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**POST - CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PEACE
CASE STUDY OF KOSOVO**

Bachelor Thesis

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Declaration

I declare that I carried out this bachelor thesis on the theme “Post – Conflict Peacebuilding towards Sustainable Peace: Case Study of Kosovo” individually under the guidance of Mgr. Martin Hrabálek, Ph.D., and only with the cited sources, literature and other professional sources of information mentioned in the enclosed list.

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In Brno, 2016

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Markéta Grbavčicová

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Abstract

GRBAVČICOVÁ, Markéta. *Post – Conflict Peacebuilding: Case Study of Kosovo*. Bachelor Thesis. Mendel University in Brno, 2016.

This bachelor thesis focuses on Post – Conflict Peacebuilding more particularly on the case of Kosovo. The first part deals with the issue of post – conflict peacebuilding and sustainable peace itself. How it evolved over the time, what are the basics and on the other hand what are the main challenges of it. Further the aim is to see the Kosovo case in its complexity starting after the First World War up to date. Moreover, there is focus on what actions by the international community followed right after the war ended including brief evaluation. The overall aim is to see whether the involvement of external actors at the end and right after the war ended led to establishment of a sustainable peace in the region. This is evaluated based on three basic measuring characteristics.

Key words: Post – conflict peacebuilding, Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, peace studies

Abstrakt

GRBAVČICOVÁ, Markéta. *Post – konfliktní budování míru: Případová studie Kosova*. Bakalářská práce. Mendelova Univerzita v Brně, 2016.

Má bakalářská práce se zaměřuje na post – konfliktní budování míru a to přímo na případu Kosova. První část se řeší samotnou problematiku post - konfliktního budování a udržitelnosti míru. Jak se během času budování míru vyvíjelo, jaké jsou jeho základy, ale na druhou stranu také jaké jsou jeho výzvy. Dále se práce snaží prozkoumat komplexně případ kosova od konce první světové války do současnosti. Také obsahuje krátký popis misí, které po válce v Kosovu probíhali. Současně je cílem práce zkoumat jestli činy mezinárodní komunity po válce v Kosovu vedli k založení udržitelného míru v regionu. To je ohodnoceno na základě tří jednoduchých měřítek.

Klíčová slova: Post – konfliktní budování míru, Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, mírová studia

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INTRODUCTION

This bachelor thesis is mainly focused on post – conflict peacebuilding and achieving sustainable peace. It is examined on the case of Kosovo. It describes the evolution of post – conflict peacebuilding including the United Nations peacebuilding evolution. Further, it elaborates on the case of Kosovo in wider context starting after the First World War through the eruption of the war in the 1990s up to today’s arrangements. The main emphasis is put on the post – conflict peacebuilding and immediate evolution after the war in 1998 – 1999. The aim is to map the role of external actors in the post – conflict peacebuilding and sustainability of peace in the region based on measuring characteristics of this particular conflict.

Why is it important to discuss this kind of topic? Although, the world is relatively peaceful nowadays. Looking around there are still many violent conflicts. The most urging and recent example is the war in Syria. Where thousands of people are being killed and suffer and one of the reasons why it still goes on, after almost six years of conflict, is inefficiency of the international community to agree on something, end the conflict and to start building a sustainable peace in Syria. Therefore, if we can look at a case of Kosovo, where the international community intervened, ended the violence and significantly helped to save lives, to protect people and to contribute towards sustainable peace in the region. Although, it was not trouble – free, the end of war and the period right after war was quite smooth. Therefore, looking at lessons learnt in Kosovo and using them around the world could be very beneficial. Of course, peacebuilding cannot be approached like “one size fits all” but the knowledge from relatively successful case might be helpful for the future ones.

Concerning the structure of my bachelor thesis, in the first chapter there is described the aim of the paper as well as methodology used in order to achieve the goal. In order to set a firm bases to the thesis in the second chapter there is the evolution of peace studies and of the post conflict peace building. Further, there is focus on different forms of violence and what is required to maintain a sustainable peace. Lastly, the United Nations peacebuilding is addressed since the UN is one of the big players and shapers of the peacebuilding concept as we know it today.

In the third chapter, there is a closer look at Kosovo historical background between the end of the First World War and until the point when the international community intervenes in Kosovo. The case of Kosovo is very complex reaching back to 14th century and it needs proper analysis that would assess especially the ethnical dimension and an evolution of the issue. That is what has been done in the third chapter that gives a sense of the Kosovo context. We need to understand the past in order to understand better the presence and future.

The fourth chapter discusses about the actions taken by the international community that aimed to end the war and the actions taken immediately after the war. In this chapter, I focus on the main three international actors involved in the Kosovo territory. And those are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations and the European Union. At the end of the chapter is a brief conclusion of criticism of the actions the international community has undertaken and major events that happened in that period.

Subsequently, the chapter five consists of the main outcomes of the practical part of my thesis. It analyses the measuring characteristics that I set on the beginning in order to assess in what state is Kosovo right now in terms of peace. The main things that were look at is the demographics of the region, level of structural violence and homicide rate.

The last chapter, the sixth one, offers a different perspective on the sustainable peace in the region. It is important to take into consideration also different measuring characteristics than those assessed in this work. That is why this chapter was also included to make the conclusion more feasible.

In the conclusion, there is presented the outcome of the thesis including the suggestions what should be taken into consideration while ensuring sustainable peace in Kosovo.

1. AIM AND METHODOLOGY

The aim of the bachelor thesis is to assess how involvement of the external actors in post – conflict peacebuilding in Kosovo led to achieving a sustainable peace in the region. It should be assess through the actions taken and their impact on the development after the war.

The overall research strategy and the main method used is a case study of Kosovo in a context of post – conflict peacebuilding. This research strategy was chosen in order to assess the issue of Kosovo within the region in its complexity and to create the bigger picture of the issue.

The topic dimension of the question of Kosovo is the time dimension and spatial dimension. The time dimension was determined from 1918 to 2016. The reason to choose this time frame is that after the First World War it was for the first time when Kosovo and rest of Albania were tore apart and ended up in different countries. From the opposite side, the issue is assessed up to today to see the long term implications of involvement of external actors and long term effects of building a sustainable peace in the region. Regarding the spatial dimension, it is Balkan more specifically the Kosovo territory. Since it is very interesting territory in regards to ethnic conflicts and following process of reconciliation after the war. It is also territory where NATO forces were deployed to help the peacebuilding efforts as well as UN Peacekeeping force and also peacebuilding activities of the European Union. These dimensions serve for a deeply contextual analysis. Since the case of Kosovo requires a holistic approach and cannot be examined only partially.

The research question in this bachelor thesis is:

- *Did involvement of external actors in Kosovo after the war in 1998-1999 help to build a sustainable peace in the region?*

This research question was chosen in order to find out the direct and indirect impacts of external actors during the conflict and the most importantly after the conflict and during the post – conflict peacebuilding in the country. Whether it is beneficial for the both sides

to involve external actors to the post – conflict peacebuilding, it does not have any effect or it makes the peacebuilding worse than if no one would get involved in the process.

As main measuring characteristics for the research question were chosen:

1. Demographics of Kosovo
2. Level of structural violence
3. Homicide rate

In order to clarify, demographics in the region was a key, because the major conflict cause was the ethnic – based structural violence. The majority of Kosovo inhabitants are of Albanian descent. Therefore, there will be assessed, how demographics evolved before, during and after the conflict, and how it influenced the violence during the conflict.

At the point the direct violence erupted, the structural violence was no longer bearable. Consequently, another measuring characteristic is the level of structural violence, for example, access to education of all ethnic groups, involvement in the society, probability of getting a job by each ethnic group, etc.

The last measuring characteristic is the homicide rate i.e. number of violent deaths per population of 100,000. It was chosen as an indicator of safety and direct violence in the region.

To sum it up, *demographics of Kosovo* was chosen as a natural element of the region that nevertheless led to the violence, both structural and direct. Therefore, there are added measurement characteristics for both of them. To see how structural violence evolved we will measure *its level* and for direct violence, we will measure a *homicide rate* in the region. Based on my assumption, these three characteristics should help to properly and objectively assess the situation before and after the involvement of external actors and assess the sustainability of the peace within the Kosovo territory.

2. PEACEBUILDING

2.1 History of the Peacebuilding

The first institutionalized efforts of post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding date back to the end of the Second World War, more particularly to the cases of Japan and Germany. At that time the term used to describe the process was *Nation – building*. It was not focused on economic reconstruction but a political transformation of the country, more precisely it could be defined as the democratic transformation of post – conflict societies and its institutions under a supervision of foreign military forces.

This approach was mainly undertaken by the United States and its allies from the fifties to seventies of the 20th century. Further, it was defined by collective activities of non – governmental organizations, international governmental organizations, and private institutions and companies. It led to an increase of NGOs in this area (Waisová, 2008: 26 – 28).


The discipline of Peace studies was established in the 1970s by the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung, who is known as ‘father’ of Peace studies. He founded the term “peacebuilding” in his article *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*. He describes peacebuilding as an elimination of direct violence but also elimination of the structural violence (Galtung, 1976: 297).

Accordingly, we distinguish between two kinds of peace: *negative peace* and *positive peace*. The difference between these two is the presence of structural violence. Negative peace is defined as a state where direct violence is absent but structural violence remains. On the other hand, positive peace is described as a state where both, direct and structural, violence is absent. It is where life can be experienced to be bliss (Galtung, 1996: 2).

To clarify, direct violence is meant in direct ways of hurting and harming. On the contrary, structural violence is a state with no physical harm. However, the structure and institutions are frozen and are more favorable for certain individuals or groups. It can be also defined as an unequal distribution of resources among individuals and groups. It is most commonly political repression and economic exploitation. There is also a third form

of violence and it is cultural violence which is behind the structural violence. It is simply put the culture that legitimizes the structural violence in the society. Therefore, as can be seen at the figure below (see fig. 1), cultural violence set the ground for structural violence. Further, if there is overwhelming, long – lasting structural violence there is a high probability it will accelerate into a direct violence (Galtung, 1996: 2).

Figure 1: Flow of Violence



Source: own graph; Galtung 1996; 2

From this definitions emerges that in order to build a sustainable peace, we must focus on the structure eliminating the structural violence. According to Galtung (1976: 298), we need to establish *the structure of peace*. His suggestion is as follows. We should focus on 6 main areas:

- | | | |
|---|---|----------------|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Equity; 2. Entropy; 3. Symbiosis; 4. Broad scope; 5. Large domain; 6. Superstructure. | } | Infrastructure |
|---|---|----------------|


These above are the crucial points that should be taken into consideration in order to create the structure of peace. Beginning with equity, the structure should not exploit any of the involved parties. Relations within the structure must be entropic, it must be removing the social distinctions. It must ensure that not only elites and centers are involved but broad variety of people. Symbiosis demonstrates a high level of independence in regard to exchange within the system. Further, broad scope of exchange must be ensured. It should not be purely economic. And lastly for infrastructure, there should be a large domain of parties to the exchange. Finally, in order to build lasting

sustainable peace, the country should be absorbed into superstructure. It is the further step taken towards peacebuilding (Galtung, 1976: 298 – 299).

Further development in peacebuilding was brought in 1990s. After the end of Cold War, there was a push within the United Nations to change the approach towards the international relations. There was no longer urgent threat and need to act reactively. Then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published an annual report in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: not paged) called *An Agenda for Peace*. This report makes concept of peacebuilding familiar within the United Nations. Boutros-Ghali states there: *“I turn to the problems that the Council has specifically requested I consider: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping - to which I have added a closely related concept, post-conflict peace-building.”* According to this report the peacebuilding is defines as an *“action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”*

There is a need to clarify terms in order to distinguish between preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. Preventive diplomacy takes place before the violence starts and its goal is to prevent the conflicts. If the conflict occurs despite of the preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping are there to stop the violence and attain the peace. Then there is set ground for post-conflict peacebuilding. Post-conflict peacebuilding has a goal to strengthen and solidify peace in order to prevent violence from reoccurring (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: not paged).

Figure 2: Basic life-history of conflicts and the phases of engagement



Source: Lund, 1996: 290

The distinction is further explained on the figure above (see fig. 2). You can see that the post – conflict peacebuilding starts immediately after the conflict stops. Firstly, it occurs during instable peace and later it is transformed into a stable peace. That is the state when the conflict is resolved and we are striving to establish durable or sustainable peace (Lund, 1996: 290).

Another UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, helped to further develop the peacebuilding concept by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Brahini Report in the year 2000. According to him, the post-conflict reconstruction should consist of many parallel and integrated activities that should start after the direct violence ends. Goal of these activities is to consolidate peace in the area. He elaborated on the key activities which are: demilitarization, institutional reform, law reform, police reform, monitoring of human rights, election reform, and support of social and economic development. At this period the United Nations contributed significantly towards post-conflict peacebuilding development (Waisová, 2008: 30).

Another famous peace study’s author, John Paul Lederach, claim in his book *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* that we need different approaches

than only the traditional ones. Precisely he says: *“Building peace in today's conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside. In short, constructing the house of peace relies on a foundation of multiple actors and activities aimed at achieving and sustaining reconciliation.”*(Lederach, 1997: xvi).

2.2 UN Peacebuilding

The United Nations are the world’s largest international organization. Therefore, also their role in the peacebuilding is very crucial and important. This sub – chapter will be dedicated to the role of UN in peacebuilding.

As mentioned in previous chapter, the first mention about the post – conflict peacebuilding was in the 1992 Agenda for Peace by the Secretary – General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Furthermore, in 2000 in Brahini Report there was more extensive elaboration on the topic. It was defined as *“activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”* (UN, 2000:3).

It can be also defined as different measures that should prevent countries to lapse or relapse to the conflict. The main objectives are to strengthen the national capacities at different levels and lay the foundation to the sustainable peace in the region.

The essential features of peacebuilding according to the United Nations are the individual approach, one size fits all does not work in this case. Further, it is crucial to have a national ownership present and not to only rigidly implement what we want to do in the country and the third feature is to have a clear focus and therefore, have a narrow range of activities (UN, 2010: 5).

2.3 Objectives of Peacebuilding

Those were specified in the *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict* (UN, 2009). The main objectives of peacebuilding that should be taken into a consideration right after the conflict ends are as followed:

- Establishing security,
- Building confidence in a political process,
- Delivering initial peace dividends,
- Expanding core national capacity.

However, the challenge of each unique peacebuilding is to find out which objectives fit the particular case. This cannot be done on one size fits all basis. We need to assess each individual case in order to make the peacebuilding in given country effective and most importantly sustainable.

There is support needed in five areas that directly lie under the four below mentioned objectives:

- *“Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform*
- *Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels*
- *Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees*
- *Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels*
- *Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure (UN, 2009: 6).”*

These five areas must be tackled either nationally or by international actor in order to build a long lasting peace. The most crucial point is to start as soon as possible with the actual action. The first two years after the conflict are the most important ones in order not to relapse to another conflict in the country.

Further, the activities should unfold base on the particular case of the country. For example if the conflict was based on drugs smuggling, illegal exploitation of natural resources or ethnicity, those issues must be the ones that will be addressed during the peacebuilding process. It can be as well based on issues with a lack of respect to human rights bad governance and do on. It is obvious that peacebuilding has very broad agenda. However, for each individual country it will be much more narrow (UN, 2010: 12).

2.4 Challenges of Peacebuilding and Sustainable Peace

According to the *UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation* (2010: 16 – 22), there are three main challenges the peacebuilding is facing today. It is the financial challenge filling the gap of resources that the peacebuilding requires; the challenge of coordination, the national ownership is crucial and the challenge is how to coordinate all the actors and ensure the ownership of all of them; and the communication challenge, there should be a clearly set expectations and clear communication towards the people about progress and what they can count with. Moreover, since peacebuilding happens in insecure and politically fragile, it is by default challenging environment to undertake any action in.

If the peacebuilding is done right, it sets a firm basis for the sustainable peace. Therefore, the challenges are to some extent overlapping. The first one is “Partnerships for the Sustainable Peace” i.e. that one organization cannot do it alone. We need the involvement of local actors and support from the organizations as the UN. Second, we need to be clear in regards to finances. What can be invested into building a sustainable peace. And last, we need to improve leadership and make it more inclusive also for the civil society to take an action to achieve the sustainable peace together (UN, 20150: 9).

3. KOSOVO HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 In Between the Two Wars

The question of Kosovo is not an issue of recent years. It reaches far to the past. It is a complex problematic consisting of many diverse issues such as ethnicity, religion, economic – social issues, cultural – politic issues and even international – legal issues. The complexity and difficultness of the situation is caused by coexistence of majority of Kosovo Albanians and minority of Kosovo Serbs in a scarce piece of land in the middle of Balkan Peninsula (Štěpánek, 2011: 12).

Going back to the end of the First World War, on December 1st, 1918 was the territory of Kosovo was united under the Serbian rule to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, since 1929 known as a Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Although, it might be seen as a climax of efforts of nationalist to establish South Slavic country, it was more of a reestablishment of Serbian Kingdom. It was due to Serb population majority and previous experiences with governance, army, diplomacy and interior issues. During that time period, Kosovo did not constitute of its own autonomic region. It was together with Macedonia called *South Serbia* (Girgle, 2006: 33).

The integration of Kosovo into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes did not dispense with resistance from the Kosovo Albanians. Albanian rebels *Kachaks* did not want to surrender easily. It was partly caused by bad communication, since Albanian leaders thought that Yugoslavian supervision is only temporary. The Kingdom led cruel fights against the rebels and they were forced to capitulate towards the end of September 1924 (Štěpánek, 2011: 45 – 50). The resistance was something they could build up on in the later issues in 1990s. However, other than that it had more negative implications than positive and intensified repression towards Kosovo Albanians (Girgle, 2006: 38).

Very significant part of the conflicts at Kosovo territory is caused by diverse ethnicities living at small piece of land. In 1921, Kosovo had population of 469 010 citizens. Out of this number 64 percent were Kosovo Albanians (Štěpánek, 2011: 43). Although, the statistics from this time period were not the most precise, it can still serve as good example of ethnic distribution within the area.

Despite of the fact that Kosovo Albanians were represented in large numbers, they were a victims of a structural violence. Albanians were not recognized as a national minority. Therefore, even their language was suppressed. The only official language used between the two world wars was the Serbo-Croatian. Furthermore, public schools in Albanian language were forbidden and closed down. The reason behind was probably Serbian effort to keep Albanians illiterate and uneducated in order to make sure that there will not be any nationalistic aspiration for their own country. This strategy obviously worked and disqualified young Albanians from the education system. Even though they were majority, only one third of elementary schools students were Albanians and only 2 percent of them attended secondary school and high school. Moreover, those interested in higher education were usually forced to leave the country and often went to study to Albania (Girgle, 2006: 33 – 34).

Additional obstacles were put to Kosovo Albanians through colonization of Kosovo by Slavs. There are not exact numbers available, however, some estimates are talking about 12 000 families (around 60 000 people) moved to Kosovo until the year 1941. The main objective of the colonization was to change the ethnic structure and increase the loyalty to the governing bodies in the region but it did not affect the region to such extent. Second option was resettlement of non – Slavic population. However, it was not successful either. Before beginning of the Second World War the ethnic proportion in Kosovo did not change by any significant proportion (Štěpánek, 2011: 59 - 77).

In March 1941, Yugoslavian government signed agreement to join Axis powers. It was soon followed by insurgency and coup. New government was assigned to the office, but did not last long. It were countries of the Axis to invade Yugoslavia and set their own regime. Yugoslavs were not prepares for so called *Blitzkrieg* and they were soon forced to surrender. It happened on April 17th, 1941. Consequently, the Axis powers divided the territory among themselves. It was the first time in modern history to have all Albanians unified under one country, although, the country was not independent. Since then, started the cultural unification. Over 170 Albanian schools were established in Kosovo. Furthermore, Albanian defense army was formed with a primary purpose to bully Kosovo Serbians (Girgle, 2006: 40 – 42).

3.2 Post – Second World War Tito’s Yugoslavia

After the Second World War, there were extensive talks about territory arrangements at the Balkans. On August 7th, 1945, the decision was made that Kosovo would become part of Serbia. However, the decision did not reflect the opinion of everyone. On September 3rd, 1945, followed establishment of autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija. Same as Kosovo, Vojvodina became autonomous territory as well. Nevertheless, the autonomy was not equal for both regions. For example Vojvodina had 20 representatives in Yugoslavian government, but Kosovo and Metohija had only 15 representatives without further explanation. The differences remained up until year 1963, when the new constitution was approved and Kosovo had the same rights as Vojvodina (Štěpánek, 2011: 117 – 118).

Despite of this development, the situation for Kosovo Albanians was still not very good. Therefore, in 1968 there were a student demonstration across Kosovo for bigger freedoms but in a while it had escalated to demonstrations to improve the conditions of Albanians in Kosovo. Slogans such as “Kosovo – Republic”, “Live Albania” and “We want a university” could be heard in the streets. Even though, the demonstrations were heavily suppressed, the situation significantly improved. The university was established in Pristina, Albanian professors and textbooks were used to teach the language and a rapid Albanization in administration and security took place. The culmination of these events was finalized by approval of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. Thanks to the constitution its rights were enlarged and its status was almost same as of republic. The only difference was that Albanians same as Hungarians in Vojvodina were not recognized as a *nation* (*narod* in Serbian) but only as a *nationality* (*narodnost* in Serbian). The distinction between nation and nationality was that nation had a right to have its own republic within the federation but nationalities did not have such a right. The lowest category in the ethnic hierarchy was the *national minority* it was for example Roma, Vlachs or Jews (IICK, 2000: 35 - 36).

During the late 1970s, there could be observed a sense of freedom for Kosovo Albanians. The autonomic region could operate freely with minimum interference from the Serbian government. Further, there have been overwhelming positive discrimination towards

Albanians. Only one in five job vacancies in the region gained Serbian or Montenegrin. Moreover, most of the information was published in Albanian. That had as an effect ignorance of Slavs in important issues. At this point, Serbians felt more like a victims of Albanians and that they have become an ethnic minority in a state within their own state with no protection from Serbia (Vickers, 1998, 131 – 132).

3.3 Post – Tito’s Period

Another very important milestone was May 4th, 1980 when the president of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito died. He was the only one “all – Yugoslavs” leader among nations who was no longer present. Therefore after his death, the old wounds opened even more significantly. The clash between Serbian nationalism and Albanians in Kosovo had escalated rapidly (Lendvai, 1991: 251).

The situation did not remain calm for a long time. On March 1981, there was a demonstration in Pristina University’s canteen. Where the students protested about the bad quality food in the canteen. Firstly, it seemed as little harmless demonstration, but it soon escalated into something way bigger (Štěpánek, 2011: 267). At the time of establishment of the Albanian University in Pristina, no one expected its rapid growth. Until 1981, there was 36,000 students and 18,000 students enrolled in extension programmes. Majority of them was enrolled at not very perspective humanities programmes and did not get easily employed after they finished the university. It led to severe economic issues and steady growth of unemployment among youth. In 1981, it was 25.7 percent in Kosovo and in 1989 it raised up to 57 percent (Rogel, 2003: 167). Kosovo was always the poorest region of Yugoslavia. Its Gross Material Product (GMP) was only 44 percent of the Yugoslav average and further declined in 1980 to 27 percent and in 1990 to 22 percent of average GMP (IICK, 2000:37).

The demonstrations that started as an innocent student complain grew up into an insurgency calling for *de jura* recognition of Kosovo as a Yugoslav republic not only an autonomous region (Lendvai, 1991: 258). Another demonstrations followed in the upcoming weeks and the slogans they were shouting changed rapidly e .g. *We are Albanians, not Yugoslavians*. It was followed by repression and arresting throughout

Kosovo (Štěpánek, 2011: 268 – 269). By the end of 1980s, there were records of 584,373 arrested, interrogated or interned Kosovo Albanians out of about two million living in Kosovo at that time. That counts for almost half of the adult Kosovo Albanian population (Rogel, 2003: 168).

What followed was reckless propaganda from Belgrade. That was claiming that by giving more autonomy to Kosovo, it will only lead to secede of Kosovo to Albania. This rhetoric led to increased feeling of threatened Serbs at their own territory (Lendvai, 1991: 258 – 159). As the Serbian nationalism was increasing in Yugoslavia, it led to raise of Slobodan Milosevic and consequently to the adaptation of an extreme nationalistic Serbian policy. (IICK, 2000: 34).

When Slobodan Milosevic first time faced the Kosovo issue in 1987, he was an ordinary Communist party member. He was sent to Kosovo to settle down the situation in the autonomous territory. Where Serbs were complaining about unfair treatment from the Albanians police officers. Milosevic was obviously nervous. This event was probably breaking point in his nationalistic course. After mapping the situation he claimed: “*No one will ever dare to beat you again!*” and for that he became a national hero. He returned back to Belgrade radicalized and eager to continue in dealing with the Kosovo question (Štěpánek, 2011: 351 – 352). Consequently, the media campaign intensified and was openly racist. It escalated to the point that any national activities of Kosovo Albanians were interpreted as separatism and terrorism. Further, individual crimes of Kosovo Albanians were considered as political crimes (Girgle, 2006: 63 – 64).

3.4. Kosovo after Losing Its Autonomy

The situation was escalating not only in Kosovo but across Yugoslavia. The protests were raising more massively and more frequently as the Serbian anti – Albanian rhetoric increased. It all escalated in July 5th, 1990, when Kosovo autonomy was annulated as the local government was dismissed and then the occupation of Kosovo by Serbs started (Girgle, 2006: 67 – 68).

As the situation worsened, it was also being known internationally what is happening in this territory. However, there were only a weak tries to prevent the violence and they were

not very successful. The Kosovo Albanians saw the international attention as the only way to get out of this situation. Their non – violence resistance did not work and were not properly supported. Consequently, their conclusion was that the only way how to get the attention was the violence (IICK, 2000: 1).

After Kosovo was not invited to the peace talks and was only once mentioned in the Dayton Agreement (signed 1995 and ended the war in Bosnia) that was the last signal, that non – violent resistance is not working and the international attention can be obtained only by violence (Abazi, 2004: 19 – 20). Therefore, Kosovar leaders called for a civil disobedience. It led to further growth of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Judah, 2008: 79 – 80). Despite the tension and increasing violent accidents and demonstration, the war within Kosovo territory did not start until 1998.

Another event that led to KLA growth and violence outbreak was the fact that in spring 1997, Albanian government crashed. Therefore, there was a free access of KLA to weapons from Albania (Judah, 2008: 80).

KLA was proclaimed a terrorist organization by the Serbian government. Therefore, there were increasing abuses of human rights of Kosovo Albanians. It included illegal searches, detention, physical abuses and torture. It was noticed by many international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IICK, 2000: 53).

The war officially started on February 28th, 1998 when one of KLA strongman was arrested and his extended family of 58 members was killed. Until the outbreak of the war in 1998, Kosovo was no priority for the international community. They were focusing on the other Yugoslav republics that were more important in terms of status (IICK, 2000: 55 – 56). However, the way it was perceived by the international community changed after first events of the war and after massacre in Drenica, it was no longer perceived as Serbs fighting against domestic insurgency. It was more seen as a genocidal campaign against Kosovo Albanians (Abazi, 2004: 25).

Since that point the international Community took a more active role in the case. There were issued 2 warnings by the US and other NATO member states in March and June

1998. However, those empty threats did not help since it was safely ignored by Serbian army and nothing happened. UN added upon this with its resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 condemning the actions of Serbian government, imposing embargo on Yugoslavia and calling for a cease – fire and finding solution to establish a peace in the region (Abazi, 2004: 26 – 27).

In June 1998 NATO started openly discussing the military intervention of the alliance to Yugoslavia. They saw the urgency and the discussion was focusing on air strikes. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was emphasizing the need of military action since diplomacy was failing to end the crisis. According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), there were over 260,000 Kosovar Albanians internally displaced and 200,000 people fled the country as a result of attacks of the Yugoslavian army (IICK, 2000: 72 – 73).

As year 1998 was going to the end, the international community realized that Milosevic cannot be perceived as a partner in solving this crisis. Therefore, NATO decided to take action without the UN Security Council permission since Russia and China would block it. Their strategy was humanitarian intervention and to help the people to achieve democracy in that territory. Consequently, on March 24th, 1999 the NATO intervention to Kosovo started by attacking the most strategic targets (Girgle, 2006: 104 – 108). Both sides miscounted and instead of a fast short attack the bombing lasted for 78 days i.e. until June 10th, 1999, it was destroying major targets in Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro. Until the bombing ended, UNHCR more than 848,100 Kosovo Albanians fled the country and 1.45 million of them was internally displaced (Abazi, 2004: 87 – 88). Kosovo Albanians leaving Kosovo was unfortunately the undesired effect the NATO intervention had. It contributed to the Serbian goal of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo (IICK, 2000: 88 – 89).

4. ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE WAR ENDED

In this section, the key players after the war will be identified including their action towards post – conflict peacebuilding and creation of a sustainable peace in the region.

4.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The first time NATO started to talk about the involvement in the crisis in Kosovo was in 1997. When during meeting of foreign ministers expressed its concern about the ethnic tension in Kosovo. The international community was long hesitating if there should be some action taken. However, it got to the point when it was clear that Milosevic will not stop if he would not see a direct threat. Therefore, the use of force became necessary Robertson, 2000: 7).

The NATO campaign in former Yugoslavia was quite extensive. It took place from March 24th until June 10th 1999. Since the result of the airstrike was not such a visible elimination of the Yugoslav forces and did not stop them from killing of civilian Kosovo Albanians. At NATO Summit in Washington D.C. on April 23rd, 1999, they decided to intensify the air strikes in order to force the Yugoslav leadership to cooperate (IICK, 2000: 91).

The NATO mission had a clear goals set well ahead. They wanted to bring halt to Milosevic actions:

1. “ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
2. ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
3. agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
4. agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations;
5. provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations” (Robertson, 2000).

After the UN got involved and the war ended on June 10th, 1999, that was the time when NATO airstrikes were suspended and the Kosovo Force from NATO (KFOR) entered the territory. It was authorized by the United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 in the clause 4:

“The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees (UNSC, 1999: not paged).”

The one of the main aims of the KFOR was the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Majority of the former KLA were later absorbed to the Kosovo Protection Corps. That is Kosovo civil defence force (Judah, 2008: 95 – 96). Further, it was supposed to support the UN mission but still to keep its independent position. In general terms, KFOR was supposed to support and protect any international civil presence (Friedrich, 2005: 235 – 236).

4.2 United Nations

For the United Nations, it was for them the first time to take up such governing role in some conflict resolution. Under the same resolution, as the NATO was authorized to have a military presence in Kosovo, was also established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in the clause 5:

“Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo (UNSC, 1999: not paged).”

From the clause above, you can see that the main aims of the UNMIK mission are to rebuild Kosovo and provide there the transitional administration.

UNMIK is run under the Special Representative of the Secretary General and consists of four pillars. The first pillar dealt firstly with the refugees was under the UNHCR. However, after the emergency was over in June 2000, it phased out. Since then the Pillar I deals with the police and justice administration. The Pillar II takes care of the civil administration, it is UNMIK itself. Furthermore, Pillar III focuses on the democratization and institution building it belongs under the Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Lastly, the fourth Pillar IV supports the reconstruction of economy and infrastructure. It falls under the European Union (Friedrich, 2005: 237).

At the time of the UNMIK establishment in 1999, its mission was *“to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people could enjoy substantial autonomy and self-government (UN, n. d.)”* One of the steps towards it, were so – called proto – ministries. Those ministries had always two heads one foreign and one local. Further, a constitutional framework was adopted in May 2001. The framework was leading the territory towards having general election, to establish assembly, government and also presidency (Judah, 2009: 95).

In the year 2008, Kosovo declared independence. Therefore, the original mission was accomplished and they proclaimed their own country. However, it did not mean end of the UNMIK. After the proclamation of independence, it transformed and its strategic objective now is the *“promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo through engagement with all communities in Kosovo, with the leadership in Pristina and Belgrade, and with regional and international actors, including the OSCE, EULEX and KFOR (UN, n. d.)”*

The UNMIK was quite successful from the beginning. It could be seen on such indicators as over 700,00 people to return to their homes, the KLA was in process of demilitarization and turning into a civil police force, recruitment of Kosovo Police Service, economy slow recovery, and shared responsibility of local and international leaders. Despite of those

indications of healthy recovery, there were still many serious concerns (ICCK, 2000): 107 – 108).

4.3 European Union

The involvement of EU in Kosovo did not start before the 1999. It was also addressed in the resolution 1244 in the clause 17:

“Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation (UN, 1999: not paged).

The last pillar of the UNMIK, the economic development was managed by the European Union. The EU was main responsible for a macroeconomic reform in Kosovo in order to turn it more into a market economy. Further, it was supervising Kosovo’s banking sector, macroeconomic policies, taxes and budgetary systems (Fride, 2007: 2).

Further the EU contributed through the Stabilization and Association process (SAP). It was a program established in 1999 to stabilize the region of Western Balkans. Its aim was to ensure the political and economic stability in the region more specifically said state – building. Kosovo was a great destabilization of the region. Therefore, it would fit perfectly the process. However, at the time it was not a sovereign country so it could not be state – building. Due to that, Kosovo was involved only partially (Schenker, 2008: 1 – 3).

Although, Kosovo was still legally part of the Serbian Republic, it was eligible to use some of the SAP funding. Due to this EU was put into a precarious situation. Through the UNMIK it was part of the governing structures and through the SAP it was a donor to Kosovo (Schenker, 2008: 11).


As the role of the UNMIK transformed in the 2008 after the Kosovo independence was claimed, the same goes to the European Union. It was established by the European

Council in the European Union Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on 4 February 2008. It still operates under the framework of the UN Resolution 1244 from the year 1999. It was established to support “Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities, and law enforcement agencies in developing an effective judiciary based on the rule of law and free from political interference.” The mission is under umbrella of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (EULEX, n. d.)” The European Union can be considered as the most important international actor in the region after the independence was declared. The importance of stability in the Western Balkan region is for NATO as well as the European Union significant. Since it is right at their neighborhood (Verheij, 2010: 3).

4.4 Criticism Actions Undertaken by the International Community

The point of views on the success or failure of the missions varies from one person to another. According to Džihic (2009: 8), in a public poll that was conducted in 2009, were people quite happy with the NATO and their KFOR. Around 68 percent perceive KFOR positively. However, only 16 percent of respondents perceive positively UNMIK and 35 percent is not viewing the government positively.

Figure 3: Level of satisfaction with a work of main institutions in Kosovo



Source: UNDP/USAID, 2007.

The satisfaction of Kosovars can be also seen at the figure above (see fig. 3) based on UNDP and USAID data. The UNMIK is not very popular, but on the other hand KFOR seems to be very well accepted among the Kosovo population and their work is appreciated.

Looking at each pillar of the UNMIK separately, the first pillar can be considered as successful from the point of view of Kosovo Albanians since majority of them have returned back to the country. On the other hand, return of minority's refugees did not work out and even more of them left later on than returned after the war (IICK, 2000: 203).

Pillar II, the civil UN administration, based on the popularity among the people, it was failing to be well accepted. The main aim of this pillar was "*to perform basic civilian administrative functions; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo* (Council of Europe, 2005: 8)" Although Kosovo declared independence, it is still partially under supervision of the UN and not recognized by many countries. Therefore, this was partially achieved.

Regarding the pillar III that is under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, their focus was to the democratization and institution building. The OSCE has helped with organizing elections and establishing local electoral offices. Further in other institutions it helped with a training of people and serves as supervisory body (OSCE, 2011).

Last but not least the Pillar IV, the economic reconstruction and growth are the most unsuccessful parts of the mission. The unemployment is very high especially among youth and economy grows very slowly. Moreover, there is very high mortality rate of children, low level of education and polluted environment. A strong economy is a cornerstone of functioning country. There needs to be much more outcomes in this area (Lemay-Hébert, 2009: 69). What probably causes the unpopularity of the UNMIK is that 65 percent of Pristina respondents says that UNMIK is accountable for the current economic situation (UNDP/USAID, 2007: 29).

Regarding the NATO intervention in 1998, it has been a controversial topic ever since. However, the NATO mission to end the war followed up by the KFOR were considered as a success in ending the violence and saving people's lives (Dobbins, 2005).

Lastly according to Coelho (2015: 7 – 14), there were three main issues with the post – conflict peacebuilding in Kosovo. The first is a low local ownership. It is debatable if an authority over the local institutions brings more benefits or issues. However, it is argued it often lacks local knowledge and sensitiveness to local issue. The second is that the countries are after war often repaired as broken machines, only importing the processes. The local interest is not the most important thing. It applies on Kosovo as well. And lastly, the issue in Kosovo was the political corruption while building Kosovo's democracy and institutions. Kosovo is one of the most corrupt countries in the region.

4.4.1 March 2004 Riots

On March 17th, 2004, demonstrations erupted across the country. It was for the first time since the conflict ended to see such a thing and obviously the UNMIK and KFOR were not prepared to such a situation. Their reactions were very slow (Judah, 2009: 109 – 110).

It was unclear whether it was organized or only ad hoc event. Thanks to the long lasting ethnic conflict the people were tending to turn to violence easily and too many of them had still experiences with it. Put it in other words almost any citizen of Kosovo were able to do such a things as to burn their neighbor's house or violate them in any other way without clear guidance and organized actions (HRW, 2004: not paged).

It was the first large scale violence after the war. During that day 19 people were killed. It consisted of 11 Albanians and 8 Serbs. Further, 4000 Serbians fled Kosovo (Judah, 2009: 109 - 110).

The violence started in Mitrovica (see map below), which is the border city of the Serbian enclave on the north of the country. It was clear signal of a deep roots of the hatred due to inter – ethnical conflict. It was also further on the epicenter of the clashes of the Kosovo Albanians and Serbians (Briscoe et al., 2011: 7).



Source: BBC News.

It was not only shock for the people but also to the UNMIK and KFOR. It also raised questions how much they have achieved during past 5 years and where is their mission going when such a violence can interrupt (BBC, 2004).

4.5.1 Declaration of Independence 2008

The next big milestone was Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia. It occurred on February 17th, 2008 on the Kosovo Assembly. The declaration was following after two years of Pristina Belgrade negotiations that did not lead anywhere. So with the push of mainly the United States of America and European Union the so called Ahtisaari's plan was implemented. It was proposing Kosovo to become an independent state under supervision of the international community, namely the NATO and EU. However, the issue for the future become that the status of Kosovo was not settled internationally before implementing the plan (Džihic et al., 2009: 2 – 5).

It was followed by huge celebration on the independence by the Kosovo Albanians. It also triggered uprisings at the Northern part of the country as well as massive protests. It was not shock only for Serbian people, but also the government was not planning to recognize Kosovo any time soon and proclaimed that they will never do so (Perritt, 2009: 211 – 212). Further huge demonstrations were taking place in Belgrade where people were attacking western embassies and rioting in the streets. Later, Serbia was withdrawing their diplomats from the countries that recognized Kosovo (Džihic et al., 2009: 5).

Within one year after the declaration there were 62 countries recognizing Kosovo out of 192 UN members (Džihic et al., 2009: 2). Up to today, there is 111 countries recognizing Kosovo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has intentions of diplomatic communication with those yet not recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign country (Anonymus, 2016).

Despite of support of the United States of America and majority of the EU, Kosovo stays in certain “international limbo” with half of the countries recognizing it and other half hesitating to start the diplomatic relations with Kosovo. Since the independence declaration was a big push of western countries, it will be also very difficult to get Kosovo to become a member of the United Nations. Each member must be approved by the UN Security Council but Russia and China will veto such a motion. Therefore, Kosovo is stagnating at one point and to transform this situation into a movement forward will take a lot of time and efforts (Waehlich, 2011).

4.5.1 Kosovo Exodus 2014 onward

Another major event is taking place since 2014 when Serbia loosened border controls and basically allowed anyone from Kosovo to enter the country. Due to big economic problems and unemployment, this was an opportunity for the Kosovo citizens to leave the country in a search of better life. Since the majority of Kosovo’s youth population, Kosovo is the country in the youngest population in Europe, is unemployed, they often see it as the only way out. The unemployment rate among youth rises up to 60 percent and average is 45 percent. Until February 2015, it is estimated that around 50,000 people left Kosovo to the west Europe (Alexander, 2015).

Up to now, over 70,000 Kosovars applied for asylum in the European Union. Despite of amount of effort of the international community put into the economic recovery, it did not have the desired outcome. Some argue that the amount of economic and political effort put into the Kosovo had more damaging than building effect to the newly born country (Hehir, 2016).

5. ANALYSING THE MEASURING CHARACTERISTICS

5.1 Demographics of Kosovo

The demographics of Kosovo was chosen as one of measuring characteristics. Therefore this chapter is dedicated to monitor its evolution throughout the time. The percentage of Albanian population in Kosovo grew from 67 percent to 78 percent between years 1961 and 1981. The reasons for the increase were two. First, the fertility rate of Albanian women was much higher than the fertility rate of the Serbian ones. And second, Serbs and Montenegrins living at Kosovo territory were emigrating to other parts of the country. Within the same time period, around 100,000 Serbians and Montenegrins left Kosovo (IICK, 2000: 38).

However, much higher numbers were talked about across the country and in Belgrade as a part of anti – Albanian propaganda. Many Serbs leaving Kosovo were complaining also about harassment and discrimination. Objectively, it was obvious that the Serbian community in Kosovo was shrinking and consequently losing its privileges in the society. They were often claiming in the interviews conducted with them that they were afraid of physical violence as well as damage at their own properties. Further, they were often describing also institutional and ideological discrimination (IICK, 2000: 38).

Figure 4: Share of Serbian population in total population of Kosovo

	Total population	Serb population	Share of Serb population
<i>1948</i>	728,436	171,911	23.6
<i>1953</i>	804,530	189,869	23.6
<i>1961</i>	966,026	227,016	23.5
<i>1971</i>	1,247,344	228,264	18.3
<i>1981</i>	1,585,333	209,498	13.2
<i>1991</i>	1,961,515	194,190	9.9

Source: IICK, 2000: 39

In the table above (see fig. 4), you can the decreasing trend in proportion of Serbian population on the total population. There were mainly two reasons for that. First is aforementioned fertility of Kosovo Albanian women. According to many Serbs it was

politically motivated birth rate. And second, increasing number of Serbians leaving Kosovo (IICK, 2000: 39).


However, since the census is never precise enough. Therefore, let us see also different figure from different source. According to Judah (2008: 2), in 1981 there were 1.58 million citizens within the Kosovo territory. Out of that 1.22 million were Kosovo Albanians. That is 77.4 percent and only 14.9 percent were Serbians and Montenegrins that is 236 thousand. However, the estimation was even higher, counting only around 10 percent of the population were Serbians. In 1991 there was unfortunately no official census.

Figure 5: Kosovo population (in percent) by ethnicity based on the official censuses in 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 2011

Ethnicity	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981	2011
Albanian	68	64,3	67,1	73,7	77,4	91
Serbian	24,1	24,1	23,5	18,4	13,2	3,4
Others	7,9	11,6	9,4	8	9,4	5,6

Source: KAS, 2015: 35

Figure 6: Graphic representation of ethnic proportion of population of Kosovo



Source: KAS, 2015: 35

In the table above (fig. 5), you can see only the most accurate data, collected during the official censuses in the years 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 2011. Unfortunately, in years 1991 and 2001 there was no official census due to the instability in the region. The trend that we can see in the table is a downward trend in the Serbian population after 1953. As it was mentioned above, during that time there were efforts from Serbia to settle in Kosovo to force Albanians from the territory.

Despite of not knowing the numbers in 1991 and 2001, we can assume that the trend was downward according to the previous figures as well to the proportion from the year 2011 where was only 3.4 percent of Kosovo population had a Serbian descent.

Looking at the other side, despite of the efforts of Serbian government to ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians the proportion of them on Kosovo population is constantly rising and during 2011 census reached to 91 percent of the population. During the initial years after the war the United Nations Mission helped many Kosovo Albanians to return. Out of around 850,000 of Kosovo Albanians that fled the territory 800,000 returned back to Kosovo by November of the same year the UNMIK started. It is known as a quickest refugee return in modern history (IICK, 2000: 203).

Further, the high proportion of Albanians and low proportion of Serbians was probably caused of a post – war hostility of Albanians towards Serbs. Up to this point, Albanians refuse to live on the same street as Serbs and the society is highly ethnically segregated. Most of Serbs still living in Kosovo live in northern Kosovo province.

Another factor, is the insecurity of minorities in the region, they fear of return of violence. More of them fled after the events in 2004. Therefore, the post conflict violence that occurred also contributed towards minorities decreasing (Friedrich, 2005: 266). Many feared revenge from Albanians after open Serbian tries of Albanian ethnic cleansing. Therefore, they left before they were in a risk (Clark, 2002: 3).

5.2 Level of structural violence

Throughout the 20th century, the structural violence was committed to either side – Serbians as well as Kosovo Albanians. It only depended on what side was the imbalance

arrow pointing at. While Serbians were trying to minimize the Albanian influence at the territory, they were forbidding textbooks and classes taught in Albanian language in order to keep the Albanian population uneducated and not striving for independence (Girgle, 2006: 33 – 34).


After the war, there was no such a discrimination against Albanians or any minority embedded in law. However, de facto discrimination towards minorities mainly against Serbs but also Roma and others. The culture that allowed the discrimination was one of the main reasons of minorities not returning to Kosovo and many others fleeing the country also after the war ended (Friedrich, 2005: 266).

5.3 Homicide rate

Naturally, the homicide rate was rapidly decreasing after the war ended in June 1999. It is same as with the refugees return as they return back to Kosovo extremely quickly the same went to relative normal numbers. As you can see on the figure bellow, it normalized almost immediately. The undeniable factor that caused the smooth transition are the international actors and they involvement during end of the war and throughout the post – conflict state – building. Up to the date, the homicide rate is around 2 violent deaths on 100, 000. The rapid drop is incomparable for example to the homicide rates in Latin America after war.

The UNMIK and KFOR efforts undeniably led to faster reduction of the direct violence within the Kosovo territory. Since there was no Kosovo army at that time, KFOR was the one securing the territory and its borders. In this regard, the mission was successful (Triantafyllou, 2014: 5).

Figure 7: Homicide rate in Kosovo between 1953 and 2013



Source: Marsavelski et al., 2016: 20

Despite of decreasing of number of violent deaths, the region is still not safe. According to statistic data, many people still encounter with direct violence such as sexual assaults, rape and so on. However, the level is decreasing.

To connect the demographics with the homicide rate, it can be seen that more violence is proportionally committed at the ethnic minorities. I the period of time from January 30th to May 27th, 2000 there were reported 26 murders of Serbians in Kosovo and 52 Albanians. The disproportion based on the size of the ethnic groups is huge (UNHCR, 2000: 1).

6. KOSOVO AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE

According to Hoogenboom (2011: 3 – 4), besides of the issues such as bad economic situation, youngest population in Europe and lack of development that are being the main drivers of the instability in the region there are 4 most urgent things that need to be taken care of to ensure the sustainable peace in the region.

To ensure that the effective peacebuilding within the Kosovo territory we must tackle those four issues:

1. Tighten the gap between the state and the citizens;
2. Address the lack of the rule of law;
3. Decrease the mistrust among different ethnic groups especially Serbs and Albanians;
4. Improve the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia (Hoogenboom, 2011: 4).

The gap between the state and its citizens is visible mainly through the level of accountability of the government. It does not keep itself accountable to the citizens and it is a big obstacle to sustainable peace.

The main problem concerning the rule of law is corruption. Those who have money are powerful. Therefore, the rule of law has only a limited effect on those. Secondly, the north Serbian enclave is its own story. Since there are a local leaders and more systems operates, there is a lack of clarity (Hoogenboom, 2011: 4). It causes unclerness and unfairness in the country. Further, the level of organized crime is really high and it is most of the time not persecuted. Most often it is human trafficking, money laundering and drug smuggling (UNODC, 2008: 74).

The mistrust between Serbians and Albanians still prevails. It is very demanding to overcome the past but the consolidation of those two groups is critical for the sustainable peace in the region.

Now 17 years after war and 8 years after Kosovo's declaration of independence Serbia still did not recognize Kosovo as an independent country. Despite consensus of those two countries is very crucial for stability in the region none of them is willing to compromise.

Belgrade is still claiming sovereignty over the Kosovo territory (Briscoe et al., 2011: 7 – 8). Unless they reach the compromise, the tension in the region will probably last.

CONCLUSION

My research question was if the involvement of external actors in Kosovo after the war in 1998 – 1999 helped to establish a sustainable peace in the region. Despite of the efforts of the international community that were put into stabilizing and rebuilding Kosovo after the war in 1998 – 1999, the country continues to have its own struggles and crisis.

The post – conflict peacebuilding was evolving in the second half of the 20th century, when there were emphasis not only to end the violent conflicts but to further help to avoid relapsing back to the violence soon after and building a sustainable peace. Important for this thesis was also the Johan Galtung's definition of peace and its components: the direct and structural violence that were later used as measuring characteristics in practical part.

After the basis theory of peacebuilding and sustainable peace, the thesis consisted of the history of Kosovo territory, which was reaching far back to the history very troublesome. Especially in regards to the demography and fights between the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbians. As Kosovo territory appeared under the rule of Serbia within then Yugoslavia was a big shock for the Kosovo Albanians who were a majority of Kosovo population. Since the demographics were and are a big player in the territory they were chosen as the last measuring characteristic.

After the unrests of the Albanian population of Kosovo escalated to a large scale conflict on the territory. In other way put, they moved from non – violent resistance to a violent aggression. Serbian government then led by Slobodan Milosevic started openly to use military force at the territory in 1998. The rule of Slobodan Milosevic was one of the key factors in the nationalistic and anti – Albanian rhetoric Serbia was enforcing.

Despite of disagreement within the United Nations Security Council, the NATO air force campaign started in 1999 with bombing the Serbian military targets. It was the first direct involvement of the international community pushed mainly by the western world powers. Although, it lasted longer than expected, after 78 days since the beginning of bombing the war ended. And it probably helped to save many lives and stop the war quicker.

Later on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo was established. Consisting of the NATO KFOR to keep order in the post – conflict period, UNHCR taking care of return of the refugees, OSCE for democratization and institution building and EU taking care of reconstruction and economic growth in Kosovo. Those are further described in the chapter 4.

As mentioned above, based on the certain factors as the definition of peace by Johan Galtung, which is absence of direct as well as structural violence and the historical background of the region, which suggests that only way how to ensure the sustainable peace is to keep the ethnic clashes under control, I selected three measuring characteristics that were assessed in the practical part of the thesis. And it is demographics of Kosovo, level of structural violence and homicide rate.

Regarding the first one of them, demographics were and are long term issue in Kosovo. The territory is historically settled by the Kosovo Albanians but with a constant tries of Serbia to take control over it. With such a things as settlement of Serbians in Kosovo in order to push the Kosovo Albanians out. However, these tries were not successful and the proportion of Albanians is mainly increasing. The ethnic cleansing that was taking place mainly before and during the war also did not bring the desired outcome that Serbian authorities wanted. The fast return of the Kosovo Albanian refugees after war. Around 800,000 out of 850,000 of them returned within first year after the conflict. The resettlement of refugees was led by the UNHCR and it was the fastest return of refugees in the modern history and the international community managed this very well. However, it does not apply for the management of return of minority's refugees since many of them did not return and more have left after. Especially the Serbians were leaving because they were fearing a revenge from the Kosovo Albanians.

Judging by the current demographic situation in Kosovo the ethnic environment is still not very stable and the acceptance of the minorities is very hostile. The consequence is current proportion of the population by the ethnic group where Albanians stand for 91 percent but Serbians stands only for 3.6 percent.

With this being said, we are moving straight to the second measuring characteristic that has been assessed and it is the level of structural violence. Despite tries to assess it quantitatively it was very difficult to find the right indicators. Therefore, this characteristic was assessed only qualitatively in connection to the demographics of the territory. As the Kosovo Albanians were discriminated often by law and set structures before the conflicts, it caused a really deep roots to the ethnic tensions among them and especially with the Serbian minority. The tension consequently emerged to the surface during riots in 2004 and after declaration of the Kosovo independence in 2008.

The last measuring characteristic, the homicide rate, the drop after end of the war was significant and now it is around 2 violent deaths on 100,000. In compare to Latin American countries after end of civil wars there, is this drop and fast end of direct violence real success of the international community. Further, the KFOR are very well evaluated by the Kosovars in keeping the peace.

To conclude, the international community involvement in Kosovo ranks among those more successful missions. However, the main bottleneck in Kosovo is the economic growth which is absent and causes exodus of young Kosovar due to non – existent jobs and extremely high unemployment. Further, another bottleneck that remains is *de facto* discrimination of other minorities by Albanians and their continuous outflow. If we take a look on the resources that were invested in Kosovo, the economy should be boosting much more.

For the future in order to ensure the sustainable peace. It is important to ensure acceptance of the newly born country within the international community through negotiations before declaring the independence. It is important to avoid the country to be floating in limbo between being internationally recognized by some countries and by some not. Further, in such a deep ethnic conflicts, it is important to put higher focus of the reconciliation of the various ethnic groups. Thirdly, the rule of law must be enforced from the beginning to set a clear basis to the post conflict society. And lastly, it is crucial to get the civil society and local authorities involved in the process of peacebuilding after the war. Because without local involvement and ownership it will not work.

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