



**Master of Arts Thesis
Euroculture**

University of Groningen

Palacký University of Olomouc

July 2018

Towards an integrated European development policy?

*An analysis of the contribution of Dutch politicians to the emergence of a
European development policy from 1973 to 1977*

Submitted by:

Tessa van Beusekom
Student number first university: 3222578
Student number second university: 80078695
Contact details:
+31623358297
tess-1989@hotmail.com

Supervised by:

Ine Megens
Hynek Melichar

Utrecht, July 17, 2018

Signature

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the initials "TB" inside a stylized, elongated shape.

THESIS Declaration sheet



MA Programme Euroculture Declaration

I, Tessa van Beusekom, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled "Towards an integrated European development policy?", submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "T. van Beusekom", written over a dotted line.

Date

17-07-2018

Abstract

From 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) established an official relationship with its overseas countries and territories which evolved into a partnership with an increasing network of developing countries. Despite its reluctant attitude towards the EEC's cooperation with developing countries, the Netherlands collaborated with European partners to work towards a joint European policy. In 1973, Jan Pronk, an inspired Minister of Development Cooperation introduced structural changes in Dutch development policy. This thesis sought to find out how Minister Pronk tried to influence European policy and whether he was supported by Dutch members of the European Parliament and fellow European Ministers.

After a general overview of the EEC's decision-making process and the European and Dutch development policy, this thesis addresses the question how Dutch politicians, who were active in the field of development cooperation, tried to promote coordination within the emergence of a common European development policy between 1973 and 1977. Next to their position within the European decision-making process, their personal actions and resources are analyzed to see how they functioned. The results show that despite that some Dutch Parliamentarians advocated for their national Minister on the European level, disappointment with the progress towards a common European policy dominated. A more integrated European development policy was not feasible in the short term and Pronk's ambitious policy proved difficult to harmonize with the wishes of the other Member States.

Key words: Development policy, European integration, Decision-making, Self-reliance, Developing countries, Developed countries, Intergovernmentalism, Pressure politics.

Table of contents

List of Abbreviations	4
Introduction	5
Chapter 1: Theoretical framework and methodology	9
<i>1.1 EEC institutions and their role within development policy</i>	9
<i>1.2 Theories of Europeanization and decision-making</i>	11
Chapter 2: The emergence of a European development policy (1957-1975)	14
<i>2.1 The first association between the EEC and overseas countries and territories</i>	14
<i>2.3 Regionalists versus globalists: conflicts between the member states in the 1960s</i> ..	15
<i>2.4 The year 1972: a critical juncture</i>	19
<i>2.5 The Council's reaction to a more comprehensive Community policy</i>	21
<i>2.6 From 1973 onwards</i>	23
Chapter 3: Dutch development policy from 1957 to 1977	29
<i>3.1 Characteristics of Dutch development policy from the late 1950s to the 1970s</i>	29
<i>3.2 Priorities for the Den Uyl cabinet, 1973-1977</i>	33
<i>3.2 An evaluation of Minister Pronk</i>	37
Chapter 4. Pronk and the EEC Council of Ministers	41
<i>4.1. 1973: Pronk's first year in the EEC Council of Ministers</i>	41
<i>4.2. 1974: The Dutch Council of Ministers</i>	45
<i>4.3. 1975: The EEC and the United Nations</i>	47
<i>4.4. 1976: The EEC Presidency</i>	49
<i>4.5. 1977: Pronk's last year in office</i>	53
Chapter 5: Dutch members in the European Parliament	57
<i>5.1. The procedures of the European Parliament</i>	57
<i>5.2 Van der Hek</i>	60
<i>5.3. Broeksz</i>	62
<i>5.3 Schuijt</i>	66
Conclusion	69
Bibliography	72

List of Abbreviations

AASM	Associated African States and Madagascar
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
CDC	Committee on Development and Cooperation
Coreper	Committee of Permanent Representatives (European Council)
CIEC	Conference on International Economic Cooperation
DGIS	Directorate-General for International Cooperation (Directoraat- Generaal Internationale Samenwerking)
EC	European Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EUA	European Union of Account
GNP	Gross National Product
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MEPs	Members of European Parliament
Maghreb	Northern Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania)
Mashreq	Arab peninsula (historical region of the Arab world to the East of Egypt. Comprises the modern states of, among others, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait)
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OCTs	Overseas Countries and Territories
STABEX	Stabilization of Export Receipts Scheme
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

In 2005, the Presidents of the European Council, the European Parliament and the Commission signed the joint declaration on “The European Union’s Development Policy.” Also known as the “European Consensus on Development,” this document set out the common values, principles and objectives of the European Union’s development cooperation policy. The document was politically very important, because it was the first official common framework for a coordinated and coherent implementation of cooperation measures by the Commission and the Member States.¹

The European Consensus marked the first time in fifty years that the European Union (EU) succeeded to consolidate all the positions of the Member States with regards to development policy in a common declaration. The EU’s road towards a consensus on development policy has been a long and difficult one. In 1957, France initiated the definition and implementation of a European development policy with the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome. Through a European development policy, France could maintain its interests and influence over Africa, while sharing the costs of this policy between the Member States.²

At the time, an association between Europe and the French overseas territories and a specific European investment fund for Africa was a difficult issue to solve. France and Belgium formed a front as ‘regionalists’, and stressed the strategic links with European colonies, whereas West-Germany and the Netherlands were the ‘globalists’, and placed more emphasis on poverty eradication and a focus on non-French speaking African countries and non-African countries.³

This debate culminated in the adoption of an association agreement between the then European Economic Community (EEC) with the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), a group of mostly French-speaking African countries in 1957.⁴ From then on, every five years a new agreement was signed and new countries were added: the Yaoundé Conventions with the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) (1963, 1968), the Lomé Conventions with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) (1975, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1995) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000).⁵

¹ Dieter Frish, ‘The European Union’s Development Policy. A Personal View of 50 Years of International Cooperation,’ *Policy Management Report* 15, European Centre for Development Policy Management, April 2008, 57-58.

² Karin Arts and Anna Dickson ed., *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol* (Manchester, University Press: 2004), 13.

³ Veronique Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire* (Hampshire, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics: 2014), 13.

⁴ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire*, 13.

⁵ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy*, 2.

Most scholars agree that with the Treaty of Rome, only the objectives for a development policy were set, but not the implementation. At the time, ideas on development as a process or an objective were rather vague and the objective as formulated in the association agreement was no exception.⁶ As a consequence, there was a lot of room left for the Member States to interpret and implement the agreement to their own liking and there was no consistent EEC policy. Nonetheless, some scholars argue that, despite the fact that from the 1950's to the 1980's, the EEC development policy was limited in both geographical and political scopes, it was very progressive.⁷ The beginning of the 1970's were an especially important time for the EEC because this was when a development policy started to take shape, through initiatives of the Commission and subsequent actions taken by the Council. At the same time, a global progressive movement caused some European countries to change their development policy. These changes are the starting point of this thesis.

In 1973, a new government was installed in the Netherlands; a center-left coalition under the leadership of Prime Minister Den Uyl. This government is known as the most leftist government in Dutch history. Part of this cabinet was an inspired new Minister of development cooperation called Jan Pronk. Pronk was part of the left-wing of the Labor Party and quite radical in his style. He was a passionate politician who approached development issues with a politicizing approach.⁸ He had had many ideas for a new, progressive development policy and enabled a substantial increase in financial aid. Also, he introduced criteria to determine which countries would receive financial aid, made human rights part of development policy and supported liberation movements in Africa and Latin-America. Dutch development policy was quite exceptional because of its left-wing activist character at that time.

Furthermore, the Dutch government was one of the few governments in the world that was keen to achieve the norm to spend 0.7% of its national income on development aid, which was set by the United Nations General Assembly in 1970. In 1975, the Netherlands became the second country to do so, following Sweden. Many other countries lagged behind, including the traditional 'Big Five' donors: the United States, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In 1976, the Netherlands further increased their development budget to 1.0% of the

⁶ L.J. van der Veen, "Het Ontwikkelingsbeleid van de Europese Gemeenschap in de praktijk. Een analyse aan de hand van drie landenstudies" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1985), 2.

⁷ Maurizio Carbone, "Introduction: The new season of EU development policy," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9, no. 2 (2008): 111.

⁸ Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën uitgegeven door het Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Kleine Serie 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977* (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2005), XIX

GNP and together with Canada and three Scandinavian countries, it was a forerunner among Western aid donors.⁹

Much has been written about Pronk and his influence on the national development policy. His leading role within the growing progressive movement in Western countries (especially Scandinavian countries) and his efforts within UN meetings on development cooperation, also receive a great deal of attention. Nonetheless, his role within the process towards a European development policy is still relatively underexposed. More generally, not much has been written on Dutch politicians on the European level in this period. Did Pronk advocate his proposed changes within the Council of Ministers and did he have any support for his ideas from the Dutch Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)? Also, how did Dutch MEP's, who were involved with development policy, try to influence or contribute to the emergence of a European development policy? These are all questions this thesis seeks to address.

Similar research has already been done by Anne-Sophie Claeys on the role of France and French interests in European development policy since 1957. Claeys analyzed the different channels used by France to contribute to the elaboration of the European development policy by looking at organizational models of the EU.¹⁰ Even though France had the strongest influence in the creation of a European development policy, it would be interesting to see to what extent the Dutch progressive government, in particular the inspired Minister Pronk, had an influence.¹¹

For my research, I will focus on the possibilities and limits that Dutch politicians encountered and what their concrete actions were with regards to a European development policy. Did they aim for small successes or cooperation with colleagues? Was it their political conviction, enthusiasm, sense of influence or their position within the party or parliament that drove them? How did they view the prospect of a more integrated Europe? These questions are important to form a concrete analysis of what their personal resources and actions were with regards to the creation of a European development policy, but also to understand how they functioned. To answer these questions, the following research question will be used:

⁹ "History of the 0.7% ODA target," *Development Assistance Committee Journal* 3 No.4 (2002): 9 – 11, Revised March 2016.

¹⁰ Anne-Sophie Claeys, "'Sense and Sensibility': the role of France and French Interests in European Development Policy", in *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol*, ed. Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (Manchester: University Press, 2004).

¹¹ Arts and Dickson ed., *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol*, 4.

How did Dutch representatives who were active in the field of development cooperation try to promote coordination within the emergence of a common European development policy between 1973 and 1977?

The first chapter gives an overview of the decision-making process within the EEC to show the power relations between the different institutions. I then analyze the emergence of a European development policy from the Treaty of Rome to the 1970's and the most important events in Dutch development policy in this period. In the next two empirical chapters, I examine the personal performance and actions of Dutch politicians domestically and on a European level and the means that they had at their disposal to exert influence.

I think that this case study is relevant because it allows for an analysis of both national and European interests in development policy. It provides an assessment of the levels of coordination, coherence and complementarity between the European Council, the European Parliament, Member States and within Member States. Examining this subject can have an added value when the outcomes are used for comparison. Also, compared to other European policies, EU development cooperation is still an understudied area, despite its economic and political importance.¹² I would like my thesis to be ground work for further comparison studies of development policy, for instance studies of other Member States and their influence on European development policy or cross-studies with different countries and policy areas.

¹² Arts and Dickson ed., *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol*, 3.

Chapter 1: Theoretical framework and methodology

This chapter will first explain the EEC's decision-making process with regards to development policy in the period that is central to this research. I evaluate the power relations between the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council and what this meant for the position of the Dutch politicians. Then, I discuss which theory best suits my case study.

1.1 EEC institutions and their role within development policy

Since the Treaty of Rome, many changes were made to EEC policy-making, but most policies were adopted as follows. The Commission drafted the proposal and the Council examined them and adopted them. The Council did not have legislative power and it could also not initiate or draft proposals, this was a sole competence of the Commission. There were ways for the Council to go around this, for example the Council could influence the initiation of policies by adopting opinions, resolutions, agreements or recommendation with political weight, or by discussing areas outside of the treaties' competences.¹³

Until the introduction of direct elections in 1979, the European Parliament (EP) was mostly a consultative body, consisting of delegations from national parliaments. Its main task was to prepare opinions on Commission legislative proposals, before they were adopted by the Council. The Council was not obligated to accept the EP's opinions.¹⁴ Through budgetary treaties in 1970 and 1975, the EP gained joint budgetary authorities with the Council. The EP could revise the budget and take the final vote on its adoption or rejection.¹⁵

The Treaty of Rome made no reference to foreign policy, but the European Economic Community (EEC) was authorized to supervise the external economic relations. Next to the creation of a common internal market arose and an external trade policy, the Treaty of Rome also enabled the creation of an association agreement. The Member States agreed to make joint financial contributions to their still-dependent territories and to give them preferential access to the European market.¹⁶ This association agreement evolved into a partnership with an ever-

¹³ Philippa Sherrington, *The Council of Ministers. Political Authority in the European Union* (London: Pinter, 2000), 11-12.

¹⁴ Sherrington, *The Council of Ministers. Political Authority in the European Union*, 11.

¹⁵ Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Micheal Shackleton, *The European Parliament* (London: John Harper Publishing, 2011) 4. Accessed June 29, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central.

¹⁶ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 1999), 5.

increasing network, including former territories of new Member States and other developing countries.¹⁷

The first association agreement provided for a framework for developing aid programs. Within the European Commission (from hereon: Commission), a specific department was put in charge of these aid programs, called the Directorate General of Development Policy.¹⁸ The head of this department was responsible for the disbursement of aid and the assignment of local authority officers in each associated country or territory.¹⁹

The Commission financed the development projects through the European Development Fund (EDF).²⁰ The Commission also initiated, implemented and guarded the contacts between the EEC and the associated countries. The Treaty of Rome stated that it was the responsibility of the authorities in the associated countries to introduce economic and social projects for EEC financing. The Commission solely managed the social projects, such as financing hospitals and teaching institutions. For economic projects, the Commission and the Council were jointly in control. First, the Commission assessed the proposals for economic projects. Then, the Commission made financial proposals for the accepted projects and forwarded them to the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers had to vote in favor by a qualified majority before a project could be adopted.²¹

Within the EP, the Committee on the Association with Overseas Countries and Territories was established in 1958. In principle, seven members would come from the three large Member States (West-Germany, France and Italy), three from Belgium and the Netherlands and two from Luxembourg. The name of the Committee changed to Committee on Development and Cooperation in 1973.²² The Committee on Development and Cooperation (from here on: CDC) monitored developments such as the decolonization process and the renewals of the Community's external relations with the OCTs. The CDC dealt with reports on subjects ranging from the progress on the association policies to proposals (mostly implementing agreements) made by the Commission.²³

¹⁷ Friedrich Hamburger, "An Overview of EU Development Policy." In *European Union Development Policy*, ed. Marjorie Lister (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 12.

¹⁸ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire*, 2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

²² Franco Piodi, *The Development Committees. Reports and Resolutions of the Various Committees Responsible for Development Cooperation from 1958 to 1999* (European Parliament: Archive and Documentation Center CARDOC, 2010), 17.

²³ Piodi, *The Development Committees*, 18.

Despite the expansion of the EEC's external relations over time, the political external policy – also called 'high politics' - remained the exclusive responsibility of the Member States.²⁴ This also had impact for the EEC's aid programs. Even though the Commission launched initiatives to coordinate Member States' aid programs, most Member States saw development cooperation as a component of foreign policy and not as a separate area of external relations.²⁵ As a result, the Commission had to focus on the technical side of development and joint action on non-controversial aspects. This made EEC aid programs supplementary to that of Member States' aid programs.²⁶

1.2 Theories of Europeanization and decision-making

As the previous overview has shown, the decision-making process of the EEC is not a fixed phenomenon but it evolved over time. Even though the Treaty of Rome laid down guidelines on decision-making, it was only a framework that developed into very complex and diverse sets of procedures over time.²⁷ Glenda Rosenthal argues that, because of this complex system, "there is no single decision-making process in the EEC, but multiple processes that depend on many different variables."²⁸ The EC is a unique system of multilevel governance, but this also makes it difficult to map the decision-making process.

A widely used theory on the complex and multi-level organization of the current European Union (EU) is Europeanization. Europeanization theories can be used to research the process of intuition-building and political integration on the European level. On the other hand, Europeanization can also be used to look at the impact of European integration on the domestic policies of the Member States.²⁹ Yet, theories on Europeanization are constantly innovated because Europeanization is a contested concept itself.³⁰

Another group of scholars used decision-making theories to show how the EU works as a system for making decisions. Many try to explain the EU's decision-making process by using different analytical categories or types of decision that show the system of multi-level governance. Glenda Rosenthal's study focuses on decision-making in the early years of the

²⁴ Bretherton and Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 4.

²⁵ Frans Alting von Geusau ed., *The Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1977), 118.

²⁶ Von Geusau, *The Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order*, 118.

²⁷ Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, *The Men Behind the Decisions. Cases in European Policy-Making* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975), 1.

²⁸ Rosenthal, *The Men Behind the Decisions. Cases in European Policy-Making*, 1.

²⁹ Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble, "Conceptualising Europeanisation," *Public Policy and Administration* 17, no. 2 (2002): 9.

³⁰ Buller and Gamble, "Conceptualising Europeanisation," 9.

EEC, just like my thesis. Rosenthal tests three conceptual schemes of decision-making: intergovernmentalism, pressures and ‘elite networks.’³¹ With intergovernmentalism, decision-making takes place between individual members of the national governments who defend the enhancement of his or her country’s position.³² In the second scheme, decision-making is the outcome of pressure exerted by the public, interest groups or parliamentary representatives. When decision-making is the result of behind-the-scenes lobbying by a small group or network, Rosenthal calls this ‘elite networks.’ This network functions in the interest of a cause.³³

Both decision-making theories and Europeanization theories focus on the eventual result of the decision-making process. They are theoretically neutral and do not provide insights into the personal resources and actions of politicians. Since the goal of this thesis is not to look at the outcome of decision-making, but on the input of Dutch politicians within this process, both types of theories are not sufficient. My research question refers to the contribution of Dutch politicians to the emergence of a European development policy and I want to know how these politicians functioned and what their motives were.

Theories focusing on individual’s attitudes towards political decision-making need to be explored. Examples are prospect theory and behavioral theory which draw from political science, sociology and social psychology. The former takes risk as a central feature of political decision-making and the latter looks at the behavioral attributes of policy content. For the period being researched in this thesis, a lack of personal information of MEPs exists. This makes it difficult to assess risks and behavioral patterns. Therefore, both types of theories will not be used in this analysis.

The aforementioned theories fall short to find the answer that I seek. However, Rosenthal’s model is useful for me for to clarify how European institutions work to the individuals who actually work for the institutions. In my research, the actions of individual people are central, but it is important to know the context in which they operated. Their actions took place on different levels and Rosenthals model can be used to position the actions of the individuals. I will use Rosenthal’s theory as a framework and to offer some reflection on which decision-making levels the Dutch politicians tried to promote coordination within European policy.

For the intergovernmental scheme, I focus on the Council of Ministers meetings. Rosenthal argues that decision-making cannot only be seen as a culminating point when the

³¹ Rosenthal, *The Men Behind the Decisions. Cases in European Policy-Making*, 3-5.

³² *Ibid.*, 3.

³³ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

Council of Ministers meet, but as a continuation that ranges a period of several years. At any point, pressure can be used by groups within and outside the institutional structure.³⁴ I cannot use all the examples that Rosenthal added to the pressure scheme. I only look at one type of actors, but in two ways. I look at the MEPs as individuals and as members of a committee. The last scheme, the elite network, will be difficult to investigate because it is a type of informal, backroom decision-making. Yet, Rosenthal argues that it cannot be ignored.³⁵ These three schemes are my starting point, which I expand by looking at the personal input of the Dutch politicians.

Peterson and Bomberg argue that “the role of ideas is more important in the EU than any other system of governance, given the Union’s given the EU’s ambition to transform and modernize European political economies.”³⁶ It is my goal to get a clear picture of the ideas of the Dutch politicians that led them to intervene in the process towards a European development policy. Before going into this, the emergence of a European development policy will be analyzed.

³⁴ Rosenthal, *The Men Behind the Decisions. Cases in European Policy-Making*, 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

³⁶ John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, *Decision-making in the European Union* (New York, St. Martin’s Press: 1999), 11.

Chapter 2: The emergence of a European development policy (1957-1975)

This chapter provides an overview of the key developments of the external relations of the EEC with developing countries, focusing on the shift to a coherent development policy. The most important discussion points, treaties and policy documents will play a central role. The following topics will be dealt with successively: the first association between the EEC and overseas countries and territories, the debate between regionalists and globalists and the key changes from 1972 onwards that led to the emergence of an EEC development policy.

2.1 The first association between the EEC and overseas countries and territories

During negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, the French delegation insisted that it would only enter the EEC's common market if its colonies were included. At that time, France, the largest colonial power of the six Member States, already formed an integrated 'common market' with its overseas countries and territories (OCTs) and it had strong political and economic ties with them.³⁷ The French delegation proposed the following idea: France would open its African market to companies and products from other Member States. In exchange, the other Member States would take part in financing a European Development Fund for the OCTs and they had to open their borders to French colonial products.³⁸

Aside from Belgium, the other Member States did not see the benefits of this proposal. Especially West-Germany and the Netherlands were not keen on the prospect to become part of a preferential zone that would be harmful for their links with developing countries in Latin America and British Africa.³⁹ French proposals were accepted and only a few concessions were made for West-Germany and the Netherlands because France threatened not to join the EC if the other Member States would not give their approval to an association.⁴⁰

Part IV of the Treaty of Rome officially established a relationship between the EC and the French OCTs in the form of a framework that was meant to preserve the ties between colonies and former colonies in Africa. According to some scholars, this step can be seen as the

³⁷ Karin Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2000), 98.

³⁸ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy*, 12.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁰ Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 98.

“first actual attempt to Europeanize development assistance.”⁴¹ The association between Europe and the OCTs consisted of all six EC member states and eighteen OCT’s,⁴² mainly French and Belgian colonies in Africa.⁴³ The association’s aim was to promote economic and social development of the OCT’s and to establish close economic ties between the OCTs and the EEC.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the framework created a free trade area between the EC and African territories. It enabled the abolition of custom duties or similar charges, including all quotas for products from the OCTs on the European market. This meant that goods that were produced in the OCTs would have preferential access to the EEC markets and a common external tariff for import from developing countries was established. In return, goods that were produced by the EEC Member States would have equal access to the OCT’s markets and custom duties on EEC exports were gradually abolished.⁴⁵ As a result of this system, later called ‘reverse preference’, other developing countries were discriminated against.⁴⁶ According to Article 132.3 of the Treaty of Rome, due the contractual nature of these relationships, the Member States had a legal obligation to “contribute to the investments required for the progressive development of these countries and territories.”⁴⁷

2.3 Regionalists versus globalists: conflicts between the member states in the 1960s

Because of decolonization during the late 1950s and early 1960s, rapid changes occurred on the international stage. The established association with the OCTs was not applicable to newly independent states, such as Tunisia and Morocco. Therefore, separate cooperation treaties with these countries had to be negotiated.⁴⁸ This coincided with the establishment of several new multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank’s International Finance Cooperation (1956) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).⁴⁹ According to Karin Arts, despite these new multilateral institutions and the shortcomings of the existing

⁴¹ See for instance: Sarah Delpitte and Joren Verschaeve, “The Role of the European Parliament in EU Development Policy”, in *The European Parliament and its International Relations*, ed. Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (New York: Routledge, 2015), 37.

⁴² After the Second World War, these colonies were referred to as Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).

⁴³ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire*, 13.

⁴⁴ Arts, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention”, 98.

⁴⁵ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire*, 16.

⁴⁶ Martin Holland, *The European Union and the Third World*. The European Union Series (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 26.

⁴⁷ Holland, *The European Union and the Third World*, 26.

⁴⁸ Arts, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention,” 99.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 99.

association agreement, the EC and the newly independent states wanted to maintain a trade and aid relation with each other. As a result, the EC decided to develop the existing association further by entering into successive negotiated treaties. With each new treaty, more developing countries in Africa and later also countries in the Caribbean, the Pacific, Asia and Latin America were added.⁵⁰

Arts explains that because of the need for an ongoing trade and aid relationship between the EC and an increasing amount of developing countries, a new agreement was necessary. She states that first, "a temporary solution had to be found to allow continued application of the association provisions to the newly independent countries."⁵¹ Subsequently, in 1961, the Council of Ministers made a few adjustments to the existing association agreement and arranged for a joint Association Council that would meet twice a year. This Association Council established a new cooperation framework for the EC and the former associates, which was finalized with the Yaoundé I Convention in 1963.⁵²

Nonetheless, the existence of negotiated treaties between the EC and an increasing group of developing countries did not mean that the EC acted as a unity. In contrast to what Arts argues, Anne-Sophie Claeys shows a more complicated story in her analysis of expansion of the EC's trade and cooperation agreements after the independence of the associated countries. In the early 1960s, France, in order to convince the other member states to maintain the association, argued for a Euro-African group in the interest of both European countries and the newly independent countries. This Euro-African group did not have a political purpose but was meant as a solution for OCT's exports and development problems.⁵³

According to Claeys, the Netherlands and West-Germany saw the period of the first association agreement as a "transitional period" and they were opposed to a renewal of the partnership, whereas France, Belgium and the Commission were in favor.⁵⁴ African countries wanted to maintain the association because it reflected their homogeneity as a group, but it also reminded the former colonial powers of their responsibility for the weak economies of the African countries.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 99-100.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Anne-Sophie Claeys, "'Sense and Sensibility': the role of France and French Interests in European Development Policy", in *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol*, ed. Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (Manchester: University Press, 2004), 121.

⁵⁴ Claeys, "'Sense and Sensibility': the role of France and French Interests in European Development Policy", 122.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 122.

Since the establishment of the EC, there was an ongoing conflict among the Member States about whether the European development policy should choose a regional or a global focus.⁵⁶ France and Belgium preferred a regional development cooperation policy, meaning that they wanted the treaties to be limited to the traditional partners in Africa. On the other hand, West-Germany and the Netherlands, sometimes supported by Italy, advocated for a globalization of development policy in order to expand the scope of the treaties to other developing countries.⁵⁷

Another important issue that the Member States had different opinions on was the kind of trade agreement. From the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, a reciprocal trading arrangement (meaning the reverse system of preference) was established. In practice, this kept the monopoly of the French firms in place. Therefore, France did everything it could to maintain this system of preference during negotiations. On the contrary, West-Germany and the Netherlands (and Britain after its accession in 1973) favored a more liberal policy and the idea of non-reciprocity, which would allow developing countries to expand their importations and protect their emerging economy.⁵⁸

The Netherlands and West-Germany managed to push through one of their demands for a renewal and extension of the association from the Treaty of Rome. In 1963, there was a victory for the globalists when the EC adopted a Joint Declaration of Intent which enabled countries with “production structures comparable to those of the Associates” to join the Yaoundé Convention.⁵⁹ Because of this Joint Declaration, the EC reached out to other developing countries outside of the association. Moreover, developing countries now had the possibility to choose between two options: they could either join the Yaoundé Convention or they would negotiate their own association agreements with the EC.⁶⁰

The Joint Declaration of Intent was related to previous developments, namely that France had opposed the accession of Great Britain to the EC. This led not only to a failed attempt by Britain in 1963, but also to the failure to expand the association to Nigeria and the East African Community. The Netherlands and Germany were disappointed about this and in return, demanded that the existing limiting scope of trade and cooperation agreements under the Treaty of Rome were to be extended to countries with a comparable level of development

⁵⁶ Karin Arts and Anna Dickson, “EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol?”, in *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol?* ed. Karin Arts and Anna Dickson (Manchester: University Press, 2004), 5.

⁵⁷ Arts, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention”, 100.

⁵⁸ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy*, 81.

⁵⁹ Arts, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention”, 100.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.

as the associated countries.⁶¹ Further negotiations with African states that had expressed their desire to negotiate for a new association with the EC, culminated in the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention in July 1963. It was an agreement between the EC and eighteen Associated African States and Madagascar (ASSM) which came into force in 1964 and was valid for five years.

The Yaoundé agreement was recognized as a Convention, in contrast to the former association agreement from the Treaty of Rome. France had initiated the use of the word “association”, since it first proposed the idea of a relation between the OCTs and the EC’s common market. For France, an “association” was the most appropriate name because it did not imply an integration of the OCTs into the EC, which was deemed undesirable because of the fundamental economic and social differences between the OCTs and the European countries. Moreover, an association would compensate the deteriorating political ties of France with the countries of the sub-Saharan Africa and at the same time boost the OCT’s imports into the Community market and thereby reducing the trade deficit of the French empire.⁶²

However, shortly after the EC created the association, its meaning was challenged by anti-imperialist and pan-African movements. By the early 1960s, a reassessment of association was required. This resulted in the formulation of a formal Convention that recognized the new, legally independent status of the associates, while the main economic aspects of the existing agreements remained.⁶³ Moreover, the Yaoundé Convention was unique because it linked a number of separate development policies (covering financial aid, technical assistance and trade preferences) under one integrated approach and it was the first example of a common contractual relation between the industrialized and developing world.⁶⁴

The Convention expired in 1969 and was renewed for another five years with the Yaoundé II Convention. During the second Yaoundé period, the first enlargement of the EC took place. The British accession would require major changes within the external relations of the Community, because new trade and aid provisions for the ‘Commonwealth associates’, as

⁶¹ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire*, 80.

⁶² The following documents explain the motives for France to establish an “association” of the Overseas Countries and Territories with a European Common Market: Bulletin du Centre international d’informations, “*L’association des pays d’outre mer au marché commun*”, numéro special, 15.01.1957, pp. 1-5 and Brochure, “*Les Français devant les problèmes d’outre-mer*”, Archives historiques de l’Union européenne, both retrieved from <https://www.cvce.eu/s/cc>.

⁶³ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 1999), 113.

⁶⁴ Martin Holland, *The European Union and the Third World*. The European Union Series (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 27-28.

they were called at the time, had to be agreed upon as part of the Accession Treaty.⁶⁵ In the 1960s, the EEC also signed its first agreements with some southern Mediterranean countries.⁶⁶

Despite the extension of agreements, ideas on development as a process or an objective were still unclear and so were the objectives in the agreements.⁶⁷ As a consequence, there was a lot of room left for the Member States to interpret and implement the agreement to their own liking. This meant that there was no consistent, coherent Community policy and one can question whether ‘policy’ was even the right word at this point. There were still disagreements between the Member States about the scope of Community policy. Also, Member States were reluctant to give up part of their sovereignty and allow a bigger role for Community policy in an area that they considered part of their foreign policy. This made it difficult to move from an ‘association’ to the creation of a development policy. Nonetheless, this started to change from the beginning of the 1970s.

2.4 The year 1972: a critical juncture

In 1971, the EC was one of the first developed economies that introduced a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which established tariff reductions or exemptions for imports from developing countries, so not only the OCTs. According to Karin Arts, the GSP marked a “major change (...) and would become a useful instrument for increasing export revenues and improving trade records of developing countries, particularly in Asia.”⁶⁸

The idea for a GSP emerged in the first half of the 1960s as a response to the need to industrialize the developing countries. The export of developing countries consisted mainly of raw materials, but, with the exception of crude oil, this type of export did not create a regular increased flow of foreign exchange.⁶⁹ Through the GSP, the industrialization of developing countries would be promoted and they would receive exports privileges on the markets of the industrialized countries. This preferential access would entail reduced or abolished import duties.⁷⁰

During the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, ideas for a GSP system were first discussed on an international level, but it was not until

⁶⁵ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire*, 81.

⁶⁶ Christopher Piening, *Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1997) 8.

⁶⁷ L.J. van der Veen, “Het Ontwikkelingsbeleid van de Europese Gemeenschap in de praktijk. Een analyse aan de hand van drie landenstudies” (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1985), 2

⁶⁸ Arts, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention,” 100.

⁶⁹ Gerrit Faber, *The European Community and Development Cooperation* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1982), 54.

⁷⁰ Faber, *The European Community and Development Cooperation*, 55.

1970 when an agreement was reached on several basic elements of a GSP. Examples of these basic elements were: the GSP had to have a temporary nature (because import duties could be abolished after the developing country had reached a certain level of competitiveness or industrialization) and each developed country (also called donor country in this context) would use its own system, but a certain sense of harmony was considered desirable.⁷¹ In 1971, the EC became the first donor country that implemented a GSP system, scheduled to be maintained until the year 2000.⁷²

Subsequently, September 1972 marked another important event: the Commission drafted its first Memorandum on Community development policy.⁷³ In this Memorandum, the need, urgency and significance of a Community policy for development cooperation was explained. The Commission stated that, in contrast to the previous regional policy, the Community was taking on an increasingly global scale for its development cooperation since the last few years. For instance, the Community held dialogues with other regions besides the OCTs such as Latin America.⁷⁴ In view of the upcoming enlargement of the Community and the next UNCTAD meeting, the Commission admitted that the developing countries, as a whole, expect more from the EC. Therefore, while building on to the commitments already undertaken, the Commission stated that it was now time for a new Community development policy that provided guidelines to coordinate the resources of the Member States and the Community.⁷⁵

In the memorandum, the Commission also admitted the shortcomings of the current Community's development cooperation. It stated that the "treaty establishing the EC did not specifically provide for means of technical and financial cooperation, except in favor of the ASSM (African Associated States and Madagascar) and the OCT's."⁷⁶ The Community had to implement a cooperation policy that was better balanced geographically and applicable to the diverse situations of the developing countries.⁷⁷ Another shortcoming was that the Member States exercised their national policies independently from the Community, which led to divergent and incoherent strategies that could have damaging consequences for the

⁷¹ Faber, *The European Community and Development Cooperation*, 55-56.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 56.

⁷³ Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 101.

⁷⁴ Commission of the European Communities, "Memorandum on a Community Policy on Development Cooperation," Synoptic and programme for initial actions, *Communications of the Commission to the Council of 21 July 1971 and 2 February 1972*, p.16. Retrieved from: Archive of European Integration, <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

⁷⁵ Commission of the European Communities, "Memorandum on a Community Policy on Development Cooperation," 16.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 33.

effectiveness of international cooperation. Therefore, the Commission encouraged the Community and the Member States to gain more coherence in the use of specific instruments of cooperation and between internal economic policies and cooperation policy.⁷⁸

According to the Commission, the memorandum was necessary because the EEC had started to move towards an economic and monetary union and was preparing for its own enlargement. Therefore, it was important that the EEC expressed its will to link its own progress to that of the developing countries and to expand its pursuit of a better international distribution of prosperity to broader groups of people who were previously underprivileged.⁷⁹ In short, the EEC's development policy had to move away from its exclusive economic, commercial instruments and expand to other areas such as financial and technical assistance, industrial cooperation and cooperation on human resource development, corresponding to the responsibilities of the Community as a major economic actor.⁸⁰

Despite these ideas on the need for a Community development cooperation, the Member States were still allowed to pursue their individual policies. Coordination was merely meant to improve the effectiveness of both Community policy and the Member States' policies.⁸¹ Next, it was up to the Council of Ministers to react to this memorandum.

2.5 The Council's reaction to a more comprehensive Community policy

In September 1972, in response to the Memorandum of the Commission, the Council of Ministers – in this context: the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of the six EC member states – had its first general debate on Community policy.⁸² This event was quite particular, since in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Council of Ministers only held summits sporadically and none of them had been specifically on development cooperation before.⁸³ During the meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Memorandum was discussed and an ad-hoc working group on development cooperation was established in order to study and report on the possible contents of a general and coherent Community policy.⁸⁴ Despite this rather unique happening, this was not the event that triggered a future emergence of the Community policy.

⁷⁸ With the Second Development Aid, the period 1971 to 1980 is meant.

⁷⁹ Commission of the European Communities, "Memorandum on a Community Policy on Development Cooperation," 18.

⁸⁰ Joseph McMahon, *The Development Co-operation Policy of the EC* (London: Kluwer Law International Ltd, 1998), 3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁸² Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 101.

⁸³ Wolfgang Wessels, *The European Council. The European Union Series* (London: Palgrave, 2016), 5.

⁸⁴ Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 101.

According to Joseph McMahon, the emergence of a Community policy rather came from various conferences held between the Heads of State and Government.⁸⁵ Moreover, McMahon describes the subsequent Paris Summit in October 1972 as a “significant turning point in the attitude of the member states.” This event was the first conference of the enlarged Community. McMahon terms this Conference as a “turning point in the attitude of member states.”⁸⁶ Karin Arts supports this when she argues that “the Paris Summit Declaration showed more commitment to the cause of developing countries than ever before.”⁸⁷ Viewing the change of attitude of the Member States as the origin of an emerging development policy is questionable. I think that it was the presence of the new Member States that lead to new developments regarding the Community policy.

Nonetheless, McMahon considers the Paris Conference a turning point because it ended the dispute between the regionalists and the globalists and recognized both approaches. This is illustrated, among others, in the basis of a joint statement published after the Conference, which states: “(...) the Community must, without detracting from the advantages enjoyed by the countries with which it has special relations, respond even more than in the past to the expectations of all the developing countries.” and: “(...) in the light of the results of the UNCTAD Conference and in the context of the Development Strategy adopted by the UN, the Institutions of the Community and Member States are invited progressively to adopt an overall policy of development co-operation on a world-wide scale.”⁸⁸ From this text, it is evident that existing preferential relations were still important and should continue. However, a general worldwide development cooperation policy had to be put into effect gradually.

The 1972 Memorandum of the Commission also made references to the Second UN Development Decade. Subsequently, the Member States agreed to the objective of increasing their volume of aid, in accordance with the target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) set by the UN in the International Development Strategy for the Second Decade.⁸⁹ This target was agreed upon during a Council meeting in July 1974, when a series of resolutions and recommendations were passed. In the next part, these resolutions and recommendations will be discussed. Furthermore, the British accession enabled many changes for the development policy of the Community as a whole, because the Member States no longer had to abide by the

⁸⁵ McMahon, *The Development Co-operation Policy of the EC*, 5.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸⁷ Arts, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention,” 101.

⁸⁸ Meetings of the Heads of State or Government (Summit), “Statement from the Paris Summit,” *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Paris, 19-21, October 1972, No. 10. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities, 6. Retrieved from: <http://aei.pitt.edu/1919/>.

⁸⁹ Meetings of the Heads of State or Government (Summit), “Statement from the Paris Summit,” 7.

‘association’ on French terms. The next part will therefore also look at the consequences of the British accession to the EC.

2.6 From 1973 onwards

Whereas Joseph McMahon terms the year 1972 as a turning point, Mirjam van Reisen argues that the first EC enlargement in 1973 can be seen as a “turning point for EC development policy.”⁹⁰ The first enlargement meant a substantial increase of the scope of European development aid; a “breakthrough by those that advocated a globalized aid approach.”⁹¹ New trade and aid provisions for the former British colonies, the ‘Commonwealth associates’, as they were called at the time, had to be agreed upon as part of the Accession Treaty.⁹² In other words, a major review of the Community’s external relations was needed.

During the negotiations and preparations leading up to the first enlargement of the EC, the Commonwealth associates were offered three options. One option was to participate in the Yaoundé II’s successor agreement which would come into force in 1975, the second option was an association under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome and the third option was straightforward trade agreements. These options were all based on the concept of ‘association’ and several developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (who were part of the British Commonwealth) saw this as an unequal relationship and insulting. Therefore, they acted strongly against it and made several accusations to the European Community that the accession arrangements were neo-colonialist policies.⁹³

The associated countries that were already part of the associated agreements of the European Community, joined with the Commonwealth associates and managed to negotiate for commonly agreed principles, if they decided to join the Yaoundé II successor agreement. The most important element of these principles was non-reciprocity. Despite French protest, the inclusion of this principle was achieved with the help of Britain, West-Germany and the Netherlands.

According to Mirjam van Reisen, the inclusion of non-reciprocity was an important, since the Treaty of Rome had been completely based on the concept of reciprocity.⁹⁴ The

⁹⁰ Mirjam van Reisen, “The Enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What Future?,” in *EU Development Policy in a Changing World. Challenges for the 21st Century*, ed. Andrew Mold (Amsterdam: University Press, 2007), 39.

⁹¹ Van Reisen, “The Enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What Future?,” 39.

⁹² Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development*, 81.

⁹³ Van Reisen, “The Enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What Future?,” 39-40.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 40.

element of non-reciprocity was seen as essential for the developing countries to build and protect their emerging economic potential without being exposed to competition from strong competitors.⁹⁵ Furthermore, a scheme for export stabilization, called STABEX, was introduced. This instrument would create more economic stability in countries that were very dependent on exports of basic commodities, by compensating the demand and price fluctuations. Lastly, former British colonies received extended access to the whole Community market through special protocols on products such as sugar, rum and bananas.⁹⁶

Eventually, all associated countries chose the option to join the Yaoundé successor agreement.⁹⁷ This led to the signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975 and it included 46 ACP countries, whereof 21 Commonwealth associates.⁹⁸ In a broader context, the Lomé Convention took into account the philosophy of the idea of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that was upcoming at that time. For instance, the principle of non-reciprocity was in line with the idea of the NIEO of a ‘genuine interdependence’ between equal partners. Furthermore, the presence of a broader variety of countries (more African countries, but also Caribbean countries and the Pacific), meant a break from the former ‘Eurafrica’ idea towards globalism.⁹⁹

Parallel to the negotiations for the Lomé Convention, there were also important developments within the Community itself. After the Council’s first meeting on development cooperation, a Working Party on development cooperation was established in December 1972.¹⁰⁰ In 1973, the Foreign Ministers of the nine Member States published a document on the European Identity. In this document, the principles of the Paris Conference were reaffirmed and the emergence of a Community development policy was recognized. Furthermore, it stated that the association with the African countries had to be reinforced, existing relations with Latin America developed and new relations has to be established with countries in Asia.¹⁰¹

Subsequently, in 1974, there were five meetings by the Council of Ministers on development cooperation. This shows a clear difference from the situation before 1973, when specific meetings on development cooperation had only occurred once. During one of these 1974 Council of Ministers meetings in July, the Council approved nine resolutions and

⁹⁵ Van Reisen, “The Enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What Future?,” 40.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁹⁷ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire*, 81.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁹⁹ Adrian Hewitt and Kaye Whiteman, “The Commission and Development Policy: Bureaucratic Politics in EU Aid – From the Lomé Leap Forward to the Difficulties of Adapting to the Twenty-First Century,” In *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol*, ed. Karin Arts and Anna Dickson (Manchester, University Press: 2004), 141.

¹⁰⁰ McMahon, *The Development Co-operation Policy of the EC*, 6.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

recommendations on development cooperation. These resolutions were the result of the preparatory work carried out by the Working Party.

The Working Party operated from December 1972 until the first half of 1974. According to Karen Arts, the group prepared the “ground for important steps forward.”¹⁰² The aim of the Working Party was to work out a consistent attitude towards comprehensive Community policy in the field of development cooperation on a global scale, taking the results of the UNCTAD Conference and the development strategy adopted by the United Nations, the results of the Paris Conference, the memoranda from the Commission and the member states and the discussion of the Council of September 1972 as a starting point.¹⁰³ The Working Party consisted of delegations from each Member State and from the Commission. It had to submit interim reports to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and a comprehensive report to enable the Committee to submit its report to the Council, before 1 May 1973, in order to enable the overall policy to be implemented gradually.¹⁰⁴

Subsequently, the report was discussed at the 248th meeting of the Council on 25 and 26 of June 1973. The Council instructed the Coreper to examine further, with the help of the Working Party, some questions which arose from the Council meetings. These questions concerned the differences of opinion that still existed among the Member States and in particular, the possible grant of aid from Community funds to non-associated countries.¹⁰⁵ Between September and October 1973, the Working Party held three meetings after which it drew up a text called “Possibility of making financial resources from Community funds available to non-associated countries.”¹⁰⁶

The Working Party made several general reflections, concerned with the present situation, the necessity and objectives of an overall development policy on a world-wide scale and the general principles of the Community development policy.¹⁰⁷ With regards to the commercial cooperation, the Working Party focused its attention on three problems: questions

¹⁰² Arts, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention,” 102.

¹⁰³ Documents concernant les travaux du Conseil sur la politique de coopération au développement 25.09.1972 – 22.03.1973, *Conseil de la Communauté Économique Européenne Archives Historiques*, CM 2/1974 2190, Annex 1, “Draft Terms of Reference of the Working Party on Development Aid” (Text proposed by the Chair), p.1.

¹⁰⁴ *Conseil de la Communauté Économique Européenne Archives Historiques*, CM 2/1974 2190, “Annex 1, Draft Terms of Reference of the Working Party on Development Aid,” p.1-2.

¹⁰⁵ Documents concernant les travaux du Conseil sur la politique de coopération au développement 25.05.1973 – 05.02.1974, *Conseil de la Communauté Économique Européenne Archives Historiques*, CM 2/1974 2201, “Report of the Working Party on Development Cooperation,” The Council, S/595/2/73 (GCD 28) rev.2, Introduction, p. 3, 3a.

¹⁰⁶ The Council, “Report of the Working Party on Development Cooperation,” S/595/2/73 (GCD 28) rev.2, Introduction, p.3a, 4.

¹⁰⁷ The Council, “Report of the Working Party on “Development Cooperation,”” p. 4.

arising from the commodity agreements, the problems relating to the improvement of generalized preferences and the question of promoting exports to developing countries. It proposed several measures aimed at market stabilization in the developing countries.

Other measures dealt with capacity building of local importers and exporters and familiarizing with the developing countries' markets, as well as improving the Community's generalized preferences.¹⁰⁸ The Working Party also noted that certain bilateral agreements with developing countries contain provisions that affect the commercial and economic sector, which would serve as a basis for promotional activities.¹⁰⁹ These matters were all developed into a suggested draft Resolution.

The report of the Working Party can be characterized as a list of possibilities. It provided two examples of how the Community should pursue general aims: promoting economic growth and social progress in developing countries by responding to their needs and attempting to achieve an effective and coherent integration of EEC policy in this field with international efforts. It also explained what Community policy should be based on and set out measures for implementing an overall policy on a world-wide scale.¹¹⁰ Moreover, according to the Working party itself, this report merely provided a series of general guidelines for the short- and medium-term, because the guidelines are not meant to be definitive.¹¹¹

In the Working Party's report, it was stated that it should be regarded as "an initial approach to an overall policy on a world-wide scale."¹¹² It was also acknowledged, that even though this report touched upon many fields within development cooperation, it did not cover each field comprehensively, due to the time limit that was fixed by the Council. It was up to the Council to decide whether further studies were necessary on topics that were not dealt with exhaustively in the report.¹¹³ Nonetheless, this report led to important steps taken in the subsequent year. In the last months of the working groups' existence, the Council agreed upon the direction and priorities for Community development policy for the next few years, approving nine Resolutions and recommendations on development policy.

According to Joseph McMahon, the approval of these resolutions and recommendations show that "it was now possible to talk about a Community development co-operation policy."¹¹⁴ The resolutions and recommendations adopted were concerned with, among other things, the

¹⁰⁸ The Council, "Report of the Working Party on "Development Cooperation," p.27-30.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 39, 40.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹¹⁴ McMahon, *The Development Co-operation Policy of the EC* 6.

improvement of the generalized preference system, commodity agreements, the volume of official development assistance, support for export promotion and financial and technical aid to non-associated developing countries. The Council also reached a series of conclusions on the harmonization and coordination of the cooperation policies of the Member States.¹¹⁵

After its July 1974 meeting, the Council invited the Commission to think about the EC's co-operation with developing countries currently and in the near future. This resulted in a Commission memorandum called 'Development aid: fresco of Community action tomorrow.'¹¹⁶ This fresco was an elaboration of the Council resolutions mentioned above. It addressed the diversity of underdeveloped situations and the selectivity in the Community's overall cooperation policy. In the selection of providing aid, the poorest and neediest countries and sectors would have priority. For instance, countries or sectors that were most dependent on exports of raw materials or those who only have one product to export.¹¹⁷ This document was represented as a "revolutionary document", because it was seen as the basis of a worldwide development policy of the Community.¹¹⁸

At the end of 1974, there was a clear outline of a Community development cooperation policy. First of all, the approach of the Community would be country and instrument specific, meaning that preference was given to countries that were already part of the association, or that were about to become part of it. Through this approach, the selectivity among the associated countries was justified and integrated into the Lomé Convention. Second, to balance this selectivity, the Generalized Preference System (GSP) had to be improved continuously and the EC had to promote international commodity agreements for products of export interest to developing countries. Last, in order to solve the conflict between regional and global approaches, official development assistance had to be increased and financial and technical cooperation had to be extended to non-associated developing countries, meaning the countries that were not part of the Lomé Convention or a bilateral agreement with the Community.¹¹⁹

Next to introducing a global scale of Community development policy, the Commission also paved the way to another new element. From 1975, several problems relating to raw materials, energy, international trade and developing countries became an important topic

¹¹⁵ McMahon, *The Development Co-operation Policy of the EC*, 6.

¹¹⁶ Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 103.

¹¹⁷ Development aid: 'Fresco' of Community action tomorrow. Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (74) 1728 final, 30 October 1974. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/74, p.9. Retrieved from: Archive of European Integration, <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

¹¹⁸ Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy*, 92 and European Commission, "Development Aid: Fresco of Community Action Tomorrow," 16.

¹¹⁹ McMahon, *The Development Co-operation Policy of the EC*, 8.

within Community development policy. Due to globalization, the Commission saw these problems as crucial and intertwined and therefore, it published several documents related to it.¹²⁰ This cluster of problems was also addressed at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) of December 1975 in Paris.¹²¹ The CIEC became known as the North South Conference, because it laid the foundations for a North-South dialogue on energy, raw materials and development and financial matters.¹²² Within the North-South dialogue, the EEC tried to take joint positions through the Council of Ministers and it was involved in agreement negotiations.¹²³

Aside from the Commission's leading role, the Council of Ministers was also quite influential regarding the implementation of development policy. It still held regular meetings a few times a year, specifically on development cooperation. In 1976, there were two meetings on development cooperation and in 1977 there were three meetings.¹²⁴ The aim of these meetings was to get a better grip on the Community's and the Member States' development policy measures.

To sum up, this chapter has shown that the 1972 Memorandum and the Paris Summit initiated a series of breakthroughs for the emergence of a common European development policy. In the same period, the EEC became the world's largest trading block and an important actor within the international trading arena.¹²⁵ To illustrate, by 1975, the EEC had established relations with forty-six ACP countries under the Lomé agreement, signed trade and cooperation agreements with Mediterranean, Maghreb (Northern Africa) and Mashreq (Arab peninsula) countries and preferential trade agreements with Spain and Israel.¹²⁶ This increased economic power is important to keep in mind when discussing the EEC's role within the rest of the world.

Despite the previously discussed advances on the creation of a common European development policy, many internal differences of opinion (such as the one about globalist vs. regionalists) continued to exist. The following chapters will expand on Dutch perspectives on these debates. Before going into the actions of Dutch politicians on a European level, a general overview of Dutch development policy will be given in the next chapter.

¹²⁰ Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 103.

¹²¹ Ibid., 103.

¹²² Ibid., 103 and Overseas Development Institute (ODI), "Briefing Paper. The Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC), August 1976, 1.

¹²³ Arts, "Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention," 104.

¹²⁴ The numbers of meetings of the Council on development cooperation was found through the Central Archives Search Engine (CASE) of the European Council: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/archives/search/>.

¹²⁵ Christopher Piening, *Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 4.

¹²⁶ Piening, *Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs*, 3.

Chapter 3: Dutch development policy from 1957 to 1977¹²⁷

In this chapter, Dutch development policy between 1957 and 1977 is analyzed. Both foreign and domestic developments and their influence on Dutch development policy will be examined. The following topics are discussed successively: the characteristics of Dutch development policy from the 1950s to the 1960s, changes within the internal government organization, the emergence of a progressive movement at the beginning of the 1970s, the priorities of the Den-Uyl cabinet, Pronk's ideas and priorities for development policy, Pronk's attitude towards the EEC and, finally, a review of Pronk's years in office as Minister of Development Cooperation.

3.1 Characteristics of Dutch development policy from the late 1950s to the 1970s

The development policy of the Netherlands in the late 1950s was focused on a multilateral approach. Due to the low financial resources, caused by World War II, the government wanted to make a limited amount of resources available to development aid.¹²⁸ Also, Prime Minister Drees argued that if the government would spend more aid on developing countries, there would be a backlash from disadvantaged groups within the Netherlands.¹²⁹ Multilateral aid was seen as the only way for the Netherlands to provide for a meaningful contribution to development aid. Bilateral aid would have too little impact and it was disadvantageous for the Netherlands to operate on the same terrain where stronger countries were already present.¹³⁰

Another characteristic of the late 1950s was that the Netherlands provided the largest share of its development aid for its own colonies. According to Duco Hellema, during the first half of the 1950s, 90% of the development budget went to the colonies and in the second half 70%.¹³¹ Due to the increasing interest in development aid at the end of the 1950s, various parties, such as businesses, political parties and churches, advocated for an expansion and diversification of Dutch aid efforts and activities.¹³²

During the 1960s, thoughts about development within the international political climate changed. In 1961, the General Assembly of the UN proclaimed the 1960s as the first UN

¹²⁷ This chapter is based on various sources but mostly the anthology on Dutch development policy from 1949 to 1999, edited by J. Nekkers and P. Malcontent.

¹²⁸ P. Malcontent and J. Nekkers, "Doe wel en zie niet om," in *De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949 – 1999* (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1999), 16.

¹²⁹ Malcontent and Nekkers, "Doe wel en zie niet om," 16.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹³¹ D. Hellema, "Beschamende Situaties. De Eerste Staatssecretaris en de Oprichting van DGIS", in *De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949 – 1999*, ed. J. Nekkers and P. Malcontent (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1999), 127-128.

¹³² Hellema, "Beschamende Situaties. De Eerste Staatssecretaris en de Oprichting van DGIS," 128-129.

Development Decade and made a recommendation to the industrial countries that they should provide 1% of their national income towards development aid. The idea for the first Development Decade reflected an optimism felt by the Netherlands and other Western countries about the possibilities to help developing countries become more prosperous and modern, just like the Marshall aid had improved the economies of Western Europe.¹³³

During the first UNCTAD meeting in 1964, African, Asian and Latin American countries worked together as the ‘Group of 77’ to defend economic interest of developing countries. Gradually, development aid was no longer only about financial aid, but also about trade. Through international cooperation, developing countries should gain preferential access to western markets and receive fairer prices for raw materials.¹³⁴

These international developments had an effect on the Netherlands. According to Peter Malcontent and Jan Nekkers, “[n]ot only the character but also the size of Dutch development aid underwent a transformation in the sixties.”¹³⁵ To illustrate, Malcontent and Nekkers point out that within ten years, Dutch development aid quintupled from less than 200 million guilders in 1961 to almost one billion in 1971.¹³⁶ Because of economic growth, people were less worried about primary necessities, like income and welfare, and thus more attention was put on issues such as a better environment, democratization and poverty in developing countries. In addition, the introduction of the television made it possible for people to see and follow emergency situations in developing countries. As a result, the number of action groups and country committees engaged with third world problems increased.¹³⁷

In connection with the growing attention within society for problems relating to developing countries, political pressure to expand development aid also increased. In the 1960s, it became too difficult for the government to reject proposals from politicians to increase the budget. In 1963, a politician from the Labor Party submitted a motion to increase the development aid to 1% of the national income, based on the recommendation of the UN’s first Development Decade. This motion was almost unanimously approved.¹³⁸

Furthermore, an increasing share of the development budget was allocated to bilateral aid in the 1960s. First of all, businesses and churches lobbied in order to use the expanding budget of the government for their own activities in developing countries.¹³⁹ Second, after the

¹³³ Nekkers and Malcontent, “Doe wel en zie niet om,” 17.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 21-22.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

Sukarno regime in Indonesia fell, the Netherlands initiated an international conference in 1967 to rehabilitate and develop Indonesia's economy. Through this international consortium, the Netherlands provided financial bilateral aid to Indonesia, which amounted to several billion guilders in the following decades.¹⁴⁰

Next to the increase of bilateral aid in the 1960s, the official organization at the government level also expanded. In the 1950s, development policy was controlled by two ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Union Business and Overseas Territories.¹⁴¹ Due to the growing interest in development aid from the late 1950s onwards and the establishment of institutions such as IMF and the World Bank, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance became more active within the field of development.¹⁴²

Because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Finance all interfered with financial aid for development, they were often in conflict with each other. The creation of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) in 1965 largely solved these problems.¹⁴³ DGIS was a department within Foreign Affairs and it was (and still is) responsible for the coordination, execution and financing of development cooperation policy. DGIS was created out of several Directorates within Foreign Affairs: the Directorate for International Organizations, the Directorate for Financial and Economic Development Assistance and a Directorate for Technical Aid.¹⁴⁴ The authorizations of other ministries within the area of technical assistance now belonged to DGIS, and in less than a decade, more than two hundred civil servants worked under DGIS.¹⁴⁵

However, the financial aid remained part of the Ministry of Finance's budget and the Ministry of Economic Affairs remained responsible for its spending. It was not until 1974, when the responsibility for financial aid was transferred to the Minister for Development Cooperation, initiated by the then Minister Jan Pronk.¹⁴⁶

After the elections of 1963, it was decided that a State Secretary would be appointed specifically for development aid. Several political parties were of the opinion that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would not be able to deal with development aid alone anymore because the

¹⁴⁰ Nekkers and Malcontent, "Doe wel en zie niet om," 26.

¹⁴¹ Hellema, "Beschamende Situaties. De Eerste Staatssecretaris en de Oprichting van DGIS," 127.

¹⁴² Ibid., 129.

¹⁴³ Sjoerd Keulen, *Monumenten van Beleid. De wisselwerking tussen Nederlands Rijksoverheidsbeleid, sociale wetenschappen en politieke cultuur, 1945-2002* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2014), 98.

¹⁴⁴ Hellema, "Beschamende Situaties. De Eerste Staatssecretaris en de Oprichting van DGIS," 138.

¹⁴⁵ Nekkers and Malcontent, "Doe wel en zie niet om", 28.

¹⁴⁶ G. Posthumus, "Een 'ideale vorm van hulp.' Bilaterale financiële hulpverlening, het India Consortium en de IGGI," in *De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949 – 1999*, ed. J. Nekkers and P. Malcontent, 156.

aid to developing countries had become an important aspect of foreign policy.¹⁴⁷ In 1965, the function of Secretary of Development Aid was scaled up to Minister in 1965.¹⁴⁸ This decision was seen as the best solution for the partisan allocation of seats among the governing parties, but it can also be regarded as a sign that development aid was increasingly important.¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the Dutch government continued to increase the amount allocated to development aid.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, bilateral aid not only increased, but it also became more structured. The Minister of Development Cooperation, Udink, implemented a concentration policy to provide aid for a limited number of countries. Minister Udink decided that, next to the overseas territories of Surinam and the Antilles, bilateral aid should also be given to Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Tunisia, Colombia and Peru.¹⁵¹

Minister Udink had a strictly economical viewpoint on the issue of development, but from the end of the 1960s, perspectives on development aid changed.¹⁵² From the end of the 1960s, the gap between Western countries and developing countries was increasing. The UNCTAD conferences of 1968 and 1972 made suggestions to reform the world trade system, but the Western countries were not willing to reform accordingly. As a consequence, radical, Marxist ideas gained popularity, such as the idea of *self-reliance*. The concept of self-reliance was a strategy advocated by socialist leaders like Fidel Castro and Mao Zedong and focused on the aim of economic, political and social independence of countries without influence from outside.¹⁵³

These international developments also had an effect on Dutch politics. Where previously, internal problems in development countries were seen as the main causes of these countries' disadvantaged position, a new generation of politicians shifted the focus to external, international problems, especially the unequal distribution of the world's economic and political system.¹⁵⁴ One of these politicians was Jan Pronk, who was part of the New Left movement, a group of young, leftist politicians aligned with the Labor Party, who wanted to

¹⁴⁷ Hellema, "Beschamende Situaties. De Eerste Staatssecretaris en de Oprichting van DGIS," 133.

¹⁴⁸ Keulen, *Monumenten van Beleid*, 72.

¹⁴⁹ Hellema, "Beschamende Situaties. De Eerste Staatssecretaris en de Oprichting van DGIS," 140. The decision for creating a Minister without Portfolio position was made by the 'formateur', which is the person who leads the formation of a coalition government after an election or when a government has collapsed.

¹⁵⁰ Margriet Brandsma & Pieter Klein, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie* (Utrecht: Scheffers, 1996), 31.

¹⁵¹ Brandsma and Klein, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie*, 27.

¹⁵² László Kulcsár, "Population and Development," in *The Sociology of Development Handbook*, ed. Gregory Hooks (Oakland: University of California Press: 2016), 55-56.

¹⁵³ Nekkers and Malcontent, "Doe wel en zie niet om," 32.

¹⁵⁴ J. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 258.

introduce radical changes in the party.¹⁵⁵ In 1971, Pronk became a member of the House of Representatives and the Labor party spokesman for development cooperation.¹⁵⁶

In May 1973, Pronk wrote an article on the desirability of an integrated European development policy. In his opinion, more European integration would only be relevant if this policy adequately responded to the wishes of the people in the developing countries as expressed in the framework of the UN.¹⁵⁷ Pronk is skeptical of the recent attempts by the Commission to improve the coordination of development policy on the European level. He argued that even though the Commission and the heads of government have expressed their will to meet the expectations of all developing countries (through the 1972 Memorandum and the Paris Summit), they refused to change or abolish the preferential treatment to countries with whom the EC has special relations with. As a consequence, the EC development policy still had a regional focus.¹⁵⁸

Pronk rather saw a European development policy with a socialist character, meaning that the poor countries had an equal say within international economic decision-making. In contrast, the Commission had pleaded, to Pronk's disappointment, for a capitalist development policy (with some instruments derived from the welfare state to prevent it from being exploitative), and a Eurocentric decision-making process for both development aid and trade policy.¹⁵⁹ A few months after his article, he had the chance to elaborate his ideas into policy, because he was chosen as the Minister of Development Cooperation in a new cabinet.

3.2 Priorities for the Den Uyl cabinet, 1973-1977

In May 1973, a new government took charge that consisted of a coalition between the Labor Party, Radicals (PPR), Democrats (D'66) and left-wing Christian Democrats.¹⁶⁰ In his government statement, Prime Minister Den Uyl presented the government program, which was based on the election programs of the progressive parties and the Christian democrats.¹⁶¹ This government statement had a very leftist character, illustrated by its highest priority: the elimination of inequality and deprivation.¹⁶² Furthermore, welfare was seen as an important

¹⁵⁵ Keulen, *Monumenten van Beleid*, 120.

¹⁵⁶ Brandsma & Klein, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie*, 38.

¹⁵⁷ Jan Pronk, "Naar een geïntegreerd Europees ontwikkelingsbeleid?," *Internationale Spectator* 27, no 5 (1973): 166.

¹⁵⁸ Pronk, "Naar een geïntegreerd Europees ontwikkelingsbeleid?," 171.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹⁶⁰ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 258.

¹⁶¹ J. Bosmans, *Staatkundige Vormgeving in Nederland. Deel II. De tijd na 1940* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1999), 102.

¹⁶² Brandsma & Klein, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie*, 45.

way to create equality. The governments' aim was to show solidarity towards the least fortunate people, not only Dutch citizens, but also towards disadvantaged people around the world.¹⁶³ This cabinet is nowadays regarded as the most leftist government that the Netherlands ever had.

It becomes apparent from the government statement that development policy was now recognized as one of the priorities of the government. The increase of government spending was allocated to housing, education and welfare, environment and development cooperation.¹⁶⁴ In the chapter 'Distribution of wealth in the world', a big part was dedicated to development cooperation. The government aimed to increase the expenses for development cooperation within the next four years to 1,5 percent of the national income and high priority would be given to aid through multilateral institutions, specifically the UN.¹⁶⁵

The part on development policy was entirely taken from the election program of the progressive parties and written by Pronk. He stated that Dutch development policy should aim to reduce the dependence of the poor on the wealthy. A central goal of Pronk was self-reliance, the pursuit of economic and political growth for developing countries on their own terms without pressure from developed countries.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, Pronk preferred untied aid, meaning assistance that can be used to buy goods and services in any countries, instead of tied aid, when goods and services can only be bought from the donor country. Priority was given to public financial assistance without conditions, instead of commercial investments and loans. In addition, experts and materials had to be exerted from developing countries in order to stimulate practical cooperation.¹⁶⁷

Furthermore, development policy had to become comprehensive, by including policies trade and investment policies and aim for the structural development of the development countries' economies.¹⁶⁸ Pronk wanted to abolish trade barriers and reform the international monetary system. This had to be achieved through the EEC, by developing initiatives to transform Resolutions of the UNCTAD conferences into concrete measures to the benefit of developing countries and making proposals aimed at a fairer international division of labor, in line with the strategy for the second development decade.¹⁶⁹ Lastly, the coordinating powers

¹⁶³ Bosmans, *Staatkundige Vormgeving in Nederland*, 102.

¹⁶⁴ Netherlands Parliament. Second Chamber Proceedings, *Handelingen Tweede Kamer* (from hererin: HTK), 1972-1973 12 383, Kabinetsformatie, Nr. 2, I Programmagegevens betrekking hebbend op de grondslag van het beleid, p.14.

¹⁶⁵ HTK, 1972-1973 12 383 Kabinetsformatie, Nr. 2, p. 20 and Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 258.

¹⁶⁶ HTK, 1973-1974, 12600 V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1974, Hoofdstuk V, Memorie van Toelichting, Nr 2, p. 28.

¹⁶⁷ HTK, 1972-1973 12 383 Kabinetsformatie, Nr. 2, p. 20.

¹⁶⁸ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 258.

¹⁶⁹ HTK, 1972-1973, 12 383, Kabinetsformatie, Nr. 2, p. 20

of the Minister in charge of development cooperation had to be strengthened in the following areas: the policy regarding international organizations with development cooperation as their primary goal (UNCTAD and the World bank) and the policy carried out by “an integrated Europe regarding developing countries.”¹⁷⁰

The government statement shows that even though the Dutch governments aimed to reach for further European integration, it should not be the main goal. In other words, an expansion of European cooperation was less important than achieving a progressive policy.¹⁷¹ Nonetheless, the government statement also recognized the importance of the EC and that it was the best channel to initiate improvements for trade measures. Therefore, it seems that the Dutch government chose a middle-way; making use of two channels, international organizations and the EC.

After the government statement, Pronk elaborated his policy. Under Minister Udink, the concentration countries were not selected with specific criteria, but at the beginning of the 1970s, criteria became necessary because the Netherlands continued to increase its annual aid.¹⁷² In 1973, Pronk introduced three general criteria for recipients of bilateral financial aid. The first criteria was the prevalence of poverty and the second the existence of specific needs that were not yet provided for by other donor countries.¹⁷³

Additionally, Pronk wanted to help the poorest countries, provided that these countries were willing, or already had begun, to change their social system in such a way that all parts of society could profit from the aid and economic growth. Therefore, the last criteria looked at the countries’ own effort to improve its domestic situation. Whereas the first two criteria could be determined through economic data, the last criteria was more difficult to apply. Pronk explained that the government would look at socio-political policies that developing countries had implemented, such as distribution of personal income, health employment, education and housing.¹⁷⁴

Yet, there were other criteria that determined the choice of countries. Whether a country respected human rights and the wish to maintain a dialogue with a nation with an important or international status were also important. For instance, Pronk justified his choice for Egypt by pointing out the importance of maintaining a dialogue with a country with regional influence. Chile was removed from the list, because of the human rights violations by the Pinochet regime

¹⁷⁰ HTK, 1972-1973, 12 383, Kabinetsformatie, Nr. 2, p.21.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 22.

¹⁷² Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 265-266.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 266.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 266.

and the same happened to Uganda under Idi Amin.¹⁷⁵ Because of these criteria, development policy became an integral part of foreign policy.¹⁷⁶

Pronk also wrote several memorandums. One was about the Dutch development aid to Indonesia, one about the quality of the Dutch bilateral development cooperation and one about the restructuring of the Dutch economy and development cooperation, in collaboration with the Minister of Economic Affairs Lubbers. The most important for this research is the 1976 memorandum on EC development policy. This memorandum stated the Dutch government's view on the principles for a European development policy as well as possibilities for an ongoing cooperation between the Member States in several areas of development cooperation.¹⁷⁷

In principle, the Dutch government supported a harmonization of the Member States policies and Community policy and it submitted several proposals to put into effect. However, in practice, the different development policies of the Member States made joint action difficult. Furthermore, Pronk was skeptical to subordinate national policies to common action of the EC. According to Voorhoeve, Pronk was afraid that the EC would become a bulwark of economic power which would weaken the negotiating strength of developing countries.¹⁷⁸ The next chapter will elaborate further on this memorandum.

During his time in office, Pronk was faced with much international turmoil. First of all, the oil-exporting countries quadrupled the oil export price. Pronk reacted to this by saying that he understood these actions and linked them to the frustration of the developing countries with the world economy.¹⁷⁹ Also, the worsening economic situation of low-income, oil-importing countries between 1973 and 1975, due to a world food crisis, rising oil prices, caused Pronk to introduce a new program for direct aid, such as the fast distribution of emergency assistance, as distinct from long-term development aid.¹⁸⁰

In addition, in order to realize his ideal of self-reliance, Pronk supported the developing countries' demand for a New International Economic World Order (NIEO). The NIEO included a number of demands of developing countries, put forward in the 1970s, which required a redistribution of the world's production, trade, capital and monetary flows, plus a reform of the international economic institutions in order to shift the unequal balance in economic power in favor of the developing countries. However, the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs

¹⁷⁵ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 267.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 267

¹⁷⁷ HTK, 1975-1976, 13 600V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het jaar 1976, Nr. 42, Memorandum Inzake het Ontwikkelingsbeleid van de EEG, p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 273.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 259.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 260.

were skeptical about NIEO. This led to a situation where Dutch policy verbally followed Pronk's line, but in practice, the restraint of Pronk's colleagues was felt.¹⁸¹

Even though there was a broad political support for the budget increase for development aid, Pronk's decisions sometimes met with opposition from other parties. In addition to his support for Communist countries, Pronk also supported several liberation movements. In July 1973, Pronk announced that he would send financial support to four independent movements in Portuguese colonies in Africa. He argued that this support was necessary in order to achieve a political goal: to end colonial domination by Portugal. However, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats accused Pronk of supporting Marxist movements with money that could be used by these movements to buy weapons.¹⁸²

Pronks' use of political motivations to support liberation movements, together with his support for Cuba and Vietnam, contributed to his image as a leftist and activist Minister.¹⁸³ Moreover, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he quickly gained a reputation for being demanding and difficult to keep up with because he constantly wanted to introduce new ideas, while at the same time, he wanted to stay in control of everything.¹⁸⁴

3.2 An evaluation of Minister Pronk

Pronk represented a new policy with new ideas, but how successful was he in practice? Shortly after he left office, scholars agreed that Pronk's main success was that he was able to deliver on the promise to increase the financial aid. During the 1970s, the budget for development cooperation increased from one billion to three billion and there was a broad political support for it. Subsequently, the norm of 1.5 per cent of the national income was realized in 1976.¹⁸⁵

Furthermore, scholars argued that Pronk was successful in making distinct changes to development policy. Pronk strongly believed that development policy was more than providing financial aid but that it also involved structural changes. Despite the limited time period, he worked very hard to try to implement the principles of an integral development policy that involved financial, industrial and technological relations with developing countries, by redirecting or redesigning various elements of Dutch policy.¹⁸⁶ One example often mentioned it that before Pronk came into office, development policy was seen as one of the instruments of

¹⁸¹ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 260.

¹⁸² Brandsma & Klein, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie*, 53.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁸⁶ H. Bos, "Balans van een Beleid", *Internationale Spectator* 31, no.9 (1977): 534.

foreign policy, in addition to supporting the Dutch business community. However, Pronk reversed this situation by making foreign policy an instrument of development policy.¹⁸⁷

Furthermore, some scholars who wrote about Pronk shortly after his time in office, argue that he stood out from predecessors because of significant changes to the policy making process of the department. He initiated discussion rounds at the department and personally interfered in detail with the policy process. He brought his own detailed policy agenda to the table because he had a lot of expertise in this policy area.¹⁸⁸

Overall, recent literature on Pronk is more critical about his performance. Sjoerd Keulen describes Pronk as a politician who wanted to be in control of everything and introduce drastic changes, but as a result, encountered resistance.¹⁸⁹ For instance, there is more emphasis on the conflict between him and his colleagues. Pronk wanted to strengthen his own position by extending his authority. Together with the Minister of Finance, he gained joint responsibility for the World Bank and primary responsibility for the spending of financial aid, which used to belong to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Also, it was agreed with the Ministry of Economic Affairs that the responsibility for the UNCTAD policy changed to a co-responsibility with development cooperation.¹⁹⁰ The loss of responsibility on how financial aid was spend, was a significant loss for the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Pronk tried to keep the influence of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to a minimum which caused irritation with Minister Lubbers.¹⁹¹

The strengthening of his position and his far-reaching interreference also brought Pronk in conflict with his colleagues at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Due to Pronk's third criteria and the emphasis on human rights for the concentration countries, Dutch development policy became strongly political charged and there was a chance that Pronk would interfere with the policy area of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Van der Stoel, was a much more moderate social democrat. He denounced Pronk's confrontational style, where Pronk's principles seemed more important than the effectiveness of the policy.¹⁹²

Both early and later literature point out that Pronk attained much publicity for his ideas and he enhanced the reputation of the Netherlands among developing countries. At the same time, support for his ideas were less apparent outside the Netherlands, especially among other

¹⁸⁷ L. Metzemaekers, "Ontwikkelingshulp gericht op structuurhervorming", *Internationale Spectator* 31, no.9 (1977): 537.

¹⁸⁸ Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën uitgegeven door het Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Kleine Serie 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977* (Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Den Haag: 2005), XXII and XXIV

¹⁸⁹ Keulen, *Monumenten van Beleid*, 120.

¹⁹⁰ Nekkers and Malcontent, "Doe wel en zie niet om," 37.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 37.

Western countries.¹⁹³ According to Voorhoeve, “Pronk was successful in changing the formulation of Dutch aid policy, but made little direct impact on the policies of other donor countries.”¹⁹⁴ Pronk was very driven and had a lot of knowledge on development aid. He attained much publicity for his ideas and he enhanced the reputation of the Netherlands among developing countries. At the same time, he had a unconventional political style and pronounced views which caused strained relations with some Western countries.¹⁹⁵

Pronk’s confrontational style caused conflict with his colleagues in the EC. First of all, most EC Member States did not agree with the NIEO. According to Malcontent and Nekkers, Pronk refused to make concessions and regularly clashed with other Member States that were not willing to adhere to the demands of NIEO.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, Pronk surprised his EC colleagues when he called the self-reliance actions of the oil-exporting countries understandable and proposed to allocate more financial assistance to the poorest oil-importing developing countries.¹⁹⁷ Second, Pronk unsuccessfully tried to gain more focus on Asia and Latin America. He wanted to change the protectionist trade policy of the EC towards Africa, which he despised.¹⁹⁸

Pronk’s opinions did not only gave him trouble in his relationship regarding the EC, but also his colleague Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, the State Secretary for European Affairs. The fact that European development policy officially fell under the authority of Brinkhorst was very difficult to accept for Pronk, who had assumed that he would have full control on this policy area.¹⁹⁹ For instance, Pronk’s policy note on the EC’s development policy clearly interfered with Brinkhorst’s policy area. Also, Brinkhorst was a proponent of the African focus of the EC, which also caused frictions between him and Pronk.²⁰⁰

What is also interesting is Pronk’s own reflection on his authority towards the ACP policy in an interview years later. During the Den-Uyl cabinet’s first week in office, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Van der Stoel, decided that the policy with regards to the EC-ACP relations, would fall under the authority of State-Secretary Brinkhorst, who was in charge of European cooperation. Yet, the finances of this policy still fell under Pronk’s budget. In the interview, Pronk said that he was very surprised about this decision. Moreover, he was the only European

¹⁹³ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 259 and Bos, “Balans van een Beleid.” 534

¹⁹⁴ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 259.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 259.

¹⁹⁶ Nekkers and Malcontent, “Doe wel en zie niet om,” 34.

¹⁹⁷ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, 260.

¹⁹⁸ Brandsma & Klein, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie*, 55.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 56.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

minister who did not have the authority over this policy and he felt like his bargaining position in Brussels was weakened because of it.²⁰¹

To conclude, Pronk's most important motives seemed to have been his aim towards structural reforms and the strengthening of his own position. However, judging from the evaluation of his period in office, both proved to be difficult to achieve. There is also an interesting contradiction in Pronk's policy with regards to the EC. On the one hand, Pronk's view of the European development policy was quite pessimistic, while on the other hand he wanted to fully control this policy area.

What can also be concluded from the literature is that Pronk's performance with regards to the EC is not discussed in depth. When it is discussed, the emphasis is on Pronk's skeptical attitude towards the EC and conflicts with his colleagues. However, I believe that this subject deserves a more detailed analysis, especially because there were many conflicts of interest between Pronk and his national and European colleagues and it would be interesting to go deeper into the interaction between them. The next chapter will elaborate on Pronk's ideas and actions regarding European development policy.

²⁰¹ L.J. van Damme en M.G.M. Smits, 'Ik heb getracht er bovenop te zitten. Interview met dr. J.P. Pronk', in: L.J. van Damme en M.G. M. Smits (red.), *Voor de ontwikkeling van de derde wereld. Politici en ambtenaren over de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1989* (Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis: Den Haag, 2009), 175.

Chapter 4. Pronk and the EEC Council of Ministers

This chapter looks at how Minister Pronk tried to promote coordination within European development policy. I analyzed the minutes of the Council of Ministers meetings on development cooperation and memorandums from delegations. These archival documents are accessible to the public and can be found through the database CASE, the Council's Archives Search Engine.²⁰² I used the English version of the documents. When the English version was not available, I translated the French or Dutch version.

I also looked at the debates of the Dutch Council of Ministers, because they provided insight into the creation of a standpoint for the Dutch delegation in meetings on the European level and within international conferences, where the Dutch contributed to this common standpoint. I used the official documents from the Dutch government in print. A series of 6 volumes on Dutch development policy was published by the Huygens Institute/Institute for Dutch History between 2002 and 2009. I consulted the online version of the series.²⁰³

Furthermore, I looked at Pronk's memorandum on EEC development policy from 1976 and three explanatory notes to the National Financial Annual Report. According to Pronk, the explanatory notes clarified his policy in a more general sense and together they formed a memorandum itself.²⁰⁴ The memorandum and explanatory notes are important to determine Pronk's attitude, initiatives and influence with regards to the EEC.

4.1. 1973: Pronk's first year in the EEC Council of Ministers

In an explanatory note to the National Financial Annual Report for 1974, Pronk presented the guiding principles of the Dutch government's aims towards establishing a European development policy.²⁰⁵ The Dutch government saw opportunities to address the EEC's commitments and it would try to ensure a fair balance between the interests of the EEC and the developing countries.²⁰⁶ The first general principle was to strive for a rapid formulation and implementation of an EEC development policy on a global scale. The second principle was that

²⁰² <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/app/case4/home.aspx>. Not all sources could be found in this database. I received most of the memorandums through mail from a Council archivist.

²⁰³ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/retroboeken/os/#page=0&accessor=toc_1&view=homePane

²⁰⁴ L.J. van Damme and M. Smits, 'Ik heb getracht er bovenop te zitten. Interview met dr. J.P. Pronk', in: L.J. van Damme and M. Smits (red.), *Voor de ontwikkeling van de derde wereld. Politici en ambtenaren over de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1989* (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2009), 181.

²⁰⁵ HTK, 1973-1974, 12600-V Rijksbegroting, Rr. 2, Buitenlandse Zaken, Memorie van Toelichting.

²⁰⁶ HTK, 1973-1974, 12600-V Rijksbegroting, Rr. 2, Buitenlandse Zaken, Memorie van Toelichting, 32.

Community development policy had to improve the position of developing countries vis-à-vis the EEC, emphasizing trade measures.²⁰⁷ The third principle was that Community policy had to be integrated into international agreements already designed for this purpose.²⁰⁸

This explanatory note shows that Pronk supported a more integrated EEC development policy, as long as this policy was also aimed at non-associated countries and integrated international frameworks. However, Pronk was skeptical on the feasibility. He argued that a more integrated EEC development policy “ambitious and only feasible in the long term.”²⁰⁹ These guiding principles can be found in Pronk's arguments in different EEC meetings in the next paragraphs.

Based on the report of the Working Party on Development Cooperation in 1972 (see chapter 2), there were three fundamental questions that the Member States could not agree on. First, the principle of grants of financial aids from EEC funds to non-associated countries. Second, whether a closer cooperation of the Member States should be achieved through harmonization, coordination or only consultation. Third, whether a connection should be made between the EEC's relation with the associated countries and Mediterranean countries and the framing of an overall development cooperation policy on a world-wide scale.²¹⁰

In the EEC Council of Ministers meeting on development cooperation in June, 1973, the delegations²¹¹ discussed questions two and three. The minutes of the meeting reflect three different opinions. The French, Belgian and Luxembourg delegations prioritized the relations of the EEC with the associated countries and other countries that the EEC already had commitments with.²¹² Therefore, no new policy should be undertaken but existing policy should be made more comprehensive and efficient.²¹³ On the contrary, the British, West-German, Danish and Dutch delegations argued for the introduction of a new, world-wide policy, simultaneously with the already existing policy with associated and Mediterranean countries.²¹⁴

²⁰⁷ HTK, 1973-1974, 12600-V Rijksbegroting, Rr. 2, Buitenlandse Zaken, Memorie van Toelichting, 32.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

²¹⁰ Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; CM2 1973 file 13: 248th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 25/26.06.1973; Minutes, doc. 1420/73, p. 4.

²¹¹ I decided to refer to delegations, because the records of the Council meetings are not always clear on whether it was the Minister or State Secretary who said something or the permanent representative of the EEC. When it was clear that Pronk said something, I used his name. Also, the participants of Council meetings are present as representatives of their country and not in a personal capacity.

²¹² 248th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 25/26.06.1973, Minutes, doc. 1420/73, p. 20.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 20.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6, 13, 14.

The Irish and Italian delegations were in the middle; they only agreed with a world-wide policy if it would not interfere with the EEC's internal progress towards a monetary union.²¹⁵

In this meeting, Pronk argued that if under-development was not regarded as a world-wide issue, the weakest developing countries would be left out, which was not acceptable for the Dutch government.²¹⁶ Furthermore, the Netherlands only agreed to a harmonization and coordination of Member States' cooperation policies if it did not jeopardize the achievements of international organizations.²¹⁷ Aside from a development policy on a world-wide scale, Pronk emphasized that the Commission should quickly submit proposals for refining the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), whereby access of developing countries to the European market should be improved.²¹⁸ The Danish delegation agreed with Pronk.

In the end, the Belgian president of the meeting decided that the Working Party would continue its work on the problems raised at this meeting. These problems would also be discussed more fully during the next Council meeting.²¹⁹ This meeting showed that most Member States agreed on the necessity of a development policy on a world-wide scale, but not on whether this world-wide policy should be connected to the existing association policy or established separately.

Furthermore, Pronk's arguments with regard to the poorest developing countries and the improvement of the GSP showed the importance that the Netherlands attached to providing aid for the neediest countries and the emphasis on trade measures, which was also addressed in the explanatory note to the National Financial Annual Report for 1974. Yet, Pronk's colleagues, except the Danish Minister, did not express an opinion on these issues.

During the next Council meeting in November 1973, the Danish president asked the delegations to discuss Resolutions regarding financial and economic support for developing countries.²²⁰ In this meeting, Pronk proved willing to accept the Resolutions for further improvement, whereas the other delegations were more critical.²²¹ The French delegation

²¹⁵ 248th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 25/26.06.1973, Minutes, doc. 1420/73, p.18.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

²²⁰ Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union ; CM2 1973 file 22: 259th session of the Council, Brussels, 05.11.1973; Minutes, doc. 2206/73, p. 6 and Note by the Chairman of the Working Party on Development Cooperation, European Communities, The Council, S/1167/73 (GCD 30), Permanent Representatives Committee, 703rd meeting (part 3) – 26 October 1973, p. 2

²²¹ 259th session of the Council, Brussels, 05.11.1973; Minutes, doc. 2206/73, p.7.

demanded that all problems in the Community development policy needed to be resolved before Resolutions could be accepted.²²²

Another example that showed that Pronk wanted to move forward, was related to the draft Resolution on the volume of official development assistance. Pronk regarded this Resolution as an example of the “will to succeed to working out a European development policy on a world-wide scale.”²²³ The Italian and Irish delegations said they were not able to meet the obligation to bring the level of development aid up to 0.7% of the GDP.²²⁴ Pronk reassured them that it was merely an important recommendation and at this stage, there was no implementing decision.²²⁵ Moreover, Pronk stated that recognition of this issue in the Resolution would be the best solution to break out from the deadlock that the Council had gotten into.²²⁶ Eventually, no agreement was reached because the British delegation refused to agree with the 0.7% target and the West-German delegation was not willing to make any textual changes.²²⁷

The last Resolution was on the harmonization and coordination of the cooperation of the Member States. Supported by the British Minister, Pronk pointed out the importance of this Resolution. He wanted “the Community [to] try to actively coordinate its policy with that of the international organizations that all Member States are also part of.”²²⁸ He argued for the necessity to seek coherence between EEC policies and what is being done on the international level.²²⁹ The French delegation criticized this phrasing, afraid that the Community’s actions would become subordinate to criteria established by international organizations. They advocated for a passive formulation, namely that “the activities of international bodies are taken into account.”²³⁰ In the end, the delegations agreed with Pronk’s suggestion to maintain an active formulation on the coordination with international organizations in the resolution and accepted the resolution.²³¹

Both meetings showed that Pronk had a proactive role during the discussions. Pronk showed willingness to accept Resolutions and to make compromises to other delegations in order to make progress. He also sought support from colleagues, mainly the West-German and

²²² 259th session of the Council, Brussels, 05.11.1973; Minutes, doc. 2206/73, p. 8.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 13

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 8, 12.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 14, 21.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 58.

British Ministers. However, his attitude did not lead to many results, because the delegations were not able to reach an overall agreement, except the previously discussed Resolution.

4.2. 1974: The Dutch Council of Ministers

In the EEC Council of Ministers on development cooperation meeting on June 13, 1974, the motions for a Resolution on the volume of aid, the financial aid to non-associated countries and the harmonization and coordination of the cooperation policies of the Member States were on the agenda. The Resolution on the volume of aid was adopted, but the other two were not.²³² The Dutch delegation refused to give its final approval to the resolution on the harmonization and coordination of the cooperation policies of the Member States because it argued that as long as the preparation for a EEC development policy on a world-wide scale was still in progress, this Resolution could not yet be approved.²³³

In this case, the Dutch delegation was responsible for blocking an agreement on a policy proposal. Yet, this action makes sense when looking at one of the general principles from the 1974 explanatory note, which stated that the Dutch government would not approve the harmonization and coordination of EEC policy if it went against its main principle: the aim of a development policy on a world-wide scale. The Resolution of financial aid to non-associated countries was not accepted because of a reservation by the French delegation.

With regards to financial aid, another relevant discussion was on the negotiations between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries. The West-German President of the EEC Council had proposed an amount 360 million EUA²³⁴ of financial assistance to three Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Malta) which amounted to 72 million per year, almost 6 million per year for the Netherlands.²³⁵

France and West-Germany left the initiative for an amount to the Netherlands. However, there was a lot of internal debate about what the Dutch should propose, taking place in a Dutch Council of Ministers meeting.²³⁶ Minister Pronk, on the one hand, was of the opinion that the Member States should jointly agree on the scale of EEC aid. However, Brinkhorst (State

²³² Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; CM 2/1974 file 26: 292nd session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.06.1974; Minutes, doc. 314/74, p. 3,4.

²³³ 292nd session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.06.1974; Minutes, doc. 314/74, p.3, 4.

²³⁴ EUA stands for: European Union of Account, a currency unit used in the 1970s on the basis of the currencies of the EEC Member States.

²³⁵ Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën uitgegeven door het Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Kleine Serie 104 (from herein: RGP 104), Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977* (Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Den Haag: 2005), p. 240 (footnote 3).

²³⁶ RGP 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking*, #92, Ministerraad, 21 juni 1974. Notulen (Agendapunt 4 c), p. 240

Secretary for European Affairs) and Van der Stoel (Minister of Foreign Affairs), in fear of isolation, argued in favor of brokering a deal with the British and propose an amount directly. Pronk responded that he did not mind to be in an isolated position on this matter, since it concerned finances that were part of his budget.²³⁷

Pronk's criticism of the proposal can be explained from the general principles on European development policy in the 1974 explanatory note. For Pronk, it was important to connect the existing policy agreements and ongoing negotiations with the future policy on a world-wide scale. Thus, before a financial commitment to the Mediterranean countries could be decided, an agreement had to be reached on the overall scope of the European development policy.²³⁸ Also, the proposal to grant financial aid to the three countries did not correspond with the principle that Community aid had to help poor countries and improve their position towards the EEC. In Pronk's view, the proposed amount did not match the needs of the countries because their economies were not doing that bad.

At the end of the discussion, Prime Minister Den Uyl chose a middle way and decided that the Dutch delegation would state that the approval for the financial aid could not be completed before every delegation withdrew its reservation. Also, the Dutch delegation would only mention an amount when the negotiations would ask for it and this amount should not be higher than 250 million, with an extension to 275 million. The fear for an isolated position and blocking further European cooperation was in this case stronger than Pronk's argument that the Community's development budget would escalate to an unclear high amount.

Another topic in the Dutch Council of Ministers concerned a proposal by the Commission that the EEC would make an annual financial contribution to the ACP countries of 2,5 to 3,5 billion EUA.²³⁹ Again, Pronk argued that the Dutch delegation should not mention an amount. In his view, such matters belonged to the bilateral negotiations of the Member States. He only wanted to agree to the proposal if it was clear that the amount was a one-time contribution.²⁴⁰ In the end, the Dutch Council did not reach an agreement.²⁴¹

Pronk's critical attitude can be explained from his disapproval of the EEC's focus towards the ACP countries and his inability to influence the EEC-ACP policy. Pronk felt like the European policy with regards to the ACP countries was largely determined in Brussels and led by France. Therefore, he saw the financing of these countries as a support for France's neo-

²³⁷ RGP 104, Dierikx et al, Ministerraad, 21 juni 1974. Notulen (Agendapunt 4 c), 241.

²³⁸ Ibid., 242.

²³⁹ Ibid., 240.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 245.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 246.

colonial relations with these countries.²⁴² Also, Pronk tried to gain support within the EEC for sending aid to poor countries in Asia and Latin America. Because this proved unsuccessful, he was reluctant to further integration of the EEC-ACP development agreements.²⁴³

What is also important for understanding Pronk's reluctant attitude towards financial contributions for the ACP countries, is that Pronk did not have the authority on this policy area, even though the finances were part of his budget (see chapter three). Given the fact that Pronk wanted to control everything related to development cooperation, it must have been frustrating for him to have no control over a policy he had to pay for.²⁴⁴

Judging from the meetings in 1974, it is clear that Pronk had developed a more critical attitude towards the EEC and that he was less willing to compensate compared to the previous year. The meetings of the Dutch Council of Ministers showed that, in contrast to his Dutch colleagues, Pronk did not feel the need to prevent progress within a European development policy and he did not fear an isolated position. This was also apparent from the EEC Council of Ministers meeting in June, when he was the only Minister that blocked a proposal for a motion on harmonizing and coordinating development cooperation policies of the Member States.

4.3. 1975: The EEC and the United Nations

In 1975, only two Council of Ministers meeting on development cooperation took place and the records of these meetings were too limited to determine Pronk's role in the discussions. Therefore, this section is shorter than the other sub chapters and it will focus on Pronk's attitude towards the EEC with regards to the United Nations (UN).

In September 1975, the Seventh Special Session of the UN took place. The session was dedicated to issues of economic development and international economic cooperation.²⁴⁵ In a letter to his Prime Minister, Pronk reported on the role of the EEC during the UN session and evaluated the EEC Council of Ministers meeting on development cooperation that took place a month later. Pronk said that the UN session had a positive result, which was partly caused by

²⁴² L.J. van Damme en M.G.M. Smits, 'Ik heb getracht er bovenop te zitten. Interview met dr. J.P. Pronk', in: L.J. van Damme en M.G. M. Smits (red.), *Voor de ontwikkeling van de derde wereld. Politici en ambtenaren over de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1989* (Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis: Den Haag, 2009), 174.

²⁴³ Brandsma and Klein, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie*, 56.

²⁴⁴ Damme en Smits, 'Ik heb getracht er bovenop te zitten. Interview met dr. J.P. Pronk', 174-175.

²⁴⁵ Barnett Baron, "Population and the Seventh Special Session: A Report." *Population and Development Review* 1, No. 2 (1975): 297 and RGP 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977*, XX.

the constructive role of the EEC. There was no sign of disunity between the member states and the discussions between the Member States took place in a good atmosphere.²⁴⁶

Pronk pointed out that in order for the EEC to maintain its constructive position, steps need to be taken quickly, in order to “turn the commitment to commit into concrete measures.”²⁴⁷ In this regard he described the EEC Council of Ministers on Development Cooperation on 13 October as “disappointing,” because no agreements were reached.²⁴⁸ Judging from the minutes of this meeting, it can indeed be argued that the outcomes were vague and not meaningful. The Council considered that it should make a better assessment of the developing countries’ request made during the UN session, by adopting a pragmatic attitude.²⁴⁹ It does not elaborate on what this pragmatic attitude entails.

In view of the outcome of the UN session, the Commission had submitted proposals with priority schemes concerning technical assistance for the promotion of exports of the non-associated developing countries, financial aid for the poorest countries (including emergency aid in the event of disasters) and agricultural production aid.²⁵⁰ The Council was only able to come to an agreement on the first issue and all delegations (except France), agreed to allocate 3,5 million EUA for the promotion of trade coming from non-associated countries.²⁵¹ The other matters were forwarded to the Coreper.²⁵²

Pronk expressed his disappointment with the Council’s progress during the EEC Council meeting. He pointed out that, now that the EEC had taken a leading position during the Seventh UN Session, it rested a heavy responsibility to realize its “commitment to commit.” However, when it became clear in the course of the meeting that the Council could not agree on many policy proposals, Pronk argued that the EEC had been hypocritical during the UN session and that it was not possible for the Dutch government, in this context, to go along with minimum positions.²⁵³

²⁴⁶ RGP 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977*, #168. Brief van Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Pronk) aan Minister-President (Den Uyl), 5 November 1975, Brief, 7e Speciale Zitting van de Algemene vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, p. 474.

²⁴⁷ RGP 104, Brief, Brief van Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Pronk) aan Minister-President (Den Uyl), 5 November 1975, p. 475.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 475.

²⁴⁹ Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; CM 2/1975 file 81: 361st session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.10.1975; Minutes, doc. 609/75, p. 1-2.

²⁵⁰ 361st session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.10.1975; Minutes, doc. 609/75, p.2.

²⁵¹ RGP 104, Brief, Brief van Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Pronk) aan Minister-President (Den Uyl), 5 November 1975, p. 475.

²⁵² 361st session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.10.1975; Minutes, doc. 609/75, p. 3

²⁵³ RGP 104, Brief, Brief van Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Pronk) aan Minister-President (Den Uyl), 5 November 1975, p. 475.

Pronk's disappointment can be explained from his explanatory notes to the National Annual Reports of 1974 and 1975. In the explanatory note for 1974, Pronk argued that the EEC should accept its international responsibilities, in accordance with its dominant position in the economic world order, and because of its comprehensive trade relations with developing countries (forty percent of the developing countries' export was sold to the EEC).²⁵⁴ Pronk envisioned an important role for the EEC in creating a new international economic order and the EEC's contribution to the UN session was a starting point. Yet, the results of the EEC Council meeting in 1975 showed that the EEC was not ready yet to commit itself to such an obligation.

In the explanatory note for 1975, Pronk argued that the Dutch government would strive for food aid to become part of the EEC's financial and technical assistance and be made available world-wide, based on agreements decided at the World Food Conference. Yet, a year later, there was still no agreement on the increase of Community food aid or which actions to take following the World Food Conference. At the Council of Ministers meeting in October 1975, the delegations could not agree on the increase of community food aid and whether the EEC should participate in the International Fund for Agricultural Development that was set up at the UN World Food Conference.²⁵⁵

In the same explanatory note, Pronk expressed his disappointment with the overall progress made on EEC's development cooperation. He argued that in the two years that passed since the first EEC Council of Ministers meeting on development cooperation, no steps were taken in the area of trade policy and only a first step towards a world-wide development aid.²⁵⁶ At the same time, he argued that this lack of sufficient results was no reason for concern since a European development policy could only be reached with difficulty and on the long term.²⁵⁷

The previous examples illustrate how Pronk's expectations and ambitions for the EEC proved not realistic on the short term and how he seemed to get a more critical attitude.

4.4. 1976: The EEC Presidency

In September 1976, Pronk presented a memorandum to the Dutch House of Representatives that contained three principles for a European development policy. The timing of this memorandum seems rather late to bring about a change, since the Netherlands held the EEC

²⁵⁴ HTK, 1973-1974, 12 600V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting, nr.2, Memorie van Toelichting, 31,32.

²⁵⁵ 361th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.10.1975; Minutes, doc. 609/75, p.3-4.

²⁵⁶ HTK, 1974-1975, 13 100 V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1975, Nr. 13, Memorie van Toelichting, 62.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 62.

Presidency that year from July to December. Nonetheless, the memorandum was submitted to the Commission and the other Member States and discussed at the upcoming Council of Ministers meeting.

In the memorandum, Pronk argued in favor of the same principles as in the earlier explanatory notes in 1973 and 1974. In light of these principles, the Dutch government considered the current efforts of the EEC and the Member States insufficient. Internationally accepted objectives were barely reflected in their efforts, there was no prospect for a development aid that provided sufficient support for the most needy countries and populations aside from regions in Africa and the Mediterranean and there was no common trade policy that equally benefitted all developing countries.²⁵⁸ The lack of progress was, according to the Dutch government, due to the Member States' failure to agree on how a common development policy should be pursued. The Dutch government concluded that, given the structural nature of the development issue, in principle the EEC could act more effectively than the individual Member States. The condition for a common development policy was that it has to be based on the objectives derived from international frameworks such as the Second Development Decade, the Seventh Special Session of the UN and the World Food Conference.²⁵⁹

This was the first time the Dutch government openly expressed its criticism this firmly in an official policy document to the Commission and the other Member States. The memorandum also suggested proposals for a better cooperation between the Member States on several development policy areas.²⁶⁰ As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there was no consensus between the Member States on whether a closer cooperation should be achieved through harmonization, coordination or consultation. Pronk suggested to make an inventory to determine for each policy area what kind of cooperation took place (consultation, ad hoc coordination, general coordination or joint policy) and then determine the conditions for a more intense cooperation between the Member States. In this regard, the Dutch government was in favor of an "intensive consultation in all policy areas, as well as an ad hoc coordination in the appropriate cases."²⁶¹

Pronk made suggestions for an improved cooperation between the Member States within different policy areas.²⁶² One suggestion concerned the overall coordination of

²⁵⁸ HTK, 1975-1976, Memorandum van de Nederlandse regering inzake het ontwikkelingsbeleid van de EEG, p. 3-4.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 1,4.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 5.

²⁶² Ibid., 6.

emergency and humanitarian aid, which was part of the EEC's food aid, a policy area almost fully decided on the European level. The Member States already had a consensus on how they envisioned such aid, but the implementation was problematic because there was no proper consultation and coordination on an ad-hoc basis.²⁶³ The Dutch government aimed for an overall coordination of this policy and proposed to commence shortly with the establishment of a common emergency policy to build up an emergency unit.²⁶⁴

With support of the Chief Executive of the Directorate on European Integration (part of DGIS, see chapter 3), Pronk submitted another memorandum on a proposal for emergency and humanitarian aid. They both argued that timing and presentation of the proposal was now more important than normally, because of the EEC Presidency.²⁶⁵

In the memorandum, the Dutch government stated that it wanted to increase European collaboration for two reasons. First, the Dutch government considered emergency and humanitarian aid desirable for providing assistance based on the needs during and after a disaster. Second, the scale for providing aid in the most effective way was beyond the capabilities of individual Member States.²⁶⁶ To achieve this, a coordinating center should be set up in Brussels, with a team of experts responsible for maintaining contacts with the Member States, the Council and the country concerned. Furthermore, these teams would coordinate the granting of help and identify areas of needs, in cooperation with UNDRO, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization.²⁶⁷ This memorandum reflected one of Pronk's general principles, namely that harmonization and cooperation of the Member States' policy was desirable, as long as the EEC coordinated its policy with that of the international organizations.

Furthermore, the Dutch Permanent Representative to the EEC and civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiated informal meetings with their British and West-German colleagues to see whether they could reach an agreement on proposals to improve food aid.²⁶⁸

²⁶³ HTK, 1975-1976, Memorandum van de Nederlandse regering inzake het ontwikkelingsbeleid van de EEG, p. 7.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁶⁵ RGP 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977*, #201, Memorandum, Chef Directie Integratie Europa, Directoraat-Generaal Europese Samenwerking, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (van Swinderen) aan Directeur-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (van Gorkum), 23 juli 1976, p. 571.

²⁶⁶ Traduction, Lettre de la Représentation Permanente des Pays-Bas auprès des Communautés européennes, á Secrétaire Général du Conseil des Communautés Européennes, Brussels, 4 Novembre 1976, 5/1682/76 (ALIM) (GCD 46), p. 8.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁶⁸ RGP 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977*, #198, Memorandum Hoofd Bureau Nood- en Voedselhulp, Directie Financieel-Economische Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking aan Minister voor

Subsequently, the British delegation submitted a memorandum on a new strategy for Community food aid to developing countries.²⁶⁹ This memorandum proposed that the EEC should grant food aid whenever possible; not only as a means of providing relief in emergency situations, but also in connection with projects and as a contribution to the increase of the volume of investments. These objectives were in line with the recommendations of the UN World Food Conference and the Community's wish to contribute to the solution of the world food problem.²⁷⁰

In a telex to the Dutch Permanent Representative to the EEC, Pronk wrote that the Netherlands had cooperated informally in the preparation of the British memorandum and that he largely agreed with the content.²⁷¹ Therefore, during the upcoming EEC Council of Ministers meeting on development cooperation, the Netherlands would support the premise of the British Minister (Judith Hart) that EEC food aid should be primarily used as a development tool and not as a channel for the marketing of surplus product.²⁷²

The Council of Ministers meeting was held in November 1976 and chaired by Pronk. The Council discussed the follow-up to the World Food Conference and instructed the Coreper to examine the British memorandum regarding a new strategy for Community food aid and the Dutch memorandum on emergency and humanitarian aid. Both would have priority during the next Council meeting on development cooperation.²⁷³

Furthermore, during the debate on the Resolution on harmonization and coordination of development cooperation policies, the Dutch memorandum on EEC policy was included in the discussion.²⁷⁴ The Dutch delegation emphasized a proposal of an institutional nature, derived from its EEC memorandum. Pronk wanted to initiate joint meetings of the Council (consisting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation) which would examine the

Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Pronk), 29 Juni 1976, Verslag informele bijeenkomst met Engelse en Duitse delegatie inzake EEG-voedselhulp, p. 564.

²⁶⁹ Note de Transmission, Objet: Aide alimentaire, Mémorandum de la délégation britannique concernant une nouvelle stratégie en matière d'aide alimentaire de la Communauté aux pays en voie de développement, Communautés Européennes, Bruxelles, le 18 Octobre 1976, R/2349/76 (ALIM 27), p. 1.

²⁷⁰ Note de Transmission, Objet: Aide alimentaire, p. 6.

²⁷¹ RGP 104, Dierikx et al, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977*, #212, Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Pronk) aan Permanent Vertegenwoordiger Nederland bij EG te Brussel (Lubbers), 1 November 1976, EEG Voedselhulp, p. 595.

²⁷² RGP 104, Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Pronk) aan Permanent Vertegenwoordiger Nederland bij EG te Brussel (Lubbers), 1 November 1976, p. 594.

²⁷³ Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; CM2 1976, file 51: 417th session of the Council, Brussels, 08.11.1976; Minutes, doc. 855/76, p. 3,4.

²⁷⁴ 417th session of the Council, Brussels, 08.11.1976; Minutes, doc. 855/76, Annex, p. 1. (Resolution on the coordination and harmonization of development cooperation policies within the Community).

structural aspects of development aid problems.²⁷⁵ These requests to emphasize the development issue as a structural issue show that the Dutch delegation tried to incorporate a general principle of their national government into the Council's discussions and policies.

It can be concluded that during the Dutch EEC Presidency, Pronk made several efforts to influence the decision-making process of the Council. First of all, Pronk actively looked for support among his fellow Ministers for his proposals regarding emergency aid and food aid. Second, the Dutch and British memorandum played a role in the Council's discussions and were prioritized for the next meeting. Furthermore, Pronk addressed general principles of the Dutch government for a European policy, by emphasizing that the Council should look at the structural problems of development issues and that an EEC policy should not interfere with international organizations. Compared to the two previous years, Pronk showed a more proactive attitude. Nevertheless, he still criticized the slow progress of the EEC in his memorandum. Because the discussion about the memorandums was continued during the next EEC meeting, the analysis of 1977 will have to determine whether Pronk managed to bring about a change.

4.5. 1977: Pronk's last year in office

For the year 1977, Pronk presented another explanatory note to the National Financial Annual Report. This note reiterated the disappointment expressed in the 1976 Memorandum with regards to the insufficient efforts of the EEC and the Member States towards a common development policy, viewed from the three general principles of the Dutch government.²⁷⁶ Even though Pronk had showed more willingness to improve the cooperation and coordination of a European development policy in the previous year, it is clear that he was still critical of the achievements of the EEC and the Member States.

During the EEC Council of Ministers meeting in March, 1977, the institutional initiative of the Dutch delegation to hold separate meetings on problems relating to development countries was on the agenda. The Council agreed to hold general discussions once or twice a year on problems regarding the relations with developing countries. Whereas Pronk proposed joint meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation about structural development problems, the Council decided to hold general discussions within its

²⁷⁵ 417th session of the Council, Brussels, 08.11.1976; Minutes, doc. 855/76, 2.

²⁷⁶ HTK, 1976-1977, 14 100 V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1977, Nr.2, Memorie van Toelichting, p. 53.

meetings.²⁷⁷ The aim of these discussions was to achieve greater coherence in the Community's and the Member States' development cooperation policies. Member States could make suggestions for priority issues and the Commission would submit a working paper on these issues.²⁷⁸ This illustrates that Pronk's proposal was partly successful.

The Council approved a Resolution on the coordination of Community and Member States' emergency and humanitarian aid projects. The text of the Resolution resulted partly from the Council's discussion on the Dutch memorandum on emergency and humanitarian aid during the 1976 meeting.²⁷⁹ The coordination, efficiency and coherence of Community and Member States' aid would be increased on a case-by-case basis, to meet the needs created by disasters. It also agreed on measures to be taken in case of immediate and short-term emergency aid. An inventory would be made that combined the means and actions of the Member States and the EEC, but it also took account of the work of UNDRO. It requested the Commission to submit proposals for putting into effect the guidelines for the proposed measures.²⁸⁰

These examples show more integration on a European level. Pronk's ideas for an inventory and UNDRO coordination were adopted. However, Pronk's proposals remained more ambitious. For example, Pronk advocated for an overall coordination instead of a case-by-case approach.

With regard to food aid, the Council approved a number of texts on the improvement of its food aid strategy, but it is unclear whether the British-Dutch memorandum of 1976 played a role in this. The minutes state that "the Council approved a number of texts on the improvement of food aid strategy." The texts are not attached to the minutes and could also not be found in the archive.²⁸¹

During the next meeting in June, the item "general discussion on the prospects for development cooperation" was again on the agenda.²⁸² In the discussion, several issues within development policy were addressed such as rural development, agriculture and food production in the developing world. The Council concluded that there was a broad agreement on the need for a unified approach for implementing solutions to these issues. It requested the Commission

²⁷⁷ Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; CM2 1977, file 15: 442nd session of the Council, Brussels, 22.03.1977; Minutes, doc. 309/77, p.4.

²⁷⁸ 442nd session of the Council, Brussels, 22.03.1977; Minutes, doc. 309/77, p.5.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., Annex, p.1 (Council Resolution on the Co-ordination of the actions of the Community and the Member States in Emergency and Humanitarian aid).

²⁸⁰ Ibid., Annex, p. 2

²⁸¹ 442nd session of the Council, Brussels, 22.03.1977; Minutes, doc. 309/77, p. 4.

²⁸² Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; CM2 1977, file 29.1: 456th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 16.06.1977; Minutes, doc. 521/1/77, p. 2.

to submit proposals on actions to be taken and assistance that should be given to the Council, the Parliament and the Member States.²⁸³ Since Pronk put the item on the agenda, he indirectly forced a debate on these issues within the Council and Commission.

In the meeting in November 1977, the Council made progress with regards to the previously adopted Resolution on the coordination of Community and Member States' emergency and humanitarian aid. It agreed to several practical measures for the coordination of urgent and humanitarian aid by the Community and the Member States.²⁸⁴ A coordination procedure was laid out, consisting of the definition, objectives and the role of the coordinator for two stages: immediate relief and short term emergency aid. A coordinator would be appointed to keep the inventory of the means available in the Member States and the Community up to date. Also, each Member State and the Commission would appoint a contact person who would be in direct liaison with the coordinator.²⁸⁵

All measures aimed at an optimal coordination between the actions of the Member States and the EEC. This shows that the Council had developed Pronk's proposal for an inventory of the means of actions available into a proposal for an institutional and administrative framework in Brussels. It also showed that the Council had found a solution to determine the best possible coordination between the Member States and the Community in a certain policy area, which has also been an aim for Pronk in his 1976 memorandum on EEC policy.²⁸⁶ Pronk's memorandums on emergency and humanitarian aid and EEC policy were not only influential for the decision-making process, but also led to some concrete results on the longer term.

To conclude, Pronk's principles for a European development policy as stated in the 1976 EEC Memorandum and the explanatory notes for 1974, 1975 and 1977, were barely touched upon in the discussions of the Council. Some motions for a Resolution had a reference to international objectives, like 0.7% target for volume of aid, but Member States were not able to agree on the objective. In the Council's discussions and the text of the Resolutions, there was no emphasis on providing aid for the poorest countries or improving the GSP, two matters that were important for the Dutch government.

²⁸³ 456th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 16.06.1977; Minutes, doc. 521/1/77, p.2.

²⁸⁴ Historical Archives of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; CM2 1977, file 59: 485th session of the Council, Brussels, 28.11.1977; Minutes, doc. 997/77, p. 2.

²⁸⁵ 485th session of the Council, Brussels, 28.11.1977; Minutes, doc. 997/77, Annex I, p.1-7. (Measures for the coordination of actions by the Community and Member States as regards Emergency and Humanitarian Aid).

²⁸⁶ HTK, 1975-1976, 13 600 V, Nr. 42, Memorandum van de Nederlandse regering inzake het ontwikkelingsbeleid van de EEG, p. 5.

On a personal level, Pronk was critical towards his national and European colleagues, especially with regards to international commitments. While Van der Stoep and Brinkhorst tried to look for support among EEC partners, Pronk rather wanted to stick to his principles with the possible consequence of a Dutch isolation. During the EEC presidency, Pronk softened his criticism. He actively looked for support among his fellow Ministers and initiated several proposals. The EEC presidency was seen as an opportunity to influence the Council's decision-making process.

Chapter 5: Dutch members in the European Parliament

This chapter looks at the Dutch Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that were part of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (CDC) between 1973 and 1977. In literature dated before the European Parliament's direct elections in 1979, it is argued that there were links between the European Parliament (EP) and the parliament of the Member States. The main example of such a link was the dual mandate, meaning that MEPs were simultaneously members of their national parliaments.²⁸⁷ Also, because MEPs owed their seats to their national parties, the latter formed a central point for information links between MEPs and members of parliament of the same political party.²⁸⁸

Therefore, part of the analysis in this chapter will analyze whether Dutch MEPs also had a national agenda. I will focus on the MEP's actions as a committee member, but also include their views towards the EEC's integration process and the possibilities and limits that they faced while operating within the EP. The reason for this is that, in general, MEPs considered the consultative powers of the EP too limited. According to Richard Corbett, they argued that "a system whereby ministers alone could adopt legislation suffered from a democratic deficit."²⁸⁹ I would like to see to what extent the actions of Dutch MEPs conformed with this argument. Before I start with the analysis, I first describe the EP's rules of procedure, the committees and my justification for selecting documents.

5.1. The procedures of the EP

The Rules of Procedure from 1972 stated that the parliamentarians formed themselves into groups according to their political affinity.²⁹⁰ The membership of the committees was proportionally distributed among the size of the political groups and the national delegations in the plenary. MEPs could indicate their preferences for committees and the election took place each year in March.²⁹¹ Each committee had a chairman and one or two vice-chairmen, which

²⁸⁷ Martin Wing and Mark Hagger, "Committees in the European Parliament," in: *The European Parliament and the National Parliaments* ed. Valentine Herman and Rinus van Schendelen (Westmead: Saxon House, 1979), 34.

²⁸⁸ Derek Hearl and Jane Sargent, 'Linkage Mechanisms Between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments', in: *The European Parliament and the National Parliaments* ed. Valentine Herman and Rinus van Schinkelen (Saxon House: Westmead, 1979) 4.

²⁸⁹ Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Micheal Shackleton, *The European Parliament* (London: John Harper Publishing, 2011) 3. Accessed June 29, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central.

²⁹⁰ European Parliament, Rules of Procedure December 1972, *Office for Official Publications of the European Communities*, 11, 36.

²⁹¹ Wing and Hagger, "Committees in the European Parliament," 49 and European Parliament, "Rules of Procedure December 1972," Rule 37 (2), p. 37.

were important positions with a certain amount of power. In theory, the committees chose their own chairman and vice-chairmen, but in practice, the political groups agreed beforehand to reflect the distribution of seats in the plenary.²⁹²

The committees examined questions raised to them by the EP or by the President on behalf of the Parliament's Bureau, which consisted of a President and eight Vice-Presidents.²⁹³ For each subject that the committees examined, a rapporteur was appointed who prepared the committees' report on the subject. These reports usually included a motion for a resolution and an explanatory statement of this motion.²⁹⁴ Rapporteurs also had an important position because they introduced the report in the plenary and had more speaking time than MEPs who spoke on behalf of their group or individually.²⁹⁵

I chose to look at the subjects that fell under the competences of the CDC. In a memorandum from 1973, their focus shifted from associated countries to the needs of all developing countries. This change was made in response to the Paris Summit in 1972, when Community development policy set the aim to meet the needs of all developing countries.²⁹⁶ According to the 1973 memorandum, the CDC had to reflect on the content of the Community's commitment to a world-wide development policy and how this would complement its regional responsibilities.²⁹⁷ In the implementation of Community policy making, it had to take into account the interests of the developing countries. Examples of subjects were: financial aid, food aid, economic issues (such as the GSP), multilateral negotiations and the coordination and harmonization of development policy.²⁹⁸

The member lists of the CDC show several interesting things. First, with the establishment of the EP, it was decided that in principle, the CDC should consist of three members from the Netherlands (see chapter 2). However, only two Dutch MEPs were part of the Committee between 1973 and 1977.²⁹⁹ This means that the principle did not correspond

²⁹² Wing and Hagger, "Committees in the European Parliament," 51.

²⁹³ European Parliament, "Rules of Procedure December 1972," 11.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 36, 40

²⁹⁵ Debates of the European Parliament (from hereinafter: DEP), Sitting of Wednesday, 4 July, 1973, '18. Strengthening the EP's budgetary powers', p. 133.

²⁹⁶ Europees Parlement, Commissie voor Ontwikkeling en Samenwerking, "Nota van de Heer Dewulf inzake de bevoegdheden van de nieuwe Commissie voor ontwikkeling en samenwerking," 18.3.1973, PE 32.892, p. 1-2.

²⁹⁷ Europees Parlement, Commissie voor Ontwikkeling en Samenwerking, "Nota van de Heer Dewulf inzake de bevoegdheden van de nieuwe Commissie voor ontwikkeling en samenwerking," 3.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁹ Bibliotheque Parlement European Parliament, Bulletins 1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978, List of Members, Committee on Development and Cooperation.

with the reality. Second, Dutch MEPs never held a chairman or vice-chairman position between 1973 and 1977 in the CDC.³⁰⁰

However, the member lists of all committees show that the Netherlands was more strongly represented in committees such as Political Affairs, Legal Affairs, Agriculture and Economic and Monetary Affairs, in contrast to the CDC.³⁰¹ Furthermore, the Political Affairs, Legal Affairs and Economic and Monetary Affairs committees were considered politically more important and had a larger impact on the EEC.³⁰²

According to the member lists of the CDC, Arie van der Hek of the Labor Party and Piet van der Sanden of the Catholic People's Party were members from December 1973 to March 1974. They were replaced by Jan Broeks of the Labor Party and Wim Schuijt of the Catholic People's Party. Within the EP, Van der Hek and Broeks belonged to the Socialist Group and Van der Sanden and Schuijt to the Christian Democratic Group. Because no relevant information was found on Van der Sanden, he is left out from the analysis. It is important to note that the CDC was not the only committee that these Dutch MEPs were part of. This could influence their activity within the CDC.

With regards to the actions of Dutch MEPs, I will focus on four things. First of all, I look at the EP's plenary debates where the most important topics were debated and where Resolutions were passed, mostly in response to proposals by the Commission.³⁰³ Second, written and oral questions will be discussed, both individual or with more MEPs. These questions were aimed at the Commission or the Council. Questions for written answers were brief and submitted in a written form to the President of the EP who forwarded them to the institution addressed. MEP's could also ask brief questions to be answered by oral procedure without a debate.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, questions could be put on the EP's agenda and dealt with by oral procedure with a debate. These questions could be requested by a committee, a Political Group or five or more MEPs and related to general problems.³⁰⁵

Third, I look at the motions and amendments to Resolutions, either individually or with a group. These motions could lead to the adoption of non-legislative resolutions and were used

³⁰⁰ European Parliament, Bulletins 1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978, List of Members, Committee on Development and Cooperation.

³⁰¹ European Parliament, Bulletins 1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978, List of Members of Committees.

³⁰² Wing and Hagger, "Committees in the European Parliament," 49.

³⁰³ Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Micheal Schackleton, *The European Parliament* (John Harper Publishing, London: 1995) 273.

³⁰⁴ European Parliament, "Rules of Procedure December 1972," Rule 45 and 46. p.43.

³⁰⁵ European Parliament, "Rules of Procedure December 1972," Rule 47, p. 44-45.

to initiate new Community action.³⁰⁶ Fourth, I look at the MEP's role as rapporteur, since this was a powerful role within the committees.

The meetings of the CDC itself could also have been interesting to examine, but the minutes were too limited to determine the role of the Dutch MEPs. Therefore, I decided to leave them out. The EP's archival documents were not accessible online, but sent to me through email by an archivist upon request. I mostly used the English versions and I translated the French and Dutch version when necessary.

5.2 Van der Hek

Van der Hek mainly asked questions and was not that active in the plenary debate. In 1973, Van der Hek requested an oral question with debate regarding the GSP, together with four Dutch MEPs of the Socialist Group. The question was a response to a statement by the Danish President-in-Office of the Council that the GSP could be extended to individual East European countries.³⁰⁷ In the debate, the Dutch MEPs said that they had no objections to trade agreements between the Community and individual Eastern-European countries, but that developing countries should have greater access to the Community's market than non-developing countries.³⁰⁸ The Vice-President of the Commission responded that the Commission would make sure that in its proposals to the Council, the advantages for developing countries would not be modified. Certain sectors and products that were sensitive for developing countries, would be excluded from the preferential scheme for East European countries.³⁰⁹ Because there was no motion for a Resolution on the question, the debate was closed. The Dutch MEPs argued that they were dissatisfied and would continue to pressure on the matter of the East European countries and the GSP.³¹⁰

Furthermore, Van der Hek addressed several written questions to the Commission and some of them dealt with topics that corresponded with his national party affiliation. For example, Van der Hek asked the Commission whether it was prepared to suspend European Development Fund aid to Burundi until its government stopped to systematically kill and deport

³⁰⁶ Corbett, Jacobs and Schackleton, *The European Parliament*, 273.

³⁰⁷ DEP, Sitting of Thursday, 13 December 1973, '9. Joint Debate on Mr Dewulf's report and Oral Question No 134/73 with debate: Generalized tariff preference', p. 251-252.

³⁰⁸ DEP, Sitting of Thursday, 13 December 1973, p. 252.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 256.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 257.

people out of the country.³¹¹ The Commission answered that it was opposed to violating human rights, but it would not take any steps to suspend the aid.³¹²

In addition to human rights, Van der Hek advocated for a world-wide development policy, as opposed to a focus on the ACP states. He criticized the European Commission's focus on supporting African countries, despite their commitment to adopt an overall policy of development cooperation on a world-wide scale made during the Paris Summit.³¹³ The Commission replied that before the EEC could plan an overall policy of world-wide cooperation with sufficient financial means, the focus should be on a limited number of developing countries, primarily the ACP states.³¹⁴

Another question that indicated Van der Hek's strong nationalist and socialist point of view was about Surinam. Surinam has been associated with the EEC since 1962 as part of the overseas countries and territories.³¹⁵ It was in the interest of the Dutch government that Surinam remained associated with the EEC after its independence. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was important that the EEC could give some sort of guarantee that Suriname could become an associated country again after its independence, otherwise Surinam would be less cooperative in its independence.³¹⁶ Van der Hek asked the Commission whether Surinam could become part of the new association agreement between the EEC and the ACP countries, in light of Surinam's expected independence in 1975.³¹⁷ The Commission was hesitant to do so, because it would not be appropriate to anticipate on this while the negotiations between the EEC and the ACP countries were still ongoing. Instead, it would be better to maintain and adjust the existing association.³¹⁸

³¹¹ European Parliament, Written Question No. 297/73 by Mr. Van der Hek, PE 33.904/E.

³¹² Official Journal of the European Communities (hereinafter: OJ), Vol 16, No C 106, 6 December 1973, English edition, Answer Written Question no 294/73 by Mr. Van der Hek to the Commission of the European Communities, Subject: Community policy towards the developing countries, p. 15. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>.

³¹³ European Parliament, Written Question No. 294/73 by Mr. Van der Hek, Subject: Community policy towards the developing countries, PE 33.904/E.

³¹⁴ OJ C 77, 4.7.1974, p. 2, Answer to Written Question No 294/73 from Mr. Van der Hek.

³¹⁵ M.K. Anyadike-Danes, M.N. Anyadike-Danes, "The Geographic Allocation of the European Development fund under the Lomé Conventions, *World Development* 20, no. 11 (1992), 1647-1661.

³¹⁶ RGP 104, *Diericks et al, Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bronnenuitgave Deel 4, 1973-1977*, Memorandum Waarnemend Hoofd Bureau Algemene Integratie en EGKS, Directie Integratie Europa, DGES, BZ (de Visser) aan Chef Directie Integratie Europa (Italianer), 3 juli 1973, 'Toekomstige relaties van Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen met de EEG, p. 32

³¹⁷ European Parliament, Written Question No.169/74 by Mr. Patijn and Mr. Van der Hek, 'subject: European Development Fund and Surinam', PE 37.262/E.

³¹⁸ Publicatie van de Europese Gemeenschappen, 25.9.74, Nr. C 113/7, Antwoord schriftelijke vraag Nr. 169/74 van de heren Patijn en van der Hek aan de Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen (5 augustus 1974).

Van der Hek's written questions show a clear national party affiliation. He raised the issue of human rights as a criteria to suspend development aid, as was part of the Dutch development policy established by Pronk. He also advocated for a Community policy on a global level, like Pronk did. However, it did not bring them anything because the Commission and the Council did not take subsequent actions.

Van der Hek's analysis brings forward the question whether the Dutch parliamentarians had a national agenda. In a debate of the Dutch House of Representatives, Van der Hek made some interesting comments with regard to his job as an MEP. Van der Hek complained about the EEC's failure to expand its development aid to non-associated countries and regretted that the Council and the EP agreed to reduce aid to non-associated countries. He stated that "all Dutch Socialists in the EP were doing their best to defend Minister Pronks' policy in the EP as well."³¹⁹ This shows that Van der Hek used the EP as a platform to protect national interests.

In the same debate of the Dutch House of Representatives, Van der Hek argued that he was not sure whether the Netherlands was ready for a further European integration. He also argued that as long as it was unclear what a further European integration would mean for the relations between the different EEC institutions, the EP should not be given more budgetary powers.³²⁰ He claimed that the EP was deciding on the allocation of budgetary amounts, while it did not take any responsibility for the policy that had to be implemented with these amounts. In 1975, a budget treaty had made the Council and the EP joint budgetary authorities and the EP could revise the budget and take the final vote on its adoption or rejection.³²¹ This shows that Van der Hek was not only critical of the institution that he was a representative of, but also skeptical of a more integrated Europe at this stage.

5.3. Broeks

Compared to Van der Hek, Broeks was a more active MEP. Broeks contributed several times to the general debates as a spokesperson for the Socialist Group. On some of these occasions, Broeks emphasized that the EEC's development policy was not only for the benefit of the associated developing countries, but that "the objective of [the Community's] aid should still be to help all the countries in the world to arrive at greater economic and social independence."³²² This comment shows similarities to Pronk's principle that future European

³¹⁹ HTK, 1975-1976, 18 December 1975, 36ste Vergadering, 18 december 1975, Overeenkomsten, p. 2199.

³²⁰ HTK, 1975-1976, 18 December 1975, 36ste Vergadering, 18 december 1975, Overeenkomsten, p. 2198.

³²¹ Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, *The European Parliament*, 4.

³²² DEP, Sitting of Wednesday, 30 April, 1975, '3. The Community's overall development cooperation policy,' p. 83.

cooperation should also take into account the economic and political emancipation of developing countries. Broeksz also emphasized that bilateral policies should be harmonized with Community policy, so that Member States would not work towards different goals.³²³

In a debate on a report on the application of the GSP, he also acted as the spokesman of the Socialist Group and requested, together with a West-German Socialist, three amendments to a motion. In these amendments, Broeksz emphasized that the GSP should be simplified, constitute a genuine and balanced improvement for all countries, include as many products as possible (especially important export products for developing countries) and its opportunities had to be made clearer.³²⁴ The amendments on simplification and improvement of the awareness of opportunities were approved and the Resolution was adopted.³²⁵ The amendment to include as many products as possible was rejected. An MEP of the Christian Democrats Group rejected the amendment because he feared that the inclusion of more products would be disadvantageous to Mediterranean products through the generalized trade preferences for developing countries that produced the same or similar products.³²⁶

Similar to Minister Pronk, Broeksz reminded the EEC of its duty towards all developing countries. On one occasion, Broeksz criticized the Commission's Vice-President for stating that the proposals for a new GSP should be modest due to the difficult financial situation of the past year.³²⁷ Broeksz argued that the Member States were wealthy enough to go further than the current proposals.³²⁸ He made similar arguments in another debate: "our own economic problems pale in the shadow of comparison with the fate of these [developing] countries. I am firmly convinced that we can and must do more in the world's poorest countries; it is our duty to do so."³²⁹

Broeksz also asked oral questions that were put to the general debate. Since Broeksz did not speak during these debates and the questions did not include a motion, I will focus on the content and the collaboration with other MEPs. One question was in collaboration with other Socialists and asked the Commission why it did not refuse Uruguay's request for tariff

³²³ DEP, Sitting of Wednesday, 30 April, 1975, p. 83.

³²⁴ DEP, Sitting of Thursday, 16 October 1975, '10. Regulations on the applications of generalized tariff preferences,' p. 244-246.

³²⁵ DEP, Sitting of Thursday, 16 October 1975, p. 246.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 245.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 244.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

³²⁹ DEP, Sitting of Tuesday, 11 October 1977, '4. Regulations relating to the application for 1978 of the generalized tariff preferences,' p. 35

preference because of its human rights violation.³³⁰ The Christian Democrats supported the selectiveness on this issue for a different reason, namely the EEC's market protection. The Conservatives were hesitant to allow trade agreements to be jeopardized by political questions like this one.³³¹

Another question in collaboration with other Socialists was about the EEC's attitude towards South-Africa. The Socialists wanted the EEC to strongly condemn the apartheid regime in South Africa and not grant any trade concessions to the country. The Christian-Democrats agreed with the first request, but thought that it was too risky to make accusations against a government that is trying to find solutions.³³² Broeks also tabled a question in collaboration with other Socialists and Dutch MEPs from different Political Groups, including Schuijt.³³³ They asked whether the EEC should not urge Argentinean authorities to restore its democratic freedom and human rights.³³⁴

In collaboration with British and West-German MEPs of the Socialist Group, Broeks asked the Commission if it could ensure that the Common Agricultural Policy would play a bigger part in development cooperation between Europe and developing countries, in terms of a more rational organization of world food supplies and the exchange of agricultural production.³³⁵ Finally, there was one individual written question on Community food aid in which Broeks asked whether the Commission could affirm that the usage of Community food aid really reached the countries that are the most in need.³³⁶

Like Minister Pronk, Broeks also made proposals to improve the Community's food aid. Broeks was the rapporteur of three reports of the CDC that dealt with food aid. As a result of the first report, the EP adopted a Resolution which approved the Commission's proposal to increase the budget for skimmed milk powder.³³⁷ As a result of the second report, the EP

³³⁰ DEP, Sitting of Thursday, 13 May 1976, '5. Oral Question with debate: Relations between Uruguay and the Community', p. 154.

³³¹ DEP, Sitting of Tuesday, 11 October 1977, p. 154, 156.

³³² Sitting of Wednesday, 15 January, 1975, '7. Oral Questions with debate: The Community's attitude to South Africa,' p. 108-111.

³³³ DEP, Sitting of Wednesday, 7 July, 1976, '14. Oral Question with debate: Violation of human rights in Argentina', p. 136.

³³⁴ DEP, Sitting of Wednesday, 7 July, 1976, p. 136.

³³⁵ DEP, Sitting of Thursday, 16 September 1976, '8. Oral Question with debate: Common Agricultural Policy and the Third World,' p. 173.

³³⁶ Parlement Européen, Question écrite nr. 194/77 de M. Broeks, Objet: Contrôle de l'usage de l'aide alimentaire, PE 48.730/Fr.

³³⁷ European Communities, European Parliament, Working Documents, 1976-1977, 6 July 1976, Document 208/76, Report on the regulation of the rules for the supply of skimmed-milk powder as food aid, p.5 and OJ, No C 178/59, 2.8.76.

approved Commission's proposals for the supply of skimmed milk powder and butter oil.³³⁸ Through Broeks's third report, the EP agreed with the extension of beneficial agreements for ACP countries which would provide continued stability for key export products for ACP countries that were in a bad economic situation.³³⁹

These reports show that Broeks played an important role for the CDC with regards to food aid. The last report took into account the interests of the developing countries, which was not only important for the CDC but also for Minister Pronk. It is not clear why Broeks focused on food aid because I could not find any further information about this.³⁴⁰

In addition, Broeks was concerned with the decision-making process of the Council. On behalf of the Socialist Group, he proposed two motions for a Resolution to improve this. In the debate on the first motion in 1973, Broeks expressed his dissatisfaction with the Council's failure to take decisions. He said that the EP had given its opinion on more than 200 proposals, which were submitted by the Commission to the Council, but the Council has not yet dealt with them.³⁴¹ In the motion, Broeks noted that the Council had been unable to take steps to improve its decision-making procedure and the cohesion of Community action and requested the Council to fix a date by which it would take effective measures.³⁴² This Resolution was adopted.³⁴³

In 1976, Broeks demonstrated his frustration with the Council's lack of progress again. This time, he made several concrete proposals for the improvement of the decision-making process. He urged the Council to take decision through majority vote, or, when the Treaty provided, by a qualified majority and when one Member State was absent. Also, the Council should leave more matters for the Commission to deal with.³⁴⁴ However, during the general debate, Broeks withdrew his motion for unknown reasons.³⁴⁵

This analysis showed that Broeks was an important member for the Socialist Group. He often spoke on its behalf and tabled motions. Furthermore, Broeks often collaborated with

³³⁸ OJ, No C 183/69, 1. 8. 77, 'Skimmed-milk powder and butteroil food-aid programmes', paragraph 2.

³³⁹ OJ, No C 266/47, 7.11.77, "Resolution on renewing the arrangements for the reduction of import charges on beef and veal products, originating in the ACP states."

³⁴⁰ I checked the biography on www.parlement.com. I requested the extended version of his biography through PDC and checked newspaper articles, but none of them had any information on Broeks' activities as an MEP.

³⁴¹ Debates of the European Parliament, Sitting of Thursday, 20 September 1973, 6. Tabling of a motion for a resolution and decision on urgent procedure – reference to the committee, p.102.

³⁴² OJ, No C 87/6, 17.10.1973, 'Resolution on the measures taken by the Council to improve its decision-making,' p. 6. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>.

³⁴³ OJ, No C 87/6, 17.10.1973, "Tabling of and vote on a motion for a Resolution.

³⁴⁴ European Parliament, Working Documents 1976-1977, 10 March 1976, Document 6/76, PE 44.068.

³⁴⁵ OJ, No C 79/18, 5.4.1976, Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu> and: Minutes of the Proceedings of the Sitting of Wednesday 10 March 1976, 'Oral questions with debate: Decision-making procedure of the Council,' p.5.

MEPs from his own Political Group, but also other groups. Third, Broeksz regularly collaborated with MEPs from countries that Minister Pronk also sought support from West-Germany and Great Britain.

In his actions, Broeksz followed the line of Minister Pronk. Some questions showed that Broeksz emphasized human rights as a means to discuss development aid, just like Minister Pronk and Van der Hek did. Broeksz also emphasized development policy on a global scale and that aid should be aimed at the poorest countries.

His contributions to the debate on the Community's overall development policy and his proposals for an improvement of the Community's aid policy, showed that he was in favor of a harmonization between the Member States' policies and Community policy. His attitude towards a more integrated Europe was more positive than Van der Hek's. Also, in contrast to Van der Hek, Broeksz spoke in favor of strengthening the budgeting powers of the EP.³⁴⁶ However, he was critical of the lack of progress regarding the Council's decision-making process illustrated by two motion.

Despite Broeksz active attitude in the EP, it remains hard to determine if and to what extent his activities led to follow-ups in the Commission and the Council.

5.3 Schuijt

Compared to Van der Hek and Broeksz, Schuijt's actions connected to the CDC were limited because of his responsibilities in many other committees. For two years, he was a member of the Cultural Affairs and Youth and Political Affairs committees. During all four years, he was a member of the Legal Affairs Committee and held its chairmanship for two years. He was a member of the Committee on External Economic Relations and the chairman of the Associated Committee for one year.³⁴⁷ Therefore, this part will be less extensive.

In 1976, Schuijt wrote a report on the trade relations between the EEC and African countries. Aside from emphasizing the importance of the Lomé Convention, the report also referred to the trade relations with the Maghreb (Northern Africa) and Mashreq (Arab peninsula) region. Special attention was given to South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, that were not part of the Lomé Convention. In previous analyses, CDC meeting minutes were not included. An exception is made here, because they show an interesting difference between the draft version and the final version of the motion for a Resolution that resulted from this report.

³⁴⁶ DEP, Sitting of Wednesday, 4 July 1973, '18. Strengthening the budgetary powers of the EP,' p. 152.

³⁴⁷ European Parliament, Bulletins 1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978, List of Members, Committee on Development and Cooperation.

When the first draft of the report was presented by Schuijt in a meeting in October 1976, CDC members could not agree on whether the report should have a strong condemnation of the white minority government in South Africa.³⁴⁸ The report therefore had to be discussed during several subsequent meetings. In March 1977, a draft version of the motion for a Resolution was discussed. Paragraph ten stated that:

“For political and moral reasons, and especially in light of the Charter of Human Rights, the EP calls on the governments of the Member States to work out (...) solutions to the problems connected with the Republic of South Africa which will remove the policy of apartheid (...).”³⁴⁹

In the CDC’s meeting one week later, Schuijt and a few other members (from all political groups, except the Socialist Group), did not agree with this paragraph and argued for a less strong condemnation of apartheid. In the final version, the phrasing was as follows:

“ (...) South Africa’s role as a potentially important trading partner of neighboring African states and of the Community is hindered by its fatal policy of apartheid, and asks the Community and the Governments of the Member States to seek, (...) possible ways of putting an end to the policy of apartheid.”³⁵⁰

The humanitarian aspect of the issue was removed and the emphasis was now a commercial one, namely South Africa’s value as a trading partner. This phrasing does not correspond with the aim of the CDC because it does not look at the matter from the perspective of the developing country, but from that of the Community. Nevertheless, the report was unanimously adopted by the members of the CDC.³⁵¹ The requested motion for a Resolution was not adopted in the general EP debate because it touched upon too many sensitive political issues.³⁵²

Whereas Broeks was critical of the Council’s decision-making, Schuijt was critical of the lack of time MEPs had to deliver opinions on Commission proposals. Schuijt wrote a

³⁴⁸ Committee on Development and Cooperation (from hereinafter: CDC) Minutes of the meeting held on Friday, 29 October 1976, PE/XII/PV/76-11, p. 3-4.

³⁴⁹ CDC, Draft Report on on trade relations between the European Community and the countries of the African continent, 21.3.1977, PE 45.547/res./rev., p. 10.

³⁵⁰ European Community, European Parliament, Working Documents 1977-1978, Document 47/77, Report Report on on trade relations between the European Community and the countries of the African continent, 29.4.1977, PE 45.547/fin, p. 6.

³⁵¹ CDC, Minutes of the meeting of 29 March and 30 March 1977 in Rome, PE/PV/XI/77-7, p. 7.

³⁵² CDC, Minutes of the meeting held on Wednesday, 16 February 1977, PE/XI/PV/77-3, p. 3 and CDC, CDC, Minutes of the meeting held on 29 March 1977, PE/PV/XI/77-7, p. 7.

working document on the functioning of the parliamentary committees, where he proposed ideas to make the EP's work more efficient. The increase in plenary sittings, meetings of (sub)committees and the dual mandate was becoming too much for the MEPs to cope with. Schuijt proposed, among others, that MEPs should be a member of only one committee and there should be a better coordination between the dates and place of plenary meetings and committee meetings.³⁵³ The archive could not provide more insight into whether further action was taken on this report.

Schuijt's limited actions with regards to development issues, do not provide enough information to make valid conclusions on his contribution to the European development policy or whether he had a national agenda. However, the analysis of Broeksz and Schuijt's activities illustrated general differences between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists in the EP.

With regards to proposals for development policies, Christian Democrats reasoned from an economic perspective and whether these policies were in the interest of the EEC's common market. This has become apparent in their support for the GSP, violation of human rights and their emphasis on the Lomé Convention. In contrast, the Socialists reasoned from the perspective of the developing countries, they wanted to take a stronger stance against human rights on humanitarian grounds and emphasizes the non-associated developing countries.

Furthermore, there were differences between the MEPs with regards to their actions as a member of the CDC. Broeksz was the most active member and the only MEP that saw some of his motions approved. Van der Hek was very critical of the EP and European integration, while Broeksz and Schuijt made efforts to make the EEC's decision-making process more efficient. Even though this latter point had nothing to do with development policy itself, a quicker decision-making could lead to the discussion and eventual approval of more policy proposals in the field of development cooperation.

³⁵³ European Parliament, Ad Hoc Working Party for examining the Procedures and Working Methods of the European Parliament, Working document on the functioning of the parliamentary Committees, 15.12.1973, PE 35.393.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to show how Dutch representatives who were active in the field of development cooperation tried to promote coordination within the emergence of a common European development policy between 1973 and 1977.

From the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the mid-1970s, the debate on development cooperation within the EEC gradually changed from an 'association' to a 'development policy.' The Netherlands reluctantly went along with the first association agreement in 1957. Starting from the 1960's, development aid became more important in the political debate in the Netherlands. In 1973, a very leftist government took office, which led to an ambitious development policy that aimed to reach out to the poorest countries and populations. Minister Pronk was skeptical towards a harmonization and cooperation between the EEC and the Member States in the field of development aid.

By using Rosenthal's schemes, several conclusions can be drawn. Within the decision-making process of the first scheme, the intergovernmental level, the Council of Ministers meeting were the focus. Pronk's performance went through several phases. It changed from pro-active in the first year, to a more critical attitude in the next two years and then experienced a revival with the EEC Presidency. He used the EEC Presidency as a means to initiate new proposals and to look for support among his fellow Ministers. However, he remained disappointed about the lack of commitment of other Member States. Yet, the analysis of the Council meetings have not given the impression that Pronk was isolated within the EEC. He was often supported by his West-German and British colleagues. Unfortunately, this support was not enough to reach an agreement between all Member States.

For the second scheme, the focus was on Parliamentary pressure. The MEPs were faced with the limitation that their institution only had consultative powers, but they nevertheless used different means to exert pressure on the Commission and the Council. Both Broeks and Schuijt used their position of rapporteur to exert pressure on the Commission and the Council on a few occasions. Broeks used his important position within the Socialist Group to speak on its behalf or to table questions. Nonetheless, their actions did not lead to many concrete results.

The MEPs faced the same problem as Minister Pronk, namely that issues that the Netherlands considered important for a European development policy were often not spoken about in the general debates or in the Commission's policy proposals. The only thing the Socialist MEPs could do for Pronk was to advocate for issues that were important to Pronk on the European level.

The third scheme, the elite network, is difficult to assess. It was not possible to take into account the behind-the-scenes diplomacy that took place within the Council and the EP. Nevertheless, one example can be recognized in the Dutch effort to influence a British memorandum proposing a new strategy for EEC food aid to developing countries in 1976, discussed in chapter four. This example is an interesting side note on how a group of like-minded Member States sought cooperation through informal meetings between their delegations. For future research, it would be interesting if more examples of this behind-the-scenes lobbying could be found.

With Rosenthal's model, I showed how the Dutch politicians performed within the institutions and which possibilities and limits they encountered. All Dutch politicians discussed in this research were disappointed with the slow progress of the decision-making of the EEC. However, it was mostly due to reservations of the larger Member States (especially France and Great Britain) that an overall agreement was not reached and discussions were postponed. Aside from one occasion, the Netherlands did not block a proposal for a motion.

In this thesis, additional attention was paid to the personal motivations of Dutch politicians. Minister Pronks' personal motivations and his view towards the EEC stayed relatively similar throughout all years. For Pronk, his general principles for a European development policy (its implementation on a global scale, focus on improving the position of the developing countries regarding the EEC and integration into international agreements) were his most important motivations. Even though he sometimes sought cooperation, he was only prepared to compensate when his principles were not in danger. Another motivation for Pronk was the important task he envisioned for the EEC in creating a new economic world order. However, he felt that the EEC did not commit to its duty towards developing countries and he was very disappointed about this.

Next to Pronk's personal motivations, his position within the Dutch government also played a role in his performance. He had a different tactical approach towards the EEC compared to his colleagues Van der Stoel (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Brinkhorst (State Secretary). While Van der Stoel and Brinkhorst tried to look for support among EEC partners, Pronk rather wanted to stick to his beliefs with the possible consequence of a Dutch isolation.

Initially, Pronk was motivated to further integrated EEC's development policy and willing to make concessions. However, throughout the years, the lack of willingness of other countries and his activist approach, led him to become more and more skeptical. Ultimately, his ideas and demands for a European development policy were very far from the policy that the EEC had decided upon so far, and it proved too ambitious to be achieved at this stage.

Because the EP consisted of national delegations instead of directly elected members, public opinion did not play a role for MEPs. This gave them the opportunity to follow their national party line. The personal motivations of Van der Hek and Broeksz, the Social Democrats, were clearly influenced by their national party affiliation. They tried to gain support at the European level for ideas that corresponded to the Dutch development policy. Broeksz and Van der Hek knew that they were supported in their ideas by the national Minister. It explains why many of their questions in the EP touched upon subjects that were also important for the Dutch government. For Schuijt, this was not the case, but because of his membership for many other committees, he was more focused on issues within other policy areas.

Furthermore, the MEPs personal view on further European integration and the authority of the institution that they worked for played a role in how they operated. Van der Hek was critical of a further European integration and the EP itself. He did not make any proposals to improve the EEC's decision-making process and he spoke negatively about the extension of the EP's powers. Broeksz and Schuijt were also critical of the EEC's decision-making process, but they proposed changes to improve this and were positive towards an expansion of the EP's powers.

While working on this thesis, I experienced some limitations because of the unavailability or limited content of some archival sources. However, this did not lead to major problems for my analysis. Future research could expand on this thesis by looking at how other Member States tried to promote coordination within the emergence of a European development policy, or by focusing on any other policy area. A comparative analysis of different Member States could also be interesting.

Bibliography

Secondary sources

- Alting von Geusau, Frans ed., *The Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1977).
- Anyadike-Danes, M.K. and Anyadike-Danes, M.N., “The Geographic Allocation of the European Development fund under the Lomé Conventions, *World Development* 20, no. 11 (1992), 1647-1661.
- Arts, Karin and Dickson, Anna, ed., *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol* (Manchester, University Press: 2004).
- Arts, Karin, “Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention” (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2000).
- Baron, Barnett, “Population and the Seventh Special Session: A Report.” *Population and Development Review* 1, No. 2 (1975): 297-306.
- Brandsma, Margriet & Klein, Pieter, *Jan Pronk. Rebel met een missie* (Utrecht: Scheffers, 1996).
- Bretherton, Charlotte, and Vogler, John, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 1999).
- Bos, H., “Balans van een Beleid”, *Internationale Spectator* 31, no.9 (1977): 533-535.
- Bosmans, J., *Staatkundige Vormgeving in Nederland. Deel II. De tijd na 1940* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1999).
- Buller, Jim and Gamble, Andrew, “Conceptualising Europeanisation,” *Public Policy and Administration* 17, no. 2 (2002): 5-24.
- Carbone, Maurizio, “The new season of EU development policy,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9, no. 2 (2008): 111-113.
- Claeys, Anne-Sophie, “‘Sense and Sensibility’: the role of France and French Interests in European Development Policy”, in *EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol*, ed. Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson (Manchester: University Press, 2004),

- Corbett, Richard, Jacobs, Francis and Schackleton, Micheal, *The European Parliament* (London: John Harper Publishing, 2011) 4. Accessed June 29, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- L.J. van Damme, L.J. van and Smits, M., red., *Voor de ontwikkeling van de derde wereld. Politici en ambtenaren over de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1989* (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2009).
- Delputte, Sarah and Verschaeve, Joren, “The Role of the European Parliament in EU Development Policy”, in *The European Parliament and its International Relations*, ed. Stelios Stavridis and Daniela Irrera (New York: Routledge, 2015).
- Dimier, Veronique, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire* (Hampshire, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics: 2014).
- Faber, Gerrit, *The European Community and Development Cooperation* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1982).
- Frish, Dieter, ‘The European Union’s Development Policy. A Personal View of 50 Years of International Cooperation, *Policy Management Report 15*, European Centre for Development Policy Management, April 2008.
- Goldstone Rosenthal, Glenda, *The Men Behind the Decisions. Cases in European Policy-Making* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975).
- Hamburger, Friedrich, “An Overview of EU Development Policy.” In *European Union Development Policy*, ed. Marjorie Lister (London: Macmillan Press, 1998).
- Herman, Valentine and Schendelen, Rinus van, ed., *The European Parliament and the National Parliaments* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1979).
- “History of the 0.7% ODA target,” *Development Assistance Committee Journal* 3 No.4 (2002): 9 – 11, Revised March 2016.
- Holland, Martin, *The European Union and the Third World. The European Union Series* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
- Keulen, Sjoerd, *Monumenten van Beleid. De wisselwerking tussen Nederlands Rijksoverheidsbeleid, sociale wetenschappen en politieke cultuur, 1945-2002* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2014).
- Kulcsár, László , “Population and Development,” in *The Sociology of Development Handbook*, ed. Gregory Hooks (Oakland: University of California Press: 2016),

- Malcontent. P. and Nekkers, J., “Doe wel en zie niet om,” in *De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949 – 1999* (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1999).
- McMahon, Joseph, *The Development Co-operation Policy of the EC* (London: Kluwer Law International Ltd, 1998).
- Metzemaekers, L., “Ontwikkelingshulp gericht op structuurhervorming”, *Internationale Spectator* 31, no.9 (1977): 535-538.
- Peterson, John and Bomberg, Elizabeth, *Decision-making in the European Union* (New York, St. Martin’s Press: 1999).
- Piening, Christopher, *Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1997).
- Piodi, Franco, *The Development Committees. Reports and Resolutions of the Various Committees Responsible for Development Cooperation from 1958 to 1999* (European Parliament: Archive and Documentation Center CARDOC, 2010).
- Pronk, Jan, “Naar een geïntegreerd Europees ontwikkelingsbeleid?”, *Internationale Spectator* 27, no 5 (1973): 166-177.
- Reisen, Mirjam van, “The Enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What Future?,” in *EU Development Policy in a Changing World. Challenges for the 21st Century*, ed. Andrew Mold (Amsterdam: University Press, 2007).
- Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën uitgegeven door het Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Kleine Serie 104, Dierikx et all, *Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bronnenuitgave, Deel 4 1973-1977* (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2005).
- Sherrington, Philippa, *The Council of Ministers. Political Authority in the European Union* (London: Pinter, 2000).
- Wessels, Wolfgang, *The European Council. The European Union Series* (London: Palgrave, 2016).
- Veen, van der L.J., “Het Ontwikkelingsbeleid van de Europese Gemeenschap in de praktijk. Een analyse aan de hand van drie landenstudies” (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1985).
- Voorhoeve, J., *Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).

Primary sources

Commission:

Commission of the European Communities, “Memorandum on a Community Policy on Development Cooperation,” Synoptic and programme for initial actions, *Communications of the Commission to the Council* of 21 July 1971 and 2 February 1972. Retrieved from: Achive of Eurpean Integration, <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

Development aid: 'Fresco' of Community action tomorrow. Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (74) 1728 final, 30 October 1974. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/74. Retrieved from: Achive of Eurpean Integration, <http://aei.pitt.edu/>.

Council (Accessed through the Council’s Archives Search Engine, unless stated otherwise. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/archives/search/>)

Documents concernant les travaux du Conseil sur la politique de cooperation au développement 25.09.1972 – 22.03.1973, *Conseil de la Communauté Économique Européenne Archives Historiques*, CM 2/1974 2190.

CM2 1973 file 13: 248th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 25/26.06.1973; Minutes, doc. 1420/73.

CM2 1973 file 22: 259th session of the Council, Brussels, 05.11.1973; Minutes, doc. 2206/73.

CM 2/1974 file 26: 292nd session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.06.1974; Minutes, doc. 314/74.

CM 2/1974 2201, “Report of the Working Party on Development Cooperation,” The Council, S/595/2/73 (GCD 28) rev.2. 25.05.1973 – 05.02.1974.

CM 2/1974 2190, Annex 1, “Draft Terms of Reference of the Working Party on Development Aid”, 25.09.1972 – 22.03.1973.

CM 2/1975 file 81: 361st session of the Council, Luxembourg, 13.10.1975; Minutes, doc. 609/75

CM2 1976, file 51: 417th session of the Council, Brussels, 08.11.1976; Minutes, doc. 855/76.

CM2 1977, file 15: 442nd session of the Council, Brussels, 22.03.1977; Minutes, doc. 309/77.

CM2 1977, file 29.1:456th session of the Council, Luxembourg, 16.06.1977; Minutes, doc. 521/1/77.

Note by the Chairman of the Working Party on Development Cooperation, European Communities, The Council, S/1167/73 (GCD 30), Permanent Representatives Committee, 703rd meeting (part 3) – 26 October 1973. (Received through mail via an archivist)

Note de Transmission, Objet: Aide alimentaire, Mémorandum de la délégation britannique concernant une nouvelle stratégie en matière d'aide alimentaire de la Communauté aux pays en voie de développement, Communautés Européennes, Bruxelles, le 18 Octobre 1976, R/2349/76 (ALIM 27). (Received through mail via an archivist)

Traduction, Lettre de la Représentation Permanente des Pays-Bas auprès des Communautés européennes, à Secrétaire Général du Conseil des Communautés Européennes, Bruxelles, le 4 Novembre 1976, 5/1682/76 (ALIM) (GCD 46). (Received through mail via an archivist)

European Parliament (received through email via an archivist, unless stated otherwise)

Bulletins 1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978, List of Members, Committee on Development and Cooperation.

Nota van de Heer Dewulf inzake de bevoegdheden van de nieuwe Commissie voor ontwikkeling en samenwerking," 18.3.1973, PE 32.892.

Rules of Procedure December 1972, *Office for Official Publications of the European Communities*.

- *Debates, questions and working documents*

Sitting of Wednesday, 4 July, 1973, '18. Strengthening the EP's budgetary powers.'

Sitting of Thursday, 13 December 1973, '9. Joint Debate on Mr Dewulf's report and Oral Question No 134/73 with debate: Generalized tariff preference.'

Sitting of Wednesday, 30 April, 1975, '3. The Community's overall development cooperation policy.'

Sitting of Thursday, 16 October 1975, '10. Regulations on the applications of generalized tariff preferences.'

Sitting of Tuesday, 11 October 1977, '4. Regulations relating to the application for 1978 of the generalized tariff preferences.'

Sitting of Thursday, 13 May 1976, '5. Oral Question with debate: Relations between Uruguay and the Community.'

Sitting of Wednesday, 15 January, 1975, '7. Oral Questions with debate: The Community's attitude to South Africa.'

Sitting of Wednesday, 7 July, 1976, '14. Oral Question with debate: Violation of human rights in Argentina.'

Sitting of Thursday, 16 September 1976, '8. Oral Question with debate: Common Agricultural Policy and the Third World.'

Sitting of Wednesday 10 March 1976, 'Oral questions with debate: Decision-making procedure of the Council.'

Sitting of Wednesday, 4 July 1973, '18. Strengthening the budgetary powers of the EP.'

Written Question No. 297/73 by Mr. Van der Hek, PE 33.904/E.

Written Question No. 294/73 by Mr. Van der Hek, Subject: Community policy towards the developing countries, PE 33.904/E.

Written Question No. 294/73 by Mr. Van der Hek, Subject: Community policy towards the developing countries, PE 33.904/E.

Written Question No.169/74 by Mr. Patijn and Mr. Van der Hek, 'subject: European Development Fund and Surinam', PE 37.262/E.

Question écrite nr. 194/77 de M. Broeksz, Objet: Contrôle de l'usage de l'aide alimentaire, PE 48.730/Fr.

- *Adopted Resolutions in Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ).*

Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>.

OJ, No C 106, 6 December 1973, English edition, Answer Written Question no 294/73 by Mr. Van der Hek to the Commission of the European Communities, Subject: Community policy towards the developing countries.

OJ C 113/7, Antwoord schriftelijke vraag Nr. 169/74 van de heren Patijn en van der Hek aan de Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen (5 augustus 1974).

OJ, No C 183/69, 1. 8. 77, 'Skimmed-milk powder and butteroil food-aid programmes.'

OJ, No C 266/47, 7.11.77, "Resolution on renewing the arrangements for the reduction of import charges on beef and veal products, originating in the ACP states."

OJ, No C 87/6, 17.10.1973, "Resolution on the measures taken by the Council to improve its decision-making."

OJ, No C 87/6, 17.10.1973, "Tabling of and vote on a motion for a Resolution."

- *Committee on Development and Cooperation meetings*

Minutes of the meeting held on Friday, 29 October 1976, PE/XII/PV/76-11.

Minutes of the meeting of 29 March and 30 March 1977 in Rome, PE/PV/XI/77-7.

Minutes of the meeting held on Wednesday, 16 February 1977, PE/XI/PV/77-3.

Minutes of the meeting held on 29 March 1977, PE/PV/XI/77-7.

Working Documents, 1976-1977, 6 July 1976, Document 208/76, Report on the regulation of the rules for the supply of skimmed-milk powder as food aid.

Draft Report on on trade relations between the European Community and the countries of the African continent, 21.3.1977, PE 45.547/res./rev.

1977-1978, Document 47/77, Report Report on on trade relations between the European Community and the countries of the African continent, 29.4.1977, PE 45.547/fin.

Ad Hoc Working Party for examining the Procedures and Working Methods of the European Parliament, Working document on the functioning of the parliamentary Committees, 15.12.1973, PE.

Netherlands Parliament, Second Chamber Proceedings

1972-1973 12 383, Kabinetsformatie, Nr. 2, Hoofdstuk I Programmagegevens betrekking hebbend op de grondslag van het beleid.

1973-1974, 12600 V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1974, Nr. 2, Hoofdstuk V, Memorie van Toelichting.

1974-1975, 13 100 V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1975, Nr. 13, Memorie van Toelichting.

1975-1976, 13 600V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het jaar 1976, Nr. 42, Memorandum inzake het Ontwikkelingsbeleid van de EEG.

1976-1977, 14 100 V, Buitenlandse Zaken, Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1977, Nr. 2, Memorie van Toelichting.

Miscellaneous

Meetings of the Heads of State or Government (Summit), "Statement from the Paris Summit," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Paris, 19-21, October 1972, No. 10. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities, 6. Retrieved from: <http://aei.pitt.edu/1919/>.

Bulletin du Centre international d'informations, "L'association des pays d'outre mer au marché commun", numéro spécial, 15.01.1957, pp. 1-5 and Brochure, "Les Français devant les problèmes d'outre-mer", Archives historiques de l'Union européenne. Both retrieved from <https://www.cvce.eu/s/cc>. Accessed: April 16, 2018.