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**FACTORS INFLUENCING THE TRANSITION PROCESSES IN A SELECTED  
DEVELOPING COUNTRY**

Master's Thesis

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## **Abstract**

The thesis will explore the factors influencing the transition in a selected developing country. The chapters will analyze contemporary theories of various authors and scholars and further apply these theories to the situation in the selected country. The paper will unravel whether the theories currently in use are compatible with the current situation in the 21st century.

## **Key words**

transition, regime change, governance, Venezuela, third wave, global society, network state, democratization, legitimacy, representation, communication technology

## **Declaration**

I declare I wrote the thesis Factors Influencing the Transition Processes in a Selected Developing Country under the guidance of Mgr. Lenka Dušková, Ph.D. All used sources cited in any form have been acknowledged in the text and the list of sources.

In Olomouc, .....

.....

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### Zásady pro vypracování:

The thesis will explore the factors influencing the transition in a selected developing country. The chapters will analyze contemporary theories of various authors and scholars and further apply these theories to the situation in the selected country. The paper will unravel whether the theories currently in use are compatible with the current situation in the 21st century.

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Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave*. Norman; London, University Of Oklahoma Press, 1998., Zenisek, Marek. *Prechody K Demokracii V Teorii A Praxi*. Plzeň, Vydavatelství A Nakladatelství Ales Cenek, 2006., O'Donnell, Guillermo et al. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986., Linz, Juan J. *Fascism, Breakdown Of Democracy, Authoritarian And Totalitarian Regimes*. Madrid, Centro De Estudios Avanzados En Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March De Estudios E Investigaciones, 2002., Avineri, Shlomo. „On Problems of Transition in Post-communist Societies“. *Cardozo Law Review*, vol 19, no 06, 1998, Yeshiva University.,

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## **List of abbreviations**

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CLAP	Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción, Local Committee for Supply and Production
CTV	Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela
DMV	Department of Motor Vehicles
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEDECAMARAS	Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Venezuela, RB	Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
RCTV	Radio Caracas Televisión
SMS	short message service
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## Introduction

The idea of democracy was born more than 2500 years ago in the city of Athens. The premise of the concept is to give every citizen the freedom to express his opinion and vote by casting a vote in an election.<sup>1</sup> Even though the concept of democracy experienced a window of revitalization since the 1970s and the global society had been getting more accustomed to the entailments of this fact, it is utterly impossible to define a model-democracy, a proto-democracy, that would serve as a foundation for other nations to build on as each implemented democratic system is an original combination of people, cultures, ethics, values, history and other aspects specific for any given example. In the opening chapter, the author will attempt to look at democracy not simply as a form of government, but rather as a set of ethical concepts that sprouts through all aspects of our lives as a form of social unification that helps us retain stability. We will begin by looking at various models of governance and most importantly defining a democratic system as such. The thesis will highlight the concept of democracy, together with its ideals and values, to contrast other forms of government. Later, we will stress out the role that history and the previous form of governance play in directing the transition. The author will stress the importance of history based on the conclusions of scholars such as Schlomo Avineri.<sup>2</sup> In other words, it is important to look where we came from and where we are right now in order to see what lays ahead of us. The thesis will take into consideration various directions a transition can have and what drives these changes in direction in specific forms of governance.

In the second chapter, the author will look at the transitions during the third wave of democratization, as crowned by Samuel Huntington in his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*.<sup>3</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, the author had decided to divide these factors into three groups, namely economic, political, and social. To better incorporate a broader scope of these factors, we have selected two nations – Brazil and Czechoslovakia in the period between the 1970s and 1990s,

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<sup>1</sup> Hansen, Mogens Herman. *The Tradition Of Ancient Greek Democracy And Its Importance For Modern Democracy*. Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Avineri, Shlomo. *After Communism: Travails Of Democratization*. Dissent, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.



characterized by distinct factors, to demonstrate how varying actors and conditions, given by specific contexts of the nations shape the process of transition. The thesis will look at each one of the factors and attempt to determine whether the factors aided the transition processes or rather prevented transitions from taking place as defined and formulated by scholars of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The final chapter will look at the nation-shaping processes in the context of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to determine whether it presents any new drivers derived from the modern transitions. The chapter will analyze the three, previously mentioned groups of factors in the context of events in the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, focusing on the events preceding the mass-eruption of protests between 2013 and 2017, as well as the public mobilization and disobedience during the following years. This analysis will be performed in the context of newly emerged concepts of global civil society, network state, and media and modern communication technologies all of which will be presented at the beginning of the chapter.

## Objectives, aim, and methodology

The aim of the thesis is to investigate potential nuance in transitional factors in the 21st century. The work takes into consideration the recent, rapid technological development enlarging certain factors pointed out by authors such as S. Huntington, G. Sartori, or S. Lipset, which had undoubtedly shaped the most recent global wave of regime change that took place in between the 1970s and 1990s.

The work will attempt to answer, whether the regime change taking place in the 21<sup>st</sup> century Venezuela outlines the previous factors observed and described by scholars during the third wave as defined S. Huntington, and point out any potential, new elements of regime change at the beginning of the current century. Having created the categories of economic, social, political factors, the paper will examine each of these in both contexts of the third wave and the 21st century to identify, whether any of the three groups play a role more significant than the other two. The question of regime change is often presented as if having a single, primary cause stemming from either one of the mentioned groups of factors. The author of this thesis is instead hoping to detect a possible bridge between these three, interconnected aspects of regime functionality that are in his opinion shrinking and becoming wider, following the footsteps of gradual technological innovation and change.

The author had structured the thesis around the concept of liberal, representative democracy and thus, the predominant focus will be on the people of a given regime as 'the smallest unit' of a democratic nation. The first chapter provides the historical context of democracy as a governing method, followed by a detailed study of the system and its individual aspects – the people, the electoral system, and the government, to firmly anchor the concept of the governing style and identify deviations in the following chapters. To conduct this study, the author sourced primarily Giovanni Sartori, Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, Robert Dahl, George Sørensen, and John Locke. Having anchored the concept, the thesis will detail previous studies of regime change during the third wave divided into three categories; *economic*, based on Martin Lipset's analysis of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education of European and Latin-American nations; *social*, pointing out the living conditions, opportunities, and

issues concerning *the people*, based on studies of the military dictatorship in Brazil and socialist Czechoslovakia as presented by S. Huntington, Ruth Collier, Scott Mainwaring, Gordon Skilling, and Ritter, Daniel; and political factors, portraying the events from the perspective of the governing bodies of the nations. The case studies of Brazil and Czechoslovakia were selected to contrast various realities and thus gather and demonstrate a wider selection of factors in nations that differ greatly in each of the three mentioned categories. The final case study of Venezuela was selected due to the nation's democracy-leaning tendencies at the end of the third wave, and their rapid decline at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, marked by severe socio-political as well as economic issues surging the nation. Venezuela also belongs to the category of Latin-American countries detailed in chapter 2, that had rapidly improved on many of the aspects described in the group of social factors to levels comparable to non-free democratic European nations during the third wave due to modernization and thus, Venezuela at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century represents a unique blend of these two categories of nations.

## 1. Liberal democracy as a system

We begin by looking at democracy as a political system. This chapter will explore the history of the term “democracy” and provide context to its scope. Contrasting other coined terms such as communism or socialism, that can be directly linked to a specific author, democracy is a concept lacking a universal definition. Missing a “model” that could be simply followed, democracy is rather represented by a set of ideas that has been shaped and transformed throughout millennia by the sociohistorical context within a specific region that had accepted democracy as its governing system of choice.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis will attempt to outline critical aspects of a liberal democratic system without which, as argued by authors such as Fareed Zakaria in his book *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, one stops dealing with modern understanding of liberal democracy.<sup>5</sup> To clarify, when talking about democracy, one is talking about a model that is implemented into a certain context. Therefore, for this thesis, we will define our core model as a *representative liberal democracy*, contrasting the Greek direct democracy, that utilized citizens themselves as the decision-makers. Due to the nature of modern states, their size and the number of various interests that require representation, democratic nations tend to utilize a representative form of democracy. The process of selection of these representatives will be detailed in chapters to come. The *liberal* in representative liberal democracy refers to the *rule of law*, which is put in place to limit the individual representatives, according to which the elected representatives are bound to act and make decisions, contrasting illiberal representative democracies, which are at risk of loss of legitimacy due to the lack of rules and transparency in decision-making processes.<sup>6</sup>

Correspondingly, when dealing with democracy as an empty concept without any sociohistorical context, one is at risk of making incorrect and biased assumptions and even bending and reshaping the definition of democracy in a way that defies the

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<sup>4</sup> Sørensen, Georg. "Democracy, Authoritarianism And State Strength". *The European Journal Of Development Research*, vol 5, no. 1, 1993, pp. 6-34. *Springer Nature*, doi:10.1080/09578819308426577. Accessed 2 Nov 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Zakaria, Fareed. *The Future Of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy At Home And Abroad (Revised Edition)*. W.W. Norton & Company, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987.

value-based understanding of democracy itself. An example of such a false association by name could be the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an authoritarian regime, which ranks as 167 out of a total of 167 countries mentioned in the annual Democracy index assessment done by *The Economist*.<sup>7</sup> The country is seen scored with a similar outcome in other indexes dealing with freedom indicating factors, such as the Freedom in the World Index presented by *The Freedom House*. This index marks North Korea as the 3<sup>rd</sup> country with the worst aggregate scores for political rights and civil liberties.<sup>8</sup> Giovanni Sartori, a professor at Colombia University, had described the potential threat of vagueness of the term followingly:

“Among the conditions of democracy, the one recalled least is that wrong ideas about democracy make democracy go wrong. I take this to be a sufficient reason for writing this book.”<sup>9</sup>

When defining the base of our liberal democratic model, the thesis will follow the logic in Sartori's *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* and use both prescriptive and descriptive definitions, to prevent misinterpretations of this erratic term. The reason for this is given in the first chapter called *What democracy is cannot be separated from what democracy should be*.<sup>10</sup> There are numerous ideas about what democracy is and how should we measure it. Most scholars can agree on what democracy should be, rather than what democracy, applied in the real world, is. Therefore, this chapter will primarily focus on descriptive, qualitative aspects of democracy, that will be accompanied by a set of descriptive measurements corresponding to the real-world applications of the term.

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<sup>7</sup> "EIU Democracy Index 2018 - World Democracy Report". *Eiu.Com*, 2020, <https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index>. Accessed 3 Nov 2019.

<sup>8</sup> "Freedom In The World 2019: Democracy In Retreat". *Freedomhouse.Org*, 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat>. Accessed 3 Nov 2019.

<sup>9</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

## 1.1 History and the scope of democracy

The history of democracy as a system of governance stretches across history to the fifth century B.C.E., where it emerged as an alternative form of government in ancient Athens, contrasting other then-existing systems in various city-states in ancient Greece.<sup>11</sup> Democracy as a system is not a concept developed overnight, years, nor decades. Rather than that, it acts as a living, flexible and ever-evolving set of governing ideas, adjusting to the needs of various people diachronically. From the signing Magna Carta Libertatum in 1215 to the revolutions in France or America, democracy was moving forward with humankind, evolving into its current forms we witness today. These numerous implementations of a vaguely familiar term in different sociohistorical contexts had led to the fragmentation of value systems shared by people living in historical democracies and thus to an alternative perception of the system itself.<sup>12</sup>

Democracy is a concept historically revolving around the people, who are being governed. The etymology of the term democracy stems from ancient Greek compound *demokratía*, with *demos*, meaning the people, and *kratos*, indicating the governing power.<sup>13</sup> *Demos* in ancient Greece, however, did not automatically entail all of the inhabitants of the governed region, but rather the city-state's citizens. The title of a citizen was reserved for all free adult males, meaning the women, children, and slaves, was not being considered citizens, did not have the right to vote and did not take part in any decision-making processes.<sup>14</sup> The scope of "citizen" as a role and a group was gradually enlarging over time. One of the first attempts to adjust the scope of what it means to be a citizen to the modern times can be seen contemplated by the fourth American president James Madison who said: "The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Constitutions. The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar delicacy. Allow the right to vote exclusively to property owners, and the rights

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<sup>11</sup> Montesquieu. et al. *Montesquieu The Spirits of the Law*. Cambridge University Press, 1989.

<sup>12</sup> Elliott, John E. "Joseph A. Schumpeter And The Theory Of Democracy". *Review Of Social Economy*, vol 52, no. 4, 1994, pp. 280-300. *Informa UK Limited*, doi:10.1080/758523325.

<sup>13</sup> Raaflaub, Kurt A et al. *Origins Of Democracy In Ancient Greece*. Univ. Of California Press, 2009.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

of persons may be oppressed...Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property owners ...may be overruled by a majority without property....”<sup>15</sup>.

Let us explore the scope of “citizenship” enlarging with time quite rapidly, by looking at the early United States, a representative of an extremely diverse nation, described as one of the first nations to democratize during the first wave by Samuel Huntington.<sup>16</sup> In the case of the early United States, the founders of the constitution had decided to leave the decision of who is allowed to vote, where is the general vote taking place and when, to the individual state’s legislations, resulting in unfair voting practices across the country in many states. By the 1860s, the right to vote was enlarged to also apply to white males without property, excluding people bellow 21 years of age, African Americans, Native Americans, women and non-English speakers.<sup>17</sup> If we were to continue down this path, to a point where all of the above-mentioned groups had gained the right to vote, make decisions and participate in public discourse, we must fast-forward to the year 1971 and the act of congress to lower the voting age in light of the Vietnam War. In the period between 1776 – 2000, the individual states of the United States of America had passed over 14 legislative changes of the voting system, to eventually incorporate all of the citizens.<sup>18</sup> Some of the legislation that portrays the gradual development and the enlargement of the term “citizen” and their rights to vote. The author would like to highlight some of the vital changes, namely the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment of 1868 granting all African-Americans citizenship without the right to vote, the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment preventing federal or state governments from denying citizens the right to vote based on race, the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment of 1920 granting suffrage to women, the 1965 Voting Rights act that was supposed to remove discriminatory barriers that kept people of color from voting, and the 1993 National Voter Registration act that had enabled easier access to voting registration through DMVs<sup>19</sup> and public assistance

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<sup>15</sup> Madison, James, and Gaillard Hunt. *The Writings Of James Madison*. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1903, pp. 121,122.

<sup>16</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>17</sup> Schank, Roger C., and Jaime G. Carbonell. "RE: THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS". *Associative Networks*, 1979, pp. 327-362. *Elsevier*, doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-256380-5.50016-5. Accessed 3 Nov 2019.

<sup>18</sup> Epps, Garrett, The Citizenship Clause: A 'Legislative History'. *American University Law Review*, Vol. 60, no. 2, 2011, pp. 331-338.

<sup>19</sup> DMV referring to the Department of Motor Vehicles

centers.<sup>20</sup> In short, it took one of the biggest modern democratic countries over 242 years to grant equal rights to all of the citizens inhabiting the countries' states (excluding the residents of Puerto Rico, Guam, and other US territories, who are not being represented by in the United States Congress nor are they allowed to participate in the presidential elections in the United States)<sup>21</sup>, and thus fit the description of what the author sees as modern, liberal democracy in terms of its classification of a 'citizen'.

As the scope of the term 'citizen' varies from one state to another and gradually transforms itself with time, for the purpose of this thesis, the author will define "the citizens" as the people over which a given state executes its governing power (excluding minors). The reason for this is the inherited, rooted aspects of democracy, which is indicated in the term "democracy" itself. It is the free consent of the people to be governed that gives a regime its legitimacy.<sup>22</sup> Authors such as Baron de Montesquieu or Tocqueville stress out the importance of the sovereignty of the people. In his book, *The Spirits of the Law*, Montesquieu defines the principle of democracy as "the love of the laws and of our country".<sup>23</sup> "As such love requires a constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of all private virtues; for they are nothing more than this very preference itself. This love is peculiar to democracies. In these alone, the government is entrusted to private citizens. Now, the government is like everything else: to preserve it, we must love it."<sup>24</sup>, he continues.

The role of a citizen cannot be simply defined as a top-down relationship between the elected individuals and the remaining population as seen by the elected minority. An equal part of this relationship must be secured by the active participation

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<sup>20</sup> Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Jonathan Hoffman. "Registering And Voting With Motor Voter". *Political Science & Politics*, vol 34, no. 01, 2001, pp. 85-92. *Cambridge University Press (CUP)*, doi:10.1017/s1049096501000130.

<sup>21</sup> Kömives, Lisa. *Enfranchising a Discrete and Insular Minority: Extending Federal Voting Rights to American Citizens Living in United States Territories*. The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2004, pp. 115-138.

<sup>22</sup> Locke, John. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, An. Infomotions, Inc., 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. *The Complete Works Of M. De Montesquieu. Translated From The French. In Four Volumes*. Printed For T. Evans; And W. Davis, 1777, p. 76.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.



of the citizens in their democracy and preference to the public, instead of private, interest as described by Montesquieu.<sup>25</sup>

Following this premise, the primary goal of an elected government in a liberal democratic system will be defined as Cicero's *salus populi suprema lex esto*, which translates to "The health (welfare, good, salvation, felicity) of the people should be the supreme law."<sup>26</sup> This secures a reciprocal, mutually beneficial relationship between the governed and the government.

As the mainstream discourse of the past two thousands-plus years had been defining democracy using a set of ideas that were striven toward, one cannot help but see political democracy as a set of processes that are being implemented to convert these abstract ideas from paper into reality. These decision-making processes serve as a delivery method of democratic ideals as well as provide checks and balances that ensure their deontological application, following the previous premise of *salus populi suprema lex esto*.<sup>27</sup> Each individual is permitted to think and express their own opinions and through their elected representative influence the decision-making processes at the government-level. As a variety of opinions is to be expected in the general population, logically, each of these ideas is to be represented in correlation to the number of people subscribing to the same idea or school of thought. The existence of conflicting ideas and the relationship between the majority and its opposition (minority) is vital for the existence of political democracy.<sup>28</sup> In other words, "In democracies, the opposition is an organ of popular sovereignty just as vital as the government. To suppress the opposition is to suppress the sovereignty of the people."<sup>29</sup> Since 'the people' are comprised out of both, the majority and the minority, excluding any group in the decision-making processes would contradict the prescriptive ideal of democracy itself.

How does a system deal with such complexity of opinion? How does it ensure the transfer of power from an individual person to the abstract 'government'? When do the people, the *demos*, wield an actual power that translates into real-life

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<sup>25</sup> Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. *The Complete Works Of M. De Montesquieu. Translated From The French. In Four Volumes.* Printed For T. Evans; And W. Davis, 1777.

<sup>26</sup> Cicero, Marcus Tullius, and James E. G Zetzel. *On The Commonwealth ; And, On The Laws / Cicero.* Cambridge University Press, 1999.

<sup>27</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited.* Chatham House, 1987.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ferrero, Guglielmo. *The Principles of Power,* New York: Putnam, 1942, p. 217.

consequences? The answer is: at the time of elections.<sup>30</sup> It is the processes of electing representatives representing various parties, ideas, and schools of thoughts through which the people can influence decision-making, policies and overall direction of the state they live in. Democratic systems have therefore deployed strict set rules and policies that deal with the people who vote, the process of elections itself as well as checks and balances that are in place to prevent the elected representatives from abusing their entrusted power and function as a vanguard of transparency.

Let us explore these above-mentioned checks and balances in detail. We have divided these checks and balances into three categories to ensure all parties and crucial decision-making processes are included. The first category, *the people*, covers the decrees in place to protect the state's governed individuals; *the electoral system*, which describes the rules according to which citizens can participate in the elections and elect their representatives; and finally, *the government*, a category outlining the checks and balances ensuring the entrusted power cannot be kidnapped by the elected government.

## **1.2 The people**

There are three facets of *the people* that will be mentioned. Let us introduce the first one. Any discussion about liberal democracy would be incomplete without addressing the issue of *equality* of the people. We have previously mentioned that a key element of a democratic system is the representation of all existing ideas and schools of thought that may be traced to various groups of people. It is therefore critical for all groups and individuals, with the exception of minors, to be bound by the same rules and for them to be granted access to the same set of freedoms and liberties. In a democratic system, all citizens are to be treated equally no matter their race, gender, creed, social status or any other artificial category we can create to differentiate one human being from another. We talk about "...a society whose ethos requires of its members to conceive themselves as being socially equal."<sup>31</sup> As we saw with the example of early democratized

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<sup>30</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

United States and its legislative changes mentioned above, granting equal rights and equal opportunities to all can be a process requiring a vast amount of time.

If all citizens of a society are equal, everyone holds the same amount of power - the power to make decisions. However, for their power to be recognized and put into practice, the people must be *sovereign*. What precisely are we referring to when we talk about the *sovereignty of the people*? The characteristic of such a state is that the people are the source of the state's power and stand behind the decision-making processes. In other words, all government authority emanates from the people, who further exercise this power through legislative, executive and judicial bodies.<sup>32</sup> We talk about a government by the people as opposed to government by the one (monarchy) or the few (Oligarchy).<sup>33</sup> The people, free and independent to make their own decision are said to be the essence of a democratic state.<sup>34</sup>

There are many types of freedoms we can discuss. When discussing 'free people' in this thesis, what is being described is people granted political freedom, in contrast to other freedoms. The reason for this is that "...political freedom is not of the psychological, intellectual, moral, social, economic, or legal type. It presupposes these freedoms - it also promotes them - but it is not the same as these."<sup>35</sup> Sartori continues to describe political freedom as a freedom *from* something rather than freedom *to* something. "We have political liberty, i.e., a free citizen, as long as conditions are created that make it possible for his lesser power to withstand the greater power that otherwise would, or at any rate could easily overwhelm him. This is why the concept of political freedom primarily assumes an adversary connotation. It is freedom *from* because it is freedom for the weaker."<sup>36</sup> It is the government's responsibility to ensure the protection of human rights and civil liberties - the freedoms of its citizens under a constitution. Human rights in this context will refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as

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<sup>32</sup> "The Constitution Of The Czech Republic". *Psp.Cz*, 2020,

<http://www.psp.cz/en/docs/laws/constitution.html>. Accessed 6 Jan 2020.

<sup>33</sup> Anderson, Jonathan F. "Book Review: Zakaria, Fareed, *The Future Of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy At Home And Abroad*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003". *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, vol 26, no. 3, 2004, pp. 460-463. *Informa UK Limited*, doi:10.1080/10841806.2004.11029455.

<sup>34</sup> Tocqueville, Alexis. *Democracy in America* (trans. George Lawrence). Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969.

<sup>35</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987, p. 298.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 302.

presented by the United Nations in 1948. These rights are derived from natural laws and are independent of local legal jurisdiction.<sup>37</sup> Following this line of thought, we must address civil liberties. Unlike human rights, civil liberties are not universally set. Rather, they represent a set of limitations placed on the government of a given country that has been put in place to prevent the government from interfering with one's freedoms.<sup>38</sup> These freedoms are put forward in the form of constitutions, bills of rights or other legislation, all of which are contextual and thus reflect the society in which they're found.

Equality of the people, their sovereignty and their individual freedoms are indicators proving that the citizens of a given country are indeed *demos*, rather than simple subjects of a higher power over which they have no control. "Free elections with unfree opinion express nothing. We say that the people must be sovereign. But an empty sovereign who has nothing to say, without opinions of his own, is a mere ratifier, a sovereign of nothing."<sup>39</sup>

### **1.3 Electoral system**

Having outlined the requirements for the category of *the people*, we move on to the *electoral system*. Elections are complex processes through which the people of a given country elect their representatives. Electing a representative is important for a simple reason - the power of the people in the period in-between two elections is rather inactive. Instead, the people exercise their power by electing representatives who are expected to be further representing their best interests in the elected government on their behalf. Based on the previously mentioned criterion that each individual holds the same power, that is a single vote in the election process, all votes are counted and based on the majority-rule principle the representatives are chosen.<sup>40</sup> The purpose of this subchapter is to characterize elections as a democratic process that is decisive and transparent, conducted to reflect the will of the people.

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<sup>37</sup> "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights". *Un.Org*, 2020, <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>. Accessed 6 Jan 2020.

<sup>38</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

We begin by describing democratic elections as free, fair, recurrent and competitive. In order to define the freeness and fairness of elections, we will be drawing on an essay by Jørgen Elklit and Palle Svensson published in the *Journal of Democracy* in July 1997, which examines the relationship between elections and democratic development and attempts to expand on one of Robert Dahl's institutional prerequisites of democracy, that of free and fair elections. While the only indication Dahl gives for free and fair elections is that the "elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon"<sup>41</sup>, the authors of the essay go into great length to create a checklist of specific criteria for election assessment. Firstly, an important distinction between individual phases of the voting process was established. As the term "elections" often only connotes the election day itself, the authors divided the elections into three time periods: 1) pre-election period, campaigning and registering the voters; 2) the election day the vote-counting processes; 3) post-election period – announcing the results. Before we examine individual criteria in these periods, let us set definitions for both "freedom" and "fairness". Freedom, according to Jørgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, correlates closely with the voters as individuals. Having free access to all means necessary to form an opinion in the pre-election period, making a free decision at the poll and later living freely with the consequences of one's decision is contrasted with restricted options in the mentioned time period, limited freedom of choice of one option over another, and fearing the consequences one's choice might have in the future.<sup>42</sup> Fairness, in this context, is with regard to the election process itself. It is defined as "...unequal treatment of equals, whereby some people (or groups) are given unreasonable advantages"<sup>43</sup> and is closely tied to the transparency of the elections and conditions provided to all parties involved in the process. The authors provide a full list of requirements that are necessary to be fulfilled in each phase in table 1. To elaborate on the dimensions, conditions provided encompass both the voters - granting them rights such as freedom of movement, participation, speech, access to voting stations, right for the secrecy of the ballot, and the possibility to complain, all candidates in the election race, who are to be granted

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<sup>41</sup> Dahl, Robert A. *Democracy And Its Critics*. Yale University Press, 1989, p. 221.

<sup>42</sup> Elklit, Jorgen, and Palle Svensson. "What Makes Elections Free And Fair?". *Journal Of Democracy*, vol 8, no. 3, 1997, pp. 32-46.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

equal opportunity to participate in a transparent electoral process using an orderly political campaign, share the same access to media presence, and the entity in power, who is to secure access to all polling stations for representatives of the political parties, accredited local and international election observers, and the media, ensure impartial treatment of candidates by the police, the army, and the courts of law, and finally, requires all involved in the process to accept the result of these elections.<sup>44</sup>

Table 1 – Checklist for Election Assessment <sup>45</sup>

Time period	Dimension	
	Free	Fair
<b>Before polling day</b>	Freedom of movement Freedom of speech (for candidates, the media, voters and others) Freedom of assembly Freedom of association Freedom from fear in connection with the election and the electoral campaign Absence of impediments to standing for election (for both political parties and independent candidates) Equal and universal suffrage	A transparent electoral process An election act and an electoral system that grants no special privileges to any political party or social group Absence of impediments to inclusion in the electoral register Establishment of an independent and impartial election commission Impartial treatment of candidates by the police, the army, and the courts of law Equal opportunities for political parties and independent candidates to stand for election impartial voter-education programs An orderly election campaign (observance of a code of conduct) Equal access to publicly controlled media Impartial allotment of public funds to political parties (if relevant) No misuse of government facilities for campaign purposes
<b>On polling day</b>	Opportunity to participate in the election	Access to all polling stations for representatives of the political parties, accredited local and international election observers, and the media Secrecy of the ballot Absence of intimidation of voters Effective design of ballot papers Proper ballot boxes Impartial assistance to voters (if necessary) Proper counting procedures Proper treatment of void ballot papers Proper precautionary measures when transporting election materials Impartial protection of polling stations
<b>After polling day</b>	Legal possibilities of complaint	Official and expeditious announcement of election results Impartial treatment of any election complaints Impartial reports on the election results by the media Acceptance of the election results by everyone involved

Having described the voters as making their choices freely in a process that is legitimate and transparent, we continue by addressing the criterion of competitiveness. At the beginning of the thesis, we have stressed out the vital role of opposition in a

<sup>44</sup> Table 1

<sup>45</sup> Elklit, Jorgen, and Palle Svensson. "What Makes Elections Free And Fair?". *Journal Of Democracy*, vol 8, no. 3, 1997, p. 37.

democratic system. We have provided the distinguishability from other governing systems, such as monarchy and oligarchy, as one of the ways democracy can be defined. Competition in the context of this thesis describes a situation in which parties and individuals outside of the influence of the ruling majority have the capability to compete against the party or individual in power in free and fair elections. A scenario, which is being described, is one where equality of the people, mentioned previously, extends into the realm of pursuing a political career and all participants are granted equal opportunities in the political race.

Finally, to ensure that the power to govern is not gripped by a group or an individual for an extensive period of time, elections must be recurrent. Given the fact that democracy, as a governing system, is an adjustment of certain ideas to a socio-cultural and historical context in a given time, it is difficult for us to provide a specific time-frame after which elections should re-occur.<sup>46</sup> The recurrence of elections doesn't just vary from country to country but also depends on the nature of the elections. The time-frame in-between elections that are presidential, legislative, senate, regional, municipal or concern any other type of governing body may vary. The timeline of elections is provided by the constitution or any other form of a legal agreement providing a precedent and establishing procedural guidelines for the country.<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless, the recurrence of elections will be regarded as one of the milestones of a legitimate democratic system in this thesis.<sup>48</sup> The thesis will later explore the question of the timeframe in which an election is introduced after a transition and the impact of various timelines on the outcome of the given transition.

The legitimacy of elected representatives is a pivotal aspect of a system that derives its power from the consent of its people. Therefore, a transparent process of elections granting. This subchapter had outlined the requirements for such legitimacy and thus described the character of democratic elections.

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<sup>46</sup> Avineri, Shlomo. *After Communism: Travails Of Democratization*. Dissent, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.

<sup>47</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

## 1.4 The government

It was said that the government is elected based on the preferences of the *people* it governs and thus reflects and represents their interest. If this premise is true, why is it important to talk about rules that check and balance these representatives?

“Democracy is the power of the people over the people. But the problem then takes on a completely different twist; it does not consist only of the up-going of power but, even more, of its downward descent. If, along this two-way process, the people lose control, then the government *over* the people is in danger of having nothing to do with the government *of* the people.”<sup>49</sup> What does Sartori assert by the government losing its connection to the *people*? Any history book can provide enough grim insight into the consequences of a transfer of governing power into the hands of an individual or a closed group of people. In most cases, unlimited power leads to its abuse in ways that often strips the citizens of their rights and freedoms.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, Madison notes that “The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?”<sup>51</sup> This subchapter will explore the characteristics of democratic governments as well as the checks and balances in place to ensure enforcement of the constitution.

The most fundamental restriction this subchapter will open with is the separation of powers of the government. For the purpose of this thesis, we will be looking at the separation of the government, or the *trias politica*, as presented by Montesquieu in his *Spirits of the Law* in 1748.<sup>52</sup> To prevent the cumulation of power, Montesquieu proposed a system in which he divided the responsibilities of the government into three, equal branches, each acting independently. The branches are not only independent of each other though, as each of them possesses a means to limit the other two and thus prevent them from abusing their power.<sup>53</sup> Even though what has

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<sup>49</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987, p. 30.

<sup>50</sup> Avineri, Shlomo. *After Communism: Travails Of Democratization*. Dissent, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.

<sup>51</sup> Hamilton, Alexander et al. *The Federalist*. Liberty Fund, 2001, p. 268.

<sup>52</sup> Montesquieu. et al. *Montesquieu The Spirits of the Law*. Cambridge University Press, 1989.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.



just been said may portray individual branches as in conflict with one another, which they often are, all three of them still function as one unit – the government.<sup>54</sup> Later, Madison talks about the necessity to divide the power in his essay *Federalist no. 51* and describes it as a “... great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”<sup>55</sup> Let us now mention the individual branches. The individual powers and the forms of bodies of the government of each of the branches may vary from country to country depending on the given constitution.

*The legislative branch* of the government is a body entrusted with considering, amending and enacting laws prepared by the executive branch, or other members of the legislative body. Various countries name their national-level legislative body in different ways with “congress”, “parliament” or “assembly of representatives” being the most common.<sup>56</sup> The members of this body are selected during elections and are referred to as representatives. Besides enacting laws, the legislative branch of the government also holds the executive branch accountable for its actions, functioning as a check to balance its power.<sup>57</sup>

*The executive branch* is responsible for the implementation of the laws enacted by the legislative branch. The body has the power to establish embassies and enforce laws.<sup>58</sup> It consists of the government of individual ministers with the president (depending on the constitution, the president may be joint by the head of the government – the prime minister)<sup>59</sup> acting as the head of the government. The executive branch has the power to veto the laws enacted by the legislative branch and thus forms its check.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Taft, William Howard. "The Boundaries Between The Executive, The Legislative And The Judicial Branches Of The Government". *The Yale Law Journal*, vol 25, no. 8, 1916, pp. 599-616.

<sup>55</sup> Hamilton, Alexander et al. *The Federalist*. Liberty Fund, 2001, p. 268.

<sup>56</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987.

<sup>57</sup> Taft, William Howard. "The Boundaries Between The Executive, The Legislative And The Judicial Branches Of The Government". *The Yale Law Journal*, vol 25, no. 8, 1916, pp. 599-616.

<sup>58</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987.

<sup>59</sup> "The Constitution Of The Czech Republic". *Psp.Cz*, 2020, <http://www.psp.cz/en/docs/laws/constitution.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Taft, William Howard. "The Boundaries Between The Executive, The Legislative And The Judicial Branches Of The Government". *The Yale Law Journal*, vol 25, no. 8, 1916, pp. 599-616.

*The judicial branch* is the dominant, decisive force when it comes to the interpretation of the constitution and various laws. Its main task is to interpret the constitution and apply their findings to real-life cases and scenarios.<sup>61</sup> The body is a multi-level system of courts and judges, in most cases nominated by the president and appointed by the legislative branch.<sup>62</sup> Its ability to check the legislature lies in its ability to declare laws proposed by the legislature as unconstitutional and similarly, declare executive acts as unconstitutional, to check the executive branch.

Having described the division of power into individual branches, we must still address their relation to the law and their transparency. We have previously stated that the ideas of democracy rely on deontological factors. In other words, we expect the outcomes of the democratic processes to be based on objective truth, following a set of fixed, given rules. Correspondingly, we expect all of the citizens, including the elected individuals, to be subjects to the same rules no matter their background, race, status, wealth, etc.. The principle of *rule of law* simply states that no one is above the law, contrasting other, previous ideas such as the divine right rule that had placed the ruler above the law.<sup>63</sup> Montesquieu contrasts the virtuous men of ancient Greece and those, who do not obey by the rule of law in the third chapter of *Spirits of the Law*; “The political men of Greece who lived under popular government recognized no other force to sustain it than virtue. Those of today speak to us only of manufacturing, commerce, finance, wealth, and even luxury. When that virtue ceases, ambition enters those hearts that can admit it, and avarice enters them all.”<sup>64</sup>. In his comparison, we see the consequences of the deterioration of “the rule of law” in the 18<sup>th</sup> century – greed and personal interest over *salus populi suprema lex esto*.

We will close the government section with the principle of the majority rule, minority rights or, in other words, limited rule of the majority. Firstly, we look at the terms “majority” and “minority” in three groups of context as presented by Sartori. He created these groups to demonstrate, that the terms majority and minority can be bent

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<sup>61</sup> Taft, William Howard. "The Boundaries Between The Executive, The Legislative And The Judicial Branches Of The Government". *The Yale Law Journal*, vol 25, no. 8, 1916, pp. 599-616.

<sup>62</sup> "The Constitution Of The Czech Republic". *Psp.Cz*, 2020, <http://www.psp.cz/en/docs/laws/constitution.html>. Accessed 6 Jan 2020.

<sup>63</sup> Hamilton, Alexander et al. *The Federalist*. Liberty Fund, 2001.

<sup>64</sup> Montesquieu. et al. *Montesquieu The Spirits of the Law*. Cambridge University Press, 1989, 22.

in various contexts to correlate to different things, creating confusion in the discourse. Sartori did acknowledge the necessity to protect minorities in certain contexts by quoting James Madison in his *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited* on page 133; "Give all the power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all the power to the few, they will oppress the many.' The intent, then, is to avoid giving 'all the power' either to the many or to the few by distributing it in turn and/or concurrently to majorities and minorities."<sup>65</sup> Let us now present the three contexts provided by Sartori and describe the role of majority and minority in them.

In the first, *electoral* context, Sartori focuses exclusively on the role of the majority. The elections are compared to a game (in which the winner wins by receiving the majority of the votes). In this context, he says, "whoever votes with the minority (thus failing to join a plurality) is on the losing side: His vote counts for nothing. In voting, then, "minority" simply denotes those who must submit to the will of the majority (even if a simple plurality)."<sup>66</sup> Therefore, in the context of voting, the minority has no rights.

In the *constitutional* context, the focus is put on the minority and its right of opposition. In the author's views, this was the context in which the majority rule is the most perilous.<sup>67</sup> The author clearly articulates the dangers of the 'tyranny of the majority', as crowned by Tocqueville and by John Stuart Mill, in the constitutional context where the majority obtains unlimited, or absolute power. Instead, what he proposes in the constitutional context, is the *limited rule of the majority*, to prevent the majority from crushing the opposition and seizing the control of the state, suppressing the minority.<sup>68</sup>

This chapter has elaborated on the structure of the elected government and the rules it is obliged to obey. We have presented Montesquieu's division of power in detail and provided evidence for its necessity in a democratic system. Having described each branch of the government, their functions, powers as well as checks they hold to balance the powers of the remaining branches, the chapter provided enough historical insight

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<sup>65</sup> Elliot, Jonathan, and James Madison. *The Debates In The Several State Conventions On The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution*. J.B. Lippincott, 1941, 5:203.

<sup>66</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987, p. 134.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

into the consequences of governments not obeying by the law. Finally, the categories of “majority” and “minority” have been enlarged and contrasted in various contexts to demonstrate the variability of their use in the discourse.

### **1.5 Measuring democracy and democratization**

The thesis has so far provided a detailed prescriptive description of democracy, tracing back the origin of the term, depicting its use in the discourse and expanded the term by describing its individual elements. Even though the character of this thesis is primarily qualitative and prescriptive, we cannot leave out the descriptive, quantitative ways to formulate the term democracy. Due to the scope limitations, we continue by briefly describing different descriptive ways used by scholars to identify the level of democracy in a given country. The author had selected three various methods one can use to obtain quantitative data when measuring democratization and the status of democracy in a given country. The methods we have selected are namely: *The Freedom House index*, *Polity IV*, and a method proposed by professor Vanhanen. These three methods have been selected to contrast one another as well as to explore different aspects of democratic systems. Unfortunately, there is no universal tool that could simply give us a universal answer to our questions, and thus it is necessary to select the proper tools for the proper task. The Freedom House Index takes aim at individual political rights and civil liberties, placing the conditions set for the *demos* at the forefront. The Polity IV was designed to interpret data put forward by the elected government officials and thus reflect on their reality, concerning primarily the processes and conditions presented by chapters 1.3 and 1.4. Finally, the method proposed by professor Vanhanen takes a close look at the power distribution in a nation. Combining the previous two actors – the governed and the governors, Vanhanen had assigned the highest significance to the degree of competition and the degree of participation of the people in the elections.

The first measurement method this subchapter will mention is the Freedom House Comparative index. The Freedom House publishes an annual report called the *Freedom in the world*, scoring 195 countries and 14 territories in how “free” the

countries are.<sup>69</sup> The “freedom” is determined by a score received in two categories – there are 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. For each of these, the country can receive 0-4 points with 0 marking the least free and 4 being the freest. After this assessment, the countries are given a separate rating for their political rights and civil liberties based on the previously mentioned questions. Scores 1-7, with 1 being the freest and 7 being the least free, are given to individual countries. The average of the score for political rights and civil liberties are combined to determine the freedom status of the inspected countries. In the end, what we are left with a figure showing us the status of the country with 1.0 – 2.5 being *free*, 3.0 – 5.0 *partly free* and countries that scored 5.5 to 7.0 are designated as *not free*.<sup>70</sup> We chose to demonstrate this particular index as it reflects on the freedoms, liberties, and characteristics one is to expect from a democratic system, discussed in subchapters 1.2-1.4. The fact that the individual indicators are scored by a sample of citizens of the given country also provides a solid truth foundation. Among other groups of indicators tracked by the Freedom House are *Freedom of the Net* and government effort to manipulate online information, *Freedom and the Media* and *Nations in Transit*.<sup>71</sup>

We now move to a different data set, that of the Polity IV project. Polity IV, with the help of a US government-funded research project *The Political Instability Task Force*, is an annually updated dataset currently covering 167 countries. It differentiates itself from the other datasets by creating a spectrum of related qualities of democratic and authoritative powers in a government, rather than exploring these as mutually exclusive governing systems.<sup>72</sup> The Polity Score is a scale ranging from -10 to +10, where -10 indicates a hereditary monarchy and +10 resembles a consolidated democracy. The data also enables the researchers to create regime categories, dividing countries into 1) autocracies (scores -10 to -6); 2) anocracies (scores -5 to +5); and 3) democracies (scores +6 to +10). The Polity score divides points on a 10-points scale to indicators correspond to the following things: 1) the competitiveness of political participation; 2) the openness to executive recruitment; 3) the constraints on the chief executive; 4) the

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<sup>69</sup> "Methodology 2019". *Freedomhouse.Org*, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2019>.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> "Polityproject". *Systemicpeace.Org*, 2020, <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

competitiveness of executive recruitment.<sup>73</sup> The data for this project is gathered from the official central government institutions and political groups that have authority in the given state, excluding any separatist or independence movements.

To contrast the Freedom House Comparative Survey and the data provided by the Polity project, we now move to a different set of indicators. While the measurements of the Freedom House focus primarily on political rights and civil liberties, there has been a critique as to the relevance of this data set to the actual measurement of democracy. An alternative approach was proposed by professor Vanhanen in his 1984 book *The Emergence Of Democracy: A Comparative Study Of 119 States; 1850 - 1979*. In order to calculate the degree of democratization, Vanhanen proposed two variables to effectively assess the degree to which power is distributed; 1) the percentage share of voters for the smaller parties, independents in parliamentary elections and their share of the seats in parliament; 2) the percentage of the adult population that voted in the given elections.<sup>74</sup> Using these variables, he created an index of power distribution in the historical data provided by his case study.<sup>75</sup> Using his index and Dahl's theoretical dimensions of democratization as a background, he identified two most important dimensions of democracy, namely; 1) the degree of competition, and 2) the degree of participation.<sup>76</sup> These, in Vanhanen's words, were critical indicators of democratization missing from both the Freedom House and Polity's measurements. The critique he provides towards the Polity project is that the dataset is based on subjective evaluations, rather than empirical variables but most importantly, its lack of importance given to the election participation.<sup>77</sup>

We have presented three separate models created to measure democracy and democratization, each of which had focused on different aspects of democracy mentioned in the previous subchapters. The author notes that due to their individual

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<sup>73</sup> "Polityproject". *Systemicpeace.Org*, 2020, <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

<sup>74</sup> Vanhanen, Tatu. *The Emergence Of Democracy: A Comparative Study Of 119 States; 1850 - 1979*. Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1984.

<sup>75</sup> Vanhanen, Tatu. *Dependence Of Power On Resources, A Comparative Study Of 114 States In The 1960'S*. Institute Of Social Science, Jyväskylä University, 1971.

<sup>76</sup> Vanhanen, Tatu. *The Emergence Of Democracy: A Comparative Study Of 119 States; 1850 - 1979*. Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1984.

<sup>77</sup> Vanhanen, Tatu. "A New Dataset For Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998". *Journal Of Peace Research*, vol 37, no. 2, 2000, pp. 251-265. *SAGE Publications*, doi:10.1177/0022343300037002008.

specializations, each of these measurement techniques on its own does not provide sufficient indications for a researcher to determine the overall status of a given system. Instead, what is needed is a cross-combination of these or other methods to secure data from multiple sources, to reliably create a better image of the nation's overall status of democracy. The author has attempted to select contrasting data collection sets to successfully cover the issue from multiple angles. A disruptive element of each of these, and thus something to take into consideration while collecting data, might be the geographical location of the researched nation combined with the identity of the researcher, who might, based on nationality, color of the skin, language, and or other features, be receiving biased, inaccurate answers.

In this chapter, we have looked at the concept of democracy from various angles. First, we have described the concept in terms of its origin and historical use. As the meaning of the terms was not only enlarged with time but also bent to suit its users, we continued the chapter by describing the term in specific contexts. The chapter had divided the concept of democracy into three primary aspects of the system. We described *the people* or *demos* as the most fundamental aspect of a democratic system. The subchapter had described who a citizen of a democratic state is, their relationship to one another and what are their rights and liberties in such a system.

Having described the "attendees" of the democratic process, we moved onto the *electorate*, the process used to select the individuals representing the many in the government. We have characterized the process as free, fair, recurrent and competitive and further dived into the translations of application of these terms in the real-world. The subchapter *the government* had outlined the division of the government, or *Trias politica* and the logic behind this arrangement as presented by Montesquieu, Taft, Hamilton, and Sartori. We discussed the restrictions put on the governing body of a democratic state in order to equally balance power and prevent the government from going rogue.

Finally, to contrast the prescriptive data, the closing subchapter presented three descriptive means to measure democracy and democratization and their indicators, attempting to target the concepts thought of as vital in the subchapters *the people*, *the electorate* and *the government*.

## 2. Transitions in the 20th century

The first chapter had covered 'liberal democracy' as a broad term as well as specified its use in various contexts and anchored most crucial criteria underlining its legitimacy. As the discourse on the topic of democracy, democratization, and transitions of systems is rather erratic, we continue by looking at specific examples from the third wave of democratization, a term coined by Samuel Huntington describing the time period from 1974 to 1990.<sup>78</sup> It is important to note that the political organization described in the first chapter is an idealistic model, real-world implementations of which are often a question of a degree of implementation of the described principles, rather than a simple question of whether the given system does or does not fulfill certain criteria. As Huntington noted himself, "Political regimes will never fit perfectly into intellectually defined boxes, and any system of classification has to accept the existence of ambiguous, borderline, and mixed cases."<sup>79</sup>

According to Huntington, democratization is a diachronic process that comes in waves. A wave is defined as "...a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time".<sup>80</sup> The waves of democratization as described by Huntington are accompanied by reverse waves, during which we observe an opaque phenomenon. This chapter will closely look at the events of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the 3<sup>rd</sup> wave of democratization. Later, the chapter will examine the factors thrusting the democratization. Three groups of factors had been created in order to outline boundaries between them, namely economic, social, and political.

The group of economic factors was created to investigate to what degree did the economic situation and model of the given country play a role in the nation's transition. The group of economic factors will examine indicators such as industrialization, education, urbanization and wealth. The inner economic reality of a nation has the potential to succeed or fail in sustaining the overall wellbeing of the people and their

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<sup>78</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 15.



ability to obtain as well as spend wealth in a given system is closely tied to the society itself. In a system that fails to provide needed securities of employment and leaves the individual struggling to financially sustain oneself, be it for reasons such as a lack of available occupations on the job market or the wages not being sufficient to cover living standards in the given society, the people are prone to destabilizing actions such as strikes, protests, and revolts.<sup>81</sup> Therefore it is safe to make a connection between the economic characteristics of a given system and the state of its society. For this purpose, the author had created a category of social factors. In this group of factors, we will look at the role of an individual and the role of a collective, the potentials, and risks of mobilization, working-class and labor movements, civil societies, political society, and the elites. The last group of factors that will be presented in this chapter will be political factors. The reason for this grouping is simple – it is the individual people in their specific contexts that form a society. Forming a society indicates arranging the many into a single, political system that acts as a single unit. The element of a political system that gives it its focus, shape and form, policies, and drives are once again – the people. In this group, we will begin by bridging the previously mentioned political society and elites and the state of affairs. Later, the chapter will discuss the motivation and rhetoric of political movements of the third wave, various paths countries with different nation-state arrangements took, the re-emergence of social and political organizations during transitions, and the demobilization of certain organizations during the consolidation period.<sup>82</sup>

As we can see, all three of these categories are closely interconnected, as the individual concepts revolve around arbitrary notions created and named by humans. Thus, inevitably, we will often find ourselves applying these as contexts to *the people*, without which none of the notions would have ever existed.

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<sup>81</sup> Collier, Ruth Berins, and James Mahoney. "Adding Collective Actors To Collective Outcomes: Labor And Recent Democratization In South America And Southern Europe". *Comparative Politics*, vol 29, no. 3, 1997, p. 285.

<sup>82</sup> Collier, Ruth Berins, and James Mahoney. Labor and Democratization: Comparing the First and Third Waves in Europe and Latin America". *Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley*, Working Paper No. 62-95. 1995.

## 2.1 Context of the pre-third wave period

As mentioned previously, the period between 1974 to 1990 is referred to as the third wave by Samuel Huntington. We begin by looking at the events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that had set the stage for the transitions that took place in this time-frame.

The 20<sup>th</sup> century saw the most drastic changes in human history. To prove this argument, we note that it is a century that started with people riding horses, even the most technologically developed nations only beginning to control, use and implement electricity and create grids on a large scale, and medicine not having discovered even the most basic antibiotics. A dramatic shift in human thought and technology came with the world witnessing the first two global-scale total wars, the Manhattan Project and the first usage of atomic weapons, humans walking on the surface of the Moon and the first steps toward large-scale infrastructure project in the Earth's orbit. Humanity has ended this century with high-speed means of travel available to the public through inventions such as trains, cars, and planes, enabling us to transit over the vast corners of the globe within, in most cases, less than days. Erasing physical distance between one another has been stepped up with the introduction of computers and other information technology and the beginning of the digital revolution, connecting people without the need to travel all together, making sharing ideas, thoughts, audio, and video easier than ever before.<sup>83</sup> The human population has almost quadruplet by the end of the century, growing from 1.65 billion in 1900 to 6,4 billion in 1999.<sup>84</sup>

The innovations and changes in technology were accompanied by radical changes in the human perception of the world and the role they had played in it. It is important to see both, changes in technology and thought, in their context of an extremely short timeline. Various schools and scholars have attempted to interpret the issue of social change and addressed the question of individual human lives and their role in rapidly changing geopolitical structures of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>85</sup> In the aftermath of the Great War, in a period in between the first reverse wave of democratization and the

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<sup>83</sup> Arnold, David. "Europe, Technology, And Colonialism In The 20Th Century". *History And Technology*, vol 21, no. 1, 2005, pp. 85-106.

<sup>84</sup> Krausmann, Fridolin et al. "Growth In Global Materials Use, GDP And Population During The 20Th Century". *Ecological Economics*, vol 68, no. 10, 2009, pp. 2696-2705.

<sup>85</sup> Camus, Albert et al. *The Myth Of Sisyphus*. Penguin Classics, 2000.

glooming War War II, scholars of the Frankfurt School of thought focused on the critique of the way in which social theory was applied to the world to interpret the socio-political trends of the time, more specifically, the increasing strife between parties of different beliefs, primarily the clash between capitalism and socialism.<sup>86</sup> The areas believed to be the agents of social change in predominantly the Frankfurt school models are outlined in this thesis – economic, social and political, as these were believed to contain most of the human drives behind the social change itself.<sup>87</sup> During the second and the third wave of democratization (1943-1990) or a period that can be referred to as the Cold War (as coined by Walter Lippmann, 1947-1991), we see the individual nations “picking sides”, searching the globe for allies that would follow relatable doctrines in economics, society, and politics, to trade with.<sup>88</sup> The quest for promoting a given doctrine abroad, while retaining power and the favor of the *demos* at home, was in large the fuel of Cold War geopolitics. Failing this quest meant a risk of internal transformation of the nation and a transition towards the opaque doctrine.<sup>89</sup>

However, according to Huntington, the second wave was not purely a political game of which nation provides better answers to the question of political alignment, economic system, and social organization. In the *Third Wave*, he points at political as well as military factors as the root of democratization during the second wave. In the book, the victory of the Western allies is being portrayed as the primary reason for transitions toward more democratic systems in this period. Not all nations had transitioned under the same condition, however, with some, such as West Germany, Italy, Japan, a large part of Austria and South Korea, having transitioned by being imposed democracy by the winners of World War II – the Western allies. Certain nations had simply followed the model of the victors of the war and shifted toward more democracy resembling alignments. These nations include many Latin-American countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia and a couple of European countries – Greece and Turkey.<sup>90</sup> The turmoil of War War II had left its mark

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<sup>86</sup> Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation Of The Public Sphere*. Massachusetts Institute Of Technology, 1991.

<sup>87</sup> Horkheimer, Max et al. *Dialectic Of Enlightenment*. Stanford University Press, 2002.

<sup>88</sup> Lippmann, Walter et al. *The Cold War*. Harper & Row, 1972.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

globally. Both the Axis and the Western allies had exhausted resources and manpower, which was noted by their colonies abroad. Growing nationalism in the colonies had left the central powers with no other options than to gradually start decolonizing. Many of the newly created nations had followed the model of the western victors, similarly to the previously mentioned countries.<sup>91</sup> That is not to say that those countries had remained democratic for extensive periods of time. According to Weiner, this was characteristic of former British colonies in the period of the second wave.<sup>92</sup>

No matter how long did the nations retain democracy as its political ambition, the wave of democratization has affected many nations with diverse political alignments at the time. These include countries structured as racial oligarchies, military regimes, personal dictatorships, and one-party regimes. A puzzling question has arisen as to what made some of the non-democratic regimes at the time transition and not the others. One cannot predict the direction of a transition based simply on the regime structure shortly before the transition itself, claims Huntington.<sup>93</sup> Instead, it is necessary to look at the history of system change in a given country to notice a pattern of trends, replacing one another periodically.<sup>94</sup> The example given in the *Third Wave* is the previously mentioned set of Latin-American countries. The author goes as far as to describe the alteration between democratic and authoritarian systems not as a transition between particular political systems but as the political system itself (similarly to changing the ruling political factions in a stable democracy).<sup>95</sup> The example of countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia show the nations being prone to fluctuating between more pro-democratic, populist governments and military regimes. Historically,

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<sup>91</sup> Strang, David. "Global Patterns Of Decolonization, 1500-1987". *International Studies Quarterly*, vol 35, no. 4, 1991.

<sup>92</sup> Weiner, Myron. "Empirical Democratic Theory And The Transition From Authoritarianism To Democracy". *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol 20, no. 04, 1987, pp. 861-866.

<sup>93</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>94</sup> Avineri, Shlomo. "History Returns, With A Vengeance". *Dissent*, vol 60, no. 1, 2013, pp. 98-102.

<sup>95</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993, p. 42.

The term Axis powers, also called the 'Rom – Berlin – Tokyo Axis', or the Triple pact, refers to the military coalition of Italy, Germany, Japan and other adhered states such as the Kingdom of Romania, Slovak Republic, Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Bulgaria during the conflict of the Second World War.

The term Allies refers to the coalition of 'the Big Four' – the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and China, together with the governments in exile due to Axis occupation such as France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway and others, joined by nations that had simply aligned themselves with the Allies, such as India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, and others.

factors such as radicalism, exploitation of power and organizational disarray had reached a tipping point after which it was up to the more conservative military to replace the democratic government with the popular support of the *demos*.<sup>96</sup> In a similar manner, the military regime would eventually struggle to contain economic problems surging the nation and, with the escalating politicization of the previously professional army, either stepped down or was pushed down with the popular support of the *demos*.<sup>97</sup>

We could continue tracking the historical pattern throughout the third wave, with twenty-three out of twenty-nine countries democratized between 1974 and 1990 having had previous experience with democracy at some point in history. This, however, is not a sufficient indicator of the cause of the transition itself, as the final stage of the third wave starts to encompass a large number of nations with no previous democratic experience, such as Romania, Taiwan, Mexico, Bulgaria and parts of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.<sup>98</sup>

Having briefly described the events and trends in the pre-third wave period of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the following chapters will break down the trends in the period of the third wave into three groups of factors and elaborate on what role did these factors play in the transitions of late 1980s.

## **2.2 Economic factors affecting the third wave**

This subchapter will explore the economic aspects of a set of democratic transitions that took place at the end of the third wave. The facets of economic factors will include wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education, stemming from the leading proponents of the modernization theory Seymour Martin Lipset and his book *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Following the string of thoughts of Max Weber, Lipset attempted to interpret quantitative as well as qualitative data concerning the relationship between democracies and economic development. He opens one of the

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<sup>96</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>97</sup> Casper, Gretchen, and Michelle M Taylor. *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*. University Of Pittsburgh Press, 1996.

<sup>98</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

chapters with “Perhaps the most common generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”<sup>99</sup> It is important to stress out that Lipset did not imply that the cause of democratization is the growth of economic development. He did, however, make a connection between the levels of various aspects of socio-economics areas, such as previously mentioned wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education and the level of democratization of a given country. The samples of countries were grouped into four categories, namely:

a) **European and English-speaking Stable Democracies**, e.g. Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, the UK and the US

b) **European and English-speaking Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships**, e.g. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R.

c) **Latin-American Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships**, e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Mexico Uruguay

d) **Latin-American Stable Dictatorships**, e.g. Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Panama, Peru, Venezuela<sup>100</sup>

Let us begin with the dissection of the individual economic parameters, beginning with *wealth*. Indicators of wealth selected by Lipset were not simply corresponding to the overall wealth of the country. Knowing that the overall wealth might be distributed in an unfair, unequal way, indicators such as per capita income, thousands of persons per doctor, persons per motor vehicle, telephones per 1000 persons, radios per 1000 persons and newspaper copies per 1000 persons were selected.<sup>101</sup> As we can see, the aptly chosen indicators correspond to the usage of

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<sup>99</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 48,50.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

financial means, the *wealth*, by the people and thus create a much better overall picture of the real-life application of Lipset's thesis.<sup>102</sup>

The indicators chosen for monitoring the *industrialization* were a) Percentage of Males in Agriculture; and b) Per Capita Energy Consumed (tons of coal per person). By looking at indicator a), we see a division of the workers into two sectors: agriculture and industry, leaving out now commonly accepted and in certain cases very gainful sector of public services. Overall, both indicators a) and b) point at a higher level of industrialization in European democracies, followed by the level of industrialization in European dictatorships, Latin-American democracies, and Latin-American dictatorships in this order.<sup>103</sup>

To visualize the relation to education, Lipset chose to track the a) overall literacy of the nation in percentage, as well as of the stages of education, starting with b) Primary Education Enrollment per 1000 persons; c) Post-Primary Enrollment per 1000 persons, and ending with; d) Higher Education Enrollment per 1000 persons. This allowed the analysis to specify concrete numbers of people pursuing education and potentially link the level of literacy of a nation to its potential to influence the transition of its regime. Lipset himself stressed out the importance of education in both modernization and democratization and claimed, that workers in developed countries are not only more likely to be educated but also express stronger drive towards democratic values, such as tolerance, mitigating violence and clashes between various groups.<sup>104</sup>

The final set of indicators chosen to illustrate economic development dealt with urbanization. Urbanization played a vital role during this phase of modernization as the growing new, industrial sector attracted workers from the field of agriculture, who often left the rural areas to pursue careers in rapidly growing cities.<sup>105</sup> Lipman used data provided by the International Urban Research of Berkley to measure the percentage of

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<sup>102</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites Of Democracy: Economic Development And Political Legitimacy". *American Political Science Review*, vol 53, no. 1, 1959, pp. 69-105.

<sup>103</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 52.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Harris, Nigel. "Economic Development And Urbanisation". *Habitat International*, vol 12, no. 3, 1988, pp. 5-15.

the overall population living in a) cities over 20 000; b) cities over 100 000; c) Metropolitan Areas.

When comparing the gathered datasets, all of the samples showed a connection between development and democratization. For the indices connected to the *wealth*, people in democracies have had higher per capita income, were more likely to own a motor vehicle, telephone and radio, there were more doctors among the population, compared to the other three groups, including unstable European democracies and dictatorships.<sup>106</sup>

The group of *industrialization* indicators showed that men in stable, Latin-American dictatorships were 3,1 times more likely to be working in the agricultural sectors than men in stable, European democracies. Curiously, the percentage of men working in agriculture in Latin-American democracies and unstable dictatorships dwarfed the European democracies (21%) with 52% and rather aligned with 67% in Latin-American dictatorships. The consumption of coal per capita was 2,5 times higher in European democracies, compared to European dictatorships, with comparable 2,4 times higher consumption in Latin-American democracies, contrasting their dictatorship counterparts. The scores rise if we compare the score of both systems in individual regions, with the consumption being 6 times higher in the European democracies in contrast with Latin-America and 5,6 times higher in European dictatorships, than in the same group of countries in Latin-America. An assumption can thus be made, that the overall industrialization was generally higher in Europe, compared to Latin-America.<sup>107</sup>

The question of *urbanization* points at a common trend for all four groups of countries – the highest percentage of people tended to reside in the first group of cities, cities with inhabitants ranging between 20 000 and 100 000. As for metropolitan areas, people in Europe were 1,6 times more likely to live in one, if they lived in a stable democracy in comparison with 1,7 times more likeliness for countries of Latin-America.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 51,52.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.



The last group provided, *education*, shows major differences between various groups of countries. European, stable democracies had scored 96% of literacy, followed European dictatorships with 85%, Latin-American democracies with 74% and Latin-American dictatorships with 46%. Examining the data, we notice a rather large gap of 28 points between countries of Latin-America, while both democracies and dictatorships in Europe vary by 11 points. A similar trend of higher scores in European stable democracies, compared to dictatorships and both systems in the Latin-American region can be seen throughout the data.<sup>109</sup> Although all of the groups of indicators provide valid insight into the economic conditions in the four given groups, Lipset highlighted education as “..more significant than either income or occupation.”<sup>110</sup> He notes that “The evidence on the contribution of education to democracy is even more direct and strong on the level of individual behavior within countries than it is in cross-national correlations.”<sup>111</sup> Nonetheless, sourcing Dewey, he makes an interesting point concerning education and its relation to democracy by pointing at both Germany and France before the Great War and noting, that although both countries were among the most educated in Europe at the time, education by itself was not sufficient enough in containing the other destabilizing factors at the time.<sup>112</sup> Dewey described the German education system at the time as focused on disciplinary training, rather than on personal development. And thus, instead of simply pointing to the level of literacy, the system and its quality must be taken into consideration when describing the complex relationship between education and democracy.<sup>113</sup>

Overall, looking closer at the presented data, we see that the scores vary dramatically not only between stable democracies and authoritarian regimes but also depend on the geographical location, with the Latin-American countries generally scoring lower than their European counterparts.

All the above-discussed indicators of economic factors, however, are said to sustain democracy, make the system stronger by creating educated *demos* commonly

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<sup>109</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, p. 53.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> Dewey, John, and Jo Ann Boydston. *The Middle Works, 1899-1924*. Southern Illinois University Press, 1985.

sharing democratic values in a nation that provides occupation opportunities and enables the *demos* to freely spend their financial resources, rather than develop it.<sup>114</sup> A link between *wealth* and stability in both democracies and authoritarian regimes was made by Mainwaring et al. who asked whether it is economic development that seeds democracy in a nation, or whether it only helps sustain an already consolidated democratic state. Although reaching the same conclusion as Lipset, the authors did point at the initial state of inequality and continuously rising inequality in both democracies and authoritarian systems as a potent, disruptive factor.<sup>115</sup>

As demonstrated by Lipset, Weber and Mainwaring et al. in this chapter, there is a link between the economic character of a nation and the level of democratization. More specifically, we have shown that stable democracies are more likely to be successful in developing a multitude of areas of their economy such as industrialization, education, urbanization and the overall wealth of the country as well as its citizens. As indicated by multiple scholars, the link between the economic wealth of the country does not correlate with the country's transition. It was also shown that European unstable democracies and authoritarian states shared a higher percentage of educated people than their Latin-American counterparts. Whether the rising number of educated individuals in the countries that had transitioned in the 1980s was the key factor behind it, however, remains a question. Instead of looking at economic factors, Huntington had described the situation preceding these transitions as countries "yearning for freedom", after a long time of oppression by their authoritarian rulers.<sup>116</sup> We will continue by addressing the social factors that may have played a role in the transitions of the third wave.

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<sup>114</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

<sup>115</sup> Mainwaring, Scott et al. "Democracy And Development: Political Institutions And Well-Being In The World, 1950-1990". *Latin American Politics And Society*, vol 43, no. 3, 2001, p. 178. *Cambridge University Press (CUP)*, doi:10.2307/3177153.

<sup>116</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

### 2.3 Social factors affecting the third wave

The thesis had previously stated that people in a system that fails to provide needed securities of employment and leaves the individual struggling to financially sustain oneself, be it for reasons such as a lack of available occupations on the job market or the wages not being sufficient to cover living standards in the given society, are prone to destabilizing actions such as strikes, protests, and revolts – they lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the *demos*. The previous chapter had covered the role of economic factors in initiating transitions as well as in sustaining or destabilizing the prevailing regime. We will bridge the next chapter and continue by discussing the social aspects of the third wave and focus on the role of individuals and collective actors in transitions of the third wave. The chapter will continue to address the question of what role does mobilization and mass gathering play in transitioning nations. Finally, we will address the role of civil society and its resurgence during mobilization.

It is difficult to say what role a given individual has in a system, that is about to or is transitioning. Individual people who spoke out against a regime that happened to be an authoritarian one, such as the communist regimes in eastern and southern Europe or Latin-America, were to be silenced, often by means such as reprimand, probation work, fines, removal from a post (occupation), prison or capital punishment, depending on the seriousness of their “misbehavior”. If we look at the example of the USSR as presented by William Clark, one of the most common misdemeanors in the nation was widespread in black market activities.<sup>117</sup> The socio-economic situation in the Soviet Union in the 1980s was so critical, an estimated 83% of the population had at some point resorted to purchasing goods through the shadow economy to obtain needed food and services.<sup>118</sup> This is a sufficient indicator of the regime not being able to sustain its *demos*, who had resorted to illegal means to cover their basic needs. With a large chunk of the population suffering from either lack of occupation or financial means to live a normal day to day life, it became harder for the regime to assert its legitimacy. In the previous centuries, legitimacy in undemocratic systems stemmed from various sources such as the divine right of kings, religion or social structuring, while in the modern time,

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<sup>117</sup> Clark, William A. "Crime And Punishment In Soviet Officialdom, 1965–90". *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol 45, no. 2, 1993, pp. 259-279.

<sup>118</sup> Belikova, G., and A. Shokhin. "The Black Market". *Soviet Sociology*, vol 28, no. 2, 1989, pp. 50-65.

nationalism or ideology had been utilized to legitimize authoritarian systems. In the case of eastern and southern Europe, Marxism-Leninism was the ideology legitimizing the control of the government over many aspects of the people's lives.<sup>119</sup> How does one accept such legitimization, if the core premise – the shared ownership of the means of production, as defined by Karl Marx, was visibly failing the *demos*, leaving them struggling and muted?

Another problem for the authoritarian regimes at the time was posed by modernization that had brought about a wider spread of education among the population. After World War II, the rhetorics and ideas of democracy became widely accepted by people globally to a level at which authoritarian regimes publicly used the look-alike rhetorics without implementing them.<sup>120</sup> This stems from the previously mentioned vagueness of the term democracy itself.

At a certain point in its existence, a nation failing to retain its legitimacy, the situation becomes unbearable for too many and frustration turns into action. Individual, afflicted groups start to mobilize, gather and express their discontent by protesting or striking. In this chapter, we look at the case studies of Brazil as presented by Ruth Collier and Czechoslovakia as presented by Gordon Skilling, to demonstrate the transitional potential of agitated *demos*, the character of the mobilized mass, as well the approach taken by the government in power when faced with mobilization. The reason for selecting Brazil and Czechoslovakia is that in both nations, the governing power lost its legitimacy, the *demos* resorted to mobilization and later, the country's transition, in which collective actors played a vital role. Both governments in power had also employed distinct strategies to deal with the situation. The samples also represent two of the groups of non-democratic countries outlined in the previous chapter – European and Latin-American.

Looking at Brazil in the period of the third wave, we find it controlled by a military dictatorship with general Ernesto Geisel as the head of the nation. Geisel's presidency had started a gradual liberalization of the country, opening the window to the opposition. However, the window was briefly shut, following a substantial gain of

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<sup>119</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>120</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

support by the now recognized opposition in 1974 and 1976, which had gained overwhelming support. The military had dissolved the congress, attempting to regain control, failing to support gradual opening in the country's liberalization. It was at this point, according to Collier, that labor movements shifted to the political scene and gradually started to gain traction. The late 1970s saw an increase in protests from unionized labor movements from fields such as the automobile industry or metallurgy, demanding changes in their conditions as workers. Soon enough, however, unionized protests had grown large and spread further from closed fields to the entire working-class neighborhoods and church groups, to the entire lower-class population.<sup>121</sup> At this point, the visible dissatisfaction with the governing power portrayed by the labor unions had also empowered social movements and eventually, to political organizations. In 1979, João Figueiredo was elected the president, continuing the gradual re-democratization initiated by Geisel. The country suffered economically under Figueiredo's rule, inevitably leading the country into a crisis.<sup>122</sup> After months of protests, escalating into a massive gathering of over a million protestors on April 16<sup>th</sup>, 1984, the military rule was forced to acknowledge the protestor's demands and grant the first, direct elections in 1985, allowing the *demos* to select the first, civilian president.<sup>123</sup>

To contrast Brazil, we selected Czechoslovakia during the third wave to represent a European, non-democratic nation. Based on the previous chapter, we assume a higher level of modernization, compared to Brazil.

Shortly before the events of the third wave, the leadership of Czechoslovakia attempted to transition toward a more pro-democracy leaning, socialist model. This reform was attempted by from above by Alexander Dubček and other members of the communist party in the 1960s, by launching the Action plan of 1968, which was to grant perks such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech by a new constitution. The idea was to introduce new, liberal reforms, better tailored for the reality of

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<sup>121</sup> Collier, Ruth Berins, and James Mahoney. "Adding Collective Actors To Collective Outcomes: Labor And Recent Democratization In South America And Southern Europe". *Comparative Politics*, vol 29, no. 3, 1997, p. 285-303.

<sup>122</sup> Mainwaring, Scott. "The Transition To Democracy In Brazil". *Journal Of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs*, vol 28, no. 1, 1986, pp. 149-180.

<sup>123</sup> Collier, Ruth Berins, and James Mahoney. "Adding Collective Actors To Collective Outcomes: Labor And Recent Democratization In South America And Southern Europe". *Comparative Politics*, vol 29, no. 3, 1997, p. 285-303.

Czechoslovakia.<sup>124</sup> The Action Plan was briefly accompanied by a dwindle of censorship of media and publications, allowing for the debate of the subject in public discourse. However, Czechoslovakia having a very close relationship with Moscow, the pursuit of liberalization was halted in 1968, during the Prague Spring by the military intervention of the combined armies of the Warsaw Pact, who entered the country without the Czechoslovak government being warned, reinitiating normalization and censorship. This intervention was portrayed in Soviet media as a “request for fraternal assistance”.<sup>125</sup> After the Prague Spring, the communist party had purged itself from any dissident opinion that might have been left there after Dubček’s attempt to liberalize and the system itself cracked down on any vocal or published ideas, conflicting with the policies presented by the governing party in power. In the period between the Prague Spring in 1968 and the Velvet revolution in 1989, the civil society was rather dormant, with the exception of what Gordon Skilling labeled as ‘the second polity’, referring to small movements for human rights and civil freedom that prevailed in the intellectual circles of academics, writers, and journalists. Most notably, Charter 77, founded in 1977 by dissidents of various backgrounds such as philosophers Jan Patočka and Ladislav Hejdránek, psychologist Jiří Němec, a writer and playwright Václav Havel, a reform communist Zdeněk Mlynář, a novelist and poet Pavel Kohout, mathematician Václav Benda, and others. With the re-introduction of censorship and ‘official narratives’, banned ideas and concepts were spread hand-to-hand through samizdat publications.<sup>126</sup>

The re-shift towards democratization came in the late 1980s, as the neighboring socialist regimes began to crumble, with what Huntington described as ‘snowballing effect of democratization’. In the *Third Wave*, he notes; “Successful democratization occurs in one country and this encourages democratization in other countries, either because they seem to face similar problems, or because successful democratization elsewhere suggests that democratization might be a cure for their problems whatever those problems are, or because the country that has democratized is powerful and/or is

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<sup>124</sup> Ritter, Daniel. "Civil Society And The Velvet Revolution: Mobilizing For Democracy In Czechoslovakia". *The Centre On Social Movement Studies Working Paper*, 2012, <http://cosmos.sns.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2012WP04COSMOS.pdf>.

<sup>125</sup> Skilling, H. Gordon. "Czechoslovakia And Helsinki". *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol 18, no. 3, 1976, pp. 245-265.

<sup>126</sup> Skilling, H. Gordon. *Civic Freedom In Central Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

viewed as a political and cultural model.”<sup>127</sup> Unlike the workers, who were represented by no union at the time and thus lacked the convenient means of mobilization, the students did so on campuses, streets, through the Socialist Union of Youth and later, in 1989, through a newly created independent student body STUHA. The peak of what could be referred to as a rebellion was a student protest to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of a fellow student murdered during the Nazi occupation on November 17<sup>th</sup>, 1989, that eventually escalated with anti-communist rhetorics and was dispersed by the police. As a reaction, protests continued and gained traction, ultimately leading to what is known as the Velvet Revolution.<sup>128</sup> A new movement, Civil Forum emerged, uniting a wide audience of people dissatisfied with the regime, leading to a general strike on November 27<sup>th</sup>, also joint by laborers, halting production for over two hours. Through an agreement, the communist party and the newly founded opposition that consisted of smaller civic movements, found common ground, allowing the first democratic elections in June 1990.<sup>129</sup>

Dissecting the cases of Brazil and Czechoslovakia during the third wave, this subchapter had explored various social aspects that had played a vital role in the transitions of the two nations. In the case of Brazil, we looked at a top-down transformation from one regime to another, attempted and partly supported by the military regime failing to control the economic situation in the country.<sup>130</sup> Following the indices of subchapter 2.1, we noted that Brazil's transformation was primarily led by a mobilized labor force demanding better conditions, gradually growing into a broader social, low-class movement and eventually becoming politicized. This contrasts the trans-placement<sup>131</sup> in the case of Czechoslovakia, who's labor force was not unionized by any means other than through the communist party itself, thus making it more difficult to mobilize. Instead, small intellectual circles spreading ideas and information in secrecy played the role of the initiator of mobilization through students. As

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<sup>127</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993, p. 100.

<sup>128</sup> Ritter, Daniel. "Civil Society And The Velvet Revolution: Mobilizing For Democracy In Czechoslovakia". *The Centre On Social Movement Studies Working Paper*, 2012, <http://cosmos.sns.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2012WP04COSMOS.pdf>.

<sup>129</sup> Glenn, John K. "Competing Challengers And Contested Outcomes To State Breakdown: The Velvet Revolution In Czechoslovakia". *Social Forces*, vol 78, no. 1, 1999, pp. 187-211.

<sup>130</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

subchapter 2.1 indicated, the reason for the role of distinct actors in these two transitions may lay in the overall level of modernization of the two countries, with European nations having a higher level of literacy and the overall higher percentage of an educated population, while the countries of Latin-American employed significantly larger percentage of its population in agriculture. Nevertheless, both of the transitions would not be possible without some sort of mobilization that had rallied people behind a common cause, after the governing power lost grip on its legitimacy in the eyes of the *demos*.

#### **2.4 Political factors affecting the third wave**

The final section of this thesis describing the transitions of the third wave will address the role of political factors. More specifically, we begin by describing the role of the elites and groups in power in various transition processes as described by Samuel Huntington in *The Third Wave*. Later, the chapter will explore the contestation of legitimacy by populism and the military on examples from Latin-America. Finally, as social and civic movements gain traction, they slowly start shifting toward a more specific role in the government-to be and become politicized. The chapter will provide insight into the involvement, development, and dissolution of these movements during a transition and following consolidation.

Undoubtedly, both economic and social factors mentioned previously played a significant role in the democratization of the third wave. Some of them, such as modern technology<sup>132</sup>, means of mobilization and communication, growing literacy and relatable nations serving as a role model, even forming a strong foundation of preconditions, without which the process of democratization could not start at all. However, as Huntington notes; “The emergence of social, economic, and external conditions favorable to democracy is never enough to produce democracy. Whatever their motives, some political leaders have to want it to happen or be willing to take steps, such as partial liberalization, that may lead to it happening.”<sup>133</sup> In this statement,

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<sup>132</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.



Huntington might seem to be underestimating and underappreciating the role mobilization of the *demos* played in the transitions. The author of this thesis sees this statement as simply stating, that an authoritarian power has always a potential option to suppress any form of resistance utilizing violent, military action, as it was in the case in China, during the incident of Tienanmen Square in 1989. The case of China presents similar openings in liberalization and initiation by student movements in the case of Czechoslovakia.<sup>134</sup> Stressing out that most of the transitions are impossible to simply categorize into predetermined boxes, Huntington expanded on Linz's *reforma* and *raptura*, creating a third group of processes, all of which focused on the role of elites at the time of a transition. Namely, the groups are;

- a) Transformation – represent transitions in which group in power initiates the transition, a top-down approach
- b) Transplacement – represent transitions in which both the group in power, together with the opposition initiate the transition by negotiating
- c) Replacement – represent transitions in which the opposition initiates the transitions, while the old regime collapses or is overthrown
- d) Interventions – represent a transition lead by external actors<sup>135</sup>

For the purpose of this thesis, this chapter will only deal with transformation and transplacement transitions to democracy.

We use the case of Brazil as a representative of a nation that, according to Huntington, went through a transformation during the third wave. To describe how this transformation came to be in the late 1980s, we firstly describe the way in which the military regime gained the popular support of the *demos* in the first place.

According to Scott Mainwaring, the initial cards played by the military legitimizing the coup d'état in 1964 were overwhelmingly negative, revolving around anti-communism, anti-corruption, and anti-chaos.<sup>136</sup> The vision of a 'common enemy' seems to be what had riled people up at the start, granting the newly created military-

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<sup>134</sup> Pei, Minxin. "Creeping Democratization In China". *Journal Of Democracy*, vol 6, no. 4, 1995, pp. 65-79.

<sup>135</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>136</sup> Mainwaring, Scott. "The Transition To Democracy In Brazil". *Journal Of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs*, vol 28, no. 1, 1986, pp. 149-180.

controlled regime legitimization. Nonetheless, “to remain credible for the long haul, however, there must be a universally recognized and accepted the threat of communism, corruption, or chaos”.<sup>137</sup> In the Roman Empire, the role of a military leader acting as the head of a nation – a dictator, was a short-term role, reserved for situations that required a swift military solution on a larger scale, or at times when the period reserved to come to a final decision through democratic means was not sufficient, transferring full power to the hands of the dictator, transforming the nation into an imperium for a limited interval of time. The connotation with the role of a dictator has changed diachronically, shifting towards a more negative one. As Sartori mentions, some scholars, notably Machiavelli or Rosseau, praised the Roman dictatorship role and its utilization in specific contexts.<sup>138</sup>

Following the logic of the original purpose of military leadership as the head of the country, de-militarization of the regime and transformation back to a democratic form of government is to be expected. Coincidentally, this was precisely the case of Brazil during the third wave. Preceding the 1970s, presidents Branco (1964-67), Costa e Silva (1967-69) and Médici (1969-74) all publicly declared gradual liberalization as their end-goal, although none of them succeeded in their ambition.<sup>139</sup> Curiously, the reason for this, provided by Mainwaring, is that regardless the abuse and limitation of human rights, the nation had aligned itself with western values, including democracy, retaining some of the institutions characteristic to liberal democracy such as opposition and its right to sit in the congress, that was only dissolved twice, contrasting the nation’s neighbors Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. The question of whether we are describing an opposition-controlled by the military regime, simply providing a means to continue the civilian support, or one that is legitimate, remains unanswered. However, the existence and traditions of opposition parties, voting, and the constitution were said to have provided an underlying continuation of democratic practices.<sup>140</sup> The period between 1974 and 1983 saw a continuous power struggle between the National Renewal Alliance

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<sup>137</sup> Mainwaring, Scott. "The Transition To Democracy In Brazil". *Journal Of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs*, vol 28, no. 1, 1986, p. 151.

<sup>138</sup> Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory Of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham House, 1987.

<sup>139</sup> Mainwaring, Scott. "The Transition To Democracy In Brazil". *Journal Of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs*, vol 28, no. 1, 1986, pp. 149-180.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

Party (the party in power) and the opposition – Brazil Democratic movement, with the popularity scales, slowly tilting towards the opposition. In 1974, the opposition overwhelmingly seized the majority of 16 out of 22 Senate seats, effectively indicating the nation's popular preferences. Another major step towards liberalization initiated from above came in 1979, with the abolishment of the Institutional act No. 5, created in 1965, limiting many of the basic human rights and freedoms such as freedom of assembly and speech, imposing censorship on film, music, and theatre and granting the President and the Governors power to legislate by decrees.<sup>141</sup> Finally, with the combination of a large public campaign for a direct presidential election by the now united opposition of the regime, the growing support of the opposition and the vision of returning to a democratic system presented by the continuous mobilization of protestors described in chapter 2.2, the first direct presidential elections in held in 1984, successfully electing a civilian president, confirmed the popular demand for the return to democracy.<sup>142</sup> The following segment will present a case of transplacement, as defined by Huntington, representing an agreement of the 'old' and the 'new' (systems/parties), combining the newly obtained legitimacy of the, now allowed opposition, and gradual withdrawal of the old elites. The thesis will use the example of Czechoslovakia during the third wave to contrast a different approach taken by both nations, as well as to examine whether the steps taken by the parties in power were comparable and whether both acted upon the same inputs.

The previous chapter had mentioned an opening for liberalization in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, initiated by Alexander Dubček launching the Action plan of 1968. In his paper *Civil Society and the Velvet Revolution: Mobilizing for Democracy in Czechoslovakia*, Ritter classifies this attempt as a top-down approach – a would-be transformation, similar to the case of Brazil. Given the time and place, however, the Soviet Union could not afford any 'disobedience' from one of its most developed satellites in the midst of the Cold War. The author of the thesis would argue that letting Czechoslovakia transform in the 1960s would bring on the snowballing effect in the

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<sup>141</sup> Mainwaring, Scott. "The Transition To Democracy In Brazil". *Journal Of Interamerican Studies And World Affairs*, vol 28, no. 1, 1986, pp. 149-180.

<sup>142</sup> Collier, Ruth Berins, and James Mahoney. "Adding Collective Actors To Collective Outcomes: Labor And Recent Democratization In South America And Southern Europe". *Comparative Politics*, vol 29, no. 3, 1997, p. 285-303.

Eastern bloc, signaling the weakening and retreat from the soviet ideology from the region we later saw in the late 1980s. Be it the economic, structural or social changes enforced by the Action plan, or the fear of rising nationalism in the individual countries, the Soviet leadership resolved to military intervention. Successful suppression of the 'counterrevolutionary' ideas through intervention might have halted the transformation in the 1960s, but had undoubtedly played a vital role in the during the Velvet revolution as "it revealed the true nature of Czechoslovakia's relationship with the USSR and the undemocratic character of the Prague leadership."<sup>143</sup>

Following the suppression of the transformation and an internal purge of the communist party, the leadership seems to have been 'cleansed' of any potential dissidents. The reason for this political unity and willingness to suppress might have stemmed from the economic well-being of the Czechoslovak nation at the time.<sup>144</sup> Having expelled undesired individuals from the party, there was not much internal support for any sort of liberalization after the Prague Spring of 1968. Vital leverage granted to the embryotic opposition of the regime at the time was created by the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The accords represented an attempt to ease the tension between the European countries, the US and Canada. The Western nations had pushed forward safeguards such as; no-interventional approach to internal affairs of the European states, the prohibition of force or scare tactics, equal rights among the people and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.<sup>145</sup> Following the accords, a civic society - Charter 77, mentioned in the previous chapter, begun to form with a single goal: to hold its government accountable to adhere to the agreed points, targeting primarily the support for the protection of human rights. Combining actors from various fields, religions, and ideas, the group sought to avoid prosecution by defining itself as a non-political organization tasked with the mission to begin "helping the Czechoslovak

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<sup>143</sup> Ritter, Daniel. "Civil Society And The Velvet Revolution: Mobilizing For Democracy In Czechoslovakia". *The Centre On Social Movement Studies Working Paper*, 2012, p. 6. <http://cosmos.sns.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2012WP04COSMOS.pdf>.

<sup>144</sup> Skilling, Gordon. "Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia". *Allen and Unwin*. 1981.

<sup>145</sup> Gordon Skilling, H. "Czechoslovakia And Helsinki". *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol 18, no. 3, 1976, pp. 245-265.

government implement its own laws: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki Covenant on Human Rights.”<sup>146</sup>

The final shift in the politics came in 1988, with the introduction of re-structuralization and revision of the socio-economic aspects of the Soviet Union – the ‘prestoika’ and ‘glasnost’ presented by president Gorbachev, effectively unleashing the snowballing across the Eastern Bloc. The protests of 1989 described in the previous chapter were accompanied by police units awaiting orders that never came.<sup>147</sup> Instead of forcing obedience, the regime, with support of Moscow, had acknowledged its fall, initiating negotiations with the now-forming opposition. The leading actor in the opposition was the newly formed Civil Forum – the umbrella organization of the revolutionary movement that had joined the students in their attempt to transform the nation. Civil Forum, not having a long history of existence, had still enjoyed tremendous support from the public, as its founders were the same dissidents who formed, a rather small-membered Charter 77.<sup>148</sup> Following successful direct elections in 1990, the political movement had transformed into two separate political parties in 1991, following an internal division of ideas.<sup>149</sup>

There is a similarity in the initial, political push from above, in both cases of Brazil and Czechoslovakia, with the latter being unsuccessful, due to ‘from above’ referring to a regional leadership of a nation connected to a large body of nations that disapproved of the liberalization. Later, with ‘prestoika’ and ‘glasnost’ being implemented, one could argue that even this maneuver indicates a willingness to liberalize the nations directed from above. The author believes that while the case of Czechoslovakia points at the governing power (the Soviet Union) accepting its defeat without previous ambitions to liberalize the nations it engulfed, the military leadership in Brazil never truly wanted to remain in power for an extended period. While attempts to remain in

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<sup>146</sup> Tucker, Aviezer. *The Philosophy And Politics Of Czech Dissidence From Patočka To Havel*. University Of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, p. 124.

<sup>147</sup> Ritter, Daniel. "Civil Society And The Velvet Revolution: Mobilizing For Democracy In Czechoslovakia". *The Centre On Social Movement Studies Working Paper*, 2012, p. 6. <http://cosmos.sns.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2012WP04COSMOS.pdf>.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Hanley, Sean. *Rise And Fall Of The Czech New Right, 1989-2002*. Routledge Curzon, 2005.

power were made, these represented attempts to balance the power of the opposition and the governing military, to prevent a 'kidnapping' by a populous entity.

### 3. Transitions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century

We opened the second chapter by describing the characteristics of transitions of systems as presented by Samuel Huntington, outlining groups of indicators, in which motivators of transitions were identified, as well as the context of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which had shaped the state of affairs and the mentioned transitions during the third wave, as illustrated. The chapter had presented the examples of Brazil and Czechoslovakia in this period to look at the governing powers and the *demos* of these two nations, which with the combination of economic conditions served as the leading actors of presented system changes.

Correspondingly, this chapter will begin by characterizing transitions taking place in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, to accurately introduce the reality of this era, the thesis will readjust the scope of the analysis and firstly look at the transitions of nation-states into what Manuel Castells described as *network states* – an interconnected, dependent network of globalized states. Accordingly, we must scale-up the *demos* and the civil society acting on the nation-state level, to a mobilized, *global civil society*.<sup>150</sup> Both terms will be correlated with rapid changes in communication technology, connecting and representing actors on various levels. Later, the thesis will re-introduce the economic, social and political factors outlined in the previous chapter and examine their roles in nation-state affairs in contemporary Venezuela. It is problematic for anyone to outline and interpret agents and factors in a stream of events we are still currently a part of. The chapter will attempt to point at specific trends in the selected groups of factors.


Firstly, we address the state of nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. To better understand the form and shape of a given state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, first, we must address the concept of globalization. As Ward Rennan and Pim Martens asserted in their publication

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<sup>150</sup> Castells, Manuel. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, And Global Governance". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 78-93.

*The Globalisation Timeline*, scholars of a rather skeptical nature see globalization as a concept that had always prevailed in human history, continuously shaping cultural, economic and political aspects of human lives throughout centuries. This is contrasted by hyperglobalist approach that points at a breaking point in history with its gradually increasing speed, driving social, political and economic changes. However, technological innovation could be considered as the common ground of both, with the skeptics pointing at the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492 or the industrial revolution, while the hyperglobalist camp points at the rapid advancements in communication and globe-wide access to fast travel options in, predominantly, late 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>151</sup> The author of this thesis, having witnessed the rapid growth of communication technology and increase of speed and access to various geo-locations first hand, will side with the latter camp of ideas. The reason for this is the wide access to information technology and the internet. As can be read from graph 1., the percentage of the Earth’s population accessing the internet in 2017 was 49,72%. We shall come back to the indications of this access on *demos* later in the chapter.

**Graph 1. Individuals using the Internet (% of the population)<sup>152</sup>**



<sup>151</sup> Rennen, Ward, and Pim Martens. "The Globalisation Timeline". *Integrated Assessment*, vol 4, no. 3, 2003, pp. 137-144.

<sup>152</sup> World Bank. "Individuals using the internet (% of population)". *World Development Indicators*, The World Bank Group, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS>, Accessed 1 Mar 2020.

Equal importance in the matter of globalization was assigned to the wide-spread of capitalism as an economic means and the impact it has on the global scene.<sup>153</sup>

By coining the previously mentioned term 'network state', Manuel Castells attempted to characterize the relationship between individual states functioning as a united, interconnected entity, characterized by flexibility of procedures, shared responsibility and sovereignty of individual 'parts' (nations), and most importantly, a very distinctive reality of individual 'parts', their governments, and the *demos* that are being governed.<sup>154</sup> The nature of this interconnectedness is primarily economic and political. While the decision-making processes of transnational companies were centralized to their headquarters, the production of individual parts, assembly and other processes connected to the final creation of given goods have been scattered across the globe through outsourcing.<sup>155</sup> Similarly, political power in regions is being connected, motivated by various factors such as trade (NAFTA, Mercosur), coordination and dialogue (APEC, ASEAN), or as in the example of the European Union creating a large, multi-purpose network, ratified by a constitution. To tackle global-scale issues, the nations had created international and supranational institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, NATO, International Atomic Energy Agency or the European Security Conference.<sup>156</sup> It is the branching character of this division of multiple institutions and cooperation groups that, according to Castells, creates a united framework of a 'network' state. As he pointed out, "not everything or everyone is globalized, but the global networks that structure the planet affect everything and everyone".<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Rennan, Ward, and Pim Martens. "The Globalisation Timeline". *Integrated Assessment*, vol 4, no. 3, 2003, pp. 137-144.

<sup>154</sup> Castells, Manuel. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, And Global Governance". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 78-93.

<sup>155</sup> Bieler, Andreas. "Neo-Liberal Globalisation, The Manufacturing Of Insecurity And The Power Of Labour". *Labor History*, vol 53, no. 2, 2012, pp. 274-279.

<sup>156</sup> Castells, Manuel. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, And Global Governance". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 78-93.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.



Logically, the nations having access to new means of creating and maintaining connections across-the-board, granting access to similar means of connecting to its *demos*, must have stimulated a similar transformation of the population of these nations. This newly transformed *demos* had been described as 'global civil society' by Mary Kaldor. The concept of global civil society stems from scaling up the local actors, such as grassroots organizations, unions of laborers, religious groups, civil movements, and others, who exist to represent the various groups of *demos*, to put forward, represent and defend their needs, interests, and values outside of traditional, political representatives. The composition and importance of the leading factors vary from nation to region.<sup>158</sup> However, is it these actors that shape the policies inside nations at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Professor Ingrid Volkmer argues otherwise. In her 2003 publication titled *The Global Network Society and the Global Public Sphere*, the author proposed the existence of a public sphere of influence on the international playing field, which is overwhelmingly shaping the local level policies and steps taken by nations across the globe.<sup>159</sup> The risk of adjusting internal policies to best suit the international interests is that local governments are still being elected by their local *demos* and thus should reflect their interests and opinions. Alienation of the *demos* from its country's elected leadership brings with it decreased legitimacy. "Political representation based on democracy in the nation-state becomes simply a vote of confidence on the ability of the nation-state to manage the interests of the nation in the global web of policymaking. Election to office no longer denotes a specific mandate, given the variable geometry of policy making and the unpredictability of the issues that must be dealt with. Thus, increasing distance and opacity between citizens and their representatives follows."<sup>160</sup>

While every nation has its specific, internal, destabilizing forces that may revolve around areas such as the nation's history, culture, social groups, and movements or

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<sup>158</sup> Castells, Manuel. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, And Global Governance". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 78-93.

<sup>159</sup> Volkmer, Ingrid. "The Global Network Society And The Global Public Sphere". *Development*, vol 46, no. 1, 2003, pp. 9-16.

<sup>160</sup> Castells, Manuel. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, And Global Governance". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, p. 82.

allocation of resources, in the current era, anyone, given access to the internet (excluding nations attempting to control access to information and instead work on designing their own, closed, internal networks controlled by the party in power), can enter the now global, public discourse and be exposed to a never-ending flow of information and opinions on topics ranging from relatively distant and unrelatable, to discussions able to trigger a reaction on a global scale. Many of the underlying issues either 'violate' the now widely accepted previously-mentioned democratic values that had been spreading since after the Second World War<sup>161</sup>, or are directly linked to the current issues that are both global in their magnitude and in the way humans are dealing with them (e.g. climate change, the unsustainable chain of consumption).<sup>162</sup> The shared recognition of widely accepted values by the global society has induced the growth of non-governmental organizations dealing with these international and global issues outside of traditional politics. Governments can also outsource some of its power to these NGOs, who, unlike political parties, deal with concrete cases of violation of the shared values and function on basis of expressions of human solidarity on the ground. The potential support or distrust of governments expressed toward global civil movements inside their nations, be it NGOs, or civil activism, have had an unprecedented impact on the public opinion of both supporters and opponents of these movements and their governments. The underlying issue connected with global society is that while modern technology enables individuals to unite globally, it does not necessarily indicate a collective unification under the same flag. Rather, we witness likeminded groups of individuals connecting globally, creating diverse global groups that impact the state of affairs both locally and globally.<sup>163</sup>

### **3.1 Economic factors – globalization and modernization**

The world's economies and cultures had become critically interconnected, free trade in this newly interconnected environment has driven the growth of many developing

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<sup>161</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>162</sup> Castells, Manuel. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, And Global Governance". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 78-93.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

economies around the world. While it remains a fact that having a role in the global production and trading system can provide an opportunity to the weak economies to specialize on specific service or to become a part of a multiple-step production procedure and thus grow economically, two important factors have to be taken into consideration. Firstly, being 'a gear' in this complex system makes each of the individual parts dependent on the continuation of the existence of their role. For the purpose of this subchapter, the roles will be defined based on Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory. The categories presented are *periphery*, representing less developed nations in fields such as industrialization, education and civil society, which are partly participating in the global trade with their less diverse economy, *semi-periphery*, which refer to countries with a higher level of industrialization, playing an important transitional role between periphery and the core, and *core*, developed nations with high levels of wealth and development than the previous categories, often being the primary beneficiaries of the global trade in terms of both the consumption of the final goods as well as the monetary value gained by the trade.<sup>164</sup>

The role of a peripheral or semi-peripheral country can vary from being an exporter of a specific commodity such as natural resources, agricultural or farm goods, production of a part of the final end-product, to acting as a cheap, outsourced labor force and so on. Secondly, it is often the case that the nations of the periphery, such as Bangladesh, Chad, Benin, Haiti, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka or Burkina Faso, are given its role based on their ability to supply cheap labor force.<sup>165</sup> The countries are thus at risk of being exploited by predatory behavior of the companies renting this labor. These companies can simply allocate their outsourcing and find an actor willing to produce at a lower cost, leaving the now dependent nation stranded with severe consequences.<sup>166</sup>

The indications for the stability of nations exploiting its *demos* through means such as cheap labor force and an overall lack of security of financial means were described in the second chapter. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, smaller,

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<sup>164</sup> Goldgeier, James M., and Michael McFaul. "A Tale Of Two Worlds: Core And Periphery In The Post-Cold War Era". *International Organization*, vol 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 467-491.

<sup>165</sup> Babones, Salvatore. "The Country-Level Income Structure Of The World-Economy". *Journal Of World-Systems Research*, 2005, pp. 29-55.

<sup>166</sup> Beck, Ulrich, and Kathleen Cross. *Power In The Global Age*. Polity, 2014.

weaker economies have now the opportunity to participate in the global network and grow. In his study *The Country-Level Income Structure of the World-Economy*, Salvatore Babones highlights both trends of transitioning towards and from the *core*. The data presented was collected between 1975 and 1999 and showed nations that had managed to 'jump' up in their role from the *periphery* to a *semi-periphery*, such as Algeria, Botswana, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Thailand. The trends growing in the opposite direction from the *core* to *semi-periphery* or *semi-periphery* to *periphery* included Venezuela, Syrian Arab Republic, Swaziland, Nicaragua, Guyana, and Cameroon. The country with the most drastic jump between 1976-1992 was South Korea that had managed to leapfrog from a peripheral to a core country within this timeframe.<sup>167</sup> The Asian Tiger had transformed from a strick, authoritarian nation focusing on industrialization and export in 1976 to a flourishing free, presidential democracy, ranking with 83/100 points, according to the Freedom House index in 2020.<sup>168</sup>

While the thesis did mark a certain level of economic development as a precondition of democratization in non-democratic regimes (not necessarily its driver), widespread global trade, growing industrialization, modernization and access to foreign markets by less developed countries do not seem sufficient to improve the living conditions of their *demos*. The chapter will now move to the description of the economic decline in Venezuela which was marked by mass protests and chaos following the elections in 2014. We have selected Venezuela as a nation that leaned strongly towards a democratic system and supporting democratic institutions at the end of the third wave. Simultaneously, the not-so-diverse character of its economy throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup> century enables us to better track the correlation between events in a nation, in which power-grabbing revolved around control of oil production and trade.<sup>169</sup>

Venezuela is an example of a peripheral country that had prioritized its role as an international supplier of natural resources, in this case predominantly oil, over the development of critical domestic sectors such as food production. The economic decline

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<sup>167</sup> Babones, Salvatore. "The Country-Level Income Structure Of The World-Economy". *Journal Of World-Systems Research*, 2005, pp. 29-55.

<sup>168</sup> "South Korea | Freedom House". *Freedomhouse.Org*, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2020>.

<sup>169</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

of Venezuela is a gradual process that had been monitored for decades, due to the importance of oil as a strategic resource and the obvious indications of owning such resources for the wealth of the nation.<sup>170</sup> Venezuela's primary strategy for decades had been renting petroleum grounds. The strategy had been described as "economic cycles ... characterized by a conflictive dynamic between a sector that exploits natural resources with high productivity and international competitiveness and a sector focused on the internal market with low productivity and in need of transfers from the other sector in order to function"<sup>171</sup> by Fernando Dachevsky and Juan Kornblihtt. This delicate balance had shown problematic in 2001, when the fiscal participation of the state in the petroleum revenue fell to 30 percent, compared to 70% in 1989. This decrease occurred shortly after the peak of petroleum exports by the nations, according to OPEC, that was monitored between 1997 and 1998.<sup>172</sup> The reaction of the at-the-time-leader, Hugo Chávez, was a gradual overvaluation of the nation's currency to support the import substitution strategy of certain sectors, to lower the cost of goods and materials needed in the newly created sectors.<sup>173</sup> The currency's overvaluation had reached 459% in 2010, compared to 1989, continuously expanding the gap, reaching overvaluation of 1589% in 2015, effectively transferring the purchasing power to the import sector.<sup>174</sup>

Due to the hyperinflation demonstrated in graph 2, the purchasing power of the domestic market had suffered severely, with 80% of the population reporting food insecurity according to FAO reports in 2018. With the prices of consumer goods having skyrocketed, as can be seen in graph 3, 75% of the population was dependent on so

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<sup>170</sup> Dachevsky, Fernando, and Juan Kornblihtt. "The Reproduction And Crisis Of Capitalism In Venezuela Under Chavismo". *Latin American Perspectives*, vol 44, no. 1, 2016, pp. 78-93.


<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*


<sup>173</sup> Rodrik, Dani. *In Search Of Prosperity*. Princeton University Press, 2012.

<sup>174</sup> Dachevsky, Fernando, and Juan Kornblihtt. "The Reproduction And Crisis Of Capitalism In Venezuela Under Chavismo". *Latin American Perspectives*, vol 44, no. 1, 2016, pp. 78-93.

**Graph 2. Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) - Venezuela, RB <sup>175</sup>**



**Graph 3. Consumer Price Index (2010 = 100) - Venezuela, RB <sup>176</sup>**



<sup>175</sup> World Bank. "Inflation, GDP (annual %) – Venezuelal RB". *World Development Indicators*, The World Bank Group, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=VE>, Accessed 4 Mar 2020.

<sup>176</sup> World Bank. "Consumer Price Index (2010 = 100) – Venezuelal RB". *World Development Indicators*, The World Bank Group, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=VE>, Accessed 4 Mar 2020.

called CLAP (Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción) boxes – food subsidies provided by the government.<sup>177</sup> The food insecurity stemmed both from the lack of goods on the market due to weak import substitution sectors as well as lack of financial means to purchase food, reported by nearly 90% of the population.<sup>178</sup> The stress put on Venezuela's population unable to maintain a stable living standard, in a country whose currency gradually lost its value, combined with political collision after the 2017 elections, the country had plunged itself into a mass protest across the board.<sup>179</sup> The following subchapter will cover social factors driving and shaping these riots.

### **3.2 Social factors – Global Civil Society**

Our subchapter covering the social factors during between 1975 and 1999 had highlighted two potent drivers of transitions – mobilization and education (in connecting with the third wave in Brazil, education can be described as exposure to information and following spread of democratic values and notions that were widely accepted, as described). This subchapter will address the nature of global civil society and outline the development of both mobilization and the spread of information, or education, to investigate the degree to which the mobilized *demos* participate in bottom-up transitions in the modern age. Later, the subchapter will detail the unraveling of the situation in Venezuela since the 2014 power transfer to president Maduro.

Let us first address the subject of education and the spread of information. Although the thesis had described the 20<sup>th</sup> century as ground-breaking in terms of innovation in fields such as energy production, medicine, travel, and communication, with the latter two drastically changing the manner of interaction between people, the accelerating innovation at the turn of the century had surpassed it. Until the very end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, such a manner of communication was only an abstract idea. In his

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<sup>177</sup> Doocy, Shannon et al. "The Food Security And Nutrition Crisis In Venezuela". *Social Science & Medicine*, vol 226, 2019, pp. 63-68.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela'S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77.

interview for Fox Movietone News, in 1929, Czechoslovak president Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk described his hope for the future of technology:

“I sometimes fancy a much greater invention. To see and hear in the distance without any wires. Just imagine. You could observe from your place, say in the sitting room, the jungles of Africa, what divide beasts are doing there. And more – you could see and listen to the jungles of our human society. Every man, then, would be forced to be honest, and there would be no secret plotting anymore of all the wickedness.”<sup>180</sup>

Having the benefit of interpreting Masaryk’s vision 91 years into the future, we see that a part of the Czechoslovak president’s wish did come true. Wireless devices enabling the world’s population to capture both audio and video, and simultaneously transmit both to any other given device on the other side of the globe in real-time are not only a reality. For half of the Earth’s population, as demonstrated in graph 1, they are the basics and essentials, the bread and butter of living in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. How did the new technology change the world we live in? They provide an instant link between everyone and everything. The scope of the connection between human activities was described as “... dependent on strategic nodes connected around the world. These include global financial markets; global production and distribution of goods and services; international trade; global networks of science and technology; a global skilled labor force; selective global integration of labor markets by the migration of labor and direct foreign investment; global media; global interactive networks of communication, primarily the Internet, but also dedicated computer networks; and global cultures associated with the growth of diverse global cultural industries”, by Emanuel Castells.<sup>181</sup> The thesis will highlight primarily the networks outlining peer-to-peer communication, combined with websites and applications through which we access the flow of information.

Connecting with peers via cellular networks as well as online in the current era is not only relatively simple and swift, it is also remarkably diverse. People can engage in

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<sup>180</sup> “Masaryk At Palace--Outtakes | Moving Image Research Collections”. *Mirc.Sc.Edu*, 2020, <https://mirc.sc.edu/islandora/object/usc%3A1144>.

<sup>181</sup> Castells, Manuel. “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, And Global Governance”. *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, p. 81.



communicating directly through mobile phones – both voice (calls) and text (SMS), or through messaging apps and services such as email, Telegram, WhatsApp, WeChat, Viber, Snapchat or Slack. An alternative to direct messaging is social networks gathering large numbers of people globally with distinct purposes. We will list a few, together with the vision or purpose as presented by the networks to demonstrate the purpose of most used communication tools. An example of a specialized network is LinkedIn, who's vision is to "create economic opportunity for every member of the global workforce".<sup>182</sup> Twitter, on the other hand, wishes to "advocate for free expression and protect the health of the public conversation around the world".<sup>183</sup> Facebook's mission is to "give people the power to build community and bring the world closer together".<sup>184</sup> Reddit with an average of 21 billion screen views per month identifies itself as "a growing family of millions of diverse people sharing the things they care about most."<sup>185</sup>

Various networks have various goals and offer diverse features to their users. By looking at the presented sample, we see that the one thing connecting all of the networks above is the aspiration to connect globally. These networks are the providers of global public discourse for the global civil society. While many of the networks' purpose is predominantly 'casual' networking with friends and family, the world had witnessed their utilization in emergencies such as the 2012 Hurricane Sandy, the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and the terrorist attacks in Paris, or the 2016 flooding in Louisiana, enabling rapid dissemination of emergency information to the affected communities.<sup>186</sup> However, there is no need for information to be of an emergency nature in order for it to spread fast and far. How likely a piece of information is to be 'trending' depends entirely on the network's users – what they like and dislike, and thus, if information resonates with the value systems of a wide audience of people, the information quickly circulates on many screens, exposing the information to millions of people, causing a global snowballing effect. At this point, we can clearly state that this rapid means of

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<sup>182</sup> "About LinkedIn". *About.Linkedin.Com*, 2020, <https://about.linkedin.com/>.

<sup>183</sup> "Twitter - Advocacy". *About.Twitter.Com*, 2020, [https://about.twitter.com/en\\_us/advocacy.html](https://about.twitter.com/en_us/advocacy.html).

<sup>184</sup> Menlo Park, California. "Facebook". *Facebook.Com*, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/>.

<sup>185</sup> "Homepage - Reddit". *Redditinc.Com*, 2020, <https://www.redditinc.com/>.

<sup>186</sup> Kim, Jooho, and Makarand Hastak. "Social Network Analysis: Characteristics Of Online Social Networks After A Disaster". *International Journal Of Information Management*, vol 38, no. 1, 2018, pp. 86-96.

communication is a double-edged sword, bringing with it great positive potential and benefits, as well as threats. As we indicated at the beginning of the third chapter, rather than unifying the entirety of its users, the networks enable like-minded people to connect and, similarly to the nation-state level, create large, diverse faction spread globally. Throughout these, the information distributed and 'agreed-upon' by the majority of one group may vary substantially, or even be contradicted by the information presented by a different group, be it a disagreement in terms of political opinions, social issues, world views, opinions on locally implemented policies, or general disagreement based on distinct value systems. A study done by the Department of Computer Science University of Illinois had examined confirmation bias of people representing camps of diversified ideas when presented with information deviating from their group's narrative. The study was initiated to explore the impacts of 'information bubbles' existing on platforms across the internet, that supply users' newsfeeds with homogenous information based on algorithms, that predict the likeliness of the content being aligned with the exposed user. What was found is that "users' attitude change, after being exposed to information diverse environment, is likely not only influenced by their selection of information but also their self-evaluated agreement with the information they read."<sup>187</sup> In other words, by engaging in a conversation in a closed, information-homogenous environment enforcing one narrative over the other, people are at risk of acquiring a polarized attitude due to the lack of exposure to diverse information.

The following part of the chapter will dissect the mobilization of the *demos* in Venezuela in the context of global civil society between 2014 and 2017, a period, in which Venezuela experienced the biggest spikes in protests in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We will attribute the rising importance of the role of social media in Venezuela to a set of laws, policies, and practices, with the start point being the Social Responsibility in Radio and Television law implemented in 2004 by Venezuela's National Assembly, that had inevitably led to an increasing level of censorship and the spread of fear tactics by the government, targeting the opposition, journalists, broadcast stations and newspapers

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<sup>187</sup> Liao, Q. Vera, and Wai-Tat Fu. "Beyond The Filter Bubble". *Proceedings Of The SIGCHI Conference On Human Factors In Computing Systems - CHI '13*, 2013. ACM Press, doi:10.1145/2470654.2481326.

publishers.<sup>188</sup> Due to the mutually indicating nature of these factors, the subchapters of social and political factors will be closely tied. We also note that unlike the unrests in the previous case studies of Brazil and Czechoslovakia during the third wave, there was no dominant group of people, as the protests riled up students, as well as labor workers, public figures and the political opposition.<sup>189</sup>

While the state of Venezuelan society during the presidency of Hugo Chávez had been described by Mallen and García-Guadilla as “a state of heightened tension between citizens, whose very subjectivity subsumed under their perceived political affiliation”, what followed after the victory of Maduro in the 2013 presidential race was an escalation, during which “... all forms of public social interaction were interpreted through antagonistic political narratives”, creating great division among the *demos* of Venezuela.<sup>190</sup> Handpicked by Chávez, president Nicolás Maduro shared only a part of the public support of his presidency. In fact, the results of the 2013 race showed, that the face-off between the two candidates was decided by a margin of 1.59%, with Maduro being supported by 50.66% of the total number of voters, as reported by *The Guardian*.<sup>191</sup> Apart from the polarized nature of this result, the nation also faced a crisis in the form of growing inflation of its currency, accompanied by rising prices of consumer goods such as medicine, gasoline, and food, as presented in graphs 2 and 3, both of which had risen sharply after the assumption of office by president Maduro. Alienation with the regime by approximately half of the population, combined with the rising shortage of goods and means to purchase them had pushed large numbers of dissatisfied *demos* to the streets all across Venezuela. *La Salida* – the Exit was among the first events in February 2014, uniting primarily young students representing the opposition parties Volundad Popular and VENTE.<sup>192</sup> A public, non-government-affiliated

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<sup>188</sup> Knight, Brian, and Ana Tribin. "The Limits Of Propaganda: Evidence From Chavez'S Venezuela". *Journal Of The European Economic Association*, vol 17, no. 2, 2018, pp. 567-605.

<sup>189</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela'S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>191</sup> Watts, Jonathan. "Nicolás Maduro Narrowly Wins Venezuelan Presidential Election". *The Guardian*, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/15/nicolas-maduro-wins-venezuelan-election>.

<sup>192</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela'S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77

organization *The Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict* had reported at least 9286 protests in 2014 alone, an increase of 111% compared to 2013, with a majority of the protests taking place within the first six months of 2014.<sup>193</sup> Many of these protests have turned violent, paramilitary was deployed to control the situation, leading to numerous arrests, injuries as well as fatalities.<sup>194</sup> Due to an increasingly controlling nature of the state with relation to the traditional, as well as internet media, the "... social media erupted in Venezuela as an important method of escape from different state controls established by traditional media in Venezuela by citizens who were interested in gaining access to information and the establishment of communication and relationships around the social transformations in Venezuela, despite an emerging increase in existing social unrest".<sup>195</sup> Even with attempts by the international community to facilitate dialogue between the government, the opposition and the public, the highly polarized nation only witnessed a continuation of protests, combined with a rise in criminal activity such as looting, due to common goods shortage in the following three years.<sup>196</sup>

The 'self-dissolution' of the National Assembly by the president after the clash between the legislative and executive bodies of the government in January 2017 had sparked the second large wave of protests throughout 2017. According to *The Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict*, there was a 44% increase in the number of protests compared to 2016, reaching a historical number of 9787 protests between January and December 2017.<sup>197</sup> The official narrative of the situation presented by the Venezuelan media described a situation in which actors on both domestic as well as

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<sup>193</sup> "Informe: Conflictividad Social En Venezuela En 2014 | Observatorio Venezolano De Conflictividad Social". *Observatorio Venezolano De Conflictividad Social*, 2020, <https://www.observatoriodeconflictos.org.ve/tendencias-de-la-conflictividad/informe-conflictividad-social-en-venezuela-en-2014>.

<sup>194</sup> "Conflictividad Social En Venezuela En Marzo De 2014 | Observatorio Venezolano De Conflictividad Social". *Observatorio Venezolano De Conflictividad Social*, 2020, <https://www.observatoriodeconflictos.org.ve/tendencias-de-la-conflictividad/conflictividad-social-en-venezuela-en-marzo-de-2014>.

<sup>195</sup> Said-Hung, Elías, and Francisco Segado-Boj. "Social Media Mobilization In Venezuela: A Case Study". *Social And Economic Studies*, vol 67, no. 4, 2018, p. 236.

<sup>196</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela'S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77.

<sup>197</sup> "Conflictividad Social En Venezuela En 2017 | Observatorio Venezolano De Conflictividad Social". *Observatorio Venezolano De Conflictividad Social*, 2020, <https://www.observatoriodeconflictos.org.ve/tendencias-de-la-conflictividad/conflictividad-social-en-venezuela-en-2017>.

international levels, were actively attempting to destabilize the institutions and the regime itself, siding with the regime and only presenting limited, or partial information altogether. The mobilization of ‘smart mobs’ on online social networks, such as Twitter, showed the ability to cover the events in a form of a continuous flow of information, supplying both information and media covering the events unfolding in Venezuela, that were shared globally.<sup>198</sup> Similarly to the mobilization of *demos* through social media and modern communication technologies in nations such as Tunisia or Egypt during the Arab spring, the constant and accessible flow of information turned out to be a critical foundation for the mobilization on the ground.<sup>199</sup>

Even though the freedom of assembly is granted by the constitution, in contemporary Venezuela, the right is not protected in practice. According to the *Freedom House* report, the protesting *demos* were at risk of being charged under various laws, and demonstrations aiming at directly discrediting Maduro’s government clashing with police and paramilitaries. The shared footage and pictures portraying clashes between the civilians and armed police, showing the suppression of human rights and freedoms had quickly generated a global outcry from the international community.<sup>200</sup>

### **3.3 Political factors – Venezuela’s internal and global network of influence**

Our subchapter covering the economic factors had presented the concept of a network state, outlined the role of Venezuela in this formation and described the impact of the decline in participation of the state in the oil revenue on the economic situation in the nation, as well as on day-to-day life. The following chapter had detailed the manner, in which events unraveled after the presidential elections in 2013 and described the role of social media in the mobilization of Venezuela’s *demos*, contrasting traditional state-

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<sup>198</sup> Said-Hung, Elías, and Francisco Segado-Boj. "Social Media Mobilization In Venezuela: A Case Study". *Social And Economic Studies*, vol 67, no. 4, 2018, pp. 235-259.

<sup>198</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela’S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77.

<sup>199</sup> Said-Hung, Elías, and Francisco Segado-Boj. "Social Media Mobilization In Venezuela: A Case Study". *Social And Economic Studies*, vol 67, no. 4, 2018, pp. 235-259.

<sup>200</sup> "Venezuela | Freedom House". *Freedomhouse.Org*, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2020>.

owned media outlets. The final subchapter will present the state of politics in Venezuela in the given time period, the key political notions that were implemented and the reactions these notions generated domestically, as well as globally.

To better reflect on the social movement, smart mobs, and the mobilization through social media, we begin by highlighting the failed coup to overthrow Chavez's government in April 2002. This crisis of legitimacy, also called the 'media coup', was in large being perpetrated by the private, commercial media in Venezuela, primarily by the four biggest publishers and networks in the country, namely; RCTV (Radio Caracas Televisión), El Nacional, Globovision, and Venevision, represented by the FEDECAMARAS (Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production) – a union combining the business sector, high-ranked members of Venezuela's oil company, the CTV (Confederation of Workers of Venezuela) and parts of the armed forces, who took the role of political activists in the country.<sup>201</sup> As the constitution chartered by Chavez in 1999 protected the freedom of the press without censorship under articles 57 and 58, the domestic commercial media, as well as some international outlets, such as *The Washington Post*, or *El Pais*, were free to begin aggressive coverage, critiquing and destabilizing Chavez's regime. The reason steering politics through media was so potent at the time is that the media formed the only self-proclaimed democratic opposition to Chavez's rule and connected wide audience through numerous channels running on television sets, radios, and paper news publications. The target of this organized barrage was weakening the regime.<sup>202</sup> This closely correlates with a hypothesis by Emanuel Cass proposed in 1997, nominating the electronic media as the 'privileged space for politics' in the future.<sup>203</sup>

The joint forces of the private media outlets and other high-ranked actors did manage to alienate a significant portion of the state's population from the democratically elected government in 2002, sending many to the streets to protests, while covering and airing the demonstrations live on the TV screens. Escalation was also

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<sup>201</sup> Lemoine, Maurice. "Dans Les Laboratoires Du Mensonge Au Venezuela". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 2002, <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2002/08/LEMOINE/9214>.

<sup>202</sup> Castillo, Antonio. "Breaking Democracy: Venezuela's Media Coup". *Media International Australia Incorporating Culture And Policy*, vol 108, no. 1, 2003, pp. 145-156.

<sup>203</sup> Castells, Manuel. *The Information Age*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

being pushed through provocative headlines, targeting Chavez's mental sanity, urging people to take to the streets, or directly stating that this is the 'Time to Overthrow This Government', as featured on the front page of *El Universal* on March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2002.<sup>204</sup> The following month, April brought about more chaos and confusion as the news outlets continued to publish gradually escalating headlines mentioning fuel shortage, military leaders disassociating themselves with the regime and finally, on April 12<sup>th</sup>, reporting Chavez stepping down as the president, a falsehood that had riled up many of Chavez's supporters, counter-protesting in the streets, demanding the president's return to the office. The reaction of the news outlets that had been daily airing protests against the regime was to impose a complete news blackout on the protests, effectively self-censoring their networks and papers.<sup>205</sup> Due to this information blackout, people who protested the regime in the preceding days had little to no information concerning the counter-coup and subsequent Chavez's return to power.<sup>206</sup>

The attempted coup had a decisive impact on the future development of the dissemination of information in the nation. Firstly, the one-sided coverage of the events had left a significant part of the *demos* with distrust toward the public media. Secondly, the failed coup had enabled Chavez to identify his adversaries within his ranks as well as public elites, such as the owners of the news networks and the state's oil company mentioned above. Finally, in December 2004, Venezuela's National Assembly had implemented previously mentioned Social Responsibility in Radio and Television law, in an attempt to better steer the discourse in public media. The law was further extended in 2010 to include internet news broadcast, as well as social media.<sup>207</sup> It was the enactment of this specific law that later drove the suppression of basic human rights and freedom, specified in the first chapter, namely freedom of speech, freedom of movement and association, freedom of assembly, equal opportunities for political

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<sup>204</sup> Castillo, Antonio. "Breaking Democracy: Venezuela's Media Coup". *Media International Australia Incorporating Culture And Policy*, vol 108, no. 1, 2003, pp. 145-156.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Encarnación, Omar G. "Venezuela's "Civil Society Coup"". *World Policy Journal*, vol 19, no. 2, 2002, pp. 38-48.

<sup>207</sup> Said-Hung, Elías, and Francisco Segado-Boj. "Social Media Mobilization In Venezuela: A Case Study". *Social And Economic Studies*, vol 67, no. 4, 2018, pp. 235-259.

parties and independent candidates to stand for election and impartial treatment of candidates by the police, the army, and the courts of law.

While Chavez managed to maintain the favor of a substantial chunk of the population by utilizing Bolivarian missions - social programs primarily funded by the nation's oil exports, designed to help the low, working class in terms of social justice, welfare, education, and poverty-reduction, following his death in 2013, the nation's crippled economy struggled to sustain these programs. Maduro's assumption of the office was followed by a sharp decline in the global prices of oil, which, together with the decreasing share of oil revenue by the government made it more difficult for Maduro's regime to sustain these social programs.<sup>208</sup> Graph 4 below shows the import prices of crude oil as presented by the OECD. The graph highlights Venezuela's biggest trading partner – the USA, represented by the lowest line on the curve and Australia, who is positioned the highest, to reflect on the global range of prices of oil.

The economic crisis in the nation had inevitably left to what the opposition called 'a humanitarian crisis', that had forced the *demos* to the streets. The reaction of the regime was increased repression and censorship related to the protests. In her article *Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela's Twenty-First Century Socialism*, Professor María Pilar García-Guadilla highlights the pro-government protests that were granted permission to occupy symbolic places, unlike the pro-opposition protestors, frequently leading to violent clashes between the two polarized groups.<sup>209</sup> The situation had taken a turn for the worse in 2015 after the United States, Venezuela's largest trading partner, imposed sanctions against seven Venezuelan officials, most of which acting officials in agencies such as the nation's intelligence services, courts, military, and police, accusing them of "perpetrating human rights violations and public corruption".<sup>210</sup>

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
<sup>208</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela'S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> "'Deeply Concerned' Obama Imposes Sanctions On Venezuelan Officials". *The Guardian*, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/09/obama-venezuela-security-threat-sanctions>.



**Graph 4. Crude oil import prices – OECD member states** <sup>211</sup>



In 2015, the opposition of Maduro’s government had managed to secure a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, the legislative body of Venezuela's government, reaching the potential to effectively challenge Maduro’s executive power by utilizing mechanisms of representative democracy. The president’s reaction to the loss of power over the National Assembly was to assemble the Communal assembly, a body that was created to parallel the National Assembly yet remained unmentioned in the country’s constitution, that had perished shortly after its creation due to inside conflicts.<sup>212</sup>

Utilizing its powers, the National Assembly attempted a recall referendum against Maduro in 2016, only to have the proposition suspended by the government. This antagonistic action taken by the opposition had provoked a contemptible reaction by the president who had pressed the Supreme Court of Venezuela to postpone the upcoming elections for governors, immobilizing the National Assembly.<sup>213</sup> Furthermore,

<sup>211</sup> "Energy - Crude Oil Import Prices - OECD Data". *Theoecd*, 2020, <https://data.oecd.org/energy/crude-oil-import-prices.htm#indicator-chart>.

<sup>212</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela’S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77.

<sup>213</sup> Brodzinsky, Sibylla. "Venezuelans Warn Of 'Dictatorship' After Officials Block Bid To Recall Maduro". *The Guardian*, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/venezuela-president-maduro-recall-referendum>.

in March 2017, the General Assembly was stripped of its legislative powers by the Supreme Court which, at this point, had obtained the legislative capabilities, effectively compounding the judicial and executive powers in a single branch of the government.<sup>214</sup> Knowing the Supreme Court was dominated by Maduro's allies, the controversial reversion of power was referred to as a coup by the opposition and generated great turbulence not only domestic but also international, effectively sending thousands of *demos* to the streets of major Venezuelan cities on daily basis and having the neighboring nations strongly condemn the merging of power as well as the suppression of human rights targeted at the anti-government protestors.<sup>215</sup> Despite ongoing mass protests, Maduro had announced that an election for a new government body – the Constituent Assembly, who's representatives were, similarly to the General Assembly, to be elected by popular vote in late July 2017. Following the call for elections, the opposition used a public consultation against the call as a way to remain transparent and advise against the President's decision, boycotting the election altogether.

Maduro's call for an election to the newly created body of government had sparked an international outcry and swift reactions by some of the world leaders. A group of nations including the USA, Canada, Mexico, Panama, and 28 other nations comprising the European Union, sanctioned Venezuela, targeting its "security forces and government ministers and institutions accused of human rights violations and the non-respect of democratic principles or the rule of law", similarly to the wave of sanctions in 2015.<sup>216</sup> More aggressive financial sanctions, targeting the country's exports, including the dominant oil industry, were imposed by the USA. The combined set of sanctions, according to a 2018 report conducted by a UN special rapporteur Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, have had a devastating impact on an already dire

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<sup>214</sup> García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. "Polarization, Participatory Democracy, And Democratic Erosion In Venezuela'S Twenty-First Century Socialism". *The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, vol 681, no. 1, 2018, pp. 62-77.

<sup>215</sup> Watts, Jonathan. "Venezuela Opposition Allege Coup As Supreme Court Seizes Power". *The Guardian*, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/30/venezuela-president-nicolas-maduro-national-assembly>.

<sup>216</sup> Emmott, Robin. "EU Readies Sanctions On Venezuela, Approves Arms Embargo". *Routters*, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-eu/eu-readies-sanctions-on-venezuela-approves-arms-embargo-idUSKBN1DD0UN?il=0>.

humanitarian, economic and political crisis surging the nation. In his report, Zayas described his experience in Venezuela with the following words:

“The effects of sanctions imposed by Presidents Obama and Trump and unilateral measures by Canada and the European Union have directly and indirectly aggravated the shortages in medicines such as insulin and anti-retroviral drugs. To the extent that economic sanctions have caused delays in distribution and thus contributed to many deaths, sanctions contravene the human rights obligations of the countries imposing them. Moreover, sanctions can amount to crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. An investigation by that Court would be appropriate, but the geopolitical submissiveness of the Court may prevent this.”<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> United Nations Secretariat. *Report Of The Independent Expert On The Promotion Of A Democratic And Equitable International Order On His Mission To The Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela And Ecuador*. United Nations, New York City, 2018, pp. 13-14.

## Conclusion

This thesis had followed the issue of regime transition and social change throughout the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. To track these changes, we have selected the model representing liberal representative democracy to contrast with the case studies of Brazil and Czechoslovakia in the period between 1974 and 1990 and Venezuela in the period between 2002 and 2017. The objective was to study the nation-shaping processes at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as observed and described by scholars such as S. Huntington, G. Sartori, S. Avineri, M. Lipset, S. Mainwaring, R. Collier, and G. Skilling, focusing on economic, social and political factors, and to identify potential new drivers of social change in these three groups brought about by the exponential technological advancements of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The first chapter had described democracy as an idea chronologically changing to reflect the context of its time and to best suit the needs of people utilizing this concept. Therefore, it is to be expected to see the concept morph in the future. By defining the supreme law of a democratic system as *salus populi suprema lex esto* - the health (welfare, good, salvation, felicity) of the people is the supreme law, we have set up an anchor pillar of the system. Finally, we have stressed out the importance of representation of the *demos* in relation to the legitimacy of a regime in a given nation. Following Sartori's assertion, we noted that the top-down power assertion of the elected can, in nations governed by bodies lacking legitimacy, indicate that the government *over* the people has very little to do with the government *of* the people. Policies implemented by a government to best benefit the individual constituents of the government are likely not aligned with *salus populi suprema lex esto*, worsening the conditions for the *demos*. Using examples from the third wave, we noted that the *people* are prone to destabilizing actions such as strikes, protests, and revolts in systems that fail to provide them with basic resources such as food, medicine, housing, and means to earn money to purchase these resources.

The global scene at the end of the third wave entailed the victory of democracy, as the period started with 24.6 % of the world's nation being democratic (1973) and

ended with 45.4% of the nations democratized (1990).<sup>218</sup> However, Huntington described each of the democratization wave being followed by a reverse wave that had hindered the process of democratization, that had ultimately peaked with the end of the third wave. How well has the world maintained the process of democratization? Having peaked in the 1990s, what does the current trend tell us about the state of democracy in the world? According to the data gathered and presented by the Freedom House in the first two decades of the new millennium, the period between 2005 and 2019 had marked a 14-year decline of democratic scores of individual nations. The year 2005 had seen 83 nations increase their net score, while 52 nations' scores sank. The net gains continued to drop throughout the decades, while net declines continued to rise. The most recent scores given in 2019 portraying the fluctuation, show 37 nations as having improved their democratic score, while the reality in 64 countries worsened.<sup>219</sup> A worrying trend can be observed in the 41 consolidated democracies globally, 25 of which (France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Italy, the United States, and others) had seen their score lowered, pointing to worsening of the perception of democracy in the eyes of *demos* of these systems, not to mention the scores of nations that had been marked as 'partly free' or 'not free'. However, the *demos* of the 21<sup>st</sup> century now have a powerful edge on their daily struggle - the means to broadcast their daily conflict directly from the lion's den. Venezuela, which had been the case study of the third chapter is one of these nations.

When comparing the case studies of transformations of the third wave and the decay of democratic institutions and the rule of law in Venezuela, we see that what had changed is primarily the scale of actors of social change and their drivers. During the third wave, the main role was played by various, local actors mobilized under a common cause denouncing the governing regime for distinct reasons, as it was in cases of Czechoslovakia and Brazil. Venezuela exhibits many economic issues that are currently pushing the country's *demos* to the street, most of which are connected to the state's involvement in renting its petroleum reserves and overall inadequate management of the nation's economy, leading to food and medicine shortages, unemployment, and the

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<sup>218</sup> Huntington, Samuel Phillips. *The Third Wave*. University Of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

<sup>219</sup> Repucci, Sarah. "A Leaderless Struggle For Democracy". *Freedom House*, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy>.

collapse of sectors such as services or transportation. The nation's elites had also been bending the rule of law to their needs over the past two decades, creating an environment benefiting a minority, while suppressing rights, freedoms, and opportunities of the rest, ultimately leading to the diminishment of their legitimacy by over a half of the nation's population.

The nuance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century comes with the introduction of communication technologies. When describing the 'snowballing effect' during the third wave, Huntington described an aspiration that took years to spread. Local actors in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century were most certainly motivated by foreign actors, however, this process was extremely slow, compared to the speed with which information spreads in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Be it the discontented *demos* of Tunisia, Algeria, India, Iran, Bolivia, Venezuela, Hong Kong, Georgia or Russia, actors of social change now have the means to not only mobilize their fellow citizens but to gather attention from the global civil society. The ideological unification of many people on the global stage then may generate a reaction from either the individual, nation-state leaderships, or, as we presented with various sanctions in the third chapter, a joint effort of the network state to limit an issue pressing its people globally. Seeing large-scale disobedience taking place across the globe is a thorn in the eye of a modern, interconnected, globalized network of institutions, each of which vitally relies on the mentioned interconnectedness and on keeping their dedicated role in the global network, as well as on retaining legitimacy in the eyes of their *demos*. A dialogue between the global civil society and the network of states will thus be required in order to refocus global policies on *salus populi suprema lex esto* to contain the rising alienation of people from their elected leaders.

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