MENDEL UNIVERSITY IN BRNO

Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies

Kosovo Protection Corps and its influence on political stability in Kosovo

Bachelor thesis

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Declaration:

I thereby declare that the bachelor thesis *"Kosovo Protection Corps and its influence on political stability in Kosovo"* was elaborated individually by Olena Dubová. All the literature and other sources are specified in the list of literature.

In Brno, May 21, 2015   **....................**

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Abstract

DUBOVÁ, O. *Kosovo Protection Corps and its influence on political stability in Kosovo.*

Bachelor Thesis. Brno, 2015

The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the potential correlation between KPC members and organized crime as well as their influence over the political stability in Kosovo since the end of the conflict. The first part of the thesis is based on a literature research which introduces the theory of conflict, the level of safety and the organized crime definition. Then, the analytical part focuses on Kosovo history, its correlation with organized crime and the decision making process of former KPC members. Finally the suggestion part enumerates some improvements in fighting against organized crime such as INTERPOL membership to bring trust and transparency to the International Community.

Key words: Kosovo Protection Corps, Kosovo, Organized Crime, INTERPOL, EULEX, UNMIK, KFOR, NATO

Abstrakt

DUBOVÁ, O. Kosovský ochranný sbor a jeho vliv na politickou stabilitu Kosova.

Bakalářská práce, Brno, 2015

Hlavním cílem této práce je zjistit potenciální vztah mezi členy Kosovského ochranného sboru (KOS) a organizovaným zločinem a vliv členů KOS na politickou stabilitu Kosova od konce konfliktu. První část práce je založena na literární rešerši, která zahrnuje teorii konfliktu, úroveň bezpečnosti a definici organizovaného zločinu. Praktická část je zaměřena na historii Kosova, analýzu vztahu mezi příslušníky KOS a organizovaného zločinu. Návrhová část přináší možná řešení a zlepšení v boji proti organizovanému zločinu a to především díky instituci INTERPOL, jehož členství přináší důvěru a transparentnost do mezinárodní komunity.

Klíčová slova: Kosovský ochranný sbor, Kosovo, organizovaný zločin, INTERPOL, EULEX, UNMIK, KFOR, NATO

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
AKR	Alliance for a New Kosovo
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CE	Criminal Enterprise
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FBI	The Federal Bureau of Investigation
IAC	Interim Administrative Council
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KTA	Kosovo Trust Agency
KTC	Kosovo Transitional Council
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OC	Organized Crime
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
UN	United Nations
UNIAMK	UN Interim administration mission of Kosovo
UNMIK	United Nation Mission in Kosovo
UNODC	United Nations office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization

UNDP   United Nations Development Program

UCDP   The Uppsala Conflict Data Program

WTO   World Trade Organization

INTERPOL   International Police organization

NCB   National Central Bureau (INTERPOL structure)

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INTRODUCTION

Since the 90s, former Yugoslavia has gone through various intern wars ending by separations and independences forming the current Balkans countries. Those successions of internal wars have enabled nationalist movement and criminal organizations to strengthen both their military position and political influence over the fragile or well established governments. The Kosovo war ignited from the Slobodan Milosevic decision to limit the Kosovo region independency from 1989, led ethnic Albanian leader Dr. Ibrahim Rugova to organize peaceful resistance. The escalation of the conflict and the radicalization of some paramilitary groups such as Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Armed Force Group of Kosovo (FARK) created the first spark for Milosevic's troops to mobilize throughout Kosovo. NATO officially intervened in March 1999 with a three month bombing campaign over the Kosovo Region and Serbia. The post conflict resolution framed by United Nations and NATO has seen a number of criminal organizations that profited from the weak socio-political situation. The demilitarization of the KLA and the strong population support for its leaders facilitated the establishment of new political parties which will shape the course of the political transformation.

The setup of the United Nation Mission in Kosovo associated with NATO peace support operation so called KFOR set a new military supervision and general administration for the region. The Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo Police Service (police academy) designed by United Nation directly emerged from the KLA group dissolution. The international presence and the re-establishment of the complete administration gave free hands to organized crime groups to profit and proliferate from this weak post conflict period through former KLA members. This thesis aims at analyzing the correlation between KPC members and organized crime as well as their influence of the political stability of Kosovo since the end of the conflict up to now. This study does not analyze the international relations between Serbia, Kosovo, United Nation or European Union nor the socio economic interests involved in the conflict. Other limitation relates to the lack of official proof or prosecution against former KLA/KPC leaders for alleged war crime or involvement in Organized Crime.

METHODOLOGY

In order to deploy a complete picture of the political situation in Kosovo and the influence from former members as well as potential connection to organized crime, the thesis will be supported KLA by a methodology based on qualitative research. This type of research offers a deep understanding of human behavior and decision making process. The qualitative method tends to gather information from different point of view separated in primary and secondary sources. Various type of information can be used, such as: Interviews, non-participant and participant observations, analysis of documents and material etc. Interviews and observations are to be used to support a reflection strategy and not a one way thinking.

As this method often approaches the edge of the non-objectivity from the researcher, a particular attention and focus needs to be addressed to step away from subjectivity. It is very important to select the right sources of information from different parties to tempt to bring an answer to the thesis hypothesis. The conclusion is therefore made of propositions rather than a proven reality.

This research study utilizes primary and secondary sources of information. Those two classes of sources relate to the degree of legitimacy of the information. Primary sources correspond to undisputable information with are officials and valid, such as: legislative document, regulations, international treaties etc. The secondary type of source relates to qualitative data such as, in-depth interview, direct observation and written documents (magazines, website, reports, books etc.). Those qualitative data are subjective and form the core of the reflection process.

The first part of the paper will focus on the literature research which introduces theoretical part of the conflict establishment including anthropological factors. Then, a presentation of the level of safety is provided as well as a definition of the organized crime and its typology.

In the second part of this study, an analysis of the Kosovo conflict with history and root causes will be exposed. The analysis will continue with a presentation of the political evolution from the post conflict time till 2014. Eventually, the level of safety will be analyzed from period 1998 to NATO bombing end and from June 1999 till

recent time, including the organized crime penetration and United Nation as well as EULEX measures against it.

The third and final section of this thesis will verify the hypothesis linking some Kosovo Protection corps (KPC) members to the Kosovo organized crime. SWOT analysis will be used to evaluate the process of decision making of KPC members. In parallel, a second SWOT analysis will be presented to evaluate the benefit and obstacles of the KPC members stepping into politics. Finally suggestions will be introduced to better stabilize the political situation as well as improve fight against crime and foster European Union integration. As part of the primary sources, the following documents are used: United Nation official resolution UN 1244 which was the very first signed frame work agreement between the international community, KLA leaders and the Republic of Yugoslavia following the end of the conflict. It translates the Rambouillet accord as well as exposes the function of the United Nation Mission in Kosovo and the demilitarization of the KLA. The Rambouillet accord that presents the peace plan with the reasons why NATO engaged in a bombing campaign. UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 that describes the Kosovo Protection Corps objectives, its supervision by KFOR forces and its obligation to not have any role in law enforcement. The OSCE reports present official results of legislative and municipal elections. Finally the UNODC convention against organized crime defined the guide line for combating OC activities.

Some of the secondary sources used for this work are the following. To analyze the organized crime definition, I used the book: *Organized Crime in our Time* wrote by Jay S Albanese. The author developed an academic approach for defining criminality using consensus across world best criminologists. For the typology I extracted information from the survey carried out by UNDOC on forty well know organized crime groups. For the theory of conflict the books from ŠMÍD, BRAHM and EICHLER helped me to define the type of conflict and their phases of development.

For the analysis part UNMIK reports from 1999 up to now present the insight of the organization and cover each aspects of the Kosovo status. From the political situation to freedom of movement, it covers the news of the reported period and compares the actual status to the road map. The other international institutions reports such as UNDOC, OSCE, UNHCR and EULEX provided me with the essential information on safety level, criminal activities and refugee's situation.

1. LITERATURE RESEARCH

1.1. Theory of conflict

The term conflict and its definition in the context of security research is an extremely diversified phenomenon that is at the center of researchers' attention in the field of political science, but also in various other disciplines (Šmíd, 2010).

Conflict is defined as *"a conflict between clearly definable actors who seek to exercise their interest in one or more of the same areas, and these two actors have been conflicting feelings as a situation where one party is a profit loss for the other"(*Pšeja 2002, s. 82).

According to the new Heidelberg methodology, the HIIK understands a political conflict as *"a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society - the conflict items - between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so"* (Conflict Barometer, 2014).

To understand the importance and role of conflict in international relations, it is necessary to take in account factors that are considered essential to the nature of the conflict. It must show certain characteristics. It must have actors, who are usually states, although we can see increasing frequency where the non-governmental actors are also involved in conflicts. It must have a clearly definable issue field. There must be present tension that acts as a predisposition of conflict and is typically expressed in attitudes such as distrust, etc. The last component of the conflict is the action that takes the form of measures and actions implemented by the parties in conflict (Pšeja, 2002).

1.1.1. Types of conflict

There are many options how to categorize different forms of conflict. It depends on criteria we choose. One of the main breakdowns divides armed and unarmed conflicts (nonviolent or violent). Then the type of actors involved in the conflict and the political-geographic nature of the affected territories must be taken into account. With those criterion we are talking about international conflicts, transnational, national or non-governmental (Šmíd, 2010). Conflict can also be differentiated according to the nature of the conflict on the basis of its position within the international system, which based

on analytical planes can be distinguished between system conflict, international and national conflicts. A system conflict can be called conflicts that ultimately lead to a change in the nature and structure of the international system and power distribution among actors. Typical examples are the two World War settlement were powers have been redistributed and borders re-designed in some cases. International conflicts characterize clashes between units in the international system, but there is no change in their structure. National conflicts take place inside the state's borders (Pospíšil, 2012)

It is essential to introduce the typology of conflicts in terms of their causes. Those causes settle the main object of incompatibility or hostility. The most basic breakdown of conflicts in terms of their causes is the question whether armed conflicts are:

- o conflict of interest;
- o conflict of values;

Conflicts of interest constitute a conflict which is conducted on tangible good in the form of economic profit, raw materials, resources, political domination or similar matters. Such conflict is, in most cases objectively analyzable. There is a mutual incompatibility that can be quantifiable therefore it is easier to agree on compromises and to bring a solution to the dispute where the opponents. We can separate the conflict of interest into the following types:

- o conflict over territory[1];
- o economic conflict[2];
- o political conflict;

Conflict of values on the other hand relates to an issue much less tangible. Conflicts of values and attitudes related to material issues less than interests but paradoxically are more directly measurable. The values, beliefs, and attitudes are by their nature conscious. The driving force behind such a conflict is animosity.

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[1] Conflict over territory, but only if it brings some economic territory or foreign policy profit. If it is only symbolic, historical value it falls within the conflict of values

[2] For example conflict of raw material resources. Further conflict over access to markets, trade routes etc.

Factors that incite that animosity are mostly ethnicity, nationalism and religion, therefore conflict of values can be detailed into (Šmíd, 2010, p. 19):

- o   ethnic conflicts;
- o   religious conflicts;
- o   ideological conflicts.

1.1.2.   Actors of conflict

In each conflict definition, there must be entities or actors. Not every actor has the same character, features, objectives and level of involvement in the conflict (Šmíd, 2010). A conflict actor can be an individual, a state, an international organization or a non-government entity. Collective conflict actors are distinguished from one to another through their internal cohesion and internally shared goals. An actor is perceived as decisive if his existence, actions, and communications considerably alter the practices of at least one other conflict actor pertaining to the conflict item (Conflict Barometer, 2014).

1.1.3.   Conflict stages

The dynamic of conflicts can often be separated into several phases following a logical order. Even though we can define the general dynamic as a sigma curve with an ascending and a descending phase (Šmíd, 2010). We can define phases as such: Latent conflict, Conflict Emergence, Escalation, Hurting stalemate stage, De-escalation and peacebuilding. Conflicts possess their own degree of irregularity which leads sometimes to jump some of the phases.

Figure 1: Phases of conflict

Source: Brahm, 2003

1.1.4. Intensity of conflict

Furthermore, by the intensity of the conflict or its preparation can be detailed on a wide range from stable peace to intense war (Šmíd, 2010, p. 23):

o Lasting peace-this situation can rarely be achieved and we can only record it in a limited number of rich countries and not always.

o Permanent peace- there is already present a certain level of mistrust and hostility manifested in political crisis.

o Unstable peace- government and opposition are not communicating; there are (mostly ethnically) separate camps, demonstrations. The first violence occurs in the form of street battles, dehumanization and demonization of the adversary.

o Low-intensity conflict- It is already an armed conflict, but so far there are involved only some actors and some locations. There is often state of emergency and government has also used the army, not only the police to maintain order.

o War or conflict of high intensity-this was the first full-fledged conflicts, there are no people outside the conflict, but may not be affected the entire territory.

In this context, it is also important to mention the content of the term war. War is called an armed conflict if:

- o There are at least two armed forces, of which at least one is a regular in the sense subordinate to the authority of government (military police).
- o Both sides have at least a minimum driven organization in battles, organized defense and strategic planning attacks.
- o Military operations have at least some level of continuity and are not spontaneous, simple, and casual (Šmíd, 2010, p. 23).

1.1.5. Conflict measures

Conflict measures are actions and communications carried out by a conflict actor in the course of a political conflict. They are constitutive for an identifiable conflict if they lie outside established procedures of conflict regulations and – possibly in conjunction with other conflict measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of the state. Established regulatory procedures are defined as those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by the conflict actors. Examples may include elections and court procedures. The use of physical violence, however, is never considered to be an established regulatory procedure. Core state functions encompass providing security of a population, integrity of a territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic or cultural order. A state function or the international order is threatened if its fulfillment and persistence, respectively, becomes unlikely in a conflict actor's point of view[3] (Conflict Barometer, 2014).

1.1.6. Conflict resolution

Conflict resolution relates to an interdisciplinary academic field and is trying to analyze the causes and developments of social conflict with a tendency to violence. Conflict resolution emerged as a distinct field during the Cold war in 1950's and 1960's. Its goal was to develop strategies for a regulated and peaceful settlement of social conflicts in general and international conflicts in particular. According to Diez, 2011: *"Conflict resolution is about ideas, theories and methods that can improve our understanding of conflict and our collective practice of reduction in violence and enhancement of political processes for harmonizing interest"*.

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[3] Conflict Barometer published in 2014 a study, where we can find trends of conflict evolution in the world. In the attachments you can find a graph showing those trends.

John W. Burton developed theoretical approach towards conflict resolution by differentiating between conflicts about interests and conflict about needs. Barton argues that conflicts about material interests, such as access to resources or disputes about territories, can be solved relatively easily by compromise and negotiations as soon as both parties at least share an interest in reaching a solution for the problem. In contrast, conflicts about immaterial human needs, such as security, identity or recognition are more difficult to handle, since they are usually based on deep-rooted societal and psychological perceptions and emotions. In these cases the conflict can only be resolved by identifying and addressing the underlying causes (Diez, 2011).

In this field of study acts many research centers such as the Stockholm International Peace Institute, the Research Institute Oslo or the institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the University of Virginia. These institutes have spread theoretical considerations, becoming more influential on the practitioners such as diplomats and government representatives in their daily practice in international conflicts. For example, in South Africa, the Center for Intergroup Studies successfully applied the theoretical approaches emerging in the field towards the disputes between the system of Apartheid and its opponents. Another example of applying Barton's problem-solving approach to practice have been made in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities in 1965 and 1966. The idea consists in the involving individuals into the workshops, who play a significant role in the negotiations process, but are not officials of the government involved. There was hope for the development of different personal and communicative relationships between the conflicting parties despite the ones dominant in the officials' dialogues and statements. They had to be adapted to the specific conflict situation and could indeed contribute towards the establishments of alternative relationships among the parties of the conflict (Diez, 2011).

1.2. Security level

According to Eichler (2006), security is hard to define, hardly measurable and its contents cannot be precisely quantified. At the most general level security is defined in two basic ways - negative and positive. Negative definition is similar to the negative definition of freedom, which says that it is the absence of restrictions or absence of resistance or serious barriers to the movement. Negative definition of security means that it is about absence of threats. Positive definition of security is always related to a particular subject, to the point, man, town, state or community safety. The security is the entity that has ensured its survival and opportunities for further development. Security is often explained as a negation of the negative conditions. This means that the safety is an entity that is beyond the reach of direct and urgent threat. For example the animal species are safe when living in an area with no natural enemy. The environment is safe if in the area is no industrial activities.

Security can be further understood objectively (as the absence of threats to values and interests) and subjectively (as an absence of fear of endangering themselves, their values and interests). Therefore, it is useful to distinguish whether security is as a general attribute, character: a feature that can take values between zero and completeness. Security as an attribute with a certain level or value can be attributed to almost anything- safe distance, secure source of information, secure supply of raw materials, it is a synonym for security, supportability, trouble-free. Security as a functional sphere is an area of activity or even directly as a policy. This narrower concept is dynamic, involves processes of security and refers to a conscious and controlled the activities of specific entities and institutions-groups, organizations, states. Security is never finished and filled completely. It is just perfect condition or property (Balabán, 2007).

1.2.1. Security objects

Traditional and still dominant approach deals with national security. New reference objects are located at levels below the state, above and parallel with it. Model Copenhagen School brought his own typology of reference objects- whose safety is involved. All can be placed on five levels.

- Global international systems (UN, WTO but also the global economic system or ecosystem).

- International subsystems (group of units, which links the intensity differs from its surroundings, usually territorially defined, such as NATO, OECD, and African Union).

- Units (traditionally mainly States, currently autonomous units but also became a powerful multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations-NGOs[4].

- Subunits- (organized groups within units, interest groups, formalized networks, political parties).

- Individuals (people as individuals, not as a group or population).

This typology is based on international relations and is well suited for inclusion institutions or organizations, preferably with legal subjectivity. But it can worse gusts phenomena outside the politically defined and institutionalized entities (Balabán, 2007).

1.2.2. Security in international relations

In international relations, safety is defined by a core value and it is the highest goal of any state. Safety as the status is most often explained as a lack or absence of danger of the highest values of the state or community. A State is secured if it ensures defense of its territory and values that are present in, the functioning of its institutions and protection of the population. Efforts of each State to its own security focuses on three main objectives. The first objective is the elimination of potential threats, whether they are military or non-military. The second is to ensure internal order and cohesion, which is the strongest cement of State stability. Finally, the third objective is associated with ensuring justice and public safety (Eichler, 2006).

[4] Their activity is almost not dependent on the power of the states.

Figure 2: State security diagram

Source: Helfgott, 2008

1.2.3. Relativity of security

Security cannot be absolute; it is always relative and is directly proportional to threats or risks. No state can achieve a state of absolute collateral of its security. Usually the security is assured more or less. Although it cannot be never precisely measured and therefore the most relevant question is, how much security is sufficient? Security is always the result of the interplay of subjective and objective factors. The first objective of long-acting factor is geography - the farther the threat is, the less urgent, and the greater the possibilities the counter it. Another objective factor is history (Eichler, 2006).

1.2.4. Subjective factors

Security is based on a set of measures that each state or community safety accepts in order to ensure their own safety. All these measures and their promotion is national security policy or security community. Non-military part of the security policies are primarily active diplomatic measures, which focuses mainly on bilateral and multilateral contracts and obtaining security guarantees on the basis of membership in alliances or in coalitions. The military part of the security policy focuses primarily on armed forces establishment and their combat training (Eichler, 2006).

Security issues are constantly dealing with all international relations theory. The most important are: realism, neo-liberalism, neoliberalism, constructivism and critical theory. Each of these theories is the result of examination of international security relations

from a certain angle. None of them are perfect, none has universal validity. The relevance of any of these theories is not absolute and therefore always relative. When examining international security relations is not possible to prove the truth of a theory and a theory cannot be dismissed in the name of another theory. Individual schools in the approach to security and security threats differ in a number of issues. Each has its strengths and weaknesses which is most often associated with clearly defined states interests and therefore said to be State - centric security. It consists mainly of measures that accept states or coalition in order to insure against specific current and future security threats. And we distinguish soft security-political, economic, social and environmental security. Dimensions of non-military security often complement each other and connect (Eichler, 2006).

1.3. Organized crime

1.3.1. Definition of organized crime

Various definitions of what is the organized crime are offered by international institutions, criminologist, safety organizations and countries. If the objective of such criminal organization is largely shared among institution, that is obtaining money through illegal activities, the definition itself and the way it is structured often differ.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for instance makes a distinction between the Criminal Enterprise (CE) and the Organized Crime (OC), considering the first term as a "*group of individuals with an identified hierarchy*" having a number of minimum 6 protagonists with one identified leader. However the OC group is defined by "*any group having some manner of a formalized structure*". According to the definition of the FBI, the OC groups maintain their position through "*the use of violence, official's corruption, graft or extortion*"[5]. This political dimension is not always incorporated in the OC definitions.

The office on Drugs and Crime of the United Nations (UNODC) signed in December 2000 the very unique global convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In the convention, the article 2(a) offers a definition which is sensibly deviated from the FBI as it calls for a group of minimum 3 members "*existing for a period of time*" and committing one or more "*serious crimes or offences*" which are punishable for at least 4 years of imprisonment. One can notice that the political aspect is not implemented in this UNODC definition; it emphasizes the categorization of the crime by its sentence but leave apart the way of achieving it. The notion of time is often defined as a temporal continuity, in other words, a random and single criminal activity cannot be attributed to an OC organization.

In the fifth edition of his book entitled: "Organized crime in our times", Jay S Albanese approached the definition of the OC using a qualitative method. Using as baseline the analysis of Frank Hagan, he gathered a dozen of criminologists' terminologies for OC over the last 30 years and found out a consensus bringing together 11 characteristics of OC groups.

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[5] Definition at: www.fbi.gov

Characteristics	Number of Authors
Organized Hierarchy Continuing	16
Rational Profit through Crime	13
Use of Force of Threat	12
Corruption to Maintain Immunity	11
Public Demand for Services	7
Monopoly over Particular Market	6
Restricted Membership	4
Non-Ideological	4
Specialization	3
Code of Secrecy	3
Extensive Planning	2

Figure 3: OC group characteristics

Source: Organized crime in our times, 5th edition

Focusing on the first 4 characteristics, we can acknowledge that the definition offered by the FBI and UNODC incorporate at least 3 of those. Utilizing this consensus, J S Albanese lied down a definition as followed: *"Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials" (*Jay S Albanese, Organized crime in our times, 2007, page 4*).

1.3.2. Typology of Organized crime

After summarizing what could a definition of OC, a particular attention is to be addressed on the typology of organized crime. Due to the complexity of criminals groups,
a typology analysis is mandatory to classify for regional and international security institutions in order to better set actions plan to persecute them.

The Center of International Crime Prevention (a UNODC department) rolled out a survey focusing on 40 well known OC organizations deployed over 16 countries (Pilot survey, UNODC, September 2002). This survey presents various characteristics such as the size, structure, identity, use of violence, corruption and political influence. It is shown that drug trafficking represent the vast majority of the OC activities while the foot prints of those groups cover more than 5 countries. The penetration into the legitimate economy is proved for 75% of the groups and 18 demonstrate a large cross-

over in their activities between legitimate and illegitimate ones. The corruption is also widely used and essential for 18 groups while the political influence is absent for half of the surveyed organizations. Concerning identity, 10 cases share same ethnical origin, 13 gather members from same background but the rest do not present strong ethnical or social links.

All of the groups utilize a form of more or less structured pattern and half of their headcounts go over 50 persons. The use of violence is essential for 23 groups and 10 are claimed to use it occasionally. This massive tendency emphasizes the security threat that OC groups engage and encourage International institutions to combat them.

Jay Albanese proposes a segmentation of the OC illegal activities in three main items: Provision of illicit goods, provision of illicit service and infiltration in legitimate business.

For the provision of illegal good or service, the violence is used as a support of the mechanism rather than direct method for import/export. However, the infiltration of legitimate business does require a higher usage of violence. The author confirms also the UNDOC survey regarding ethnicity as being a "*weak descriptor*" of OC constitution. As mentioned previously the notion of "organized group" has been commonly agreed across institutions, government and criminologist. The UNDOC survey presents the structural typology of the OC organization linked with their mode of operation (Albanese, 2007, p. 9). The following hierarchy structures are captured in the UNDOC survey.

1.3.2.1. "Standard Hierarchy"

This hierarchy corresponds to the most common structure and largely employed by Asian, Russian and Eastern Europe OC groups. Led by a single leader with a clearly defined hierarchy across sub leaders, it applies a strong internal discipline with code of honor and often recruits members sharing a strong social or ethnical identity. The use of violence is essential to run the business and those OC groups are usually covering and controlling a defined territory.

Figure 4: Standard Hierarchy

1.3.2.2. "Regional Hierarchy"

The regional hierarchy still responds to a unique leading center however there is a certain degree of autonomy at regional level. They are characterized by large varieties of activities and like the standard hierarchy; usage of violence is widespread across sub groups. A single social or ethnical origin is also one of the characteristics.

Figure 5: Regional Hierarchy

Such structure is visible in the United State, Japan, Australia and Italy.

1.3.2.3. " Clustered hierarchy"

This structure is rare and defined by an association of OC groups. The degree of independence in each group is important and the "governing" center does not always have a strong influence over the sub groups. Such hierarchy is created to regulate internal "fights" and divide geographically the market.

Sub groups are usually defined with standard hierarchy. The UNDOC present three OC organizations with such structure,

Figure 6: Clustered Hierarchy

they are located in South Africa (motorcycle gang), Germany (Italian based group) and Russia (Ziberman group).

### 1.3.2.4. "Core group"

The core organization is defined by a small quantity of individuals and is the rarest hierarchy seen among OC groups. The social identity of the group is almost absent and the loosen structure allow groups to rapidly decrease or increase group member as wish. The leadership is formed by few key members and relations are cemented by trust and long term collaboration. Those groups are often not named and are less sensible to law enforcement, as a result, some groups that belonged in the past to the category 1 or 2 have restructured their staff to that core organization.


Figure 7: Core group

1.3.2.5. Criminal network

According the UNDOC survey, only 4 out of the 40 groups analyzed can take part of the hierarchy. However such structure is likely to be more common as it is difficult for authorities to identify those criminal networks due to their low public profile. Key individuals are usually perpetrating one type of criminal activity and the group

is built around them. The level of hierarchy is defined by the level of "expertise" and network. Personal loyalty is the strongest pillar of such organization rather than social or ethnical origin.

Figure 8: Criminal network

As seen previously, the difficulty to commonly express what the organized crime is comes from the fact that it is very subjective. The United Nations themselves agreed that the convention did not lead to a consensus on a definition. One can observe that the OC group's main objective is to generate profit from illegal activities. The link between generating profit and corruption can vary from countries to countries and is often the source of confusion between "white collar" and "political" crime with organized crime.

1.3.3. Definition of "White Collar crime"

The thesis dedicates a short part of this theoretical section on "White Collar crime" to better understand how it deviates from OC.

This expression was given in 1939 by Edwin Sutherland to the American Sociological Society and defines a *"crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation"*[6].

The term covers a large variety of non-violent crime usually perpetrated in commercial situation to obtain financial benefit.

1.3.4. Definition of Political crime

Political crime is a problematic concept. Data on political crime in research and course texts in criminology and criminal justice are sparse and there is considerable confusion about what constitutes a political offense (Ross, 2003). There are a number of factors that may contribute to this lack of consensus. First, all crimes can be viewed as political in that, by law, they have been deemed a threat to society. Some suggest that any attempt to categorize or classify "political crime" is itself a political act. Second, most ideologically motivated criminal behaviors fall under other categories of criminal behavior. Political crime differs from other types of crime in that its motivation is ideological. An actor has committed a political crime if he or she has a political or ideological intention or motivation. In some contexts political crimes are committed simultaneously by both citizens and the state [7](Helfgott, 2008).

Political crime is generally classified into two categories: oppositional crime (crimes against the government) and state crime (crimes by the government). Oppositional crime includes nonviolent offenses such as dissent/political protest, sedition, espionage, and treason and violent offenses such as assassination and domestic and international terrorism. State crime includes political corruption, illegal domestic

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[6] Definition taken from Legal Information Institute of Cornell University

[7]For example, as has been the case in many riot situations throughout history (e.g., during the civil rights movement, Vietnam War protests, the LA riots), during the 1999 WTO riots in Seattle, both protesters and police were charged with committing offenses

surveillance, human rights violations, state corporate crime, and state violence [8](Helfgott, 2008).

1.3.5. Definition of terrorism

In comparison with the organized crime, the definition of terrorism is widely shared across institutions and governments. This consensus defines it as crimes designated to intimidate or coerce civilians or a government in order to reach political or social objectives, through activities such as destruction, assassination or kidnapping. Unlike the OC group objective to make profits, in every case a terrorist act has a political objective. (UNODC, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2004).

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[8] Genocide, torture, deadly force

2. ANALYTICAL PART

2.1. Kosovo history

The ethnical and territorial conflicts between Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serbs have been lasting for couple centuries with certain intense crisis peaks and period of stable cohabitation in the Kosovo region. Both parties have always been claiming their own heritage of the Kosovo legacy. Looking at the demographic perspective, the Kosovo has been a place of permanent mixture of religions, ethnicities and languages.

By the end of the 6th centuries, the majority of the Balkan was Christian, though; no real conviction or cohesion was adopted by peasants towards religion. In the 850s, the Bulgarian empire set Christianity and Byzantine –Slavic culture among the Balkan countries, which will turn into Orthodox Christianity later on. The annexation of Kosovo to the Serbian Empire in the 13th and 14th centuries cemented the Orthodoxy through various churches and monasteries creations.

The battle of Kosovo in 1389 between the Ottoman and Serbian Empire was one of the greatest war in the European middle age, this war set a new curve in the Kosovo history as Turkish defeated the Slavs and the territory became in 1455 part of the Ottoman Empire. After few centuries under Christianity, Islam was introduced and new principles were presented. Muslim communities were preferred at the eye of the Ottoman leadership and the employment of religion became a social barrier forcing Christian population to flee (Castellan 1988, 9; Berkes 1964, 10). Despite of centuries of Ottoman attacks on Serbian communities, Kosovo remained the cradle of Serbia with strong orthodox identity with numerous monasteries and churches. The Kosovo demographic situation has been punctuated by few massive migrations, the first one in 1690, as seen around 300.000 Kosovo Serbs escaping to central Serbia by fear of Turkish reprisals after the Austro-Hungarian army has left the region. This massive migration changed the demographic ratio in favor of the Albanian (Weithmann, 1996).

The 19th century was a vector towards independence of the Balkan from Ottoman Empire, in 1844; the Prime Minister Garašanin (1812 – 1874) expanded his vision of the great Serbia with this political program called: *Načrtanije.* Half century

later, Albanian writer Sami Frashër wrote similar program[9] which become the national plan for "Greater Albania". Appendix 1 presents the Greater Albania vision of the ethnic Albanian paramilitary group KLA.

These beliefs mixture associated with the migration flows and influence from neighboring countries created a large number of ethnical minorities and dispersion in terms of national identities. The difference between Islam and Christianity (Catholic and Orthodox) has led to some issues for Albanian to socially integrate among Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro communities (Peza, 2013).

Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the southern part of the former empire was inhabited by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. At this time the Kosovo was part of Serbia and in 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was official introduced. In the Ottoman Empire, things changed just before the First World War as the Albanian declared independence from the Empire in accordance with the plan wrote by Sami Frashër. The international community somehow supported the territorial independence of Albania but not the Albanian living out of the Albanian territory which represented at that time a significant percentage. Due to different of origins, religion and culture, Kosovo Albanian always showed difficulties to integrate within the Serbian population (Peza, 2013).

During the Second World War, Kosovo had been connected to Albania through Italian fascists, as a result, many Albanians migrated to Kosovo and the first step of the "Greater Albania" plan was on the way for most Albanians. Following the end of WW2 and the departure of Italian, Kosovo was re-incorporated within Serbia. Over the following years, many Kosovo Serbs were expulsed from the region by the Serbian authorities judged as collaborators with Italian fascists. This migration significantly changed the demographic balance in favor of Albanian. In the 60s, a new leader of Yugoslavia was elected, Josip Broz Tito. His internal policy mainly contributed to strengthen relations within the Republic; he implemented rights for minorities such as school education in native language (Albanian for Kosovo). In 1974, Kosovo became an autonomous province with access to a federal structure of government. Despites, efforts to better integrate Kosovo Albanians among Serbs, the Albanian majority felt racism

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[9] *(Albania - What It Was, What It Is and What Will Become of It? Reflections on Saving the Motherland from Perils which Beset It)*

from Yugoslavian government and Serbs. They have always claimed the recognition of national status from Serbs and Croats (Stone, 2005).

In the 80s, a new leader emerged in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic. He became president of the presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in 1989, followed by his election as the first president of Serbia after the fall of Communism in 1991. Although Yugoslavia went through economic problem in the late 80s, Milosevic focused on nationalism (Peza, 2013) and was pointed as endorsing a "Serbian Nationalist agenda". After Tito's death, it was not possible to lead people by ideology; Milosevic used the historical events to touch the population. He compared the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the rise of Albanian population in the southern region to the Battle of Kosovo (Šmíd, 2007).

During this time, Kosovo Albanians kept on demanding the creation of their own Republic; however those requests were constantly rejected by Milosevic' institution. In 1989, after the massive strikes within the Kosovo region, the Serbian government abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and gave Serbia direct control over the region. This date symbolized the birth of peaceful resistance from Kosovo Albanians led by Dr. Rugova which continued till the conflict escalation in 1998. Kosovo Albanians organized boycott of Serbian institutions following the revoke of the Kosovo Autonomy. Tension were at its maximum but the conflict did not escalate. On September 1991, the un-recognized Republic of Kosovo led by Dr. Rugova organized a clandestine referendum in Bosnia aiming at supporting the Independence of Sovereignty of Kosovo. The votes turned out to be at 98% in favor of the independence. The newly established parliament submitted the application for recognition to the European Community but without success, only Albanian did recognize it. Despite this non recognition, Kosovo parliament illegally organized presidential election in May 1992 and Dr. Rugova became the first president of the Unofficial Republic of Kosovo (Štěpánek, 2011).

From 1992 to the conflict escalation in 1997, the peaceful resistance from Dr. Rugova has seen a gradual increase of nationalism among Kosovo Albanians. To support the self-proclaimed government, funds were sent by Albanians and Kosovo Albanians living in Western Europe and North America creating the economical backbone of the Kosovo resistance (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001). However the economy

remained poor and violence, black market and armed groups started to appear. Following the Dayton Agreement (1995) Kosovo Albanians felt left aside by the international scene and small armed groups turned into regionally structured ones. The Kosovo Liberation Army was established around 1994 and started terrorist attacks against Serbian police and institutions. Serbian police force replicated with violent and brutal retaliation setting the first step towards the conflict escalation. (Štěpánek, 2011).

2.2. First phase of the civil war

The year 1997 has been an important milestone of the civil war escalation, after the Dayton Agreement disappointment for Dr. Rugova' government associated with an increasing nationalist regime from the Serb police, a radicalization of the population occurred characterizing the decline of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). This radicalization and the increasing support of the KLA actions have been materialized by the event of September 1997, where a Kosovo Albanian teacher was killed by Serbian Forces. This event did not cement the beginning of the KLA, but initiated the uprising of nationalism among Kosovo Albanians (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001). During the ceremony of the teacher funerals, few KLA members addressed the crowd and proclaimed that war was the next necessary step.

In the next month, violence, murders and torture from Serbian police cracked down with 40000 troops, 200000 Kosovo Albanian refugees fled to neighboring countries (Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 2003, page 206). The international community was concerned about the Kosovo situation but they failed to ensure effective measures to prevent bloodshed. After the Serbs launched an attack early March 1998, the international attention became immediate. The United States and European leaders met to discuss rapid actions to avoid similar situation as in Bosnia few years before. In the following months, the International Community set economic sanctions against Milosevic regime and promoted dialogues between opponents (Daalder, 2000). In October 1998, NATO[10] increased the pressure on Milosevic and managed to install a cease fire during the negotiation between Richard Holbrooke and Milosevic. Through the 1998 UNSCR 1207 and the OSCE[11] (Kosovo Verification Mission) was launched to

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[10] North Atlantic Treaty Organization

[11] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

make sure the commitment was effectively happening on ground. Even though the US Secretary, Madelaine Albright, asked KLA leaders to not take advantage of the Serbs retreat, the organization used it to regroup and strengthen (OSCE, 2003). The cease fire has been rapidly forgotten and escalation restarted between Albanians and Serbs, leading to new human violations from both parties. The event in Racak village where 45 presumed civilians including few children were killed by Serbian forces directly engaged the International community into the conflict. Serbia authority claimed that civilians were actually KLA soldiers that have been dressed afterward as civilian to turn it into a fake war crime and gain support from the International Community (OSCE, 2003).

2.3. Rambouillet negotiation and NATO air campaign

NATO and UN rapidly organized the Rambouillet negotiations where Kosovo leaders namely, KLA leaders associated with Rugova government and Serbia leadership met. The Kosovar Albanian delegation named a 29 years old KLA representative (Hashim Thaci) as head of the delegation rather than Rugova. This election was a surprise for the counterpart negotiators and showed the shift in political power in Kosovo (Daalder, 2000).

As part of this agreement, KLA must have been disarmed in the 3 months following the signature and all Serbian troops had to be withdrawn from Kosovo, except 1,400 border guards and 2,500 security forces. NATO forces would be deployed by 30,000 members to ensure security stability of the region and United Nations will deploy the United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to administratively control the region until a final status of Kosovo would be decided. In three years' time, a new meeting will be held to define future directions of the Kosovo situation. KLA leaders returned to Paris on 18th March 1999 to sign off the agreement while Serbian parliament rejected the proposals after a last ultimatum from NATO following the deployment of 30,000 Serbs soldiers (OSCE, 2003).

On March 24th 1999, NATO started the bombing campaign over Serbia which last till June 10th. The campaign was launched to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to intervene against the threat of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The original plan was to use 300 NATO aircrafts but the number has been increased to 1000 units during the course of the campaign (NATO's air war for Kosovo a strategic and operational assessment,

2001, page 33). It is important to mention that the KLA organization collaborated with NATO in many attacks. By the end of the war, the number of refugees culminated at 800,000 plus 600,000 internal displaced persons. UNSCR[12] 1244 regulation was adopted on June 10th by the Security Council and was approved by Serbian authority which started to withdraw their forces from the region. NATO and KFOR[13] troops entered Kosovo on June 12th 1999 and the "Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation" was signed between Hashim Thaci and Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson (KFOR commander) shortly after (Jeffries, 2001).

2.4. Kosovo Liberation Army origins and expansion

The foundation of the KLA has been a point of divergence among authors; some are stating that it took its root from Macedonia in 1992; others link it with the Popular Movement for Kosovo (LPK). Chris Edges, Balkans bureau chief at New York Times from 1995 to 1998 identified the KLA core group taking traditions from the WW2 fascist militias and rebels who fought against Serbs during WW1. KLA leaders' and fighters 'origins were vastly linked with the ethnic Albanians who fought for Muslim Croat federation against Serbs during Bosnia war (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001). The objective of the KLA was political, the secession from Serbia and the creation of independent state of Kosovo or a Greater Albania remained the main goal in the organization which defined the KLA as a terrorist group as defined in the first part of this thesis. Along with the conflict escalation, KLA has seen its headcounts increasing mainly with villagers left homeless after Serbs shelling and burning operations following 1998. According the OSCE, the KLA structure was organized in regional zones with central General Staff commanding operations. Trainings were held in northern Albania with the help of unofficial British and German military instructors. The CIA provided military training and advised on how to fight the Yugoslav army (Aranas, 2012).

Funds to support KLA operation were mainly flowing from Western Europe via Diaspora and from Albania. Interpol stated in front of the U.S Congress in 2000 that from 1996 to 1999, 900 million DM reached Kosovo and half of it was thought to be

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12 United Nations Security Council Resolution
13 Kosovo Force

illegal drug money (UNODC, Crime and its impact on Balkans, 2008). We will analyze later the various connections between organized crime and KLA transformation.

From 1996, the KLA officially entered in competition with the LDK[14] party of Rugova. Following the radicalization of the young Kosovars, deceived by Rugova's non-violent resistance, the KLA gained in strength and by end of 1998, controlled a third of the Kosovo territory (UNODC, Crime and its impact on Balkans, 2008). At the end of NATO bombing, Hashim Thaci became the head of the self-proclaimed provisional government of Kosovo. The tension between LDK and Thaci interim government regained in strength and in recognition of the collaboration with NATO campaign associated with the establishment of the UNSCR 1244 regulation, KLA members were offered integration within the newly deployed Kosovo administration and the Kosovo Protection Corp (UNSCR 1244 regulation). KLA fighters were claimed as savers for most Kosovars and becoming a 'freedom' soldiers was highly valued. Therefore the disarmament and the transformation into the KPC, offered possibilities for young people to integrate public administration or security forces.

The support from NATO through KFOR and the United Nations through UNMIK greatly helped former KLA commanders to gain control over public and private business as administrative records were absent and UN guidelines was not covering economic policy (ICG Balkans Report N° 123, 19th December 2001). Up to 1999, three different civilian institutions were running in parallel, LDK led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, Thaci interim government and the UN administration. Regional administrations have rapidly been under control of the former KLA leader government, as former soldiers were already present while UN mission deployment has been slow. Following the undertaking, the cohabitation within the newly deployment governments were not ideal, Rugova's party always seen the KLA as threat for peace. In December 1999, Ibrahim Rugova, Rexhep Qosja (LBD) and Hashim Thaci (UCK) signed an agreement with UNMIK to cease parallel structures of the provisional government. From what it started as liberation people or 'people' army, the objective of the KLA was to gain political power rather than promote the democracy and encourage peaceful relations with Serbia as Rugova' objective (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001).

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[14] Democratic League of Kosovo

The disintegration of the KLA offered four main possibilities for the former soldiers. As mentioned above the KPC was the natural aspiration for re-integration into the society. However only 5000 people were to be hired under KPC organization and 2500 for the KPS, which was significantly leaving about 15 000 without direct reinsertion. The main duties of KPC members were to ensure security service for the population and facilitate restructuration of the region. KPC funds were coming from the Kosovo budget government and helped by the Western countries donations as well as Diaspora. KPC members were offered salaries between DM 170 and DM 670 which was barely offering sustainability of a family living in an urban (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001).

2.5. Political transformation in Kosovo from 1999 to 2004

The political situation in the 90s was centered around Ibrahim Rugova's LDK. However after the Dayton disappointment and the increase of armed groups (KLA and FARK) seen as dangerous but lately as liberator of the country, transformed the political situation of Kosovo. From 1997 to 1998 more than 15.000 people joined the KLA activities and the credibility of their leaders increased drastically at the eyes of the Kosovars. At the end of the hostilities in June 1999, some KLA leaders therefore found naturally their way into politics utilizing the framework from United Nations. Strong from his reputation after June 1999, Hashim Thaci established his own provisional government which last till December. Thaci's party which was claimed as KLA heritage and named as Party for the Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK) and later named as PDK. This political penetration stimulated the international community concern as it was known to be a facade of the Drenica group (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001). This group was known as the most criminal association in Balkan that has been alleged for multiple war crimes and organized crime activities in which some leaders have been judged by the Mitrovica court in 2014 (EULEX, 2014). The PDK under Thaci was known by Kosovars as being extremist in comparison with Rugova's political party. A part of those two largest parties, a third one emerged in 2000 also with a heritage from KLA background. Led by Ramush Haradinaj and named as Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), the party was founded in April 2000 and considered as radical extremist with a leader that will be later sent to The Hague court to respond allegation to war crimes during the conflict. During the first two quarters of 2000, altogether 30 Kosovo Albanian parties were active in the region, Bosniac parties were accountable with 3

delegations and Kosovo Turkish community was represented by two political parties (UNMIK, report of June 6th 2000).

At the municipal election of October 28th 2000, the first real test for political parties following the 1999 United Nation intervention, Ibrahim Rugova party surprisingly won with 58% of votes (21 municipalities). The PDK gathered 27.3% of votes (6 municipalities) and the AAK of Haradinaj claimed 7.7% of intention (UNMIK, report of 15th of December 2000).

This victory was very well received by the international community proving that Kosovars still preferred a moderated approach rather than extreme position. Some violent manifestations were predicted but nothing happened (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001)

Following the municipal elections in 2000, the two largest political parties namely, PDK and LDK continued to show resistance and opposition with each other. The large victory of the LDK brought massive frustration for the PDK and led to impossibility to find a common agreement on the co-governance. This strengthened the need to use a third party such as the international community as a mediator between the two parties. The United Nations established following the 1999 intervention, the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) and the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government has been a subject of fracture within the political environment, while the LDK and AAK demonstrated support for the document, PDK expressed opposition to the nature of the provisional institution. The Framework established parliamentary election for November 2001. LDK party won a large majority with 46.29%, followed by the PDK with 25.54%, 10.96% went to the newly established Kosovo Serb Political entity and 7.82% was claimed for the AAK (Legislative elections in Kosovo, 2001). After several month of deadlock situation, an agreement was found on February 28th 2002 by the three main political parties to form a coalition government where Bajram Rexhepi from PDK was elected as Prime Minister. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova was appointed President of Kosovo with four ministries going to his party, two ministries to both PDK and AAK and finally one ministry for Kosovo Serb party (KP) and non-Serb minority community (UNMIK, report of 22nd of April 2002). This first multi-ethnical government showed a good step towards recognition of minorities but did not remove the residual tensions between

Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb members. On July 4th, Kosovo Serb members walked out from the assembly after ignorance from the President of the Assembly.

The second municipal elections were held on 26th October 2002, showed some changes in the political landscape. LDK received 46% of votes keeping 11 municipalities and a plurality in 8 (against 22 in 2000). PDK strengthened his overall vote share to 29% compared to 27.3% from 2000 and the AAK did not win majority or plurality but improved their overall vote score. Kosovo Serb party received the largest number of votes in 5 municipalities (Council of Europe, 8 of January 2003).

On July 16th, conviction of war crimes against four former member of the KLA initiated protests from Kosovo Albanians. The growing participation of the Kosovo Serbs into politics of Northern territories (Mitrovica) and the weaker relation between NATO/KFOR and KPC members created tension. Many murders have been reported during the year 2003 largely against Serb minorities. The international community continued to roll out the hand over to the Provisional Institution of responsibilities concluded in the Constitutional framework. The economic situation of Kosovo was very linked with the Political stability as the unemployment rate was still very high. UNMIK objective was to privatize former socialistic owned enterprises at the number of 400 in order to bring investment, growth and employment. However the international community failed in this regards. This strategic failure deeply poisoned the public opinion towards UN, NATO and specially the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), in charge of privatization process. This loss of trust from Albanian communities associated with the growing charges against former KLA members plus the expansion of the Serbian parallel structure within the area inhabited by Serbs, created hatred in Kosovo Albanian mind towards international community. Many arrests or suspension of former KLA members servicing as KPC leaders or personals, occurred in 2003 and early 2004. This was perceived by the Albanian communities as an attack on the legitimacy of the resistance and fights of 1998-1999. The arrest of the Prizren KPC commander Selim Krasniqi and several other officers by KFOR forces during a Kosovo Parliament event kicked off a heavy demonstration by KLA veterans across the region (ICG, 2004).

The peak of violence happened in March 2004 when assault and attacks occurred from Kosovo Albanian on Kosovo Serbs minorities following a tragic incident where couple Albanian kids have drawn in a river near a Serb house. This spark rapidly spread

all over the country and rebellion from Kosovo Albanian ignited. These two days riots were symbolized a turning point for both International community and people of Kosovo. Kosovo Politician leaders have demonstrated ambivalent point of view and used those riots for their own political objectives including the objective of independence of Kosovo and rapid transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to the Provisional Institutions. Few political leaders and other officials blamed parallel structure causes for the riots rather than accused an Kosovo Albanian actions towards Serb minorities. Albanian political leaders did apology to UN officials on behalf of the population and publicly issues letters to Kosovars that what happened was not acceptable. However apologies towards Serb minorities have never been mentioned by politicians. Some officials among municipalities may have also encouraged the violence during the course of the event (UNMIK, report of April 2004).

2.6. Political situation from 2004

This downturn in the history of post conflict Kosovo stability brought a lot of questions from the international community on how to proceed. The parliamentary election of October 2004 ran smoothly and even though the AAK won only 8.4% of vote, a coalition was formulated with the LDK and the assembly elected Ramush Haradinaj as prime minister. The PDK won 28.9% (30 seats) of the vote and the LDK 45.4%. (47 seats). Even though Haradinaj was known as a strong KLA fighter, he was evaluated as successful prime minister. However an international arrest warrant on May 8th 2005 stopped his mandate and he was replaced by his deputy Bajram Kosumi until March 2006 (Historical Dictionary of Kosovo, 2001, page 28).

On January 2006, Dr. Rugova died and was replaced few weeks after by Fatmir Sejdiu (LDK party). On May 1st, Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi resigned and was replaced by the former KLA commander Agim Ceku (AAK), the assembly also elected a new Assembly President Kolë Berisha (UNIAMK[15], report of June 2006).

In 2007, the political situation of Kosovo has seen a shuffle of the Assembly in favor of the PDK led by Hashim Thaci, indeed the PDK won the election with 34.3% giving them the majority. Early 2007 the LDK party suffered from a split in the party when one of his leader Nexhat Daci established his own party (LDD). This major

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[15] United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

separation led to a 22.6% in favor of the LDK during the parliamentary election, the LDD gathered 10%, the Alliance for a New Kosovo (AKR) 12.3% and the AAK 9.6%. The coalition between the LDK and the PDK ended with the nomination by President Sejdiu of Hashim Thaci as Prime minister. The latter became officially Prime minister on January 9th and led Kosovo to the Declaration of Independence on February 17th 2008. Following this declaration, most of the city of Northern Kosovo administratively controlled by Serbs minorities, organized a boycott. On June 15[th,] Kosovo Assembly adopted the "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo" with implementation of their own anthem and creation of embassies within states recognizing the independence (UNIAMK, report of July 2008).

Since the declaration of independence, the Kosovo authorities increased their opposition to fulfill the Resolution 1244 (1999), stating that passed the Declaration of Independence and adoption of the new Constitution, this Resolution is no longer relevant. The KPC has also been transformed into the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as envisaged by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo and was formed with 2,500 members lightly armed. The end of 2008 has seen also the reform of the UNMIK into the EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) which is the largest civilian mission under the European Security and Defense policy. Its final staff target was around 1,900 internationals and 1,100 local staff and including approximately 1,400 international police officers.

The municipalities' elections of November 2009 were the first ones completely organized by the Republic of Kosovo, though the Kosovo Serbs mostly boycott the vote, 23,000 observers including 600 international observers monitored the election. The main parties PDK and LDK slightly improved their support while the AAK saw its supports doubled (UNIAMK, report of January 2010).

On September 27th 2010, President Sejdiu resigned from his position after a Constitutional Court verdict stating that he was holding both the Presidency and the LDK leadership which is against the UNSCR 1244. This event associated with a maneuver from the Hashim Thaci to privatize the telecom operator without the LDK's consent led to decision of the acting president (Jakup Krasniqi) to dissolve the assembly and organize extraordinary election on 12th December (European parliament, Observation delegation, January 27th 2011). After massive complains claiming vote

manipulation, many recount and re vote activities took place in some municipalities. Certified results on 7th February 2011 showed PDK wining with 34 seats, LDK with 27 seats, Vetëvendosje with 14 seats and AAK with 12 and AKR with 8. AKR leader Behgjet Pacolli was promoted to Kosovo President and Hashim Thaci re-elected as prime minister. Early March a new political crisis hit Kosovo which void the Presidential election of the previous month, in the next weeks an agreement between the coalition government and the opposition party (LDK) elected Atifete Jahjaga (Kosovo Security Force director) as Kosovo President. Mmr Jahjaga is still the current President, in 2014 the Assembly election has been showing similar results as those of 2010.


Figure 9: Parliament Assembly elected seats

Source: Own work based on OSCE and UNMIK reports

Observation: The figure 9 clearly describes the shift in the political parties at the parliament level. The 2007 election settled a new direction as the PDK won the majority and was able to roll out their independence road map. Concerning the historic of prime ministers, table in appendix 2 emphasizes the domination of former KLA/KPC leaders at this position since 1999.

2.7. Organized crime in Kosovo

The organized crime groups have taken advantage of the past decades situation in Balkan countries. The fall of the communism and consequently the transition from totalitarian rule to democracy have often brought disorder in law enforcement, social and economic norms. This transformation process facilitate the increase of organized crime activities"In addition to that transformation, the region experienced independence wars with the former Yugoslavia regime, boosting even more the opportunity of OC groups to proliferate. The rise of cross border smuggling routes, increase need of firearms and rise of militia or paramilitary structure are key factors for promotion of the criminality (UNODC, 2008).

The disintegration of Albania finance scheme in 1997 led to massive armories looting operations and rebellion. From one day to another, Albanian became refugees, black marketers and an easy prey for the growing OC groups. The escalation of the conflict in Kosovo from 1996 to 1999 formed an excellent business growth for Albanian OC groups which could easily sell their guns and set relations with paramilitary group. The Kosovo region is situated at the epicenter between Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and becoming a key location on the so called "Balkan route" from Afghanistan to Europe through which transit opium till Turkey and then heroin to Europe. The appendix 3 describes the drug route as established by the KLA-Taliban alleged coalition.

In 2008, the UNODC estimated that 80 tons of heroines were flowing through Balkan region to reach Europe. The link between Albanian organized crime and the paramilitary groups fighting for Kosovo independence rapidly grew. The rebellion groups required funds for equipment in order to defend the Albanian cause against the Serbs. In 2000, Interpol stated that from 1993 on, Albanian drug lords massively supported the KLA actions, half of the "donation" from ethnic Albanian outside Kosovo was thought to be illegal (UNODC, Crime and its impact on Balkans, 2008). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) qualified the drug route as KLA-Taliban due to the high level of interactions between the two terrorist entities. Michael Levine, former U.S counter narcotic agent and DEA head office member mentioned in May 1999 that Interpol, Europol and every other European intelligence possessed files leading to drug syndicates associated with KLA and other Albanian gangs. Marko Nikovic, a former

vice president of the New York based International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association, stated in March 2000, that "Kosovo is set to become the cancer of Europe".

The constitution of the OC groups in Kosovo is based on hierarchal order, disciplined and group membership is exclusive. It corresponds to the "Regional Hierarchy" described in the research part. The ethnic Albanian OC groups which cover the vast majority of the criminal organization in Kosovo are based on clans with family relatives (Stojarová, 2003). Each clan governs a territory and competition among rival clans often results in bloody scenario. The KLA and FARK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo) emerged from those clans, various murders occurred during and after the conflicts on both sides. This tension was also visible within the KPC as both troops were incorporated in it after June 1999 (Heinemann-Grüder, 2001).

The ethnic Albanian OC groups are localized in three main zone, Drenica, Dukadjin and the Lab. Each of those region were controlled by the respective Drenica group, Metohija group and the group controlling the south eastern territories. According to the BIA Security Information Agency in Belgrade which published a book in 2003: *Albanian Terrorism and Organized Crime in Kosovo and Metohija.* Those three entities were known to be respectively loyal to Hashim Taci, Ramush Haradinaj and Rrustem Mustafa. The two latter have been judged for War Crime by the Hague. Others smaller clans or families covered remaining territories. The OC groups in Kosovo are operating in human trafficking, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, stolen vehicles, cigarette


Figure 10: Main 3 OC groups in Kosovo
Source: Own work based on BIA

and fuels. The Kosovo OC groups worked closely with Albanian mafia which benefited from the growth of the Balkan drug trafficking operations and was facilitating from the lack or inexistence of government institution after June 1999 (BIA, 2003).

In the appendix 4 we can see the evolution of heroin seizure in Italy transiting Albania from 2001 to 2006. Assuming that Albania and Kosovo drug trafficking was correlated due to internal agreements; we can conclude that from 1999 to 2004 the drug market across Albania, Kosovo and the surrounding regions drastically increased.

Marko Nikovic estimated that the Kosovo mafia was handling two tons per month of heroin before 1999 while this number increased between four and half and five tons by March 2000. He qualified the "Kosovo narcotics ring" has one of the hardest to identify and break as it is run by families. The initial objectives of KFOR and UNMIK were to restore social and political stability while re-integrating former paramilitary fighters into civil life. However this international presence was not meant to be an organized crime bureau with dedicated investigators. A senior NATO official reported that "Generals did not want to turn their troops into cops" (Pascali, 2001).

The human trafficking has been a major concern following the NATO intervention, the growing number of international institutions indirectly feeding the growing demand for sexual exploitations (UNODC, 2008). In the Appendix 5, we can assess the growing number of assisted women from 2000 to 2003.

Major measured/units implemented by UNMIK /KFOR to combat organized crime.

Appendix 6 describes the key institutions and department that both UNMIK and Kosovo Government EULEX implemented to combat organized. In the appendix 7 the number of seizure increased from 2009. Two interpretations can be given, either the number of heroine flowing in the region increased leading to a proportional increase of seizure. Or the newly established Kosovo drug policy efficiently improved the number of heroine seized.

2.8. EULEX road map to combat OC

EULEX issued in June 2009 a baseline report setting key actions that Kosovo institutions must follow to upgrade their capability against organized crime and corruption. The key outcomes of the study were the following:

o   Weak collaboration between Kosovo Police Border and Kosovo Customs.

EULEX found in 2009, the complete lack of coordination and strategy between the two units limiting efficiency of illicit goods movement as they establish the very first barrier to transnational crime.

o   Improve coordination between Kosovo Police Directorate against Organized Crime and KP Regional Narcotic Investigation (RNIS).

- Deploy an intelligence-led police in the next three years, to proactively tackle at regional level organized crime, corruption and cross-border crime.
- No evidence of strategic guidance for implementing a crime prevention strategy. Lack of common indicator for crime detection.
- No organizational planning for patrols, no directions given from superiors to patrol officers leaving them on their own discretion to plan their patrols.
- KP station commanders lacked in producing annual planning for communities' priorities and concern.
- Improve witness protection program.
- Low salaries of Judges, with average age above 60 years old.

2.9. Level of Safety

The level of security drastically worsens early in 1998 when the conflict escalation started to rose. The Serbian forces engaged military action to track and punish KLA. On July 1998, Serbian force launched a military and paramilitary action that leads more than 100.000 Kosovars had to leave their home. The Serbian offensive targeted the villages and backcountry areas as at that time most Kosovar paramilitary organization were operating out of urban areas. As a result, people were fleeing internally to friends, family or relatives located in cities. In contrast with 1999 where they forced to leave, the Kosovars left their by choice to ensure their own safety during 1998 events (Daalder, 2000).

The cease fire of October 1998 materialized a direct return of refugees and internally displaced people. Milosevic troops re started to track down early 1999 with cleansing action starting from February. In the course of 4 months, 800.000 people became refugees and several hundreds were internally displaced. The UNHCR made an estimation of 590.000 internally displaced people by May 13th 1999 however exact figures are difficult to capture (OSCE, 2003).

In the graph below, one can see the different steps of the conflict escalation as explained in the earlier chapter. Those steps are directly linked with the level of safety and consequently refugees' number evolution.


Figure 11: Kosovo Albanian refugees

Source: Own work based on data from the UNHCF and UNMIK reports

The graph in appendix 8, present the distribution of refugees destination and their number. According to the "Comite International de Geneve" (ICRC), the displacement of civilians is prohibited and considered as a war crime unless the security of the civilians is directly endangered or imperative military action is demanded (Convention of Geneva, Chapter 38, rule 129).

In the course of the event, this legitimate need to expel people to protect them has been a large topic of discussion for the international community. The OSCE formulated three possible objectives from the Serbian authorities: 1. Expel all Kosovo Albanian from Kosovo. 2. Reduce number of Kosovo Albanian to keep control over the minorities. 3. Clear out areas where the KLA/FARK were known to be present and supported in order to protect civilians from crossfire and fighting. The OSCE verification mission performed a lot of interviews among Kosovo Albanian refugees camp that converged towards the direction of ethnic cleansing due to the brutality and violence engaged by Serbian forces and paramilitary units forcing spontaneous departure within minutes sometimes burning houses. Some cases were reported where Kosovo Serb police was actively supporting and helping Albanian (OSCE, 2003).

Following the end of the NATO intervention and the rapid return of Kosovo Albanian, the level of safety for ethnic Albania drastically improved. However, in regions where mix between ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serbs were present, a new movement of violence and harassment occurred. Even among ethnic Albanian populations, persons of mixed ethnic, persons who refused to join KLA units, persons who criticized the self-proclaimed government (led by Thaci) were targeted for persecution. Following the disarmament of the KLA, many KPC members have been arrested by KFOR forces for wrongdoing activities such as tortures, forcing confessing under threat, beating or killing (UNHCF, March 2000).

The histogram in appendix 10 refers to officially reported crimes but it was expected that many have not been reported due to fear of reprisal or/and poor expectation that positive result will occur from the jurisdiction (UNHCF, March 2000). KFOR forces were not equipped nor deployed to perform civilian policing using small patrols, this opened doors to free violence during the firsts months following June 1999 (Under orders, 2001, p. 467). Provisional district court was established between June and September 1999. However as we can see in the appendix 11, the efficiency and the

capacity to bring a fair judgment often lacked. Persecution of judges with threat to death often occurred in that post conflict period as well as a lack of motivation to sentence crime against minorities. Along the year 2000, UNMIK and KFOR implemented a special brigade so called Political Violence Task Force consisting of patrols or personal protection for targeted individuals. However during the course of 2000, the Ambassador Vucikevic house (Republic of Yugoslavia) was bombed by extremists. One senior representative of the LDK party (Xhemajl Mustafa) was murdered in central Pristina on November 23th 2000 with reluctance of the local population to help assisting identification of suspect were noted by UNMIK. Earlier in June, Halil Dreshaj, another LDK leader was murdered in front of his family by two gunmen wearing UCK uniforms. Later on April 24th 2001, Ismet Raci (senior LDK official) was murdered in his apartment (O'neill, 2002). Several others murders touching directly LDK party or former FARK leaders occurred in the following years (many of them were established as witness for Ramush Haradinaj trial in The Hague). The witness protection has been an issue since the end of the Kosovo conflict, the trial of Haradinaj demonstrated this lack of protection where 34 out of 100 witness were allowed to conceal their identities. (New York Times, 2011)

From October to December 2000, UNMIK police and KFOR arrested 38 Kosovo Albanian alleged for weapons, women and drugs trafficking (UNMIK report, December 2000).


Figure 12: Weapons seized by KFOR from May to September 2001
Source: Own work based on data UNMIK, report of October 2001

In the following years, the freedom of movement for ethnic Serbs was largely restricted forcing KFOR and UNMIK forces to escort convoys. Those convoys were

very often attacked by extremists and the general level of safety for Kosovo Serbs as well as UNMIK and KFOR officers drastically deteriorated. From 2001 to 2004 riots, each UNMIK reports indicated an increase number of attacks against the international presence, each arrest of former KLA members convicted for war crime or criminal activities were publicly announced and followed by demonstration until the large escalation exploded in March 2004 riots. In 2003 UNMIK claimed an alarming increase of radicalization with extremist or criminal elements inside the KPC leading to internal 16 discipline sanctions. In the same reported period, 68 members of KPC voluntarily left the corps stating that they will not comply with the KPC Disciplinary code (UNMIK report, October 2003).

The Kosovo Police Service has increased his responsibilities since its establishment in 1999, UNMIK police handed over to the KPS police stations till 2006, year where border gates were also handed over to KPS forces (UNMIK report, November 2006). In the EULEX report of 2012, the Kosovo Police was accountable with 8,500 members including 13% of minorities. The Kosovo Police has deployed a good practice for general public safety and security. However the northern territories still sees parallel security structures weakening the entire stability. The appendix 7 shows the number of drug seizure from 2008 to 2012 with a steady increased quantity. This shows that efficiency within the Kosovo Police has improved.

The appendix 9 summarizes the overall conflict phases from 1995 till Kosovo independence. The level of safety is directly linked with the intensity of the conflicts phases. The Kosovo ethnic demography in 2005 in presented in appendix 12.

2.10. SWOT analysis

SWOT analysis 1: KPC members and their connection with OC

Strength	Weakness
Strong local population support for former KLA fighters and KPC members	KPC members did not benefit from a high salaries forcing them to look for alternatives
Strong link with former KLA members which migrated to criminal activities after June 99	Easily corrupted
KPC members were controlling borders specially in region of strong KLA support	Strong nationalism
Weak UN and KFOR actions against OC from 1999 to 2002	No clear visibility on Kosovo independence until 2006 making ethnic Albanian nervous and frustrated
Weak prosecution from local judges against ethnic Albanian	Inter OC group conflict
Strong kinship among ethnic Albanian families making difficult for criminal investigation	Violent behavior

Opportunities	Threat
Increase income considerably	International community putting pressure on Kosovo government to clear OC threat if EU integration is wished
Continue to destabilize social and security order to enlarge illegal trades within and outside the countries and grow revenue	KFOR and UNMIK increase efforts against OC and corruption since 2002
Corrupt more and more KPC or KPS members to increase trades	OC groups activities increase leading to a decrease of level of safety
Political support from former KLA leaders PDK and AAK parties	Trust and engagement from international community disappearance
Possibility to support and help local people (Kosovo Albanians) Human trafficking increase demand from 1999 because of international presence (sexual demand)	State Economy decrease
War in Macedonia and the growing conflict in Northern Kosovo demanded weapons	Albanian drug lords asking former KLA member for payback
Balkan drug trafficking increase	LDK party opposition

Observation: As we saw in the thesis, former KLA/KPC members had an undisputable support from the local population. The evident financial support from illegal activities during the war set numbers of connection between KLA and Albanian and Kosovo Albanian organized crime. That support has been given under conditions, we can assume those conditions being either direct help or indirect via corruption. Following the KLA demilitarization, end of 1999, part of the former freedom fighters integrated the KPC ranks. With salary between 170 and 670 Deutsche Mark, KPC members were sometimes pushed to find alternatives to sustain their families. Meanwhile the organized crime activities have seen new opportunities to grow through increase of drug demand, weapons trade for the Macedonia war and human trafficking. The ambiguous status of the Kosovo politicians from PDK and AAK parties also could have motivated KPC members to step inside illegal activities as "protected or even mentored" by Kosovar elites. The various murders of the LDK leaders reinforce that leadership participation into opposition repression. As we saw in the various sources, the combat against organized crime was not the top priority for the KFOR and UNMIK in the first years, openings doors to OC activities and consequently increasing attraction and solicitation for KPC members.

If we use that SWOT analysis to build a worst case scenario, it would start with an overall increase in decision to take part of OC activities. Political leaders would lose control over the OC groups and inter-groups conflicts would start rising. If NATO and UN would not engage further resources, transnational criminality would therefore jump leading to a general decrease of level of safety and political stability. International community would gradually lose confidence in the government and military intervention might pop up driving a conflict escalation, internal displacement of people or even refugees and eventually war.

On the other hand, if we look at the other scenario which tends to bring peace and stability. It would begin with an active and strong investigation against OC groups; this "hunt" would generate number of pushback and frustration from ethnic Albanian as we saw during the years 2001 to 2004 (until riots) due to the strong kinship among them. Therefore the international community would have to play a major role here in tracking down criminals (including political leaders if indicated) while helping promoting and training new Albanian and minorities leaders and setting strong security action plan as well as long term vision for independence. Level of safety would stabilize

and then increased, confidence will be gained from international community as trustful partner for EU integration.

SWOT analysis 2: KPC members and their insertion into politics

Strength	Weakness
Seen as liberator for majority of Kosovo Albanian bringing them strong trust from locals	Recognized by international community as fighters not politicians, lacking experience in politics
Political support from former KLA leaders PDK and AAK parties	Deterioration of relations between KPC and KFOR leading to mistrust
Knowledge of illegal activities network Connection with Albanian OC	Promoting nationalism rather than equal rights among each minorities
Trust and help from other countries which support and recognize the Republic of Kosovo	Easily corrupted
	Distrust of other countries which don't recognize Kosovo as independent
Connection with Albanian politics	
Intervention of NATO and collaboration creating favorable environment for KLA leaders to move politics	Continuing connections with ethnic Albanian fighters in Macedonia and Southern Serbia
Opportunities	**Threat**
Engage in Politics and deploy the Great Albania vision	War crime sentence from The Hague criminal court for certain KLA leaders
Lead the region towards complete independence	Risk of civil war and separation of northern territories due to majority of non-Ethnic Albanian population supporting Ethnic Serbs
Stabilize the political situation and set favorable security and economic performance to integrate European Union	Low salaries can cause proliferation of OC and create disorder
Strong knowledge of OC groups activities and network, helping then to provide efficient investigation or control	Fighting against OC group can lead to personal security issue (see attacks against LDK party leaders)
Build strong synergies between police and politics	Nationalism increase on the ethnically Serb inhabited areas

Observation: The penetration of former KLA/KC members into the politics following 1999 NATO intervention has been exponentially increasing. As mentioned in the previous SWOT, former fighters benefited from strong public support and their insertion became completely natural. This second SWOT has the objective to roll out the decision making process of former KPC members to enter politics. Apart of local support, former KLA/KPC members have a strong knowledge for criminal networks, to some extend we have seen that interconnection between KLA and OC activities has been present. This understanding of OC network make them very efficient to limit or eradicate them assuming that they do not benefit in kind through corruption. KLA leaders also benefited from NATO support as they directly help with on ground operation during 1999 bombing. The political objectives of KLA for independence and Greater Albania vision associated with the multiple assassinations after 1999 of some LDK leaders as well as attempt to murder Dr. Rugova set a fragile relation with KFOR and mistrust from the international community. However event of March 2004 showed the necessity of integrating former paramilitary leaders for the political stability of the region. The collaboration with NATO created a favorable environment for this insertion as KLA members were placed as allied to the intervention, not supporting them would directly discredit what NATO and UN have done. This has been the background of the post conflict period up to now. Any allegation against the Kosovo leaders would directly be translated as a direct mistake done in 1998/1999, we can therefore argue on the verdict pronounced by The Hague criminal court on few cases.

There are therefore opposite scenario that can be extracted from this SWOT. The first one is made of assumption that political leaders are not supporting OC activities and that corruption does not impact drastically reforms. In that regards, measures against OC would be determined and their implementation efficient. Dialogue among minorities would be facilitated at the government level and fight against OC activities will be transparent through membership with INTERPOL for instance. Security and political stability will be enhanced and foreign investors will start investing. As the economy would grow, EU integration would be facilitated.

On the other hand, if political leaders are directing their attitudes towards nationalism and the concept of Greater Albania, a seizure within the region would appear. The northern territories inhabited by Ethnic Serb would fall into nationalism as well, due to government rejection.

3. SUGGESTING PART

3.1. Integration path to EU

In 2012, EULEX issued a technical feasibility regarding the integration of Kosovo within the European Union. Even though some improvement in terms of consolidation of democratic institutions and rule of law has been done, there is still a long way to fit inside EU requirements. The 2010-2011 election demonstrated a clear lack of maturity in that regards forcing a recount and cancellation of certain polling stations. The 2014 elections were handled showing progress in that regards.

3.2. Organized crime and corruption

The biggest gap refers to fight against organized crime and corruption, if Kosovars are willing to enter the Union they must clearly step up in their implementation process and show efficiency and impartiality of Kosovo judiciary system. In this study we could see that few high ranking political leaders were alleged to support or take part of illegal activities, however nearly never the prosecution led to sentence. The protectorate from United Nation and NATO for certain leaders have created a shield for a "just" prosecution. The complete lack of protection for witnesses is also at the center of the reform that Kosovo must undertake if Kosovo government wants to show credibility to EU. Weapons trafficking, human being trafficking and drugs represent still a large threat for the region and must be addressed. Therefore it could be suggested that a delegation of criminal experts from European Union specialized in Balkans OC activities have free cards to launch investigations within the country, the Kosovo government will therefore show transparency which is clearly missing from actual status. This investigation might lead to high ranking public officers due to previous mentioned allegations and sentences and condemnation must be clearly set. This might bring some turbulence into the local population still supporting former KLA/KPC members who moved to OC activities. However, if Kosovo is to enter into the Union, transparent investigation must be applied.

3.3. Dialogue with Belgrade

The northern territories of Kosovo inhabited by ethnic Serbs still represent today a seizure in both public administration and law enforcement. The level of safety has improved but integration of minorities continues to be an issue in that region. Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina have occurred in past years, on Friday 19th April 2013, both Serbia and Kosovo prime ministers agreed on the normalization of relations which represent a step forward the EU integration, this agreement mainly cover the Kosovo Police organization in northern region of Kosovo. This political agreement needs to be turned into concreate and legal measures. Some ministers such as Hashim Thaci are still under warrant in Serbia for war crimes, if a common objective for both countries is to integrate European Union, efforts must be done in that regards. Following the previous paragraph, never official regulation and constructive approach will be set if Serbia see Kosovo leaders as criminal. In that regards, EU should use indirect pressure on Serbian government to temporary freeze those accusation until the international court takes measure to investigate them.

3.4. Recognition of Republic of Kosovo

The integration with the European Union cannot be granted if some of his members do not recognized Kosovo as a legal Republic. For instance, Spain, Slovakia and Greece do not recognize the unilateral declaration of Independence. This fracture among EU members will have to be solved if Kosovo is to integrate EU one day.

3.5. Cooperation towards INTERPOL

In the progress towards Organized Crime and Terrorism fight, I suggest that Kosovo takes as a road map all actions needed to enter INTERPOL. That integration will foster cooperation between each member on transnational crime and help combatting OC activities within Kosovo region. This International Police organization gather today 190 countries members, contributing to the establishment of the world largest police database and tools. The INTERPOL standards must be fulfilled and directly integrated as a mandatory membership needed for EU integration. This will prove Kosovo effort to fight effectively against crime prevention as a long term objective. The membership application must be handed over to the Secretary General by the Kosovo government.

Membership decision is voted by the General Assembly and must gather two-thirds of the majority. If Kosovo is to enter INTERPOL, they will have to appoint a dedicated a National Central Bureau (NCB) which will ensure: liaison between the different department of the region, liaison with other NCB, liaison with the Organization's General Secretariat (INTERPOL convention, article 4 and 7).

INTERPOL has several expertise's in criminality prevention. Their data management system provides country members with direct access 24/7 on criminal's details, fingerprints, DNA profiles, stolen documents (travel or administrative documents). At the demand of countries members, a staff specialized crime officers can bring assistant to national police investigation and capacity building and training course are completely integrated within the organization. Kosovo could therefore gain the help from key crime experts to prosecute perpetrators. The effective Border Management system created by INTERPOL will enhance the Kosovo customs police to better identify fake identity, stolen vehicles and all other illicit goods. At a geographic level, the biggest benefit would come from the surrounding countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monte Negro and Serbia as they are already members of INTERPOL. This will therefore create solid police network collaboration as transnational crime represents the vast majority of the OC activities.

3.6. Preventing proliferation of OC activities through economy

As it was analyzed through the SWOT analysis, a key factor of former KPC members to support or take part of OC activities relates to either low salary or at a regional level, unemployment rate. Kosovo has therefore to improve his attractiveness for foreign Business investors, the rule of law and political stability is a key factor for external investors to secure business expansion in the region. Kosovo has one of the largest reserves of minerals of Europe compare to its surface. In our global economy and technology race, minerals present in Kosovo such as coal, lead, zinc, silver and chromium represent a terrific business opportunity. My suggestion is therefore to facilitate dialogue between international technology companies and mining industrials and to elaborate extracting possibility across the region. The mining industries will therefore generate income tax and fill the state's treasury. Public institution will consequently be able to offer new positions in security and law enforcement. As a direct consequence, international relations will expand and global technology companies might be interested to invent in some facilities close by to limit transportations cost. However to prove and secure external investment, Kosovo must implement clear and transparent metrics to quantify corruption and level of safety.


Figure 13: Stability through economy cycle

Source: Own work

4. CONCLUSION

Proliferation of the Balkan drug route, human and weapons trafficking associated with the weak political stability following the NATO intervention stimulated temptation for KPC members to increase their income. KFOR and UNMIK focused until 2002 on re-establishing administration and governmental institutions to stabilize the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. As we saw in this study, the objective of the international community for the years following the end of the war was not to primary fight against organized crime. KFOR forces were not equipped and trained to engage street fighting and UNMIK police took time to train and deploy investigators. As many sources stated, the patriotism of the ethnic Albanian after the war was such that motivation to track Albanian ethnic OC groups was low, leading to a growing criminal activities within the region. The ambiguous status of the political leaders of PDK and AAK and their direct or indirect link with illegal activities promoted the deterioration of the level of safety for minorities as shown during the 2004 riots.

Fight against organized crime became top priority for UN in 2003, which leads to intense training period for the Kosovo Police Service, many arrests occurred that year and questions regarding KPC members rose. The SWOT analysis presented in the last section of the thesis present the position of KPC members and the process of decision making when it comes to fully or partially engage in illegal activities. The strong kinship among ethnic Albanian and the deep roots of organized crime within lead families across the region has been the hardest barrier for UNMIK until the partial handover of civil police institutions in 2006. Numbers of anti-OC units have been created from UNMIK after 2002 but the results lacked to appear due to the increasing wish from the population to gain independence and the growing mistrust from locals towards the international community. The year 2004 will set a turn in Kosovo's road to independency with massive riots directed against Serbs minority and international presence. This period of radicalization saw also changes in the political environment where former political parties led by former KLA leaders increased their vote share during the following municipal and legislative elections. Even though those leaders never condemned rioters for these anti-ethnically Serb actions, they demonstrated a strong influence and ability to control the conflict de-escalation. This concluded that former KLA fighters and KPC members prove to politically

stabilize the region due to their strong support and trust from the population. This statement has been confirmed by the 2007 election where the PDK took the majority at the parliament.

The independency of Kosovo was proclaimed in 2008 following the parliament election and most of the UNMIK institutions were handed over to the newly established Republic. The level of safety within the region has been a major concern since 1999 due to the constant ethnical hate between ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serbs population. United Nation handed over the administration supervision to EULEX end of 2008 which is still active today. KPC has been transformed into KSF early 2009 in agreement with UN road map. Allegation concerning organized crime participation for Kosovo political leaders such as Hashim Thaci or Ramush Haradinaj is still on the press today. We have showed in the thesis that former KLA/KPC members and leaders carried with them a very strong and essential support from the population. The second SWOT analysis showed that KLA/KPC leaders are essential to stabilize the country as long as they actively fight against any kind of criminality. The members who leaked to criminal activities have been and will be a threat against the level of safety and political stability of the region. Those persons must be judged and sentenced and to do so witnesses shall be protected accordingly. The political vacuum created after 1999 allowed numbers of nationalist parties to freely enter the political scene and high level ranking positions in law enforcement. Looking at the prime ministers history from 1999, it is obvious that former KLA/KPC leaders have strongly influenced the course of the political evolution. The legislative election of 2007 saw Thaci's party PDK gained the majority of seats at the assembly, leading to the Independence of Kosovo few weeks after. The nationalism among certain political parties must be controlled and limited as this could be a starting point for a new conflict escalation.

The Kosovo has set an objective to enter European Union, however drastic improvement are needed to fit in EU regulation in terms of safety level, corruption and administration. To limit organized crime and corruption while promoting political stability, Kosovo should give clear transparency to the international community as it comes to prevention against organized crime. The main thesis suggestion is built around the necessity for Kosovo to enter INTERPOL organization so that international prosecutors can directly interfere with Kosovo intelligence units to combat organized crime and have clear transparency. The INTERPOL organization will boost interactions

between countries members, helping Kosovo law enforcement to improve their efficiency in the track and identification of criminals. Another thesis could be focused on the direct and indirect social and macro-economic benefits that Kosovo would gain through INTERPOL membership.

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
Appendix 7: Graph of quantity of heroine seized in Kosovo

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Appendix 1*: Map of Greater Albania*

Source: Makedonian Press Agency, 1999

Prime minister of Kosovo	Period	Party	Background
Hashim Thaci (self-proclaimed)	Apr 99 –Feb 00	PDK	KLA spokesman
Bajram Rexhepi	Mar 02 – Dec 04	PDK	KLA doctor
Ramush Haradinaj	Dec 04 – Mar 05	AAK	KLA region commander. KPC deputy commander
Bajram Kosumi	Mar 05- Mar 06	AAK	KLA supporter
Agim Çeku	Mar 08 – Jan 08	AAK	KLA/KPC general commander
Hashim Thaçi	Jan 08 – Dec 04	PDK	KLA spokesman

Appendix 2: *Kosovo Prime Ministry from 1999*

Source: Own work based on UNMIK and OSCE reports

Sources: NNICC; DEA; UN; *EIR*.

Appendix 3*: 'KLA-Taliban' Drug Route to Europe*

Source: NNICC; DEA; UN; EIR

Appendix 4: Quantity of heroin seized in Italia and transiting through Albania

Data extracted from UNODC report from 2008

Appendix 5: Number of trafficked women assisted by IOM

Data extracted from UNODC report from 2008

Appendix 6: Institutions to combat Organized Crime

Source: Own work based on EULEX and UNMIK reports

Appendix 7: Quantity of heroine seized in Kosovo
Source: Kosovo Police, 2012

Appendix 8: Country of destination for refugees in 1999

Source: Own work based on *Data coming from Refugees, volume 3,*

number 116, 1999, UNHCF

Intensity of the conflict

1990 1995 Sept 98 Mar 99 Jun 99 Mar 04 Feb 08

FRY
KLA emergence

NATO
Bombing

UNMIK
KFOR
KPC
KPS

EULEX
KSF
KP

Conflict latent

Conflict emergence

1st phase of escalation

2nd phase of escalation

De-escalation

Conflict emergence

3th escalation

Peace building

Dayton agreement

Cease fire accepted by Milosevic and KLA

Conflict escalation after Rambouillet NON signature

More than 800.000 refugees 500.000 ID persons

12th June, end of bombing

Riot of March 2004

Kosovo Independence

Appendix 9: *Kosovo Conflict phases*

Source: Own work based on literature analysis

**Appendix 10***: Type of crime for the period June 1999 to February 2000*

Source: own work based on data from UNHCF report from March 2000

Appendix 11*: Judiciary process results from June 1999 to January 2000*

Source: own work based on data from UNHCF report from March 2000

Appendix 12: *Ethnicity of Kosovo in 2005*

Source: http://en.academic.ru/pictures/enwiki/75/Kosovo_ethnic_2005.pn