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##### *The development of relations between the European Union and the United Kingdom from 1973 to Brexit*

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**Ústav cizích jazyků**

Anglický jazyk se zaměřením na vzdělávání

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Prohlašuji, že jsem bakalářskou práci vypracoval samostatně a použil pouze uvedené prameny literatury.

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# Abstract/Annotation

The bachelor thesis will be dealing with the development of integration efforts between the United Kingdom and the European continent. Thesis is divided into five parts – Introduction to the history of the European Union, Historic background and UK reasons for joining European community in 1973, Accession of the United Kingdom to the EC, The reasons for the Eurosceptic and conservative policy towards the European Union, and Consequences of 2016 referendum on UK and development of UK and EU relations. The intention of the first two chapters is to explain in more detail the nature of European integration for a closer understanding of British Euroscepticism. The remaining three chapters thus describe the development of British membership in the European project and their approach to integration. The thesis objective will be to clarify objectively why Brexit occurred and why the British decided to leave the EU. Specifically, the fifth chapter will outline possible scenarios for future with help of data and previous Brexit phases. Due to the topicality of Brexit and its nature, it is not possible to draw unambiguous conclusions from a small number of sources and therefore all conclusions could only be applied to this work.

**Keywords:** European Union, Britain, Brexit, integration, economy, Euroscepticism, European Community, Conservative party, Labour party, European Union politics, foreign affairs, referendum.

Abstrakt/Anotace

Bakalářská práce se bude zabývat vývojem integračních snah mezi Spojeným královstvím a evropským kontinentem. Práce je rozdělena do pěti částí – Úvod do dějin Evropské unie, Historické pozadí a důvody Spojeného království pro vstup do Evropského společenství v roce 1973, Přistoupení Spojeného království k ES, Důvody euroskeptické a konzervativní politiky vůči Evropské unii a Důsledky referenda z roku 2016 a vývoji vztahů mezi Spojeným královstvím a EU. Záměrem prvních dvou kapitol je podrobněji vysvětlit podstatu evropské integrace pro podrobnější pochopení britského euroskepticismu. Zbývající tři kapitoly tak popisují vývoj britského členství v evropském projektu a jejich přístup k integraci. Cílem práce bude objektivně objasnit, proč došlo k Brexitu a z jakého důvodu se Britové rozhodli opustit Evropskou unii. Pátá kapitola se bude konkrétně věnovat možným scénářům do budoucna za pomoci dat a analýzy předchozích fází Brexitu. Vzhledem k aktuálnosti tématu a jeho povaze není možné z malého množství zdrojů vyvodit jednoznačné závěry, a proto je možné všechny závěry aplikovat pouze na tuto práci.

**Klíčová slova:** Evropská Unie, Británie, Brexit, integrace, ekonomie, euroskepticismus, evropská komunita, Konzervativní strana, Labouristická strana, Politika EU, zahraniční vztahy, referendum.

# List of abbreviations

BTO–Brussels Treaty Organisation ECR–European Conservative Party

CAP–Common Agricultural Policy EPP–European People’s Party

CEE–Central Eastern European countries UKIP–United Kingdom Independence Party

CT–Constitutional Treaty CFP–Common Fishery Policy

EC–European Communities ERDF–European regional development fund

ECB­–European Central Bank FGR–Federal Republic of Germany

EEC–European Economic Community IAR–International Authority for the Ruhr

EFTA–European Free Trade Area BSE–Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

EMS­–European Monetary System

EMU–European Monetary Union

ERM–European Exchange Rate Mechanism

FTA–Free Trade Area

ECJ–European Court of Justice

EDC–European Defence Community

ECSC–European Coal and Steel Community

ERDF–European Regional Development Fund

IGC–Intergovernmental Conference

SEA–Single European Act

TEU–Treaty on European Union

QMV–Qualified Majority Voting

WEU–Western European Union

OECD–Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OEEC–Organisation for European Economic Cooperation

UNRRA–United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

# Introduction

The aim of my bachelor thesis is to focus on the historical development of relations between Europe and the United Kingdom. The analysis of this development will include the historical period of European integration and how far it has come in the twentieth century. Based on progress and the relationship between the European Community and the United Kingdom since 1973, an analysis will be outlined. In this analysis, emphasis will be placed on critical moments between newly formed partners within the community. The intention will be to describe this relationship and explain the individual approaches of the prime ministers until 2016 when the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union. The conclusion of the work will be devoted to the evaluation of data on Brexit. The thesis should converge to answer the hypothesis of whether Brexit was truly beneficial for the British on political and economic level.

To achieve these results, several books will be used to analyse the development of UK-EU relations, but especially the political journal Foreign Affairs that provide exceptional preview with various interpretations. Subsequently, also books that analyse economic development or process data about Brexit. Additional sources will be survey portals such as Eurobarometer and YouGov.

British membership in the European project has been very problematic from the very beginning. Both sides have gone through critical stages, such as the negotiations on the CAP, Fontainebleau and, in the short past, the Euro crisis. Nevertheless, relations between the two entities did not improve much during the time of British membership. Britain undoubtedly belongs to the European project because it has built it itself for several decades and is therefore an integral part of it, regardless of the Eurosceptic moods of the British. Shortly after the referendum, the current Prime Minister Boris Johnson drew attention to this fact himself:

*"I think the opposite is true. We cannot turn our backs on Europe. We are part of Europe."[[1]](#footnote-1)*

# Introduction to the history of the European Union

This chapter will deal with the historical period before the establishment of the European Union, and shortly after its inception. The chapter contains a historical definition of European politics from the early Middle Ages to the period before the Second World War. The later consensus of most European politicians on the implementation of these ideas was clear since everyone wanted to prevent the devastating conflict that had just taken place.

Therefore, the historical definition is an indispensable part of understanding the development of the European project from 1951 to the present. It will also help to understand why the United Kingdom has always been a so-called "Awkward partner" and why it decided to leave the EU in 2016. Using the example of historical ties between states, one can compare today's politics and perceive how Europe has evolved and what political directions it has influenced it the most.

## The idea of European unification up to the 20th century

Modern European politics and states are fundamentally determined by developments from the Middle Ages to the Second World War, but the basic introduction to this political-war game on the European continent began with the period after the collapse of the Roman Empire. During this period, the greatest unification took place on the European continent and beyond. The Roman Empire stretched from the territory of the Saudi Peninsula to the British Isles[[2]](#footnote-2). The most important part of this period for the future of European history is the era of Emperor Trajan, who formed war colonies in the conquered territories. The purpose of these war colonies was to cripple the conquered territories and create a similar culture to the Roman one, thus actually creating a unified European culture at that time[[3]](#footnote-3). He was later followed by his successor, Emperor Hadrian, who, instead of war campaigns, chose a more diplomatic way of traveling to conquered territories and creating a meaningful policy that was harmonized with the Roman one[[4]](#footnote-4). From today's point of view, this period cannot be described as the beginnings of European integration, but rather as the involuntary unification of European cultures under one central power.

This fact was pointed out by former US President George W. Bush during a visit by the President of the European Commission in 2003 when he emphasized that Europe would be as big and united as the Roman Empire after the 2004 enlargement. The former president's comment can be seen as a concern or support for the future enlargement of the EU in 2004, when a new world superpower emerged, and a rebalancing of world power took place.[[5]](#footnote-5)

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the European continent struggled with the migration of nations and the creation of new territorial units and cultures. However, each culture has evolved differently, and despite the process of conquest and warfare, this has not been a fundamental element as the exchange across societies that have led European integration forward[[6]](#footnote-6). Later developments, though, make it possible to seize power and centralize government into the hands of the king and create a unified rule and culture.

This was achieved by one of the most famous rulers of Europe, Charlemagne. He thus created a proto-European society and culture in Western Europe which shared a value framework and cultural customs. Charlemagne hence succeeded in creating a similar model as the Roman Empire, and despite its smaller size, it fulfilled the way of a unified society and culture across Western Europe. The greatest success can be considered his later conquest to Rome, where he was crowned as emperor and created the tradition on which later the Holy Roman Empire was built[[7]](#footnote-7). The result was a consolidation of identity towards the state and unity across territories.

One of the first concepts of European unification is the idea of George of Podebrady who wanted to unite Europe against the Turkish threats. His idea was to unite the Christian nations under the leadership of the French king, who was willing to join this political alliance, but the whole idea fell after rejection by the pope. He perceived this idea as unacceptable, as it bypassed papal power and formed a kind of secular society[[8]](#footnote-8). Nonetheless, it is possible to perceive his ideas as one of the first to lay the background for intergovernmentalism.

An additional concept concerning European unification was the idea of Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, who so unconsciously followed the ideas of George of Podebrady. His work *Projet Pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* deals with the European Community of Nations that are sovereign but cooperate with each other to achieve peace on European soil.[[9]](#footnote-9) These ideas are closely related to his participation in the peace negotiations in Utrecht, which significantly influenced him. He then wrote his work in which he discusses the common values of modern Europe. He advocated the creation of institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the right for citizens in the state. Including among them a progressive tax or the right to education for all. His work was influenced by William Penn's ideas on peace in Europe, in which he proposed an almost future European Parliament with the power to invoke war against disobedient members.[[10]](#footnote-10) In the same way, his ideas influenced Immanuel Kant, who in his work on Eternal Peace is ideally devoted to government across nations.[[11]](#footnote-11)

However, these theorists responded to the conflicts that took place in the seventeenth century and, in particular, to the Thirty Years' War which results determined the future of Europe for the next three centuries. The most important outcome is the Westphalian Peace Conference, as it proposed resolutions that were ahead of its time. This meant the creation of a world order on which most of today's world and international rules stand. The most important resolutions include the definition of state sovereignty in international relations and the secularization of power[[12]](#footnote-12). The outcomes of the Westphalian Peace had a major impact on the European continent at the time.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Europe was again at war in which almost all European powers took part, as they did not want to allow France to gain the status of a hegemon on European soil[[13]](#footnote-13). This conflict has brought Europe back into inequality of power, leading to the creation of a community even of often impartial observers, such as the United Kingdom[[14]](#footnote-14). The UK has always sought to maintain a European power equilibrium so as not to create a hegemon that could endanger it. Therefore, the cause of this conflict is mainly the changes and the revolution in France that created unrest among other rulers in Europe.[[15]](#footnote-15)

The end of the Napoleonic Wars thus symbolizes the failure of possible changes in Europe. Maintaining this status quo was essential for absolutist rulers. All this was accompanied by the creation of the Holy Alliance, which served as an aid to absolutist rulers for securing peace, power and preventing the creation of potential hegemons. Nevertheless, governments struggled with the revolutions of 1848, although these were unsuccessful revolutions, in later years they brought about fundamental changes in society that were similar across Europe[[16]](#footnote-16). The very idea of European unity was highlighted by Napoleon himself when he mentioned this idea from his captivity: *"Europe thus divided into nationalities freely formed and free internally, peace between States would have become easier: The United States of Europe would become a possibility."* [[17]](#footnote-17)

This idea was followed by, for example, Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Mazzini, who further developed the modern ideas of republicanism and the nation's self-determination. Giuseppe Mazzini also contributed to the creation of the Young Europe movement, which had its own offices in each nation and whose goal was to free itself from the current regime, thus creating a system of free nations[[18]](#footnote-18). Although it was more of a strong leftist movement, it can still be considered as uniting European values across nations.

The most prominent ideas of the time were presented by the socialist Saint Simon, who advocated a modern approach to politics and the functioning of the state. In his work *Réorganisation de la société européenne*, he focuses on how to reduce disparities between social classes and create a modern state. The crucial part of his vision was a federal Europe based on progress and social transformation in society[[19]](#footnote-19). Still, even from today's point of view, this idea bears negative elements, because it was only applicable to Europe, thanks to its technological progress. That progress should unite it as did Christianity in the time of Charlemagne. He thus perceived politics and state leadership as very technocratic, it is debatable whether it is possible to find a parallel between his ideas and today's EU.

Summarizing all integration efforts before the beginning of the twentieth century, it is clear that European policy was conducted outside the interests of their citizens or for the benefit of the state, as rulers and wealthy nobles played a decisive role. Changes in political affairs did not begin to occur until the end of the Thirty Years' War, yet the first changes in society did not begin until the end of the nineteenth century.

Despite all the revolutionary ideas of European unification, there was no stronger influence that would allow these philosophies to be shifted as the Westphalian system established an order that the rulers followed, especially because it provided them with power and sovereignty over their land[[20]](#footnote-20). The polemic remains to what extent European society has developed in the same way and what values it has preserved through large inhomogeneous units to this day.

## 1.2 Ideas of European unification in the early twentieth century

Europe changed significantly in the second half of the nineteenth century, the most fundamental changes being the gain of the right to vote for wealthy middle-class men or the creation of assemblies in which senior citizens could participate in the legislative process. Even so, this process needs to be seen with a certain perspective, as it is far from similar to a modern democracy, but it has undoubtedly opened the way for it.

The most important change in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe was the unification of Germany which created a new superpower on European soil and thus affected the balance of power. Moreover, the emergence of this hegemon shook the European political order when it won the war with France and gained Lorraine and Alsace.[[21]](#footnote-21)

Almost forty years later, the European conflict, now known as the First World War, escalates, one of the reasons being the disruption of the balance of power. What matters is how European states worked together before the war broke out and how interdependent they were through foreign trade. According to statistics on the Baripedia page[[22]](#footnote-22) foreign trade increased from the end of the nineteenth century until the outbreak of war, followed by economic stagnation. It is clear from this fact that European countries were already at least economically close at that time. This developed a connection and cooperation of the nations with each other, but still with a high degree of restriction. The post-war period created an ideal environment for future architects of the European project.

One of the above-mentioned architects is Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, whose greatest idea is Paneuropa. His work can be divided into two parts, which in both cases create a unified institutional framework and European identity, these parts are political-ideological and philosophical-moral.[[23]](#footnote-23) Later, this idea crystallized as the movement itself, and in 1924 it established an office in Hofburg. The movement organized regular congresses with the participation of important European statesmen and thinkers, important members being Aristide Briand, Otto von Habsburg, Konrad Adenauer, and later Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle. The Pan-Europe movement sought to create an almost today's EU with the aim of creating an institutional framework in which European states would work together and try to prevent conflict in a diplomatic way[[24]](#footnote-24). Later, Aristide Briand expanded his ideas, who, as foreign minister of France, perceived weakened Germany as a future threat. Therefore, sought to place the war outside the instrument of politics. Briand saw economic integration as a fundamental tool of politics that leads to prosperity across nations.[[25]](#footnote-25)

## 1.3 The period after the Second World War and the emergence of the European project

The devastating outcome of World War II on Europe once again opened the way for the idea of unifying the European continent under a supranational framework. It would serve these states as a guarantor of peace and economic prosperity, but at the same time, it would deepen the integration process that Europe desperately needed after the end of the war.

Already during the war, mutual cooperation was established, which can be described as the association of the Benelux countries or the agreement on the Bretton wood monetary system. Later, the most ambitious project to this day was created, the UN. A large number of federalist movements arose on the European continent, as well as other political groups that wanted to restore Europe in their own way.

These political groups include, for example, the efforts of the Communists in Western Europe to consolidate power, which raised concerns in the United States as they did not want to allow further spread of communism across Europe[[26]](#footnote-26). It should be noted that the United Kingdom also replaced Winston Churchill with Clement Attlee, who represented the Labour Party.

The situation in Europe seemed difficult to rectify through conventional political methods and state measures, so US Secretary of State George Marshall came up with a plan to restore the European economy. Even before the implementation of the Marshall Plan, UNRRA was already managing and coordinating the existing economic aid.[[27]](#footnote-27)

Following the subsequent implementation of the Marshall Plan, the OEEC initiative was set up to coordinate cooperation at the European level in the redistribution of funds and mutual economic cooperation. Through this cooperation, space began to open up for further agreements, one of which was the NATO, which is built on transatlantic cooperation with the United States to achieve security in Western Europe[[28]](#footnote-28). Joining NATO was a crucial step for European states to ensure security after the former allies ideologically divided and created a bipolar world in which Western Europe lay in the middle. The Cold War then pushed Europe to act quickly and created further alliances and potential transnational cooperation.

The integration process continued, its next step being the establishment of a European Council with the aim of cooperation and a unified dialogue across European states. The European Council was the product of the 1948 Congress of Europe, which made it clear that integration was inevitable only no one knew how to approach it[[29]](#footnote-29). Gradually, during this period, several initiatives for closer cooperation emerged, which paved the way for the establishment of the ECSC, which later became the culmination of the then political cooperation and solution of post-war Europe.

The result of the period between 1945-1951 was an effort to restore the European order. Predominantly initiate the economic recovery of Europe which undoubtedly carried several other elements such as prevention of further wars, stability of political systems in Western Europe, preventing the spread of communism to Western Europe, and anchoring the new world order.

Several prominent theorists and federalists have contributed to the deepening of the process of cooperation, but post-war politicians have had the greatest influence, so the example of Winston Churchill's speech in Zurich is an example[[30]](#footnote-30). Where he proposed the creation of the United States of Europe. His speech was aimed mainly at Western European politicians, who later really took up the idea. He also mentioned in his speech that the United Kingdom should not participate in this project and be a mere observer.

The author of The End of the Wilsonian Era also considers European integration to be inevitable[[31]](#footnote-31). The article describes the world order based on the proposition of President Woodrow Wilson. In this proposition, he develops the equality of nations and the rule of law in a world order which was absolutely necessary to establish after the end of World War II. He thus perceives Europe as a scene of constant conflict for generations, mainly the Franco-German one, which needed to end and transform its development into a policy of cooperation within Europe. This happened in the early 1950s, as another conflict was unthinkable for Europeans.

# Historic background and UK reasons for joining European community in 1973

This chapter will address the beginnings of European integration from the ECSC to the EC but will not include a detailed list of all events that would not be relevant to the UK or further analysis.

From the above chapter on the historical development of European integration, one can conclude that Europe has gone through several conflicts that have shaped its political atmosphere, yet this changed fundamentally after the Second World War. Most of Europe was open to closer cooperation, promoted by several European movements, one of which was the mentioned Pan-Europe movement, but also by individual federalists such as Altiero Spinelli. Spinelli's ideas have influenced other European politicians, but especially French Ministers Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. They did not share Spinelli's radical idea of the immediate creation of a federation, but rather a slow process of integration and deepening cooperation between states.[[32]](#footnote-32) From today's point of view, we can call this process a spillover, as it occurs very often at the European level[[33]](#footnote-33). The first initiative was Schuman's induction on Monnet's idea of economic cooperation and prosperity, later also on previous cooperation in OEEC or the former UNRRA. Europe was ready for this cooperation in all respects as any cooperation or political motivation created the perfect ground for Schuman's ECSC plan.[[34]](#footnote-34)

## 2.1 European Coal and Steel Community

The European Coal and Steel Community was a unique project of the time, but it was not unexpected because all previous events were converging to it. In the second half of the 1940s, several international organizations were formed and operated on the principle of intergovernmentalism. These organizations were an example for the future European project, so Schuman's plan became more than economic cooperation. It was also a concept of mutual security and prosperity in Europe, based on the principle that states with common economic ties will perceive war as impossible.[[35]](#footnote-35)

The ECSC was preceded by several negotiations, such as the previously created Council of Europe, but the most important ones took place between Schuman and Adenauer. The aim was to find a compromise between the interests of states and mutual cooperation for the future prosperity of Western Europe. Despite some problems, such as the control of the IAR or questions about the Saar, a compromise was finally reached, which was the creation of a mutual pool of coal and steel resources[[36]](#footnote-36). Materials such as coal and steel were absolutely essential for the renewal of Europe, as well as for the control of possible revanchist sentiments by Germany. Following negotiations and administrative agreements, the ECSC treaties were signed on 18 April 1951, which later received great political support from all its participants, but also beyond[[37]](#footnote-37). Exception included the UK, which was able to take part in the project but ultimately decided not to delegate part of its sovereignty to the newly created ECSC bodies, which could be described as Britain's conservativism.[[38]](#footnote-38)

## 2.2 Treaties of Rome and the creation of the EEC

Following the success of the ECSC, the only way forward for the European project was the initiative set up at the Messina conference.[[39]](#footnote-39) That initiative was later developed by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, who addressed a report on how this cooperation could expand between the six states. The result of these negotiations and Spaak's report initiated the summit in Rome, where the Treaties of Rome were signed in 1957. The signing of these treaties officially created the European Economic Community (EEC), which set much more ambitious objectives than the previous ECSC[[40]](#footnote-40). These agreements included, for example, the creation of Euratom for the control of nuclear energy in Western Europe and its peaceful uses.

One of the crucial points of these treaties was the agreement establishing a customs union. Other efforts were the first attempts to create a single market that will be a fundamental element of the future European Community. What made the EEC different from the ECSC is the fact that the states now wanted to create a real union in which the problem of one would be the problem of all.[[41]](#footnote-41)

This form of cooperation has always discouraged Britain, as it has always sought to implement intergovernmentalism in Europe. A united and strong Europe is an obstacle for Britain to exercise its own influence over individual states.

Therefore, already at the beginning of the period between 1951-1957, the UK's approach to integration negotiations can be described on the example in the EDC. In the absence of ratification of the EDC by France, the UK seized the opportunity and created a rather less binding WEU, which operated on the principle of strong cooperation within NATO. This brought the FGR into NATO in 1955, the exact opposite of what France wanted.[[42]](#footnote-42) The UK's actions were pragmatic and deliberate, especially because they wanted to avoid further integration in Europe, which would put them on the edge of Europe.

Still, this step was only a small delay in the overall European project, as the EEC's results were astounding, giving the UK no choice but to apply for membership in EEC in 1961. However, almost twelve years would have to pass since the first request before Britain was invited to the club.[[43]](#footnote-43) For this reason, Britain was forced to create cooperation that suited it more but was not as successful as the EEC. This cooperation was EFTA, which brought together independent Western European states.

According to O’Rourke in chapter Brentry, the UK sought to join the EEC further, as its successes were unexpected, and it was noticeable that those who did not participate would be fundamentally economically behind. This fact was already such an unpleasant idea for the British, especially after the loss of Commonwealth pride and the unclear development of British politics or the economic situation within EFTA.[[44]](#footnote-44)

## 2.3 Establishment of EEC governing bodies

With the creation of the EEC came the need to create autonomous institutions, whose members still have ties to their states, yet primarily work for these institutions. The new institutional structure has allowed considerably better negotiations between states. They even accelerated the process of rapid application of EEC treaty plans. That is why four key bodies are being set up to govern the operation and development of the EU to this day. There is a different form of cooperation in each institution, as well as a different representation or voting.[[45]](#footnote-45)

1. European Commission (EC) – Its crucial role is to legislate, monitor compliance with EU laws, and enforce contracts (proceedings). Its members are elected. Later, it took on a much larger role with the extension of its powers and the possibility of bringing actions with the ECJ. It is considered a major player in integration efforts.
2. The Council – It is used for meetings of heads of state and ministers. The council makes the main decisions about the direction of the union and also the application of its goals. In the past Council voted in form of unanimity and later on QMV was introduced.
3. The Assembly – Later known as the European Parliament. The proposed legislation is approved in this institution. Originally, there were only appointed deputies, but since 1979 there have been elected representatives and the institution gain much more power and today represents the European demos.
4. European Court of Justice (ECJ) – Serves as the supreme court for EEC members, overseeing the correct application of judicial rules and the harmonization of European law. [[46]](#footnote-46)

## 2.3 Period between the EEC and the EC

Between the ratification of the EEC to the merger agreement known as the EC, several fundamental changes have taken place, which will later affect the first enlargement in 1973. Following the success of the EEC, further efforts have been made to deepen integration.

These efforts were mostly led by the European Commission, especially by President Hallstein[[47]](#footnote-47). One of the greatest successes of this period was the creation of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), which is still one of the EU's most fundamental policies.

Another success was the Luxembourg compromise on the QMV vote which was implemented shortly after the crisis of empty seats[[48]](#footnote-48). The last great achievement before the first enlargement was the initial set up of EMU in 1969, followed by Werner's report. The biggest event from the UK's point of view was the Hague Summit, which set out the criteria for admitting new members to join the EC.[[49]](#footnote-49)

As a result of these criteria, Britain had to meet several conditions in many areas. Some of these conditions were very unfavourable even before joining, yet Heath decided to continue on the path to membership. EC membership was so beneficial to the stagnant British economy that there was not much going back[[50]](#footnote-50). Between 1960 and 1970, Britain was dealing with economic problems and its place in a bipolar world. Whereas the EEC dealt with its own failures and internal problems which also affected the British's efforts to join the EEC. In particular, these issues are disputes between Charles de Gaulle and other members in some areas, but especially the CAP and the conditions for new members to join[[51]](#footnote-51). In addition, France worsened its relations with Britain after its withdrawal from NATO[[52]](#footnote-52). This was due to a bad relationship with America, with which Britain tried to have the best possible relations at all costs. These problems will later affect three new members in 1973.

# Accession of the United Kingdom to the EC

The UK's admission to the newly created EC structure was preceded by two unsuccessful applications and a very unique relationship between the British and EC. As it is clear from the above chapter, European integration has been present since the early 1950s, and from the beginning, it was of a supranational nature, which later turned into an intergovernmental model. Even so, the British political scene in the 1950s was more opposed to joining the ECSC or EEC. The attitudes of the then top British politicians were mostly negative, but it best captured by the surprise of then Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin when he learned that Schumann and Adenauer had agreed to create the ECSC[[53]](#footnote-53). Author O'Rourke even states that Schumann made this proposition almost unacceptable for Britain to even participate. That would prevent Britain's efforts to boycott future efforts to create an ECSC and integrate across Europe[[54]](#footnote-54). This was preceded by Bevin’s hesitant actions, who had already pointed out in previous negotiations the importance of an independent Britain in the world[[55]](#footnote-55). In doing so, he sought to draw attention to the fact that Britain is still a superpower and cannot take part in a project that would limit its autonomy, but in this case, it is possible to argue about the extent to which Britain really was a still world power.[[56]](#footnote-56)

On the contrary, author David Fromkin states that Britain has lost its status as a world power and explains the phenomenon on the loss of colonies. The crucial moment was a report from the British government directly to George C. Marshall, which stated that Britain could no longer maintain its position and support in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is also necessary to take into account Britain's efforts to involve America in European politics in which has succeeded. Based on these efforts, NATO, the Marshall Plan, and later the OECD were created[[57]](#footnote-57). Despite all these successes, however, the UK was no longer the superpower it wished to be. From that, it is necessary to conclude that there are other factors that affected their process of accession.

## UK relations with the continent in the period 1951-1973

During this period, Britain was often on the edge, when it perceived European integration as something fundamentally negative or tended to appear neutral. Nonetheless, this approach changed fundamentally before the end of the decade, as Harold Macmillan decided to apply to the EEC in the early 1960s. This commitment is all the less understandable after his previous participation in the Spaak Committee as Chancellor Exchequer and his views pointed out the exact opposite[[58]](#footnote-58). This step was necessary as the British economy began to lag behind the continent and the orientation towards the Commonwealth also changed dramatically. These facts are pointed out by data[[59]](#footnote-59) on the economic development of the continent in comparison with Britain, although Britain still could be seen in this period as an economic giant, according to O'Rourke.[[60]](#footnote-60)

Indication of significant change was the attitude of the USA, which the British perceived as their closest partner with the outbreak of the Cold War, but they showed the British a certain distance from such a close alliance. This was most accentuated by strong US opposition to British action during the 1956 Suez Crisis. This differing view of Britain-US relations was even more pronounced after a speech by the former Secretary of State saying that the British could not expect unique relations with the United States. They were rather to support the European project than having special relations with Britain.[[61]](#footnote-61)

Therefore, they used what is nowadays called soft power to turn Britain closer to the continent and their project. All this further undermined Britain's ability to become a superpower, as it had to give up its important colonies such as India and others in the Middle East in previous years.

This completed the fact that the British had lost their status, but were not prepared for it, as they still felt like a strong nation due to past successes. The result was a vague attitude to the first integration process (ECSC) and later to the EEC, even though they understood the implications for the country's future.[[62]](#footnote-62)

The previous nationalization of coal by the Clement Attlee government was one of the important reasons for the reluctance towards the ECSC[[63]](#footnote-63). Yet, the main factor was the already mentioned unexpected announcement of a project about which the British knew almost nothing. The French and the Germans agreed without a significant British representation, which absolutely surprised the British Cabinet, and especially Minister Bevin.

Shortly after the announcement of the project, the British tried to find a compromise, but this was not possible, as Schumann was determined to create a project only on the basis of an agreement with Germany, Italy, and Benelux. The British did not have a clear position, because in many ways they felt antipathy towards West Germany and the continent in general[[64]](#footnote-64). This phenomenon of hostility towards the continent is explained by the author Charles Grant on the example of Winston Churchill, who would always prefer the USA or international trade rather than the continent[[65]](#footnote-65). Although the first non-participation in the European integration was not so crucial for the British, the second will already be, because it will have the character of a common market and its own political structure.

The later development of European integration does not leave British politicians calm, and therefore there is a greater deepening between the islands and the continent because the original six is ​​economically successful and gains political power in a bipolar world, the same in which the British lose that power. This fact greatly disturbed the British, all the more so as their market began to focus on the continent and the imperial system of preferences ceased to be effective.[[66]](#footnote-66) Subsequent deterioration of relations with the USA due to the Suez Crisis had a major impact on British diplomacy, which intended to participate in the negotiations after Messina and participate in the creation of the common market. Later, however, the British withdrew from the negotiations because they were not prepared to give up their imperial system of preferences and the partial restriction of sovereignty that is accompanied by participation in other integration processes.[[67]](#footnote-67)

Further, development prevented the British from negotiating in any way about the future development of the key pillars of the EC and especially the CAP or the first drafts of the EMU[[68]](#footnote-68). At the same time, they did not even help themselves in the field of international relations with the continent, because they often deceitfully criticized the whole project in front of Americans, who were very supportive of integration efforts. In the above-mentioned facts, it is easy to find several recurring phenomenon’s that will reappear even later, and therefore the British will later have a strong distance not only to EU policy but to everything it represents.[[69]](#footnote-69)

Later, the British temporarily created an answer in the form of an intergovernmental EFTA community which was to represent the EEC counterpart and prevent the economic dominance of the six. This project was largely unsuccessful because it lacked deeper political integration which is one of the crucial elements to achieve economic prosperity.[[70]](#footnote-70)

Based on the growing dominance of the Six and economic success, Britain decided to submit its first application in 1961, when the Macmillan Cabinet decided that membership outweighed the disadvantages, and the wait would have a severe impact on the future of Britain. This application was rejected by Charles de Gaulle, who saw in it a hostile British mood to dismantle the continental project, thus stabilizing the European equilibrium[[71]](#footnote-71). The second application came in 1967, and despite significantly better relations, it was vetoed due to the import of American politics to the continent, there was often drawn a metaphor of a Trojan horse. These views were mainly expressed by Charles de Gaulle, who was initially backed by the rest of the community, but later blocked further negotiations with his approach.[[72]](#footnote-72)

The best-known incident is the 1966 empty chair crisis which was later resolved by a different approach to voting, moving from unanimity to QMV[[73]](#footnote-73). The change in voting and the end of President Gaulle allowed the British to re-apply for membership in the community. The result was that Prime Minister Heath submitted a third application to the EC, this time already successful.

## Accession and years after 1973

Even before joining the EC, Britain had to come to terms with the accession criteria set out at the Hague Summit, in which the members of the Six agreed on the terms of accession to the community. All these conditions will be very difficult for the British to accept. This fact is pointed out by the author William Diebold who mentions that these are the same criteria that the British have tried to avoid since the 1950s[[74]](#footnote-74). It is for these reasons that they have had to accept several unpleasant trade and political conditions, which are the convergence criteria known as Acquis Communautaire. These conditions were particularly specific in the area of ​​trade for Britain, where it had to get rid of preferential trade with the Commonwealth and create a customs zone and a single market[[75]](#footnote-75). Diebold adds that the British perceived entry as a necessity, but the willingness on their part was negligible, just as the French did not want to lose their leading position in the community.

The entry of the British brought several political concessions, but also issues in the area of ​​sovereignty or sustainability of trade in agricultural products with important partners as New Zealand. Since the end of the Hague Summit in 1969, Britain has sought to meet the convergence criteria, and Edward Heath has finally accepted all the conditions set out in Articles 2 and 3. Heath later assured the community that Britain would accept all the conditions set out by the community, but it would need more time for some specific ones.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Although Britain tried to meet all the conditions before 1973, the issue of the CAP and the British's contributions to the budget was never resolved. In the years following joining the EC, it will become clear how big a problem CAP is not only for the British but for the whole community.[[77]](#footnote-77)

Britain initially proposed unification on the continent and its need for integration, later on, eventually became an enemy of its own proposal. That is why it also boycotted the first Hague Summit, the BTO, and later the Council of Europe. As result, Britain was very hostile to the success of the six.[[78]](#footnote-78)

In all negotiations, Britain rather pretended to be interested and eventually withdrew from the majority all negotiations due to her own specific policy of national pride with a combination of economic preferences, until it finally found out that it must be at this core.[[79]](#footnote-79)

Subsequently, the economy or even the political scene in Britain was slowly being weakened, all prime ministers like Churchill, Macmillan, and Wilson approached this as something inherently wrong, yet Macmillan and Wilson had to file an application, which Gaulle rejected.[[80]](#footnote-80) It was a considerable retaliation for Suez or reluctance at the beginning of the project, that only changed with the end of Gaulle and the arrival of Pompidou and Heath, who managed to successfully get Britain to negotiate and join the EC.[[81]](#footnote-81)

In 1971, the British Parliament approved Britain's accession to the EC, although a large number of Labour were against it. There was also noticeable opposition from some backbencher conservatives who were against joining the EC, mainly due to the potential loss of parliamentary or judicial sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty in the case of courts was appropriate, as the ECJ had the highest position in terms of implementing legislation within the community. Despite the minority opposition, the treaty was approved, and Britain joins the EC on October 28, 1973.[[82]](#footnote-82)

Britain's accession to the European Community was very difficult to associate with one majority phenomenon or element, yet it is clear that some of them must be economic reasons and political ambitions to lead the European community. Something like this could never have happened because the community was already so strong and rigid to such an extent that the new member could never get into a stable decision-making core and influence the direction of the community so easily.[[83]](#footnote-83)

If the British approach was based solely on economic ambitions and partly selfish motives in combination with focusing only on their own interests, then it was initially from the beginning unsustainable[[84]](#footnote-84). The community to which Britain joined was built on integration and cooperation, but the British partially neglected it. Above all, the political elite or society in Britain was not prepared for a new approach to Europe, in which there was a closer connection between nations.

From the article by Andrew Shonfield, these conclusions can be drawn to some extent, and by the fact that we already know the results today, it is possible to point out critical mistakes in the British approach.

According to Shonfield the first mistake was in the British approach to the beginnings of integration in the 1950s. The second one is the government's mistake not to provide an accession referendum, as Denmark, for example, has done. In addition, to respond to the results of this referendum and get citizens to take a positive approach to the EC, all the more so to inform the MP's what impacts the EC had on Britain[[85]](#footnote-85). None of this happened, because Britain was trying to rush its entry due to several factors that had almost forced it to join as soon as possible[[86]](#footnote-86). The result of this rushed entry was a referendum in 1975, but also a later escalation of British antipathy towards the continent, which culminated in 2016.

# The reasons for the Eurosceptic and conservative policy towards the European Union

The reasons for the already well-known Euroscepticism among the British are partly outlined in the previous chapters, but now the intention will be to define the reasons for the referendum of 1975 and the later increasingly obvious aloofness of the British to the European project.

As already mentioned, the British always hoped to avoid the issue of joining the EC, but this was not possible, and in the end, they had to indeed approach for many more external reasons. The result was a vague attitude not only at the political level but also at the public level which did not know how to approach the European project. This was particularly difficult because the British constantly believed in their dominant position in the world, which was still often reminded by the media despite the opposite[[87]](#footnote-87). Author David Fromkin draws attention to this fact and links it to other causes[[88]](#footnote-88), as defined by other authors such as Stanley Hoffman, who focuses on incompatible views on the future of the community between the Six and the UK. Joining the community could therefore only be described as a pragmatic step by Edward Heath's government, which is true, but it is also a very progressive attitude of Heath himself, who, unlike most British prime ministers, has embraced Europe.[[89]](#footnote-89) Despite this effort to lead Britain to the heart of Europe, Heath had to end his premiership because of many domestic difficulties, which led to Harold Wilson's government.

Immediately after taking office, Wilson decided to straightaway discuss Britain’s membership in the EC. It was not unexpected, at that time, Euroscepticism was the domain of the Labour Party, which had a significant extreme left-wing. Cabinet members like Tony Benn were also in this radical part of the party. It was for these reasons that it was necessary to start negotiations on EC membership, as the ruling party itself began to disintegrate on this issue.[[90]](#footnote-90)

James Callaghan later said at the Council of Ministers that the basic terms and treaties negotiated by the Heath government must be renegotiated. To better understand Labour’s efforts to negotiate change lied precisely in their political positions, as they were a considerably left-wing party at the time, and therefore perceived the EC as a capitalist project[[91]](#footnote-91). This scepticism was also helped by a significant halt in economic growth, which has grown incredibly in EEC since the early 1950s. However, growth came to a halt in the early 1970s, accompanied by oil shocks and a significant change in the economic environment within the common market[[92]](#footnote-92). Everything was accompanied by Werner's report, which defined the initial emergence of EMU, EMS, ESF, and ERM, which also changed the financial environment within the EC. Britain joined after it could have a say in it thus having to accept most of the rules.[[93]](#footnote-93)

The last factor that helped to call a referendum was the changes in prices that arose in connection with the change of the Commonwealth's preferential system to the European market, which worked significantly differently from the original one. In this system, the British paid significantly more to support agriculture, which often did not even come from their country[[94]](#footnote-94). Overall, it is possible to complete the issue of the referendum with one crucial point, and that is the reform of future contributions to the Community budget because it would be disproportionately larger than from all other members. The British would not benefit from their contributions at all, as most went to the CAP, which is an almost negligible issue for the British.[[95]](#footnote-95)

Summarizing these factors, a more comprehensive pattern of evolving British Euroscepticism emerges, forcing Harold Wilson to invoke a referendum in 1975. A significant symbol of British Euroscepticism was the very division of Wilson's cabinet on this issue, in which individual ministers could decide for themselves which part of the campaign they would stand for, thus influencing public opinion[[96]](#footnote-96). The critical point for future development is the promise to renegotiate Heath's inadequate criteria and change the CAP. However, none of this will succeed and, on the contrary, it will further divide the current approach of citizens as well as the Labour Party to the EC. The only result for Britain was a promise from the EC that ERDF funds would be created to support the regions so that at least part of the money would be returned.[[97]](#footnote-97)

In the referendum, citizens were offered to remain in or leave the community, participation in the referendum was almost 65%, of which 67.23% decided to remain in the community[[98]](#footnote-98). According to Bogdanor, citizens at that time were rather optimistic and inclined to the European project, mainly for economic reasons and prosperity. Another causes why people often did not perceive criticism from the No campaign was that it only tried to draw attention to the loss of sovereignty and the rise in the price of specific goods[[99]](#footnote-99). However, that had another obvious cause, and that was the financing of the No campaign, which was completely negligible compared to the Yes campaign. The opposite was the 2016 referendum, in which the Leave campaign faced several allegations of over-financing the campaign[[100]](#footnote-100). Several important personalities also supported staying in the European community, the two most prominent being the future prime minister Margaret Thatcher and MP Roy Jenkins, who was a noticeable British Europhile. The effects of the referendum dampened critics at the Labour Party and most opponents, yet it still preserved the status quo[[101]](#footnote-101). The cabinet in the following year disintegrated because EMS and a period of British uncertainty ensued, both in the government and in the future of Europe.[[102]](#footnote-102)

## The Margaret Thatcher Period

The answer to the unclear period and changes in almost all areas was Margaret Thatcher, who took over the position of the first female prime minister in the UK. She differed significantly from its predecessor in the economic field, foreign policy, and especially in her approach to the EC. When she took office, Britain was in an unsatisfactory economic situation, which it found itself in due to the economic downturn[[103]](#footnote-103) during the 1970s and its adaptation to the common market, of which it was a new member.

James Callaghan left Margaret Thatcher in an unusually difficult situation, but she was able to cope with the problem somewhat quickly. One of the reasons for the success is the rather quiet period of the Conservative Party, which in meantime changed its approach during the Labour Party governments and was united in matters of the country's direction[[104]](#footnote-104). That is why the initial success of Thatcher's cabinet is due to the rapid response to the housing market and fundamental liberalization, which in many respects solved the problems of the 1970s, in what Labour had just failed[[105]](#footnote-105). These successes helped Thatcher continue the series of changes that brought Britain closer to the United States, moving the traditional Keynesian model closer to the neoliberalism often advocated by Milton Freedmen. Later in the 1980s, Thatcher found an ally in the world, Ronald Reagan, who took the same ideological and economic direction with her.

Looking at British-European relations, a major problem arises because Europe was unenthusiastic to accept Britain's changing policy but was open to negotiating with the new prime minister, from whom they expected a change in diplomacy.

These expectations were in place from the outset, as Britain really wanted to strengthen its relationship with and position in the community but before that it needed to address the very fundamental problem of EC membership. That was a reform of the CAP and British budget contributions, which grew every year[[106]](#footnote-106). Thatcher had been trying to solve this problem since she came to office, but between 1982 and 1984, relations between Britain and even within the community itself worsened. None of the members was willing to discuss the change, as the main beneficiaries of the CAP were states with great influence, with the exception of Germany, the only one cooperating with France on the basis of good mutual relations and previous agreements.[[107]](#footnote-107)

After several negotiations and European councils, in which Thatcher unsuccessfully pushed for change, relations with most heads of state gradually deteriorated. If her efforts for change came a little earlier or less drastically, she would have a better chance of success. That is because in 1980-1981 the president of the commission was the British Europhile Roy Jenkins[[108]](#footnote-108), who could help her set up the negotiations.

Though, negotiations culminated in 1984 in Fontainebleau, after which the treaty that reduces British contribution to the budget is named[[109]](#footnote-109). The amount available for reimbursement is 66% which is less than Thatcher imagined, yet it was a success. The Fontainebleau agreement allowed her to strengthen her own position, but also the opinion of citizens on the EC[[110]](#footnote-110). The result in Fontainebleau will have a positive impact mainly on domestic politics, while relations with Europe gradually worsened. Response to Fontainebleau is the formation of the Franco-German bloc, led by Mitterrand and Kohl.

Despite worse relations with Europe, Britain was a clear winner from the point of view of its own citizens, as it got its money back and still benefited from the ERDF, which had just been created in connection with keeping the British in the community.[[111]](#footnote-111)

Less than a year after the success of Fontainebleau, British Commissioner Arthur Cockfield came up with a report on the creation of a single market, later known as the SEA. Deeper integration was welcomed by the British for the first time, as it focused on the economic issues of the community rather than on the political establishment. All Member States were in favour of creating a single market, which would not only strengthen global competitiveness but also broaden the economic potential of individual countries as a whole[[112]](#footnote-112). Thatcher also expressed support for the single market, and she perceived it as an important step for Europe and its future in the global world. Uniquely for the first time, the British have really tried to move European integration forward, depending on whether it can be seen as a step forward.[[113]](#footnote-113).

The British took the SEA more as a step for them, as they wanted at the very beginning in the 1950s when they preferred to create an FTA than a customs union stated by O’Rourke.[[114]](#footnote-114)

The course of negotiations on the single market was accompanied by several disagreements on the essential criteria. Eventually culminating in the replacement of the unanimity procedure to QMV at the Council of Ministers. This change created completely unprecedented conditions, which led to the fact that no state itself was able to block negotiations alone.[[115]](#footnote-115)

After the approval of the SEA criteria and the setting of its objectives and date, it was clear that the integration efforts of the European partners could not end here. Thatcher herself sensed this in the late 1980s, however, what made the fundamental problem was not integration itself, but rather an unwillingness to support something other than the single market. The result was an even greater deterioration in relations with Europe, which were already at their minimum during the Thatcher period[[116]](#footnote-116). Britain then emerged in a situation where it did not have good relations with the continent due to previous negotiations, for example, Fontainebleau and later various issues within social policy or future issues of the community.

Since the approval of the SEA, everything has culminated in even greater integration, the outline of which has already been set out in the preamble of the act itself. This deepening of community relations was already becoming unbearable for Thatcher[[117]](#footnote-117). Everything changed fundamentally with the year 1989 when the Iron Curtain fell and the future issue of German unification, of which Thatcher was concerned and was not afraid to express those concerns. Despite her fears, German unification eventually took place, and the Mitterrand-Kohl bond was even stronger[[118]](#footnote-118). The two presidents, led by the President of the European Commission Delores, have begun to push integration forward towards the creation of a political union.

This effort was already there before their own aspirations, from men like Spinelli or Tindemans who had tried to push this idea before. Only when the terms of office of these three statesmen correlated was it possible to achieve real results. Still, this was preceded by the recurring issue of EMU, but this time it seriously set its goals for the future and made the Member States conditional on joining the ERM.[[119]](#footnote-119)

All these integration efforts have had a major impact on Thatcher's cabinet, which has been exposed to growing domestic discontent and poor relations with Europe. Crucial, however, was the question of joining the ERM or Social Charter, to which Thatcher was beginning to have strong opposition.[[120]](#footnote-120)

In this context, Geoffrey Howe had decided to speak in parliament, when he resigned and led the cabinet to disintegration. Howe's speech in the House of Commons was unexpected and at the same time demonstrated the level of the political format of British democracy.

His speech was perfectly aimed at the Cabinet's reluctance to participate in European integration and the ERM system, and this was the question that plagued Britain since the 1950s. Howe pointed out that further hesitation to engage in integration could be worse than the years before 1973 and the subsequent Eurosceptic failure within the community after that year.[[121]](#footnote-121) The effects of his resignation were so perilous not only for the Conservatives but also for the cabinet itself, which disintegrated under Thatcher. In his speech, Howe successfully shifted the issue of Britain in Europe, as well as the future of success the forthcoming Maastricht Treaty.

## The end of Margaret Thatcher and the political change with the arrival of John Major

After the fall of Thatcher's cabinet, former Chancellor of Exchequer John Major took office. The arrival of the Major was very complicated by the exchange of some key ministers, and especially by the changes in Europe. One of them was the unification of Germany, which she feared and did not help with her anti-European approach in the late 1980s. Later she became almost hostile toward the whole of Europe.[[122]](#footnote-122) Major thus faced not only changes in Britain, where the Labour Party, which had been dormant for a decade, began to slowly consolidate and take a clear stance on both domestic and foreign policy, but also faced fundamental changes on the foreign scene.[[123]](#footnote-123)

One of these changes is the above-mentioned negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, which defined the establishment of the European Union as a political union, thus completing the process of integration[[124]](#footnote-124). Shortly before the TEU came into force, Kenneth Clarke became Secretary of the Treasury, known for his pro-European views and sometimes referred to as the Europhile[[125]](#footnote-125). During the talks in Maastricht, the Major managed to negotiate two important opt-outs, which was a typical means for Britain to slow down the EU's integration policy at home. These opt-outs include the exception to the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, the Schengen exception, and the most important one from EMU[[126]](#footnote-126). That is why the already mentioned Kenneth Clarke supported Britain membership in ERM II[[127]](#footnote-127). He did not want Britain to miss another crucial step in European integration as his predecessor Geoffrey Howe pointed out before him.

Though this did not happen, as the objectives of EMU only began to emerge after the Delores report, and subsequently, they required fixed exchange rates under ERM II. Britain had been in ERM II for a short time but was not genuinely prepared to become part of this fixed system, especially with the German mark[[128]](#footnote-128). Later economic outcomes could be described as serious as it was this situation that Britain did not want to get into, nor did its political establishment.

The party was once again divided on the matter of the European project, which made everything even worse in this situation[[129]](#footnote-129). There could be speculation over how the economy and outlook on the EU would change if Britain remained in ERM II and later became part of EMU. This possibility for the future can later be reflected in Blair's efforts to be part of EMU, but it is still unclear to what extent Britain would change its whole approach to the EU.

The Major's period was markedly different from the end of the Thatcher one. His great success is the negotiation of opt-outs from Maastricht, but these opt-outs no longer satisfied a considerable portion of his party. Conservatives, in particular, grew into a Eurosceptic party during the 1990s through treaties such as Maastricht and Amsterdam[[130]](#footnote-130). This fundamentally changed the roles of Conservatives and Labour.[[131]](#footnote-131)

Negotiating Maastricht was difficult, but the proposed opt-outs helped greatly to push through the TEU, which created a political union with the aim of creating an EMU. Britain wanted to be a part of EMU and participate in the future but did not yet know how.

Although the TEU had a character comparable to the Constitution, it was not, because it merely consolidated previous treaties and summarized most of the previous results of the IGC into this treaty. There was also a referendum in the game, but it was hastily removed from the table. Since Maastricht did not have the character of such a drastic change in the functioning of the community or Britain. It only set the future framework and definition of the direction integration will take[[132]](#footnote-132). It was at this time that the first Eurosceptic parties emerged that would not have survived financially before. Those that are worth mentioning and played a crucial role in the development of Britain are UKIP and the Referendum Party[[133]](#footnote-133). That is why Maastricht has allowed strong Eurosceptics to criticize the new EU more than ever before.

Shortly before the election, the IGC took part, which later continued and acquired a character of the treaty we know today as the Amsterdam Treaty. On the basis of this treaty, certain adjustments were made to the pillars of the TEU and to the democratic model of the EU. The treaty has set a new democratic precedent, with the EP electing the president of the EC, giving voters more power, and reducing the democratic deficit[[134]](#footnote-134). Other factors were the consolidation of democracy as the core of the EU, but this was not necessary for a state like Britain, which is one of the oldest democracies. Major, therefore, contributed to British politics by putting the Conservatives into a difficult period. Subsequent, views on the EU were fundamentally polarized, which later led them to lose the 1997 election.[[135]](#footnote-135)

It is arduous to assess Major's actions from such a brief explanation of events, but his decisions indicate that he was more pro-European despite the exit from the ERM. Britain had to withdraw from this project because it was in fact disadvantageous financially for the British at the time, but overall, Maastricht was solved without major complications.

Furthermore, Major had to deal with the proponents of an ever-stronger core of the union in which he really wanted to be, but he could not offer this idea to his own deputies like no one before him[[136]](#footnote-136). The result was the partial failure of the Amsterdam treaty and the collapse of the Conservative Party's policy, which was increasingly divided over EU issues. At that point, strong Eurosceptic views were already emerging, which would later manifest in the Conservative Party. Nevertheless, it provided an almost free path to the power of the Labour Party, which had been dealing with its function of opposition for almost twenty years and was now able to consolidate power[[137]](#footnote-137). Through all the problems Major faced, whether, in domestic or foreign politics, his premiership was quite often determined by secondary factors.

## The Return of the Labour Party and the politics of Tony Blair

Tony Blair's rise to power is due to several factors, the most important being the internal conflict in the Conservative Party since the late 1980s and the consolidation of the Labour Party on most issues. The other one would be a change in society at the end of the 20th century when a young visionary politician had high hopes and offered citizens what they wanted.

Tony Blair wanted to come up with a completely different policy not only for Britain but also for his European partners, but it was not so easy, as his predecessor left him in a difficult situation. Complications arose both on the domestic scene, where Blair had so far enormous support but was still unable to stimulate a clear interest in the EMU, which in the late 1990s was a necessity for being within the heart of Europe[[138]](#footnote-138). All this was complemented by the crisis of the previous Major government, when BSE appeared in Britain, which caused a major impact on the agricultural market with Europe.[[139]](#footnote-139)

Blair tried to solve all these complications and find a new approach to politics in Britain, where any form of social notion was discredited by the history of the Thatcher governments. Although the EU saw Tony Blair as a positive change, when the time came for the British presidency, other countries tended to look at their proposal for a third way with a certain distance.[[140]](#footnote-140)

Although the third way was very close to European partners, they were not willing to accept it to such an extent. Mostly because it contained a certain amount of British model with that was omitting typical EU bureaucratic basis while also being fairly decentralized[[141]](#footnote-141). The most important result of their presidency was the IGC, which negotiated Agenda 2000. This has brought further integration, preparation for the accession of the Eastern Enlargement States, support for unemployment, and several other social benefits across the EU[[142]](#footnote-142). For Britain, the most fundamental change was the CAP and tax reform. The British have always tried to come up with a change regarding the CAP despite their successful rebate. Regardless of anything, they wanted to change the system completely because its functioning paralyzed Europe.[[143]](#footnote-143) British, therefore, perceived CAP as something inherently unnecessary.

In the end, Blair tried to change Europe enough to be acceptable to the British. He himself wanted to be at its core, but he knew that the British would not be willing to accept so much integration and change within a decade. His supposed feeling of winning over the Treaty of Nice was just another failure of British policy towards Europe, because Britain, through its opt-outs, actually missed other major integration steps that will ultimately cost her a lot.[[144]](#footnote-144)

When the time came to decide on EMU, it was necessary to make a definitive decision on the British part, as most partners in Europe intended to launch the project in 1999. Blair's cabinet incomprehensibly postponed this decision, thus failing to participate in the beginnings of EMU and these consequences will accompany Britain to Brexit. Blair could have chosen to participate especially when he won the election with a result that secured him a majority.[[145]](#footnote-145) This was not possible later when he decided to strengthen his friendship with the United States enough to send troops to Iraq.

As a result, he lost his support among voters, and subsequent negotiations on EMU are in fact almost impossible, as his support in the later elections is not enough to promote EMU membership without any struggles.[[146]](#footnote-146). For Blair, membership in EMU was crucial, as a bloc of members of the so-called hard core was created. Two-speed Europe was hence formed, where the members of the EMU act fundamentally behind closed doors and decide on the direction of the single market. Those who do not participate in this hard core of eurozone members to a greater extent lose the opportunity to negotiate benefits for their countries and to influence European policy[[147]](#footnote-147). This non-participation is particularly important because the EU's economic success is very closely linked to its political one.

Blair's indecision and postponement of the initial question of EMU membership was a pragmatic move by his government. They did not want to end up like Thatcher or Major's later failure to withdrawal from ERM.

Blair's other governments were no longer strong enough to achieve the implementation of EMU, which became operational in 2001. Blair finally said in parliament that the crucial issue of the euro had been postponed for the time being, even though experts recommended adopting the euro[[148]](#footnote-148). The government has therefore set up a system of its own tests to see if they are ready for adoption. These tests showed that Britain was not ready for adoption, and Blair eventually postponed the euro issue[[149]](#footnote-149) as it would have to go through the House and probably a referendum, which was almost impossible at that time. The later issue of the euro in Britain was no longer even about the euro, but rather about its membership and future in the EU or its own preferences.

As a result, Germany became the leading country within the EU and thus also acquired the seat of the newly formed ECB in Frankfurt[[150]](#footnote-150). The British again missed another integration point and in many respects decided to have opt-outs from several treaties over the period between 1993-2001[[151]](#footnote-151). The impacts of these opt-outs from Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and especially EMU were no longer small steps towards a complete British relegation to the second track within Europe, but on the contrary to complete derailment from this project.

Britain's policy was more cautious towards the rest of Europe, as they began to perceive themselves as apostates in this project. The British themselves have not yet seen this, but everything changed in 2004 when the Eastern enlargement took place and CEE countries were allowed to enter the European single market.

At the same time, the British themselves lobbied for the admission of these eastern states in order to equalize the power division of the West on key issues of integration.[[152]](#footnote-152)

This was initially successful when the Poles later sided with the British on the issue of the CAP when the reform took place within the forthcoming CT. The ensuing reform in disputed Europe regarding CT eventually passed and was crucial for the British as they saw it as a fundamental problem of the whole project.[[153]](#footnote-153)

However, in the end, the British gradually lost this aid, as these new members, as well as new democracies, sought their place in Europe. They were looking for their new economic and political place in Europe[[154]](#footnote-154). Still, Europe did not bother with British distance and weak involvement in the European project, and during the IGC from 2004-2005 created a CT. This meant to be the fundamental document of the union and thus complete the fact of political union leading to the federation.

Even before the British began negotiating any major changes or discussing implementation, Blair postponed the vote on CT, knowing what the problem was not only for politicians but also for the citizens. With this postponement, Blair avoided a major discussion of the CT when crucial states such as France and the Netherlands rejected it in a referendum[[155]](#footnote-155). Blair's political steps towards the EU can be defined by postponing the problem, but this phenomenon in British policy towards the EU is long-lasting and must stop somewhere, otherwise, there will be complete separation from the core of the project.

Furthermore, Blair has faced a loss of popularity, a phenomenon that can be attributed to several events. To maintain the party's integrity, he decided to hand over his premiership to Gordon Brown, with whom he had a well-known Granita agreement[[156]](#footnote-156) on this transition of power. Deficiencies began to appear with the German Presidency when Angela Merkel become in charge of Germany and she wanted to enforce the CT, this time only in a different form. She succeeded at the time of the Portuguese Presidency, and the drafted treaty is called the Treaty of Lisbon, which is sometimes referred to as more a comprehensive form of the previous CT.[[157]](#footnote-157) Given that the Treaty of Lisbon is just another summary of previous treaties with new human rights definitions and the removal of previous pillars, few are able to perceive its supranational nature and the arrangements for democracy within the EU.[[158]](#footnote-158)

Nevertheless, it was later signed by Gordon Brown, mainly because of Whitehall's good relations with the CEE states, which partly supported British Euroscepticism in Europe.[[159]](#footnote-159) This result was also due to previous negotiations on the CAP with a positive outcome for the British. Another factor was the change of prime minister and so far, the minimal problem of immigration after the Bolkenstein directive[[160]](#footnote-160) proposal. The Lisbon treaty thus underwent almost no considerable obstruction due to the fact that the British negotiated traditional opt-outs again[[161]](#footnote-161), even though they wanted to participate in the core of the project, for fear of the growing eurozone.[[162]](#footnote-162)

From the very beginning of Thatcher to the end of G. Brown, there is an alternating trend towards Europe in British politics, but there is an indisputable parallel between all prime ministers. The main element of this parallel lies in a decent relationship with Europe at the beginning of their mandate, which turns into a Eurosceptic view at the end. Though, this phenomenon is complemented by the fact that Europe is an issue for them, in which everyone disagrees not only within the cabinet but also within the party. As a result, there is great disagreement at several levels of attitude, either towards the EU or towards its own citizens, on EU policy issues.

This phenomenon is further explained by Michelle Cini in her public opinion analysis[[163]](#footnote-163). Decent results in domestic politics are precisely caused by the policy of promises and frequent delineation towards the EU. This effect, combined with the previous setbacks of either the Prime Minister or the ministers, has really created a detachment from the core of European politics. However, as a result of these failures, they also suffer in domestic politics, as European politics is actually domestic politics as well. This is due to the fact that MEPs from Britain sit in the EP and all laws and regulations of various forms[[164]](#footnote-164). go to the British Parliament. There, they are also subject to approval and adjustment by British MPs.

Therefore, the question of whether Europe is the one that restricts the autonomous nations is very erroneous, as these nations manage the project and implement their own policy. The British were thus unable to reach their demos in Europe and show their citizens that it was impossible to constantly turn to their history and prolong something that is already gone. In this respect, Britain did not even help the media, which had criticized the European project, almost from its inception to the Brexit.

The most common portrayal of the EU in Britain was the idea of the continent's elitist project controlling Britain as a vassal state[[165]](#footnote-165). In the end, everything converged on Brown's successor, David Cameron, who truly listened to the people's views on the EU. Thus, fundamentally helping them solve their problem once and for all[[166]](#footnote-166). The crucial question remains whether the citizens knew and really wanted to leave the Union, but from today's point of view, it is rather a better question whether the cabinet knew it.

# Consequences of 2016 referendum on UK and development of UK and EU relations

Previous information points to rather unclear developments for British politics. This fact is particularly evident after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the correlation with the economic crisis in 2008, which is also associated with the collapse of the euro area. The end of Gordon Brown's term indicated a fundamental change in British politics. The Conservative Party had been able to consolidate its positions on critical issues of the crisis and the EU. Yet, the Conservatives were partially helped by Gordon Brown's lack of action in the area of migration from CEE. Migration had become such a crucial issue for the British, as immigrants made up 15%[[167]](#footnote-167) of the total workers.

The result was hostility towards the EU, but not only due to migration but also to increasing bureaucratization and centralization of power, which was unacceptable to the British. It was all the less understandable why they approved the Treaty of Lisbon or their original proposal to give CEE countries access to the British market immediately after accession. The consequences of the eurozone collapse and unbalanced migration were major factors for the British to choose different leadership that represents their will.

The British chose the young and charismatic David Cameron, and it can be speculated that he represented the same change as Tony Blair. His approach and promises of change within the EU had given citizens hope that Britain will act differently from Europe on economic recovery and return jobs to its own citizens.[[168]](#footnote-168)

## 5.1 The period leading to Brexit

Britain had been moving slowly towards Brexit since its first referendum, the result of which was to maintain the status quo. In the above-mentioned chapters, it was stated that Britain had joined in almost the worst period and later had to deal with several shortcomings of the project. This contributed to the British Eurosceptic view so much that they were never able to empathize with the project. This was due to a myriad of factors such as the media that define the British mood towards Europe, as well as economic downturns over the years. Based on previous information, it can be stated that British indifference to the EU and reluctance to participate in it is based on its past from the fifties. If Britain took its part in the beginnings of integration, it could be its leading member today and also shape it to its imagination.

Nonetheless, the British failed to participate at the beginning of the project and fundamentally influence it, thus gaining a secondary position within the union due to their reluctance to integrate.

In the period of David Cameron, they got to the edge of the project, which, for example, forced them to leave the EPP and move to ECR[[169]](#footnote-169). The result was a subsequent aversion of British citizens to the EU, and this trend has gradually fluctuated since the collapse of the eurozone[[170]](#footnote-170). This development had been abused by the long-standing UKIP party without serious backing in the past but slowly gaining the support of citizens dissatisfied with domestic, and European policy.[[171]](#footnote-171)

The fragmentation of the system and growing dissatisfaction forced Cameron to act quickly. His attitude became more and more Eurosceptic, trying to alleviate the moods in society that reflected dissatisfaction with the excessive migration from CEE combined with slow economic recovery. Cameron thus saw the split of smaller parties such as Plaid Cymru or the Northern Irish parties (DUP, Sin Fein) on the issue of EU membership. The worst thing for him, however, was that his government was in a coalition with the Liberals who supported EU membership.[[172]](#footnote-172) For Cameron, this meant a very difficult situation because some of his own backbencher MPs were also beginning to oppose EU membership. Cameron came up with a statement to stop *"banging on about Europe"*, which de facto created an even worse atmosphere.[[173]](#footnote-173)

The same pattern began to emerge in a society that was strongly polarized on the issue of EU membership, and Cameron decided to resolve it with his Bloomberg speech. In his speech, he announced the possibility of a future referendum, which secured him the votes of voters across the political spectrum who were against the EU[[174]](#footnote-174). According to Clarke's research[[175]](#footnote-175), it is clear that the people's attitudes were so polarized that Cameron had to succumb and his coalition partner did not have enough leverage to do anything about it.

Subsequently, in 2013, a bill passed in the parliament[[176]](#footnote-176), which stated the need to hold a referendum by 2017 at the latest. This necessarily created a condition for calling it, it was a reaction of already dissatisfied citizens but also politicians. Before the referendum, Cameron tried to negotiate better conditions so that he would not have to give citizens the opportunity to decide on such a fundamental issue as EU membership[[177]](#footnote-177). Nonetheless, the negotiations did not turn out well at all, because the EU was in crisis and therefore questions about other British opt-outs were not on the table.

Dissatisfaction grew drastically and the British slowly began to form two main groups for the referendum. The first group was the Remain campaign, which failed to grasp the issue of membership sufficiently and used only the so-called Project Fear[[178]](#footnote-178). The second group was the Leave campaign, which had a much better financial background and was backed by several important figures, unlike in 1975[[179]](#footnote-179). The inclination for the referendum to take place shortly after the election was self-evident, but now it was a question of how the government should cope with the will of the citizens in contrast to the interests of the country. The result was a vague approach in all areas and to the deceitful Leave campaign, which attacked undecided citizens with completely inadequate statements.

At this time, Europe had just recovered from the crisis and now had to address the issue of the biggest renegade of the project that still wants better conditions than the others. An excellent example is Angela Merkel's speech in the UK parliament when she suggests to Britain lawmakers that she is not able to help Britain in this regard or any other[[180]](#footnote-180).

This only deepened mistrust in the EU, even though Cameron was in favour of remain and aware of the value of membership. Despite the EU's opposition to the direction of British politics, Cameron decided to proceed towards the referendum. In this way, he tried to avoid a further split of voters or prevent the further success of UKIP as in the 2014 EP elections[[181]](#footnote-181). His consolation was the Scottish referendum from 2014 in which he managed to maintain the status quo. Based on this, he considered the possibility of a membership referendum as an option as he did not perceive other factors.

It could be said that Cameron hoped that people would vote as in the case of the Scottish referendum, which is according to Clarke referred to as the LeDuc Law of referenda[[182]](#footnote-182). The author Clarke speaks of Cameron's gamble in which he gained support in the case of the Scottish referendum and is now trying to replicate the same result in the case of EU membership.[[183]](#footnote-183) The crucial question, then, is whether Cameron wanted to avoid the fate of previous prime ministers who failed to come to terms with the EU and eventually succumbed to the domestic influence of dissatisfaction[[184]](#footnote-184).

The process of the referendum already indicated significant problems that could arise in the event of the success of the Leave campaign. These mostly came from economists or the IMF, which must have disturbed Cameron himself. This is one of the possible reasons why he changed his position so fundamentally before the referendum was announced and wanted to negotiate new conditions[[185]](#footnote-185).

His attempt to negotiate Britain's almost new position within the Union was virtually impossible. It would thus set a precedent for already Eurosceptic states to continue in this British direction.

Therefore, the EU decided to comply with Cameron only on minor requests that would not disrupt its own functioning. Cameron's approach is so unquestionably ironic, as the British have already had an opt-out[[186]](#footnote-186) from further integration after Lisbon. In the end, the result of Cameron's negotiations did not satisfy most of the already decided British, and even those who were still hesitant. Surveys shortly before Brexit indicate that the gap between the two camps began to narrow[[187]](#footnote-187).

Cameron could not even condemn the false campaign or sufficiently define the real problems that would arise in the case of Brexit. He himself acted similarly to the Remain campaign with the project fear tactic, which eventually proved to be disastrous.

## 5.2 Developments prior to Brexit

The perception of the forthcoming referendum was hope for the people to break out of the dysfunctional EU system. At least that's how a large number of people perceived it, but the question is whether they were really able to present this idea as their opinion.

The reason is the specificity of British society, which is mainly influenced by traditional media and mostly politicians or public figures.[[188]](#footnote-188) The mood before the referendum was just pointing out the obvious shortcomings of politicians, and personalities like Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, and Gove have just taken advantage of this. They managed to act as elites representing the opinion of the people[[189]](#footnote-189), but again the question arises as to whether the people were sufficiently informed on this issue.

What led to uncertainty among voters was a lack of awareness, which Nigel Farage eventually seized with his deceptive campaign. Clarke mentions that he tried to persuade both determined and undecided voters to leave the EU with a populist approach[[190]](#footnote-190). He grasped almost all topics and overwhelmingly criticized the EU, of which he was paradoxically a Member of the European Parliament.

Cameron and the rest of the cabinet were unable to defend the EU sufficiently, and indeed not at all because the Conservatives themselves suffered from considerable uncertainty about the EU. For the British, and especially the ruling elites, regardless of the party, the EU has always been a burden in comfortable governance in their own country. The cabinet's only response was to send leaflets[[191]](#footnote-191) with information on the referendum and the EU. However, this was sadly insufficient compared to the way Farage campaigned Leave with others like Johnson or Gove. On the contrary, almost nothing could help the Remain campaign, because the Project Fear strategy did not work from the beginning.

The attempt to intimidate people with the economic disaster that the EU and the cabinet warned of was no longer taken seriously, especially because people did not see Remain as a campaign that understood their needs[[192]](#footnote-192).

The effects of Leave's deceitful campaign had a catastrophic impact on Remain that was unable to cope with such amount of populism. The Leave campaign gained strength in all respects and bordered on the boundaries of standard political campaigns, as they often spoke of terrorism and mass migration.

It is also worth mentioning their false statements about sending 350 million pounds a month to the EU. At the time, they put this statement on a bus traveling through London, but after Brexit, this statement was denied, and this money will not be allocated to the NHS as promised by UKIP.[[193]](#footnote-193) This phenomenon was very topical in 2015 with the migration crisis.

The data pointed to a very small difference between Remain and Leave[[194]](#footnote-194). This fact could no longer be overlooked, as the economic risks of the performance were, in combination with other factors, absolutely crucial, and yet the Leave campaign did not even mention them.

With a brief summary of factors such as the dishonest campaign, the influence of the media, and economic impacts, everything was influenced by the so-called cues and valence policy. These factors are addressed by the author Goodwin, who describes the causes of Brexit through valence politics[[195]](#footnote-195). In conclusion, the closer the referendum was, the more obvious it was how drastically it would affect the outcome of the undecided voters. However, Cameron's approach and the very poor defence of the EU, which could hardly come when Britain avoided most integration or be at the heart of Europe, played a decisive role. The willingness to integrate within the EU is fundamental to the development of member states, as Goodwin states[[196]](#footnote-196), but the British approach is also critical. Their approach is seldom moderate but, on the contrary, rather indecisive or extreme[[197]](#footnote-197).

It is very difficult to assess whether Cameron is at all responsible for the referendum even though he was against it with the rest of the cabinet[[198]](#footnote-198). In this case, it is possible to speculate to what extent the British unwillingness to integrate within the EU was the core of the problem. It seems possible to draw at least one conclusion, which is the British reluctance to give up its position and accept the need for the existence of a political entity such as the EU, which ensures the functioning of modern Europe.

## 5.3 The main cause of Brexit

The previous chapter identified the key moments before Brexit. In this chapter, these moments will be further expounded on the basis of the causes of Brexit. On most of these causes, several authors agree, but the clear cause is indeterminate.

Throughout its history of membership, Britain has gone through several setbacks and quarrels with the founding members, who perceived the EU as a completely different entity from the British. This image of the EU was largely negative, and the media did not try to change it, let alone the political elites, as they used it to profile themselves in domestic politics. Therefore, finding a clear cause is impossible, because Britain has slowly begun to profile itself within the EU through its failures.[[199]](#footnote-199)

Before defining the causes, it is necessary to state on the basis of what, according to the author of Goodwin, people make decisions. These factors include the cues and valence politics as already mentioned. Based on these factors, it is clear that people will make decisions based on cues, which are politicians, the economy, and feelings about the EU and other parties[[200]](#footnote-200). A very important factor is Downs' spatial politics[[201]](#footnote-201), in which he states that parties will try to cover as many topics as possible. In this way, the Conservatives will try to steal the topics of UKIP, which could help them to cover the gap that UKIP managed to create. Cameron and the cabinet failed to clearly express support for the EU, and this was also closely linked to the declining popularity of the cabinet according to data from YouGov[[202]](#footnote-202).

According to the defined valency policies, this is critical for the citizen who follows the opinions of leaders. By that Conservatives have denied themselves a fundamental position in which only credible leaders can push through the main questions about Brexit. That's why politicians like Farage and Johnson have seized the key debating areas about Brexit. In this way, for all supporters of Brexit continued to dominate the issue of migration, which was constantly repeated and exaggerated[[203]](#footnote-203). The data thus show that people's trust is essential. It moved from the Conservatives and Labour to the UKIP as traditional parties lost support[[204]](#footnote-204). The data points to constant transitions of citizens' moods and, above all, unclear attitudes, because the situation was constantly changing, and the campaign became more hectic with each passing day[[205]](#footnote-205).

This is further emphasized through an individual approach to specific domestic or foreign issues. The data point to people's dissatisfaction with the EU, and it is possible to conclude that people are dissatisfied with the loss of political sovereignty. Area, age, gender, education, or income are also influencing factors. Each of these factors fundamentally affects an individual's approach to the EU and their awareness[[206]](#footnote-206).

The main driver of Brexit is migration, but not the one from 2015, but the one that Britain gave the green light in 2004 to CEE countries. Even before the Bolkestein directive, they did not resist cheap labour from the CEE countries, which essentially improved it economically. However, it did not perceive what impact it would have on its future, which did not become apparent until several years later. It is possible to speculate that the British would withstand this pressure, but not in combination with other factors that drastically intensified the British reluctance to open up to Europe.

Then there was the political crisis in Europe after Lisbon, in which the EU's democratic deficit grew to such an extent that the Union was losing its own demos[[207]](#footnote-207). At that time, the British were no longer willing to be part of this demos and therefore still hoped that they would only benefit from the SM[[208]](#footnote-208). In principle, this did not succeed, because migration to Britain increased during the euro crisis, which ultimately accounted for the already mentioned 15% of economic workers. The British benefited from this migration, as it benefited the economy, but not the citizens, especially in non-cosmopolitan areas[[209]](#footnote-209). That is why there has been a fundamental dichotomy on migration issues between people and even the Cabinet.

Through the issue of immigration, it was possible to fundamentally influence the debate on the referendum and to abuse this topic to influence undecided voters. Therefore, immigration, the NHS, and the economy have become valence topics of the 2016 referendum[[210]](#footnote-210). The British wanted to have control of each of these issues and not share it with the EU. All these factors resonated especially with UKIP voters who, based on the data, are less educated, do not live in large cities, and often no longer work or fall into the lower-income class[[211]](#footnote-211).

It was mainly UKIP voters who heard these ideas often but could not suspect that their reversal could not be achieved in today's world. As part of the failure, author Helen Thompson sees British hesitation on EMU issues and in Cameron's later talks with Merkel. Conversely, she draws the most attention to the trap that the EU got into, and because of it the British left. The trap is the lack of power to change something, and on the contrary, it is criticized for having too much power over the Member States, creating a paradox in which citizens de facto lose faith in this project[[212]](#footnote-212).

Therefore, allowing CEE countries access to the Britain market had been a crucial mistake. In this case, it was indeed a Trojan horse, which the British consciously invited, unlike everyone else in 2004. Antipathy intensified when the British began to recover from the crisis and yet saw economic migration from Europe where much of the crisis was still ahead of them.

The author of the article Europe after Brexit also sees the problem in this and points out the importance of 2004, in which the British expected changes within the EU. These changes occurred, and even a change in the balance of power within the EU, although these were changes positively received by the British, in the end, they did not find new allies within the EU[[213]](#footnote-213).

Through this fact, the EU has moved from its original functioning of the so-called permissive consensus to a more democratic model. Permissive consensus is defined as the effort of elites who act independently without restriction by other bodies or actors. This allowed them to bring their citizens the most benefits from the EU, but that has changed since the 1990s[[214]](#footnote-214).

This fact is further elaborated by the author of the article Roots of Brexit with the theory of unpreparedness of the British for changes after 2004. Until then, the British fundamentally benefited from membership, despite many disadvantages. Nevertheless, he perceives their progress since 1992 as a failure, in many respects when they have not decided to have a single agreement approved through a referendum. The main problem, as the author points out, is that migration, on the other hand, benefits Britain economically[[215]](#footnote-215).

In this regard, it is necessary to mention the opinion of the author of Charles Grant. He comes up with identical ideas concerning British reluctance to solve European problems that were crucial points leading to Brexit. The author emphasizes the critical role of the media and their influence on citizens, especially in Britain, where they play a much greater role than in other EU countries. This fact was very relevant during the CT crisis in 2005 and which the British managed to avoid. He points to the fact that the ideas of Brexit were already very topical at that time, even without all the factors of migration or the collapse of the eurozone[[216]](#footnote-216).

## 5.4 Brexit

Brexit was the result of the already mentioned migration from CEE, but also the fear of the migration crisis in 2015. Side factors were the media's efforts to discredit the EU and citizens lack of knowledge of what the EU really is. An example of this ignorance is portrayed in a 2011 report aimed at the British population. In fact, this report showed some support for the EU, but only in areas that the British considered essential. In other respects, they had no idea what the EU was doing and on what basis it was working[[217]](#footnote-217). Such a degree of ignorance of the EU and reluctance to participate in integration could only lead to what we know today as Brexit. The British were really unique in this because the report[[218]](#footnote-218) on the willingness to accept a European identity was badly lost by the British.

Brexit is thus a successful interplay of the already historical mistakes of British policy towards the EU and then the factors that appeared shortly after 2000 and lasted until the referendum in 2016. This is an integral part of the factors mentioned in previous chapters, but it is necessary to emphasize what brought so many people to the referendum. It was the fear of the migration crisis and terrorism in 2015, as highlighted in that year's report[[219]](#footnote-219). In this report, terrorism is indeed considered the biggest threat in the EU at the time. Farage and other populists abused it so well in many forms and persuaded very specific groups of Britons to vote as they did.

Shortly before the referendum, it was clear that the cabinet was very unpopular, and also the considerable division of conservatives did not help. Cameron urgently needed to keep his promise about the 2013 bill and prevent greater fragmentation or dissatisfaction among people. Before the referendum, the data showed a small advantage for Remain[[220]](#footnote-220), which meant nothing, because people usually make decisions based on emotion[[221]](#footnote-221). The decisive factor was the feelings of people and cues, especially towards politicians who represented a moderate direction compared to Farage.

The culmination was the referendum of June 23, 2016. The referendum was attended by 72.2% of voters and 51.9% were in favour of Brexit. This ended British membership of the EU and its Eurosceptic nature[[222]](#footnote-222). A closer look at the data and regions can lead to a correlation between several factors that determine the electoral mood. All indications point to that older, unemployed, and less educated voter were in favour of Brexit. Clarke also points out that there is a clear correlation between UKIP voters and those who voted for Brexit[[223]](#footnote-223). The data also indicate that people at risk of economic migration and from poorer regions were also in favour of Brexit. Results indicated the failure of the Remain campaign, which bet on Project Fear that failed to intimidate voters to vote according to LeDuc Law and maintain the status quo. This time, the British did not address the economy as in 1975, but rather their autonomy, because they were concerned about it[[224]](#footnote-224).

The same correlations can be made by comparing data from the authors Zhukovskii[[225]](#footnote-225) and Kosenikov[[226]](#footnote-226) from the Knoema portal. The data thus indicate insufficient participation of young people and, conversely, high participation of the elderly and the less educated or non-working. Specifically, it is possible to point out the regions that are affected by a high rate of migration and are stagnating economically due to globalization. Based on this, it can be concluded that people naively hoped that they would gain their original economic and political power.

The referendum led to the resignation of David Cameron, who was replaced by Theresa May, and with her came an uncertain period. During this period, Theresa May called early elections to consolidate her power, but she failed and fundamentally weakened her position, on the contrary, she lost her majority. Subsequently, she had very difficult negotiations with the EU. The EU was led by Michel Barnier and the entire team of European diplomats, which acted as one entity of 27 states. Britain, led by chief negotiator Davis, faced itself against the political giant[[227]](#footnote-227).

When simplifying the whole issue of Brexit, it is possible to encounter two fundamental problems. The first is the lack of support for Theresa May in Parliament regarding the withdrawal agreement that led to her replacement by Boris Johnson. The second factor is the border of Northern Ireland, otherwise known as the Irish Backstop. According to O'Rourke, Ireland will to some extent be part of the Single Market, making it part of the EU[[228]](#footnote-228). This created a hybrid model to prevent potential conflict. After the Brexit architect Boris Johnson took over the position of prime minister, the business agreement was finally negotiated and becoming valid from 31.12.2020.

Therefore, when assessing the economic impacts of Brexit, it is not easy to find a consensus. Author Goodwin states[[229]](#footnote-229) that the economy will not be so affected by Brexit and will be able to cope with it. He also states that since joining the EC the British have experienced only economic growth except for a few declines within the economic cycle. Nevertheless, it states that barriers or conditions to WTO trade must not arise between the EU and Britain. Perhaps the most interesting finding is the positive effect of migration on the economy, which is acknowledged by both Clarke[[230]](#footnote-230) and the author McNamara. McNamara further elaborates on how the referendum was caused by cleavage politics and enabled the consolidation of the power by elites. The biggest failure is that the British complained about something they could actively influence and still they did not[[231]](#footnote-231). After Brexit, they will have a very strong and united neighbour next to them, over which they will no longer have any influence.

Brexit was completed in December 2020, when both parties agreed on the final text of the trade agreement. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement[[232]](#footnote-232) points to Britain's efforts to avoid barriers to trade, but not to be part of the single market. Originally, they wanted to achieve the Swiss or Norwegian model, but it would still mean an even worse position than they were in. It can be read from the agreement that Britain does have a very specific partnership with the EU, as Britain remains outside the single market, but to some extent, both sides have barrier-free access to their markets[[233]](#footnote-233). In some sectors, Brexit has had critical impacts such as banking, stock exchanges, and most importantly on fisheries. Leaving the CFP is not only a big problem for British fishermen, but also creates economic uncertainty for the sector in the future[[234]](#footnote-234).

The conclusion and the very result of Brexit is that in the period of the referendum, Britain did not even realize what could really happen when leaving the EU. The result was a paralysis between the years 2016-2019 which might continue after 2021, as stated by the author Pippa Norris[[235]](#footnote-235). The author points to the success of conservatives who have been united on Brexit all along and have taken Labour’s votes. What is most surprising is the impact of Brexit on the regions. Some regions have just promised a return from Brexit to economic and prosperity and a greater degree of political freedom[[236]](#footnote-236).

However, they will now suffer from the loss of the ERDF and the principle of subsidiarity, which is likely to make them even poorer. The EU has taken care of the regions through the integration system since the 1990s[[237]](#footnote-237). Britain will now have to take back this role, and Boris Johnson is already working on it. The author of the article Project Love considers his actions as buying voters with subsidies to regions that have long operated thanks to the EU[[238]](#footnote-238). Based on this, it is possible to observe a certain parallel with the late 1970s. But it is unlikely that Britain will be able to replicate the successes of the 1980s accompanied by the economic boom.

## 5.5 The future of Britain after Brexit

It is not yet possible to determine exactly what Brexit actually means for Britain. This reasoning is likely to be unclear in the future, as Britain will have to be closely linked to the EU, regardless of its departure. It is thus more of a pragmatic step that the British cannot actually avoid. This fact is pointed out by Springford's analysis, which is based on the fact that the British will have to comply with previous market regulations if they want to trade with the EU[[239]](#footnote-239). This fact almost forces Britain to fall into the EU's economic orbit. This is due to the fact that during their membership, the British have become very closely linked to the single market, so it is nearly impossible to find new trading partners on basis of FTA.

In today's globalized world, the effort to focus on other markets almost makes no sense for the British. Especially because the trade balance and integration with the EU is so large that it is disadvantageous for the British to allocate their exports elsewhere. This fact is emphasized by Malaubdic et al. in their analysis of the economic interconnectedness of Britain and the EU[[240]](#footnote-240).

Currently, Britain, like most of the developed world, is led by services, and Brexit will have a major impact on them. This is pointed out by data from Investopedia[[241]](#footnote-241) that are showing a significant drop in GDP shortly after Brexit. In contrast, it is possible to use an older analysis from Belke, from which it is clear that Britain will feel an economic loss due to Brexit[[242]](#footnote-242). For a complete comparison, it is also possible to state Hope's analysis of the impact on London, in which most European stock exchanges and banks lie[[243]](#footnote-243). Although this is an analysis that preceded the UK-EU agreement, yet it works with hypothetical scenarios in which London almost always stagnates economically. Even so, it has more potential to cope with those consequences of Brexit better than the rest of Britain.

Based on previous information, it is easy to come to the conclusion that Brexit certainly did not help Britain on the economic or political level. Therefore, it is only possible to take into account their distinctive approach and sense of superpower and pride, as stated by the author Shapiro[[244]](#footnote-244). According to the author, Britain today may be a middle power that, no matter what, will still not be able to leave the imaginary orbit of European politics. The biggest problem is that Britain will try to do this, no matter what, instead of accepting this fact long ago. It is also worth mentioning the survey for the EP from 2018[[245]](#footnote-245). It showed that the British are not the most Eurosceptic, on the contrary, those were CEE countries, i.e., young democracies.

The saddest aspect about this is that Britain has left the EU only because of their reluctance and lack of knowledge about the European project. Even gloomiest is that one of the oldest democracies let herself be influenced by blind populism from those that acted only for their own good.

The conclusion is that people have not had the opportunity to ratify European treaties through referendums, as had been the case in other countries. In principle, the British never took part in shaping politics, whether European or domestic. In Britain, this power is mainly in the hands of the government and parliament, unlike in Switzerland. It was all the odder when Cameron accepted this possibility and decided to try his next gamble. Unfortunately, he lost this gamble because he gave people the opportunity to decide the future of their country, in which the British did not have much experience.

The British, no matter what, will still have to gravitate to Europe, because today they are inextricably part of it. Throughout their history, they have been involved in Europe, according to Reynolds, and have always tried to thwart the possibility of a European hegemon[[246]](#footnote-246). Today, they no longer have to fight for power equilibrium in Europe, because the continent stopped playing this game seventy years ago. Yet, as Reynolds states, no island is an island, the British thus should be part of the continent and perhaps for the best adhere to their traditions in which they excel. After all, Europe can offer the British a lot, and so can they to her.

# Conclusion

As a conclusion of the work, I would like to evaluate the results and answer the established hypothesis. By evaluating the work, I would state that the formal elements of the text partially lack a more thorough logical division. This shortcoming is caused by the complex division of historical interpretations in individual chapters. The aim was to create a cohesive and stratified text which is not always possible in the case of interpretation of historical events that require continuity. Thus, my effort was to create a partially continuous storyline from the beginnings of integration to the British departure from the EU.

The evaluation of the used literature, in this case, will be based on my topic and its current course. There were several publications at the time, but the very development of Brexit makes many sources out of date. The whole process of Brexit ended last year which meant a lack of quality publications that would provide full-fledged information. Due to the fact that Brexit is a very current topic, it was not possible to choose unequivocally academic texts. So far, many texts related to Brexit have focused on very specific topics, and thus there is a lack of a general summary of the issue. Therefore, all the Brexit literature I have used belongs to a greater extent within the academic framework but is also intended to suit the needs of interested readers.

The work dealt with the issue of the relationship between the UK and the EU. This relationship was described through an objective interpretation of historical events or a depiction of the attitudes of fundamental actors in this period. However, the topic of Brexit could not be unambiguously concluded without further analysis of data and information, so it is an interpretation based on the sources I used.

Finally, I would like to address the hypothesis and other statements defined during the work. The answer to the established hypothesis is that Brexit was beneficial to the British only in some areas, but not in those that are essential in the current world. These areas are the economy, foreign policy, and democracy, and in all these areas Britain is likely to be weakened based on the data presented. Nevertheless, the British have won their imaginary autonomy and sovereignty from the EU, so it is very difficult to draw a clear conclusion. The only clear assumption is that the British managed to achieve the so-called Pyrrhic victory. The result is an unclear position in the world for the British that they will have to resolve quickly, otherwise, Brexit was a step backwards.

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# Resumé

Závěrečná práce se věnuje problematice vztahu Spojeného Království a Evropské unie od vstupu do evropského projektu v roce 1973. Zaměřuje se však i na období evropské integrace ještě před vznikem samotného projektu, tímto poskytuje širší kontext ke kompletní analýze vývoje vztahů mezi těmito dvěma subjekty. V práci je převážně zastoupen pohled ze strany Spojeného Království, který je úzce komparován s tím evropským. Záměrem je vysvětlil příčiny euroskepticismu a následně objasnit vývoj okolo Brexitu, který zásadně změnil nejen britskou, ale i evropskou politiku.

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