Putnam (1993, 2000) assumed that one generates the other (cf. Berman, 1997; Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). I argue that it is possible to integrate both into one theory, and the dilemma of the immediate role of NEP can be settled by focusing on the attitudes of participants. The attitudes can help us understand the variation in the information NEP transfers (see also Schlozman et al., 2012).

As Dalton (1996, p. 2) explained, “culture sets norms for behavior that members of society acknowledge and generally follow, even if they personally do not share these norms.” However, culture is spread through participation and discussion. The norms of inactive citizens might be overcome by their more active counterparts. Berman (1997) provided the evidence from the Weimar republic where the Nazi party was able to lure the activists and abuse their skills to spread the party propaganda and infiltrate significant parts of the civil society (Berman, 1997, p. 419–420). The inactive citizens might represent the silent majority and still not influence the overall culture as much.<sup>21</sup> It is easy to ignore the silent voices. As a result, the civic culture is not entirely representative and is disproportionately shaped by the more active citizens.

As others have subsequently pointed out, it is better to evaluate the overall democratic potential of the civil society than assume that it is solely beneficial for democracy under all conditions. Reiter (2009, p. 32) argued that the general rule of thumb for the evaluation of the impact of civil society associations on democracy is the extent to which it promotes the

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<sup>21</sup> It is worth noting that the term silent majority is infamously used by Richard Nixon when trying to spin the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations as a protest of a vocal minority. It provides a practical example of the theory that the norms of inactive citizens do not spread much to represent the overall civic culture and. This led Nixon to the attempt to misrepresent this group’s values.

democratic values. Chambers and Kopstein (2001) similarly claimed that the problem is important also for stable democracies. They (2001, p. 857–858) suggested that “there will always be a certain number of people who reject the core principles of liberal democracy.” These people cannot be transformed through deliberation in a public sphere nor through participation. Instead, the question is how many fellow citizens will get convinced by their message (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). Therefore, the initial values are key to determine the impacts of participation (see also Reiter, 2009).

The entire relationship between non-democratic values and participation circles back to the issue of containment. The active lead the passive and if the active are non-democratic the democracy cannot function well. Putnam (1993) might have been right about the stock of social capital. However, it does not decline only if it is not maintained well; it can be reduced by the stocks of the negative social capital in society. In comparison to the civic associations, NEP provides a better tool for the analysis. It allows us to focus on the direct relationship between values, activity, and democracy without the need to focus on the mediating role of associations. NEP also has a multiplicative effect as the values of non-participants contribute less to the overall stock.

Furthermore, the values of participants serve as a substitute for the motivation and goal of participation. The sample of actions mentioned in the introductions is far from covering the entire range of citizens actions. Yet, the variation in immediate motives of citizens related to action is often too great for an analysis based on survey data. The specific motivation to participate is almost impossible to decode. Still, as Van Deth (2014, p. 350) remarked, “[...] neglecting the goals or intentions of citizens as a defining feature of political participation would throw out the baby with the bathwater.” I utilize these more persistent values and attitudes as a proxy measure of citizens motives.

Since Max Weber it has been assumed that the perception of system legitimacy is key for its stability and ultimately for its survival. All the studies on democratic studies share the fundamental assumption that the citizens' perception of democracy has an impact on the stability and deepening of regimes (Fils & Pierce, 2009, p. 175–176). The hope is that “participation will help build public trust in government and strengthen civic capacity” (Tolbert, McNeal, & Smith, 2003, p. 25). However, these results are dependent on the values of participants. The anti-democratic culture lowers the democratic norms and prevents effective

function of institutions (Huntington, 1991, p. 22). The consolidated democracy is characteristic for the internationalization of democratic norms (Diamond, 1993, p. 64, 74–76). The citizens attached to non-democratic, authoritarian attitudes pose a threat especially if they are more active (Kirbiš, 2013). The mixture of the underlying civic culture of countries varies and subsequently also the type of participants.

The debate on the systemic effects of participation has for a long time been obscured by the fact that the overall participation was done mainly by the citizens with the pro-democratic allegiant values. The recent development to more assertive orientations leaves an open door to re-evaluation of the impacts of the various types of participation. Different values and attitudes influence different levels of the democratic system. This dissertation focuses on the intermediate level of democratic institutions (see Easton, 1965) and how various types of participation influence them. Booth and Seligson (2009) recently provided a thorough examination of the legitimacy in Latin America. Using survey data, they demonstrated that legitimacy is indeed a multilevel phenomenon. The results are especially important as they targeted a geographic area rarely used in comparative studies. Indeed, the pooled sample from the eight countries convincingly showed that legitimacy is both a universal and multidimensional concept. The authors built on Easton and his followers (namely Dalton, 2004) and showed that indeed the evaluation of regime performance differs from the diffuse support. The low support for the government does not lead to the instability of the regimes. The authors also explained this relationship by the lack of ideological alternatives. Instead, the result was a greater participation (Booth & Seligson, 2009).

The shift to assertive culture is responsible for the changes in the quality of government (Dalton & Welzel, 2014). Similarly Fails and Pierce (2008) found that the democratic legitimacy has no impact on the deepening of democracy and instead prior institutionalization of democracy influences the formation of mass attitudes. Paxton (2002) also showed that the social capital improves the quality of institutions but not the democratic regime itself. Dalton and Welzel (2014, p. 290) noticed the interesting fact that the civic activism of Putnam's social capital (1993, 2000) corresponded to the allegiant culture, respectively using the same indicators such as the civic association membership, church attendance, or trust. Thus, the main question should be reformulated to what type of participation improves government.

O'Donnell (1998) traced the idea of selfless service to the public interest to republican values. Citizens who hold them control corruption. Similarly, the outcome of NEP is closely tied to the individual values of the citizens. If the participant is not interested in the republican tradition, respectively in democratic values, their actions are not likely to control the corrupt behavior of the elites or improve the government effectiveness. Thus, the non-democratic participation has an immediate impact on the quality of democracy. The deconsolidation has many steps, and the ineffective government is just a first of them. It takes time before the non-democratic alternative gets enough supporters to threaten democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 15). With the fading memory of non-democratic past some states might relapse to non-democratic regimes if the democracy is ineffective for a prolonged time (Huntington, 1991, p. 19).

Merging the literature on civic culture and strong democracy indicates that potentially active democrats are not sufficient for a healthy democracy. The values must be expressed through the behavior and the citizens with democratic values must participate. Otherwise, they would not add to the government effectiveness.

*H5:* Participation of citizens with democratic values has a positive impact on the government effectiveness. The participation of citizens with non-democratic values has a negative impact.

The civic culture well explains the impact of values on government effectiveness. Although the overall civic culture had changed, the core of the theory linking democratic values to the legitimacy of the regimes remains the same. The apathy might play a beneficial role if it concerns citizens without democratic values and NEP best shows the extent of their involvement. Strong democracy elaborates the idea of active citizens further. The participation improves the government, yet it needs the previously democratically educated citizens. Though the mechanism of such education is still not clear, it is still possible to test the impact of people already having these attitudes and of their fellow citizens who do not.

To summarize the expectations of individual theories as well as hypotheses presented by the author, Table 1 is added which in one place presents all the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4. Various forms of NEP represent the input in the system and the independent variable. Government effectiveness is then the output and a dependent variable. It represents the middle

ground between the quality of democracy which is the main concern of the strong democracy and the stability of the democratic system which is the main concern of the empirical theory of democracy. NEP can have a multitude of effects on government effectiveness. It can overwhelm the system and decrease the quality of the civil services. As such it would worsen the perception of public services and slowly erode the credibility of government and subsequently the legitimacy of a democratic system. On the other hand, government effectiveness captures the quality of policy formulation and implementation, key areas of quality of democracy for the theory of strong democracy. The government's effectiveness thus represents a meaningful indicator for a cross-country comparison in the following chapter. The fact that the arguments about the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness are systemic rather than limited to democracy makes it possible to include countries that would not rank as consolidated democracies in the sample as well and thus increase the generalizability of the findings.

Table 1 - Hypotheses about the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness

Hypothesis	Source
H1: The underlying affective values influence the government effectiveness. H1a: The level of NEP has no effect on the government effectiveness.	Almond & Verba, 1963, 1989; Dahl, 1956, 2015
H2: The protest participation decreases the government effectiveness.	Huntington, 1973

H2a: The protest behavior is a form of elite-challenging action utilized mostly by citizens with post-material values. They can differentiate between various levels of legitimacy and hold democratic values. Therefore, protest does not represent a threat to democracy, quite contrary as it increases government effectiveness.

Inglehart, 1971, 1990; Dalton, 2008; Dalton & Weltzel, eds. 2014

H3: Participation of citizens with democratic values has a positive impact on the government effectiveness. The participation of citizens with non-democratic values has a negative impact.

Combination of the civic culture and strong democracy

H4: Overall, NEP has either no impact or negative impact on the government effectiveness

Overall empirical theory of democracy

H5: Overall, NEP has a positive impact on the government effectiveness no matter the type.

Overall strong democracy

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## 4 Macro level analysis of non-electoral participation and the government effectiveness

The intricate relationship between participation and democracy represents an analytical challenge. The aggregation of individual values might lead to the individualistic fallacy or disregard for the individual agency of citizens and cultural determinism. The sample of countries must be carefully chosen to represent comparable cases. The relationship of the empirical theory of democracy to participation was built on a narrow set of countries and often driven by the example of the USA. So was the idea of the participatory strong democracy (Barber, 1984, p. xvi). The American system emerged victorious from the Second World War and represented the example of stable liberal democracy and the ideal civic culture was also based mostly on the Anglo-Saxon example.

Strong democracy often tries to avoid the cross-country comparison in practice. The authors elaborated the normative arguments or focused on the practical examples in small communities (see also Sartori, 1987). In these terms strong democracy is empirically oriented as well (see Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Sousa Santos, 1998). On the other hand, the case studies cost the strong democracy the perspective of the broader picture (see Chambers, 2009).<sup>22</sup> This approach responds to the paradox of a vicious circle of participation where strong participation needs the ideal participants to work, and these participants can only be created by the participation itself (MacPherson, 1977). The small-scale practices are supposed to subsequently influence the macro-level as well. Yet, as Pogrebinschi and Samuels (2014) stated, to challenge the empirical theory the strong democracy must prove that it does not represent a threat on the macro-level.

Another issue is that the simple cross-country study forces the researcher to choose one time period. This might lead to a period bias, e.g., concurrence of the high NEP and fall of democracies in the late 1920s and early 1930s during the economic crisis. Furthermore, the

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<sup>22</sup> Comparative studies face challenge of difference public spheres among states and therefore the comparability itself (see Haug & Teune, 2008). The result is then the focus on case studies focusing on the processes. Similarly, the participatory democracy also remains either normative or descriptive based on the case studies. There are only few exceptions of comparative studies among cases of participatory democracy (Cabannes, 2004). The case studies are unfit to provide significant arguments for the broader issues of political system. As a result, both have a hard time when trying to question the empirical theory of democracy.

relationship between NEP and government effectiveness is supposed to be dynamic at least on the theoretical level. Therefore, it is necessary to use the panel data.

Table 2 - Sample of country-years

Country	ESS wave							
	c	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Total N = 169	N=20	N=22	N=20	N=22	N=23	N=23	N=19	N=20
Austria	•	•	•				•	•
Belgium	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Bulgaria			•	•	•	•		
Cyprus			•	•	•	•		
Czechia	•	•		•	•	•	•	•
Germany	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Denmark	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Estonia		•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Spain	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Finland	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
France	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Greece	•	•		•	•			
Croatia				•	•			
Hungary	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Ireland	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Iceland		•				•		•
Italy	•					•		•
Lithuania					•	•	•	•
Luxembourg	•	•						
Netherlands	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Norway	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Poland	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Portugal	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Sweden	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Slovakia		•	•	•	•	•		
Switzerland	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
United Kingdom	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

Chapter 3 also shows that the two theoretical approaches can be integrated into one framework. Nevertheless, all these assumptions must be tested on the macro-level of countries. Table 2 shows the sample of country-years used in the following analysis. Although the dissertation compiles data from various sources such as World Bank, International Labour Organization or Polity IV, the sample size is driven by the availability of survey data from the ESS. The large sample of countries is best to capture the role of participation in democracy. The European region offers ideal ground to test the assumptions set in the second and third chapter. It is homogeneous enough while providing the necessary variation.

#### 4.1 Methods for modelling the cross-section time-series data

As Kittel (1999, p. 225) noted, one of the major issues in the cross-national comparative research is the fact that the number of cases is both too large for a qualitative analysis and too small for a quantitative one. The qualitative analysis could be restricted to a few cases, but the perspective would be narrower. On the other hand, the quantitative approach needs more observations instead. In order to investigate the impact of non-electoral participation on democracy, I use the analysis of the pooled cross-section time-series data (CSTS)<sup>23</sup> of 32 European states in the period from 2002 to 2016 (see Sayrs, 1989; Beck, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002). While it has many advantages, it is no panacea. This chapter deals with the pitfalls and hurdles of the CSTS analysis with regard to the standard linear model. First, it specifies the problematic areas and subsequently provides possible solutions.

CSTS is popular especially in the field of comparative political economy where it has been utilized since the 1950s. However, it grew in popularity in political science especially in the last twenty years (for an overview of the use of CSTS methodology in political science see Key & Lebo, 2015). While most empirical analyses in political science focus only on cross-sectional units (Almond & Verba, 1963, Booth & Seligson, 2009; Dalton, 2008), the CSTS combines repeated observations of the variables for different cross-sections over multiple time points. One of the beneficial results is the overall higher number of units of analysis. In the case of a balanced dataset, the resulting number of observations is a product of spatial units (N) and

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<sup>23</sup> Some authors used panel data instead (see Baltagi, 2005). I opted for the CSTS as panel data might be confused with repeated surveys.

time periods (T) resulting in higher power to test the hypothesis. In the study of European countries, the pooled CSTS increases the number of observations from dozens to hundreds depending on the periodicity of the panel. The result is an increased design leverage. There are more degrees of freedom and power to test the hypothesis<sup>24</sup>, more variability, and often overall more informative data (for the summary of benefits of CSTS see Baltagi, 2005, Chapter 1).

One of the other advantages is the ability to analyze the effects not discernible by the sole cross section or time series. Researchers are often able to model the time dynamics and create overall more complicated models. However, the ordinary least squares (OLS) as the most prevalent model is often not appropriate. Nevertheless, it serves as a starting point of the CSTS analysis. (see Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 4) The simple model with one dependent and one independent variable is

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta x_{i,t} + e_{i,t}$$

where in the double subscript the  $i$  represents cross-sectional units and the time periods. From now on I use “countries” when referring to spatial units and “years” instead of time periods for higher clarity. The  $y_{it}$  represents then the continuous dependent variable<sup>25</sup> for unit  $i$  at the time  $t$ , e.g., government effectiveness for the Czech Republic in 2016.

However, the OLS is optimal only if the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem hold. The errors must be IID (independent and identically distributed). This means that to be the best linear unbiased estimator it is necessary for all the error processes to be homoscedastic, i.e., to have the same variance. Same model then fits all units equally well. Sayrs (1989) called it the constant coefficient model and reminds that the heteroscedasticity of errors will lead to the inefficient estimates and autoregression will lead to the biased estimates under the OLS. Hicks (1994, p. 172) summarized five main violations of OLS assumptions when it comes to the analysis of CSTS in practice:

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<sup>24</sup> Another possibility is to focus on subunits (suggested by King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 219–223). However, the researcher then faces the problem of missing data.

<sup>25</sup> The models for limited dependent variables are available as well. Most of the explanations of the following text were adapted to the presented analysis and reader should be aware that the CSTS analysis is much broader than presented in this chapter.

the errors for regression equations estimated from pooled data with OLS procedures tend to be (1) temporally autoregressive, (2) cross-sectionally heteroskedastic, and (3) cross-sectionally correlated, as well as (4) conceal unit and period effects, and (5) reflect some causal heterogeneity cross space, time, or both. (see also Fortin-Rittberger, 2015; Podesta, 2002; Sayrs, 1989)

There are various approaches which enable us to cope with these violations. Nevertheless, it is crucial to keep in mind that the traditional methods of econometric analysis of CSTS were developed mainly for large samples and for estimators with asymptotic properties derived for  $N \approx \infty$  or  $T \approx \infty$ . Political scientists appropriated some of these methods. However, they must be used with caution as the comparative political science deals with slightly different datasets. Irrelevant whether on individual or aggregate level, the political scientists are concerned with sociological phenomena. However, the availability of the data differs. Economists are often able to pool data for large  $N$ , large  $T$  even when it comes to countries. Political scientists rarely do so as they mostly rely on aggregated survey research. This study is a typical example of such problematics. Dataset used in this dissertation is cross-section dominant, i.e.,  $N > T$  (see Stimson, 1985). The presented analysis thus emphasizes the cross-section first and the time series second. Hence, one must keep in mind that the traditional methods have their limitations in the  $N > T$  situation.

The debate on the appropriate methodology of CSTS analysis is not over yet and researchers must be mindful of the possible pitfalls of CSTS analysis. The best approach seems to be to start with a simple model and based on diagnostic tests specify the appropriate model. Both cross-sectional and time-series, i.e., dynamic, properties of CSTS must be addressed. Chapter 4.2 therefore presents not only the preferred model but also the other potential models to provide the reader with maximum information. The following section follows with a deeper discussion of possible OLS assumptions violations and offers solutions with regard to the data structure of this dissertation, i.e., low  $N$ , short  $T$  and  $N > T$  unbalanced dataset.

#### 4.1.1 Key issue: homoscedasticity and correlated errors

The main specification issue regarding analysis of the CSTS data remain to be the unit heterogeneity and non-spherical errors, i.e., heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and serial correlation resulting in the model misspecification. First, I address Hick's concerns

(1), (2), and (3), which require correction. The subsequent chapter deals with the alternative model specifications related to (4) and (5).

The panel heteroscedasticity is usually caused by the fact that countries systematically differ. The model fits individual countries with different precision. Even in the limited sample the countries tend to have different values and hence different variances.<sup>26</sup> For example, in the analysis of people the physical characteristics are more or less the same. However, the countries might differ substantially, e.g., GDP of Romania and Switzerland (Hicks, 1994). Therefore, it is important to mind the scale of variables, e.g., the GDP per capita is more appropriate than GDP, or to transform them, e.g., through logarithmic transformation. As Beck and Katz (1996, p. 1) stated, the panel heteroskedasticity differs from an ordinary heteroscedasticity as the variance differs between countries but remains the same within each of them.

The population orthogonality conditions are another crucial problematic aspect of CSTS analysis. They are needed for the consistency of OLS (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 52–54). The error processes have to be independent of each other; no covariance of errors between observations  $\text{Cov}(e_{i,t}, e_{i,t-1}) = 0$ . OLS assumes that the errors of one observation are not related to errors of any other observation. However, there is often a cross-country dependency, e.g., Nordic countries probably share some common characteristics. In the cross-national context countries are often linked together as well, especially in the economic area. Nevertheless, these contemporaneous correlations might differ by unit as for example Czech Republic might be economically linked to Germany but independent of errors in the southern European countries (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 636). Then, the errors might be correlated across different cross-section units in the same time period, i.e., contemporaneously correlated. It can be expected “that large errors for unit  $i$  at time  $t$  will often be associated with large errors for unit  $j$  at time  $t$ ” (Beck & Katz, 1995).

The correlation of errors might be spread not only through space but also through time. Similarly, countries might correlate at different points of time or even with themselves. In the CSTS setting the errors tend to be autocorrelated, i.e., temporally dependent. The country  $I$  at the time period  $t$  inclines to be correlated with the same country  $i$  at the time  $t-1$ . Some characteristics of countries are either time invariant or reflect previous values, e.g., population,

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<sup>26</sup> In general, higher values have higher variance.

GDP, degree of democracy. The OLS assumes that there should be no connection between the observation of the Czech Republic in 2018 and the Czech Republic in the 2019, or between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2018, or between the Czech Republic in 2018 and Slovakia in 2019. However, such a situation is rare in the CSTS setting (Sayrs, 1989, p. 13–14; also see Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 390–391). The correlation of errors within one country in different time points comes from the time-series part of CSTS. Autocorrelation usually concerns the time series dominant data as there are only T-1 possible pairs of years to correlate (assuming only first order autocorrelation). The cross-sectional dominance minimizes the possibility of autocorrelation error (Stimson, 1985, p. 925–926). Nevertheless, it is important to test for possible autocorrelation as it biases the standard errors and results are thus less efficient (Drucker, 2003, p. 168).

In general the violation of the IID assumption (of  $\text{Cov}(u_i, u_j) = 0, i \neq j$ , and the homoscedasticity) means that OLS is no longer an efficient estimator which means that the standard errors are not correct. They are pushed downwards and subsequently the significance is overstated. It is therefore important to test for their presence.<sup>27</sup> The IID assumption tends to be violated most of the times when dealing with the CSTS. Is it usually caused by the omitted variables which are now a part of the error component? However, these factors are often unknown or cannot be measured, e.g., the complex historical processes of individual countries.

To overcome the issue researchers have come up with methods which fix these shortcomings. There are two main statistical solutions able to correct for contemporaneous and serial correlation. First is the Parks (1967) method of Generalized Least Square (GLS) popularized by Kmenta (1986) in his econometric publication. The GLS uses a covariance matrix of errors to transform the linear model to be suitable for the OLS estimation (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 636–638; Kmenta, 1986). It purges the non-stochastic element from the error and thus the OLS applied on the transformed system is again efficient. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously the structure of errors is rarely known. Parks (1967) was aware of that and uses estimated covariance matrix of errors instead. The result is the feasible generalized least square (FGLS) instead.

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<sup>27</sup> In this thesis I, use the modified Wald test to test for heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test for cross-sectional independence, and the Pesaran's cross-sectional dependence test for contemporaneously correlated errors (see Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 397–399).

However, Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) argued that although GLS works well, FGLS has some limits when it comes to finite samples. They (1995) used Monte Carlo experiments with simulated data to show that although FGLS might be still unbiased—it is inefficient in small samples usually encountered in comparative research. Furthermore, it is appropriate for time-series dominant datasets.<sup>28</sup> As a result, this approach leads to the overconfidence with low standard errors underestimating the variance by between 50% and 300% (Beck & Katz, 1995). Beck and Katz (1995) thus argued that the estimates of OLS are almost as good and therefore FGLS cannot redeem itself by arguing that it is a superior estimator of model parameters.

Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) instead proposed to run the OLS and calculate for the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE model) to correct for the inefficiency of OLS when it comes to heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Then the PCSE corrects for standard errors responsible for the tests of statistical significance.<sup>29</sup> This approach was developed specifically for political scientists because they deal with slightly different data than economists. Over 6,000 citations on Google scholar show the popularity of the Beck and Katz (1995) approach when it comes to the analysis of CSTS data. The PCSE method ended the statistical conservatism and hesitation whether to pool or not, as Stimson (1985) described earlier. It offered an easy method based on the all-time favorite OLS model. Together with the availability of data and a shift of comparative politics and international relations towards the CSTS analysis since the 1990s it was hugely popular. Beck and Katz (2006, p. 676) attributed

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<sup>28</sup> The estimate of the covariance matrix of errors improves with the number of observations. (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 637) With the growing number of observations the FGLS starts to resemble the GLS. Baltagi (2005, p. 176) noted that the number of extra parameters to be estimated for FGLS model is  $N(N + 1)/2$ . That is why the FGLS is appropriate mostly for the  $T > N$  datasets. For example, when there are 32 countries, FGLS needs to estimate 496 parameters; with 50 countries the number of parameters grows to 1225. This excessive number of estimated parameters is one of the reason unpopularity of Parks FGSL (Maddala, 1998, p. 60). As shown later the fixed effects model needs only  $N-1$  extra parameters to be estimated and random effects model only two. Still, when the  $T$  is long, although  $N$  is not large the FGLS is protected from the degrees of freedom deficiency by the simple fact, that there are  $N \cdot T$  observations.

<sup>29</sup> There can be some debate on the usefulness of the statistical significance when the presented sample of European countries between 2002 and 2016 could be in fact regarded as a whole population (see e.g., Boreham & Compston, 1992). Nonetheless, the standard errors provide further argument on the direction of relationship and the theoretical population might consist of future cases and provide some indications towards generalizability on other countries.



it to being in the right place at the right time. Wilson and Butler (2007, p. 103–104) summarized the traditional PCSE approach to analyzing countries as:

- 1) Pool the data from different countries into one data set and run OLS.
- 2) Adjust for autocorrelation (by adding lagged dependent variables or transforming the data based on an estimate of autocorrelation of the error terms, assumed to be common across panels).
- 3) Calculate PCSE.

Yet, as encompassed in its name, PCSE is designed only to correct for the standard errors. The coefficients remain biased whenever OLS itself is biased (Troeger, 2019, p. 5). Moreover, the PCSE performs well with  $T > 15$  and the performance of PCSE is purely a function of  $T$  (Beck, 2008, p. 481). Both FGLS and PCSE have been made mainly for time-series dominant data.

Furthermore, the PCSE by itself cannot deal with the autocorrelation. The adjustment must be made first. Beck and Katz (1995, p. 645) among other approaches recommended the inclusion of lagged dependent variables into the right-hand side. It includes the lagged error term and thus it became the usual way of dealing with autocorrelation. Elsewhere they (1996, p. 5) argued that the lagged variable deals with time series problematic, i.e., serial correlation; the PCSE part then deals with cross-sectional issues. However, Maddala (1998, p. 60) noted that it is well known that OLS estimators are inconsistent if there is serial correlation in errors together with lagged variables present. Thus, the standard errors are secondary to consistent estimates of the parameters. Furthermore, the lagged dependent variable tends to absorb a lot of predictive power of other variables and some authors do not recommend it (Achen, 2000; cf. Keele & Kelly, 2006; Wilkins, 2017). Therefore, other approaches to modelling or correcting for autoregression should be considered instead, e.g., first-difference models or the Prais-Winsten transformation. The downside of static models without the lagged dependent variable is that they treat the serially correlated errors as a noise and not as  $n$  information (DeBoef & Keele, 2008).

### 4.1.2 Key issue: unit heterogeneity

The main disadvantage of the OLS is that it ignores the uniqueness of individual units. It treats the whole sample as the cross-section. By itself it does not allow to model the variance unique to individual cross-sections, or time, or their groups. Pooling and running OLS thus assumes that these effects do not exist, a rare situation in practice. Wilson and Butler (2007, p. 104–105) provided a useful example of the grave consequences of model misspecification and inappropriate use of the OLS on pooled data. The panel (a) shows a situation where the OLS is an appropriate method. The points represent the individual unit observations (country) over time (year) and both the error distribution and slope coefficient are identical for each country. The individual intercepts and distribution for X differ. The panel (a) shows a situation in which pooled OLS correctly estimates slope (homogenous units). However, in the panel (b) the individual intercepts differ and the OLS reverses the sign of the relationship.

Wilson and Butler (2007, p. 104) stressed that PCSEs have no effect whatsoever on the bias resulting from misspecification of the OLS. This situation is given by the fact that pooled OLS disregards that the observation represents the same units pooled over time. Sayrs (1989) explained that the standard linear model has just one error structure for the entire pool. Its weakness is the inability to distinguish unique variance of the individual cross-sections or their groups. He concluded that when the pooled CSTS contains a large number of cross-sections, the assumption that the relationship between X and Y will be the same for all cross-sections is simply unrealistic (Sayrs, 1989, p. 25). And when countries differ in unobserved variables, they are not fit for the constant coefficient model and OLS is biased. The true model is different. Therefore, alternative models must be considered as well.

Indeed, one of the advantages of the pooled data is the ability to control for the individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2005, p. 4–5). The simple solution to unit heterogeneity is to include the country's dummy variables. This approach is usually called fixed effects model (FE) or error components model. The fixed term refers to the covariation fixed in the individual intercept rather than assumed to vary as a random variable (Sayrs, 1989, p. 6). It has been used


in econometrics since the 1960s (see e.g., Balestra & Nerlove, 1962). It helps to solve omitted or unmeasurable variables bias tied to country specific effects.

(a)

(b)

source (Wilson & Butler, 2007, p. 105) – edited for the sake of explanation by the author.

Figure 3 - Pooled regression and unit heterogeneity



The FE model gives every unit its own intercept ( $\alpha_i$ ) representing the unobserved heterogeneity; therefore, the constant term is missing in the equation.

$$y_{i,t} = \beta x_{i,t} + \alpha_i + e_{i,t}$$

With the help of FE, it is possible to model the unobserved heterogeneity. In essence it uses time averaged, i.e., time demeaned, variables to eliminate the country-specific effects. The result is the correction for the unobserved heterogeneity which does not vary over time and thus is cancelled out from the original equation. The transformed equation is estimated using OLS. Beck (2008, p. 484) explained that it is equivalent to the unit centering of all observations. It purges all cross-sectional effects and only temporal variation remains. As such it eliminates all the variables that do not vary over time, e.g., national culture or institutions such as the electoral system.

FE protects researchers from the omitted variable bias. There is no longer a threat that the error term will correlate with one of the independent variables. The unobserved country-

specific effects are accounted for (in non-dynamic panels). This Gauss-Markov assumption is sufficient to assume the constituency of estimates. On the other hand, it is better to have a well specified model that does not need FE. The country-specific effects do not explain variance. They just differentiate it from the error component (Sayrs, 1989). Still, this might not be possible with regard for the availability of data or unmeasurable variables.

There are three main disadvantages of FE. First, it does not allow to model time-invariant exogenous variables. This is why it is often called a “within” estimator as it only considers the variation coming from the time-series part. It tends to model short-run estimates in comparison to cross-sectional analysis which is able to model long-run effects (Baltagi, 2005, p. 200–201). Therefore, it is less informative especially in cross-section dominant panels. It purges the specific effects instead of modelling them. Second, the FE is biased and inconsistent in dynamic panels because of the so-called Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981).<sup>30</sup> Third, the number of degrees of freedom is reduced as N of dummy variables has to be estimated. Kittel (1999) remarked that more sophisticated models (than OLS) end up recreating the initial problem of not enough degrees of freedom. Correspondingly, Baltagi (2005, p. 13) warned if T is fixed and  $N \rightarrow \infty$  only the FE estimator of  $\beta$  is consistent; the individual effects are not consistent since their number increases with N. Therefore, FE works best with time-series dominated datasets.

In the situation when the unit specific effects exist but do not correlate with the time-varying independent variables researcher can turn to the random effects (RE) estimator. Then the RE is more efficient than the FE. It accounts for more information, both the within and between. The individual intercepts ( $\alpha_i$ ) are seen as random variables drawn from a normal distribution (Beck, 2008, p. 483). Therefore, the RE has many appealing characteristics. It accounts for more variation instead of purging it. Both within and between variation enter with different weights and thus it is more efficient than FE. And finally, the time-invariant factors can be used.

Why not use only the RE? Well, RE assumes no omitted variable bias and that we controlled for the relevant effects. Further, it does not work in dynamic panels as the

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<sup>30</sup> The biased causes the correlation of time averaged dependent variable with the time averaged error term.

country-specific effects are clearly correlated with the lagged dependent variable. The key question is whether there is a correlation between cross-sectional (and/or time period) characteristics and included explanatory variables. Whether FE or RE is appropriate can be tested via Hausman's test. It compares the consistent estimator of FE to the more efficient of RE. The efficiency is secondary to the consistency. When the estimator is not consistent the efficiency does not matter. The null hypothesis is that RE is efficient and consistent, i.e., there is no systematic difference between estimators. This situation occurs when the variance of FE is greater than the variance of RE and there is not a large difference between estimates. Then, the RE is preferable because it is more efficient, i.e., has lower standard errors. As the T increases both estimators start to be interchangeable (Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 396). Nevertheless, the individual intercepts will still be autocorrelated. Therefore, the RE is usually estimated by the FGLS to correct for the serial correlation. The FE is estimated by the OLS.

To summarize, there is a constant trade-off between the applicable method and theory. Correspondingly there is an issue whether some of the violations should be simply corrected for as a nuisance or modelled as an effect. The constant coefficient model indeed must pass multiple hurdles to be an appropriate method for analysis of CSTS in practice. Sayrs (1989, p. 24) noted that although the pooled OLS can be accommodated by many ad hoc procedures, e.g., specifying the autoregressive structure to the error, it usually does not represent the best approach. Still, it provides an important benchmark and a starting point for an analysis towards more complex models, e.g., fixed effects or random effects.

While the pooled CSTS has many advantages, the model specification is not one of them. The more sophisticated models are not necessarily the best (see Kittel, 1999). The proper model is often hard to find, and research must address multiple problems first. One by one the violations must be accounted for. However, their combination is rather tricky, and the solutions often go against the need to test specific theory (Troeger, 2019, p. 2–3). The best approach is to start with a simple model of OLS and proceed from there (see also Reed & Ye, 2011).

## 4.2 Effects of the non-electoral participation on the government effectiveness

There is no doubt that the good governance is important for democracy. It boosts legitimacy and over time translates into the diffuse support for the democratic idea itself (see

Magalhães, 2013). The question is whether NEP and how it influences government effectiveness. It is still not clear if the increase in NEP might decrease governability (Huntington, 1975, p. 64) or help to reduce tensions and assimilate new demands to increase government effectiveness (Huntington, 1975, p. 198). This chapter is thus devoted to multiple tests of the hypotheses summarized in Table 1 in Chapter 3.

Although some authors hypothesized the connection between NEP and stability of the regimes, this dissertation is focusing solely on government effectiveness as one dimension of the quality of democracy. With increasing democratization, the important issue becomes not which countries are more democratic but rather in which countries democracy performs better (Linan, 2002, p. 87; see also Reiter, 2009). Furthermore, the collected dataset is focusing on the NEP in contemporary Europe. The variation in the sample is insufficient to test the hypothesis regarding the stability of regimes. The countries fit the definition of consolidated democracy by Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 14) when “no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or to promote domestic or international violence in order to secede from the state.”

Models presented in Chapter 4.2.1 utilize the government effectiveness as one of the six indicators of the quality of governance from the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank (see Kaufman et al., 2009). It represents an aggregated measure ranging approximately from -2.5 to 2.5 in their standard normal units. Thanks to the combination of multiple sources the indicator

captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” (Kaufman et al., 2009, p. 223)

The index runs from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond to a higher effectivity. The government effectiveness indicator shows how well is the system functioning in practice and thus it is possible to test the hypothesis about the government overload and incapacitation in the presence of high amounts of NEP (*H1*, *H3*). It also shows the perceived ability of the government to formulate the policy and shows the responsiveness of government

(H4). Finally, it is possible to test the impact of various types of NEP on the government effectiveness as well (H2, H2a, H5).

There are some limits of the government effectiveness index (see Apaza, 2009). Most notably, it represents a subjective measure based on survey and elite perceptions. Therefore, the measurement itself is imprecise as are many measures in the social sciences. The key issue is rather the potential bias of the indicator which is mostly addressed thanks to the inclusion of variety of different sources (for a detailed discussion see Kaufman et al., 2011, p. 239–242). Furthermore, the objective data rely on the assessment of formal institutions. As such, they are also susceptible to bias. Moreover, the subjective evaluations matter. They construct social reality and influence behavior. The subjective evaluations are key part of the democratic legitimacy as well.

Another issue is that the availability of indicators from which the government effectiveness is composed differs. Although the authors of the dataset defended the methodology that still enables the cross-national comparison even in the case of different underlying sub-indicators (see Kaufman et al. 2011), this problem is less acute in this dissertation. First, the availability of individual indicators is better in Europe than when comparing countries across regions, e.g., Philippines, Venezuela, and the Czech Republic. Second, most of the models present are fixed effects models that account for the within variation of individual countries.

The advantage of the government effectiveness index is that it captures bigger picture of the function of the government and not only a limited set of institutions. However, its main attractiveness lies within the availability of data across time and countries. As such it enables meaningful comparative research (see Lee & Whitford, 2009). The added benefit of this indicator is that it is less susceptible to one of the critiques of *The Civic Culture* that there is selection bias of cases that does not address the interdependency between the culture and

Figure 4 - Government Effectiveness by year and country





political system (see Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 29). Thanks to their benefits, the Worldwide Governance Indicators are widely used. Individual indicators are routinely used by economists or in the interdisciplinary research including political science (e.g., Gerring et al., 2005). Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart utilized one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators to measure the “effective democracy” as compared to the “formal democracy” (see also Linz & Stepan, 1996). The effective democracy index combines data from World Bank with the indicators by Freedom House (see Alexander & Welzel, 2011; Alexander et al., 2011; cf. Knutsen, 2010).

Figure 4 shows the level of government effectiveness by individual country for the years 2002–2016. Three countries that are not fully democratic (Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) did not enter the analysis. Nevertheless, they are displayed in Figure 4 to provide a baseline for the visual comparison. Together all the countries do not indicate a common time trend. The differences among countries seem to be more pervasive pointing to the time-invariant and institutional factors at play. However, the government effectiveness still changes over time within individual country. Most of the models presented in Chapter 4.2.1 are fixed effects models that focus only on the variation within individual countries. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the interpretations should remain within the range of the observed data.

Another issue of the analysis is the substantial number of cases suitable for the quantitative analysis. The number of cases in the presented analysis is limited by the availability of survey data regarding NEP and democratic values. The variable describing the overall level of NEP is based on the individual measures for the NEP available through the wave 1-8 of the ESS. The battery of survey items asks respondents:

There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? (1) contacted politician or government official, (2) worked in political party or action group, (3) signed petitions, (4) taken part in lawful public demonstration last, (5) worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker, or (6) boycotted certain products.

The variable then shows a proportion of respondents who in the last 12 months participated in one or more activity. Therefore, it does not show the intensity of the participation but rather the amount of non-apathetic citizens.

Figure 5 - Bivariate relationship between Government Effectiveness and NEP




Figure 10 in the Appendix shows the differences in the overall levels of NEP among countries in Europe. Individual graphs illustrate the changes of the overall proportion of citizens utilizing one or more of the activities between years 2002–2016 by individual country. There are substantial differences in the overall levels of NEP both between and within countries. The highest proportion of NEP (85.4%) was observed in Iceland, the lowest in Bulgaria (15.3%). On the other hand, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are included for the comparison although they are not included in the analysis.

Figure 5 then illustrates the bivariate relationship between NEP and government effectiveness. The relationship seems to be straightforward; more NEP is associated with a better government effectiveness. Furthermore, it seems that there are two groups based on their overall level of NEP. The Western and Northern democracies show overall higher level of NEP and government effectiveness. The post-communist countries and Southern democracies show lower levels. Although the unit heterogeneity is always a concern in the CSTS analysis. Here the difference is likely influenced by the democratic history. These regional differences among states are well known. The question is whether the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness remains when controlling for other factors. Correspondingly, the years of democracy as a measure of democratic stock are included in the model among controls.

The description of the dependent variable as well as the control variables is in the Table 2. The dataset was composed from multiple sources and focuses on the period from 2002 to 2016 in which the necessary survey data were available. The ESS was chosen thanks to its rigorous methodology and data quality. Table 11 in the Appendix provides the descriptive statistics of the variables. Key predictors aggregated from the ESS and used to test the hypotheses are presented in the Table 3. The variables regarding NEP or civic culture represent the national averages. The survey item measuring dissatisfaction of citizens with the way democracy works in their country is not unchallenged as an indicator of democratic support (see Canache et al., 2001; cf. Anderson, 2002; see also Chapter 5).

Table 2 - Overview of the dependent variable and control variables

Variables	Definition	Time period	Source
Government Effectiveness	perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.	2002–2016	WGI
Rule of Law	perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence	2002–2016	WGI
Individual Values	See Table 4	2002–2016	ESS
Voter Turnout	Country averaged (weighted) self-reported voting	2002–2016	ESS
NEP	Country averaged (weighted) self-reported NEP in the last year. All the types of NEP represent the percentage of population in the last year	2002–2016	ESS
Log of GDP per capita	Natural logarithm of GDP per capita	2002–2016	WB
GDP growth %	Growth of GDP in percent	2002–2016	WB
Unemployment %	Percent of unemployed	2002–2016	ILO
Inflation %	Yearly Inflation	2002–2016	WB
Democratic stock	Years of uninterrupted democracy	1848–2016	Polity IV
EU membership	Dummy variable for EU membership (Yes = 1; NO = 0)	1958–2016	EU

Therefore, I also utilize the question regarding ban on non-democratic parties to further investigate the relationship among support for the democratic system, participation and government effectiveness.<sup>31</sup> However, the use of this indicator comes with a cost of lower number of cases and thus less power.

Among the controls in the models, I include the years of democracy. The democracy stock helps to grasp the slow institutionalization of the democratic government that might over time influence the government effectiveness. Similarly, the EU membership might influence the ability of government to formulate and implement policy. Furthermore, the economic performance and its social impacts might influence the effective operation of the government. The unemployment and inflation put a stress on the government to act and limit its actions. The log of GDP and its growth then point to the effectiveness in the economic area as well to the resources of the government at its disposal. Last, the rule of law provides an overview of the environment the government operates in. It describes the confidence of individual actors in the rules of society and will to abide by them.

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<sup>31</sup> Although the validity of this variable might also come under scrutiny, it provides additional evidence. Furthermore, it is not as problematic in Europe as it would be in USA considering the different approaches to the freedom of speech based on the historical experience. Limiting the non-democratic alternatives is a much more legitimate option in Europe.

Table 3 - Independent variables aggregated form ESS

Variables	Definition	Question and scale
Country averaged weighted responses. Result is the percentage of population holding these views.		
<b>% Satisfied</b>	Percentage of population satisfied with the way democracy works	And overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?  Scale 0–10; satisfied coded as answers 7 and above
<b>% Dissatisfied</b>	Percentage of population dissatisfied with the way democracy works	And overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?  Scale 0–10; dissatisfied coded as answers 3 and less
<b>NEP</b>	Percentage of the self-reported NEP in the last year based on the question: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?	Have you... contacted a politician, government or local government official?; worked in a political party or action group?; worked in another organization or association?; worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?; signed a petition?; taken part in a lawful public demonstration?; boycott certain products?
<b>Conventional NEP</b>	Percentage of the conventional NEP representing the activities tied to the political institutionalization (see Huntington, 1973, p. 56–57).	Have you... contacted a politician, government or local government official?; worked in a political party or action group?; worked in another organization or association?; worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?

<b>Protest NEP</b>	Percentage of the protest NEP outside the politically institutionalized framework.	Have you... signed a petition?; taken part in a lawful public demonstration?; boycott certain products?
<b>Satisfied NEP</b>	Percentage of population satisfied with the way democracy works and participating in one or more activities of NEP	
<b>Dissatisfied NEP</b>	Percentage of population dissatisfied with the way democracy works and participating in one or more activities of NEP	
<b>Democratic NEP</b>	Percentage of population agreeing with ban on undemocratic parties and participating in one or more activities of NEP	Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned
<b>Non-democratic NEP</b>	Percentage of population disagreeing with ban on undemocratic parties and participating in one or more activities of NEP	Likert scale 1-5 (Agree strongly; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Disagree strongly)

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### 4.2.1 Models and results

The following chapter introduces four sets of CSTS models exploring various aspects of the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness. First, I analyze the relationship between the government effectiveness and overall levels of NEP. Then I disaggregate the NEP into conventional and protest type. And last, I test the combined effect of values and participation. Overall, the analysis shows that there is a positive effect of NEP on the government and that the impact of NEP differs based on its type and values of participants.

As explained in the methodological part, the best approach to CSTS data is to start with the pooled OLS model (with panel corrected standard errors) and proceed further based on the possible violations. In all presented models the significant results of the Wald F-test show that the fixed effects model is preferable to the OLS model with PCSE. Therefore, I use the Hausman test to choose between the fixed effects and random effects model. The presented “R-squared” then depends on the used estimation method. The serial correlation is an issue in the macro panels with long time series that have  $T > 20$ . There it makes the standard errors smaller than they are. However, it is not problematic in the micro panel with  $T = 8$  as presented in this dissertation. Similarly, the cross-sectional dependence is more of an issue in macro panels where the residuals are correlated across entities leading to biased test results.

Most of the time the fixed effects model is the most appropriate. Therefore, it is necessary to test for the groupwise heteroskedasticity using the Modified Wald test. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, I use the report standard errors. It is important to bear in mind that the fixed effects set a unique intercept for every country and thus remove the average country effect. The country specific and time-invariant factors are purged out. The coefficients then represent a cross-country average of the time-series effect (Fortin-Rittberger, 2015, p. 396; for a similar model see Gerring et al., 2005).

On one hand, this allows us to control for the unit effects i.e., spatial autocorrelation. On the other hand, the fixed effects cannot be used to study differences across countries. Analysis then focuses only on the variation within one country over time. The bright side is that it protects the researcher from the omitted variables bias coming from these factors which is often the main problem of model specification in the cross-country studies. If the unobserved independent variable does not change over time, then the changes in dependent variable cannot



be influenced by it. The disadvantage is that it does not allow to model them and neither provides a lead on their potential origins.

The benefits of the fixed effects analysis of panel data in the field of the theory of democracy outweigh its disadvantages. When measuring the impact of NEP on the government effectiveness researchers is not facing the unresolvable dilemma of different national cultures, histories, and institutions. These specific can be addressed through the case study or methods for the low-N analysis. However, in the large-N quantitative analysis the country specific factors represent an issue that cannot be solved by the control variables. The fixed effects together with the focus on the European democracies thus help to derive more clear interpretations. Nevertheless, these come at a cost of limited generalizability of the results.

Another key issue that needs to be addressed beforehand is the potential endogeneity. Although the fixed effects models solve most of the omitted variable bias, there is the issue of simultaneity, i.e., that there is also the reverse relationship between NEP and government effectiveness. The theoretical argument for the government effectiveness as a contextual predictor of the individual NEP are not clear. For example, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) assumed that citizens expect the government to produce desired policy outcomes without them being involved. High government effectiveness might thus lead to apathy. Yet the bivariate relationship between NEP and government effectiveness shows exactly opposite relationship. On the other hand, Huntington (1973) hypothesized that the protest behavior will decrease the government effectiveness. This might form a feedback loop where the decrease in the government effectiveness further leads to more protest. Similarly, the government effectiveness might not be only influenced by the economic performance, it can cause some of it as well.

To mitigate the potential issue of endogeneity all the independent variables are lagged by one year, i.e., measured one year before the dependent variable (for similar approach see Gerring et al., 2005). Such approach is common practice both in economics, political science or sociology, but it does not represent a silver bullet solution to the problem of endogeneity (see Reed, 2015; Bellemare et al., 2017; Collischon & Eberl, 2020). The best approach would involve selecting a suitable instrumental variable that is accompanied with a great theoretical background. Unfortunately, from the available data, it does not seem that there is an

instrumental variable that would be associated with NEP and not directly with the government effectiveness.<sup>32</sup>

Table 4 presents the models that test the hypothesis regarding the simple effect of values and action. As expected, Models 1, 2, and 3 show that the total electoral turnout does not influence the government effectiveness. It is therefore excluded from the controls in further models starting with Model 4. The null effect of voter turnout is not surprising given the nature of voting. Norris (2002, p. 42–44) argued that voting turnout reaches its ceiling with the rise of education and other citizens resources. Since then, it does not rise above certain levels. The main concern when it comes to voting thus lies within its low levels and its inequality (see Birch, 2009; Hill, 2006; Machin, 2011). The elections are supposed to serve as a tool for a partial accountability. They do not influence the responsiveness of the government nor they are meant to. The theorists of the empirical theory of democracy expect the election to fulfil legitimation role and help to get rid of the bad government not to produce the best one. The proponents of the strong democracy agree and look for other tools to improve the representative democracy (cf. Parvin, 2017). Although the self-declared turnout as used in the analysis is often slightly higher than the actual one, the effect is assumed to be universal and should not influence the results.

Model 2 shows the impact of affective values towards government on the government effectiveness. They correspond to the allegiant culture. The *H1* is focusing on the role of the attitudes as a counter hypothesis to the effects of the action i.e., NEP. Indeed, the affective values towards the government that reflect the satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy have positive impact on the government effectiveness. The dissatisfaction is not statistically significant. One of the explanations might be that the overall number of dissatisfied citizens in the sample is not large and they represent a minority which is not able to influence the government effectiveness. However, the mean percentage of dissatisfied citizens in the sample is 23%. The maximum dissatisfaction in the sample was captured in Bulgaria in the 2008 (70.5%). Other possible explanation is that indeed the dissatisfied citizens are inactive and thus the dissatisfaction does not influence the government effectiveness.

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<sup>32</sup> The association of the instrumental variable to the dependent variable is therefore only through the independent variable.

Table 4 - Government Effectiveness and the voter turnout, civic culture, and NEP

(DV: Government Effectiveness)	(Model 1) Fixed Effects	(Model 2) Fixed Effects	(Model 3) Fixed Effects
% Satisfied		<b>0.704*</b> <b>(0.257)</b>	<b>0.697*</b> <b>(0.253)</b>
% Dissatisfied		0.108 (0.299)	0.053 (0.254)
Overall NEP			<b>0.795***</b> <b>(0.201)</b>
Voter Turnout	0.200 (0.449)	-0.145 (0.411)	-0.458 (0.429)
Rule of Law	<b>0.317**</b> <b>(0.092)</b>	<b>0.310***</b> <b>(0.079)</b>	<b>0.281**</b> <b>(0.090)</b>
Log of GDP per capita	0.296 (0.352)	0.375 (0.344)	0.516 (0.318)
GDP growth %	0.004 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Unemployment %	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)
Inflation %	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.006)
Democratic stock	<b>-0.015*</b> <b>(0.006)</b>	<b>-0.018**</b> <b>(0.006)</b>	<b>-0.022***</b> <b>(0.005)</b>
EU membership (0 = NO)	0.008 (0.068)	-0.001 (0.071)	0.012 (0.071)
Constant	-1.451 (3.383)	-2.121 (3.337)	-3.459 (3.132)
Observations (N)	162	162	162
R-squared ( <i>within</i> )	0.219	0.280	0.346
Number of time periods	8	8	8

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05; Units of analysis: country-year. All predictors are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses; The results are rounded to three decimals.

The positive effect of the proportion of the satisfied citizens pertains in Model 3 which adds the overall level of NEP as the proportion of citizens who participated at least once in the non-electoral activity in the past 12 months. The overall NEP does not take away the effect of the satisfaction with democracy suggesting the independent effect of the attitudes and behavior. Furthermore, the mean NEP in the sample is 0.44 (SD = 0.185) suggesting on average almost half of the citizens got involved in the last 12 months. The maximum values in the sample reach 85.3% of citizens involved in the NEP (Iceland, 2016). As such these values are enough to generalize that the high levels of NEP do not threaten the effective operation of government. Quite contrary it seems that the mass participation has a positive effect on government effectiveness.

Throughout Model 1 to Model 3, the rule of law has a significant and positive relationship with the government effectiveness. Such finding is not controversial as the societal consensus on rules decreases the cost for the government and decreases the capacity needed for coercion. Quite surprising might be the negative effect of the democracy stock measured as cumulative years of uninterrupted democratic experience. The empirical theory of democracy suggests that the long democratic experience should produce democratic civic culture. I have already argued that there is a connection between the specific support for the functioning of democracy and diffuse support for the democratic idea itself. Nevertheless, most of the democratic support comes from the process of socialization. The more democratic culture then should support the government effectiveness than in the less structured society of young democracies. Furthermore, the strong democrats would postulate that the process of socialization also influences the activity and competences of citizens who in turn are able to push for a more effective government.

The years of democracy are most likely working as a proxy measure for the complexity of the government. With the increasing uninterrupted democratic experience, the bureaucracy and formal checks and balances grow. The proportion of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works as a proxy measure of the democratic affective civic culture and the proportion of active citizens as a proxy for active and competent citizenship are included in Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. As such they take away the impact of democracy stock on the civic culture and NEP. Addition of proportion of satisfied and dissatisfied citizens increases the negative effect of democracy stock for one fifth and so does the inclusion of NEP. Although

the negative effect of democracy stock might seem rather miniscule, it represents a negative shift of 0.31 in the government effectiveness ranged from -2.5 to 2.5 over the 14 years.<sup>33</sup>

Although the effect of democratic history is not of a main interest of this dissertation, the negative effect of democratic stock and null effect of turnout provides further evidence that establishment and functioning of the electoral democracy is not a sufficient for the good governance that Larry Diamond (2007, p. 119) so pointedly called the specter haunting democracy today. Democracy then needs other tools to improve its quality. The positive impact of NEP on government effectiveness provides an empirical ammunition for the strong democrats. The fear that high levels of NEP might overload the government seems unwarranted. And it seems that NEP leads to a more effective government instead of its incapacitation.

The findings from Model 3 also well explain the durability of the disagreement about the role of NEP. The higher participation seems to increase the government effectiveness. Yet, civic culture plays a key role as well. Moreover, the aggregated effect of participation can hide the individual inequalities in participation and thus only represent the active and pro-democratic citizens. Although the values and action are part of one model, they do not go hand in hand and their combined effect is not explored. Instead of being the counter hypothesis to the strong democracy, the civic culture should be incorporated into one theory. The unification of both concepts might help to explain the improvements in the quality of democracy and its stability.

Before testing such combined effects of the attitudes and action, it is necessary to address the issue of different types of NEP. The protest NEP was initially in comparison to the conventional NEP considered as a sign of unstructured society. As such, it was regarded as problematic for the democracy and government effectiveness (see Huntington, 1973).

Protest behavior might pose a challenge to the government instead of providing useful information. It is therefore possible that this type overloads the government the most and lowers the government effectiveness. On the other hand, with the modernization of society and growth of self-expressive values there has been a rise of elite-challenging activities that supposedly do not pose a threat to democracy anymore (see Welzel et al., 2005 p. 115–126).

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<sup>33</sup> It is necessary to only extrapolate the results based on the range in data. Therefore, the maximum difference in the years of democracy in the dataset is 14 as data are gathered from 2002 to 2016 (see also Mummolo & Peterson, 2018).

These activities therefore serve as another tool for government accountability in between elections (see Inglehart, 1971, 1990; Dalton, 2008; Dalton & Weltzel, eds. 2014).

Table 5 – Conventional and Protest NEP

(Government Effectiveness)	(Model 4) Fixed Effects
Conventional NEP	<b>0.763*</b> <b>(0.361)</b>
Protest NEP	0.222 (0.357)
Rule of Law	<b>0.288**</b> <b>(0.098)</b>
Log of GDP per capita	0.442 (0.325)
GDP growth %	0.004 (0.005)
Unemployment %	-0.001 (0.005)
Inflation %	-0.006 (0.006)
Democratic stock	<b>-0.019**</b> <b>(0.005)</b>
EU membership (0 = NO)	0.021 (0.070)
Constant	-2.846 (3.228)
Observations (N)	162
R-squared ( <i>within</i> )	0.280
Number of time periods	8

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05; Units of analysis: country-year. All predictors are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses; The results are rounded to three decimals.


Table 5 disaggregates the overall NEP into the more elite-oriented *Conventional* NEP and more elite-challenging *Protest* NEP. Model 4 shows that the conventional NEP improves the government effectiveness while the effect of the protest NEP is not statistically significant. The positive relationship between the conventional NEP and government effectiveness corresponds to the idea of structured participation in modern societies described by Huntington (1973). Participation structured around political parties provides important inputs to politicians and makes them more responsive to their electorate. Vivid communication with voters and volunteers also serves as a deterrent for a corruption. In comparison to the protest behavior is this type of participation is most likely more closely tied to the pre-existing political system. As such it does not overwhelm government with that many demands that cannot be addressed.

Overall, it seems that the fear of the protest NEP is not warranted anymore. In many countries the level of protest behavior is larger than the level of conventional NEP (see Figure 6). The largest proportion of citizens engaging in the protest NEP were measured in 2016 in Sweden (65.5%) and Iceland (74.4%). The data show that the amount of overall protest was decreasing until the 2010 and started to sharply rise. This might be the effect of the economic crisis. However, the same is true for the conventional participation. New data after the 2016 are needed to address the time effect of populist wave and pandemics on the protest behavior and subsequently its impact on the government effectiveness.

There might also be a trade-off between responsiveness and accountability in the case of protest participation. The changing patterns of participation might be accumulated within this category and the variation of motives is too great to give meaningful results. It is possible that the protest participation serves as a tool for greater accountability on the national level. Yet it might also include the global movements such as climate activism that are hard to accommodate on the national level and represent more demanding inputs for the government. Still, the question is not whether protest NEP is a threat for the government effectiveness but rather why its impact on the government effectiveness differs from the conventional NEP.

Another issue might be the slow replacement of conventional NEP with protest NEP. The two might carry different information and therefore they provide different input for the system. Without letters for politicians or work for political parties the political institutions would lose more direct information to improve the effectiveness of government.

Figure 6 – Conventional and Protest NEP by country






The protest NEP might focus more to stop the bad policy than to implement a good one. In this sense, it would represent more a tool for accountability and less for the representativeness. Nevertheless, both forms are not a threat to representative democracy. Ideally there should be some balance between all forms of NEP as in the case of the mixed civic culture (see also Stockemer & Carbonetti, 2010).

The other important limitation of this study is the fact that it does not work with the data that would reflect the intensity of participation. The variables utilize in the analysis of this dissertation only provide the proportion of citizens engaging once or more in the various types of NEP. Yet it is not clear whether they participated just once or multiple times. It can be assumed that there would be a difference between or within countries with the same proportion of citizens participating but in first country only a handful times and in the other country regularly dozens a times in the last 12 months. Overall, the protest NEP might become more influential with the growth of global protest movements that challenge the structural social issues such as climate change activism or various cultural backlashes (see e.g., Inglehart, Norris 2019).

From the abovementioned reasons is impossible to disentangle whether the protest behavior represents the disloyal opposition or even anti-system opposition. To address this issue, it is necessary to combine the attitudes of participants as a proxy for the more immediate motives for participation. The motives of participants not the specific type of action might be the key to disentangle the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness. The participants dissatisfied with the way the democracy is working are the ones most likely to protest the government. They place new demands on the system which might overload the government and decrease the government effectiveness.

Model 5 therefore analyses the relationship between the government effectiveness and participation based on the satisfaction with democracy. Citizens were arbitrarily classified into three groups based on the position on the 0–10 scale of the question: “And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?” The participants who answered seven and above were considered satisfied. The citizens choose values three and less as dissatisfied. The variables represent a proportion of the population with these given attitudes which participated.

Figure 7 – Proportion of participants satisfied/dissatisfied with democracy by country



Participation of citizens scoring four, five, or six on the 0–10 scale of satisfaction is not included in the model. The need for the analysis of these two groups is given by the fact that the active participants set the norms for the rest of society and even those who do not share the norms often follow them (see Dalton, 1996, p. 2).

The sample provides large variation in NEP both of satisfied and dissatisfied. Figure 7 shows the time trend in both types of NEP by the individual country. The maximum participation of satisfied citizens reached 53.5% in Norway in 2016 and minimum in 2008 Bulgaria where only 0.6% of citizens represented the satisfied participants. The number of dissatisfied citizens never reached such heights, perhaps good news for the liberal democracy in the region. The highest level was recorded in Spain in the 2012 (26%) and the lowest level Switzerland in the 2012 (1.7%). The impact of the economic crisis has expected impact on Southern-European states such as Spain and Greece in the increase of NEP of the dissatisfied citizens. But this effect is not universal. Figure 11 in the Appendix shows similar time trend in NEP for the overall sample. When comparing the change in the satisfaction with democracy with the corresponding behavior it seems that the decrease in satisfaction was accompanied by the decrease in corresponding NEP. However, the increase of dissatisfaction was not accompanied by the equivalent increase in NEP of dissatisfied citizens.

Model 5 in Table 6 then shows the varying effect of two groups of participants on the government effectiveness. The model provides evidence in favor of the fact that the citizens satisfied with the democracy in their respective country have a positive influence on the government effectiveness. The coefficient for the participation of dissatisfied citizens is not significantly different from zero. The effect of the satisfied participants matches the findings in the Model 3 that tested the impact of civic culture and general participation. When the satisfied citizens become active, they improve the government's effectiveness. The activity of dissatisfied citizens does not have a direct effect on government effectiveness. It is likely that these kinds of participants are the one most ignored by the government as long as they represent a minority. Most likely the government labels these participants as an opposition and it is thus unresponsive to their demands. Therefore, they do not provide useful information for the government as either oppose the whole system or because the government simply does not listen to them.

On average there are 23.2% (SD = 14.6) of citizens dissatisfied with the way democracy works and the maximum reaches 70.6% in the sample. However, on average only 8.8% of dissatisfied citizens take action with the maximum of 26%. The largest levels of dissatisfaction with democracy were measured in Bulgaria. However, they were not accompanied by the same amount of participation, showing largely apathetic public. The large levels of dissatisfied participants were measured in Spain since 2012. They correspond with the anti-austerity movement of the *Indignados*. The amount of the protest NEP skyrocketed as well.

Table 6 - NEP of satisfied and dissatisfied citizens

	(Model 5)
(DV: Government Effectiveness)	Fixed Effects
Satisfied NEP	<b>1.543***</b> <b>(0.380)</b>
Dissatisfied NEP	0.660 (0.363)
Rule of Law	<b>0.264**</b> <b>(0.086)</b>
Log of GDP per capita	0.504 (0.293)
GDP growth %	0.003 (0.004)
Unemployment %	0.003 (0.004)
Inflation %	-0.006 (0.005)
Democratic stock	<b>-0.022***</b> <b>(0.004)</b>
EU membership (0 = NO)	0.022 (0.069)
Constant	-3.428 (2.963)
Observations (N)	163
R-squared ( <i>within</i> )	0.325
Number of time periods	8

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05; Units of analysis: country-year. All predictors are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses; The results are rounded to three decimals.

In these terms, Spain is an outlier ideal for the case study of the effects of various types of unconventional NEP on the quality of democracy. The government effectiveness seems not to be directly affected as its levels did not change much during the 2012–2016 period.

It is important to note that the generalizations can be only made in the boundaries of the data. None of the countries in the sample offers a situation where the number of the dissatisfied citizens was above 26%. Thus, the results cannot be interpreted for the values above this threshold. It is possible that the larger number of dissatisfied participants would harm the government's effectiveness. One can argue that the dissatisfied participant would threaten the legitimacy of the system if they would represent more than a majority citizen or in some cases even just a plurality of citizens. In this case the government would not have a choice to be unresponsive unless it would accept more permanent damage to the democratic legitimacy.

In the end, the participation of dissatisfied citizens does not seem to hinder the work of the government in the short term. This corresponds to the different levels of the legitimacy in the democratic system. The question is the reliability of the survey question measuring the satisfaction with democracy. It might represent both the satisfaction with the government as well as the satisfaction with the regime itself. It is thus necessary to use more indicators of the democratic preference. Democracy has multiple dimensions, and it is therefore too complex to be assessed using just one indicator (Quaranta, 2018, p. 195).

Therefore, I include the models for participants agreeing and disagreeing with the statement, “political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned.” The participating citizens agreeing with the ban of the non-democratic parties trying to overthrow democracy were labelled as *Democratic* participants. The citizens disagreeing were labelled as the *Non-democratic* participants. The variables are measuring the proportion of participating citizens with respective values. Although it represents an imperfect measure of the democratic support it allows to differentiate the support for the democratic idea from the support from the government. On the other hand, citizens might prefer democracy and still oppose banning the non-democratic parties, e.g., they want to defeat them in elections. Such a situation is especially likely in the post-communist countries. Still, it provides another lead on the impact of participation of citizens with pro and anti-democratic values. Regrettably, the question is included only in five out of eight waves of the ESS. As a result, there are less degrees of freedom and power to test the hypothesis.

Table 7 shows the results of models for two groups of participants based on the democratic values. The Hausman test (chi-square = 17.34;  $p = 0.067$ ) shows that the random effects model is more appropriate than the fixed effects and so does the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (chi-square = 16.61;  $p = 0.000$ ). Under these conditions is the random effects more efficient. The coefficient therefore represents average effect of predictor over dependent variable when predictor changes across time and between countries by one unit.

Table 7 - Democratic and Non-democratic NEP

(DV: Government Effectiveness)	(Model 6) Random Effects
Democratic NEP	<b>1.316***</b> <b>(0.319)</b>
Non-democratic NEP	0.823 (0.556)
Rule of Law	<b>0.549***</b> <b>(0.076)</b>
Log of GDP per capita	<b>0.109*</b> <b>(0.055)</b>
GDP growth %	<b>0.013*</b> <b>(0.005)</b>
Unemployment %	-0.005 (0.005)
Inflation %	-0.000 (0.008)
Democratic stock	0.000 (0.001)
EU membership (0 = NO)	-0.027 (0.034)
Constant	-0.891 (0.509)
Observations (N)	103
R-squared ( <i>overall</i> )	0.914
Number of time periods	5

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05; Units of analysis: country-year. All predictors are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses; The results are rounded to three decimals.



Although Model 6 is built using only a smaller sample ( $N = 103$ ), the use of more effective random effects provides another indicative result on the combined effect of values and action of citizens on the government effectiveness. In comparison to the restricted Models 1–5 have the log of GDP per capita as well as the growth of GDP significant impact for the first time. The results mirror Model 5 and together point to the values of participant as a key factor influencing the impact of NEP. The citizens who do not adhere to the democratic system also do not influence the government effectiveness. It is possible that the party system is intervening in the effect. Nevertheless, the positive and significant effect of the democratic NEP adds another evidence in favor of mass participation especially in connection with the already pre-existing democratic values of participants.

### 4.3 Summary of the macro-level relationship between non-electoral participation and government effectiveness

Chapter 4.2 specified six different models to test the hypothesis set in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 (see the overview of hypotheses in Table 1 in Chapter 3). They add other evidence that voting itself is not enough for a high-quality democracy. Overall, the models indicate that NEP does not threaten the government effectiveness and mostly has a positive impact. Yet, there are key differences based on the type of NEP. The positive effect of the overall proportion of citizens engaging in NEP seems to be driven by the conventional NEP, the NEP done by citizens who are satisfied with the way democracy works, and the NEP of citizens feeling the attachment to the democratic system. On the other hand, the protest NEP, the NEP of dissatisfied citizens and, the NEP of citizens less attached to the democratic system has no effect. Table 8 sums the results of hypotheses testing and results of individual models.

The models point to the conclusion that not only the quantity of NEP, but also its quality is crucial. Having potentially active citizens is not enough and as the values of participants seem to be the key issue. Previous democratic education and civic attitudes of citizens matter. The theoretical arguments about the effects of various types of NEP, e.g., protest or conventional, are also build around the expected values and attitudes of participants. However, the relationship between values and participation cannot be addressed on the structural level. One simple survey question regarding the democratic values is not sufficient anymore, perhaps it never was. Democracy has multiple dimensions that need to be taken in account (see Quaranta,

2018; Schedler & Sarsfiel, 2007). The satisfaction with democracy thus might combine the specific support for the government with the diffuse support for the democratic system. Moreover, it is necessary to address the question of liberal rights that constitute a necessary ingredient of the contemporary inclusive liberal democracy. Chapter 5 is therefore devoted to the elaborate study of the individual democratic values and their effect on the NEP based on the country specific dataset from the Czech Republic.

Overall, the results of the models in Chapter 4.2 suggest that democracies should be able to cope at least with the short-term surge in NEP and, in some cases, it should be beneficial. These findings are good news for strong democrats and should soothe worries based on the empirical theory of democracy. Not only can participation bring more effective government, but it is also possible to educate citizens through participation as their negative values do not seem to constitute an immediate threat to a democratic stability. One of the reasons might be that modern governments are more robust and have higher capacity to cope with complicated demands of civil society. It is also possible that the changing patterns and amount of participation made societies more participatory. The apathy does not mix that clearly with the non-democratic values or dissatisfied attitudes as they did in the 1950s.

It seems that strong democrats can therefore escape the vicious circle of participation and educate the citizens towards the democratic and inclusive values through the process. However, this assumption holds only if there are no differences among individual groups regarding democratic values. If some groups only participate rarely or not at all, they cannot be educated through the process. They simply abstain and keep their values. The impact of NEP on the civic culture would be then limited, a preaching to the choir. Therefore, there is a need for further analysis of the group differences in NEP based on the individual democratic values.

The question of participation, democracy, and democratic values is in a way a classical chicken and egg problem. The original theories were able to bypass this question by assigning values and behavior to the specific group. The empirical findings in the 1950s showed that citizens in the lower social strata were both more apathetic and less democratic. This distinction might not hold today, passivity and non-democratic values might not blend anymore. Chapter 4 focused only on one side of the problematic. The macro analysis clearly showed that it is hard to grasp citizens' values based only on one indicator.

Table 8 - Results of hypothesis testing

Hypothesis	Impact of NEP on the government effectiveness
H1: The underlying affective values influence the government effectiveness.	✓ Model 2, 3: The number of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works has a positive impact on the government effectiveness. The number of dissatisfied citizens has no impact.
H1a: The level of non-electoral participation has no effect on the government effectiveness.	X Model 3: The proportion of citizens engaging in NEP has a positive impact on the government effectiveness.
H2: The protest participation decreases the government effectiveness.	
H2a: The protest behavior is a form of elite-challenging action utilized mostly by citizens with post-material values. Therefore, protest does not represent a threat to democracy, quite contrary it increases the government effectiveness.	X Model 4: The proportion of citizens engaging in the protest NEP has no impact on the government effectiveness.
H3: Non-electoral participation of citizens with democratic values has a positive impact on the government effectiveness.	✓ Model 5, 6: The NEP of citizens that are satisfied with the way democracy works and of citizens that agree with the ban of political parties that wish to overthrow democracy has a substantial positive and effect on government effectiveness.
The participation of citizens with non-democratic values has a negative impact.	X Model 5, 6: The NEP of citizens that are dissatisfied with the way democracy works and of citizens that disagree with the ban of political parties that wish to overthrow democracy has no effect on government effectiveness.
<b>H4 (Empirical theory of democracy):</b> Overall, the NEP has either no impact or negative impact on the government effectiveness	X The overall level of NEP, the specific types of NEP and the NEP of groups with varying democratic values has positive or no effect on governmental effectiveness.

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**H5 (Strong democracy):**

Overall, the NEP has a positive impact on the government effectiveness no matter the type.

X

The overall level of NEP has a positive effect on the governmental effectiveness. However, the type of the NEP matters and some types have no effect on governmental effectiveness.

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Although the last model provided additional verification, it is necessary to take a closer look at the individual values. They not only influence the overall effects of NEP on government effectiveness. Individual values are an important reason why citizens participate as well. Chapter 5 disentangles the relationship between democratic values and participation.

There are also some key limitations to the models in Chapter 4.2. All consider only linear relationships between variables and, most of them are the restricted fixed effects that utilize solely the variation within individual countries over time. The time-invariant factors such as culture or specific national institutions are not considered. The panel data used in the models are slightly unbalanced with a medium-N of cases. The listwise deletion would severely limit the power to test hypothesis. Future research should therefore utilize new data sources for new periods and consider imputation to address the issue of imbalance in panel. Another potential issue of the quantitative analysis is the construction of the dependent variable. The government effectiveness from the World Bank is perception based.<sup>34</sup> In the case of this dissertation this is less of a limitation as the perception has direct theoretical link to the concept of legitimacy and models are based on the within variation.

The last limit to the study is the potential endogeneity in the relationship between NEP and government effectiveness. The Introduction clearly stated that the theoretical relationship between NEP and government effectiveness goes causally both ways. On the theoretical level and analytical level is the reverse causal relationship addressed by Chapter 5.3.1. The models focus on the role of the perceived government responsiveness which is a crucial dimension of the government effectiveness. For some citizens serves the perceived government responsiveness as the motivation to participate. Such relationship is nevertheless problematic in the models of Chapter 4.2. Even though all the independent variables have been lagged by

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<sup>34</sup> List of sources can be accessed through the World Bank. *Worldwide Governance Indicators – Government Effectiveness*; available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=ge.pdf>

one year, doing so is no panacea for the endogeneity issue. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a set of readymade instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity. Then, the viable solution is the detailed case study of the outliers. Spain after the economic crisis and the *Indignados* movement seem to be an ideal place where to start. Both the protest NEP and the number of dissatisfied citizens increased rapidly. Yet, it seems that they did not negatively influence the government effectiveness. This can of course be influenced by the nature of indicator and more future research is necessary.

## 5 Individual level analysis of democratic values and non-electoral participation

Chapter 4 provided evidence that the NEP is beneficial for the government effectiveness. The strong democracy seems therefore as a viable option for contemporary democracy in the Europe and the fears of the empirical theory of democracy as the Ghost of Christmas Past. The immobilization of the government is not an issue anymore. Quite contrary the more participatory societies should benefit from the more effective government. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 also pointed to crucial issues of the modern era NEP that need to be addressed.

First, the role of the pre-existing democratic values cannot be underestimated. It is necessary to further inspect the relationship between individual democratic values and NEP. The impact of NEP on the government effectiveness differs based on the democratic values of participants. Moreover, the democratic values most likely shape the behavior in the first place. The endogenous relationship between NEP and government effectiveness must be addressed, especially in the dimension of the government responsiveness. Such feedback loop between democracy and participation is the exact mechanism of the strong democracy. Strong democrats hope to start the virtuous circle where the participation builds the democratic values which in turn support future involvement in public issues.

Still, the participatory democrats often disregard the initial values of citizens and hope the participation will serve as the school of democracy. However, it is possible that under some circumstances the participation might serve as the school of non-democracy. Especially when the non-democratic values receive a positive feedback. Similarly, the deliberative democracy also relies on the process of discussion to change the non-democratic input into the democratic outputs. Thus, for the strong democracy the question of inclusion in the participatory process is crucial.

The equality in participation is also key for the empirical theory of democracy. Individual scholars working within the framework of the empirical theory of democracy approached the apathy from different viewpoints than the strong democrats. Nevertheless, the inequality in participation created by apathy was only tolerated as it seemed to serve to contain values that damaged the democracy and government effectiveness. There might be also a

vicious circle in play when some people are excluded from participation based on their values, thus do not develop necessary skills which precludes them from a future participation. If there are indeed differences in NEP based on the democratic values of individual citizens, we must ask: "Under which conditions do get citizens involved and under which they do not?"

The first part of the dissertation focused what kinds of NEP are beneficial for democracy. The second part must answer under which conditions these kinds of NEP happen. This question must be answered on the individual level. The macro-level approach is rather a blunt instrument for analysis (Norri &, Inglehart, 2019, p. 138). As Almond and Verba acknowledged, it is susceptible to an individualistic fallacy and single country study would be more appropriate (see Almond & Verba, eds. 1980, p. 45, 396).<sup>35</sup> There are of course limits to the generalizability of the findings from the single country study. Nevertheless, there are also advantages. In the case of this dissertation by far the most important benefit of the single country study is the existence of country specific data for the Czech Republic that allow us to thoroughly explore the multiple dimensions of liberal democratic values.

It has become a common knowledge that one survey question is not sufficient to address the nature of contemporary liberal democracy (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Quaranta, 2018; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). Most notably the single question item asking about the satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country confuses various levels of support for the democratic system. Some citizens might understand this as a question regarding satisfaction with the government, others as the question about current state of the democratic system. Moreover, the usefulness of such question is especially limited in the comparative research as its understanding differs among countries. Yet, these items often survive in surveys as they enable comparison over the time. Furthermore, the multidimensional nature of democracy requires more than one question and therefore asks for already limited space in the questionnaire.

The Czech version of the 2014 ISSP Citizenship Module II included multiple questions that allow to explore the democratic values of Czech citizens in depth. The Czech Republic

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<sup>35</sup> In *The Civic Culture*, the individuals instead were grouped into a macro-level unit of state civic culture. Such generalization might represent a black box covering the individual relationships. The direction of causality is often unclear as the more participatory civic culture is a mixture of values and behavior.

itself is an ideal candidate for the case study. It embodies a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe. Although it does not reach the same amount of overall NEP as in the older democracies, it has a higher amount of NEP than most other post-communist countries. It also has the same amount of various type of NEP (see Figures 6 and 7 in Chapter 4). Analysis can thus more closely focus on the values and not different types of action. The year 2014 is then ideal to explore participatory patterns not influenced by the economic or refugee crisis and before the populist turn in the Czech Republic itself.

The last chapter of the dissertation uses the country specific data for the Czech Republic together with the theoretical framework build in the last decades to explore the effect of democratic values on participation. It shows that the relationship between democratic values, NEP and democracy is more complicated. Nowadays, there are more than just two groups when it comes to the preference for democracy. Therefore, the second part also complements the first part of the dissertation on the theoretical level as individual level analysis requires a different set of concepts and approaches. As such it enables us to address the democratic theory on the individual level.

The individual level analysis still fits to the broader theoretical frame as introduced in Chapters 2.3 and 2.4. It also incorporates the new theories from Chapter 3 and combines them with the research on democratic values. The debate on the effects of NEP on the structural level of democratic systems is meaningless without the understanding of the mechanisms on the individual level. It is thus crucial to address to what extent and under which conditions groups not interested in democratic norms participate. NEP is capable of transferring the intensity of groups preference and a highly active group can shape the countries' politics even with a relatively low number of members. Yet, the differences in participation of groups with different democratic norms are an under researched area especially in newly consolidated democracies. I argue that democratic values influence participation as they shape citizens' perception of the system. The motivation to participate differs based on the citizen's democratic values as the perceived responsiveness of government influences citizens differently based on the fact whether they trust the system or not.

Contemporary research on individual political participation spreads across multiple areas. It puts emphasis on the impact of civic participation (Putnam, 2000; Clark, 2014), voter turnout (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002), democratic innovations (Ank, 2011), and NEP



(Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). The citizenship norms still play an important role in all of them as they did 50 years ago (Dalton, 2008; Gastil & Xenos, 2010; Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013). Yet, most of the individual level analysis of the NEP historically revolved either around rational choice theory (Downs, 1957) or the standard socioeconomic model (Verba & Nie, 1972) which later evolved into a broader concept of individual resources (see Brady et al., 1995).

One of the persistent criticisms of the rational choice and resource model is that it does not account for the citizens' motivation to act. The rational choice represents Weber's ideal type of zweckrational social action, i.e., technocratic acts of costs and benefits. Downs (1957, p. 7) in this regard excluded from rational behavior, and the analysis, the casting a vote for another than preferred party because of partners preference. Both rational choice theory and resource model do not sufficiently account for the “free rider problem” when the collective action of the group is threatened by the citizens incentive not to act. Such a situation occurs when the participation would bring the common good for the whole group and citizens are thus incentivized to leave the costly participation to the activist instead of participating themselves. In such a situation, motivated minorities can overcome passive majority (Olson, 1965). The models then rather explain why citizens do not participate which is in line with the expected apathy of the empirical theory of democracy. As such they explain better the current levels of participation. However, they tell us less about the motivation of citizens to participate more. The inclusion of external and internal efficacy as one of the resources increases the explanatory power of the model. Yet, the overall effect of democratic values remains under research.

The theory of strong democracy then expects the participation to work as a school of democracy. It builds a civic competence to participate even further. The local level initiatives then spill over to the structural level (Putnam, 1993). However, the theory of strong democracy still does not break the paradox and the vicious circle of participation (see MacPherson, 1977). It cannot explain properly how the non-democrats and non-participants start to participate in the first place to learn the skills and democratic values through the participation and deliberation. Therefore, there is a need to adequately consider initial values as a potential inhibitor or amplifier of political participation.

There is now great understanding of the impact of the institutional structures (Vráblíková, 2013) or personal resources, e.g., income, amount of the free time or cognitive abilities, on the actions citizens take. Although the models are powerful and straightforward,

they do not account for all of the variance. The citizens value as a driver of behavior represent the missing ingredient. They follow Weber's ideal type of the wertrational behavior, i.e., value-rational acts. The norms go beyond the rational choice of costs and benefits. Individuals consciously act based on the community values. They are influenced by society as well as their political environment. (Tracey & Berdahl, 2009) Norms can impose a powerful effect on the citizens. Although they might stress specific issues independent of the norms, they will not go against them. The norms represent a “shared set of expectations about the citizen’s role in politics,” (Dalton, 2008, p. 78) and citizens mostly fulfil these roles. If one’s action would go against them, it might trigger an ambivalence at once conviction. The result is rather passivity than carrying on with the activity (Mutz, 2002).

Dalton (2008) therefore argued that the new emerging values are more than ever responsible for the behavior. There has been continuous individualization of politics (see Dalton 1996). It has brought a continuing interest in the role of specific attitudes on the citizen’s behavior. Furthermore, individualization is also responsible for the disentanglement of traditional ties within society. The social groups based on class or religion have lower influence nowadays. I argue that similarly to the post-material values, the democratic values can provide a more general perspective on citizens' behavior than individual attitudes. Although their evaluation is difficult, it is also needed. Combined with the long-term evidence that the political activists are not representative of the whole society (see Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012, p. 2), it is necessary to uncover who participates and what are the effects of this participation.

However, the relationship between values and behavior is more complicated as there is more variance in both than ever before. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) showed that the democratic understanding among citizens is not universal. New democracies are full of democrats with adjectives who pay democracy only lip service (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). Subsequently, these values influence participatory behavior. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between various types of the democratic understanding. A basic assumption is that a healthy democracy needs the liberal democrats to be the most numerous group which also participates the most. However, scholars have recently started to worry that the popular support for democracy is eroding and citizens are becoming more passive. Especially, the polyarchy latecomers (O'Donnell, 1998) are full of the democrats with adjectives (Schedler & Sarsfield,

2007) and recently, the illiberal turn has been the new specter haunting the post-communist region (Rupnik, 2016).

The danger of democratic deconsolidation thus starts with the individual values of citizens (see Foa & Mounk, 2016; Foa & Mounk, 2017; cf. Inglehart, 2016). Although, the corresponding third wave of autocratization is typical of the gradual erosion of democratic institutions (Lührman & Lindberg, 2019), the trajectory of a country's future development is not best predicted by how it is governed at the moment and the state of democratic institutions does not provide sufficient insight. Research based on institutional arrangements is often based on the concept of polyarchy and it is well suited for the classification of regimes. The procedural understanding of democracy cannot capture whether there are groups actively opposing democracy from within the system. Instead, the norms and behavior of citizens shed light whether democracy is indeed the only game in town (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Therefore, a relationship between values and action on an individual level is a key piece of the puzzle necessary to disentangle the effect of NEP on democratic systems.

There is a need for in-depth analysis on an individual level. A single country study is the preferable framework for the analysis in this case as it enables researchers to focus on individual values within a unitary context. There will always be trade-offs between specificity and generalizability of findings. However, the goal is not to test the theory within a broad setting but rather to point to the problematic relationship between democratic values and participation and support it by the empirical evidence. Single country study on the individual level provides an opportunity to test the hypotheses regarding the relationship between values and actions, and it is an inspiration for the more general theory. Thus, the second part of the dissertation complements findings of the first part and serves as a starting point for future research.

The choice of the appropriate country for the study is driven both by the data availability and by the current sum of academic knowledge. There is a significant amount of the literature on the impact of the citizens' norms within the large group of citizens with democratic values (see Dalton, 2004; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Klingeman, 2014; Norris, 1999; Webb, 2013). However, the norms of the Western democracies might differ significantly from post-communist Europe. Post-communist regions still struggles with the general support of democracy itself. Although, countries seem to be consolidated enough to be regarded as a stable democracy, the popular support for the democracy is lower. Moreover, there are also overall

lower levels of NEP in the post-communist Europe in comparison to the older democracies (Lebeda & Vlachová, 2006). Subsequently, the way citizens utilize the opportunities of NEP as the diagonal accountability differs as well.

The post-communist region thus represents an ideal setting for the analysis. It is under researched and the most vulnerable to the potential deconsolidation. In general, there are scarce sources of the data when it comes to the granular and in depth understanding of the liberal democracy in Europe. However, the country specific data from the 2014 Czech ISSP Citizenship Module II provides detailed information on multiple dimensions of liberal democracy. They allow citizens to cluster based on their democratic values. I use these country-specific data to demonstrate that unidimensional measures of democracy come short in uncovering that there are in fact multiple groups regarding liberal democratic preference. The rapid collapse of the Czech party system and emergence of new populist subjects in 2013 gives opportunity to tap into the values of citizens accompanying the collapse of the old party system and emergence of political illiberalism (Havlík, 2019). The analysis might therefore capture the early signs of deconsolidation. Furthermore, the Czech Republic not only shares most of the patterns of democratic support typical for post-communist region, but it also has higher amount of NEP than some other post-communist countries making it an ideal case study.

The classification of citizens based on their democratic values is the first necessary step. Chapter 6.1 shows that there are indeed multiple theoretical dimensions of liberal democracy. Chapter 6.2. the proceeds with the classification of citizens into specific groups regarding their democratic values. It utilizes a set of country specific questions and a two-step clustering technique. The result is classification into four groups: Liberal Non-democrats, Liberal Democrats, Illiberal Democrats and Xenophobic Democrats. Chapter 6.3 provides the overview of the literature on group differences in participation and sets the hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 6.4. The models show that there are specific patterns in participation in the group of Liberal Non-democrats and Xenophobic Democrats who potentially threaten the democratic stability the most. The effect of External Efficacy and discussion differs based on the group membership. The results point to some possible mechanisms by which the increase in non-electoral participation might lead to decrease in legitimacy in the new democracies.

## 5.1 Multiple dimensions of liberal democracy in the post-communist Europe

There was an unprecedented proliferation of democratic values with the third wave of democratization. Democracy has become a valence issue universally accepted around the globe like e.g., happiness. (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007, p. 638–639). As a result, most of the regimes' claims to be democratic and clear distinction between non-democratic and democratic became blurred. There are multiple subtypes of regimes omitting one or more of the core democratic values, e.g., illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 2007) or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Hence, it is not surprising that the understanding of democracy among citizens is not universal (Dalton et al., 2007). Especially the young democracies have citizens who experienced both types of regime and their understanding of democracy might be confused.

The research in traditional democracies focuses on differences in the preference for decision-makers (Gherghina & Geisel, 2017), individual citizenship norms (Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013), and political disaffection (Webb, 2013). However, different as these theories are, they share a common blind spot when it comes to the multidimensionality of democracy in the new democracies (Wolf, 2018, p. 2). The post-communist region is full of the democrats with adjectives (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007) and the democratic backsliding has been a popular topic of political science conferences and scientific journals.<sup>36</sup> The migration crisis revealed harsh truth about the latent xenophobia in the region. In the post-communist countries, liberalism allegedly became “the god that failed” (Krastev & Holms, 2019) and left behind a society divided into winners and losers (Rupnik, 2017). The electoral victory of the “illiberal” parties, e.g., Fidesz or PiS, represents its unfulfilled promises. Disregarding whether these phenomena are indeed a turn or rather just a swerve of illiberalism, the assumption is that the popular support for liberal values has weakened (see Bustikova & Guasti, 2017).

There might be groups who support solely the vague concept of democracy without its liberal core. For the purpose of this text, the illiberal attitudes represent both the low support for the general liberal values and recourse to nationalism. The first one is directly linked to the departure from the rule of law and the second to xenophobic attitudes (see Rupnik, 2017, p. 78).

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<sup>36</sup> For example, both the 2018 and 2019 ECPR general conferences featured the panel devoted to the topic and the upcoming 2020 conference is no different. Similarly, the July 2018 edition of *Journal of Democracy* was devoted to the explanation of the illiberal turn in the Eastern Europe.

Illiberal tendencies thus have Janus-like qualities. Some citizens solely focus on the electoral process as the main source of legitimacy and consider the liberal aspects of democracy as not important. The free election represents the main difference between democracy and non-democracy. On the other hand, some citizens despise the minorities and actively pursue the majoritarian understanding of democracy.

The heritage of communism played an important role in the construction of illiberal values. The supposed majority was able to “legitimately” oppress the minority as shown in the process of nationalization. The dissent often stressed the lack of liberal rights. Their implementation and enforcement were missing although the communist regimes declared otherwise. For example, the Czech opposition movement Charta 77 formed around the failure of the communist government to protect human rights as promised by multiple documents most notably by the Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the so-called Helsinki Declaration. The understanding of the necessity of the protection of human rights is therefore lower in the post-communist region. Furthermore, the communist regime actively persecuted the minorities as they represented a potential opposition. For some citizens the perception of a minority as an intrusive element pertains until today.

The polyarchy latecomers (O’Donnell, 1998) are thus still full of the democrats with adjectives (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). Based on the current perception of the Visegrad group and the Czech Republic itself, one would then expect that there is a large group of illiberal, and xenophobic, citizens with the non-democratic attitudes. After all, it seems to drive the success of two major populist parties in the Czech Republic, i.e., ANO2011 and SPD. Indeed, based on the focus groups of the Czech adolescents Scott, Šmahelová and Macek (2019) showed that the individual understanding of democracy varies, especially in relation to freedom of expression and rights of minorities.

Thus, the values and expectations regarding the political arena differ and they influence citizens' behavior. I argue that democratic values influence participation as they shape citizens' perception of the system and their group consciousness (Miller et al., 1981). It is obvious that the individual motivation of citizens to participate differs. Their democratic values crucially shape their motivation. For example, the responsiveness of government influences citizens differently based on the fact whether they trust the system or not. The short-term actions are

influenced by the more stable values. Nevertheless, to analyze this interaction it is first needed to uncover the structure of democratic values in the Czech Republic.

## 5.2 Clusters of citizens based on their democratic values

Chapters 2 and 3 foreshadowed theoretical expectations about the citizens democratic values. However, the research that started in the 1950s originally did not consider more than two groups i.e., democrats and non-democrats. Since then, new concepts emerged such as illiberal democrats. However, it is not preferable to specify the individual groups based on democratic values *ex ante*. Their specification might be biased based on the expectation to find already conceptualized groups although they might represent null-sets or nearly null-sets. Result might be a misclassification. The empirical theory of democracy was driven by the empirical findings of its time. The theory of strong democracy then started with solely normative assumptions and often bypassed the empirical findings. To avoid the same pitfalls, the ideal process shall start with specification of normative subcategories of liberal democracy and then identify the existing groups based on data. Following chapter thus describes the process of the classification of citizens into individual groups based on the cluster analysis. The process is explained in depth as the results are data driven and there is a need for clarity.

One of the reasons more granular categories of democratic values are comparatively under researched is the fact that surveys often do not dedicate substantial space to questions addressing the fuzzy nature of democracy. As a result, the simple question on support for democracy constitutes an imprecise measure of support to democracy which has multiple dimensions (Canache et al., 2001; Quaranta, 2018; Anderson, 2002). One indicator fails to acknowledge that citizens have various hierarchies of values when it comes to different dimensions of democracy (Flanagan et al., 2005) and stress some areas more than others. I argue that there are three key aspects of liberal democracy: the support for democratic forms of government, the support for abstract liberal rights, and the support for the rights of minorities. All of them together represent a well-working liberal democracy.

However, most of the research on individual values runs into the problem of insufficient and unreliable data. The 2014 International Social Survey Programme Citizenship II module

for the Czech Republic represents an exception. It is uniquely suited for in depth analysis<sup>37</sup> as it offers items capturing the three dimensions of liberal democracy most endangered by the illiberal surge (see Table 12 in the Appendix). Furthermore, it provides questions on political participation and a variety of control variables necessary for the analysis.

The Czech Republic itself provides an ideal area for analysis. It still fits within a bracket of the “polyarchy latecomers” (O’Donnell, 1998). The formal democratic institutions and processes were set. Nevertheless, for the consolidation of democracy and its proper function the attitudes of its citizens are crucial. The anti-democrats must be marginal (Diamond, 1999, p. 66) and not outweigh the full-fledged democrats (Booth & Seligson, 2009). There must be an agreement that democracy is the only game in town (Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, citizens in young democracies might have varying notions about the rules of the game they play.

### 5.2.1 Data and method

The Czech 2014 ISSP survey offers multiple questions tapping into all three dimensions of the liberal democracy. To measure the democratic preference, I use two five-point Likert-scale items asking for the agreement or disagreement with the statements: “I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of,” and “Democracy is the best form of government for the country like ours.” The first represents a loyalty to the system and reflects diffuse regime support; second is the direct regime support (see Park & Chang, 2013, p. 56–57). Both relate to the democratic legitimacy. Using principal component analysis, I extracted one component representing the democratic regime support (Eigenvalue = 1,486; variance accounted = 0.743). Together these questions represent the support for the democratic regime.

The Czech ISSP 2014 data also offer two other questions related to the democracy that were excluded from the analysis. The first excluded question asks: “How well does democracy work in the Czech Republic today?” and does not directly relate to the general democratic

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<sup>37</sup> The computer assisted personal interviews were conducted between 11 April and 8 August 2014 and the response rate was 46.4%. The survey started within six months after the 2013 general election and less than three months after the new government including the populist ANO movement was formed. Other detailed information about the sampling procedures can be found in the study report (see Scholz et al., 2017).



regime support. Still, it offers a benchmark as it is the only question comparable among all the ISSP countries. The Czech Republic is significantly under the mean values of the whole group and ranks fourth from the bottom of the 38 countries involved. The only countries with lower aggregate score were Spain, Poland, and Slovenia. Second is the Churchillian measure of democracy which expects democracy to be the worst form of government except for all the rest. It also offers a statement that the choice does not matter. The wording in comparison to some other internationally asked Churchillian questions does not specify the non-democratic regime but rather “authoritarian and dictatorship” choice. Therefore, it limits the citizens options and does not allow for the less polarized view on democracy versus non-democracy. Furthermore, the question is suitable for aggregation on the country level not for individual classification. The 20.2% of respondents who chose statement that the form of the government does not matter for people like them are hard to pinpoint. Overall, 64.5% chose democracy as preferable to any other form of government. Only 15.3% chose the non-democratic variant. If one would limit the analysis to this question, Czech citizens would seem to be quite pro-democratic.

The abstract liberal rights are taken from the battery of nine questions regarding people’s rights in a democracy. Respondents were asked on scale from one to seven to choose how important they are. Most of the items represent a social dimension of welfare state or provide too broad interpretation (i.e., that all citizens have an adequate standard of living; that people be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making; that citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose government actions; that people convicted of serious crimes lose their citizen rights; that long-term residents of a country, who are not citizens, have the right to vote in that country’s national elections; that citizens have the right not to vote; that health care be provided for everyone).<sup>38</sup> I chose the two questions representing the support for abstract liberal values in theory asking how important is “That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities,” and “That governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances” Again, I extracted one principal component (Eigenvalue = 1,364; variance accounted = 0.682).<sup>39</sup> This new variable embodies the abstract support for the liberal values.

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<sup>38</sup> These items are among the battery of questions Q28–Q36 in the basic questionnaire:

<sup>39</sup> As in the case of the democratic support the PCA was chosen as it accounts most of the variance to the first component. There is no theoretical ground defending use factor analysis

The last dimension of minority rights is the greatest advantage of Czech version of the questionnaire. It consists of questions concerned with the right of different groups to hold public meetings. Therefore, it is possible to measure attitudes of citizens related to latent xenophobia. Seven groups (Vietnamese, Gay, Catholic, Jew, Muslim, Roma, Ukrainian) were used to construct an additive index where higher values represent more groups excluded from the right to hold public meetings. Groups which pose a threat to democratic order, e.g., right-wing extremists, drug users, etc., were excluded from analysis. The 1–7 summary index shows the number of illiberal values directly relating to the minorities. The Cronbach alpha of the index is 0.823. The multiple correspondence analysis shows that the first dimension explains 97.27 percent of variation in data and correlation of this factor with the additive index is 0.993 (see also Mazziotta & Paretto, 2016). Table 12 provides an overview of survey items used to specify the three dimensions of liberal democracy.

I utilize the strength of cluster analysis to classify the citizens based on their democratic values. The other option would be a simple categorization based on three dichotomous scales, e.g., democratic-nondemocratic, liberal-illiberal in theory, and liberal-illiberal towards minorities. However, such an approach would yield eight different categories,<sup>40</sup> with some representing null or nearly null sets not suitable for further quantitative analysis due to the low number of cases. Instead, the clustering technique provides an effective way of classifying citizens based on their characteristics on multiple variables. It is also not driven as much by the researcher's arbitrary expectations about the composition of groups. The method is predominantly used in marketing for segmentation with similar rationale or in biosciences for the data mining in the large datasets.

Clustering on individual survey data is still a rare yet not unfamiliar method in political science (see Verba & Nie, 1972). In past, it was often used on macro-level to classify democratic regimes on the state level (Gugiu & Centellas, 2013) or subnational level (Vatter & Stadelmann-

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instead. The two variables representing support for democracy correlate significantly (Pearson Correlation = 0.486) as do two variables concerned with democratic rights in theory (Pearson Correlation = 0.364). In both cases the variable loading on components is high.

<sup>40</sup> A great example of this approach is Ronald Inglehart's typology of citizens to materialistic, post-materialistic, and two mixed groups. However, the arbitrary threshold between liberal and illiberal values would be inevitably unprecise. On the other hand, the addition of intermediate categories would result in further growth of the number of groups.

Steffen, 2013). It also enables classification of states in relation to conflict (Wolfson et al.; 2004), welfare state (Saint-Arnaud & Bernard, 2003), or capitalism (McMenamin, 2004). In relation to understanding democracy Flanagan et al. (2005) utilized cluster analysis to classify students into groups based on aspects of democracy they stress more. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) used hierarchical clustering to increase the validity of measurement of the pro-democratic support. In this text I build up on their approach with the goal of not being reliant on one sole dimension of declared pro-democratic support.

Table 10 - The overview of the 2014 Czech ISSP survey items used for the cluster analysis

Democracy (1–5)	<p>E19 - I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.</p> <p>E20 - Democracy is the best form of government for a country like ours</p>
Abstract liberal values (1–7)	<p>There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:</p> <p>Q29. That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities</p> <p>Q32. That governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances</p>
Right of minorities (1–7)	<p>This list presents various groups of people. Mark all of those that you think should not be allowed to hold public meetings:</p> <p>Vietnamese, Gay, Catholics, Jew, Roma, Muslim, Ukrainian</p>

The process has two crucial parts. First, I apply the so-called tandem approach, i.e., the dimension reduction techniques to obtain the three dimensions of liberal democracy followed by the hierarchical cluster analysis by Ward's method.<sup>41</sup> This part of analysis provides insight into the number of clusters and their cluster centers. The clustering of cases as used here is an exploratory classification technique. Therefore, it represents an unsupervised method i.e., the number of groups and their property is not known in advance. Main guiding principle is that cases inside clusters are like each other in relation to the observed variables, and dissimilar to cases outside the cluster (Everitt, 1993). Hierarchical clustering starts with separate cases and combines them based on chosen criterion i.e., Ward method with listwise deletion of cases (N = 1282; 83.7% of total cases). The agglomerative method aggregates cases to cumulatively minimize the loss of information i.e., when the individual case is replaced by the mean group information of a cluster to which it is being merged. Hierarchical method combines cases until one cluster comprising all cases is formed. Therefore, it is up to the researcher to choose an appropriate number of clusters. Based on the agglomeration schedule and Dendrogram (see Figure 13 in Appendix), I settled with four cluster solutions.<sup>42</sup>

In the second step, I used the information on the number of clusters and their centers. They enter the analysis as an input for the k-means clustering procedure. The main benefit of the k-means method is that in contrast to hierarchical clustering its algorithm allows re-assigning of cases during the process as the centers of categories change. Therefore, it is also not that influenced by outliers as Ward's method and overall improves the final solution. Combination of both methods is needed as the k-means clustering requires the number of groups to be specified beforehand. Researchers can also use the cluster centers from the hierarchical clustering as initial seeds, i.e., points of departure, for the following k-means clustering to improve the final solution (see also Murtagh & Legendre, 2014).

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<sup>41</sup> PCA and clustering are complementary methods. PCA in the first stage reduces the "statistical noise" and subsequently leads to more robust clustering in next stage (see Husson et al., 2010). All initial variables were previously recoded to higher values represent higher preference for authoritarian/illiberal values. PCA also solves a problem of correlated variables as the Euclidean distance is used for cluster analysis. Variables entered the cluster analysis standardized.

<sup>42</sup> Agglomerative coefficient is 0.997 showing good clustering structure (see Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2009, p. 212, 215–221).

### 5.2.2 Description of individual groups of citizens

Three dimensions carry incrementally more information than a single question on the support for democracy. The dimension reduction techniques (PCA) in a first step enable utilization of more than one question for the given area as well, resulting in more robust representation of the normative category. In the next step the cluster analysis classifies citizens into groups. The clusters differ significantly in terms of variables which entered clustering. The primary components used for the clustering are artificial and hard to grasp. Thus, the description and resulting characteristic of clusters is based on their centroids of original variables rather than the components from the dimension reduction part. Such an approach enables clear understanding. For the same reason, the original scales were divided into quartiles (see also Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007) which are based on the mathematical division of the scales into four equal parts. Table 10 then shows corresponding quartiles for the mean group position. In this regard, the description of groups parallels Weber's ideal types. The means and standard deviations are in Table 12 in the Appendix.

The result of clustering is a classification into four groups: liberal democrats (39.24%), illiberal democrats (24.88%), xenophobic democrats (12.71%) and liberal non-democrats (23.17%). Although on the surface the Czech population as a whole seems to be soft democratic and soft liberal, there are striking differences under the surface. The findings carry both positive and negative messages. The liberal democrats are only a minority in the Czech Republic. Still, they are the largest group. Furthermore, there is not a large group of illiberal non-democrats present, i.e., being non-democratic, illiberal, and xenophobic. Almost 77% of the citizens are part of the group with soft or hard pro-democratic orientation. Moreover, there are two groups present with the hard-liberal values both in theory and in practice. Together they also constitute a majority of citizens (62.41%). Three out of four groups would not limit right of minorities to hold meetings and together they form an overwhelming majority (87.29%).

Perhaps the most surprising result is the fact that the non-democratic group blends the low regime support with the strong support for liberalism. The term liberal non-democrat itself sounds partly like an oxymoron. Nevertheless, this group is only “soft non-democratic,” i.e., they do not outright reject the democratic system. The mild skepticism about democracy might

be given by the fact that they perceive democracy as an ineffective system incapable of providing prosperity and citizens' rights to their full extent. Their understanding of democratic rights is most likely much broader than one the liberal democrats have; it might include the right to work promoted by communist regime etc. Such interpretation corresponds to the "losers of transformation" view. Yet, it does not result in illiberal non-democratic values.

Then, there are two groups with soft pro-democratic attachment mixed with some illiberal aspects. Their centroids are from all groups closest one to another. The illiberal democrats do not consider the government protection of minorities as a crucial aspect of democracy. However, they would not limit their rights and their position is clearly liberal in this aspect.<sup>43</sup> Their stance on democracy most likely corresponds to the Schumpeterian view of democracy and they limit the system to the free election. They do not stress the government protection of democratic rights either. Although, their mean value narrowly fits into the soft liberal quartile, they score the highest from all the groups

The last group consists of the xenophobic democrats. The term might seem harsh. Yet they would severely restrict the right of various groups to hold public meetings. Most of the members would exclude between four to six minorities out of seven from public participation. (Mean = 5.14, SD = 1.30). They seem mildly interested in the liberal democracy and would limit the system to the majoritarian population. Their exclusionary view might again be caused by the fact that they perceive themselves as the losers of transformation. Therefore, they want to protect the few benefits of democracy from the outsiders.

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<sup>43</sup> The alternative interpretation to the liberal values is the lack of interest in the topic. In other words, the citizens would not strongly defend liberal values but rather they do not care much about the rights of minorities and thus would not limit them.

Table 9 - The characteristic of clusters

		<b>Democracy best system</b>	<b>Prefer recent system</b>	<b>Government respects dem. rights</b>	<b>Government protect minorities</b>	<b>Right of minorities to hold meetings</b>
<i>Liberal democrats</i>	N = 503 (39.24 %)	Hard democratic	Hard democratic	Hard liberal	Hard liberal	Hard liberal
<i>Illiberal democrats</i>	N = 319 (24.88 %)	Soft democratic	Soft democratic	Soft liberal	Soft illiberal	Hard liberal
<i>Xenophobic democrats</i>	N = 163 (12.71 %)	Soft democratic	Soft democratic	Soft liberal	Soft liberal	Soft illiberal
<i>Liberal non- democrats</i>	N = 297 (23.17 %)	Soft non- democratic	Soft non- democratic	Hard liberal	Hard liberal	Hard liberal
<i>Total (mean)</i>	N = 1282	Soft democratic	Soft democratic	Soft liberal	Soft liberal	Soft liberal

Individual theoretical quantiles are: hard non-democratic (1st), soft non-democratic (2nd), soft democratic(3rd), and hard democratic(4th); hard illiberal (1st), soft illiberal (2nd), soft liberal (3rd), and hard liberal (4th) respectively.



### 5.3 The effect of democratic values on non-electoral participation

The non-democratic attitudes aim at the core of the regime itself and signal its low legitimacy. The basic assumption of the legitimacy literature is that a healthy democracy needs the liberal democrats to be the most numerous group which also participates the most. This chapter aims to uncover whether there are differing notions of democracy among Czech citizens and subsequent chapters analyze how these attitudes translate into action.

Although Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 foreshadowed the role of values in individual participation, it is necessary to provide an in-depth explanation in this part as well. The four groups represent a unique opportunity not only to test the differences in the level of participation, but it is also possible to test whether the predictors work the same for all groups. The literature dealing with the predictors of participation often stresses the solely differences in actual amount of participation between groups or disregards the differences altogether. It is reasonable to assume that the individual resources work equally for all the citizens. However, the motivation of citizens and the discussion within a heterogeneous network might not impact all citizens the same way. In this chapter I argue that they are conditioned by the individual democratic values. Moreover, disregard for the effect of these values caused the contradicting evidence found in the literature. It is thus necessary to provide specific explanations how these interactions influence citizens behavior.

#### 5.3.1 Government responsiveness and the non-democratic participation

The cluster analysis shows that there are multiple groups and they quite differ in their values. The liberal democrats are the largest group. Yet, the democratic consolidation might be in danger if they would also be the most passive group (Diamond, 1999). In this sense, the non-democratic participation is tied with radicalization. Post-communist countries might not have the accompanying institutions able to accommodate the demands of some groups of citizens. The low responsiveness of government then produces the radicalization (see Huntington, 1973, p. 53–56) Eventually, this might be

behind the authoritarian backlash and deconsolidation (Pogrebinschi & Samuels, 2014, p. 314).

The traditional view on the connection between democratic values and action dates at least to the 1950s when Dahl (1956, p. 88–89) observed that authoritarian groups in the USA were both less active and came from lower social strata. On the other hand, the theory of illiberal turn suggests that the non-democratic group is recently more active. Therefore, the question is how active individual groups are and how their values influence their participation. (Canache, 2012) The illiberal turn and rising populism seems to indicate changing patterns in participation (see Gherghina & Geisel, 2017; also see Rupnik, 2017). Therefore, it is possible that the non-democratic group is not the most passive one anymore and I hypothesize that:

*H6: The non-democratic group is as active as the democratic group.*

The potential rising levels of non-democratic participation cannot be explained by the resource model which is the most prominent theory of the predictors of participation. It evolved from socio-economic status into a more complex description of resources citizens have to overcome the burden of participation, e.g., time, skills, money. (Brady et al., 1995) The original assumption was that the liberal democrats are the most active group thanks to the composition of the group, i.e., they tend to be more affluent, more educated thus possessing more resources to be active. However, Dalton (2008) showed the limits of such a resource model by pointing to the fact that there has been growth in citizens resources in past decades and yet the overall political participation is declining. While the resource model works equally well for all citizens across a multitude of settings, only the first sentence of the famous quote from Brady et al. (1995, p. 271) spoke about resources when explaining that citizens do not participate: “because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked.” The context of one’s life and the variation in a citizen’s motivation are other crucial factors (Berger & Luckmann, 1991).

The effect of the individual norms thus goes beyond rational choice of costs and benefits and is influenced by the political environment (Raney & Berdahl, 2009). The individual norms change the perspective. Huntington’s (1973, p. 55) idea of radicalization based on the unresponsive government is not universal. The democratic system influences

the non-democratic minded citizens in another way than the liberal democratic ones. Democrats can turn to election to replace the non-responsive government. The dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the political system then is a powerful source of motivation to participate (Finkel et al., 1989). The non-democrats question the whole system including the election and they are motivated to turn to other forms of participation instead (Muller & Opp, 1986).

The dissatisfaction and feeling of exclusion are well captured by the external political efficacy, i.e., responsiveness of the political system (Hoffman & Thomson, 2009, p. 9). It describes one's conviction that the government listens and represents a psychological resource that does not affect all the people equally. The effect of political efficacy has been a stable predictor of participation over the last 50 years. Nevertheless, most authors focus on its internal dimension, i.e., personal sense of competence, which over time proved to be a significant predictor (see Verba & Nie, 1972; Brady et al., 1995; Niemi et al., 1991; cf. Shingles, 1981). The external efficacy as a perceived responsiveness of government is often omitted as its effect lacks empirical evidence.

The internal efficacy is a form of personal resource. However, the external dimension relates to the political system. I hypothesize that its missing effect is given by the fact that the external efficacy is moderated by democratic values. The relationship to the whole system as captured by the individual values influences the perception and trust to the lower levels, i.e., the government responsiveness. The relationship between trust in government and action represents a paradox of its own. On one hand the trust is needed for the effective operation of government. On the other hand, the citizens should remain cautious and control the government. Therefore, excessive trust leads to apathy and insufficient trust to ineffective government (Gamson, 1968, p. 42–48; see also Mischler & Rose, 1997, p. 418–419).

Verba and Almond (1963, p. 22) provided a workaround for the relationship between participation and government by stressing the civic culture in which citizens are potentially active. With this assumption they can focus on the values and attitudes of citizens without expressing the clear judgment on the activity itself. The cornerstone is the orientation of citizens towards political objectives. However, there is a connection between trust and participation. The low trust based on the non-responsive government

can drive the protest behavior (see also Gamson, 1969; Pollock, 1983; Gastil & Xenos, 2010). Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Halperin (2013) came to the similar conclusion when they found that while the overall effect of external efficacy is null, there are substantive differences among ideological groups.

Correspondingly, the scientific community recently focused on participation of dissatisfied democrats in Western democracies (Klingemann, 2014; Webb, 2013). They form the critical citizens (Norris, 1999) and hold affective values towards the system (see Almond & Verba, 1963; cf. Dalton & Welzel, 2014). On the other hand, the dissatisfied non-democrats are not allegiance to the democratic system principles. While the group does not have to be large in traditional democracies, it poses a potential challenge for the polyarchy latecomers (O'Donnell, 1998). As Van Deth (2016, p. 7) stated, most political activities are done together with others. Thus, it is influenced by the norms of the group. The perception of being in the marginalized group within the democratic system motivates the non-democratic citizens to participate more.

Booth and Seligson (2009) provided similar evidence from Latin America. They focus on multiple dimensions of legitimacy and show that the most active groups come from the opposite poles; not just the most satisfied but also the most dissatisfied participate the most. The group mixing positive and negative views on liberal democracy is rather ambivalent to politics and participates less. Such findings show the development from the 1950s where only democratic and authoritarian groups were considered. Dahl's (1956) findings together with the inter-war experience of excessive participation shaped the approach of empirical theories of democracy towards the participation (see Krouse, 1982).

Booth and Seligson (2009) cautiously followed in these footsteps including the work of Almond and Verba (1963), Sartori (1987), and Lijphart (1989). However, they identified multiple groups: the triply satisfied, the triply dissatisfied, and the mixed group in terms of support for democratic regime principles, evaluation of national political institutions, and approval of the regime's performance. The triply dissatisfied then might corrode the whole system. The mixed understanding of democracy corresponds to the stealth view of democracy (where citizens expect the government to produce desired

policy outcomes without them being involved and usually lack the motivation to get involved (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002).

The literature thus suggests that the low perceived effectiveness of government motivates the non-democratic group to participate. Hence, I hypothesize that:

*H7: Low external efficacy incentivizes the members of the non-democratic group to participate outside the democratic electoral arena.*

It enables them to express their political views in the presence of the non-responsive government. The motivation helps to overcome the obstacles of participation. The non-democratic group combines the distrust in authorities with the distrust in the system. Such a situation incentivizes them to act to influence politics as they do not expect the system will deliver preferred outcomes by itself. In the end, they become the “alienated activists” (Seligson, 1980; Shingles, 1981). As the elections are part of the system, they do not prefer, such motivation is especially fruitful in the non-electoral arena.

### 5.3.2 Discussion, xenophobia, and the non-electoral participation

This chapter tries to uncover whose voice is speaking in the public sphere. The first part of the dissertation showed the importance of discussion for a strong democracy. Barber (1984) praised the positive effects of discussion as a specific type of NEP. Unlike voting it can create affection (Barber, 1984, p. 185–190). For Barber (1984, p. 117) all citizens were *homo politicus* and to build proper community discussion is necessary. The discussion is at the heart of democracy. Deliberation is supposed to help find the collective solutions for the problems of society. The legitimacy of the system is based on this process which also produces better informed and more confident citizens. The increase in citizens' knowledge and internal efficacy triggers citizen's participation (see Eveland & Hively, 2009; McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele, 2002; Wyatt et al., 2000).

In comparison to the participatory democracy theorists their deliberative colleagues stress the quality of participation above its quantity (Held, 2008, p. 231). The deliberation is the “mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern” (Bächtiger et al., 2018, p. 2). Similar to social capital, there can also be bad deliberation. To produce

the positive results the deliberation must be above all equal. Only then can it bring higher quality decision-making and political equality (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Fung, 2005). Equal deliberation means inclusion and mutual respect. The inequality of NEP has been for a long time considered one of its main problems (Arnstein, 1969; Lijphart, 1997; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012). If some citizens are not equipped (Schumpeter, 1943, 2013) or interested (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) enough to participate as the empirical theory assumes then the participatory idea suffers. As such, the question of equality is central to the deliberative and participatory democrats. Beauvais (2018, p. 146) explained that the “[p]olitical systems are democratic to the extent that people are included in political practices.” If some groups are left out the system does not function well. This is the reason for the prominent role of justice in the deliberative theory.<sup>44</sup>

Equal deliberation creates legitimacy to the whole system. It is created through the process of deliberation. Talk allows us to accommodate various ideas and deliberation acknowledges that the reality is socially constructed. It aids to see the perspective of other citizens (Berger & Lukmann, p. 172–176). Thus, all voices must be heard and weighted to come to a mutually beneficial agreement. This is one of the reasons why the deliberative democrats are sceptical of the local level participation which pressures uniformity (Held, 2008, p. 236–237). Instead, the deliberative democracy needs “heterogenous public, in which persons stand forth with their differences acknowledged

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<sup>44</sup> The participatory democracy often points to the socio-economic obstacles of participation (see also Parvin, 2017, p. 37) stressing the role of participation in the workplace as well. The inequality in participation is also important for the empirical theory of democracy (Dahl, 2006; Schlozman et al., 2012). The empirical theory is concerned mainly with the equal representation in terms of the representative aggregation of votes disregarding the number of active citizens. The participatory theory, on the other hand, assumes that the people are naturally interested in politics and might acquire virtues by participation. Thus, the inequality is problematic as it prevents some citizens from doing so. Nonetheless, MacPherson (1977) argued that there is a loophole in the current system of capitalist representative democracy. The external conditions such as worsening environment will push people inside the political arena and result in participatory democracy. The optimal result would be a participatory democracy with competitive party system. The participatory parties help to combine the representative system with the local participation together in the multilevel system (MacPherson, 1977, p. 114). This is mostly the participatory approach as the lack of participation prevents such system from emerging.

and respected, though perhaps not completely understood by others” (Young, 1990, p. 119). The civic public is not supposed to be unified with the general will. It is supposed to be open and accessible. Participatory and deliberative democracy diverge in these expectations (Young, 1990, p. 116–121).

The mobilizing effect of discussion on citizens is undeniable (Kwak et al., 2005). However, the political disagreement within discussion might produce two different outcomes. The discussion with opposition might increase network heterogeneity and political knowledge (Scheufele et al., 2006). Then, the discussion helps with reception and processing of political news (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). All of these subsequently trigger participation. On the other hand, Mutz (2002) described how the disagreement results in political withdrawal. It might create ambivalence about one’s political views, making it harder to decide for political action. The disagreement and cross-pressures from fellow citizens discourage political participation.

The type of discussion influences the participation. It might represent the school of democracy and empower citizens to participate. Mutz (2008) challenged the assumptions of deliberative democrats by showing that the citizens who are exposed to political disagreement are likely to become less politically active. Correspondingly, she (2008) argued that the active citizens tend to avoid opposing opinions. Once they are facing the “cross-cutting” information they shy from participation. The echo chambers and social bubbles which represent an obstacle to good deliberation might on the other hand trigger participation.

Deliberation thus cannot be taken as a panacea to unequal participation. The heterogeneity of discussion networks has for a long time been a key topic of sociology. Simmel (1955) first described the shift from narrow and homogenous groups to cross-cutting relationships. Nevertheless, some people still tend to be more isolated from heterogeneous groups than others. The “web of group-affiliations” grew in relevance once more in the digital informational era (see Chayko, 2015). For Berger and Luckmann (1966), the discussion was a crucial part of social interaction. It is a key factor in the construction of objective reality in society. It allows for communication across the groups in society.

Thus, one part of the theory expects the heterogeneous networks to produce active citizens, the other to hinder it. I expect the varying relationship to be conditioned by the group membership. The isolation from heterogeneous discussion networks has a reinforcing effect on citizens' views. Therefore, the social setting of discussion matters (Scheufele et al., 2004). The members of xenophobic groups shun themselves from people who differ. They do not want them to participate. Members of the xenophobic groups are most likely to represent the small part of citizens caught in the so called “echo chambers,” i.e., they receive only information corresponding to their views (see Dubois & Blank, 2018). As such, the heterogeneous discussion network bursts their social bubble. Mutz (2008) argued that such a situation can trigger ambivalence regarding their opinions and therefore they rather withdraw from the public space. For them the effect of disagreement in discussion is quite different than to others. It discourages them from participation.

Similarly, Ha, Kim, and Jo (2013) provided evidence from South Korea that openness is positively correlated with non-electoral participation. The xenophobic group membership serves as a proxy for absence of such personality trait as well. It is connected to low trust and low tolerance. The majority of society holds contradictory values and challenges the objective reality of the xenophobic group. I hypothesize that discussion with people who hold differing opinions has positive effect on all groups but the xenophobic. While the increased network heterogeneity also increases political knowledge and triggers participation, it produces ambivalence about the views of the members of xenophobic group. Therefore, it discourages them from participation.

*H8:* The discussion within heterogeneous discussion network has a negative effect on participation for the xenophobic democrats. It has a positive effect for other groups.

### 5.3.3 Models describing group differences in the non-electoral participation

Presented analysis concentrates on the NEP related to the political institutions. I thus define participation as the activities aimed at influencing the government (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 2). Some subtypes of participation, e.g., boycotting, are therefore omitted because they are rather private and do not directly link to the political situation. The non-



electoral participation is measured as a summary score of five activities (signing petition, taking part in demonstration, attending political meeting or rally, contacting public officials, donating money or raising funds for a social or political activity). Composite variable approach is common in NEP literature (Vecchione & Capara, 2009; Vráblíková, 2014). It gives equal weights to all items and does not consider individual correlation. Given the good theory fit the summary scale is not problematic even with lower scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha = 0.621). Individual items of summary scale represent alternatives rather than the same expressions of the underlying construct (see Eveland & Hively, 2009, p. 214–215).

The OLS regression on weighted data<sup>45</sup> from ISSP 2014 Citizenship Module II for a Czech Republic (N = 1282) was run to uncover the relation between democracy values and participation. Traditional socio-demographic variables, internal efficacy, political interest, and church membership entered as controls in the analysis. Gender was measured as a dichotomy, women (52.1%) being the base category. Education was measured in years of school attendance (1–27; M = 13.2, SD = 2.97). Age was measured in years (18–91; M = 52.3, SD = 17.5). Income was represented on the ordinal scale of the income for the whole household (1–18; M = 9.96, SD = 3.91). Membership in a church organization was measured as a dichotomy (1 = active member). Political interest is a four-category response on “How interested would you say you personally are in politics.”

With respect to the interpretation of interaction effects were all the Likert questions in following analysis rescaled so the scale will start with 0 instead of 1, e.g., from 1–5 to 0–4. All the Likert-scale based variables are treated as continuous in the following analysis. The dichotomization would result in loss of information and power (see Harpe, 2015). Internal efficacy is a mean score on two five-point Likert scale (0–4) in “I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing the Czech Republic,” and “I think most people in the Czech Republic are better informed about politics and government than I am.” The score of the former statement has been

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<sup>45</sup> There is no significant difference in results between analysis on weighted and unweighted data.

reversed. The higher overall score represents higher internal efficacy ( $M = 2.12$ ,  $SD = 0.91$ ). The external efficacy is a mean score of two Likert scale variables (0–4): “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does,” and “I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think.” The two questions are closely connected ( $r = 0.573$ ) and scale is reliable (Cronbach alpha = 0.723). The external efficacy represents subjective perception of citizens' environment ( $M = 2.23$ ,  $SD = 1.03$ ).

The Discussion serves as a proxy for heterogeneous discussion networks. It is measured as attempts to convince others: “When you hold a strong opinion about politics, how often do you try to persuade your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?” with possible answers of never (35.89%), rarely (33.71%), sometimes (24.26%), and often (6.15%). In the following analysis the discussion is treated as a continuous variable. It does represent the underlying continuum of the frequency of discussion with opposition. The dichotomization would result in loss of information and the dummy coding in a loss of power (see Harpe, 2015).

Individual groups from cluster analysis entered analysis dichotomized with the omitted category being Liberal Democrats. First, I test the differences among groups using the dummy variables. The last model tests the difference in effect through the interaction effect which represents the joint effect of group membership and external efficacy (Aiken & West, 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2002). Without interaction the effect is assumed to be the same for all groups. Therefore, the common coefficient is shaped mostly by the groups with larger variation and group size. If the majority of citizens would be liberal democrats like in the Western countries, the inclusion of interaction would be unnecessary. Models with interactions are also superior to estimation of separate models for each group because this approach can result in loss of statistical power. Furthermore, the comparison of significance of individual effects among groups does not represent a formal test of differences in slopes (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2002, p. 36). Models with interactions on the other hand enable deeper insight into focused questions and help to establish boundary conditions of effects (Hayes, 2018).

Multiple linear regression models were tested to investigate the association between position on democracy and political participation. Model 1 shows differences among groups equivalent to ANOVA. The liberal democrats represent the base category

for the comparison. The two mixed groups, i.e., illiberal democrats and xenophobic democrats, participate the least. This somewhat corresponds to the findings of Booth and Seligson (2009) that the mixed groups participate the least. It can be argued that the mixed understanding of democracy signals weak interest in politics and absence of strong opinions (besides the singular issue of minority rights). Thus, these groups are complacent with the process of voting. Yet, the difference might be given solely by the accumulation of citizens with low resources within these groups. Model 2 therefore adds the socio-economic variables. The differences in participation of illiberal democrats and xenophobic democrats in comparison to the liberal democrats remain. The effect size for the exclusionary democrats is lower and it seems that education and age play some role at the composition of this group.

Model 3 then adds other control variables which are not directly tied to the socio-economic status. They express personal networks and psychological resources. The two main variables of interest, i.e., Discussion within heterogeneous network and External Efficacy are included as well. The Model 3 explains larger share of variance than the Model 2. The overall effect of education is also lower when the political interest and internal efficacy are included in the model. External efficacy is insignificant predictor for all the groups. The effect size of the membership in the xenophobic group is again reduced rendering the membership insignificant. Thus, it seems that the xenophobic values by themselves do not influence the amount of participation. The inactivity of the xenophobic group can be partly attributed to the composition of the group and based on the resource model these factors represent rather long-lasting effects. The illiberal democrats seem to be naturally less motivated to participate in line with the findings of Booth and Seligson (2009).

Another important finding is that the Liberal Non-democratic group does not significantly differ from the liberal democratic group. It corresponds to the expectation expressed in *H6*. Dahl's (1956) findings about the passivity of non-democratic citizens are not applicable to the case of the post-communist Czech Republic. Interpretation of these findings depends on the personal stance about the state of Czech democracy. It can be seen as the glass half full that the Liberal Democrats are the largest group and one of the two most active. On the other hand, the non-democratic participation constitutes a

challenge for the legitimacy of young democracy in the Czech Republic. However, the non-democratic group mixes only soft non-democratic values with the hard preference for democratic rights. It is therefore crucial to explore under which conditions does the non-democratic participation increase as Model 3 does not account for the varying effect of External Efficacy or Discussion among groups.

Table 10 - Individual values and the participation on the individual level

DV: Participation	Model 1 Participation	Model 2 Participation	Model 3 Participation	Model 4 Participation
Illiberal	<b>-0.241</b> *** (0.063)	<b>-0.221</b> ** (0.071)	<b>-0.163</b> * (0.069)	<b>-0.168</b> * (0.068)
Non-democratic	-0.070 (0.076)	0.020 (0.087)	0.025 (0.085)	-0.184 (0.112)
Exclusionary	<b>-0.368</b> *** (0.072)	<b>-0.199</b> * (0.088)	-0.105 (0.093)	0.090 (0.111)
Sex (Women)		0.013 (0.059)	0.094 (0.059)	0.084 (0.059)
Education		<b>0.067</b> *** (0.011)	<b>0.040</b> ** (0.012)	<b>0.042</b> *** (0.012)
Age		<b>-0.004</b> * (0.002)	<b>-0.006</b> *** (0.002)	<b>-0.006</b> *** (0.002)
Income		0.014 (0.009)	0.014 (0.008)	0.015 (0.008)
Church membership			0.204 (0.149)	0.204 (0.145)
Internal Efficacy			<b>0.079</b> * (0.039)	<b>0.077</b> * (0.038)
Political Interest			<b>0.138</b> ** (0.044)	<b>0.139</b> ** (0.044)
External Efficacy			-0.009 (0.031)	<b>-0.062</b> * (0.031)
Discussion			<b>0.131</b> *** (0.038)	<b>0.164</b> *** (0.041)
Exclusionary X Discussion				<b>-0.230</b> ** (0.080)
Authoritarian X Ext. Eff.				<b>0.172</b> * (0.077)
Cons.	0.635*** (0.047)	-0.249 (0.223)	-0.609** (0.222)	-0.717** (0.229)
<i>N</i>	1274	971	935	935
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.023	0.091	0.156	0.171
adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.084	0.145	0.158
RMSE	0.868	0.856	0.812	0.806

OLS models; Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Model 4 adds interaction terms for the liberal non-democrats. The coefficient of the External Efficacy then represents the effect when the interacting group membership is zero, i.e., for the rest of the “democrats.” While Model 4 does not account for much of variation, it provides better insight into contextual effect of individual groups. The overall effect of External Efficacy in Model 3 was negligible, Model 4 shows quite a different picture. There is disordinal interaction present and the effect of External Efficacy varies based on the group membership. Results correspond to the *H7* and the effect of External Efficacy is positive for the non-democratic group ( $\beta = 0.174$ ), negative and insignificant, for the rest ( $\beta = -0.055$ ).


To graphically illustrate the disordinal interaction Figure 8 describes the marginal effect of External efficacy and Discussion on NEP. It helps to better understand the resulting model of regression analysis and better grasp the group differences. Marginal effects show the changes in the linear prediction of the value of the dependent variable (NEP). The changes are based on different values of the chosen independent variable in the regression model. Other control variables entering the model are held constant, in this case fixed at their means. Figure 8 shows group differences between democrats and non-democrats in the linear prediction of the value of dependent variable (NEP). The difference is significant for the largest values of External Efficacy showing that strong conviction is needed.

The possible explanation is that for non-democratic groups the higher External Efficacy signifies the belief that someone listens in an otherwise unresponsive and illegitimate regime. The Czech non-democrats stress the democratic rights not the regime themselves. Thus, the responsive government motivates them to participate more. As they do not represent the dominant group, they might be lacking a key component to trigger participation, the group identification (Miller et al., 1981). The responsive government targeting non-democrats with its message might help them to feel like an included group. The findings go against Gamson’s expectations of a political apathy in the presence of high trust. However, they are consistent with some findings about the higher efficacy levels found in authoritarian regimes (Zhou & Ou-Yang, 2017).

Further, Iyengar suggests that the external efficacy is boosted when the outcome of an election is in line with the citizen’s preference. There is a reciprocal effect of

electoral participation on the external efficacy as well (Finkel, 1985). Even though the effect is rather small, in the case of the non-democratic group it forms a possibility of a feedback loop. The results of the election might mobilize non-democrats to participate outside the electoral arena. If the government does indeed listen to demands challenging the regime,

Figure 8 - Marginal effect of External Efficacy on NEP depending on the group membership



*Values of the linear prediction are based on Model 4; Figure plots differences based on the group membership and value of External Efficacy; values of other independent variables are in the linear prediction fixed at their means.*

it might be convinced that its message is overall well received and stress it further. Then, the external efficacy for the non-democratic group further increases and triggers an increase in participation. The result is a downward spiral of democratic legitimacy.

The democratic groups, on the other hand, must instead overcome the free rider problem and spiral of non-participation when there is a responsive government present. These findings point to the problematic interplay between voting and non-electoral participation in post-communist areas when there is a group which does not adhere to democratic principles. These satisfied non-democrats are not the potentially active

citizens keeping the government in check Almond and Verba (1963, p. 346–347) wish for. They participate mostly when there is already a responsive government and thus lower its overall accountability. The difference between the effect of the environment on democratic and non-democratic participation might explain the different paths new democracies take in building state capacity and institutional accountability. Yet, it is possible that the non-democratic participation might motivate the liberal democratic groups to be more active which ultimately balances the system. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether there is indeed an illiberal turn or just a swerve in the Czech Republic.

Furthermore, there is a second disordinal interaction present in Model 4 (see Figure 9). The effect of discussion with opposition differs and the xenophobic group is indeed negatively influenced by the discussion within heterogenous network as stated in *H8* Therefore, the question is not whether people are encouraged or discouraged by the discussion (see Mutz, 2002; Eveland & Hively, 2009; Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). It is rather that people are discouraged by the participation. The process described by Mutz (2002) fits the xenophobic group.


The discussion therefore holds up to some expectations about its prodemocratic influence. The deliberation tames the xenophobic attitudes and prevents from translating into broader society. On the other hand, these findings go against the core of deliberative democracy. The main attributes of the deliberation are inclusiveness and equality. In the case of the xenophobic democrats, it seems that either of these cannot be achieved. Yet, the withdrawal from the participation might signify the educative function of deliberation. It is possible that the citizens will not be excluded forever and only need time to process their ambiguous values.

The important note is that the sole frequency of discussion correlates with the attempts to convince others ( $r = 0.545$ ). If it would be included in a model it would have a positive overall effect in Model 3 ( $\beta = 0.162$ ,  $SE = 0.039$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). However, it would fail to achieve required statistical significance in Model 4 (Frequency of Discussion  $\beta = 0.187$ ,  $SE = 0.042$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ; cross-product of Frequency of Discussion-Xenophobic  $\beta = -0.176$ ,  $SE = 0.91$ ,  $p = 0.52$ ). Additional research is therefore needed to uncover whether the negative role of discussion with opposition on xenophobic group is through deliberative



mechanisms or through psychological effects of isolation, i.e., participation serves as a way out of isolation which is not needed in presence of heterogenous discussion network.

Figure 9 - Marginal effect of Discussion on NEP depending on the group membership



*Values of the linear prediction are based on Model 4; Figure plots differences based on the group membership and value of Discussion; values of other independent variables are in the linear prediction fixed at their means.*

To summarize, the first part provided evidence in favor of the fact that the participation of non-democratic groups does not increase accountability of institutions. Instead, there are well-founded reasons to fear the participation of citizens without democratic values. The individual data explored under which conditions such participation occurs. The liberal non-democrats participate when they see that there is a responsive government present. On the contrary, the citizens with democratic values are growing complacent and participate less. The difference between the effect of the environment on democratic and non-democratic participation might explain the different

paths new democracies take in building state capacity and institutional accountability. Also, while it might seem that the role of parties has decreased in traditional democracies (see Mair, 2005): they influence the perceived responsiveness of government and play an important role of gatekeepers in new regimes. The question remains whether the situation of non-democratic participation together with the government perceived to be responsive to the non-democratic issues triggers the counteraction of other groups. It is also unclear whether this counteraction will be aimed on voting, i.e., changing the government, influencing it, i.e., NEP, or both.

The effect of discussion within the heterogeneous networks also proved to vary. This time the xenophobic democrats are group which behaves differently. They are deterred by the discussion with the opposition. The deliberative democracy might have limited appeal to these citizens. The disregard for the initial values was the main weakness of the participatory democrats. The deliberative expects the values to change in the process. Yet, some citizens might rather withdraw from the public sphere when experiencing the ambivalence of their opinions instead of changing them. Initially there are unequal skills, consistency of opinion or intensity of preference among citizens. The aggregate democracy, i.e., the empirical theory of democracy, solves the problem by counting votes shaped by the political parties. The deliberative democracy hopes to achieve equality through the process, but some citizens might not be interested to participate in it.

## Conclusion

The resounding conclusion of this dissertation is the need for the incorporation of the non-electoral participation into the contemporary theory of democracy. To do so it is necessary to consider the democratic values of both participants and non-participants. The values and attitudes of citizens shape how they participate and what are the effects of their actions on the democracy. For decades the theory of the strong democracy and the empirical theory of the democracy seemed to contradict one another in the role of non-electoral participation. The modernization of society, emergence of new values and changing patterns of participation seem to change this quarrel. A focus on the values of citizens can accommodate both approaches. It enables to utilize strengths of both theories while addressing their weaknesses. Together they form a complex theoretical background necessary for a future advancement in the contemporary theory of democracy.

The main contribution of this dissertation is that it relates the empirical tests to the overall democratic theory. The accumulation of sufficient evidence is the first step needed for the re-evaluation of any theory. The data utilized in the presented models are also limit the generalizability of the conclusions. The macro-level findings are limited to the sample of European democracies. The effect of time invariant factors is not discussed, and other regions might behave differently. The country specific data for the Czech Republic from the 2014 also provides key insight into the role of context surrounding the non-electoral participation. However, the composition of the groups based on the individual democratic values of citizens might differ from country to country. Nevertheless, the presented research is merely a starting point for a new unified theory. The text provides inspiration for other authors and challenges them to follow with subsequent constructive critique.

The text also adds to the debate by a thorough overview of the role of participation within the democratic theory. Chapters 1 and 2 are rarely seen in one publication. Yet, the progress is only possible through the combined effect of the empirical theory of democracy and strong democracy. Chapter 1 therefore outlined the core of the disagreement between the strong democracy represented mainly by Arnstein, Barber, Chambers, Fishkin and Luskin, and Pateman, and the empirical theory of democracy as

presented in the writings of Almond and Verba, Dahl, Huntington, and Sartori. The chapter shows that the role of non-electoral participation is the main difference between the theories. They not only attach a different role to the participation, but the expectations about its effects also differ as well. The empirical theory of democracy sees non-electoral participation as an intrusive element. The strong democracy as a vital tool for the democratic legitimacy and government effectiveness.

The difference is based on the divergent paths these schools of thought took when forming the theory. The empirical theory of democracy is based on empirical evidence. However, the core of the theory was formed shortly after the Second World War and thus might be outdated. Strong democracy focused on the normative side of the problems and, so far, failed to provide conclusive evidence in favor of its expectations. Chapter 1 showed that the disagreement is in fact also based on the different expectations about the values citizens bring into the public arena. Meanwhile there has been a significant change in societal values which influences the role of participation nowadays. Chapter 2 therefore introduced the new impulses for the democratic theory and non-electoral participation. Chapter 2.3 is specifically devoted to the changed this modernization brings and their relation to the presented theories.

Chapter 3 as a last section of the theoretical part brings all the findings together. It combines the assumptions coming from the different perspectives of the democratic theory and provides a theoretical background for the main thesis of the dissertation. Overall Chapter 3 argues that the impact of non-electoral participation differs based on the initial values of participants. The citizens with democratic values do not represent a threat to the stability of the democratic regime as the empirical theory fears. Quite contrary, they can improve the government effectiveness as the strong democrats assume. Yet, not all participation is beneficial as the strong democrats assume. The non-democratic participation has no benefits at all and in the long run it can threaten the democratic stability.

Chapter 4 offers multiple tests on the data gathered from various sources for the European region between 2002–2016. The dataset mainly utilizes the aggregated data from the European Social Survey and the governance indicators from the World Bank. The cross section is thus not limited to a narrow sample as some of the previous studies.

Moreover, Europe offers a homogeneous area with sufficient variation in the phenomena of concern. The main dependent variable is the government effectiveness. The sample does not offer enough evidence to explore the stability of democracy and the dissertation thus has a much less ambitious goal. However, the two main theories relate to the government effectiveness directly as well as indirectly in the case of the empirical theory of democracy which assumes that the prolonged period of government ineffectiveness would lead to the collapse of democracy.

The results show that both the empirical theory of democracy and the strong democracy are partially right. Civic culture influences government effectiveness. The higher number of dissatisfied citizens has a negative impact on the government's effectiveness. However, the number of satisfied citizens has no effect. Thus, the civic culture works mostly as a hindrance to the uncivil culture. The theorists of civic culture also assume that the non-electoral participation has no intrinsic value. Yet, the models show that higher non-electoral participation has a positive impact on government effectiveness. Democracy needs active citizens, not just the culture of potentially active ones.

Nevertheless, the type of the participation influences its outcome as well. Huntington (1973), as one of the most renowned critiques of the non-electoral participation, warns against the protest participation. He sees it as a sign of deinstitutionalization of the society. On the other hand, the modernization literature argues that the societal change was accompanied by the change in behavior and the protest participation is not a problem anymore. The models show that indeed the protest participation poses no danger for the government's effectiveness. The sample offers levels of protest non-electoral participation as high as the three quarters of citizens taking part in one or more of these activities last year (in Iceland in 2016). Thus, the conclusions are valid also for the high levels of the protest participation.

The last part of the macro-level analysis focuses on different types of participants. Chapter 3 provided theoretical background for the idea that the impact of participation of the government effectiveness varies based on their initial values. The models show that indeed the participation of citizens satisfied with democracy increases the government effectiveness. Their fellow citizens who are dissatisfied do not influence the government's

effectiveness by their participation. The analysis also provides another indicator for the democratic values besides the satisfaction with democracy and the results remain the same.

Thus, participation has its place in the democratic theory. It has mostly the positive effect on government effectiveness. The participatory democracy was for a long time missing the evidence of its relevance on the national level. The positive examples from the local level could not provide sufficient perspective. The fact that there is no evidence that the participation on the national level threatens the stability of democracy and instead the NEP can contribute to the quality of democracy is a long-time awaited argument in favour of the participatory practices (see Pogrebinschi & Samuels, 2014, p. 313).

However, there are still types of participation and participants which are not beneficial for democracy. The circumstance under which the participation occurs are the key. Effectiveness of government does not profit from the involvement of the citizens with the non-democratic values or from the protest behavior. They do not directly decrease the government effectiveness, but they might slowly replace the more helpful types of participation or participants if they manage to spread the uncivil culture.

Therefore, it was necessary to examine under which circumstances this type of participation happens. The last series of the macro-level models also stressed the need for the more valid measure of the liberal democracy as well. For this reason, the last section turned to the analysis on the individual level. Chapter 5 also responded to one of the traditional critiques of the macro level analysis that it disregards the individual agency and instead stresses the norms of the whole nations passed through generations. The last part of this work attempts to remedy this narrow focus by instead stressing the factors on the level of individuals.

Chapter 5 then explored the connection between democratic values and participation. It has been shown that the democratic understanding among citizens is not universal and especially new democracies are full of democrats with adjectives. Subsequently, these values influence participatory behavior. The last section of the dissertation connects the research on the citizens' understanding of democracy and political actions they take. It shows the importance of values and context when it comes

to explaining political participation. Because the literature on political participation in traditional Western democracies usually does not include democratic values as moderators, the main effects predicting participation are driven by the largest group of citizens, i.e., liberal democrats.

Such a situation is not problematic when liberal democrats are a large majority. However, the post-communist region is full of the democrats with adjectives or non-democrats. To answer whose voice is speaking in a public sphere, the first section of the last chapter identifies the groups based on their position on liberal democracy and sets the theoretical assumptions about the differences in factors triggering the non-electoral participation. The Czech 2014 ISSP Citizenship Module II data (N = 1282) provides a set of country specific questions concerned with the dimensions of liberal democracy. A two-step clustering technique is used to classify citizens. The result is classification into four groups: the liberal non-democrats, the liberal democrats, the illiberal democrats, and the xenophobic democrats.

To answer under which circumstances these voices speak, the second section specifies regression models with interactions to test whether the effect of External Efficacy and Discussion within heterogeneous networks differ by the group membership. I argue that the previously found mixed evidence on the impact of the external efficacy and discussion on participation is given by neglecting the individual democratic values. The perceived responsiveness of government is a key factor for the non-democratic group. The results show disordinal interactions for the effect of external efficacy. In comparison to the rest the non-democrats are encouraged to participate when there is a responsive government present.

These findings of this dissertation point to the fact that not only the values influence the outcomes of the participation, but the citizens also participate differently based on their democratic values as well. The non-democratic group is positively affected by the perceived responsiveness of government. The findings go against Gamson's (1968, p. 42–48) hypothesis of apathy in the presence of high trust. The more the government is perceived as responsive the more they participate. Therefore, the environment matters to citizens when deciding whether to act or not. The government responsive to the non-

democratic values does not provide the correction and the participation does not serve as a school of democracy.

These results address some of the mechanisms of the negative effects of excessive participation feared by the post-war generation of social scientists. The conditions under which the participation increases matter as they might bring vastly different types of citizens into the political arena. Thus, politicians should think twice about whom they appeal to. The interplay between voting, external efficacy and non-electoral participation might prove crucial for the explanation of decreasing legitimacy and accountability of institutions in new democracies. It is also open for future research to discover what kind of citizens' rights awaits the people who do not support the current democratic regime. Such findings might go a long way in uncovering what discredits the recent democracy in their eyes.

The other crucial finding is that the xenophobic democrats are deterred from participation when they deliberate within the heterogeneous networks. The limits on the participation and withdrawal of one group of citizens is hard for the deliberative democracy which stresses equality and inclusiveness. Although the deliberative democrats seem to be right that the discussion produces more democratic results, it might be at the cost of the exclusion of some citizens. Chambers (2018) remarked that the new wave of deliberative democrats stress the plurality of the discussion instead of the formation of the general will. The contestation-friendly model of deliberation is part of this change. Inclusion seems to be the key as the pluralism itself cannot redeem the deliberative democrats. The discoveries of the last model show that Mutz (2006) is indeed right, and pluralism discourages citizens from participation. The provided analysis shows that the effect is not universal and targets the xenophobic democrats. They are the ones who are most likely lacking the "cross-cutting" information. Exposure to new opinions triggers the ambivalence about their opinions and the result is apathy (Mutz, 2006).

Surprisingly the overall results are more positive for the strong democracy on the macro level. The micro level was a traditional stronghold of the strong democracy which focused on the participation and deliberation mainly in the small communities. Yet, the individual data points to the limits of both participatory and deliberative democracy. On the other hand, the macro level findings suggest that there is plenty of room for the



experiments with more inclusionary and participative practices. In the best-case scenario, democracy is improved, the worst-case scenario seems to be no effect and wasted effort. There are some questions that remain unanswered as well. The exact interplay between electoral and non-electoral participation is not clear yet. Neither is the long-term effect of participation on some citizens. The democratic values of the participating citizens might be given by the self-selection (Van Ingen & Van der Meer, 2016) and the analysis pointed especially to the group of xenophobic democrats as the place where to start.

There are also multiple limits of this study. Some of them are on methodological grounds. The models in this dissertation are linear and do not assume the curvilinear relationships. Some of the macro level data are also limited in range and the generalizations cannot be made after this point, e.g., the ceiling on the protest non-electoral participation in the sample is the circa 25% of the population taking part. The problem of aggregation on the macro level was already mentioned through the text multiple times and it limits the strength of the interpretation.

The individual level tries to remedy for some of these shortcomings, yet it adds another methodological complication to the mix. Namely, this study utilizes the cluster analysis to classify the sample of the Czech citizens into groups based on their position on liberal democracy. It is therefore susceptible to the same critique as the empirical theory of democracy and civic culture that it is data driven. Thus, an important caveat of Chapter 5 is that it is based on single case from the Czech Republic at a given time. Clustering as a classification technique is data driven and other countries in the region might show different group composition. The Czech Republic is a young democracy prone to a higher amount of non-democratic attitudes in society. Furthermore, given the lack of longitudinal panel data, the causal direction is only indirect and theoretical (see Quintelier & Deth, 2014). Still, Chapter 5 provided potent theoretical perspectives on the relation between participation and democracy.


Nevertheless, one of the main practical applications is the suggestion to politicians to be wary of their expressions. The political culture influences the civic culture and vice versa. Politicians should think twice about whom they appeal to. This suggestion is especially relevant for the post-communist region. Another practical implication is the necessity of the contestation-friendly deliberation which does not pursue the popular

consensus for any cost. This approach can turn out to be beneficial in the long run as it has higher potential to serve as the school of democracy for all.

Lastly, this dissertation utilizes the behavioralist approach to political science. As such it does not meticulously develop the normative side of the theory of democracy. Although the findings potentially have strong normative implications, these are not explored in depth in this text. Such a fact is important to consider as the theory of strong democracy is mostly driven by the anti-positivist position. Nevertheless, the text might serve as a starting point for the normative arguments. The presented fact that there are multiple groups within the democratic society have implications for the capacity of democratic system to come to a consensus. It stresses the need for mechanisms and democratic innovations that help to spread the understanding and democratic norms going beyond the sole assumption about beneficial effects of political participation as a school of democracy. The last chapter also points to specific interplay between electoral and non-electoral participation that needs to be further analyzed.

## Appendix

Figure 10 - Different dimension of accountability



source: Lindberg et al. (2017, p. 11) – edited by the author

Figure 11 - Non-electoral participation by country and year



Table 11 - Descriptive statistics of variables

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Government Effectiveness	169	1.398	0.549	-0.057	2.310
Voter Turnout	169	0.771	0.096	0.539	0.934
Rule of Law	169	1.370	0.548	-0.107	2.100
Log of GDP per capita	169	10.474	0.772	8.698	12.744
GDP growth %	169	1.792	2.496	-6.408	10.924
Unemployment %	169	8.090	4.093	2.55	24.787
Inflation %	169	2.251	1.930	-0.922	12.349
Years of Democracy	169	56.355	37.952	8	168
EU membership (0 = NO)	169	0.828	0.378	0	1
Satisfied	169	0.373	0.186	0.041	0.767
Dissatisfied	169	0.232	0.146	0.027	0.706

Figure 12 - Time trend in NEP of satisfied and dissatisfied citizens





Figure 13 - Dendrogram of hierarchical clustering (Ward Method)



Note: not the final clusters, Hierarchical clustering provides the insight into the number of cluster and seeds for the k-means clustering

Table 12 - The overview of survey items used for the cluster analysis

Democracy (1–5)	<p>E19 - I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.</p> <p>E20 - Democracy is the best form of government for a country like ours</p>
Abstract liberal values (1–7)	<p>There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:</p> <p>Q29. That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities</p> <p>Q32. That governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances</p>
Right of minorities (1–7)	<p>This list presents various groups of people. Mark all of those that you think should not be allowed to hold public meetings:</p> <p>Vietnamese, Gay, Catholics, Jew, Roma, Muslim, Ukrainian</p>



Table 13 - Group means of the clustering variables

			<b>Democracy best system (1–5)</b>	<b>Prefer recent system (1–5)</b>	<b>Government respects dem. rights (reversed) (1–7)</b>	<b>Government protect minorities (reversed) (1–7)</b>	<b>Right to hold meetings (0–7)</b>
<i>Liberal democrats</i>	N = 503	Mean (SD)	1.59 (0.61)	1.96 (0.77)	1.70 (0.92)	2.08 (1.13)	0.65 (0.95)
<i>Illiberal democrats</i>	N = 319	Mean (SD)	2.17 (0.89)	2.67 (1.00)	3.94 (1.62)	4.51 (1.51)	0.86 (1.01)
<i>Xenophobic democrats</i>	N = 163	Mean (SD)	2.36 (1.05)	2.64 (1.05)	2.83 (1.67)	3.47 (1.72)	5.14 (1.30)
<i>Liberal non- democrats</i>	N = 297	Mean (SD)	3.27 (1.01)	3.75 (0.87)	1.90 (1.07)	2.21 (1.22)	0.88 (1.10)
<i>Total (mean)</i>	N = 1282	Mean (SD)	2.22 (1.06)	2.64 (1.12)	2.40 (1.57)	2.87 (1.69)	1.33 (1.80)

All the variables were recorded the way that the higher values represent more illiberal, respectively more non-democratic values. Numbers in parentheses in the name of the variables represent the original scale of the survey item.

The quartiles for the **democracy** related variables (1–5) are: the first 1–2; the second: 2–3; the third 3–4; the fourth 4–5

The quartiles for the **abstract liberal values** related variables (1–7) are: the first 1–2.5; the second: 2.5–4; the third 4–5.5; the fourth 5.5–7

The quartiles for the **rights of minorities** related variable (0–7) are: the first 0–1.75; the second: 1.75–3.5; the third 3.5–5.25; the fourth 5.25–7

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## Abstract

Although free elections are necessary for the liberal democracy, they are not the sufficient condition. On the other hand, the democratization, modernization of society and growing post-material values highlight the importance of the non-electoral participation. In the past three decades the research was focused on the changing nature of political participation and analyzed the predictors of non-electoral participation. Today, the academic literature provides a complex explanation for the differences among groups of people or even states. Yet, it is still not clear what these differences mean for the democracy. Contemporary theory of democracy is also full of contradictions when it comes to the role of non-electoral participation. In fact, the non-electoral participation is the defining issue that differentiates individual theories of democracy. Some scholars understand non-electoral participation as a chance for a better government. Others fear that mass participation might destabilize the democratic system instead. The empirical theory of democracy is the main source of the skepticism about the role of the non-electoral participation and as such it has been criticized by the participatory and deliberative democrats. Nevertheless, all these frameworks were built in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and they might not reflect the current state of the affairs and the old assumptions need to be re-evaluated. The dissertation first focuses on the relationship between non-electoral participation and government effectiveness on the sample consisting of the European democracies in between 2002 and 2016. The main finding is that the non-electoral participation does not threaten the government effectiveness. Quite contrary, it has mostly positive impact. However, there are key differences when it comes to the type of the non-electoral participation. The protest participation has null effect. The participation of citizens satisfied with the democratic system or citizens with the democratic preferences has a positive impact while there is no effect when it comes to their counterparts. The differences are then driven by the values of the participating citizens. Second portion of the analytic part is therefore devoted to the analysis of the individual data. Country specific data from the Czech Republic allow to closely examine the relationship between democratic values and participation. First, the cluster analysis helps to uncover the groups based on the multi-level nature of democracy. Simple question regarding democratic preference is not sufficient anymore for the analysis of a complex phenomenon such as

liberal democracy. The results show that liberal democrats are the most numerous groups and one of the most active. Yet, they do not constitute majority of citizens. Moreover, the OLS models with interactions enable to analyze varying effect of some predictors. While the discussion has a positive effect on most, it does discourage the xenophobic democrats from the participation. Similarly, the perceived government responsiveness has a negative impact on participation of non-democrats, who interestingly in the Czech Republic combine non-democratic preference with strong liberal values. All these findings will help to better incorporate non-electoral participation into the theory of democracy.

## Abstrakt

Svobodné volby jsou nutnou ne však již dostačující podmínkou soudobé demokracie. S pokračující demokratizací, modernizací společnosti a šířením post-materiálních hodnot se stále rozšiřuje míra i role nevolební participace. Výzkum v posledních dekádách podrobně zmapoval proměny v nevolební politické participaci i faktory ovlivňující, zda se do ní jednotliví občané zapojí či nikoliv. Díky tomu je možné poměrně přesně popsat rozdíly v míře nevolební participace mezi skupinami osob či mezi jednotlivými státy. Stále však nemáme odpověď na otázku, jaké mají tyto rozdíly dopad na demokracii. Soudobé teorie demokracie nenabízí jednotný pohled. Naopak nevolební participace je tím hlavním prvkem, kterým se odlišují. Někteří autoři ji vidí jako šanci na kvalitnější vládnutí, jiní se obávají ohrožení stability demokracie při masovém zapojení občanů. Skeptický pohled empirické teorie demokracie tak kritizuje participativní a deliberativní demokracie. Jedná se nicméně o přístupy budované ve 20. století, které již nemusí reflektovat současnou společnost. Proto je na místě zhodnocení platnosti některých původních předpokladů. Předkládaná práce nejprve zkoumá vztah mezi nevolební participací a vládní efektivitou na úrovni evropských států mezi roky 2002 a 2016. Hlavním závěrem je, že nevolební participace neohrožuje vládní efektivitu, naopak má většinou pozitivní dopad. Existují však zásadní rozdíly mezi jednotlivými druhy nevolební participace. Protestní chování nemá na vládní efektivitu dopad. Participace občanů spokojených s fungováním demokracie či s demokratickým přesvědčením má pozitivní efekt. Participace jejich protějšků však nemá efekt žádný. Rozdíly v dopadu

nevolební participace na vládní efektivitu jsou tedy ve výsledku ovlivněny zejména hodnotami participujících občanů. Druhá analytická část práce proto na unikátních datech z České republiky zkoumá vztah mezi demokratickými hodnotami a nevolební participací na individuální úrovni občanů. Na základě klastrové analýzy je demonstrováno, že demokratické hodnoty se skládají z více dimenzí a občany nelze rozdělit pouze do dvou kategorií jako demokraty a nedemokraty. Data ukazují, že liberální demokraté v České republice převažují a patří mezi nejaktivnější občany, nejsou však kategorií většinovou. Zároveň některé prediktory participativního chování mohou mít zcela obrácený efekt v závislosti na demokratických hodnotách občana. Zatímco na většinu občanů má diskuse pozitivní vliv, demokraté s xenofobním přesvědčením jsou jí od participace odrazeni. Podobně pak subjektivní představa o tom, že vláda občanům naslouchá u většiny občanů nevolební participaci snižuje. Avšak vede k nárůstu participace u nedemokraticky přesvědčených občanů, kteří však v České republice mají současně i silně liberální preference. Tato zjištění slouží jako základ pro lepší budoucí začlenění nevolební participace do teorie demokracie.