

MENDEL UNIVERSITY IN BRNO

Faculty of Regional Development and
International Studies

**The Radicalisation of Muslims
in the United Kingdom**

Bachelor Thesis

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Declaration

I declare that I carried out this bachelor thesis on the theme “Radicalisation of Muslims in the United Kingdom.” individually under the guidance of Mgr. Martin Hrabálek, Ph.D., and only with the cited sources, literature and other professional sources of information mentioned in the enclosed list.

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In Brno, 2016

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Lucie Vajdová

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I would like to thank to my supervisor Mgr. Martin Hrabálek, Ph.D., for his valuable advice, assistance and very useful recommendations while writing this bachelor thesis.

Abstract

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This bachelor thesis deals with radicalisation of Muslims in the UK. The aim is to map current state of radicalisation of Muslims in the UK, with specific focus on British radical groups, strategy and initiatives of Britons in the process of de-radicalization. The theoretical part is focused on the identification of potential causes of the radicalisation process and on the characteristic profile of radicals, more emphasis is given to an examination of the role of the internet in radicalisation. Attention has been paid to statistical demographic data, dynamics and the subject of the British Muslim population based on the Census data of 2011. The practical part of the thesis is devoted to a description of British radical groups and their influence in the UK. The final chapter discusses the Contest strategy, preventive initiatives and targeted individualised intervention to counter radicalisation in the UK.

Keywords: UK, radicalisation, Muslims, deradicalisation

Abstrakt

VAJDOVÁ, Lucie. *Radikalizace muslimů ve Velké Británii*. Bakalářská práce. Brno, 2016

Má bakalářská práce se zabývá radikalizací muslimů ve Velké Británii. Cílem práce je zmapovat současný stav radikalizace muslimů ve Velké Británii, se zaměřením na britské radikální skupiny, dále britskou strategii a iniciativy vedoucí k procesu deradikalizace. Teoretická část zkoumá potencionální příčiny radikalizace a popisuje charakteristický profil radikála. Dále je kladen důraz na prozkoumání role internetu v radikalizaci. Pozornost směřuje také na demografická data, dynamiku a problémy populace britských muslimů získané z posledního sčítání lidu v roce 2011. Praktická část se věnuje popisu britských radikálních skupin a jejich vlivu ve Velké Británii. Poslední kapitola představuje britskou strategii Contest, preventivní iniciativy a cílenou individuální intervenci vedoucí k odvrácení radikalizace ve Velké Británii.

Klíčová slova: Velká Británie, radikalizace, muslimové, deradikalizace

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1 INTRODUCTION

Why do some young Muslims become attracted to radical Islamism and perpetrate or directly support violence? The question has been at the centre of worldwide academic and public debate, mainly thanks to attacks of militant Islamist groups. Even though it has been more than ten years since the London bombings on 7th July 2005, attacks have been carried out in several other countries in more recent years.

As a result of terrorist attacks in the European cities of Madrid, London, Paris and Brussels and the growing migration of Muslims, great attention has been given to Muslim communities living in Europe in terms of immigration, integration, problems of security and the growth of radicalism. The presence of various forms of violence throughout the continent and current scrutiny of Muslim communities is the reason why I have chosen the radicalisation of Muslims in the United Kingdom as a topic for my bachelor thesis. Nowadays, the theme is very relevant and thought-provoking that is another reason why I have found it very satisfying to deal with the phenomena of radicalisation.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to map current state of radicalisation of Muslims in the UK, with specific focus on British radical groups and strategies and initiatives of Britons in the process of de-radicalization. Also, it seeks to provide an overview to the causes of radicalisation and the role of the internet in it and examine the characteristic profile of a radical.

Considering the structure of the thesis, the introductory theoretic chapter discusses the current state of research into theories of radicalisation, dealing with terminology, it defines terms such as radicalisation and radical. Great attention had been placed on causes of radicalisation and how scholars explain its sources. In my thesis, three theoretic concepts of considering radicalisation from the perspective of French sociologists, social movement theory and an empiricist approach are mentioned. Furthermore, this chapter brings findings about characteristics and the roles of radicals in groups, focusing on online radicalisation and the media as well. Additionally, the chapter also covers Anglo-Saxon and European policy approaches and difference in dealing with cognitive radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation. In following parts, I discuss three academic models of radicalisation: the staircase, pyramid and the model of jihadi-Salafi Ideology. Also,

strategies to prevent and counter radicalisation are introduced, dividing programmes into general preventive initiatives and targeted individualised interventions.

The practical part is divided into two subdivisions, first concerning the demographic profile of British Muslims and the dynamics of British Muslim population supported by tables and interpreted from the Census data of 2011. It also shows the survey's findings, results of public-opinion poll and interviews concerning Islamophobia and the issues facing the Muslim community with a specific focus on young Muslims in UK.

The second part represents the core of my thesis, the case study of radicalisation of Muslims in the UK. In this part, attention is paid to the role of British radical groups and its form sub grouped into non – political religious group, religious and political groups and non-religious political group. The chapter explains the central role of British radical groups in the process of an individual's radicalisation. Non-political religious groups as Deobandi, the Tablighi Jamaat and Salafism are typified, then Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun, The Saviour (Saved) Sect and Al Ghurabaa, Ahlus Sunnah wal Jammah, The Muslim Association of Britain and alleged Jamaat-e-Islami affiliates which belongs to religious and political organization are well discussed too. In addition, the Stop the War Coalition is highlighted as a non-religious political organisation.

Finally, the section on radicalisation prevention and deradicalisation introduces the British counter-radicalisation CONTEST strategy and its distinct part Prevent with concrete functional means of prevention. The specific focus of the chapter emphasises the counter-radicalisation process. Concrete forms of preventive tools and projects such as Channel, Radical Middle Way and Operation Nicole are covered in detail. Moreover, prevention of children and youth and strategy of Muslim community engagement plays a key role in the process according to cited authors.

The final chapters come with answers to the research questions of my thesis, and conclude the achieved results, showing limitations, discussion points and suggesting future research in this field.

2 AIM AND METHODOLOGY

The aim of my bachelor thesis is to map the current state of radicalisation of Muslims in the UK, with specific focus on British radical groups and strategies and initiatives of Britons in the process of de-radicalization. Also, it seeks to provide an overview to the causes of radicalisation and the role of the internet in it and examine the characteristic profile of a radical.

Attention has been given to statistical demographic data of British Muslim population based on the Census data of 2011.

I established the following research questions:

- What is the situation of radicalisation in UK?
- What are the causes of processes of radicalisation in the UK?
- What are the British strategy and policy initiatives counter to radicalisation?

The bachelor thesis utilises data, figures and tables cited in scientific articles, academic journals, and studies, chapters of books, official British reports and British press articles. The qualitative nature of the theoretical thesis is conducted with valid and reliable knowledge implemented with a combination of synthetic and analytical approaches in methodology.

3 LITERATURE RESEARCH

3.1 Terminology

Prior to the writing of this thesis, it was essential to understand basic terms which pervade the whole work: radicalisation.

According to Neumann (2013:873), until the early 2000s barely any references to the idea of radicalisation could be found in the academic writings and till nowadays the phenomenon lacks an exact agreed definition. More thoroughly, the rise to prominence of the term became linked, with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

The term *radical* is derived from the Latin word *radix*, which means root. Indeed, in the last decades' debate about the root causes of political violence and terrorism the term is ubiquitous.

Radicalisation describes the distinctiveness of human beings against conventional views, the process of formation of opinions recognised by major societies as extreme, preceded acceptance of a fundamentalist approach to religious faith and adoption of militant Islamism. However, not all radicals inflict violent or terrorist actions. (Stehlík, 2015).

The British government's definition states that "*Radicalisation refers to the process by which people come to support, and in some cases to participate in terrorism*". (The United Kingdom's strategy for countering terrorism, 2011: 36)

Accordingly, as working definition, Mandel (2009: 111) submits the following term. "*Radicalisation refers to an increase in and/or reinforcing extremism in the thinking, sentiments, and/or behaviour of individuals and/or groups of individuals.*"

Based on definition of Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010:798) we can understand radicalisation as growing willingness to follow and support extensive changes that struggle with, or put a direct threat to, the existing order in society. Violent radicalisation is thus understood as process accompanied by the growth of a radical's desire to directly support or involve themselves in violent actions. Additionally, the author defines a radical as an individual possessing a deep-felt desire for fundamental socio-political changes.

3. 2 Theory of Radicalisation

3. 2. 1 Causes of radicalisation

Authors Rachel Briggs and Jonathan Birdwell (2009:15) state that many theories have been offered about the drivers of radicalisation, however they are not universal and never prove the rule. Therefore, the authors propose factors called radicalising agents based on their case studies of terrorist plots in the UK, which are frequently present across different cases although they are not necessarily causal factors, as for example: key places, charismatic leaders, relationship links, experiences and stated and assumed grievances.

The approach of French sociology towards radicalisation is represented by Gilles Kepel, Farhad Khosrokhavar, and Olivier Roy who point out the significance of sociological factors such as a dismissal of traditional community and lost identity in the process of radicalisation which prevails mainly among second and third generation Muslim immigrants. Thus, Farhad Khosrokhavar and Olivier Roy develop a dual identity theory, which refers to the uncertainty of Muslims between Western and national identity and two sets of norms. According to their opinion, radical groups can offer substitute identity, a feeling of community and belonging (Goerzig, Al – Hashimi, 2015:19).

Quintan Wiktorowicz and Marc Sageman belong to those scholars inspired by social movement theory or network theory. Emphasis is placed on transmitting radical ideas through personal relationships and social interactions and social networks group. Thus, it is assumed that personal bonds and peer pressure reinforce violent radicalisation and the recruitment process (Wiktorowicz 2004:24). Moreover, it is claimed that anti-civilian radicalisation is the output of three variables stated as; indiscriminate repression by the state, exclusive organisations created by insurgents and anti-system organisations promoted by rebels to motivate others towards collective action (Hafez 2004:38 in Wiktorowicz).

To find a single key reason for grievance, which is the sole cause of radicalisation leading to militant Islamism according to socio-psychologist theory was unsuccessful. Mental disorders such as anxiety and depressive symptoms, low socio-political status and other adverse life events showed no association with sympathy for violent acts and were excluded as the root of radicalisation. According to a cross-sectional survey of a

representative population sample of Muslim heritage in two English cities the risk factors of vulnerability to violent radicalisation are youth under twenty, those in full time education rather than employment, born in the UK, those speaking English and with higher incomes (Bhui, Warfa 2014).

Empiricists Sloodman and Tillie (2006:84-94) outline three major driving forces in radicalisation. At first, for some Muslims, radicalisation appears to result from a need for meaning and stability, secondly, it appears as a need for commitment and acceptance, and thirdly as a need for justice. Authors also indicate the importance of the influence from surroundings, as for example the role of the peer group, leader or a family member, isolation and access to the internet as key factors in the violent radicalisation process.

Aly and Striegher (2012: 849-852) examine the validity of the Jihadi- Salafi, model which is explained in the chapter of models of radicalisation, in a case study of home-grown terrorism and elaborates the role of religion (specifically Islam) in the radicalisation process which is, according to the counter-terrorism approach of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, a key factor why individuals become radicalized to extremist violence as well as the factor of vulnerability to radicalisation among Muslims. However, the authors' findings show a far less significant role of religion as the driver of violent extremism than Silber and Bhatt's model proposed, also it brought new insight to the pre-radicalisation phase which presumes a Muslim predisposition to radicalisation. Authors differentiate secular factors in radicalisation associated with the political, economic or social context of the occurrence of radicalisation and religious factors.

Authors of the jihadi – Salafi model also focus on the importance of online radicalisation. With the explanation that in the Self-Identification phase the Internet serves as source of information about an extreme interpretation of Islam during the Indoctrination phase, the cyber world accelerates the process of the legitimatisation of beliefs and commitment through the extremist websites and chat rooms and create a path to Jihadisation in which people are encouraged to action and the Internet serves as a tactical resource for instruction on potential targets (Silber and Bhatt 2007:37).

The think – tank Evropské hodnoty (Stehlík, 2015) produces similar findings in which militant Islamism is widely spread through social networks and the internet, in the case of European Muslims radicalisation is an output of shared social networks and Islamist ideology. Therefore, anti-terrorist and anti-radicalisation strategies should focus on Islamist ideology and Islamist social networks. The spread of alternative narrative between persons prone to radicalisation should be effective instrument in the fight against extremism.

On the other hand, British scholars Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2009:107 - 109) presume that the British community has connected the term radicalisation with an Islamic ideology since the July 2005 London bombings. The authors understand radicalisation as a myth created by the media and security policymakers in order to present a news agenda and legitimise responses to danger. Moreover, the authors point out the importance of precise contextualization of the term in official pronouncements. Although, the internet has been given a greater focus within media and political debates of radicalisation, differences between online and offline radicalisation make little sense.

3. 2. 2 Characteristics of a radical

Any deprived, victimised or endangered community produce members with certain ways of expressing their frustration. We can address injustices through official channels, or feel powerless and apathetic, protest in the streets or resort to violence in the form of riots and street fighting up to armed insurgency and terrorism. Nevertheless, we shall not put all Muslims under suspicion as there would be an automatic decline from frustration to violence and an interchangeability between the words *violent extremist* and *radical*. However, the authors suggest that even though there is not a clear division line, violent extremists are always radicals, but radicals are rarely violent (Briggs, Fieschi, 2006:16 - 17).

Scholar influenced by social movement theory, Edwin Bakker (2006:45 - 51) came up with the following list of common characteristics of Jihadi terrorists; they are mostly residents of European countries, originally from the group of second and third generation migrants, born and raised in Europe or living for more than ten years in a European

country. Europeans who have been radicalised and involved in attacks are well – integrated and educated individuals without socio-economic deprivation.

The Center for Security Studies in its Analysis in Security Policy (Vidino, 2013:1) share similar findings, stated that the first European jihadist networks had been established by the first - generation immigrants and asylum-seekers since the 1990s and nowadays most militants are so- called home-grown second- or third- generation European Muslims and also converts residing in Europe whose radicalisation process began independently by al- Qaida's affiliates.

Peter Nesser represents the empiricist approach which points to individual factors such as needs or inclinations as the drivers of radicalisation. The author identifies different personality types and roles of activists within radical group, which are driven by a wide variety of motives. A typical terrorist cell includes an entrepreneur, his protégé, misfits and drifters. *“The entrepreneur and the protégé are often religiously devout idealists who appear to join through intellectual processes and appear to be driven mainly by political grievances and a call for social justice”* (Bokhari et al., 2004: 11).

The entrepreneurial leader has the key role in recruitment behind radicalisation. The misfits appear to join cells to deal with personal problems or a troublesome past, whereas the drifters appear to join the group through their social networks for a variety of reasons. Moreover, Nesser determines that we cannot characterise and identify a single socio-economic profile of radicalised members.

3. 2. 3 The Anglo - Saxon and European approach

Anglo-Saxons separate cognitive radicalisation, which they finds as legitimate and from behavioural radicalisation that emphasises extremist behaviour, mainly through acts of terrorism and violence. The source of this approach is a belief in freedom of speech even allowing expressions of anti- democratic and extreme political views and also free expression of lifestyles and religious practises. Moreover, there is no need for government intervention until the law is broken. As a result, Neumann claims that non-violent extremists do not represent any political threat, on the contrary, free society must tolerate a degree of extremism (Neumann, 2013: 885 - 888).

Moreover, the author presumes that the European approach is influenced by the left or the right extremist movements which gained power in the first half of the twentieth century. It places more emphasis on cognitive radicalisation that emphasises extremist beliefs with the presumption that extremist ideas could potentially be seen as dangerous and leading to extremist violence. Therefore, the promotion of democracy and citizenship as well as challenging extremist ideas is perceived as the correct strategy to counter radicalisation according to Europeans.

3.3 Model of radicalisation

In the following chapter, we discuss three academic models of radicalisation Fathali Moghaddam's the staircase, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko's the pyramid and Silber and Bhatt's model of jihadi-Salafi Ideology.

3.3.1 The Staircase to the Terrorist Act

For better understanding of the psychological process which leads to terrorism, Moghaddam (2005: 167-168) developed a metaphor for the process of violent radicalisation, which refers to the "Staircase to Terrorism". Moreover, through the author's explanation it is suggested that the foundation of policy implementation to fight terrorism is prevention, which is made possible by supporting contextualised democracy on the ground floor through procedural justice, promotion of inter-objectivity and education against categorical us-versus-them thinking. By achieving this, there will be minimal motivation for individuals to climb to the final floor on a narrowing staircase of five successive levels and commit a terrorist act.




Figure 1. Moghaddam's Staircase to the Terrorist Act

Source: Own layout based on Moghaddam (2005)

3.3.2 The Pyramid model of political radicalisation

Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalkenko, authors of radicalisation in a pyramid model distinguish twelve mechanisms, as means of moving people towards political radicalisation and terrorism at individual, group, and mass levels. According to the McCauley and Moskalkenko (2008:2) “*Radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the ingroup* “. More so, we can imagine the wide base of pyramid composed of numerous sympathisers with the goals of terrorists and terrorists themselves as the apex of a pyramid with increased radicalisation of beliefs, feelings, and behaviour.

Table 1. Pathways to violence: Mechanism, of political radicalisation at individual, group, and mass-public level.

Level	Mechanism
Individual	1. Personal victimisation
Group	2. Political grievance
	3. Joining a radical group – the slippery slope
	4. Joining a radical group – the power of love
	5. Extremity shift in like – minded groups
Mass	6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat
	7. Competition for the same base of support
	8. Competition with state power – condensation
	9. Within – group competition – fissioning
	10. Jujitsu politics
	11. Hate
	12. Martyrdom

Source: Own layout based on McCauley and Moskalkenko (2008)

3. 3. 3 Model of jihadi-Salafi Ideology

The radicalisation process derived from the New York Police Department's (NYPD), proposed by Silber and Bhatt (2007:19-20) is composed of four linear distinct-phases: pre- radicalisation, self-identification; indoctrination; and jihadisation. Individuals do not inevitably pass through all specific stages on the way to the terrorist act. Authors who surveyed five homegrown terrorism cases in Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Australia and Canada recognised the importance of different venues as for example mosques, cafes, student associations, prisons, hostels and the Internet to which they refer as radicalisation incubators.

3.4 Counter - radicalisation

According to Vidino (2013:1) in reaction to the European jihadist networks and militants attacks, countries improved counter – terrorism measures, increased international cooperation and introduced controversial counter-radicalisation initiatives in order to prevent the radicalisation of young European Muslims and de-radicalise or disengage militants. The UK launched the first Prevent strategy in 2003 and in 2005 the European Union encouraged member states to adopt their own measures at the local level by the launch of a counter-radicalisation strategy.

Counter-radicalisation programmes could be divided into two categories, general preventive initiatives with the aim to make the target group of Muslim youth less vulnerable and more resilient to radical ideas. The second category represent more preferable targeted individualised interventions aimed to detect potential cases of radicalisation through a variety of measures, to assess and disengage radicals, usually through the designation of a mentor (Vidino, 2013:3).

Table 2. Measures for radicalisation prevention and de-radicalisation

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police and intelligence measures • Targeted interventions, deradicalisation programmes • Community policy, confidence-building measures • Combating violent ideologies • Combating non-violent religious fundamentalism • Projects for promotion of interreligious dialog and tolerance • Mentoring programmes, employment programmes 	 <p>Counterterrorism (specific)</p>
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Source: Own layout based on Vidino (2013)

The EU Strategy on combating radicalisation and recruitment establishes that “*addressing the challenge is beyond the power of governments alone*” and there are seven specific themes which should be addressed by trans-national projects according to commission programme for the prevention of and the response to violent radicalisation (The European Commission, 2007:4).

- *Projects aimed at competence building for professionals (for example, teachers, social welfare workers, policy advisors, civil servants, police, prisons staff etc.), spokespersons, spiritual/political leaders and youth organisations in understanding and dealing with manifestations of violent radicalisation;*
- *Projects aimed at enhancing knowledge, particularly among youth (including within schools), on variations and interpretations regarding Islam and identity, and at raising awareness on the nature of violent radicalisation;*
- *Projects aimed at devising/promoting effective channels for addressing (perceived or real) grievances as well as alternative routes for people who show sympathy or demonstrate support for terrorism;*
- *Projects aimed at improving engagement with spiritual/political leaders in order to enhance and support their potential role in the prevention of and response to violent radicalisation;*
- *Projects aimed at facilitating cross-cultural dialogue between media professionals to support the positive role the media can play in countering violent radicalisation;*
- *Projects aimed at empowering voices that counter terrorist rhetoric, particularly through the challenging of arguments that justify the use of terrorism;*
- *Projects aimed at monitoring recruitment and grooming of terrorists over the internet.*

According to Roy (2008:8 -10) it is possible to assume the existence of different roots of radicalisation, hence the disunity of policy and strategies in process of de-radicalisation. Firstly, the author represents his findings on the presumption that Al Qaida is a revolutionary organisation with a precise religious ideology, whose recruits are driven by its objective to collapse the current regimes in the Middle East and substitute them with a Caliphate established on sharia law. According to this approach, de – radicalisation is not possible without solving the political grievances and making improvements to the political

environment in the centre of the radicalisation, meaning the whole region of the Middle East.

On the other hand, Olivier Roy adds to the sense of presumption that the goal of de-territorialized Al Qaida's violence is not ideological as described above, rather that it represents the commitment to a global struggle against the dominant world power. Thus, the recruit's action involves extensive political activism also in the non - Muslim community, which explains the high occurrence of converts being radicalised. The first step in the de- radicalisation policy is to separate territorialised and nationalist conflicts from supra-national jihadism and then focus on the reasons for youth to join the global jihad and put an end to Al Qaida's narrative (Roy, 2008).

4 DEMOGRAPHIC DETAIL OF BRITISH MUSLIMS

4. 1 British Muslim communities

According to Census in England and Wales, the Muslim population has increased from 1.55 million in 2001 to 2.71 million in 2011, from which 47.2% of Muslims are born in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Very nationally diverse Muslim communities form the largest religion group after Christians. To compare, the median age of the Muslim population is 25 years, the overall population median age is 40 years. More, 33% of the Muslim population was at the age of 15 or under, 8.1% of all school-age children (5 to 15 age group) are Muslim and only 4% of Muslims was 65 years +. Also, 76% of Muslims live in four regions; the inner city conurbations of Greater London, West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire and the Humber. (The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015).

4. 2 Issues of Muslim community and youth

The demographic sources of population change are births, deaths and the net impact of immigration and emigration. Therefore, immigration of young Muslims into the United Kingdom makes the ethnic group of the Muslim population grow. The adults are usually at the age to start families, which results in a growing child population. Other factors which influence the younger age structure are traditions of larger families and higher fertility rate. To conclude, the population of those who migrated will grow as the number of births exceed the number of deaths (Simpson, 2013).

As the author Mazer (2008) suggests, the British government focuses on the basis of terrorism as marginalisation in Britain. Nevertheless the importance of oxygenation in the process of radicalisation among British Muslims, and the noteworthy role of North Africans in it, is neglected. Oxygenation here denotes the method in which Pakistani, North African, Middle Eastern and recent radical converts come together in locations such as North London and involve themselves in cultural and political exchanges, which enable the distribution and development of radical Islamist theology/ideology as well as the creation of not always apparent ideological, economic and tactical support networks.

Additionally, oxygenation helps in placing injustice at the forefront of the immigration policy and plays a role in the explanation and creation of common injustices and grievances. To be more concrete, the interaction between groups of North Africans, individuals from the Middle East and Muslim Asians with dissimilar ability sets enables potential tactical transnational/transglobal networks as well as exchanges of manpower and material. Nowadays, the oxygenation is no longer geographically dependent, rather we can view it as *virtual oxygenation*, based on internet exchanges (Mazer 2008:563).

According to the survey's findings which had been conducted by Muslim groups, since 9/11 80% of Muslim respondents reported being subjected to Islamophobia, 68% felt themselves to be treated differently, and 32% reported that they were the subject of discrimination at a UK airport. Also, young Muslim men are seen as a cultural threat to the British way of life and dangerous individuals with a capacity for violence and terrorism (Bunglawala et al. 2004 in Briggs and Birdwell 2009:5).

A public – opinion poll taken after September 2011 reported an identity crisis in British society where 26% of population saw Islam as a threat to Western values (Travis 2001 in Fetzer, Soper 2003:255). On the other hand, the serious anti-Muslim political rhetoric after the London bombings did not materialise in the UK for the reason that Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and other political figures diffused any anti-Muslim backlash and stopped using the phrase *war on terror* rather than talking about a *Muslim problem* and Muslim leaders condemned the attacks directly (Briggs, Birdwell 2009 in Murshed, Pavan 2011:271). Considering Islamic worship, 80% of British Muslims attend the mosque regularly, the London survey shows that there are more people attending mosques regularly than attending a Christian church (Pew Forum 2005 in Murshed, Pavan 2011:270).

Authors Abbas and Siddique (2012: 119- 130) carried out a study based on in-depth interviews with sample of 30 South Asian Muslim origin men and women of different classes, ethnicities, genders and aged 18-25 from across the multi-ethnic post-industrial city of Birmingham, to discuss issues of radicalisation, political participation and the spiritual leadership of Muslim community and its impact on British Muslims between 2005 - 2007.

The authors' thought-provoking finding used physical appearance through the wearing of the Hijab, beards and caps worn by young Muslims as a resistance strategy against anti-Muslim rhetoric. Additionally, groups such as Hizb-ut-Thahir give support, provide unity and attract young people who feel alienated in increasing Islamophobia in the media, prevailing racism, the negative impact of geopolitical issues and social exclusion. It was found that young Muslims have difficulty to find a middle path because of the lack of opportunities and structures within wider British society, therefore they are captured by radical political groups. Whereas, most mosques do not offer a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah for younger generations, most imams are unable to respond to the demands and challenges of the British Muslim youth because of language and cultural barriers.

The negative impact on some young men have been as a result of factors of socio-economic and cultural exclusion. The nature of radicalism in Britain is said to be more a function of socio-economic, political and criminological factors than Islam itself. Important acts such as effective political participation and representation are seen as a possible solution of how to challenge violent extremism (Abbas, Siddique, 2012).

4. 3 Muslims in numbers

Table 3. Religion in the 2011 Census

Religion	Total Population	%
Christian	33,243,175	59.3
Muslim	2,706,066	4.8
Hindu	816,633	1.5
Sikh	423,158	0.8
Jewish	263,346	0.5
Buddhist	247,743	0.4

Source: own layout, The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015

Table 4. Country of Birth of Muslim Population in the 2011 Census

Country of Birth	2011	%
United Kingdom	1,278,283	47.2
Republic of Ireland	3,677	0.1
Other Europe	162,292	6.0
Africa	275,812	10.2
Middle East & Asia	977,037	36.1
The Americas & the Caribbean	7,991	0.3
Antarctica & Oceania	966	

Source: own layout, The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015

Table 5. Muslim Population in Cities with Largest Muslim Population in the Census 2011

City	2011	%
London	1,012,823	12.4
Birmingham	234,411	21.8
Bradford	129,041	24.7
Manchester	79,496	15.8

Source: own layout, The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015

Table 6. Muslim Population Age Profile in the Census 2011

Age Group	All 2011	Muslims 2011	Muslim as % of Overall Muslim Population	Muslims as % of All population
0 - 4	3,496,750	317,952	11.7	9.1
5 – 15	7,082,382	577,185	21.3	8.1
16 – 24	6,658,636	414,245	15.3	6.2
25 – 64	29,615,071	1,289,858	47.7	4.4
65+	9,223,073	106,826	3.9	1.2
All	56,075,912	2,706,066	100	4.8

Source: own layout, The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015

Table 7. Ethnicity of Muslim Population in the Census 2011

Ethnic Group	2011	%
White	210,620	7.8
British	77,272	2.9
Irish	1,914	0.1
Other White	131,434	4.9
Mixed Ethnic Group	102,582	3.8
White and Black Caribbean	5,384	0.2
White and Black African	15,681	0.6
White and Asian	49,689	1.8
Other Mixed	31,828	1.2
Asian/Asian British	1,830,560	67.6
Indian	197,161	7.3
Pakistani	1,028,459	38.0
Bangladeshi	402,428	14.9
Chinese	8,027	0.3
Other Asian	194,485	7.2
All Black/ Black British	272,015	10.1
Black Caribbean	7,345	0.3
Black African	207,201	7.7
Other Black	57,469	2.1
Other	290,289	10.7
Arab	178,195	6.6
Any other ethnic group	112,094	4.1
All	2,706,066	-

Source: own layout, The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015

5 RADICALISATION OF MUSLIMS IN THE UK

5. 1 Role of radical groups and movements in the UK

Organisations or movements have central roles in the process of an individual's indoctrination into fundamental beliefs and the legitimacy of violence. Authors Briggs and Birdwell (2009:17) divide Muslim organisations into three categories: non – political religious group, religious and political groups and non-religious political group, nevertheless the boundaries between categories are often crossed.

5. 1. 1 Non-political religious groups

Based on Hamid, (2008) British Muslim communities imported four major theological and ideological trends into the UK with the arrival of South Asian settlers in the 1960s and 1970s. The largest number of followers come from the Barelwi tradition, Deobandi, Jamaat-I Islam inspired institutions and Ahl-i-Hadith network (Salafi or Wahhabi).

Deobandi

An Indo-Pakistani reformist movement within Sunni Islam, the name is derived from Dar al-Ulum of Deoband school founded in 1867 to preserve the teaching of the faith during non –Muslim British rule in India (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam). The essence of Deobandi teaching is embodied in beliefs and practises of the founding generations of Islam's pious forebears and Prophetic traditions. The Deobandi apolitical stance and strong ideological slant of sectarianism has shaped the Tablighi Jamaat, and radical jihadists of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Tayob, Niehaus 2011:87 -89).

Daobandi is dominant in British Islam, where the need for leadership and imams increased as the number of Mosques increased and in 1975 the first madrasa was established in a village Holcombe near Bury called the Dar al-Ulum al-Arabiyyah al-Islamiyyah (Bury Madrasa). The second madrasa Jami'at Ta'lim al-Islam (Dewsbury Madrasa) was established in 1981 by the Taglighi Jamaat, both are considered as the 'Oxbridge' of the traditional madrasa world (Mahmood, 2012).

The Tablighi Jamaat

The Tablighi Jamaat (Group for Preaching) movement was established in India in 1927 practiced the Deobandi form of Islam, designed as an apolitical, pietistic organization with the aim to send missionaries across the globe to bring unruly Muslims back to more orthodox practises of Islam. Moreover, the mass transnational movement is decentralised and recognised as the largest Muslim movement in the world, meeting annually in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

The estimated number of TJ followers (Tablighis) is more than 70 million, mostly of South Asian origin, operating in 150 countries and serving as conduit for Islamist extremist and cover for jihadist potential recruits, who intersect with radical Islamism in Pakistan receiving their initial training there often accompanied by the military training of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or Harkat -ul-Mujahideen. TJ is connected with many terrorist plots: plot to bomb airliners from London to the United States in August 2006, the attempted bombings in London and Glasgow July 2007 and terrorists Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shahzad Tanweer - leading members of the cell responsible for July 7, 2005 London Underground bombings, who come over to radical Islam from TJ. As a result of the high number of South Asian Muslims in the UK, TJ operates in many mosques, having Markazi Mosque in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire as the group's European headquarter (Burton, Stewart 2008).

Salafism (Saudi Wahhabism)

Salafism organised under Markaz Jamiat Ahl-i-Hadith is based on scriptural literalism, oneness of God and loyalty to the Prophetic Muhammad's example in belief and religious ritual. Membership to such religious multi-ethnic, supranational organisations creates shared meaning, identity and friendship networks important for young people in the community. In the middle 1990s Salafism became an alternate religious paradigm established through mosques, networks, publications, media and available literature on the Internet. (Hamid, 2008: 10 -11).

According to Hamid, the instrumental organisation for spread of Salafism in the UK was the Jamiyyat Ihya Minhaj as Sunnah, “The Society for the Revival of the Prophetic Way” (JIMAS) with leader Manwar Ali, also known as Abu Muntasir, father of Salafi dawah (proselytising) in the UK for his spread of Salafism among young people in mosques, community centres and universities in 1980s. Nowadays, British Salafism is much diversified and no longer recognised as a single movement. Key institutions are Green Lane Mosque in Birmingham, Salafi Institute, Masjid Ibn Taymiyyah in Brixton and the Islamic Centre of Luton.

More, Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005: 207- 208) differentiates the Salafi movement according to contextual interpretation into three major factions: the non-violent purists, the politicians and violent extremist called jihadist. Although all Salafis share united religious creed, there is significant difference over the assessment of contemporary issues regarding politics and violence, including figures as Osama bin Laden, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia, al – Qaeda group and the Taliban.

5. 1. 2 Religious and political organization

Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party)

The radical Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Liberation Party operates freely in the UK, however it is banned in many countries including Germany, Russia, China and Egypt. The pan-Islamist movement, accused of being a conveyor belt towards terrorism, was founded in 1953 by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in Jerusalem as a radical Sunni group, operating in almost 50 countries with the aim of the restoration of the caliphate, ruled by one leader and governed by Sharia law. The HT group in the UK was founded in 1986 by Omar Bakri Muhammad, in the mid-1990s recruited university students on campuses, once described by the National Union of Students as the single biggest extremist threat in the UK. Also, the British Prime Minister David Cameron first called for HT to be banned in 2007, following the pattern of Tony Blair in 2005 (The Week, 2015).

Al-Muhajiroun, The Saviour (Saved) Sect and Al Ghurabaa

Al-Muhajiroun, the extremist Islamist group, was founded by Omar Bakri Mohammed in 1996 and disbanded in 2004 and split into two separate groups, The Saviour Sect and Al Ghurabaa (The Strangers). Bakri is well known for his praising 9/11 hijackers at the Magnificent 19 conference in 2002. In 2009, the organisation re-launched itself as mutation Islam4UK however it was proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 in 2010. There is evidence of violence with members found guilty of inciting or founding terrorism (Raymond, 2010: 3 – 7). In 2014 government banned three aliases for the extremist organization AM as mutation Need4Khalifah, the Shariah Project and the Islamic Dawah Association (BBC News 2014).

Ahlus Sunnah wal Jammah (ASWJ)

Adherent to the Sunnah and the community is an Islamic organisation founded in the UK in 2005 by Sulyaman Keeler and ex-leaders of AM, calling the Queen an enemy of Islam. The group operates through an invitation-only Internet forum as the successor to the Al-Muhajiroun (BBC News 2005).

The Muslim Association of Britain

As it is mentioned on official website, the MAB was formed in 1997 as British Muslim non-profit organisation with 11 branches in Britain, dedicated to promote the accepted understanding of Islam and encourage Muslims to participate actively in the British society. MAB, the campaign group is well known for their Anti-war activities as Stop the War Coalition (StWC) and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and participation in protest opposing the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Since 2005 The Muslim Association of Britain runs the Finsbury Park Mosque, which was since 1997 connected with Islamist extremism of radical cleric Moustafa Kamel (Abu Hamza) until his arrest in May 2004 (Casciani, Sakr, 2006).

As London editor Andrew Gilliga (2015) claims the Muslim Brotherhood's, which aims to replace secular democratic government with Islamic caliphate under sharia law, main declared British affiliate is recognised as the MAB.

In 2015, MAB's vice president, Mohammed Kozbar said that marginalising and criminalising young British Muslims pushed them more toward extremists such as Islamic State, urged the government to acknowledge that British foreign policy remains the root of radicalism (Crowcroft, 2015).

Alleged Jamaat-e-Islami affiliates

British Muslim organisations including Young Muslims UK, the Islamic Society of Britain, the Islamic Foundation and the Muslim Welfare House are claimed to be inspired by Jamaat-e-Islami Islamist political party in Pakistan or with Islamist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (Bright 2006:25).

5. 1. 3 Non-religious political organization

Stop the War Coalition

StWC informally Stop the War was founded in 21 September 2001 following 9/11 attacks and Bush and Blair's War on Terror. StWC is dedicated to prevent and end the wars declared by the United States and its allies against terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lybia and others as well as support Palestinian rights, civil rights, opposing racism and Islamophobia and opposing bombing of Syria in 2013 (Stop the War Coalition, 2013).

Therefore, they call on a world-wide affiliation of organisations and non- Muslim and Muslim individuals to join, attracting all generations to work together for a common goal. Moreover, StWC use non-violent forms of political activism, initiate campaigns, conferences, public meeting across country and organise national demonstrations, including the largest public demonstration in British history on 15 February 2003 in conjunction with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the MAB when two million people opposed the Iraq war in London's streets (Jeffery, 2003).

5. 2 Radicalisation prevention and deradicalisation

A fundamental duty of government is to ensure the national security of the country and its people. The UK government's decision on continuing protection investment involves them purchasing cutting-edge military and new defence capabilities, strong domestic security, robust cyber defences and achieving a global reach. According to the Policy paper 2015, the Ministry of Defence will invest 11 billion pounds on innovation and new capabilities in defence and security, it represents 2% government spending of GDP on defence. The Home Office as the ministerial department which leads on immigration and passports, drugs policy, crime policy and counter-terrorism will make 500 million pounds of new investment to UK's core counter-terrorism capabilities to protect UK citizens from terrorist threats and counter the ideologies that feed terrorist and extremism (Spending Review and Autumn Statement, 2015).

5. 2. 1 CONTEST strategy

CONTEST, is a counter-terror four-pronged strategy aiming to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism. It was first introduced by the Blair-led Labour Government in 2003, updated in 2006 and again in 2011 by the Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government as CONTEST III which identified *non-violent extremism* as crucial to the radicalisation process (Coppock, McGovern:244).

The Contest strategy with its distinct parts (prevent the terrorism, pursue the terrorists, protect the public, prepare the public) was first released to the public in 2006. Prevent as the first prong, is dedicated to prevention of terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals (Huq, 2010:51).

There is an evident shift in how radicalisation is considered between the three published versions of CONTEST, the focus was first put on extremist ideologies later to the campus organisations and then to contemporary online dynamics (Kelly, 2013:395). Four strands are presented as PREVENT, which we discuss in the next chapter, PURSUE, which deals with detection, investigation and the prosecution of terrorism, PROTECT, which addresses the protection of infrastructure, crowded places and the transport system and PREPARE which is concerned with strengthening the response of emergency services (Home Office 2009a, 13).

5. 2. 2 Prevent

As a response to 7/7 when four bombs exploded in London in 2005, an attack carried out by four British-born Muslim youths, killing 52 people and leaving hundreds injured and subsequent terror plots, local authorities were given function to strengthen communities through the UK via a government agenda called Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) under the *Prevent* strand which highlights the radicalisation problem, as a component of the CONTEST British government's counter-terrorism strategy.

The Home Office and Communities and Local Government are accountable for *Prevent* aiming to prevent radicalisation of people to become or support terrorists or violent extremists, more to challenge, disrupt, support individuals, and address the grievances. The specific interest of government are mosque capacity, faith leaders and to develop the resilience of communities to violent extremism and also programs on issue of identity and cultural values (Abbas, Siddique 2012: 121).

The focus of Prevent work is based on the risks to national security from Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups. However, the new strategy applies to all forms of terrorism including extreme right-wing terrorism. The strategy allocates resources on the basis of risk, activity of terrorist organisations and sympathisers and reflects a judgment on the groups which intend to cause harm. Therefore, there is no connection between the funding of counter-terrorism according to numbers of Muslims living within a specific local authority.

Moreover, the strategy regards counter internet usage as vital to disrupting terrorist use of the internet and to address radicalisation and terrorism online. There is no funding provided to extremist organisation as well as no intention to use extremists to deal with the risks. The Prevent strategy depends on wider Government programmes to strengthen integration, with three objectives, which reflect an understanding of the radicalisation process and key factors (HM Government 2011:39 - 41).

- *respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;*
- *prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and,*
- *work with a wide range of sectors and institutions (including education, faith, health and criminal justice) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.*

PREVENT actively tries to include and govern specific types of conduct that are understood as ‘risky’ from British Muslim communities by the deployment of numerous practises while also securitising those at risk of becoming a threat, by using knowledge about radicalization to perform counter-terrorism (Kelly, 2013:397).

However, according to Kelly there are bizarre consequences of producing the targets as both *at risk* and *risky* and Prevent deployment risk and vulnerability cannot be an acceptable transition model to terrorism. This way, the concept of vulnerability to render a linear narrative about good-Muslim-gone bad, is understood as youth can be at risk of becoming ‘risky’. The author states that the Prevent strategy does not respond to knowledge about real radicalisation processes rather it gives an impression of governing terrorism (407).

The Vulnerability Assessment Framework introduced in 2012 by the UK Home Office to assess *vulnerability to extremism* across engagement with a group, cause or ideology, intent to cause harm and capability to use harm (Coppock, McGovern:250).

5. 2. 3 Channel

“Channel will provide a focus for public sector professionals and members of the community to refer individuals of concern to a multi-agency risk assessment and case management system bringing to bear a variety of resources and expertise to counter radicalisation.” (Home Office, 2009:136).

Channel is the core element of *Prevent*, set up in 2007 and supervised by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. . The multi-agency programme represents cooperation of social workers, youth workers, health workers and teachers in assisting the local police to identify individuals, primarily targeting 15-24-year-

olds in England and Wales at risk of extremism. Individuals vulnerable to recruitment to extremism are referred for a programme of intervention and receive support including life skills, mentoring support, anger management, constructive pursuits, education skills, careers, family support, health awareness, housing support, drugs and alcohol awareness (Coppock, McGovern: 245-246).

5. 2. 4 Prevention of children and youth

Learning Together to Be Safe: a toolkit to help schools to contribute to the prevention of violent extremism is the official policy guidance that emphasizes the importance of working with the children and young people, to raise awareness and provide information what makes a child or young person vulnerable to extremism and radicalisation and provide advice on managing risks. There are five strands set up as to understand extremist narrative, prevent harm to pupils, support vulnerable individuals, increase the resilience of pupils and school communities and explore grievances (Department for Children, Schools and Families 2008:5-8).

5. 2. 5 Strategy of Muslim community engagement

After the London bombings, the British government responded in terms of importance of Muslim community's engagement with the launch of the initiative made by the Home Office called *Preventing Extremism Together* (PET) to combat extremism and its causes. However, attempts to engage Muslims in the policy-making process have been disapproved of as being rushed, government-led, and involving few individuals from the mainstream Muslim community.

The Demos think tank came up with four reasons for putting communities at the centre of the counter-terrorism. Firstly, communities represent important sources of information and intelligence; functioning as our own early warning system. Secondly, the function of the community as self-policing society characterised by pre-emptive actions to divert own young people from extremism. Third, communities are leaders in tackling problems that create grievances or hamper the capability to organise. Finally, the police and Security Service act with the active consent of the Muslim community, not through force.

Research by Demos shows principles underpinned in a community-based approach in counter-terrorism strategy by the government need to be locally based, recognising and responding to the differences within the Muslim community as essential part for designing different types of intervention and policies enabling all communities to participate in the strategy. Also, an understanding of the central role of faith in responses to home-grown terrorism, enhancing partnership with group such as Salafis and working with religion-based organisations is a necessary requirement for the government and security forces. A transparent and accountable policy-making process, government's responding to grievances of Muslim are also key factors in ensuring a robust policy (Briggs, Fieschi, 2006:58-63).

The authors' six-pronged strategy for a community-based approach to counter-terrorism aims to (Briggs, Fieschi, 2006:16):

- *enhance the lives of Muslims by tackling poverty, low attainment and discrimination*
- *strengthen community infrastructure*
- *improve leadership, both by the government and within the Muslim community*
- *open up the foreign policy-making process to greater scrutiny and provide opportunity for input from all parts of British communities*
- *divert youth from extremism*
- *put communities at the heart of counter-terrorist intervention and policing, as an integrated part rather than an add-on or an afterthought.*

5. 2. 6. Radical Middle Way

Radical Middle Way (RMW) as a British government- sponsored project brings moderate Islamic academics, credible community leaders and artists to speak to young British Muslims to meet the challenge of extremism and condemn terrorism from a theological viewpoint. To promote open, responsible and cohesive communities and moderate understanding of Islam and politics the organisation engages young Muslims with faith-inspired guidance and open debate through both on and offline channels with wide-range of audio-visual content (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014).

Moreover, RMW as not-for-profit Community Interest Company creates the platform for critical thinking and deep spiritual reflection allowing youth to connect with their faith by development of the evaluation toolkit, its pilot, delivering over 230 programmes and events in UK, and overseas including Pakistan, Sudan, Indonesia, Mali and Morocco (impacteurope).

As British conservative politician Patrick Mercer stated in The Telegraph, ministers have been criticised for spending more than £100 million in the three years on soft schemes to prevent people turning to extremism such as community projects, activities and websites to tackle extremism. More than £1.2 million of it was spent on funding the Radical Middle Way, including £54 000 on its website (Hope, 2009).

5. 2. 7. Operation Nicole

Regarding counter-radicalisation strategies, Paul Thomas (2012: 121) says “*there have been examples of creative work that Prevent police personnel on the preventative and engagement sides, rather than the intelligence sides, of the activity can achieve.*” Initiative called *Operation Nicole* and the subsequent Act Now table top simulation training exercises originally devised by Lancashire Constabulary.

Operation Nicole have been identified as model and developed by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) *Prevent* Delivery Unit (PDU) enabling professionals and predominantly Muslim community representatives develop trust-based relationships in the context of counter-terrorism, implemented in dozens of cities throughout the country. Two day training workshop for counter-terrorism officers provides insight into community concerns and impact that counter terrorism operations. Two groups participate in a role play setting based on a realistic counter terrorism incident, they are introduced to fictional situation and asked to decide on their counter-terrorism interventions based on the legislative framework, meanwhile, the group experiences the other side’s perspective during a simulated terrorism emergency (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2013).

6 CONCLUSION

“While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him.” Fyodor Dostoevsky

My first research question considered the situation of radicalisation in UK. Radicalisation remains a serious danger to the United Kingdom. Suspicion falls on a wide range of groups and dangerous individuals. Groups and movements have central roles in the process of an individual’s indoctrination into fundamental beliefs and the legitimacy of violence. In my thesis, I have discussed variety of British Muslim organisations.

The non – political religious group Tablighi Jamaat is said to be serving as conduit for Islamist extremist and cover jihadist potential recruits. The TJ having European headquarter in Dewsbury mosque and operating in many British mosques is connected with many terrorist plots and attempted bombings. It still inspires many other British Muslim organizations. Another religious and political group represented by Hizb ut-Tahrir operates freely in UK, whereas it is banned in many countries and recognize as biggest extremist threat. Therefore, British ministers call for HT to be banned.

Muslim political religious group named Al-Muhajiroun, later splitted into The Saviour Sect and Al Ghurabaa both were banned by government in 2004. The organisation re-launched itself as mutation Islam4UK however it was proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. In 2014, three aliases for the extremist organization Al Muhajiroun as mutation Need4Khalifah, the Shariah Project and the Islamic Dawah Association were also banned. Further, the position of the Muslim Association of Britain is also very controversial, sometimes recognized as British affiliate of Muslim Brotherhood.

My second research question deals with the causes of processes of radicalisation in the UK. Identification of the causes of radicalisation is difficult, there are many dissimilar approaches to explain radicalisation, however most scholars and experts agree on a concurrence of a variety of factors particular to that person. More, observed UK plots shows, that there are no universal drivers of radicalisation, it is better to speak about radicalising agents, which are frequently present but not necessarily causal factors, as for example: key places, charismatic leaders, relationship links, experiences and stated and assumed grievances.

According to the counter-terrorism approach of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, the role of religion (specifically Islam) is recognized as key factor in the radicalisation as well as the factor of vulnerability to radicalisation among Muslims. However, finding shows that differentiate secular factors in radicalisation associated with the political, economic or social context of the occurrence of radicalisation play more significant role as a driver than religious factor.

Examining the role of access to the internet in the UK radicalisation process reveals that the internet serves as tactical source of information about an extreme interpretation of Islam, accelerates the process of the legitimatisation of beliefs and commitment through the extremist websites and chat rooms and creates a path to jihadisation in which people are encouraged to action. The internet is one of radicalisation's incubators enabling the distribution and development of radical Islamist ideology in UK. That is why the Contest strategy regards counter internet usage as vital to disrupting terrorist use of the internet and to address radicalisation and terrorism online.

As it seems to be very challenging to point out one single theory of radicalisation the same difficulty can be found with a common terrorist profile. According to a survey in two British cities in 2014, youth under twenty, those in full time education rather than employment, born in the UK, those speaking English and with higher incomes are at greater risk of vulnerability to violent radicalisation. Mental disorders such as anxiety and depressive symptoms, low socio-political status were excluded as the root of radicalisation.

My last research question aimed at the British strategy and policy initiatives to counter radicalisation. The UK launched the first Prevent strategy in 2003 as a part of CONTEST, a counter-terror four-pronged strategy aiming to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism. Prevent as the first prong, aiming to prevent radicalisation of people to become or support terrorists or violent extremists. However, we are unable to elucidate when a human being makes the shift from being "at risk" to "risky" and when British radicals reach the point of becoming radicalised and complete the process of radicalisation.

I have discussed different British initiatives in my paper. First, the targeted intervention is represented by Channel which relies upon cooperation with workers in

different fields in assisting the local police to identify individuals in England and Wales at risk of extremism. Individuals vulnerable to recruitment to extremism are referred for a programme of intervention and receive support. Preventive initiative, Learning Together to Be Safe, represents a toolkit to help schools to contribute to the prevention of violent extremism, provides information what makes a child or young person vulnerable to extremism and radicalisation and offers advice on managing risks. There are also obvious limitations in assessing the effectiveness of preventive measures, because it is impossible to decide if a successful result was influenced by counter-radicalisation initiatives or other reasons.

More, strategy of Muslim community engagement points out the benefits of putting communities at the centre of the counter-terrorism. In practice, Britons use preventive initiatives called Radical Middle Way and Operation Nicole, which counts as top simulation training exercises aiming to build trust-based relations between community and authorities.

Consequently, we should rather view radicalisation as a social phenomenon which is not unified and linear. More complex processes of radicalisation can occur at different levels and there are multiple and diverse pathways and dissimilar dynamics resulting in conversion to militant Islamism. Therefore, it is necessary to research, assess and use a wide range of flexible counter-radicalisation initiatives targeted on specific groups or individuals. Moreover, we must avoid the alienation of young Muslims, encourage them to engage with the wider social group, challenge extremist speechmaking and build community resilience. Authors advise that the spread of alternative narrative between persons prone to radicalisation should be effective instrument.

Broadly speaking, violent and non-violent radicalisation will be a more or less enduring feature of our societies resulting in social, political and economic transformations.

For future research in this field it would be useful to assess the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation efforts over a period of time and examine potential partners of European authorities in counter-radicalisation processes from Muslim communities.

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