

PALACKÝ UNIVERSITY
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DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY
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**COMPARATION OF THE CZECH AND SWEDISH
FOREIGN POLICY FOCUSING ON AFGHANISTAN**

MASTER THESIS

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OLOMOUC 2011

I declare in lieu of oath that I wrote this thesis myself. All information derived from the work of others has been acknowledged in the text and a list of references is given.

Olomouc 2011

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signature

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TÉMA ČESKY:

Komparace české a švédské zahraniční politiky se zaměřením na Afghánistán

NÁZEV ANGLICKY:

Comparison of the Czech and Swedish Foreign Policy focusing on Afghanistan

VEDOUcí PRÁCE:

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ZÁSADY PRO VYPRACOVÁNÍ:

Obsahem práce bude analýza a komparace zahraniční politiky České republiky a Švédska ve vztahu k Afghánistánu. Cílem bude porovnání multilaterálních a bilaterálních aktivit ČR a Švédska v Afghánistánu a míry angažmá v jednotlivých oblastech. Prvotní bude analýza zahraniční politiky obou zemí (hlavní znaky a faktory) s důrazem na strategické a bezpečnostní zájmy, která bude sloužit jako východisko pro vysvětlení charakteru činnosti ČR a Švédska v Afghánistánu.

Práce by měla přinést odpovědi na otázky:

- 1) Jaké jsou aktivity České Republiky a Švédska v Afghánistánu? Konkrétně: S kým? (EU, NATO, OSN); Kolik? (počet personálu, objem investic); Jaký je charakter aktivit? (vojenská/civilní činnost, preventivní/preemptivní akce)
- 2) Jsou aktivity ČR a Švédska v souladu s jejich zahraničněpolitickou kulturou, národními, strategickými a bezpečnostními zájmy?

Práce bude pracovat s teorií E. Kirschner o bezpečnostní a strategické kultuře států, kdy první představuje preference států pro používání preventivních nebo preemptivních akcí, unilateralismu nebo multilateralismu, ozbrojené síly nebo diplomacie, a vojenských nebo civilních instrumentů. Strategickou kulturu poté tvoří národní tradice, hodnoty a postoje vůči vnějšímu prostředí.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis investigates the Czech and Swedish presence in Afghanistan with a special attention to motives for intervention, priorities and character of their activities, in form of multilateral cooperation with NATO, EU and the UN, and in other ways (development assistance, contributions to Afghan funds etc.). All this information is confronted with their foreign policy nature, respectively, the security and strategy culture. For this purpose a detailed analysis of the Czech and Swedish foreign policy is involved, examining core attributes and approaches, and key factors, which influenced its current character - ideologies, prejudices and discourses. Additionally analysis of major threats to the countries and strategies, how Sweden and the CZ address the threats is included. Studies developed by various foreign policy research centres serve as a theoretical background, which is set against statements presented in the official governmental documents or representatives' speeches. Some similarities have been found in the Czech and Sweden approach to Afghanistan such as stressing security as the most important motive for their presence and consequently NATO as a crucial actor in their engagement, which is surprising in the case of Sweden regarding neutrality as an important feature of its foreign policy. On the contrary several basic differences have been discovered in the Czech and Swedish involvement in Afghanistan, although similar priorities and strategies can be found in the official governmental documents. To sum up, no essential disagreements have been found between the Czech and Swedish strategy culture and their presence in Afghanistan, although the engagement in Afghanistan brought a new impulse to their foreign politics – a further shift from neutrality to solidarity and international responsibility in the Swedish case and move towards development and reconstruction activities in case of the Czech Republic.

KEY WORDS

Afghanistan, the Czech Republic, Sweden, foreign policy, strategy culture, security culture, NATO, EU, UN, ISAF, PRT

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
CBRND	Chemical, Biologic, Radiological and Nuclear Defence
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CNTF	Counter Narcotics Trust Fund
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CZ	Czech Republic
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Commission
EDF	European development fund
EOD	explosive ordinance disposal
ESDP	European Security and Defence policy
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Operation
HDI	Human Development Index
HPI	Human Poverty Index
ICR	Senior Civilian Representative
IEDs	improvised explosive devices
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KAIA	Kabul International Airport
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LOFTA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MCCA	Mine action coordination centre
NATO	North Alliance Treaty Organisation
NGO's	Non-Government Organisations
NSP	National Solidarity Program
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OMLT	Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSYOP	NATO psychological operations
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMC	Swedish Mission Council
SOG	special orientation group of military police
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO	United Nation Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNWOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women
US	United States
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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1. INTRODUCTION

Stabilisation of Afghanistan has been a priority for a large number of countries for the last decade. Many countries have joined a common effort aimed at strengthening the security situation of Afghanistan in order to prevent this country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. Presence in Afghanistan is perceived as an essential part of a common counter-terrorism initiative targeted at prevention of spread of terrorism, which jeopardises international peace.

Since there are many international organisations presented, in Afghanistan, the national states have various possibilities, how to contribute to the stabilisation of this country considering their national interests and character of security and strategic culture.

E. Kirschner explains the security culture as a preference of a state to use unilateralism or multilateralism, enforcement strategy or persuasive strategy, military or civil instruments, preventive actions or pre-emptive actions to deal with security tasks. On the contrary the strategic culture includes national traditions, values, behaviour and attitudes, which influence the state foreign policy. Both of these principles can be described as static, long-term and stable, and formed particularly by special events (crisis, wars) during the history.¹

Both the Czech Republic and Sweden are participating in the stabilisation process of Afghanistan alongside their western allies, who are particularly jeopardized by the terroristic threat. Their presence in Afghanistan is for this reason presented as a national and security priority and both countries concentrate an unusually considerable amount of efforts and state resources on this country, compared with other foreign policy actions. Since the threat is due to the location of Afghanistan rather indirect, the question is, why the engagement is so emphasized, and if it is even still in accordance with their security and strategy culture.

¹ EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STŘÍLECKÝ, V., 2010: 54-55.

Besides strong engagement in Afghanistan, Sweden and the CZ have more common attributes. Both are European states with small population and also the EU members. If the commons are reflected in their security and foreign policy strategy would reveal a comparison of Swedish and Czech activities in Afghanistan (preference to cooperate with NATO, EU and the UN and amount of development aid and other contributions), which will examine basic similarities and differences.

The central goal of the thesis is to analyse, compare and explain activities of the Czech Republic and Sweden in Afghanistan and bring answer to the questions:

- A) *What is the character of the Czech Republic's and Sweden's engagement in Afghanistan? More particularly: With whom? (EU, NATO, and UN or solo); How many/how much? (Number of personnel deployed/money invested); What kind of activities? (military/civilian)*

- B) *Is the engagement in accordance with their national interests, security and strategic culture?*

The first step, while pursuing the second targets, is the analysis of the Czech and Swedish foreign policy, including the process of formation and main features, which influenced its contemporary character, and also ideologies, discourses and prejudices, which still more and less affect foreign policy decisions. Additionally major threats as they are perceived by the Czech Republic and Sweden are examined together with strategies aimed at coping with the threats in order to gain a complex picture of the security and strategy culture of both countries. Outcomes are further used a) for explanation of the Czech and Swedish motives for engagement in Afghanistan; b) for examination, if the Czech and Swedish engagement in Afghanistan is in accordance with their national interests, security and strategic culture, which will be reached by confrontation of the outcomes with actual activities in Afghanistan.

While examining Czech and Swedish presence in Afghanistan, a special attention is paid to motives, priorities, strategies and actual activities conducted in cooperation

with multilateral organisations (particularly NATO, the EU, and the UN) and other cooperation (development and humanitarian assistance, cooperation with the Afghan government etc.). The countries priorities are revealed also by looking at indicators such as costs and number of deployed personnel. Outcomes are used for comparison of the Czech and Sweden activities.

The thesis is divided into two main chapters. The first chapter deals with the foreign policy, security and strategy culture of the CZ and Sweden. Second chapter is aimed at the countries' activities in Afghanistan. Analysis of the Afghan conflict, main actors and current security, political and socioeconomic situation is also involved in order to explain character and motives of the Czech and Swedish engagement.

There were two main methods of work with data used in the thesis in order to meet the objectives: a research-compilation approach and analytical approach. First method was used to collect information from many different sources such as official government documents and government's ministries internet pages, foreign policy studies by research institutes, and articles. Method of analysis was used to interpret the collected data and draw the conclusions.

The thesis is largely based on two types of sources. First, foreign policy studies published by research institutes such as Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Razumkov Centre, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Institute of International Relations, EUROPEUM etc, which were used as a theoretical background and subsequently confronted with primary sources - key Czech and Swedish government documents (Conceptions of the Foreign Policy and Security Strategies, Statements, Annual Reports) and information provided at the official government pages or materials published by government ministries. Data used for analysis was also collected from various international organisations official pages and reports (Amnesty international, the UN Security Council, OECD, NATO, EU).

It was particularly difficult to find the same data about Czech and Swedish contributions to Afghanistan since each Swedish and Czech governments provide data in a different way. The Czech government publishes annual foreign policy reports with an exact overview of all foreign policy costs and other contributions. The Czech ministry of defence as well publicizes detailed data about all international operations. On the other hand a summary budget is missing together with Afghanistan development assistance's overview including bilateral and multilateral contributions. In case of Sweden, the summary budget is published, but exact information about military staff deployment to Afghanistan and detailed military budget is missing. This fact complicates comparison of the Czech and Swedish engagement in Afghanistan and precise conclusions. Despite this, some conclusions could be drawn and they are presented in the text due to utilization of the OECD's and Afghan government's statistics, which both provide the same data for both countries.

2. CZECH AND SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

2.1. SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY

2.1.1. Main factors, features, ideologies, discourses, and prejudices

Swedish foreign policy was shaped by historical events, and also the geographical location and character of the neighbourhood played a crucial role. In a Max Jacobson's view, geography and also historical experience are the main determinants of Sweden's security thinking.²

After Gustav Vasa established Sweden as an independent state in 1523, Sweden had to deal with an extremely conflicting neighbourhood. Sweden not only defended its statehood, but also evolved from a negligible country on the periphery of Europe to dominant a Baltic power and an important European actor. In the 17th Century Sweden ruled over a large territory with domains in contemporary Estonia, Latvia, Finland and North Germany.

The gold era was followed by power decay due to the Great Northern War and Napoleons War, when Sweden lost all its dominations. Moreover the existence of the Sweden state started to be threatened by a new power in the region – Russia. Sweden was no more able to confront Russia directly and adopted a foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment as a main instrument of the country protection. The status of Sweden was determined by a formula “*non-alignment in peacetime, neutrality in war time*”³.

Sweden practised the policy of neutralism during the Cold War, but after the Soviet Union collapsed, the situation changed. Crucial step in the Swedish foreign policy was accession to the EU in 1995, this brought mitigation in the policy of neutralism. Sweden began to be more active in the international relations and took a part in the creation of the European security system. On the other hand neutralism and non-

² Ibid.

³PASHKOV, M., 2009: 41

alignment still remain the main factors that influence contemporary foreign policy in Sweden.

A) Neutralism

Sweden started to perform a policy of neutralism as a response to growth of Russian political power in the Baltic region. This was accompanied with a loss of a large territory at the expense of Sweden. Sweden was neutral during the First and Second World War and also the Cold War⁴. Furthermore, there has been also no conflict with its neighbouring countries for the last two hundred years. Direct neighbourhood with democratic countries what creates a feeling of a protected country is another reason why neutrality started to be a deep-rooted feature of the Swedish society. According to the sociological research held in Sweden in 1999, many of respondents believe that “*since the military nonalignment has enabled Sweden to avoid war in the past, it can do the same even in the future*”.⁵

Approach to the neutrality has started to change in recent history in relation to the shift in the security environment due to the deepening globalisation. Number of Swedish soldiers has been deployed in the conflict areas to promote peace and stability⁶ and Sweden has made an active step to strengthen its security, mainly in cooperation with various organisations (the EU, the UN, NATO, the Nordic council). This is the reason, why the concept of Swedish neutralism started to be questionable. Due to the especially peacemaking character of Swedish deployment⁷, some experts started to talk about *peace-loving neutrality*⁸, but the most of them acknowledge that the Swedish neutralism has changed in the 1990s and according to Tapani Vaahtoranta even sooner –

⁴ Neutrality in the Cold war is speculative – explained below.

⁵ VAAHTORANTA, T.; FORSBERG, T., 2000: 7.

⁶ Swedish diplomat, D.Hammarskjold, elected UN Secretary General after World War II, was among the first to initiate use of international peacekeeping contingents for crisis management in different regions of the world. Sweden participated in the first UN peacekeeping operation, where UN acted as a mediator in the Palestine conflict in 1948. Source: The National Swedish Museums of Military History.

⁷ Under the auspices of the UN, Swedish military observers, police and military personal took part in missions and peace-building operations in the Middle East, in African countries, in India and Pakistan, in Kosovo, in East Timor and Georgia, in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sierra Leone. Sweden also played important role in EU operations and missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kinshasa, Congo, Aceh province and Palestine territories, etc.

⁸ PASHKOV, M., 2009

during the Cold War, when Sweden was rather pro-Western neutral.⁹ Although the pro-Western neutrality might be questionable, it is obvious that the Swedish neutralism undergone many changes since 18th century – from protecting isolation and strict neutrality during the First and the Second World War, through active participation in the UN peacekeeping operations to the participation in the NATO missions.

In the 1990s Swedish neutrality was reformulated by the Carl Bildt's Government that defined the neutrality as: "*non-participation in military alliances, with the aim of making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity.*"¹⁰ This change was followed by another in 2009, when Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) announced that "*if another EU or Nordic country were to suffer a disaster or an attack we will not be passive.*"¹¹ According to the Minister of the Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt, "*Sweden is determined to contribute to solving common tasks and to take an active role to expand joint responsibility.*"¹² The last argument proves that solidarity was straightened at the expense of neutrality.

A) Non-alignment

Entry to the EU is a demonstration of concession in the Swedish traditional policies of neutralism and non-alignment. The main motives for the EU membership were political and economical, but Sweden commits itself also to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union. Sweden is one of the most active EU countries in relation to the CFSP and emphasizes importance of enhancing common security and strengthening the EU crisis management capability, all under one condition – process of bolstering security policy of the EU should not endanger its status of military non-alignment. Sweden does not support creation of the common EU defence, which should be based on the volunteering principle: "*Membership of the EU means that Sweden is part of a political alliance, where the Member States do not have defence obligations in*

⁹ Sweden emphasised its neutral position and criticized the both sides of the conflict, but the evidences suggest, that Sweden was prepared to cooperate with NATO in case that Russia would launched an attack against Sweden. Source: VAAHTORANTA, T.; FORSBERG, T., 2000.

¹⁰ LASSINANTTI, G., 1999: 90.

¹¹ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe's new task*.

¹² Ibid.

*relation to each other but take collective responsibility for Europe's security.*¹³ At the Helsinki summit Sweden declared that a clear line between crisis management and territorial defence should be upheld.¹⁴

In conclusion it might be said that Sweden abandoned the strict neutralism and non-alignment, and only the militarily non-aligned remained, which is also questionable in relation to the active participation in the CFSP. But the Swedish government maintains that „*there is no contradiction with Swedish activity in the CFSP and their military non-alignment.*“¹⁵ Another argument, which undermines the military non-aligned, is a Swedish partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It must be emphasized that Sweden is not a full member of NATO, but Swedish political scene is not united in the view of NATO membership (will be discussed later).

B) Solidarity

After entry to the EU and establishment of cooperation with NATO, Swedish security policy started to be based primary on a principle of solidarity, which replaced neutrality as a key concept of the foreign policy of Sweden.¹⁶ One of the most striking features of the Swedish official foreign policy, it was formulated in the Defence Bill in 2009, as declaration of solidarity. It states that “*Sweden’s security is built in solidarity*”¹⁷ This principle is also visible in Swedish strong engagement in the development activities¹⁸, peace-making, strive for human rights, etc. Solidarity is also used as a motive for involvement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations, which should be understood as an expression of solidarity with people and countries, instead of as neglecting the non-alignment.

¹³ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Peace support operations*.

¹⁴ VAAHTORANTA, T.; FORSBERG, T., 2000.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ CHRISTIANSSON, M., 2010.

¹⁷ Proposition, 2008/09:140, p. 9.

¹⁸ Sweden is one of the biggest donor in relation to the GDP

2.1.2. Security Policy

According to a report on Swedish defence policy, Sweden does not face any direct threat, because the security situation of Sweden has been strengthened through enlargement of the EU and continued integration in Europe and the development of the Euro-Atlantic security system.¹⁹

On the other hand Sweden is aware of new challenges, which have arisen after the Cold War due to deepening globalization. „*In a globalised world, foreign policy risks know no borders. Threats that originate far away from Sweden can be just as palpable as those that are rooted in our geographic proximity.*“²⁰

After the fall of the Soviet Union Sweden began to develop a foreign policy system to be able to deal with new and uncertain threats as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, failing states, which provide a fertile ground to organised crime, threats caused by climate change, spread of infection (pandemic) and also a new phenomenon – risks coming from “flows” and increasing independence between people and countries due to continuing globalization. Swedish Foreign Policy Minister Carl Bildt emphasizes the importance of strengthening the “flow security”, specifically data security, fight against drug smuggling, terrorisms, human trafficking.²¹ Sweden also places large importance to the main traffic routes security. Prove is a current mission in the Gulf of Aden aimed at protection of shipping lanes. Energy security, particularly security of energy supplies, is another issue of high importance.²²

2.1.2.1. Security Strategy

Sweden adapted a specific strategy to deal with potential security threats. The integrated approach contains activities aimed at prevention, this involves efforts to promote democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Sweden activities to enhance the security include participation in peace-building and security-building

¹⁹ Government Office of Sweden, 2003, *Summary...*

²⁰ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Statement...* p. 9.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe's new task.*

operations that are wide range with increasing tendency and are conducted mainly as a part of multilateral efforts.²³

Sweden supports the implementation of so called *plug-and-play concept* for ensuring stability in the conflict area, which is based on connection of both military activities to promote security and activities aimed at democracy strengthening, state building and peace keeping, etc. That means combination of military and civilian operation, first predominately under the auspices of NATO and the EU and secondly mainly within the UN and the EU. Sweden emphasizes preservation of organisations' traditional role and its further deepening instead of development of new areas of activities, which the organisations have no or very poor experience with. Sweden is especially "worried by tendencies to make NATO more responsible also for the civilian parts of stability- and state-building operations, because experience shows that this will not work."²⁴ Sweden rather encourages the strengthening of cooperation between the UN, EU and NATO that would ensure complexity and effectiveness of the conflict management. According to the Ministry of European Affairs B. Ohlsson "a combination of the EU's civilian skills and NATO's military acumen represents the future for European, and, by extension, Swedish security."²⁵

Sweden pursues a complex approach also when dealing with the threat of terrorism. Sweden considers the threat of terrorism as very seriously. *The National Strategy to meet the threat of terrorism* worked out in the year 2008, it contains various activities ranging from adoption of the UN conventions to active participation in international operations, particularly under the auspices of the UN and the EU. Additionally, Sweden considers also the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as greatly important.²⁶

Swedish strong involvement in environmental and development issues is also indirectly connected with the security area. Sweden believes that risk of regional conflicts and terrorism can be reduced by targeting its root causes, especially through development aid and actions dealing with environmental problems.

²³ Sweden is currently participating in peace support in Afghanistan, Kosovo and off the coast of Somalia.

²⁴ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Common Challenges Ahead*.

²⁵ O'Dwyer, G., 2009.

²⁶ Government Office of Sweden, 2008, *National strategy...*

According to the Swedish Minister of foreign affairs it is important to take measures that meet environmental problems. These include soil depletion, climate change and water shortages, which may cause increase of poverty and social inequality, and consequently increase terrorism. Furthermore, poverty and high unemployment can create frustration and tension in societies, and may result in destabilisation.²⁷ For this reason Sweden pays a strong attention to development activities, which are aimed at strengthening national economies and creation of employment for young people, education, promotion of democracy and human rights, reduction of segregation, discrimination and social exclusion and gender equality.

Multilateral cooperation - collective security

The defence policy of Sweden, a rather small state with limited resources, is depending on cooperation with partners. Sweden emphasizes the need to strengthen collective security in the way as it was stated in the Article V²⁸ of the NATO treaty. In this spirit Sweden primary relies on Nordic and European partners in the security area. The EU is considered as the most important future security provider in the world.²⁹

Sweden also cooperates closely with NATO and the UN. Sweden believes that the UN activities involving peace making operations and creation of join instruments for safeguarding peace are essential to face the potential danger all around the world.³⁰

Sweden acknowledges potential in a development of the Nordic region cooperation within the Nordic Council, where cooperation in security and defence policy started to be discussed more intensively, including a possibility of establishment of a Scandinavian military-political alliance, and a new project to deepen cooperation in this area has been launched.³¹ Finally, Sweden cooperates in the area of security with Western European Union, where Sweden is an observer.

²⁷ Ministry of Defence of Sweden, 2006.

²⁸ Article 5 is at the basis of a fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked. This is the principle of collective defence.

²⁹ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe's new task*.

³⁰ *Ibid*.

³¹ The five members of the Nordic Council signed a joint programme report "Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy" at a meeting of foreign ministers in Oslo held in February 2009.

A) European Union (EU)

According to the main Swedish documents and statements the EU is the most important guarantor of the Swedish security. The strengthening the role of the EU in the world and enhancing its security capacity is one of the Swedish priorities.

„It is natural and desirable to work to ensure that the EU’s voice is heard more clearly throughout the world. This is the best way to safeguard our values and national interests in an increasingly complex world.“³²

Sweden is a strong advocate of the Lisbon Treaty, which “*strengthens the collective responsibility of EU Member States for Europe’s security*”³³. Sweden stresses especially the role of the EU in the area of the conflict management, primarily the civilian activities that include police training and mentoring, reforming a judicial system, building a local administration, etc. Sweden also strives for increase of the capacity of staff for the EU missions and development of its own military capabilities. Sweden itself participated in all EU crisis management missions and its Armed Forces form the basis of the newly-established Nordic Battlegroup. The reason is explained in the Foreign Affairs Minister’s speech: “*We (the EU members) cannot always rely on the Americans and think that they could resolve Europe’s problems. Europe must stand on its own feet.*”³⁴ On the other hand Sweden acknowledges importance of cooperation of the EU with NATO, which “*presents a pillar of the European security*”³⁵ and supports further development and deepening of the transatlantic ties.

Apart from the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Defence and Security Policy, Sweden considers enlargement of the EU as “*the foremost future instrument for safeguarding peace in our part of the world*”³⁶. Sweden promotes an integration process in the Western Balkans (especially Croatia); Turkey that “*will define*

³² Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Statement...*

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe’s...*

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

*the regional and global role of the European Union in the future*³⁷; and Icelandic membership that would “*broaden the EU's strategic horizons and opportunities*”³⁸; as well as the EU Neighbourhood policy, whereas the Eastern Partnership is a major importance.

Other areas of cooperation with the EU with a particular Swedish interest are human rights, democracy, gender equality, trade, investment, the environment and fight against terrorism. Particularly strengthening the EU measures aimed against the terrorist threat was one of the priorities of the Swedish EU presidency in 2009. Sweden perceives the EU as crucial for ensuring sustainable globalisation and flow security.³⁹

B) United Nation (UN)

The UN is viewed as fundamental to safeguard peace and security internationally. It has a crucial role in providing legitimacy to conflict management (essential condition for deploying Swedish personnel into international operations) and is fundamental in ensuring development assistance coordination and efficiency. On the other hand Sweden emphasizes the need to reform the UN Security Council, “*which should reflect the future rather than remain stuck in 1945.*”⁴⁰ The UN is also of fundamental importance to protection of international law and human rights. Sweden supports especially the UN activities aimed at disarmament, protection of human rights, particularly of women and children, and development and humanitarian assistance.

C) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Although Sweden supports military cooperation under the EU auspices, Swedish representatives are aware that the EU could hardly replace NATO if the region faced a serious threat and NATO therefore remains “*a key player for European security and integration as well as for international crisis management*”⁴¹ On the other hand Sweden highlights that the role of NATO in the crisis management is not exclusive and an

³⁷ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Statement ...*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe's...*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Government Office of Sweden, 2008, *Swedish security policy...*

involvement of the UN and EU is also important, especially in parts of the world where the NATO intentions are met with suspicion and people does not support its activities.⁴²

It is important to emphasize that Sweden is not a full member of the Alliance and its cooperation with NATO is based on the policy of military non-alignment. Sweden concretely participates in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)⁴³ and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), including engagement in NATO peace-support operations in Balkan and Afghanistan. Through the PfP, Sweden is develops and strengthens its crisis management capability to be able to take a part in peace-keeping operations. Swedish soldiers attend PfP exercises, courses, and seminars to improve coordination efficiency.

Sweden-NATO cooperation is strong and although “*the partnership works well and there are opportunities to further expansion*”⁴⁴, some Swedish politicians and experts believe that Sweden full NATO membership would be even more favourable and that militarily non-aligned to some extend affects the foreign policy of Sweden. The political parties’ opinion is divided on this issue and even the coalition partners of a ruling minority government are not united. The People’s Party Liberals and the Moderate Rally Party are pro-NATO membership, but believe that “*there is no hurry in realising the membership.*”⁴⁵ The remaining parties - the Centre Party and the Christian-Democrats are opposed and undecided (but they see cooperation with NATO as positive and do not want to exclude the possibility of NATO-membership). Opposition (the Greens, the Left Party, and the Social Democrats) oppose joining the Alliance.

The NATO supporters argue that Sweden has a lot more soldiers under NATO command than under the U.N. flag and the coordination of actions would be easier, if Sweden were a full member. Moreover, since Sweden recognises NATO as the most important body for ensuring security, taking part in the NATO discussions should be a priority. Sweden shares common values and interests with the NATO members, which almost all of the Swedish neighbours belong to. On the other hand joining NATO could jeopardise Swedish relations with Russia, which behaviour is considered as a very

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Forum for information exchange and security policy dialogue between NATO and its partner countries.

⁴⁴ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe’s...*

⁴⁵ O'Dwyer, G., 2009.

unaccountable, and bring destabilisation into the region that Sweden would like to avoid.⁴⁶ Even if this apprehension would be finally considered as a baseless, one essential obstacle to the NATO membership remains – a public opinion. Military non-alignment is supported by the majority of public⁴⁷ and since the government traditionally follows the public opinion, it seems that the rooted sense for neutralism is the biggest barrier to NATO membership.

⁴⁶ LASSINANTTI, G., 1999.

⁴⁷ In November 1998, NATO membership was supported by 25 percent of Swedes; in 2009 33 percent of respondents supported and 50 percent opposed Sweden entry into NATO. Source The Local, 2011.

2.2. CZECH FOREIGN POLICY

There are many factors that have shaped contemporary Czech foreign policy and moreover led to creation of several discourses and prejudice, which more and less affect Czech foreign policy till today. The most influential modifiers have been historical events, geopolitics and geography, which all together have had a significant impact not only on foreign policy but also security and defence policy.

2.2.1. Main factors, features, ideologies, discourses, and prejudices

A) Historical, geopolitical and geographical factors

Existence of the Czech state was threatened for several centuries due to location in direct or close proximity of Great Powers with imperialistic ambitions (The Austrian Empire, Germany and Russia). Creation of the independent state in the 1918 was a success, but historical events and geopolitical situation caused that the new country was not able to ensure its security neither in cooperation with western European countries nor with its Slavic neighbours in the Central and Southeast Europe and the Czech Republic fell into German's occupation.

Sense of threat and vulnerability, the Munich agreement and "betrayal" of western countries all together led to inclination of the country to the Soviet Union in the post-war period, followed by forced inclusion to the Soviet Union sphere of influence, which persisted till 1989.

Historical experiences have been reflected in main foreign and security policy priorities, which were set after formation of the independent Czech state in 1993. For example an involuntary inclusion into the eastern bloc led to strong inclination to the "West" after 1989. The major foreign policy objective was *return to Europe*, including reestablishment of cooperation with Western countries and liberalisation of society.⁴⁸ A fundamental goal was ensuring security and prosperity of the state by entering western

⁴⁸DRULÁK in KOŘAN, M, 2010: 373.

alliances and integrations, primarily NATO and EU, which was fulfilled in the 1999 and 2004.

Historical experience gave a rise to several prejudices and discourses, which more or less affected the Czech foreign policy thinking and making. According to Petr Drulák there are two general prejudices - *north-western* and the *south-eastern*, which are completed and modified by several specific prejudices - *Anti-Russian*, *Pro-Israel*, *Pro-Tibetan*, *Anti-Chinese*. The *north-western prejudice* is constituted by the admiration of the countries to the west and to the north, while the *south-eastern prejudice* is based on feeling of superiority and fear of the countries to the east and to the south. The general prejudices have been development during long history; the specific ones are related to the era of communism and can be labelled as *anti-communistic*.⁴⁹

Negative experience with Russia and especially collective discrediting and rejection of Russia after the military invasion in the 1968 resulted in a very strong *Anti-Russian prejudice*. Among Czech society and politicians there is a deep mistrust toward Russia and inclination to relate contemporary Russia with the Soviet Union. Direct results of the prejudice can be found in the Czech foreign policy activities, e.g. strong support for the Missile defence creation.

Similarly, negative historical experience with Germany and traditional hostility towards Germans (Czech identity was shaped in opposition to German people) led to formation of an *Anti-German prejudice*. In contrast with the Anti-Russian one, the Anti-German prejudice was weekend in the last years as a result of German support of the Czech *return to the Europe* and intensive trade exchange (Germany is the biggest Czech export partner). Another proof of good contemporary relations is Czech and German cooperation in Afghanistan.

Besides the NATO and the EU membership the new democratic government had more priorities after 1993 – democratisation and liberalisation of economy, society and foreign policy. There are two different approaches presented in the Czech foreign policy – *economic liberalism* and *moral universalism*.⁵⁰ First supports free flow of goods, service and money and associates this flows with freedom, peace and prosperity as a

⁴⁹DRULÁK in KOŘAN, M., 2010.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

result. Advocates of *economic liberalism* (the contemporary president Václav Klaus, members of the Civic Democratic Party) are sceptical about foreign policy activities and activities of international organisations aimed to promotion of democracy and human rights. On the other hand the *Moral liberals* (e.g. the former Czech president Václav Havel) argue that, in order to achieve peace and freedom, democracy and human rights have to be supported, particularly through actions of both state foreign policy and international organisations.⁵¹

Economic liberalism can be contra productive in case that the economic interest is superior to peace-making, democracy promoting, developing and other activities. For example Czech development assistance tends to prioritize countries, whose political and economic stability is a key for our economic interests (e.g. Moldova, Serbia) at the expense of less developed and unstable countries. This indicates to a pragmatic character of the Czech foreign policy, where economical interests are superior to solidarity and security tasks. Both O. Horký and Z. Hubálek criticize a lack of government's interests and low commitment to the development agenda and consider the development assistance as a weakness of the Czech foreign policy.⁵²⁵³ On the other hand, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Schwarzenberg, the CZ has a respectable record in human rights and democracy promotion⁵⁴ that is one of the cornerstones of Czech foreign policy. It can be admitted that Czech activities in this filed are undermined by the *anti-communism prejudice*, what can be seen in focusing efforts predominantly on communist regimes (Cuba, Cambodia, Belorussia, China, Iran), while ignoring human rights violation in the Middle East, in Sub-Saharan Africa, etc.

B) Political factors – between atlanticism and continentalism

There are two main ideologies adopted by Czech political parties in relation to Czech security and prosperity – *atlanticism* and *continentalism*. *Atlanticism* emphasizes fundamental role of the UK, NATO and the US for Czech security, whether *continentalism* stresses the EU and cooperation with France and Benelux as the most

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 374.

⁵² Ibid, p. 348.

⁵³ The Czech Republic did not fulfil a 1.17% quote of share of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the GNI in 2010, which is the aid quantity target agreed at the EU level. On the other hand the CZ is the biggest contributor to the development assistance of the "new" European Union Member States.
⁵⁴ Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, *Celý Balkán by měl vstoupit do EU*.

significant. Both ideologies are influenced by the *north-western prejudice*, which determines Czech inclination to western values. Combination of these two ideologies forms *an internationalist ideology*, which considers the US and NATO as a guarantee of Czech security and Germany and the EU as a guarantee of Czech prosperity.⁵⁵

In the 1990th there was an *internationalist consensus* on the form and aims of Czech foreign policy (support of the NATO and the EU membership), but the internationalist's consensus fell apart with accession to NATO and the EU.⁵⁶ The *Atlanticists*, represented by the Civic Democratic Party, started to doubt and kind of "sabotaged" cooperation with the EU (rejection of the EU constitutional treaty, disparaging of EU military capabilities⁵⁷), on the contrary the *Continentalists*, represented by the Czech Social Democratic Party criticise foreign policy of the US. Despite these disputes, the Czech foreign policy priorities are stable; because both parties follow the foreign policy line once they are at govern.⁵⁸

The EU or NATO?

The official Czech foreign policy papers stress NATO and the US as a major guarantee of country's security and cooperation with NATO and the EU as the highest priority. In security issues there is an obvious inclination towards NATO security structures and rather mistrust and unwillingness to security structures of the EU.⁵⁹ Leaning to NATO can be explained by the *atlantists ideology* and the *anti-communist prejudice* - the US as the winner of the Cold War is seen as the only international player to balance Russia. On the other hand according to J. Eichler, the CZ is closer to the EU in relation of its security and strategy culture.⁶⁰

The Czech Republic and other European countries have common historical experiences with two world wars, which is reflected in deep-rooted fear of war and

⁵⁵ DRULÁK in KOŘAN, M., 2010.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 374.

⁵⁷ The Civic Democratic Party considers the USA as the main guarantee of the Czech Republic and pursues for deepening of bilateral. On the contrary it doubts unclear and unsure procedures of the EU and criticizes tendencies of strengthening the CFSP on the expense of weakening the transatlantic ties. Source: EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 55.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

rejection of war.⁶¹ All Czech political parties advocate peaceful conflict solution and even the Civic Democratic Party, supporter of *atlanticism*, favours long-lasting preventive political and economical activities and rejects pre-emptive attacks.⁶² The Czech Republic is therefore closer to the EU strategy for conflict resolution that prefers preventive actions and civil instruments, than to the NATO's and US's one, which use military instruments and do not avoid pre-emptive actions.

To sum up, although the Czech Republic should prefer cooperation with the EU due to similar security and strategy culture; tendencies to favour cooperation with NATO in security issues still prevail. On the other hand cooperation with the EU is on the rise, especially after the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the 1990th, which was followed by rise of anti-American mood among the Czech society and led to strengthening of the orientation to the EU. According to the Ladislav Cabada, the Czech Republic currently seeks for balance between NATO and EU in security policy.⁶³

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 61.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ CABADA, L.; WEISOVÁ, Š., 2006: p. 158.

2.2.2. Security Policy

Position of the CZ in the central Europe, surrounded by democratic countries, strengthens security of the state and according to security analyzes, the likelihood of a massive military attack against the country is in a foreseeable future low. On the other hand there are new threats on a rise as a consequence of deepening globalization. Geographical distance is no longer a limiting factor and according to the Security Strategy of the CZ, an increasing influence of non state actors, their involvement in organised crime and terrorism in combination with WMD proliferation is the main factor, which jeopardizes international security and thus security of the CZ. The country connects main threats with negative impacts of globalization; apart from terrorism and organised crime it is also climate changes and deterioration of environment, pandemic diseases, a growing imbalance between the North and South, which supports the increase of radicalization and extremism, or migration. The CZ also observes with concern worsening of security environment outside the Euro-Atlantic area, especially local and regional conflicts, which erode international stability.⁶⁴

The White Paper on Defence published in 2011 characterises the main security threats as difficult to localize, hardly predictable, predominately non-state and supra-national. Globalization is mostly seen as a root cause. Apart from processes with risk potential mentioned in other state documents, the White Paper newly identifies weakening of institutions and global and regional cooperation, and ambitions of new global actors as endangering, and cyber attacks, disruption of critical infrastructure (communication, transport and energy), and mass illegal migration as significant threats to the state security.

Considering threat coming from state actors, there is an influence of the *Anti-Communism* prejudice presented. Most of the politicians look at Russia with more or less cautions or suspect. Russia is perceived as a threat especially in relation to energy security, which is together with energy self-sufficiency considered as crucial not only in relation to security, but also to prosperity and state sovereignty; using the former Prime Minister's words: "*Our ability to ensure prosperity and security to our citizens, but also*

⁶⁴Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, *Security...*

*better life and peace in the world is closely linked with energy sufficiency.*⁶⁵ On the other hand cooperation with Russia is viewed as important for strengthening economical competitiveness of the EU and possibly also for strengthening of global security and stability. In this context, the Czech Republic considers a rising potential of Asian economies as a threat and cooperation of the EU, the US and Russia will be needful to balance new Asian powers. The former Prime Minister M. Topolánek calls this strategic cooperation as a *concert of powers*.⁶⁶

2.2.2.1. Security Strategy

The Czech Republic prefers peace conflict solutions including diplomatic, political and non-violent activities. Use of military force is according to the Czech Security Strategy the uttermost solution and should be in accordance with the international law and the principles of the UN Charter. Military means can be use “*within the framework of its commitments to and solidarity with its allies, and to protect vital of the country and, if necessary, also some of its strategic interests.*”⁶⁷

Promotion of security interests of the Czech Republic are closely linked to development activities and promotion of human rights, which are superior to military actions.⁶⁸ The Czech Republic believes that poverty, unemployment, discrimination, human rights violation and lack of democracy can let to radicalization of society and instability, which can consequently jeopardize international peace. For this reason the country promotes development assistance and transformational cooperation, which has an indirect impact on global security, conflict prevention, terrorism prevention and also environmental security and is therefore an important instrument of Czech security policy.⁶⁹ The Czech Republic also advocates a principle *development through economy* and besides development assistance supports an economical cooperation in order to strengthen peace and stability. Key stimuli are promotion of sustainable economic growth and integration of developing countries into international trade.

⁶⁵ Government of the Czech Republic, 2008, *Strategic Challenges...*

⁶⁶ DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010.

⁶⁷ Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003.

⁶⁸ Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, 2011.

⁶⁹ HLAVÁČ in Úřad vlády České republiky, 2007.

The Czech Republic recognizes transformational assistance as an instrument for promoting human rights and democratic value, which are cornerstones of Czech foreign policy.⁷⁰ The Czech Republic gets an advantage from its historical experience with totalitarian regime while promoting rule of law, human rights and freedoms, assisting by democratic reforms, and strengthening democratic institutions and civil society structures. The transformational assistance is provided to two types of states: countries with totalitarian regimes, where the process of transformation has not yet begun (Belorussia, Cuba) and countries, which are being in the process of transformation (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo).

The Czech Republic stresses a complex attitude involving development and transformational assistance (promotion of democracy and human rights) while coping with terrorism and WMD proliferation. The main causes of radicalization and inclination towards terrorism are according to the White Paper an unequal economical development, excessive population growth, weak states unable to ensure rule of law, deteriorating environment and starvation. For this reason, beside participation in the international fight against terrorist, prevention in form of development assistance is crucial.⁷¹ Development aid is an inseparable part of a broader concept of combating terrorism, because it helps to mitigate economical and social differences among people in different parts of the world. Apart from development and transformational assistance, deployment of military and civilian staff is needed to ensure political stability, security and rule of law.

Multilateral cooperation and the collective security

The CZ prefers multilateral activities within international organizations and a collective approach to security. Participation in the NATO and EU multinational operations are of important strategic interests and the country also acknowledges an important role of the UN in maintaining global stability.⁷² Membership in the EU and NATO strengthens security situation of the CZ. The country supports further enlargement of both these organisations, because “*with the process of enlargement the*

⁷⁰ Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, 2011.

⁷¹ Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2011.

⁷² Ibid.

*Czech Republic is becoming an inland surrounded by the member states, what significantly enhances its security.*⁷³ On the other hand, the country is aware of broader dimensions of security issues and new types of threats, which requires close partnership and common efforts. This is the reason why the CZ is involved in strengthening international stability, particularly as a part of multilateral efforts.⁷⁴ The country prefers multilateral ways to face security problems and put a strong emphasis on international cooperation while combating terrorism and international organised crime. Activities of the CZ within international organisation in the security area also involve WMD non-proliferation, arms control and international disarmament, participation in failed state conflict resolution, conflict prevention and stabilization, promotion of democracy, human rights and freedoms.

The NATO and the EU membership is the most important instrument to meet national interests and fundamental for the security of the Czech Republic. The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic stresses that *“preserving stability and security through NATO- and EU-led operations is the most effective way of minimising negative effects of threats to security interest of the Czech Republic. Active participation in such operations is therefore essential for safeguarding security interests of the Czech Republic.”*⁷⁵

The Czech Republic also supports activities of the UN, which is important for ensuring international security, but admits that the direct relevance of the UN (and also OBSE) is for the Czech foreign policy minor than in case of NATO and the EU.⁷⁶

The Czech Republic considers deepening cooperation between the EU and NATO as a priority in order to increase efficiency of actions aiming at strengthening security and stability and avoiding of rivalry or duplicity. According to the former Prime Minister J. Paroubek *“developing of the transatlantic link is the key issue of the Czech membership in NATO and the EU”*⁷⁷ and the former Minister of Defence A. Vondra adds *“Both US and the EU face the same global security challenges and together we can tackle them more successfully”*.⁷⁸ Close transatlantic cooperation and common approach

⁷³ Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2003.

⁷⁴ Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2003.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Univerzita obrany, Ústav operačně zaktických studií, 2008: p. 144.

⁷⁷ EurActiv, 2006.

⁷⁸ Government of the Czech Republic, 2008, *Foreign policy...*

is particularly crucial in relation to the third countries in the Middle East, and to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Russia.⁷⁹

A) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The Czech Republic recognizes the alliance with NATO as a cornerstone of Czech security policy.⁸⁰ Contemporary cooperation focuses mainly on activities aimed at combating the new global threats, i.e. fight against terrorism, organised crime and the WMD's proliferation. In relation to this task the CZ gives a high importance to implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept and NATO Summit Declarations in order to ensure the defence capabilities and military assets necessary to manage new asymmetrical threats.⁸¹

The Czech Republic supports building of the NATO forces and has committed itself to promote further development of its army forces including modernisation and specialisation, especially in the field of protection against the WMD, and military healthcare, which is complementary due to its specialisation in injuries caused by chemical or bacteriologic weapons.⁸² The Czech Republic is regarded as a lead nation in the Chemical, Biologic, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence.⁸³ Effort to maintain the country's prominent international position in the area of the CBRN defence means that development of capabilities is of high priority. Contingent of the CBRN specialist have been deployed especially in Afghanistan in order to support the ISAF operation.⁸⁴

Also the Military medical service has a long-standing historical tradition and enjoys wide recognition. The NATO military operations in general represent the most likely deployment of the Czech Armed Forces.⁸⁵

The Czech Republic is also an advocate of the NATO Open Door Policy. It stresses an importance of cooperation with the EU and other individual countries, and is also in favour of its continued enlargement. Regarding the last point, the Czech Republic

⁷⁹Portál českého předsednictví Radě EU, 2009

⁸⁰ Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, 2010.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² HLAVÁČ in Úřad vlády České republiky, 2007.

⁸³ Czech Ministry of Defence, 2009: p. 55.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 63.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 26.

supports particularly accession of the Western Balkan countries.⁸⁶ NATO and the US military presence in Europe are also perceived as a protection against the Russian threat.

B) European Union (EU)

According to J. Eichler, the EU has “*the most comprehensive preventive approach to the security threats and how to cope them*”⁸⁷ Since the security and strategy culture of the Czech Republic gave a rise of preference to use preventive and civil instruments while supporting security, cooperation with the EU in the security area should be one of the highest priorities of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is actively involved in the CFSP as well as the ESDP and supports further development of these policies and its military and civilian capacities. On the other hand the Czech Republic tends to be rather euro-sceptic in relation to the further institutionalization of the CSFD and the ESDP. However, there is a consensus on Czech political scene, that it is necessary to strengthen position of the EU in the global scale.⁸⁸

The Czech Republic gives a special significance to both of military and non-military activities aimed at promotion of democracy and human rights to enhance security and peace, but it also stresses the importance of the EU while facing the security threats. The Czech Republic supports activities of the EU against WMD proliferation. To eliminate the danger of a WMD attack, the EU should pursue its policy aimed at cooperation with the Mediterranean area and also try to limit dictatorial regimes in the region.⁸⁹ The Czech Republic emphasizes need of bigger involvement of the EU in the WMD proliferation especially after the US abandoned the plan to build the Anti-missile defence shield in Europe. A requirement of stronger position of the EU towards Russia and creation of common strategy is also associated with this task. Considering Russia, the Czech Republic also emphasizes need of strengthening energy policy of the EU as a necessity for future existence of Europe. In this respect, cooperation with other states in

⁸⁶ Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, 2010.

⁸⁷ EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010: 61.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 46.

⁸⁹ Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR: *Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky na léta 2003-2006* [online], ověřeno k 18. 4. 2011, <stary.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=80&downid=43>

the EU's neighbourhood is crucial and strong and the well development Neighbourhood policy should be the highest importance.⁹⁰

Enlargement of the EU is in the Czech view "*a mean of spreading freedom, stability and free trade.*"⁹¹ The Czech Republic is strongly in favour of enlargement and argues that any geographical differences should be done. The Czech Republic supports especially an accession of the Balkan states, a region which is of strategic importance for the country in the economic area. It also advocates accession of Turkey, which is a key partner in the area of energy security and other security tasks.⁹²

C) United Nations (UN)

The Czech Republic acknowledges the significant contribution of the UN to international peace and security and supports its activities in this area by engagement in the conflict prevention and settlement, post-conflict stabilisation, expansion of the principles of democracy and good governance, the strengthening of respect for human rights, the fight against terrorism, crime and narcotic drugs, economic renewal and development cooperation.⁹³

The Czech Republic recognises an important role of the UN as "*an institutional bolt of international cooperation and the main guarantee of international security.*"⁹⁴ On the other hand the CZ acknowledges that the UN is sometimes not able to react promptly and therefore "*not fully prepared to meet present-day challenges*"⁹⁵ as a consequence of an inappropriate organizational structure. To maintain an effective role of the UN is for this reason one of the long-term interests of the Czech Republic and the country supports efforts aimed at reforming of the UN.⁹⁶ "*The Czech Republic believes that a fairer representation in the UN Security Council will contribute to a better functioning of the international system as a whole.*"⁹⁷

⁹⁰ Government of the Czech Republic, 2008, *Strategic Challenges...*

⁹¹ Nekvapil, 2011.

⁹² Government of the Czech Republic, 2008, *Foreign policy...*

⁹³ Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Koncepce ...*

⁹⁴ Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, 2011: 9.

⁹⁵ Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2003.

⁹⁶ HLAVÁČ in Úřad vlády České republiky, 2007.

⁹⁷ Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, 2011: 9.

3. SWEDISH AND CZECH PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

3.1. AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW

3.1.1. History of the Conflict and Main Multilateral Contributors

Afghanistan was due to its strategic position a subject of interests of many World Powers starting in the era of colonialism, up to the Soviet invasion in 1979. One of consequences was a long lasting instability of the country, which enabled the islamist movement Taliban to gain a control over the country in early 90th. The group, which consists largely of ethnic Pashtuns, captured Kabul in 1996 and established a repressive regime according to the Sharia law. Implementation of rigid fundamentalist rules, systemic discrimination against women, and minority groups, and mass production of opium raised concerns of the international community, but the Taliban regime became a centre of attention mainly after 11. 9. 2001 by providing a safe haven for al-Qaeda and the group's leader, Osama bin Laden. This was an impulse to an US-led international intervention – the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which started on the 7 October 2001, based on the Security Council Resolution 1368. The priorities were to eliminate terrorist activities in the country, destroy terrorist training camps, capture al-Qaeda leaders and remove the Taliban from power. The UN conference in Bonn initiated further steps, which involved political reconstruction, and presidential and National Assembly elections followed by establishment of an Afghan Interim Authority and appointment of Hamid Karzai a new President of the country. In 2001 the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with the task to maintain security necessary for development and reconstruction of the country. In 2003 NATO took over the responsibility for the ISAF operation. Another important contributor in Afghanistan is the EU, which launched a Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) in 2007.

A) United Nations (UN)

The UN is the major coordinator of the post conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan. Crucial role plays the UN mission UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), which ensures efficiency and coherency of the development activities based on the principle of close cooperation and coordination with the Afghan Government institutions on national and sub-national level, aimed at implementation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). A special attention is aimed at counter-corruption measures, mainly support of the Afghan Government's anti-corruption agenda. The UNAMA is also active in the area of human rights protection and is engaged in monitoring, documentation and data gathering.

There are number UN agencies and programmes active in Afghanistan, addressing various problems. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) focuses on crisis prevention and reconstruction, poverty reduction and good governance. The United Nation Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) pursues industrial and economic development. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) copes with the Afghan refugees issue and assists the conflict refugee and flood-affected Afghans' returns, and human rights' problematic is targeted by Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The World Food Programme (WFP) take measures to meet a food shortfall and ensure the food-security. The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) pursues improvement of education field in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and, among others, it is finalizing the National Education Support Strategy for Afghanistan. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) is aimed community development and empowerment and reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure. Gender task is in the competence of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (UNWOMEN) and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MCCA) support demining activities and provides the victim's assistance. Wide activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) include advisory, surveys, monitoring, etc and the drug problematic is also

covered by the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF). Finally, the World Health Organisation (WHO) provides news, information and statistics.

B) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO is the key body in ensuring the security in Afghanistan, which is provided mainly through International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The mission task is divided into three areas – ensuring security, reconstruction and support of the government to straighten its institutions, all in a close cooperation with the Afghan government. In the security field the ISAF cooperate with the Afghan National Security Forces and assist with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) reforms. Reconstruction and development is conducted mainly through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and ISAF also provides security and enables the UN and other international and private aid organizations and authorities to carry out development operations and reconstructions. Current mission strength is 132,457 personnel provided by 48 nations.⁹⁸

The PRT program was launched in November 2002 and came under the control of the ISAF in 2003. PRTs can be characterized as military-civilian efforts to secure and rebuild Afghanistan at provincial and district-level. PRTs consist of civilian and military components. The military personnel task is to guarantee a safe environment for the reconstruction and to assist local authorities in maintaining security in the province. PRTs help to create suitable conditions for social, economic and political development and support transition of power to the local and central authorities. Currently there are 28 PRTs in Afghanistan.

ISAF cooperates with the US-led military operation in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - Afghanistan, the joint U.S., UK and Afghan operation. Aim of the mission is protection of inhabitants and international staff in the country by fighting against terrorist and anti-government groups and training for both the Afghan army and police. The mission also performs the counter-narcotics activities, which are one of the main sources of funding for the terrorist groups.

⁹⁸ISAF, 2011, *Key Facts and Figures*.

C) European Union (EU)

The EU is one of the most important contributors in the Afghanistan post conflict reconstruction and stabilisation and a key donor. The EU stresses a complexity of the engagement in Afghanistan, i.e. „*political and civilian efforts must go hand in hand with security measures and developments on the ground.*”⁹⁹ The EU commitment is therefore broad, involving “*strengthening state capacity and institutions to promote good governance, human rights and efficient public administration, together with support of the Afghan government to assume full responsibility; and strengthening the rule of law, i.e. by assisting in the building of a civilian police force through EUPOL and also supporting the implementation of the National Justice Programme.*”¹⁰⁰

According to the European Commission Report the Commission together with the member States committed around EUR 8 billion in the years 2002 – 2010 and about EUR 610 million was donated through the Delegation in the years 2007 – 2010. Most of the aid has been allocated into strategic sectors such as governance, health and rural development, but also social protection, mine action and support for regional cooperation. Large amount of the EU assistance between 2002 and 2009 (approximately 30 %) was directed to the multi-donor trust funds (e.g. the EU is the largest donor of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA)).¹⁰¹ Other key activity aimed at security promotion is the Police Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan), which target is to support the reform of the Afghan police, implementation of the National Police Strategy and development of anti-corruption capacities, and so contribute to the strengthening of democracy, rule of law and respect of the human and women rights.¹⁰² Current mission strength is 296 international staff and 176 local staff (Dated to January 2011) consisting of police officers and experts, who provide counselling, mentoring and training. At present time EUPOL operates in 13 provinces and newly pursue its target through the "City police and justice programme".

⁹⁹ Council of the European Union, 2009: 2.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁰¹ Council of the European Union, 2010.

¹⁰² Council of the European Union, 2011.

3.1.2. Current Situation in Afghanistan

Years of conflicts and instability made Afghanistan one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world with persistently very low values of socioeconomic indicators (see Table 1). For this reason Afghanistan is classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC).¹⁰³ Situation is especially critical in a health sector¹⁰⁴, but corruption, education¹⁰⁵ and gender¹⁰⁶ are also problematic. A dangerous consequence of widespread poverty, malnutrition and unemployment is opium production, here Afghanistan is the world largest producer of opium and hashish. To improve the situation activities aimed to social and economic development, reconstruction, and reform of Afghan state institutions are needed. But the reconstruction process and development efforts are constantly being undermined by increasing insecurity in the country.

Safety and rule of law are an important condition of development of the country, but security situation in Afghanistan is continuously critical and deteriorating. Increasing number of civilian deaths, armed opposition group attacks, bomb attacks and high number of suicide attacks are clear evidence (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). The most critical situation is in the south and southeast of the country, where Taliban and other government-opposition groups is concentrated (see Map 1), there has been a marked deterioration in security also in the north in 2010.¹⁰⁷

Civilians are the most affected subjects of the conflict, not only through the number of deaths and injuries¹⁰⁸, but also through displacement¹⁰⁹, damage and

¹⁰³ The Human Development Index (HDI) value is 0.349, which placed the country to 155th position of total 169.

¹⁰⁴ Afghanistan has one of the world's worst health indicators, specifically an average life expectancy of 44 years; one of the highest maternal mortality and infant mortality rate in the World (see Table 1).

¹⁰⁵ Although education has undergone a big progress since the fall of the Taliban, 1/3 of Afghans are estimated to be illiterate, and there are still significant gender and provincial disparities. Source: Report

¹⁰⁶ Besides gender disparities in education, widespread child and forced marriage and restrictions on women movement were also documented. Source: General Assembly Security Council, United Nations, 2010.

¹⁰⁷ Human Rights Watch, 2011.

¹⁰⁸ The UN annual report shows that number of civilian deaths and injuries is increasing every year. Especially assassinations and the killing of women and children have risen dramatically. About 9000 civilians have been killed in the past four years, the most by suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to the UN report 75 % of casualties in 2010 were caused by the Taliban the Anti-Government groups. Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2011.

destruction to property, loss of livelihood and lack of access to essential services such as health care, food and education.¹¹⁰ Insecure environment had an extremely negative effect on the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate, whereas the demand for humanitarian assistance has risen due to the ongoing conflict. International development and the United Nations agencies and its staff members are also a frequent target of attacks. The UN noted that the targeted killing of government officials, aid workers, and civilians perceived to be supportive of the Afghan government or NATO-led foreign forces became an alarming trend (see Figure 3).

¹⁰⁹ The UN reported about 3 million Afghan refugees and 240 thousands of displaced persons dated to 2008 and more than 100 thousands persons displaced due to the conflict in 2010.

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011.

¹¹⁰ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2011.

3.2. SWEDEN IN AFGHANISTAN

3.2.1. Motives, strategy and priorities

Swedish cooperation with Afghanistan has deep roots. Sweden has been present in the country in the form of development assistance cooperation for some 30 years¹¹¹ and Swedish soldiers were involved in conflict and post-conflict resolution in Afghanistan during the 1980's and 1990's.

Swedish engagement in Afghanistan in the form of humanitarian and development aid and peacemaking activities is presented as “*an important example of its solidarity with people and countries threatened by conflict, oppression and poverty.*”¹¹² Sweden also presents its engagement in Afghanistan as a long-lasting endeavour to promote security and stability in the region and so contribute to collective security.¹¹³ Sweden is worried about the terrorist threat coming from Afghanistan and the possibility of the conflict spreading to neighbourhood countries with nuclear capacity. Both terrorism and conflict escalation would jeopardise global security, which Sweden, presented as a responsible international player and member of the international community, takes a joint responsibility for.¹¹⁴ Sweden's interest in helping to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan is thus, a combination of several motives comprising solidarity with the Afghan people (humanitarianism), responsibility for global security and finally national security. Solidarity is predominantly focused on women and human rights.

According to Robert Egnell and Ångström there are more hidden reasons for Swedish participation in Afghanistan. They claim that through engagement Sweden would like to appear as a credible and active international security actor (as can also be found in the speech above), which helps Sweden to follow its security and political interests.¹¹⁵ For example, by joining a mission vital to US interests, Sweden creates a

¹¹¹ *Sweden in Afghanistan.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Sweden has been involved in Afghanistan for a long time due to Sweden's own interest to promote security and stability in the region and globally, and of our interest in contributing to a collective security.

¹¹⁴ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe's new task.*

¹¹⁵ EGNELL, R, 2010.

situation of mutual expectations, which is very important for its security since Sweden is not a NATO member.

Sweden's involvement in Afghanistan is based on a *holistic approach*, which combines civilian and military operations, development assistance, diplomatic efforts and trade, in order to strengthen security and development in Afghanistan. Marginalization of the extremists' forces is, according to the government, the most important task for the international community and for the Swedish involvement.¹¹⁶ Due to its limited resources contributes mainly through international efforts in which Sweden is often seen as an engaged and constructive actor, assisting in the development of new strategies and approaches towards the stabilisation of Afghanistan.¹¹⁷ (Sweden currently provides a civilian adviser to the NATO Secretary-General, a civilian adviser to the EU Special Representative in Afghanistan, and a political advisor to the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Afghanistan.)

Sweden stresses that a coordinated international approach to Afghanistan and the fulfilment of the EU Action Plan, UN resolutions and the ISAF mandate is central for its efforts. Apart from NATO, EU and the UN, Sweden cooperates with various NGO's and works in partnership with the other Nordic countries.

*„Afghanization and self-sufficiency for the Afghan community is seen as the only way to succeed in Afghanistan.“¹¹⁸ A prior target is therefore the strengthening of the Afghan state and its ability to *maintain stability and security, democracy and Human rights and offer its residents opportunities to improve their living conditions and an equitable and sustainable development.*”, which all Sweden strives for. Sweden believes that security, good governance and development are mutually dependent and only pursuing all together can lead to stability. The Swedish commitment is therefore broad, based on the *plug-and-play concept*.*

In the security area Sweden emphasized the “*need to fight against international terrorism, but also to preserve stability in South and Central Asia and reduce the risk of conflict spreading in this tense region.*” Priority is also given to the reduction of the illegal drug dealing that affects western countries and constitutes a source of finance for

¹¹⁶ Government Office of Sweden, 2009, *Strategy*.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

anti-government groups, which together with corruption presents “*the main obstacle to process stability, democracy, and reduce suffering and poverty in Afghanistan and hinder humanitarian aid.*”¹¹⁹ Security maintenance is therefore a crucial task for the Swedish presence in Afghanistan and involves military and civilian police personnel deployment within the EU and NATO operations, assignment of experts to international organisations (the UN and the EU) to promote synergies between security-building and other operations, Afghan security force training, contributions to trust funds for improving security such as the ANA trust fund, and development assistance.

Political dialogue is another important instrument for promotion of good governance and human rights with a special emphasis on women rights, which stands in the centre of Swedish diplomatic, civil and development efforts. Other areas of central Swedish interest are education, and private sector development.

Considering geographical location, most Swedish activities are targeted at the country’s northern areas, where the Swedish-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and other Swedish personnel are located. Sweden also channels most of their funds (25 % of the development assistance) directly to places in northern Afghanistan, where Swedish soldiers are stationed.

In 2010, a total \$287.5 million were allocated in Afghanistan, targeted at peace promotion and joint efforts in a proportion 1:2.¹²⁰ According to government documents in 2010 \$161.08 million was spent on military activities, whereas development activities were supported with \$121.16 million (see Table 2). Dominance of military expenditures is a novelty - the Swedish Government Propositions show that the budget for humanitarian aid always received more money than the military budget until 2009.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Proposition 2010/11:35, p. 20.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ It is important to keep in mind that the budget for the mission is taken from a general pool for international missions, where the spending figures are approximated.

3.2.2. Multilateral Cooperation

A) NATO

Sweden has been participating in the ISAF operation since the end of 2001 in order to fulfil the central motives of its engagement in Afghanistan: strengthening of global security and so its own security. Beside the security motive Sweden put a strong emphasis on humanitarian reasons for the cooperation with NATO that can be seen in the Governmental Proposition stating: *“In order to improve the living conditions of the Afghans, aid missions are needed. In order to facilitate these, there is need of security, it is a necessary condition.”*¹²² Security together with solidarity with Afghans is mentioned frequently in the Proposals and also the Defence Minister of Foreign Affairs proclaimed *“the civilian population, security in the region, and our own security”* as the main reasons for involvement.¹²³

The Swedish contribution involves military personnel, but Sweden put a special emphasis on the character of its cooperation with NATO as being a part of the civilian operation ISAF only, not of the OEF combat mission. Apart from military deployment Sweden also provides civilian personnel, administration of the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif and financial support to NATO funds (see Table 3). All together this makes Sweden one of the largest of the non-NATO contributors to the ISAF.¹²⁴

Personnel deployment

Swedish military personnel have been supporting the ISAF mission since the end of 2001, when an intelligence battalion of 45 persons was sent to Kabul to effect surveillance. The contingent was strengthened in 2002 with the CIMIC unit (terminated in 2004), which tasked with both military and civilian activities.

In 2003 Sweden increased the number of troops available for the ISAF mission to 150 in order to support the British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan with a military observer team and an armed rapid response force to assist the other international units in the region and help to increase security. Strengthening of the Swedish commitment is also demonstrated by the deployment of the OMLT, whose task is to

¹²² Proposition 2006/07:83, p. 10.

¹²³ TOLGFORS, S, 2009.

¹²⁴ ISAF, 2011, Troop numbers and contributions.

train and mentor the Afghan army at corps and brigade level, and also assist in battles in conflict regions of southern Afghanistan.

In 2005 the Swedish commitment was expanded to 375 troops in connection to taking over responsibility for the PRT in the capitol of the Balkh province Mazar-e-Sharif starting in 2006.

A 2007 Governmental proposition further expanded the Swedish contingent in Afghanistan, which was expanded to 600 and the final troop increase (in both military and civilian personnel) to a total of 855 was approved in 2008 and prolonged to the end of 2010.

After 2010 the Swedish approach changed, as demonstrated by the decrease in the number of available personnel to be deployed to the ISAF to a maximum of 500 and the proclamation that the Swedish future commitment would have a more civilian nature with a stress on development activities and the process of “Afghanization”.¹²⁵ The decrease is rather a formal act, as the number of Swedish soldiers in Afghanistan has actually always been around 500 (see Table 4).

The current contribution involves the PRT Mazar-e-Sharif, the OMLT, a military and civilian personnel deployment to the ISAF Head Quarters and the National Intelligence Cell in Kabul, and a personnel support to the Norwegian field hospital at the Forward Support Base. All operations take place in northern Afghanistan.

PRT Mazar-e-Sharif

The PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, capitol of the Balkh province, represents the priority of the Swedish activities within ISAF and utilises the majority of Swedish personnel and resources provided to ISAF. Commanding its own PRT is very important since Sweden acknowledges its positive influence on the reconstruction and stabilisation of Afghanistan and by leading the PRT “*Sweden contributes to increasing security in the north and thereby facilitates the growth of peace and democracy in Afghanistan.*”¹²⁶ Stabilisation is supported mainly through assistance in security sector reform, mediation and conflict resolution via diplomacy and cooperation with local authorities. Important is also cooperation with UNAMA, headed by Swede Staffan de Mistura, which has a

¹²⁵ Proposition 2010/11:35, p. 20.

¹²⁶ Proposition 2006/07:83, p. 15.

regional office based in Mazar-e-Sharif. The PRT's main task is to support Afghan ownership including training and mentoring the Afghan National Army, and cooperation with International NGOs and Afghan NGOs, which is ensured by the PRT's civil components.

The PRT is formed by military and civilian parts, which cooperate closely. The civilian part of the PRT is represented by a Senior Civilian Representative (ICR), supported by political and development advisers, and other civilian specialists, who deal with political affairs, governance, development, civilian police, the penitentiary system and counter-narcotics.

The ICR has a central role in political dialogue and development cooperation due to his responsibility for development activities coordination and contact with Afghan authorities. The military part is represented by Commander, Military Observations Teams and units for service in guarding and safe escort, but no CIMIC units are represented. The number of personnel is approximately 150-200 military and 8-15 civil staff.¹²⁷

Primacy is given especially to the civilian aspect of the PRT, which is stressed in the Swedish government propositions. On the contrary the Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif in Balkh suggested that the Swedish-led PRT should change name to PST (Provincial Security Team), since, in his opinion, the reconstruction provided is minimal.¹²⁸ It is true that the PRT does not perform humanitarian work, but the civil components investigate needs and direct finances through the embassy in Kabul. Most of the development activities are thus conducted externally in close cooperation particularly with Afghan government and UN agencies, and Swedish and international NGO's. Spending on development in the PRT's territory constitutes about 20 per cent of long-term Swedish development assistance.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ ERONEN, O., 2008.

¹²⁸ LARSSON, K, 2008.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

B) EU

Sweden pursues both the strengthening of the EU role in Afghanistan and coordination of their activities in the country. In order to fulfil the second aim Sweden has deployed a Special Envoy (Ambassador Niclas Trouvé) to Afghanistan, follows the EU Action Plan as a key platform for its policy in Afghanistan, development assistance included, and is involved in the creation of the EU country strategy for Afghanistan (2007–2013). Strengthening of the EU engagement was a priority during the Swedish Presidency of the EU in 2009 and this endeavour is mentioned several times in the Swedish Governmental Proposals regarding its involvement in Afghanistan. Since the 2001 Government Proposition stresses participation of the majority of the EU members in Afghanistan, the Swedish engagement in this country can be even understood as a part of a wider response by the EU.

Cooperation with the EU is mainly on the platform of development assistance, and support of good governance and rule of law. Considering the first point Sweden closely cooperates with the EC, an essential donor to Afghanistan. The EC for example provided finances to Swedish governance projects in Mazar-e-Sharif. Good governance and rule of law are supported through the EU mission EUPOL, which is one of the most important instruments of Swedish commitment in this area. Swedish contribution to the EUPOL is broad, ranging from staff deployment to involvement in strategic management and financial funding (total cost in 2010 are estimated at \$3.84 million) Sweden is one of the main suppliers of personnel and currently provides 20 persons consisting of police officers, human rights advisers gender advisers, legal experts, logistics experts, IT professionals, etc¹³⁰ and during its EU Presidency Sweden advocated strongly an increase in the other Member States contributions.

C) UN

Sweden considers the role of the UN in Afghanistan as crucial due to its “*unparalleled competence and legitimacy*.”¹³¹ According to Sweden the UN represents the whole international community, which NATO, the EU and other organisations

¹³⁰ *Sweden in Afghanistan*.

¹³¹ Government Office of Sweden, 2008, *A national...*

represent only part of. Swedish activities in Afghanistan are based on the UN Charter and Resolutions, which authorize ISAF and other operations in Afghanistan and are an essential condition for placement of Swedish military units abroad, which would be “*unthinkable without it being supported by international law.*”¹³²

Sweden adjusts its policies in order to fulfil the UN declarations and recommendations. The UN conference in Bonn in 2001 was, according to the Government Proposition, the main reason for sending the first contingent under ISAF and further staff increase were also in reaction to the UN appeal.¹³³ Moreover, recommendation of the concept of PRT’s by the chairman of the UN Security Council is claimed to be an impulse to establishment of the Sweden PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif.¹³⁴

Swedish cooperation within the UN in Afghanistan involves contributions to UN funds, development projects, programs and agencies and support of the UNAMA mission by continual personnel deployment.

Sweden’s strong concern for human rights and especially women’s rights while providing development assistance is based on UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820 and 1612 on women’s participation, protection against violence and abuse and the rights of children to protection in armed conflicts.¹³⁵ Another area of close cooperation with the UN is counter-narcotics. Sweden donates to the CNTF, partly to fund projects aimed at encouraging farmers to find alternative sources of income. Sweden also contributes to the UNODC, which has according to Sweden a very important role in the fight against drugs in Afghanistan. According to Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) report, UNICEF is one of the three major channels of Swedish development (mainly in the field of education) and humanitarian assistance into Afghanistan. Others contributions are targeted at projects supporting security (MCCA), health and education (UNESCO), transport (UNOPS), Democratic governance and human rights (UNDP), humanitarian purposes (UNHCR), human rights United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), water and sanitation (UNICEF), human rights (OHCHR), economy and rural development (UNIDO).

¹³² Proposition 2003/04:71, p. 13.

¹³³ Proposition 2001/02:60.

¹³⁴ Proposition 2003/04:71.

¹³⁵ Government Office of Sweden, 2009, *Strategy*.

3.2.3. Development Assistance and Other Contributions

For some 30 years Sweden has been providing development assistance cooperation to Afghanistan, which is currently a major recipient of Swedish humanitarian and development aid. The amount of the bilateral assistance reached \$80 million for long-term development aid and about \$24 million for humanitarian purposes in 2010, and an estimated \$30 million was donated to multilateral organisations in order to support their activities in Afghanistan.¹³⁶ Considering location, about 25 % of long-term assistance is directed to northern Afghanistan (About \$20 million in 2010).

The volume of cooperation has gradually increased (see Table 5) and the form of cooperation has also evolved. According to the new strategy on development assistance to Afghanistan for the years 2009-2013, humanitarian support to Afghanistan should be increasingly replaced by long-term development assistance. A further change is the increase of the proportion of development assistance directed at Afghan national programmes to 50 per cent by the end of 2011 based on the Kabul Conference in July 2010 (the current proportion is 40 per cent). Sweden also stresses that the development activities should be based on Afghanistan's priorities and should meet the ANDS.¹³⁷

The main goal of Swedish assistance, which is in harmony with Afghan priorities and coordinated with the EU Action Plan, is that *“people living in poverty, particularly women and girls, enjoy better living conditions in a peaceful and democratic society.”*¹³⁸ Improving the living conditions of women is a major priority, which is based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820 and 1612. Swedish cooperation is therefore focused especially on areas of democracy and human rights, education, and development of the economy, particularly of the private sector. Sweden supports development of small businesses and, in the first instance, rural enterprises and participates in the road network's reconstruction. In the field of democracy and human rights, conflict management and effective measures against corruption are needed.¹³⁹ Activities in the education sector are broad-ranging from reconstruction and equipments supply to training. Further important areas are health, environment, and a special attention is given

¹³⁶ *Sweden in Afghanistan.*

¹³⁷ Government Office of Sweden, 2009, *Strategy.*

¹³⁸ *Sweden in Afghanistan. Development cooperation.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

to counter-narcotics activities, since an estimated 80 percent of the heroin that is sold in Sweden comes from Afghanistan.

A majority of the bilateral development assistance to Afghanistan is channelled through SIDA, which provides direct funding to various projects in the country and administrates a Local Fund for smaller interventions in the PRT Area.¹⁴⁰ SIDA cooperates with number of Swedish NGOs, which are strongly represented in Afghanistan. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) is one of the largest and most experienced organisations active in Afghanistan, particularly in the sector of education and health in rural areas. SCA also provides disability, rural development and agricultural programmes. Hand in Hand Afghanistan Organisation is a Swedish-Afghan NGO aiming at creation of job opportunities in rural areas of Afghanistan (more than two million jobs during the last 10 years). Others are the Swedish Pentecostal Mission Relief, Development Cooperation Agency Save the Children, and the Swedish Mission Council (SMC). Besides Swedish NGOs, the UN agencies and programmes, and the EU and NATO funds, Sweden provides funding to plenty of other international and Afghan organisations. (See Table 6)

Sweden contributes a considerable amount of finances directly to Afghan governmental funds and Afghan ministry budgets. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund is one of the three major aims of Swedish development cooperation and comprises about 3.5 % of total contributions.¹⁴¹ The fund is targeted at strengthening the Afghan government and to developing those programmes, which the government wants to prioritise. According to statistics provided by the Afghan Ministry of Finance a total of \$441 million have been committed to the Afghan Ministries, and amount of Swedish contributions gradually increases. The top five sectors according the amount of spent money were Education, Health, Science, Refugees and Repatriates and Public works (see Table 7). The top five sectors according to Afghan statistics are Security, Health, Social Protection, Infrastructure & Natural Resources, and Governance & Rule of Law.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Total costs in 2008 were 1.5 MUS\$. Source: LARSSON, K., 2008.

¹⁴¹ Government Office of Sweden, 2009, *Strategy*.

¹⁴² DAD Afghanistan

3.3. CZECH REPUBLIC IN AFGHANISTAN

3.3.1. Motives, strategy and priorities

“*Afghanistan is not only about Afghanistan, but it is about our future security.*”¹⁴³ Statements by the former Prime Minister Topolánek, and also official governmental documents present the Czech engagement in Afghanistan as a security priority and Czech representatives also tend to designate the Czech presence in Afghanistan as a national interest.

Identification of the Czech presence in Afghanistan as a national interest is opposed by Eichler, who claims that a national interest has to fulfil three important criteria - political, political-social and social consensus. Because most Czech citizens oppose the military engagement in Afghanistan, Eichler is persuaded that the Czech interest is not national, but governmental, and that it is related to an objective that has arisen in the CZ after 1989: to make the country a part of the *western world* with a priority on NATO and EU membership.

In the state representatives' speeches the Czech presence in Afghanistan is often characterized as an act of the Czech international commitment. In the discussion about the future of the Czech deployment in Afghanistan the Prime Minister Nečas declared that “*the Czech Republic acts as a responsible ally, who stands by its pledges to the international organisations.*”¹⁴⁴ Membership in international organisations, especially in NATO, evidently plays a crucial role in Czech engagement. The Czech Republic follows strictly the official NATO attitude towards Afghanistan, which can be seen in the statement by the Former Minister of Defence Parkanová, who proclaims that adoption of NATO resolution in Reykjavik is “*absolutely essential for Czech political decisions.*”¹⁴⁵ The Czech presence in Logar in the form of the PRT corresponds fully with priorities of NATO,¹⁴⁶ and is again considered as the act of a responsible ally and a foreign policy priority as it was stated in the former Minister of Defence speech: „the Czech PRT in Logar is in accordance with political-military ambitions of the Czech Republic and it is

¹⁴³ Government of the Czech Republic, 2009, *M. Topolánek...*

¹⁴⁴ MAŠKOVÁ, M; VOJTEK, M, 2011.

¹⁴⁵ EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010: 119.

¹⁴⁶ Government of the Czech Republic, 2010, *Návrh...*

an act of a joint responsibility for our security and security of our allies."¹⁴⁷ This proclamation is opposed by Eichler, who claims that the Czech presence in Afghanistan is more than a foreign policy priority and alliance commitment based on the logic of propriety and an endeavour "*to create a picture of the Czech Republic as a responsible western country, which takes an active part in a fulfilment of the alliance needs.*"¹⁴⁸

Apart from security concerns and endeavour to fulfil commitments to alliance, there is also a motive of an economic nature. „We are engaged in a province (Logar), where the biggest copper mine will be opened and we are expecting a profit."¹⁴⁹ This announcement proves that the economic motive has possibly played a role in the process of selection of a province where the Czech PRT to be established. On the other hand Eichler is persuaded that the economic motive was not primary for the Czech engagement in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁰

The Czech Republic has been engaged in Afghanistan from the very beginning of the conflict. In 2002 a Czech field hospital took a part in the ISAF humanitarian operation FINGAL and Czech soldiers also participated in the OEF mission.

The country focuses primarily on three main areas: state institution building, good governance and rule of law; reconstruction and development; and strengthening security, all in connection with the process of *afghanisation*. Transition of the responsibility for security and development tasks to the afghan government is presented as a central philosophy of the Czech engagement in Afghanistan.¹⁵¹

Considering location the CZ focuses mainly on provinces Logar, Paktika and Kabul, but also Wardak, Badakshan and Helmand.

The Czech Republic holds the opinion that stabilisation of Afghanistan cannot be achieved solely by military means or reconstruction and development, but both activities must be involved. The Czech PRT in the Logar province, combining security and development components, is for that reason a priority.

¹⁴⁷ EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010: 119.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 124.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 110.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2009, *PERSPEKTIVY...*

The CZ acknowledges the necessity of development and reconstruction of Afghanistan. On the other hand the country is aware of an enormous insecurity in Afghanistan, which complicates performance of the development assistance. For this reason Czech development cooperation takes place mainly through its PRT, where the military part assures the security of the civilian element.¹⁵² Other important activities involve long-term development assistance, humanitarian aid, bilateral contributions to Afghan governmental development programmes and the NATO, EU and UN funds.

Besides insecurity, the Czech Republic also considers distrust of the Afghan citizens towards foreigners, weak government, ethnic rivalry and severe geographical conditions as problematic obstruction for reconstruction activities.

¹⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2010: 13.

3.3.2. Multilateral Cooperation

A) NATO

According to the former Minister of Defence Parkanová „*the ISAF mission is of vital importance for both NATO and an international fight against terrorism. Failure of ISAF and NATO withdrawal would lead to transformation of Afghanistan into a safe heaven for terrorists. ISAF success is one of the key condition, how to avoid it.*“¹⁵³

Participation in the ISAF mission is for that reason the highest priority of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic has been engaged in all kinds of NATO operations in Afghanistan – in the military area by reconnaissance, participation in the live combat actions, and afghan police and army training, in the non-military area by engaging in psychological operations (PSYOP), and in the civil area by development and humanitarian aid, economy and infrastructure reconstruction and building of state institutions.

The contingent in Afghanistan is the largest Czech contingent abroad and the number of military personnel is constantly on the rise. In 2008 a parliamentary mandate permitted up to 415 soldiers to be deployed, in 2009 it was 580 and 720 soldiers were approved for the year 2011. But ISAF statistics show that the average number of personnel deployed to the ISAF operation has not exceeded 500 (see Table 4).

According to the Czech strategy the number of soldiers is going to decrease continuously after 2011 till the year 2014, when the process of afghanisation should be completed. On the other hand the Czech Republic promised that the contingent will stay as long as needed with regard to the Afghanistan government and the NATO allies.¹⁵⁴

Besides deploying personnel into the ISAF and the OEF, the Czech Republic also contributes regularly to NATO trust funds and initiatives, particularly the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund, the Post Operation Emergency Fund (POEF), the NRC Pilot Project Afghanistan (Counter Narcotics), and supplies the ISAF mission with 12 helicopters within the NATO Equipment Donation Programme (see Table 3 and Table 8).

¹⁵³ EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010: 119.

¹⁵⁴ MAŠKOVÁ, M; VOJTEK, M., 2011.

Personnel deployment

a) Enduring Freedom Operation

The Czech Republic is one of the four EU members that took part in the US-led operation Enduring Freedom, which cooperates closely with the ISAF mission. The country has been engaged in the OEF in three instances between the years 2004 -2009 (see Table 8). The 1st contingent was stationed at the Bagram airport, the 2nd at Kantahar airport and the 3rd on the south and the southeast of Afghanistan. The aim of the missions was to contribute to the internal security of the country by elimination of the enemy, particularly by special reconnaissance, and participation in the live combat actions.

b) ISAF

Peacekeeping Operation FINGAL was the first operation in Afghanistan, which the Czech Republic took a part in. The CZ supported the mission with two field hospitals and a field surgical team. The contingents operated predominantly in Kabul and Bagram providing medical service to ISAF members and humanitarian assistance for the people of Afghanistan.

In 2004 the CZ delegated a contingent comprised largely from an explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) detachment and a Meteo support group to NATO command headquarters in Kabul and the Kabul International Airport KAIA (see Table 8).

In April 2007 the contingent was replaced by a field hospital, and chemical detachment. The major tasks of the medical part were to provide health care to ISAF members and local inhabitants, formation of mobile teams of rapid intervention in case of mass casualties and training of the Afghan national army's medical personnel. The objective of the chemical detachment was monitoring of the chemical and biological situation including radiation. In April 2008 the Czech unit in Kabul was supplemented with the OMLT, which provided training to Afghani personnel to operate helicopters donated by the Czech Republic.

Between 2007 and 2008 a special orientation group of military police (SOG) was delegated to Helmand province to serve alongside British forces. The mission's task was to provide VIP security and hostage rescue.

Currently 4 Czech contingents are deployed in Afghanistan (for more information see Table 9):

- Task Force ISAF in Kabul represented by National Support Element responsible for administration, logistic and coordination of medical tasks; Military Police, Chemical and Biological Protection Unit; Air Mentoring Team; Field Surgical; and Representation at Kabul and Bagram headquarters,
- Helicopter Unit in Paktika Province providing transportation, observation and rescue missions,
- OMLT in Wardak province,
- Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar which task is to train and mentor a battalion of the Afghan National Army.

PRT Logar

Before the Czech Republic took over the responsibility for its own PRT in Logar, it used to support two other PRTs mainly by providing security and protection. Between 2005 and 2007 the Czech personnel cooperated with Danes and Germans within the PRT in Badakshan province. The second deployment was in 2008 in response to a request by the Netherlands to strengthen security in the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan province (see Table 8).

The Czech PRT in Logar was established on 19 March 2008 in order to make its engagement in the stabilisation and reconstruction process of Afghanistan more effective.¹⁵⁵ Military personnel constitute a majority in the PRT due to the lasting insecurity in Afghanistan, which determines the scale of engagement of the Ministry of defence in the PRT. The current military deployment is the largest in the ISAF mission.¹⁵⁶

The military part is represented by 293 soldiers, who are divided into protection, backup and reconnaissance units (including CIMIC/ PSYOPS), an EOD team and a medical team. The civilian team consist of 12 experts, who carry out particular

¹⁵⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2009, *PERSPEKTIVY...*

¹⁵⁶ Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic, 2009. *Vyhodnocení...*

developing and reconstruction programmes. Coordination between the military and civilian part is arranged by the CIMIC, who cooperates with the local government and inhabitants, but also conducts realisation of small projects.

The creation of the PRT enabled the Czech Republic to strengthen its development and reconstruction activities, the performance of which would be otherwise due to severe insecurity constraints. The presence of military staff and a “*relatively stable security situation allows effective and visible reconstruction*”¹⁵⁷

Development and reconstruction activities in the form of a long-term project and “QIPs” (Quick Impact Projects)¹⁵⁸ are the highest priority of the PRT, which is simultaneously the largest Czech foreign development project. The Czech Republic is aware that economic and social development of the province cannot be achieved by development assistance only, but activities to strengthen security and rule of law must be involved. The success of the PRT activities is also conditioned by close cooperation with local government and inhabitants. All principles are reflected in the governmental document *Perspectives of the Czech participation in the stabilisation process of Afghanistan Logar*, where the core pillars for activities of the PRT are identified:

- Support for the local government (with the stress on security and good governance)
- Support for the province’s economic development (support for agriculture, water management and use of local energy resources.)
- Support for the media and education

The importance of individual activities can be also derived from the PRT’s budget, where, apart from the three pillars, health care and infrastructure play a significant role and the area of women’s rights is also included. Most of the finance was allocated to education; agriculture; water management; good governance and security fields, and smaller amounts of money have been allocated into the health, infrastructure and media sector (see Table 10). Agriculture development is one of the principal objectives of the Czech PRT due to its positive effect on reducing poverty and poppy

¹⁵⁷ PRT Logar: *Czech Republic making a difference in Afghanistan*, p. 4-5.

¹⁵⁸ Digging wells, medical, security and education equipment supply, police and army training and mentoring, etc.

production. Support of media (journalist training, equipment supply) is very important as a part of democratisation activities, but also in order to keep the local inhabitants informed and so overcome their distrust towards the PRT's staff.¹⁵⁹

The complicated political and security situation is one of the major problems, which hinder implementation of the development projects. In 2009 about 25 % of the money allocated to the project budget was not utilised and also the number of mission staff in the future will depend on security conditions, which are expected to stay severe in the near future. For that reason the number of civil personnel will stay on the same level. On the other hand the CZ would like to increase the PRT budget to approximately \$6 million per year.

B) EU

The activity of the Czech Republic in Afghanistan within the EU is very restricted, which is explained by a low level of EU's engagement and the CZ denies its responsibility for the situation.¹⁶⁰ The cornerstone of the cooperation is the police mission EUPOL. The Czech Republic pursues further development of the operation and an increase its efficiency, which was also a part of the Czech EU Presidency plan. The Czech deployment to the mission is on the rise, but still remains one of the lowest in comparison to other EU members.¹⁶¹ This is explained by lack of security of the personnel and their engagement primarily with the reform of the Interior department, whereas the CZ prefers field training and mentoring.¹⁶² Apart from the EUPOL the CZ sent three observers to European Union election observation missions in 2009.

The CZ also considers as very important the coordination of the Czech PRT and EU activities, especially in respect to the new EU plan on strengthening its engagement in Afghanistan approved in 2009. For the future, the Czech Republic has committed itself to seek for connection of the EU plan with Logar province needs and looking for possibilities to use the EU Commission resources to fund the PRT projects.¹⁶³ The EU

¹⁵⁹ List of the all projects can be found at: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, *Přehled...*

¹⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic. (2009): *PERSPEKTIVY...*

¹⁶¹ Council of the European Union, 2008.

¹⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic. (2009): *PERSPEKTIVY...*

¹⁶³ Ibid.

development assistance to Afghanistan is considered as very important, since the contributions of the Czech Republic to the EU Commission and European development fund (EDF) constitutes majority of Czech multilateral ODA.¹⁶⁴

C) UN

The scale of the Czech cooperation in Afghanistan within the UN is narrowed to moderate contributions to several UN funds and programmes, particularly the UN LOFTA (\$132 979 in 2009¹⁶⁵), UNAMA mission (1 person deployed since 2008), UNESCO (\$43 478 documented by Czech Government¹⁶⁶) and MCCA.

In the document *Perspectives of the Czech participation on stabilisation of Afghanistan for years 2010-2012* the Czech Republic pledges to intensify contributions to the UNDP, UNICEF and other projects, but also in the field of humanitarian aid. The Czech Ministry of Defence stresses also the importance of the UNAMA mission, especially in relation to the Czech PRT in Logar, where cooperation and coordination of activities with UNAMA is emphasized. On the other hand the possibilities of future cooperation within the UN in Afghanistan are in the document rather second-rate and the term *international community* is connected predominantly with actions of NATO and the EU.

¹⁶⁴Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, in BusinessInfo, 2010.

¹⁶⁵Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic.

¹⁶⁶Ibid.

3.3.3. Development Assistance and Other Contributions

Afghanistan is a priority country for Czech development assistance and a major beneficiary. Afghanistan has been on the list of Czech priority countries since the very beginning of the Czech development assistance formation. In the *Concept of the Czech Republic Foreign Assistance Programme for the 2002-2007 Period* Afghanistan stood among 20 priority countries. In the following document *Principles after accession of the Czech Republic to the EU* from 2004, which decreases the number of priority countries to eight, Afghanistan was demoted to a country of medium-term priority, but finally, in the new *Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic for the 2010-2017 Period*, Afghanistan stands among the five priority countries again.

The majority of the development cooperation is conducted within the PRT team in Logar.¹⁶⁷ This can be seen also in OECD statistics, which show a considerable increase in Czech ODA to Afghanistan after 2008, when the PRT was established (see Table 5)

According to the Czech Government, classic development cooperation is also on the rise and will be strengthened in the following years. Between 2005 and 2010 the Czech Government financed 10 bilateral projects in Afghanistan, realized mostly by the People in Need organization for a total of \$3.9 million (see Table 11). The priority sectors are education, health, water and sanitation, transportation, agriculture and support for small and medium enterprises.

Apart from long-term development assistance, the Czech Republic has been providing finance to projects within NATO, the EU and the UN, but also in cooperation with foreign NGOs¹⁶⁸ and the Afghan government (see Table 12). Since 2007 the CZ has been supporting the National Solidarity Program (NSP).

According to statistics provided by the Afghan Ministry of Finance, a total of \$7 million of development assistance has been committed (of which \$3.6 million has been disbursed) to the Afghan Ministries in 2009-2011, mostly of within the education; energy and water and Interior sectors. (see Table 12). Another statistic defines Education

¹⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2010.

¹⁶⁸ The Czech Republic supported the HALO Trust Fund aimed at mine clearance.

& Culture; Security; Agriculture & Rural Development; Governance & Rule of Law and
Health as

4. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the Czech and Swedish presence in Afghanistan, the main motives, priorities and activities in relation to the foreign policy, security and strategy culture of these states. Second, comparison of the extent of cooperation with NATO, the UN and the EU and the amount of development aid and other contributions should have created an image of the Czech and Swedish security and foreign policy strategy. The method of data compilation and especially analysis were the prime instruments, how used to reach the objectives.

The first chapter analyses Swedish and Czech foreign policy, including the process of formation and core features, which influenced its contemporary character, and ideologies, discourses and prejudices that still more or less affect Czech and Swedish foreign policy decisions. Attention was also paid to the security strategy of the countries used to response threats.

First part of the second chapter deals with the afghan conflict, main actors and current security, political and socioeconomic conditions to bring a basic overview about the situation. Introduction is followed by analysis of the Swedish and Czech involvement in this country aimed at main motives, priorities, strategies and activities within NATO, EU and the UN, and also development assistance and other contributions, with a emphasize to data (costs, personnel deployment) as an important indicators of the engagement.

Based on findings from the first and second chapter following conclusions can be drawn :

A) Sweden presence in Afghanistan X Swedish security and strategy culture

All Non-alignment, neutrality, solidarity are to some extend anchored in the Swedish foreign policy, but their importance has been evolving through historical events, changes in geopolitical environment, and other factors. Sweden acknowledges that in the new globalised world new threats have arisen, which cannot be ignored. These threats do not come from states, but non-state actors, which know no borders. For Sweden it is a vital interest to be prepared for these threats involving terrorism, WMD

proliferation, etc. Since the actors are non-state, neutrality of Sweden, main principle of its foreign policy, is retained. But how is it with the Swedish participation in Afghanistan? Is Sweden by its engagement in the Afghan conflict not giving up its traditional policy of neutralism and non-alignment?

According to the experts and the government statements there is no doubt that Sweden continually mitigates its policy of neutrality and non-alignment, which should be rather specified as *military non-alignment* from the reason of strengthening of its cooperation with international organisations as the EU, the UN and NATO; and *peace-loving neutrality* due to its graduating participation in the peace making operations. Currently the *peace-loving neutrality* is also questionable since the Prime Minister declaration that “Sweden will not be passive, if another EU or Nordic country were to suffer an attack.”¹⁶⁹

Swedish participation in Afghanistan within the NATO-led ISAF mission could be considered as further “betrayal” of neutrality. But, the Swedish engagement in Afghanistan is presented as act of solidarity with afghan people¹⁷⁰ and as endeavour to promote security and stability in the region and so contribute to a collective security¹⁷¹, which is endangered by terroristic threat coming from Afghanistan and possible nuclear threat. Both reasons correspond with Swedish foreign policy culture.

Swedish activities in Afghanistan are based on the *plug-and-play concept*, which involves military activities to promote security and civilian activities, diplomatic efforts aimed at democracy and human rights strengthening, state building, and development and humanitarian assistance. The question point is, if Swedish military activities within NATO are not in conflict with the principle of neutrality. Considering the last point, Sweden puts a special emphasis on character of its cooperation with NATO as a part of the civilian operation ISAF only, but not of the OEF combat mission. Swedish government also stresses the neutrality of Afghanistan and its military presence as temporary, which will be terminated, when the Afghan government is able to take over responsibility for security tasks. Support of the process of *afghanisation* is therefore a

¹⁶⁹ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Europe's...*

¹⁷⁰ *Sweden in Afghanistan*.

¹⁷¹ Sweden has been involved in Afghanistan for a long time due to Sweden's own interest to promote security and stability in the region and globally, and of our interest in contributing to a collective security.

priority of Sweden. Abandonment of the OEF, emphasis of neutrality of Afghanistan and process of afghanisation can be understood as a declaration of Swedish neutrality.

According to the Swedish government, Sweden cooperates with NATO primary in order to help to ensure security, which is “*the main obstacle to process stability, democracy, and reduce suffering and poverty in Afghanistan and hinder humanitarian aid*”¹⁷² - all prior activities of the foreign policy of Sweden. The same conclusions can be found also in the UN and Human Rights Watch reports, the analysis of which shows continual deterioration of security in Afghanistan. The reports also point out poor living conditions of the Afghan people with critical values in health, education, and other sectors. Considering the situation, Sweden must have intervened in order to preserve the identity of “do-gooders”.

Worsening of security is also the main Swedish argument for gradual growths of number of military personnel deployed to the ISAF mission, which reached 855 in 2008. The amount military contribution is in comparison to the other non-NATO states over average¹⁷³, which is noteworthy as well as the fact that according to the state budgeted for Swedish engagement in Afghanistan, Sweden allocated considerably bigger amount of money for military purposes than for development and humanitarian purposes (\$161 million : \$121 million). How much attention we should pay to this information is debatable, since the data is taken from a general pool for international missions and the spending is rather approximated. It is also important to remember that the budget for humanitarian aid received always more money than the military operation until 2009.

Task of the personnel deployed to the ISAF mission has predominantly civilian character, ranging from intelligence, surveillance, to training and mentoring, and even treating (support to the Norwegian field hospital), which speaks for neutral character of Swedish engagement. So is it with administration of the PRT, which is acknowledged as a good instrument for reconstruction and stabilisation of Afghanistan and simultaneously priority of Swedish engagement in the ISAF (measured by number of personnel and costs). The Swedish PRT is situated in the area with low risk and low number of incidents, which prevents Sweden from participation in a combat and so preserve its

¹⁷² Proposition 2010/11:35, p. 20.

¹⁷³ ISAF, 2011, Troop numbers and contributions.

neutrality. Nevertheless, Sweden deployed an OMLT, which assisted in battles in conflict parts of southern Afghanistan. Also emphasizing of the reconstruction and development activities as a prior target of the team is questionable, since in the PRT there is no CIMIC unit presented and the PRT also does not perform humanitarian work. Minimum of reconstruction activities performed by the PRT was also criticised by the Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif. This can be explained by predominately external character of the development assistance to the province, where about 20 per cent of long-term Swedish development assistance is channelled.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, predominantly external performance of development assistance, mainly in cooperation with the UN and Afghan authorities can be considered as a sign of Swedish strategic culture, which stresses the role of the UN in the field of development and humanitarian aid. As a logical consequence is the most of the assistance performed above NATO, but the civil part of the PRT conducts a crucial work through assistance in a security sector reform, cooperation with, and coordination of development activities in cooperation with local authorities and International NGOs.

It is important to add that the Swedish disputed cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan is balanced by its extensive cooperation with the UN and the EU, which are both cornerstones of the Swedish foreign policy. The UN is seen as a key in safeguarding peace and security by providing legitimacy to conflict management and an important coordinator. According to the Government Proposition, Swedish military unit abroad would be “*unthinkable without it being supported by international law.*”¹⁷⁵ and Sweden seems to follow the same rule in relation to entire engagement in Afghanistan (increase of number of personnel and taking over the PRT, increase of proportion and amount of direct finances to the afghan budget, stressing the women’s rights in regard to the UN Resolutions and reports, which point at discrimination and poor social and health situation of women, targeting the development assistance at the field of education and economy as a way how fight against drugs, etc), all in response to the UN call and the UN reports. Important is also the emphasis of participation of the EU member in Afghanistan in governmental documents, which makes a Swedish engagement in

¹⁷⁴ LARSSON, K., 2008.

¹⁷⁵ Proposition 2003/04:71, p. 13.

Afghanistan part of a wider response by the EU. Sweden supports all activities of the EU in Afghanistan and pursues strengthening of the engagement, adjusts its own activities to the European strategy and is one of the main staff suppliers to the EUPOL mission. Promotion of the EU activities in Afghanistan is a natural step of the Swedish foreign policy, which supports stronger position of the EU in the world as the best way to safeguard its values and national interests.¹⁷⁶

Also Swedish broad humanitarian and aid commitment including a significant support of various organisations, primarily the UN agencies and programmes, can once again be seen as the presence of the Swedish strategic culture, which emphasize humanitarian activities, human rights, and democracy.

In conclusion it must be admitted that even the Swedish commitment to ISAF is broad, including (for Sweden) an extraordinary large number of military personnel deployment (According to Ångström, a typical Swedish mission after the Cold War numbered less than 300 troops), its numerous activities in the civilian, development and humanitarian area in Afghanistan are overreaching. Also the main Swedish commitment to the ISAF in form of the PRT stressing the civilian development dimension fits the Swedish strategic culture perfectly. Moreover, regarding the new Swedish security policy based on cooperation with Western allies and abandoning non-alignment, Swedish contribution to Afghanistan and ISAF (together with another Western Allies) is needed to show that it is a credible and responsible partner.

Although Swedish traditional foreign policy and the principle of neutrality are being continuously weakened, which can be seen not only on its broad engagement in the ISAF operation, solidarity is still strongly presented, which corresponds with the Swedish strategic culture, that gives primacy to humanitarianism before military. This argument is supported by the Government Proposition explaining the Swedish engagement in the field of security: *“In order to improve the living conditions of the Afghans, aid missions are needed. In order to facilitate these, there is need of security, it is a necessary condition”*, which places security performance on the second place.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ Government Office of Sweden, 2010, *Statement ...*

¹⁷⁷ Proposition 2006/07:83, p. 10.

B) Czech presence in Afghanistan X Czech security and strategy culture

According to Drulák, the Czech security and strategy culture favours non-violent approach to the conflict solution based on preventive political, economic and development activities to use of military force.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, due to extensive historical experiences with conflicts, an aversion to war and its rejection is presented in the Czech culture.¹⁷⁹ Support for Drulák's claims can be found in the Czech Security Strategy document, which declares that "*use of military force is the uttermost solution*" The Czech Republic, nevertheless, decided to participate in the Afghan conflict.

The Czech presence in Afghanistan is presented as a response to terroristic threat and so a security priority of the CZ. This corresponds with the Czech Security Strategy document, which considers non-state actors and their involvement in organised crime and terrorism as the main factor, which jeopardizes security of the Czech Republic. This is in accordance with the Czech Security Strategy, where the use of military force is conditioned by "*its commitments to and solidarity with its allies, and to protect vital of the country.*"¹⁸⁰ The first part of the sentence has been also fulfilled since the US-led operation in Afghanistan, which the CZ took part in, was in response to the terroristic attack on the US on 11th September 2001. Participation in the OEF and the ISAF mission, which is "*a vital importance for an international fight against terrorism*", and alongside the US ally, was therefore expectable and desirable.

An Eichler's reproach that the Czech presence in Afghanistan is first of all an act of logic of propriety and an endeavour "*to create a picture of the Czech Republic as a responsible western country*" weakens the security motive for the Czech engagement in Afghanistan, but is not in contradiction with the solidarity motive and moreover corresponds with the Czech foreign policy strategy after 1989 - *return to the Europe and return to the west.*¹⁸¹

The Czech activities in Afghanistan are predominantly conducted through international efforts, which corresponds with the statement that "*preserving stability and security through NATO- and EU-led operations is the most effective way of minimising*

¹⁷⁸ EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 61.

¹⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2003.

¹⁸¹ DRULÁK in KOŘAN, M., 2010.

negative effects of threats to security interest of the Czech Republic. Active participation in such operations is therefore essential for safeguarding security interests of the Czech Republic."¹⁸² Dominant cooperation with NATO can be explained as the Czech inclination to *atlanticism* - an significant ideology presented in the Czech strategy culture. *Return to the west principle* and NATO membership as a Czech foreign policy priority can be also found in the Czech representatives speeches about the Czech commitment in Afghanistan: "*Adoption of NATO resolution in Reykjavik is absolutely essential for the Czech political decisions.*"¹⁸³

The official Czech foreign policy papers stress NATO and the US as a major guarantee of the country's security, while activities of the EU in the security area are often connected with mistrust and unwillingness of the Czech representatives. This can be seen also in the case of Afghanistan, where cooperation with the EU is modest in comparison to NATO. The CZ put the blame on a deficit in the EU's engagement,¹⁸⁴ but still, the Czech contribution to the EUPOL mission is one of the lowest.

Character of the Czech engagement is broad, including development and humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction, state-building, democracy and human rights support, and security strengthening through providing of soldiers and civilian experts, funding project of the afghan government, the UN and NGO's, conducting its own development projects, providing finances to the IO and afghan funds, training and mentoring, military material donation, etc.

Afghanistan is a prior country of the Czech development assistance and a major beneficiary. The main supported sectors are economy development, education, health, and good governance. Everything mentioned is in accordance with CZ emphasizing of the development and civilian activities in the conflict resolution and as means to terrorism prevention¹⁸⁵, based on the ideology of *moral liberalism*, which is characteristic for the Czech strategy culture. But also attributes of *economic liberalism* can be found in stressing economical development of the country in the positive way,

¹⁸²Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2003.

¹⁸³EICHLER in DRULÁK, P.; STRÍLECKÝ, V., 2010: 119.

¹⁸⁴Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, 2009, *PERSPEKTIVY...*

¹⁸⁵HLAVÁČ in Úřad vlády České republiky, 2007.

and an economical motive for choosing the Logar province for the Czech PRT due to its important large resources of cooper in a negative way.

As a contradictory to the Czech security culture, dominance of the military activities can be identified. Although the CZ stresses civilian and development activities as a prior approach, the ODA cost are according to the OECD statistic considerably smaller than the military cost published by the Czech Ministry of Defence. Moreover, both military costs and personnel deployment are constantly on the rise. The CZ justifies this fact by referring to the severe insecurity in Afghanistan, which corresponds with the UN's and the Amnesty International's reports. Insecurity is also recognised as a main obstacle to performance of the development assistance. For the security reasons the majority of the assistance conducted within the Czech PRT, which involves both military and civilian part. Insecurity and worry of Czech humanitarians' safety can be also an explanation, why only 10 development projects have been performed in Afghanistan since the conflict beginning. (Also the UN reports show that international development staff members are a frequent target of attacks) However, it does not explain, why the CZ provided such modest contributions to the UN programmes and agencies and NGO's, and overall minor cooperation with the UN (which is not that surprising since the CZ admits that significance of the UN is for the Czech foreign policy minor in comparison with NATO and the EU) .¹⁸⁶ It must be admitted that although the most of the Czech activities in Afghanistan are in cooperation with NATO, a considerable part has a civilian, humanitarian and developing character.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand the costs of humanitarian (field hospital) and civilian (SOG police) actions decrease considerably in favour to military actions, which are a lot of higher (see Table 13). Also participation in the OEF cannot be taken as an act of *war aversion and rejection*. Moreover, only three other EU states took part in this operation. Nonetheless, the Czech support for the PRT team, which plays an important role in reconstruction and stabilisation of Afghanistan, is imposing (in relation to the ISAF and whole Afghanistan

¹⁸⁶ Univerzita obrany, Ústav operačně taktických studií, 2008: 144.

¹⁸⁷ The first Czech deployment in the ISAF mission was in form of the field hospital, which participated in the FINGAL humanitarian operation. Other contingents' tasks are aimed at afghan police, army and medical personnel training, monitoring, economy and infrastructure reconstruction and state's institutions building, transportation, observation and rescue missions.

engagement and the whole Czech development assistance¹⁸⁸). Military contingent in the PRT is the largest in the ISAF mission and also the number of civilian experts (12) is above average. Significance of development activities performed by the PRT support the official reason for establishment of the Czech PRT in this province, which is “*relatively stable security situation allowing effective and visible reconstruction.*”¹⁸⁹ Also the number of project conducted between 2008 and 2010 (96) is respectable. On the other hand the cost for the development project seems to be negligible in comparison with military costs.

To sum up, the Czech presence in Afghanistan is mostly in accordance with the Czech foreign policy documents, Czech representatives statements and thus with the Czech strategy culture. It stresses cooperation with international organisations, aims at support of security and stability, but also democracy, and development. The most interesting finding is the Czech endeavour and (with exaggeration) an obsession of the cooperation with NATO, which represents the cornerstone of the Czech engagement, but also an important determiner of the Czech foreign policy. This can be seen in Parkanová’s proclamation of NATO resolution as “*absolutely essential for the Czech political decisions*”, but also in the following of the NATO concept of the PRT, etc. On the other hand the cooperation within the ISAF mission and PRT command encouraged Czech concern of development efforts.

C) Swedish involvement in Afghanistan X Czech involvement in Afghanistan

Both Czech and Swedish commitment to Afghanistan is strong; both emphasize connection of security and development and finally, a crucial role of NATO can be seen in both Swedish and Czech activities. On the other hand, many differences can be found in the Czech and Swedish approach to Afghanistan.

Both countries emphasize international and national security as the main motive for their presence in Afghanistan. In the Swedish attitude, solidarity with the Afghans is also essential. A motive of solidarity is also presented in the Czech rhetoric, but not in

¹⁸⁸ The PRT the largest Czech foreign development project.

¹⁸⁹ PRT Logar: *Czech Republic making a difference in Afghanistan*, p. 4-5.

relation with the Afghans, but rather to its “allies”. According to Eichler, the motive based on the logic of propriety, an effort not to disappoint the its allies and to create a picture of the Czech Republic as a responsible western country is the main reason for its presence in Afghanistan. An endeavour to appear as a credible and active international security actor can be found also in the Swedish attitude, but it is not shown so ostentatiously and falls behind the solidarity motive.

Considering the strategy of the engagement, the Swedish approach is very different. The Swedish cooperation within NATO is broad and demanding considering the costs and deployed personnel, but in contrast to the CZ, Sweden considers the role of the UN as crucial and its approach towards Afghanistan seems to be based on the UN appeals. The cooperation with the EU is also a priority, which can be seen in its intensive participation in the EUPOL and stressing participation of the EU members in Afghanistan in the government proposition (2001), which can be understood as a defining of the Swedish participation as part of a wider response by the EU. On the contrary, the view NATO is a major actor, which ensures both security and reconstruction through the ISAF mission, while the EU presence tends to be underestimated. The UN role is claimed to be important due to providing legitimacy to the international operation. On the other hand cooperation with the UN is in the Czech strategy document subordinate to NATO. The CZ for example acknowledges the UNAMA mission as important, but in connection with the ISAF mission, where cooperation between the PRT and UNAMA is stressed. And finally, Czech contributions to the UN and the EU (financial, staff) are minor in comparison to NATO, but also with other contributing countries.

The ISAF mission plays a crucial role in both Czech and Swedish actions in Afghanistan and at the same time it constitutes the largest military deployment abroad. Considering the military deployment, an average number of Swedish and Czech soldiers in the country between 2007 and 2001 has been similar. Swedish contributions to the NATO funds are higher, but this is balanced by the Czech donation of military equipment. Total costs of the ISAF’s contributions are the biggest expenditure of the both Czech and Swedish budget for Afghanistan.

Both countries lead own PRT and give a crucial importance to this commitment, which demands the most of military staff available for the ISAF mission. The PRT is especially significant for the CZ, which performs the majority of developing, reconstruction and stabilisation activities through the PRT. Sweden attitude is different and most of the development assistance is, as a logical result of Swedish strategic culture, conducted externally in cooperation with the UN, the Afghan authorities, NGOs or bilaterally, whereas the PRT serves as coordination and advisory body and security provider. The form of the development activities performance is by the Sweden and CZ very different, which can be seen at the cost:

- a) Proportion of the Czech development aid towards Afghanistan: total development assistance to Afghanistan (2000-2009): \$98.6 million; PRT (2008-2010): \$11.6 million; other bilateral (2005-2010): \$3.8 million; assistance to the Afghan Ministries (2009-2011): \$7 million.
- b) Proportion of the Swedish development aid towards Afghanistan: total development assistance to Afghanistan (2000-2009): \$457.9 million; bilateral cooperation (2010): \$88 million; Multilateral (2010): \$31 million; Assistance to the Afghan Ministries (2009-2011): \$441 million.

Apart of the Czech favouring of the PRT as a development aid conductor, the data shows that the Swedish direct support of the Afghan government based on the UN conference in Kabul is proportionally considerably higher. But the biggest difference is in the amount of money provided to development activities, which is beyond comparison. The amount of money granted by Sweden corresponds with its worldwide reputation as a leader in development activities and its security culture based at solidarity, whereas Czech development aid cost are far behind its military costs (\$ 26mil : \$108mil in 2009) and corresponds with its prioritising of cooperation within NATO in the security task as a main sign of its strategic culture. The only match is in sectors supported by the development assistance with the stress on good governance, democracy and human rights, economy development, education, health and, of course, security.

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
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6. ANNEXES

Map 1 Afghanistan Security Situation (2009)




Source: Afghan Interior Ministry

Map 2 Major ISAF Units (2010)




Source: NATO HQ Media Operations Centre, Afghanistan

Figure 1 Civilian death in Afghanistan (2007 – 2010)




Source: Afghanistan Conflict Monitors – Human Security Report Project

Figure 2 Armed Opposition Group Attacks in Afghanistan (2008 - 2010)



Source: Afghanistan Conflict Monitors – Human Security Report Project

Figure 3 Attacks with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) casualties (Dead and Wounded) in Afghanistan by Type of Victim (2005 - 2010)



Source: Afghanistan Conflict Monitors – Human Security Report Project

Table 1 Socioeconomic indicators of Afghanistan

Human Development Index (HDI) rank (169 states) /value	2010	155/0.349
Life expectancy at birth (years)	2010	44.6
Mean years of schooling (years)	2010	3,3
Expected years of schooling (years)	2010	8.0
Gross national income (GNI) per capita (PPP \$)	2008	1,419
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) / rank (169 states)		
	2008	165
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births) /rank (169 states)		
	2008	157
Human Poverty Index (HPI) rank (182 states) /value		
	2007	181/59,8
Population below national poverty line (%)	2000-2008	42
Population without access to water (%)	2008	52
Population without access to sanitation (%)	2008	63
Employment (% of population ages 15–64)	2008	55,2
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) rank (178 states) /value¹⁹⁰		
	2010	176/1,4
Gender Inequality Index rank/value		
	2008	134/0.797
Maternal mortality rank/ratio	2003-2008	168/1800
Women with at least secondary education (%)	2010	5,8
Men with at least secondary education (%)	2010	34
Female labour participation rate (%)	2008	33,3
Refugees (thousands)		
	2008	2,833.1
Internatly displaced persons (thousands)		
	2008	240

Source: United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report 2010

¹⁹⁰ Transparency International (2010): *Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results*, [online], [cit. 21.6.2011], URL: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results

Table 2 Sweden, Afghanistan budget overview (2010)

Activity	Costs 2010 (US\$ Million)¹⁹¹
Military contribution to ISAF and national support functions	161.08
Police and other civilian contributions to the EU Police Mission	3.84
Long-term development cooperation	68.33
Humanitarian operations	20.12
Operations via Swedish non-governmental organisations	2
Development assistance through multilateral organisations (estimation)	30.71
Conflict management	1.38
Total	287.5

Source: Sweden in Afghanistan. Available at <http://www.swedeninafghanistan.se/>.

Table 3 Czech and Swedish Contributions to the ISAF

	CZ	Sweden
Current Troop Contribution	519	500
ANA Trust Fund (since 2007) (US\$)	501 407	4 565 218
NATO Equipment Donation Programme	12 helicopters	0
Post Operation Emergency Fund (POEF) (US\$)	524 377	0

Source: ISAF (2011): Troop numbers and contributions.

Table 4 Average Czech and Swedish staff contribution to the ISAF 2007 – 2011

	CZ	Sweden
2007	179	242
2008	321	322
2009	439	339
2010	473	479
2011	481	500
total	1893	1882

Source: ISAF (2011): Troop numbers and contributions.

¹⁹¹ Currency rating 1 SEK : 0,153 US\$

Table 5 Czech and Swedish ODA (US\$ Million) disbursed in Afghanistan (2000 - 2009) all sectors

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Sweden	11.5	20.6	27.52	41.88	55.68	44.22	46.42	56.15	73.89	80.07	457.93
CZ	0.05	0.64	0.73	6.12	6.08	1.96	4.2	10.62	42.1	26.09	98.59

Source: OECD

Table 6 Afghanistan-based organisations supported by Sweden

Organization	Sector
International Red Cross	Water and sanitation
Norwegian Refugee Council	Support to displaced people
World Bank– Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fond, National Solidarity Program	Democratic governance and human rights, Education
Danish Demining Group	Security (mine clearance)
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit	Research
Northern Development Project	Education
Alternative Livelihoods Development	Counter-narcotic
Mary Stopes International	Health and Human rights
Women for Afghan Women	Human and women rights
International Legal Foundation and Islamic Relief	Human Rights
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	Human Rights

Source: Sweden in Afghanistan. Available at <http://www.swedeninafghanistan.se/>;
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Table 7 Swedish Development Assistance to the Afghan Ministries (2001-2010)

Ministries	Committed (USD)
Science Academy	27 929 988
National Assembly	6 277 139
Women's Affairs	9 043 995
Human Development	647 706
Transport and aviation	494 774
State and Parliamentary Affairs	7 200 426
Rural Rehabilitation and Development	19 157 569
Refugees and Repatriates	22 885 310
Public Works	19 654 574
Public Health	32 390 766
Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs, Disabled	10 159 285
Justice	490 000
Interior	16 350 138
Information and Culture	36 000
Foreign Affairs	9 154 996
Finance	3 989 998
Energy and water	474 000
Education	210 259 102
Economy	1 589 285
Defence	474 000
Agriculture	7 859 005
Election Commission	16 919 650
Afghanistan Disaster Management Authority	14 744 522
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	2 870 000
Administrative Affairs	63 107
Total Committed	441 115 335
Total Disbursed	344 910 582

Source: DAD Afghanistan

Table 8 Czech military deployment in Afghanistan

Operation	Operation Character	Total Number	Duration
ENDURING FREEDOM	reconnaissance, life combat actions	120	3-8/2004
ENDURING FREEDOM	reconnaissance, life combat actions	120	5-12/2006
ENDURING FREEDOM	reconnaissance, life combat actions	3x100	2008-2009
ISAF FINGAL	Peacekeeping operation - Field Hospital	269	4/2002-1/2003
ISAF	Peacekeeping operation - Surgical Team	11	1/2003-4/2003
ISAF Kabul	EOD team, Meteo group	350	3/2004-3/2007
ISAF PRT Feyzabad - Badakshan	German's PRT participation	600	3/2005-11/2007
ISAF KAIA	Field Hospital and Chemical Detachment	658	4/2007-12/2008
ISAF URUZGAN	Protection contingents	2 x 63	7/2008-3/2009

Source: Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic

Table 9 Current Czech military deployment in Afghanistan (2010)

Operation	Personnel	Location	Costs (US\$)
ISAF KAIA	235	Kabul	12 376 000
ISAF HELI Unit	99 + Mi-171S helicopters	Paktika	29 264 000
ISAF OMLT	54	Wardak	2 356 000
ISAF PRT	293 + 12	Logar	5 375 000

Source: Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic

Table 10 PRT's reconstruction, development and Quick Impact Project overview

Projects (2008 - 2010)

Sector	Number of projects	Costs (US\$)
Education	13	2 784 825
Agriculture	26	2 549 410
Water-Management	16	2 438 849
Good governance	5	1 480 790
Security	11	1 299 340
Health	7	366 490
Infrastructure	9	316 970
Media	9	81 253
Total	96	11 317 927

QIP

Years	Costs (US\$)
2007	63 158
2008	49 669
2009	153 191
Total	266 018

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic

Table 11 Czech Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan (2005 - 2010)

<i>Sector</i>	Project	Period	Implementator	Costs (US\$)
Education	Sustainable Increase of Education in Čohi District in Northern Afghanistan	2005-2006	People in Need	562 420
	Reconstruction and Support for the High School of Agriculture in Baghlan in Northern Afghanistan	2006-2007	People in Need	691 169
	Enhancing of Quality of High Schools of Agriculture in Afghanistan	2008-2010	People in Need	815 957
<i>Total</i>				2 069 546
Health	Breaking the Circle - Drugs-addicted Assistance (Trilateral with NGOs)	2006	Outstretched Hands	43 469
	Reconstruction of Health Facilities in Kabul and Badakshan	2006-2007	People in Need	556 398
	Berkat - Health Eyes for Afghanistan	2007		33 561
<i>Total</i>				633 428
Water and Sanitation	Drinking Water and Hygiene (Trilateral with ECHO) ¹⁹²	2006	People in Need	69 565
<i>Total</i>				69 565
Agriculture	Improvement of Food Availability and Stabilisation of Incomes in Northern Afghanistan (Trilateral – EuropeAid, European Commission)	2008-2010	People in Need	176 041
<i>Total</i>				176 041
Transportation	Study "Building of a New Train Route from the Iranian Border to Kabul"	2006-2009	SUDOP	486 332
	Study "Development of Public Transport in Kabul"	2006-2008	IKP Consulting	432 663
<i>Total</i>				918 995
Total				3 867 575

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic.

¹⁹² European Commission Humanitarian Aid

Table 12 Czech Development Assistance to the Afghan Ministries (2009 - 2011)

Ministries	Committed (USD)
Human Development	11 500
Transport and aviation	11 410
Rural Rehabilitation and Development	206 289
Public Works	323 658
Public Health	462 710
Justice	770 970
Interior	1 188 659
Information and Culture	17 925
Energy and water	1 686 793
Education	1 784 791
Defence	9 668
Agriculture	593 998
Total	7 068 371
Disbursed	3.646.254

Source: Dad Afghanistan

Table 13 Czech Republic, budget for military operations in Afghanistan (2010)

Operation	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
Humanitarian Deployment (field hospital)	12.904	11.565	2.164	154	26.787
Military Deployment	10.463	76.276	106.252	53.759	246.750
Police Deployment (SOG)	3.367	6.028	470	68	9.933
Total	26.734	93.869	108.886	53.981	

Source: Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic, 2011.