

Palacký University in Olomouc
Faculty of Law

Phuong Linh Nguyenová

**The Role of the United Kingdom in the European Union's
Common Security and Defence Policy: The Effects of Brexit**

Master's Thesis

Olomouc 2021

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that this Master's Thesis on the topic of *The Role of the United Kingdom in the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy: The Effects of Brexit* is my original work and I have acknowledged all sources used. I further declare that the text of this thesis including footnotes has 176 020 characters with spaces.

In Olomouc 29 November 2021

.....
Phuong Linh Nguyenová

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Mgr. et Mgr. Ondřej Filipec, Ph.D. for his invaluable supervision, support and insightful comments and suggestions.

Abstract

The Master Thesis focuses on the development of the role and position of the United Kingdom with regards to the EU's Common security and defence policy. Main research aim is to analyse the position of the United Kingdom towards the topic of European security and defence co-operation. Moreover, the thesis analyses how the role of the UK has changed over last decades. The theoretical part of the thesis pays particular attention to the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, developed by the American political scientist and specialist on European integration Andrew Moravcsik. The assumptions of LI are tested with regards to the ESDP/CSDP with respect to the UK. The development of CSDP and the role of UK represent an essential object of the thesis. The research part of the thesis aims to analyse the preferences of the British governments since 1997. Two specific periods are chosen, the era of New Labour government, and the government of the Conservative party. Lastly, the thesis deals with the effects of Brexit on the CSDP.

Key words: The United Kingdom, the European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Brexit

Table of content

Introduction	7
1. Theoretical framework.....	13
1.1. Intergovernmentalism	14
1.2. Two-level games theory	15
1.3. Moravcsik's Theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism.....	17
1.3.1. Moravcsik's criticism of Neo-Functionalism	18
1.3.2. Liberal intergovernmentalism approach	19
2. The evolution of European security co-operation: Imprints of the United Kingdom..	25
2.1. The Brussels Treaty	25
2.2. European Defence Community.....	26
2.3. Western European Union.....	27
2.4. Maastricht Treaty and Common Foreign and Security Policy	28
2.5. Treaty of Amsterdam and European Defence	30
2.6. The Saint-Malo Declaration: establishment of European Security and Defence Policy..	31
2.7. Treaty of Nice and the European Security and Defence Policy.....	33
2.8. Lisbon Treaty and establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy	34
3. The United Kingdom's position towards the ESDP/CSDP since 1997	37
3.1. New Labour: Europeanization of defence policy.....	37
3.2. The Conservative Party in power: European security in the shadows of British Euroscepticism	46
4. The United Kingdom in the ESDP/CSDP process: testing of the LI assumptions ...	51
5. Impact of Brexit on CSDP: the future of the security co-operation between the United Kingdom and the European Union	55
5.1. Co-operation between the European Union and the United Kingdom after Brexit.....	58

6. Micro-comparison of the position of two small states towards ESDP/CSDP with the UK's one: The cases of Austria and the Czech Republic.....	61
6.1. Austria's flexible approach towards ESDP/CSDP	61
6.2. Position of the Czech Republic towards ESDP/CSDP.....	64
6.3. Austria, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom: conclusion.....	66
Conclusion	68
References.....	72

Introduction

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union has been frequently discussed not just among scholars and political leaders. It is also a broader public that is paying attention to further developments in the field of European security. After World War Two (WW2), the main goal was to bring back peace and prosperity to Europe. The United States took part in the process of Europe recovering. The 20th century meant the greatest disaster for the European continent in its history. World political leaders were aware of the necessity to take action to prevent potential conflict in the future. Shortly after the end of WW2, the Marshall Plan was launched, and its purpose was to help the European economy to recover. There were several ideas that suggested co-operation between European states as one of the main instruments to maintain peace, and to avoid a conflict.

In 1950, the Schuman plan was introduced. In this plan, Jean Monet came up with the idea of co-operation between France and Germany in the steel and coal sector. The crucial fact is, that this kind of partnership was offered by the French foreign minister to get control over Germany's production of steel and coal. There were concerns regarding Germany's intentions after the war. The matter of European security was a primary reason for the French proposal to create the Community. The European integration process started in the 1950s and within the structures of the European Community, later European Union, the member states decided to co-operate together.

In the matter of European security, the UK has played an important role. After the end of WW2, the UK and France concluded the Dunkirk Treaty which could be considered as one of the first attempts of European states to co-operate on security issues. In the late 1990s, the UK was one of those member states that urged for the creation of European Security and Defence policy (ESDP). The UK has a specific tie to the United States. The US influence on the decision of the British government was visible.

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been developing fast, and the EU has been facing new security challenges. Nowadays, the world is dramatically changing, and the developments within the other regions have a significant impact on the EU. In these times, when new security challenges are defined, the United Kingdom has decided to leave the European Union. In 2016, citizens of the UK voted in the national referendum in favour of leaving the EU. The withdrawal process has already begun, and very important aspects will need to be discussed to conclude the comprehensive agreement that would modify the specific relationship between the EU and UK. The matters of trade and the internal market play a crucial

role in further relations. The issues of migration and the rights of EU citizens are also very important. On the other hand, the security and defence sectors are crucial as the future partnership between the EU and UK will greatly impact European security.

Structure of thesis

The thesis will focus on the developments of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union from a historical point of view. The thesis intends to analyse the role of the United Kingdom since the end of WW2. The UK is one of the key international actors, and its military capacities are crucial for European security. The thesis will include six chapters.

Chapter one will explain the theory of European integration. Specifically, the liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) developed by Andrew Moravcsik will be introduced in detail. Even though this chapter's focus will be on the LI, it is very important to analyse the criticism of the other theories of European integration and why they failed solely to explain the developments within the European Community, respectively the European Union. Moreover, the Two-level game theory developed by Robert Putnam will be briefly introduced. Furthermore, this chapter will present the essential aspects of intergovernmentalism, focusing more closely on the stages of national preference formation and the process of interstate bargaining. The main aim of this chapter is to establish the characteristics and assumptions of LI.

Chapter two will analyse the development of European co-operation in security and defence since the end of the WW2. This chapter will be divided into subchapters as each will deal with particular milestone in the history of European security co-operation. The analysis will follow up with the Brussels Treaty, the European Defence Community, and the Western European Union (WEU). Moreover, the chapter will continue with the analysis of the Maastricht Treaty, Treaty of Amsterdam, the Saint-Malo Declaration, Treaty of Nice and lastly on the Lisbon Treaty and the impact on European security and defence co-operation. Furthermore, this chapter aims to define the role of the United Kingdom in this area.

Chapter three will focus on the UK's position towards the ESDP and CSDP during the last decades. This chapter will be divided into two parts. Firstly, the thesis will pay attention to the New Labour government led by Tony Blair that came to power in 1997. It will analyse the formulation of UK preferences regarding the European defence co-operation. The governments led by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown will be included. The second part will focus on the Conservative government led by David Cameron and its position towards the CSDP. The

decision to begin the analysis with the government of Tony Blair is the fact that this government was in power when the ESDP was established. The main aim of this chapter is to define the UK's national preferences regarding security and defence matters. Moreover, the ability of the UK to pursue the formulated preferences at the EU level will be examined.

Chapter four will evaluate the assumptions of LI concerning the UK's position in the ESDP/CSDP process. The focus will be on three stages of the LI model that will be characterised further in the text. The assumptions of LI will be tested.

Chapter five will analyse the potential impacts of the UK's decision to leave the European Union on European security. Moreover, the text will discuss the possibilities of further co-operation between the United Kingdom and the EU.

The thesis will include a micro-comparison of the position of Austria and the Czech Republic towards CSDP. Moreover, chapter six will compare the British position towards ESDP/CSDP with the positions of those two small states in Central Europe. Brexit will be reflected as this chapter will analyse their reactions to it in the field of security and defence.

The thesis will examine the role of the United Kingdom in the Common Security and Defence Policy with regard to the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. The purpose of this analysis is to answer the following research questions:

- 1) *What was the role of the United Kingdom within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy?*
- 2) *Has the attitude of the United Kingdom towards co-operation in the security and defence sector changed? If yes, what are the main drivers of the change?*
- 3) *Are the assumptions of Liberal Intergovernmentalism valid in the case of the ESDP/CSDP with respect to the UK?*
- 4) *How can the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union possibly impact the further development of the Common Security and Defence Policy?*
- 5) *What are possible perspectives for the co-operation between the United Kingdom and the European Union in the future in the field of security and defence?*

Methodology

The first part of this thesis will operate with one of the most influential theories of European integration. Andrew Moravcsik and his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism will be analysed in detail. The examples of decision-making and policies will be examined to show how intergovernmentalism works. The development of the EU's policies regarding security and

defence will be analysed from a historical perspective. It is vital to explain and understand the gradual evolution of European co-operation in these sectors. The thesis will focus on the most important treaties, declarations and agreements that are considered as the milestones in the process of establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The second part of the thesis will then focus on each of the selected UK's governments. The comparative method will be used in this section. Regarding the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, there will be a comparison of the government's willingness to act on the EU level or unwillingness to leave the intergovernmentalism behind. This thesis will not be quantitative research. It is rather the qualitative analysis that will go deep into the topic. Therefore, the case study method is central to this thesis. Mainly, the focus will be on the case of the UK in ESDP/CSDP process. Lijphart argues that such a method's advantage lies in the fact that it can comprehensively examine the case even if there are some limitations regarding the research resources or the investigator's abilities.¹ The thesis will not strive to generate a hypothesis and formulate a theory. Instead, the thesis will focus on established theory and its application to the specific case. Moreover, thesis will test the assumptions. Therefore, this study can be characterised as a theory-confirming type or theory-infirming.²

Bibliography

The theoretical framework of this thesis will be based on the most influential theory of European integration, and specifically, liberal intergovernmentalism developed by Andrew Moravcsik. For the elaboration of this work, it was essential to draw directly from the publications and reviewed articles written by Moravcsik. The key monography is *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. In this publication, Moravcsik introduces the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. Focusing on the analysis of intergovernmental negotiations within the EU, the author characterises the main aspects of LI theory. According to LI, states are the most important actors in the integration process. In this respect, this publication was beneficial for the theoretical chapter of this study. The topic of LI is part of the extensive publications that focus on theories of European integration. Texts by Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning examining LI are part of the publication, *European Integration Theory*, edited by Wiener and Diez. The third edition of this publication also served the purposes of this work. Moravcsik's reviewed articles that were published in academic

¹ LIJPHART, A. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *The American Political Science Review*, 1971, 65 (3), p. 691.

² *Ibid.*, p. 692.

journals represent an outstanding contribution to this thesis. For example, the *Journal of Common Market Studies* published the article *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach* by Moravcsik. In this article, the author clarifies the limitations of neo-functionalism and introduces the LI theory and the model of three stages applied to the process of European integration. Moreover, Moravcsik's article *Preferences, Power and Institution in 21st century* was also beneficial. The publication *Theories of European Integration* by Ben Rosamond and *Theorizing European Studies* written by D. N. Chrysochoou included a detailed analysis of the LI.

The publications and studies of European security were crucial for elaboration on the analytical part of this thesis. At this point, the reviewed articles and monographs written by Jolyon Howorth were crucial. His contribution to the study of European security is commendable. Howorth's text *National defence and European security integration: an illusion inside a chimera?* is a part of the publication *The European Union National Defence Policy*, edited by Howorth and Menan. Moreover, Howorth is the author of policy papers focusing on the development of the ESDP/CSDP. The publication *EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1994-2004)*, edited by Gnessoto, is beneficial because it analyses the main aspects of the security co-operation of the EU member states. Therefore, these texts are key for the elaboration of this thesis. Furthermore, the treaties and agreements adopted by the EU are crucial for chapter two and chapter three.

The text written by Cornish analysing the strategic culture of the UK that is a part of the publication *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*, edited by Biehl and Giegerich, is very important for the elaboration of chapter three focusing on the UK's position towards ESDP/CSDP since 1997. Moreover, the extensive monography *Brexit: history, reasoning and perspectives* edited by Troitino, Kerikmae and Chochia includes the chapter *British Approach to the European Union* written by Mölder focusing on the position of the British governments towards European security and defence is very credible for this thesis. Mölder studies the approaches of the governments led by Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron. Importantly, the study of the British approach, *Europeanization of British Defence Policy* written by Robert Dover, was a significant contribution. Regarding the positions of each government, it was crucial to analyse the manifestations of the political parties.

Regarding Brexit and its possible effects on CSDP, it is important to note that there are plenty of studies on this topic. However, the impact of Brexit and the further security and defence co-operation between the EU and the UK depend on the result of the negotiation process that will take place in future. At this point, the article *Impact of Brexit on Security and*

Defence Multilateralism: More Cooperation or Overlapping Interests written by Xavier was credible for chapter five. Moreover, Martill's and Sus's study on *Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or French connection?* represents an essential contribution to the part of thesis focusing on the possible co-operation in future.

1. Theoretical framework

The destructive character of WW2 forced political leaders among the European countries to find the solution and maintain peace to prevent another conflict. To eliminate the war, Karl Deutsch introduced the theory of communication. According to Deutsch, there is a casual nexus between communication relationships and integration within society. In his study *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch characterised a security community as “a group of people which become integrated.”³ This group would share a sense of community. The institutions of such a community must be strong. Furthermore, an effective communication relationship must be established to eliminate conflicts within the community. Under such circumstances, the peaceful resolution is possible “normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.”⁴ Even before the end of WW2, some scholars thought about the idea of federalist unity in Europe. Federalism and functionalism were the predominant theories in the field of international relations. The protagonists of federalism decided to establish the movement that followed the thoughts of Altiero Spinelli, who called for the creation of the European Federation in his 1941 Ventotene Manifesto.⁵ David Mitrany, the representative of functionalism, published his *Working Peace System*, the study focused on peace and preventing a war. In the first decades of the European integration process, the theory of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism became the most influential ones.

This chapter will focus on the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) developed by the American scholar Andrew Moravcsik. Firstly, this chapter will introduce Stanley Hoffmann’s theory of intergovernmentalism and Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Game theory. The contribution of these theories lies in the fact that they set out some of the main characteristics which go along with Moravcsik’s idea of LI. This chapter aims to define the main aspects of LI theory and how it explains the process of integration on the European continent. This part of the thesis focusing on LI is crucial as the theory will be applied further in the research part.

³ DEUTSCH, K. W. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. In: NELSEN, B. F., STUBB, A. (eds). *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Third Edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2014, p. 123.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁵ SPINELLI, A. *The Ventotene Manifesto* [online]. 2009 [viewed 3 June 2021]. Available from: http://www.altierospinelli.org/manifesto/en/manifesto1944en_en.html

1.1. Intergovernmentalism

Within European integration, intergovernmentalism has been considered one of the most influential grand theories to explain this process. Understanding of this theory is fundamental because some of the critical aspects of LI are based on intergovernmentalism. Therefore, this part of the thesis will briefly introduce the main characteristics and aspects of intergovernmentalism developed by American professor Stanley Hoffmann. The roots of this theory can be found in realism which is on the dominant schools in International Relations. The main idea of intergovernmentalism is that the state is a primary actor that may influence the process of integration. Hoffmann criticised the theory of neo-functionalism. According to the theorists of functionalism, economic integration would spill over into political integration. They believe that the interconnection between European states in the economic sphere would gradually lead to connectivity within a political sphere.⁶ In Hoffmann's opinion, this is a huge misconception. *"Functional integration's gamble could be won only if the method had sufficient potency to promise a permanent excess of gain over losses, and of hopes over frustration... this may be true of economic integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of high politics)."*⁷ Realist theory suggests that the nation-state is a key actor in international relations.

Regarding intergovernmentalism, two levels of politics have been differentiated. International Relations scholar Michael Barnett defines *high politics* as a *"state's security relationship with other states in the international system."*⁸ Therefore, it is distinct from *low politics*, defined as *"societal pressures, and the domestic political economy."*⁹ In the view of intergovernmentalism, European integration may be successful in the field of low politics. On the other hand, the matters of high politics will remain under the control of nation-states. In addition, Alan Milward states in his publication *The European Rescue of Nation-State* that the process of European integration was *"a part of that post-war rescue of the European nation-state, because new political consensus on which this rescue was built required the process of integration..."*¹⁰ Furthermore, he notes that the state must surrender its national sovereignty

⁶ KRATOCHVÍL, P. *Teorie evropské integrace*. Praha: Portál, 2008, p. 89.

⁷ HOFFMANN, S. *Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe*. *Daedalus*, 1966, 95 (3), p. 882.

⁸ BARNETT, M. *High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977*. *World Politics*, 1990, 24 (4), p. 531.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ MILWARD, A. S., G. BRENNAN and F. ROMERO. *The European rescue of the nation-state*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 4.

and decision-making in certain areas to the supranational institution.¹¹ Contrary, neo-functionalism refuses a nation-state as a key actor in the integration process. Several scholars focusing on European integration have followed up Hoffmann's intergovernmentalism. Furthermore, one of them managed to establish one of the most influential theories of European integration. The LI theory will be elaborated on further in this thesis.

1.2. Two-level games theory

It is essential to introduce the Two-games level theory presented by Robert Putnam. In his article *Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of Two-Level Games*, Putnam deals with the framework of forming the state's foreign affairs. According to Putnam, this process is determined by domestic politics, meaning that there is a mutual interaction between those two levels, domestic and international level.¹² Putnam's theory suggests that multilateral negotiations may be considered as two-level games. Firstly, at a national level, domestic actors put pressure on the government to pursue their own interests. The actors at the international level must negotiate with the other political leaders to reach a compromise that would be acceptable also at a national level.¹³ In other words, the results of negotiations must be feasible at both, international and national level. Corneliu Bola and Ilan Manor describe this interaction between those two levels as "*manifest in the fact that a leader who ignores domestic pressures or one who favours domestic politics above international issues will be unable to successfully ratify or negotiate a treaty respectively.*"¹⁴

Robert Putnam also emphasises the importance of the *win-sets* concept. The author divided the process of negotiation into two stages. Firstly, there is a stage of bargaining between the negotiators to arrange a preliminary agreement (he calls it Level I). Followingly, the second stage is described as separate discussions among the members of each group. At this Level II, the group must take a collective decision on whether they should ratify a tentative agreement that was reached within Level I. According to Putnam, the actors represented at Level II might be, for example, interest groups, public opinion, bureaucratic apparatus or social classes.¹⁵ These two levels are interconnected. Consultations and bargaining at Level II may impact the

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² PUTNAM, R. *Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of Two-Level Games*. *International Organisations*, 1988, 42 (3), p. 434.

¹³ Ibid., p. 434.

¹⁴ BJOLA, C. and I. MANOR. Revisiting Putnam's two-level game theory in the digital age: domestic digital diplomacy and the Iran nuclear deal. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2018, 31 (1), p. 6.

¹⁵ PUTNAM, R. *Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of Two-Level Games*. *International Organisations*, 1988, 42 (3), p. 436.

negotiations at Level I. In addition, citing R. Putnam, “*expectations of rejection at Level II may abort negotiations at Level I...*”¹⁶ In his study, Robert J. Schmidt, Jr. explained that for the understanding the outcomes of international negotiations, it is crucial not to overlook the domestic political considerations.¹⁷

The role of the win-set concept is, therefore, significant. Putnam defined the win-set as “*the set of all possible Level I agreements that would “win” – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents...*”¹⁸ This means that the Level I agreements could be concluded and ratified by these parties if win-set of all parties involved in the process of negotiation overlap. The smaller win-set is, the greater risk that the agreement at Level I would not be ratified.

According to Putnam, the size of the win-set is determined by the following factors. Firstly, the size can be influenced by the distribution of power among the actors at Level II. In this matter, Putnam referred to the relative power of isolationists and internationalists. The distinction is that the first group mostly rejects co-operation at the international level, whereas internationalists prefer to co-operate internationally.¹⁹ Moreover, the political institutions may also have an impact on the win-set. Primarily it is the nature of the ratification process that determines the size of the win-set. Putnam argues that if there is a need for a special parliamentary majority to approve ratification of an agreement, the win-set is then smaller.²⁰ In addition, Bjola and Manov note that in the case of the EU, the ratification process is even more complex because treaties have to be ratified at both levels, the EU and national level.²¹ Finally, the strategy of negotiators has a key role in the negotiation process at Level I that might influence the size of the win-set. Two-level game theory is very important because this thesis will continue with the theory of LI defined by Andrew Moravcsik, who was also partly inspired by Putnam’s theory.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 436.

¹⁷ SCHMIDT, R. J. Jr. International negotiations paralyzed by domestic politics: Two-level game theory and the problem of the Pacific salmon commission. *Environmental Law*, 1996, 26 (1), p.109.

¹⁸ PUTNAM, R. Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organisations*, 1988, 42 (3), p. 437

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 442-443.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 448-449.

²¹ BJOLA, C. and I. MANOR. Revisiting Putnam’s two-level game theory in the digital age: domestic digital diplomacy and the Iran nuclear deal. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2018, 31 (1), p. 7.

1.3. Moravcsik's Theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Andrew Moravcsik has modified Hoffmann's theory of intergovernmentalism in the 1990s. The revised theory is known as liberal intergovernmentalism, which is commonly considered as one of the most respected and influential theories of European integration. Moravcsik applied the two-level game theory in the context of Europe. In his view, the nation-states are the ones that make choices. In his publication *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, he states that "*the central argument of this book is that European integration can best be explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders.*"²² Even though Moravcsik introduced one of the most influential theories in the study of European integration in the 1990s, he was not the first scholar of liberal school that had focused on this topic. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye also tried to explain the process of European integration in the 1970s. According to these neoliberal scholars, the main reason for integration is an economic interdependency among actors. *Power and Interdependence* written by Keohane, and Nye is a complex study of interdependency among states within International Relations. The authors characterised dependency as "*a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.*"²³ On the other hand, they define interdependence as a mutual dependence. Moreover, they stated that "*interdependence in the world politics refers to situation characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.*"²⁴ Keohane and Nye emphasised that interconnectedness and interdependence are not similar. Mutual dependency among actors is determined by one important factor. Thus, interdependence depends on the constraints or costs. If the relationship is not significantly costly, there is no interdependence. Jan Karlas noted that "*mutual interaction must bring to both actors the revenues that they would not otherwise be able to achieve...*"²⁵ Moreover, this mutual dependence may positively affect maintaining world peace according to liberal theory. Petr Kratochvíl added that European integration might be a good example of liberalist persuasion the impact of institutionalisation, which would decrease the risk of war.²⁶

Andrew Moravcsik was the first liberal scholar to introduce the comprehensive liberal theory of European integration called Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In his view, a process of integration is driven by states themselves. Progress can be made if there is a will of member

²² MORAVCSIK, A. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1998, p. 18.

²³ NYE, J. S. and R. O. KEOHANE. *Power and Interdependence*. 4th ed. New York: Longman, 2012, p. 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁵ KARLAS, J. Liberalismus a velké teorie mezinárodních vztahů. *Mezinárodní vztahy*, 2014, 2, p.10.

²⁶ KRATOCHVÍL, P. *Teorie evropské integrace*. Praha: Portál, 2008, p. 167.

states. Moravcsik followed up on the theory of Two-level Games. In the article *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*, Moravcsik claims that “*the EC can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination.*”²⁷ Dimitris N. Chrysochoou adds that Moravcsik’s approach “*take the EU as a regime within which interstate bargaining becomes more efficient.*”²⁸ Above that, it may enhance the power of national leaders. The theory of LI will be examined further in this thesis.

1.3.1. Moravcsik’s criticism of Neo-Functionalism

In 1993, Andrew Moravcsik introduced a new approach in the field of European integration studies. Firstly, the author analysed the neo-functionalism theory. For a long time, it represented the most acknowledged theory explaining the process of integration in Europe. This theory was formulated in the late 1950s. In addition, Ben Rosamond notes that neo-functionalism and integration theory are literally synonyms for many scholars.²⁹ Ernst Haas was one of the most important scholars of neo-functionalism. In his publication *The Uniting of Europe*, Haas introduces neo-functionalist ideas. This theory was built up on a mechanism of spill-over. According to Haas, the process of integration is possible and sustainable if one condition is fulfilled. Therefore, it is determined by the interests of all actors included. If integration meets those interests, then it would be possible.³⁰ Neo-functionalist scholars presume that the state’s political elites agree on the integration in key economic sectors. In the next step, these states decide to establish a supranational organization that would consist of experts. To achieve the goals set out, integration would be required in other areas interconnected to that sector. According to Haas, this would lead to expansion of the integration into other key sectors. Furthermore, it would deepen the process of European integration. He suggested that actors would see integration as a benefit and will continue to support it. They would be more willing to integrate into other sectors. Finally, integration of the European states would spill over from an economic to political sector.³¹ Rosamond concluded that “*this gradual economic integration accompanied by a degree of supranational institutionalization is an*

²⁷ MORAVCSIK, A. *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, 31 (4), p. 474.

²⁸ CHRYSSOCHOOU, D. N. *Theorizing European Integration*. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008, p. 9.

²⁹ ROSAMOND, B. *Theories of European Integration*. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000, p. 50.

³⁰ KRATOCHVÍL, P. *Teorie evropské integrace*. Praha: Portál, 2008, p. 89.

³¹ HAAS, E. *Beyond the National-State. Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, pp. 111-113.

*effective route to the creation of a long-term system of peace in Europe.*³² Neo-functionalism emphasises the role of the supranational character of the process of integration.

The article *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach* written by Andrew Moravcsik, was published in 1993. Firstly, the author analysed the theory of neo-functionalism. Moreover, he pointed out the limitations of this theoretical approach. Moravcsik differentiates empirical and theoretical limits. He admits that integration has spilled over into some of the related policies and areas. However, the spill-over mechanism, a fundamental aspect of neo-functionalist theory, did not deepen integration among European states.³³

Followingly, Moravcsik continued with theoretical limits of neo-functionalism, stating that *“it failed to generate an enduring research programme because it lacked a theoretical core... to provide a sound basis for precise empirical testing and improvement.”*³⁴ The developments within European Community in the 1960s indicated that neo-functionalism failed to predict the evolution of the integration. The era of Charles de Gaulle had undoubtedly an impact on neo-functionalism. De Gaulle redefined a French approach towards European integration built upon the idea of l’Europe des Etats (Europe of nations). Kratochvíl notes that this era showed that the states themselves are key actors.³⁵

1.3.2. Liberal intergovernmentalism approach

Andrew Moravcsik pointed out the limitation of neo-functionalists’ theory that aspired to explain the process of integration in Europe. He intended to establish the theory that would overcome the limitations of those previous approaches. In his view, such a theory should combine general theories of International Relations with the international political economy.³⁶ Moravcsik managed to connect such theoretical approaches that can be contradictory in many ways. He emphasised the role of nation-states, similarly as intergovernmental scholars did. However, intergovernmentalism presented by Stanley Hoffman is based on realist approaches. Moravcsik agrees with the realist assumption that nation-states are the main actors in international relations. However, Moravcsik’s analysis of the state’s behaviour is based on the liberal theory. The author employed three essential elements of LI: *“the assumption of rational*

³² ROSAMOND, B. *Theories of European Integration*. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000, p. 52.

³³ MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, 31 (4), p. 476.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

³⁵ KRATOCHVÍL, P. *Teorie evropské integrace*. Praha: Portál, 2008, p. 95.

³⁶ CÍSAŘ, O. Teorie mezinárodních vztahů a evropská studia. *Politologický časopis* 2002, 8 (1), p. 52.

*state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.*³⁷ His theory is based on a “rationalist framework” of international co-operation. In his words, the framework “*is employed here to designate a set of assumptions that permit us to disaggregate a phenomenon we seek to explain – in this case, successive rounds of international negotiations – into elements each of which can be treated separately.*”³⁸ Moravcsik differentiates three stages of the rational framework. Within the first stage, states formulate their preferences. Moravcsik designates preferences “*not simply a particular set of policy goals but a set of underlying national objectives independent of any particular international negotiation to expand exports, to enhance security... or to realize some ideational goal.*”³⁹ Followingly, in the second stage, states have to develop a strategy for international negotiations. The main element of this phase is bargaining between representatives of states to reach an agreement that would realise the preferences and interests of these states. Finally, in the last stage, nation-states decide to establish supranational institutions and “*choose whether to delegate and pool sovereignty in international institutions that secure the substantive agreements they have made.*”⁴⁰ The concept of the rational framework then means that nation-states as key actors of international relations formulate their preferences. At the international level, they bargain with one another to reach an agreement that would reflect their preferences and interests. These actors choose rationally the strategies of negotiation that would maximise their gains.

Moravcsik set out the theory of national preference formation. At this point, he emphasises the importance of this stage and defined national preferences as “*an ordered and weighted set of values on future substantive outcomes... that might result from international political interaction.*”⁴¹ These preferences represent a consequence of the dynamic processes of the state’s system. Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning note that preferences of states are not fixed or uniform, “*they vary among states and within the same state across time and issues according to issue-specific societal interdependence and domestic institutions.*”⁴² LI suggests that governments develop national preferences as the result of domestic political bargaining,

³⁷ MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, 31 (4), p. 480.

³⁸ MORAVCSIK, A. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1998, p. 19.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴² MORAVCSIK, A. and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A. and T. DIEZ (eds.). *European Integration Theory*. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 67.

and they “*reflect the objectives of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus.*”⁴³ Governments themselves are “aggregators” of preferences. Moravcsik notes that the primary goal of governments is to stay in power. In democracies, they usually need the support of society (by casting their votes in elections), other political parties or interest groups. The interests of these groups are transmitted through the domestic institution. “*Groups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them.*”⁴⁴ The output of this process is a set of formulated national preferences that states then negotiate about at the international level. Liberal theories assume that individuals or groups are key actors in politics. It is then very important not to overlook or ignore them and their interests at the international level. “*The most fundamental influences on foreign policy are, therefore, the identity of important societal groups, the nature of their interests, and their relative influence on domestic policy.*”⁴⁵ There is a visible similarity with Putnam’s theory of Two-level Games, suggesting that actors must reflect domestic interests and preferences at the international level.

LI stresses the importance of the term “issue specific” in the process of forming national preferences. According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, “*LI’s basic theoretical claims is not that producer interests or economic interests prevail always, but that underlying state preferences are driven by preferences functions about how to manage globalization that are issue-specific rather than subordinate to a single overriding policy concern.*”⁴⁶ Regarding the European integration, the authors note that until 1989, the economic preferences outweighed among democratic countries. Furthermore, Moravcsik analysis affirms that governments of states “*reflected concrete economic and regulatory interests rather than more general concerns.*”⁴⁷ Neither security issues nor common values and ideas were the main objects of negotiations at the European level.

Stage two can be characterised as a process of reaching a substantive bargain. It is assumed that the preferences of the states will not overlap precisely. Therefore, the second phase, in which negotiations at the international level are taking place, is very important. The main aim is to reach an agreement between those states that are involved. Representatives of each state must collectively agree on conditions for co-operation that would be beneficial for

⁴³ MORAVCSIK, A. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1998, p. 24.

⁴⁴ MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, 31 (4), p. 483.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 483.

⁴⁶ MORAVCSIK, A and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A., T. A. BÖRZEL and T. RISSE (eds.). *European Integration Theory. Third edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 66.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

everyone. At this point, LI considers the theory of international co-operation. Moravcsik emphasises that states must negotiate such conditions between themselves that would ensure gains for all parties involved. At the same time, however, these states must decide how these gains will be distributed among the individual states.⁴⁸ In the case of the EU, the positive-sum negotiation model has been applied the most. This model assumes that all countries must benefit from the negotiated agreement.⁴⁹ The results of negotiations at the international level depend on the relative bargaining power of the individual actors. Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning suggest that in the EU context, the bargaining power depends on “*asymmetrical interdependence, that is, the uneven distribution of benefits of a specific agreement.*”⁵⁰ This means that those actors who are not keen to a specific agreement can influence the results of the negotiations at the international level. Moravcsik even claims that they can manipulate the negotiations to a certain extent so that the outcomes of the agreement would provide them with an advantage. Actors that do not require a specific agreement can endanger other states by their non-cooperative position. By doing so, they possess the ability to force other countries to make some concessions.⁵¹

Moreover, LI focuses on the efficiency and substantive distributional outcomes of an agreement. By efficiency, Moravcsik means that governments “*generally possess sufficient incentive, expertise and resources to bargain efficiently. They can design proposals, initiate negotiations, identify possibilities for joint gains, reach compromises and create norms and institutions without the intervention of third-party mediators...*”⁵² In this matter, Moravcsik opposes both federalist’s and neo-functionalism’s view that the role of “ideational entrepreneurs” is very important. These approaches emphasise, for example, the personality of Jacques Delors or Jean Monnet and refer to them as the important actors. They possessed a high level of prestige, better information, and contacts. By this idea, LI suggests that within international negotiations, the participation of third parties is not needed. Moravcsik argues that these parties “*rarely possess information or expertise unavailable to states.*”⁵³ According to Mareike Kleine and Mark Pollack, the theory of bargaining within the framework of LI has

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁹ MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st-century Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2018, 56 (7), p. 1653.

⁵⁰ MORAVCSIK, A. and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A. and T. DIEZ (eds.). *European Integration Theory*. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 71.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st-century Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2018, 56 (7), p. 1653.

⁵³ MORAVCSIK, A. and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A., T. A. BÖRZEL and T. RISSE (eds.). *European Integration Theory*. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 68.

been applied to the EU decision-making process. However, it was originally developed to explain the negotiation process of intergovernmental conferences.⁵⁴

In the last stage, Moravcsik suggests that governments involved in the negotiation process would decide to establish an institutional framework to secure the reached agreement. Kleine and Pollack note that there are theoretical and also empirical claims. “*The first claim is about the motives behind institutional choices... The second claim concerns the long-term development of EU institutions and Moravcsik’s insistence that government remained in control for most of this process.*”⁵⁵ Regarding the first claim, Moravcsik assumes that the representatives of states decide to pool and delegate the state’s sovereignty to international institutions. At this point, LI relies on regime theory, “*which treats international institution as instruments to help states implement, elaborate, enforce and extend incomplete contracts under conditions of uncertainty.*”⁵⁶ Moravcsik clarifies that to pool sovereignty, national governments need to agree on other voting procedures for the decision-making in future instead of unanimity. Governments also delegate sovereignty to supranational actors.⁵⁷ This means that the supranational body is allowed to make decisions autonomously to the extent specified in the negotiated agreement.

This chapter introduced the main characteristics of LI. Understanding of the LI is critical for further analysis of the United Kingdom’s role in the CSDP and its developments in the last decades. Moravcsik’s model is based on three stages that include the process of national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. According to LI, the predominant actors in the process of European integration are states themselves. Therefore, this process would not make progress unless the member states would perceive it as a positive in terms of their national interests.

Regarding the first stage of the model, preference formation, LI assumes that the national governments are aggregators of the preferences of individuals or interest groups as a result of domestic bargaining. Moreover, Moravcsik notes that the preferences of the states would rather reflect economic interest. Moving on to the second stage, LI states that the outcomes of interstate bargaining depend on the government’s bargaining power. Therefore, those state governments that are eager to pursue their preferences at the interstate level would

⁵⁴ KLEINE, M. and M. POLLACK. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2018, 56 (7), p. 1498.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 1500.

⁵⁶ MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st-century Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2018, 56 (7), p. 1654.

⁵⁷ MORAVCSIK, A. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1998, p. 67.

take the lead. Moreover, they would endeavour to gain support among other member states and create a coalition. At this point, LI assumes that the governments would authorise the integration if the process would be in conformity with their national preferences. Lastly, regarding the third stage of institutional choice, the LI assumes that the countries would decide to pool their sovereignty and delegate it to the supranational institution. The concrete powers of such an institution would be specified in the negotiated agreement. These assumptions will be tested further in the thesis.

2. The evolution of European security co-operation: Imprints of the United Kingdom

The European continent was devastated after WW2. With the help of the Marshal Plan, approved by the Congress of the United States in 1947, the European countries managed to recover economically. The process of European integration is commonly connected to the idea of economic co-operation. However, the issue of security was crucial after 1945. Jolyon Howorth notes that “*the history of European integration since 1945 is indissociable from the history of attempts to create a relatively autonomous European security and defence identity (ESDI).*”⁵⁸ The security of the European countries was a significant aspect and a motivation for further co-operation. In this chapter, the thesis will characterise the main aspects of the security and defence co-operation in Europe. Firstly, it will focus on the origins of co-operation between European states in security. Furthermore, it will pay attention to the main milestones in the last decades that impacted the development of the ESDP, respectively CSDP. It will also analyse the role of the United Kingdom in the ESDP process and its positions towards strengthening the co-operation in this area.

2.1. The Brussels Treaty

The first attempt that demonstrated an effort of security co-operation was The Treaty of Dunkirk signed between the United Kingdom and France in 1947. The fears of a possible renewal of German military forces represented the main reason of such a bilateral agreement. However, John Baylis concludes that “*although the Dunkirk Treaty focused on the threat from Germany, it was the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union which increasingly preoccupied the minds of Western policy-makers in early 1947.*”⁵⁹ The Soviet Union’s policies in Central and Eastern European countries put pressure on Western political leaders to act. The establishment of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was one of the reasons for convening a conference at which Western countries agreed to co-operate in the field of security. The representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Economic, Social, Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-

⁵⁸ HOWORTH, J. National defence and European security integration: an illusion inside a chiméra? In: HOWORTH, J. and A. MENON (eds.). *The European Union and National Defence Policy*. London: Routledge, 1997, p. 11.

⁵⁹ BAYLIS, J. Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment. *International Affairs*, 1984, 60 (4), p. 618.

Defence on 17 March 1948.⁶⁰ This treaty became known as the Brussel pact, and it established the Western Union. Furthermore, in John Baylis's opinion, the Brussel Pact was "*an important, some would say vital, milestone on the road to the formation of NATO, and Britain's role in its formation is clearly of great importance in the wide evaluation.*"⁶¹ Most of the objectives and tasks defined in the Brussels Treaty were subsequently taken over by the NATO established in 1949.⁶² Although the matters of security were on NATO's agenda, the debates among European states continued.

2.2. European Defence Community

In the 1950s, the US pressure on European countries to create an autonomous defence structure increased. The beginning of the Cold War divided the world into Western and Eastern bloc. Moreover, it was the Korean War that also exerted pressure on the issue of European defence. At the same time, the belief that Germany must be involved in Western structures prevailed. These circumstances led to the introduction of the Pleven Plan, which proposed the establishment of a European Defence Community. In the article *The European Defence Community*, the author described the meeting in Strasbourg in 1950, noting that representatives of the UK and Germany itself agreed on Germany's involvement in further European defence co-operation. The author also mentioned that "*one West German representative said that his country was ready to contribute to European defence...*"⁶³ French attitude to this issue was quite reluctant. John Goormaghtigh described that "*at the New York meeting of the North Atlantic Council, in September 1950, that German divisions should be included in the Western Defence System, it came as a blow to most Frenchmen.*"⁶⁴ In the end, French representatives agreed that Germany should be involved in further European security co-operation. Followingly, the French Prime Minister was instructed to prepare a draft declaration on German rearmament. The proposal presented by Robert Pleven was known as Pleven Plan. He proposed the creation of the European army that would be under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Pleven Plan proposed that the European army "*would be composed of*

⁶⁰ The Brussel Treaty, 17 March 1948.

⁶¹ BAYLIS, J. Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment. *International Affairs*, 1984, 60 (4), p. 616.

⁶² KHOL, R. Západoevropská unie – spící obr, či nedochůdče? *Czech Journal of International Relations*, 1996, 31 (2), p. 30.

⁶³ H.G.L. The European Defence Community. *The World Today*, 1952, 8 (6), p. 236.

⁶⁴ GOORMAGHTIGH, J. France and the European Community. *International Journal*, 1954, 9 (2), p. 96.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

*contingents incorporated at the level of the smallest possible unit – battalion or brigade.*⁶⁶ It was proposed that the army of each member state would become contingents of the European army. The agreement that established the European Security Community was signed in Paris in 1952. The UK participated in the negotiations and meetings during which this plan was discussed. However, it decided not to take a part and did not sign the agreement.

Gerhard Bebr notes that in order to form such a community, there is a condition that member states have to delegate part of their state sovereignty to a supranational authority. This was the main factor that led to the failure of Pleven's proposal.⁶⁷ Although the French Prime Minister, Robert Pleven, drew up and presented this plan, the French Parliament refused to ratify the treaty establishing the European Defence Community. John Goormaghtigh differentiates several arguments of the French opponents. Firstly, it was, he calls it "*purely emotional hostility to any form of German rearmament – rather understandable in the light of history.*"⁶⁸ In his opinion, the opponents feared that Germany would exploit these armed forces to acquire its unity. The second argument that the opponents rested on was the matter of the pooling of national sovereignty in the security and defence sector.⁶⁹

2.3. Western European Union

After the unsuccessful ratification in France, the idea of creating the European army within the European Defence Community vanished. The UK took the initiative and proposed an extension of the Brussels Pact, which was created in 1948. This represented one of the first steps in the process of European security integration. After the establishment of NATO, the Western Union found itself in the shadows of NATO, and its importance declined significantly. Following the collapse of the European Defence Community, European security co-operation needed a new impetus. Therefore, the UK suggested that Italy and West Germany should join the Western Union.⁷⁰ Accordingly, the Western European Union (WEU) was established by signing the agreement in Paris in 1954. It became known as Modified Brussels Treaty. According to Alyson JK Bailes and Graham Messervy-Whiting, this treaty "*was, on paper, still a serious expression of collective defence.*"⁷¹ The Modified Brussels Treaty included mutual

⁶⁶ H.G.L. The European Defence Community. *The World Today*, 1952, 8 (6), p. 238.

⁶⁷ BEBR, G. The European Defence Community and the Western European Union: An Agonizing Dilemma. *Stanford Law Review*, 1955, 7 (2), p. 170.

⁶⁸ GOORMAGHTIGH, J. France and the European Community. *International Journal*, 1954, 9 (2), p. 105.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 105.

⁷⁰ FRANK, L. and R. KHOL. Evropské bezpečnostní struktury. *Obrana a Strategie*, 2003, 2 (2), p. 19.

⁷¹ BAILES, A. JK. And G. MESSERVY-WHITING. *Death of an Institution. The end for Western European Union, a future for European defence?* Brussels: Academia Press for Egmont, 2011, p. 12.

defence clauses, and respectively in Article V, it states: “*If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Chapter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.*”⁷² The Western European Union has taken over some of the tasks and responsibilities of the Brussels Pact.

2.4. Maastricht Treaty and Common Foreign and Security Policy

After the failure of the Pleven Plan to establish the European Defence Community, security co-operation between European states had continued within a framework of the WEU. For more than three decades, the development of European security co-operation did not meet any significant progress. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) adopted in Luxembourg in 1970 was an exception. “*The EPC was purely an intergovernmental process through which the Member States agreed to cooperate in the field of foreign policy by consulting each other regularly and, when possible, harmonizing their views and instituting joint actions.*”⁷³ There was a necessity to discuss the issue of European security and defence again in the late 1980s. This reassessment was determined by some of the significant events that took place at the international level. It was, for example, the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc or the Gulf war. Nevertheless, the most significant impetus was the war in Yugoslavia, which ended in a bloody genocide. The European Community had been widely criticized for not being able to deal with the situation on the European continent.

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, represented a milestone in the process of creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Treaty on European Union (TEU) put down the basis for the creation of European Union. TEU defines the structure and functions of the Union. After the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was built upon three main pillars. The first pillar represented the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The second one included the provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters was represented in the third pillar.⁷⁴

Title V, article J.1 of the TEU states that “*The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provision of this Title*

⁷² Modified Brussels Treaty (Paris, 23 October 1954).

⁷³ DUQUETTE, E. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Emerging from the U.S. Shadow. *Davis Journal of International Law and Policy*, 2001, 7 (2), p. 171.

⁷⁴ Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992.

and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.”⁷⁵ Florika Fink-Hooijer argues that the development of this policy and the fulfilment of its goals depends entirely on the willingness of individual member states.⁷⁶

During the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, John Major led the conservative British government. Even though the UK supported the adoption of the Treaty, its stance towards proposal on CFSP, including the issues of security and defence, was reserved. The UK’s priority was to maintain the strong role of NATO in matters of security co-operation. In this respect, the TEU states that CFSP “*shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty...*”⁷⁷ Moreover, an idea of the supranational character of CFSP was unacceptable for Major’s cabinet. Therefore, Major emphasised that this policy had to be based on the intergovernmental framework. Foreign and security policy are traditionally a matter of high politics. Hence, member states were hesitant towards proposals that would undermine the state’s sovereignty. The UK insisted on the intergovernmental approach. Therefore, it pursued unanimity within the CFSP decision-making process.⁷⁸

The Maastricht Treaty represented a significant step for European security co-operation. According to some scholars, the Treaty set ambitious goals for foreign and security policy. “*The inclusion of security matters is probably the major innovation of the CFSP. It permits the European Union to act effectively to security challenges, in whatever form, and to anticipate crisis situations.*”⁷⁹ On the other hand, some scholars criticised the CFSP and pointed out its limits. Antonio Missiroli reminds the Albanian crisis in 1996-97 as an example of the failure of the CFSP. According to him, the EU was not able to agree on intervention in Albania. In particular, the UK and Germany refused to act.⁸⁰ Moreover, Simon Nuttall comments on CFSP “*that the more serious it gets, especially over the use of force, the more it needs to operate within solid legal structures, and the more it operates within solid legal structures, the less likely it is to be able to react flexibly to unforeseen challenges.*”⁸¹ This is a major limitation of

⁷⁵ Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, p. 123.

⁷⁶ FINK-HOOIJER, F. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1994, 5, p. 173.

⁷⁷ Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, p. 126.

⁷⁸ WEI-FANG, C. *National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany*. Durham University, 2012, p. 125-6.

⁷⁹ FINK-HOOIJER, F. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1994, 5, p. 194.

⁸⁰ MISSIROLI, A. *CFSP, Defence and Flexibility*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2000, p. 21.

⁸¹ NUTTALL, S. „Ad-hocery“ Is a Neutral Concept. In MISSIROLI, A. (ed.). *Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in European Security Matters: Assets or Liabilities?*, Occasional Paper 6. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1999, p. 29.

the CFSP. Member states are not willing to delegate their power in such areas as foreign policy or security and defence.

2.5. Treaty of Amsterdam and European Defence

The events of the late 1990s were very important for the development of security and defence cooperation between EU member states. The intergovernmental conference was convened in 1996 to negotiate amendments to the Maastricht Treaty. The negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997. The changes contained in the Treaty also had an impact on CFSP. However, the pillar structure remained. The CFSP continued to represent the second pillar which was based on intergovernmental co-operation.⁸² The Treaty of Amsterdam set a new goal for CFSP to strengthen mutual coherence and solidarity between member states. At the same time, the Treaty deals with a decision-making mechanism. Franklin Dehousse notes that the Amsterdam Treaty “*sought to achieve a compromise between the need to develop qualified majority voting, for reasons of efficiency, and the will to protect essential national interests.*”⁸³ Regarding QMV, the UK strongly opposed a proposal to implement this mechanism in matters of security and defence. Newly appointed Tony Blair refused the adoption of QMV because it would weaken the UK position within CFSP. Like previous conservative governments, the New Labour favoured the intergovernmental framework in this area.⁸⁴

Furthermore, the Constructive Abstention mechanism was introduced. It means that a member state can opt-out, but at the same time, it will not prevent the adoption of decisions by other members. Dehousse adds that “*a decision is made by the Union, but the Member State that abstains is not bound by that decision... it shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision.*”⁸⁵ Moreover, the Treaty implemented joint actions and common positions.

In matters related to security co-operation, the Treaty has integrated Petersberg tasks. These operations or tasks were defined in the Petersberg Declaration concluded by WEU Foreign and Defence ministers in 1992. According to the provisions of this declaration, military

⁸² Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997. Article J.7.

⁸³ DEHOUSSE, F. After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1998, 9, p. 532.

⁸⁴ WEI-FANG, Ch. *National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany*. Durham University, 2012, p. 128.

⁸⁵ DEHOUSSE, F. After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1998, 9, p. 533.

forces of member states might be employed in the following situations: Humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping or crisis management tasks.⁸⁶ Treaty also modified the relations between the EU and WEU. Article J.7 states:

*“The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”*⁸⁷

Even though the Treaty introduced some changes in the field of security, Dehousse criticises it for a weak defence chapter. In his view, EU countries are not willing to take steps towards an integrated operational structure.⁸⁸

2.6. The Saint-Malo Declaration: establishment of European Security and Defence Policy

The development of co-operation between the member states in security and defence in the late 1990s was determined by the convergence of the positions of the UK and France. The events on the European continent (war in Yugoslavia or Kosovo crisis) represented the impetus for discussions regarding the establishment of security policy. The EU has failed to stabilise the situation in Kosovo. The situation was managed with the help of US military forces. *“Gradually, it became clear that, if the EU was ever to emerge as a serious actor, it would need to develop autonomous capacity, both institutional and military.”*⁸⁹ The UK and France have reconsidered their positions and sought to open a debate on creating a new strong crisis management mechanism within the EU.

The UK’s traditional position towards the idea of creating the European army was restrained due to a special relationship with the US. The change of the British position was reflected at the informal meeting of the European Council in Pörschach in 1998. At a press

⁸⁶ PAGANI, F. A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1998, 9, p. 738.

⁸⁷ Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997. Article J.7.

⁸⁸ DEHOUSSE, F. After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1998, 9, p. 536.

⁸⁹ HOWORTH, J. Saint-Malo plus five: An Interim Assessment of ESDP. *Policy papers* N. 7, 2003, p. 4.

conference after the meeting, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair said: “*In respect of common foreign and security policy, there was a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role.*”⁹⁰ The changing direction of European security was apparent at the summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998. Here, the UK and France agreed on the necessity to create a military element of the EU. Followingly, the Saint-Malo Declaration was signed. Both countries expressed a common interest in strengthening the capacity for action in the field of defence policy. “*St-Malo is seen as the founding act of ESDP because it reaffirms the European Union as the most appropriate framework for the simultaneous achievement of three objectives that are difficult to reconcile elsewhere: military effectiveness, transatlantic solidarity and a strengthening of Europe’s political power.*”⁹¹ According to the Saint-Malo Declaration, the EU should be a full-fledged actor in the international arena. The Union must have the capacity to take autonomous action in response to international crises. At the same time, the relationship between the EU and NATO was addressed. The Union would act and make decisions that are in accordance with the obligations within NATO. It also states that the EU will contribute to the modernisation of the Alliance and emphasises that NATO is the foundation of the collective defence of member countries.⁹²

The document *European Council Declaration on Strengthening the common European policy on security and defence* published in 1999 set out proposals for further development of EU security, including a set of the European headline goal regarding military capabilities.⁹³ The Saint-Malo Declaration was a key document for the foundation of common European security policy. The Cologne European Council in April 1999 represented another opportunity for discussions on security and defence issues. The Kosovo crisis was an important impetus for future debates on strengthening security and defence in Europe. The conclusions of the summit included two important steps towards strengthening of European security. Firstly, the functions of the WEU have been transferred to the EU. As a result, the EU acquired new defence capabilities at its disposal. The second important step was the appointment of Javier Solana as the first High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ BLAIR, T. In RUTTEN, M. *From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents*. Chaillot Papers. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2001, p. 1.

⁹¹ GNESSOTTO, N. ESDP: result and prospects. In GNESSOTTO, N. (ed). *EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004)*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, p. 13.

⁹² Joint Declaration on European Defence, Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998).

⁹³ Cologne European Council Declaration on the common policy on security and defence (4 June 1999).

⁹⁴ OAKES, M. *European Defence: From Pörschach to Helsinki*. House of Commons Library, 2000, p. 23.

Furthermore, the ESDP required the creation of a decision-making mechanism for crisis management. The decisive factor in this regard was the Helsinki summit in 1999, where the leaders of the member states agreed to set up political and military bodies within the EU Council.⁹⁵ Moreover, representatives of member states designated to establish “*a multinational corps-level force of 50,000-60,000 personnel capable of mounting an autonomous European mission if NATO did not itself become active in a crisis situation.*”⁹⁶ Military capacities of the EU were supposed to be established by the end of 2003. The European Council summit in Santa Maria da Feira in 2000 also had an impact on ESDP. Mainly, the principles of the relationship between the EU and non-EU member states of NATO were set up. Furthermore, the mutual relations of the EU and NATO had been discussed. European leaders had agreed on the modification of issues regarding security and military capacity. Moreover, member states have agreed on the institutionalization of permanent consultation. In respect of civilian aspects of crisis management, the summit identified the priorities for this area. In this matter, member states, “*they will to be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations.*”⁹⁷ The conclusion of this summit also included the aim to establish permanent political and military structures. The events of the 1990s had changed the international security environment. The Saint-Malo initiative was a reaction to these dynamics. The EU had to face new threats such as terrorism, therefore the further development of European defence needed to be addressed.

2.7. Treaty of Nice and the European Security and Defence Policy

Following previous discussions, the Nice Summit introduced changes within the ESDP. The conclusions, summarised in The Presidency Report, included proposals for other capacity goals for military crisis management. There was a need to create permanent political and military structures within the EU. Regarding ESDP institutional structure, the European Council agreed on the establishment of three main bodies that would deal with political and security issues within the EU. Firstly, the former Political Committee was transformed into the Political and Security Committee. The Council Decision adopted in February 2000 states in its Article 1: “*The Political Committee established by Article 25 of Treaty on European Union shall meet in Brussels under a separate formation, called the “Interim Political and Security*

⁹⁵ BRITZ, M. and A. ERIKSSON. The European security and defence policy: a fourth system of european foreign policy? *Politique Européenne*, 2005, 3 (17), p. 39.

⁹⁶OAKES, M. *European Defence: From Pörtlach to Helsinki*. House of Commons Library, 2000, p. 32.

⁹⁷ Conclusions of the Presidency Santa Maria da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000.

*Committee.*⁹⁸ This body is composed by national representatives who are responsible for CFSP issues that also include ESDP matters. Ramses A. Wessel notes that the Committee “*shall exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations*”⁹⁹ and also comments that “*the reason to turn the original Political Committee into the PSC was to adapt it to the institutional needs emerging out of the development of ESDP.*”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the Committee’s task is to deal with the issues of the ESDP.

Secondly, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) was established. It represents the main military body for the meeting of the representatives of member states, more specifically, national chiefs of defence. Its responsibilities are modified followingly: “*The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework.*”¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the EUMC represents the forum for discussion among member states regarding security and defence issues that include crisis management or conflict prevention matters. The co-operation of the PSC and the EUMC is necessary. EUMC also provides military recommendations to the Political and Security Committee. Lastly, the very important body called Military Staff responsible for providing early warning, and strategic planning of Petersberg task was established.¹⁰²

2.8. Lisbon Treaty and establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy

The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, has brought significant changes to ESDP. The Treaty not only changes the name of the European Security and Defence Policy, but it also modifies the institutional structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Within the framework of the CSDP, the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was newly established. This instrument enables a group of EU member states to co-operate more closely in security and defence areas.¹⁰³ Gordon Brown was in favour to adopt the amendment regarding PESCO. According to Simón, the UK decision was influenced by the pressure of its EU partners, France and Germany. British

⁹⁸ Council Decision 2000/143/CFSP of 14 February 2000.

⁹⁹ WESSEL, A. R. The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 2003, 8 (2), p. 275.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

¹⁰¹ Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001.

¹⁰² WESSEL, A. R. The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 2003, 8 (2), p. 276.

¹⁰³ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007.

government strongly opposed the proposal for creating the EU HQ as it would undermine NATO.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the PESCO might be a channel through which the UK can pursue its own security and defence interests. In addition, provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on mutual assistance and solidarity between the EU Member States were adopted.

In matters of the institutional structure of CSDP, Lisbon Treaty introduces several changes. The creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy represented one of the most significant amendments. This position is dual as HR also represents the European Commission at the same time. The main reason for this dual role of HR is the idea that it would represent coherence and efficiency between the EU institutions.¹⁰⁵ This newly created post replaced the previously established function of High Representative for the CFSP and the position of Commissioner for External Relations. Moreover, the High Representative conducts the CFSP and CSDP and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council formation within the framework of the Council of the EU.¹⁰⁶ The very important task of the High Representative is to represent the European Union externally and engage in dialogue with other countries. Moreover, the European External Action Service was established to provide assistance to HR in matters of foreign affairs and defence policy. Formally created in 2011, it represents a diplomatic service of the EU. Article 13a of the TEU states: *“In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States...”*¹⁰⁷ The EEAS represents a sui generis formation that operates under the decision of the Council. Furthermore, the European Defence Agency was incorporated as a part of the institutional framework of CSDP. The Agency’s task defined by Article 28 D of TEU is, for example, to contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives or even to support technology research in the field of defence.¹⁰⁸ The HR is the head of the European Defence Agency.

The first appointment of HR was controversial. The UK’s candidate for this position was Lady Catherine Ashton. Even though she was appointed as the HR, her competencies were questioned because Ashton’s experiences in foreign policy were limited. Jolyon Howorth describes that *“rather than attempt to identify the most qualified person, the member states*

¹⁰⁴ SIMÓN, L. *Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security: The EU-NATO Conundrum in Perspective*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 212.

¹⁰⁵ NISSEN, CH. *European Defence Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty: The road paved for increased momentum*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, December 2007, Article 9 E.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 13a.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 28 D.

introduced arcane criteria for the appointment, such as citizenship of a small state or a large state, a Northern state or a Southern state, right- or left-wing political affiliation, and even gender."¹⁰⁹ Since Ashton represented the left-centre, it would be a counterbalance to Barroso as well as Van Rompuy. Moreover, Tony Blair failed and did not become a President of the EU Council. Jose Manuel Barroso was appointed as the President of the EU Commission. Therefore, the HR was supposed to be a candidate from the large, northern state to reach a balance among member states.¹¹⁰ In the end, the British candidate, Catherine Ashton, became the first HR.

Lisbon Treaty introduces so-called PESCO. This instrument allows a group of member states that are willing to strengthen co-operation in security and defence matters. Those members that want to participate in PESCO need to fulfil stringent criteria in terms of military capabilities. The conditions are set out in Protocol 10, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.¹¹¹ It stipulates that the member states must commit themselves to budgetary and deployability commitments.¹¹² The PESCO was established in December 2017, and 25 Member States decided to join this enhanced co-operation. In that time, only UK, Malta and Denmark chose not to be a part of PESCO. The Lisbon Treaty have, therefore a significant impact on the CSDP as it modifies institutional structure. Moreover, it provides a legal framework for the creation of EEAS, EDA or PESCO.

¹⁰⁹ HOWORTH, J. Catherine Ashton's five-year term: a difficult assessment. *Les Cahiers Europeens de Sciences Po.*, 2014, 3, p. 6.

¹¹⁰ KLEINENDORST, S. *The Appointment of the High Representative: A Balancing Exercise at the Highest Level of the EU*. Leiden University, 2020, pp. 23-4.

¹¹¹ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007, Protocol 10.

¹¹² NISSEN, CH. *European Defence Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty: The road paved for increased momentum*. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015, p. 15.

3. The United Kingdom's position towards the ESDP/CSDP since 1997

The UK's position towards the CSDP will be the main object of the following part of the thesis. After the end of WW2, European political leaders were eager to maintain peace on the continent and prevent destructive wars in future. The UK's role was very important as it was a significant military actor. Although the UK was not one of the founding states of the European Coal and Steel Community, it was, indeed, very much involved in European security co-operation since the 1950s. The first expressions of willingness to co-operate in security were represented by an agreement signed between the UK and France, the so-called Dunkirk Treaty. The UK subsequently became a member of the Western Union, within which the member states committed themselves to co-operate in the field of security.¹¹³ Following the failure of Pleven's plan that proposed the creation of a European Defence Community, the UK initiated the enlargement of the Western Union. The UK suggested to include two more members, namely Italy and West Germany. Thanks to this initiative, the Western European Union was created.¹¹⁴

This chapter will focus on the attitude and preferences promoted by the UK at the EU level in security and defence. The chapter will be divided into two parts. Firstly, it will analyse the UK's position towards European defence of the New Labour government including Tony Blair's and Gordon Brown's cabinets. The second part will focus on the government of David Cameron concerning its position on CSDP. The reason for the specific time delimitation is that since the 1997, the matter of European security has sped up, and the dynamics within this field were apparent. The work will focus on creating preferences at the national level. Furthermore, the thesis will analyse the UK's ability to enforce national preferences and interests in the negotiation process at the EU level.

3.1. New Labour: Europeanization of defence policy

This part of the thesis pays attention to the preferences and interests of the UK regarding European defence, set out under the leadership of Tony Blair. The conservative PM John Major was the one who led the British government at a time of discussions and negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty that had a significant impact on the structure and functioning of the EU. Notably, the British government insisted on the intergovernmental approach to CFSP. His successor, Tony Blair, promoted the idea of the UK as a leader in the

¹¹³ The Brussel Treaty, 17 March 1948.

¹¹⁴ Modified Brussels Treaty (Paris, 23 October 1954).

EU. Therefore, the new preferences and priorities of the UK were set out. *What factors influenced the direction of the British government in security and defence matters? Had the security preferences that the UK changed from the long-term perspective?* In the following paragraphs, this thesis will focus on the analysis of these aspects. Furthermore, this chapter will examine how the British representatives have succeeded in enforcing these preferences within the negotiation process at the EU level.

In 1997, the Labour Party won the general elections, replacing the conservative government, which had been in power for almost 20 years. The leader of the Labour Party was Tony Blair, who subsequently became the PM. During the election campaign, the Labour Party had expressed its pro-European stance. Tony Blair stated that one of the party's main goal was to bring Britain to the heart of Europe.¹¹⁵ In its Labour Party Manifesto 1997: New Labour because Britain deserves better, the party committed itself to defend Britain's interests and promote reforms in the EU; *"We will stand up for Britain's interests in Europe after the shambles of the last six years, but, more than that, we will lead a campaign for reform in Europe."*¹¹⁶ The party emphasised the maintenance of the right to use the veto in key areas such as national interests, tax issues, and defence. Moreover, the Labour Party expressed its position towards further development within the EU: *"Our vision of Europe is of an alliance of independent nations choosing to co-operate to achieve the goals they cannot achieve alone. We oppose a European federal superstate."*¹¹⁷ In this matter, Labour Party did not differentiate itself from its conservative opponent.

One of the Labour government's first tasks was to negotiate the Amsterdam Treaty, which aimed to revise the TEU. The UK sought to maintain its veto on foreign policy issues. In the case of European security, the UK opposed the proposal regarding the expansion and deepening of integration within the WEU, which was advocated, for example, by Germany and France. Andrew Moravcsik added that *"...by governments like Britain, with a credible unilateral policy and a commitment to NATO, who adamantly opposed any such policy uncoordinated with NATO."*¹¹⁸ On the other hand, the author noted that the position of the UK changed after the Labour government led by Tony Blair came into power. According to him, New Labour was more supportive in case of co-operation in social policy at the European

¹¹⁵ MILZOW, K. Europe and the European Union in the Discourse of Tony Blair. *Cahiers Charles V*, 2006, 41, p. 121.

¹¹⁶ Labour Party Manifesto 1997: New Labour because Britain deserves better.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ MORAVCSIK, A. and K. NICALOIDIS. Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1999, 37 (1), p. 64.

level.¹¹⁹ However, its position on security issues did not differ significantly from the previous Conservative government. The vision of the merger of the WEU with the EU did not meet the success due to British opposition. The UK's decision was supported by the neutral countries during the negotiations.¹²⁰ The member states also agreed to incorporate the Schengen Agreement. The Labour government had also expressed the same restrained stance on this issue as its predecessor. In the end, the UK managed to negotiate an exception not to participate in the Schengen.

The UK emphasised the transatlantic link while maintaining a so-called special relationship with the US. Tony Blair had a vision of the UK as a bridge between the United States and the EU. Security co-operation within NATO, which is the main guarantor of collective security, was very important. Therefore, the UK did not support proposals that would undermine NATO's role in Europe. *“The British political identity stresses their otherness, which places them somewhere between the rest of Europe and the United States. Moreover, the British foreign policy strategy strongly relies on the doctrine of special relationship with the United States.”*¹²¹ During the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, the United Kingdom rejected incorporating the CFSP into the first pillar based on the Community method. The UK rejected the proposal to strengthen the supranational character of security and defence matters.¹²² Instead, they promoted transatlantic co-operation within NATO.

A significant change in the UK's preferences regarding European security was visible in 1998. Representatives of the UK and France held talks at the Saint-Malo summit, where these two countries agreed on the so-called Saint-Malo Declaration on European Defence.¹²³ The Declaration represented an essential document, which subsequently set out the basis for further development of the European Security and Defence Policy. This step represented a radical change in the UK's stance on security issues. The Saint-Malo initiative proposed a strengthening EU's defence capability.¹²⁴ It also emphasised the EU's role in international relations, as it is very important for the EU to be able to respond to international crises immediately.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ MISSIROLI, A. The EU, WEU and ESDI: Amsterdam and beyond. *Insight Turkey*, 1999, 1 (2), p. 29.

¹²¹ MÖLDER, H. British Approach to the European Union: From Tony Blair to David Cameron. In TROITINO, D. R., T. KERIKMAE and A. CHOCHIA (eds.). *Brexit: history, reasoning and perspectives*. Cham: Springer, 2018, p. 154.

¹²² WEI-FANG, C. *National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany*. Durham University, 2012, p. 125-6.

¹²³ Joint Declaration on European Defence, Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

One of the main factors that have influenced British foreign and security policy is the so-called special relationship with the US. Close US-UK ties significantly influenced Britain's stance on the integration process, especially in the security and defence area. Paul Cornish describes this special relationship followingly: "*The US-UK strategic relationship colours the UK's attitude towards both NATO and the EU's efforts in the security and defence dimension.*"¹²⁵ Although Tony Blair favoured closer security and defence co-operation between EU member states, NATO's role in the British approach remained unchanged. The British government has pursued closer co-operation in security under the condition that this cooperation would not undermine NATO's foundation. The Declaration of Saint-Malo states that "*In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.*"¹²⁶ Declaration strictly rejected any attempts to duplicate NATO structures. The UK's pro-Atlantic approach to European security issues has not only been influenced by its special relationship with the US. To some extent, this attitude was also a result of the fact that the UK sought to establish a security organisation in the past. "*...the establishment of the Alliance was a result of British diplomatic efforts and neither the Labour party nor the Conservative Party has ever questioned British membership of NATO.*"¹²⁷ In addition, the author also emphasises the role of the UK in NATO: "*Furthermore Britain's advocacy of the transatlantic relationship and the primacy of NATO have left Britain in a very privileged position within NATO, where it retains far more influence than its actual political and military power.*"¹²⁸ Therefore, NATO has always been a key international organisation in the UK's security and defence matters.

During the Cold War, Europe was dependent on US defence assistance. The US became a guarantor of security and peace on the European continent. Its role within NATO is crucial as it is a country with the largest military capabilities in the world. Therefore, the UK's interest is not to change the status quo. In this manner, the US should remain the guarantor of European security and should continue in its engagement in Europe. However, developments during the 1990s suggested that the US were less willing to engage in affairs ongoing in Europe.

¹²⁵ CORNISH, P. United Kingdom. In BIEHL, H., B. GIEGERICH and A. JONAS (eds.), *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013, p. 377.

¹²⁶ Joint Declaration on European Defence, Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998).

¹²⁷ JONSON, P. *The Development of the European Security Defence Policy – An Assessment of Preferences, Bargains and Outcomes*. Stockholm: FOI, 2006, p. 159.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

The wars in the Balkans have highlighted the EU's inability to respond to the situation at that time. Furthermore, the situation showed the US's reluctance to act.¹²⁹ The Kosovo crisis was an impetus for the EU to rethink its security policy. According to Robert Dover, the escalation in the Balkans impacted the UK government's decision to introduce an idea of strengthening the EU defence capacities in Pörtlach.¹³⁰ On the other hand, Latawski and Smith think that the Kosovo crisis had not directly led to the establishment of the ESDP. However, it highlighted the need for a change within the EU in terms of security and defence policy.¹³¹ At the same time, the crisis has pointed out that Europe and the US are moving away from each other. The UK was not interested in decreasing Europe's security dependence on the United States.

Another important factor that influenced the British government was the EU project of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The United Kingdom was reluctant to the idea of strengthening economic integration. At the Intergovernmental Conference in Maastricht, the British Prime Minister, John Major, successfully negotiated an opt-out. Protocol was adopted, and it states that "*the United Kingdom shall not be obliged or committed to move to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union without a separate decision to do so by its government and Parliament.*"¹³² Therefore, the United Kingdom is not bound to take part in the third stage of EMU, in which the common currency Euro was to be introduced gradually. The Labour government's position towards the single currency was less reserved. Nevertheless, Tony Blair declared that the United Kingdom would adopt the euro only if the conditions of the five economic tests would meet. However, the adoption of the single currency is dependent on a referendum result.¹³³ The UK's approach to deepening economic integration has always been reserved. Tony Blair desired the UK to be among leaders within the EU. Due to UK's non-participation in the EMU project, Blair had to redirect the integration in another area that would be led by the UK.¹³⁴ During the UK presidency in 1998, the launch of the third phase of EMU was among the priorities. However, the UK did not take part in the negotiations. It was clear

¹²⁹ JOPP, M. Introduction. In JOPP, M. (ed). *The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations*, [online]. Chaillot Paper 17, Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1994, p. 4, [viewed 5 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp017e.pdf>.

¹³⁰ DOVER, R. The Prime Minister and the Core Executive: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Reading of UK Defence Policy Formulation 1997-2000. *BJPIR*, 2005, 7, p. 513.

¹³¹ LATAWSKI, P. and M. SMITH. *The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 137-138.

¹³² Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 1992.

¹³³ POTTON, E. and A. MELLOWS-FACER. *The euro? Background to the five economic tests* [online]. Research Paper 03/53, House of Commons Library, 2003, p. 7 [viewed 6 November 2021]. Available from: <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP03-53/RP03-53.pdf>.

¹³⁴ BULMER, S. *New Labour and the European Union 1997-2007*. Working Paper, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008, p. 6.

that the UK's role as a key player in the EU had not been fulfilled. Hence, new priority areas in which the UK would play a key role were identified. The priorities set out by the UK government included security and defence issues within the EU. Charles Grant comments that *"In the spring of 1998 Mr Blair began to talk about Britain taking a lead on the European defence. He may have realised that, if the British could appear to be better Europeans in this area, they might win considerable credit with their partners."*¹³⁵ Followingly, the UK and France agreed on co-operation in the field of European security.

The joint initiative of the UK and France was a very important step towards the establishment of the ESDP. Co-operation of these two politically strong member states had a significant impact on further security and defence negotiations. UK negotiators, led by PM Blair, have succeeded in enforcing the formulated national preferences. Based on the analysis of the outputs from Saint-Malo, it can be concluded that the UK was successful. New Labour analysed a policy area in which the UK would play a key role at the European level. British emphasis on the transatlantic partnership within NATO was also reflected in the outcome of the negotiations. NATO's function must therefore not be undermined, and EU member states must respect their commitments to this organisation.¹³⁶ At the same time, the UK convinced France that co-operation in this area is necessary. Saint-Malo talks between the UK and France were an important momentum. The Declaration provided a framework for further negotiations regarding security and defence. Robert Dover argues that the UK was aware that if it acquired a strong player such as France, it would also secure a stronger negotiating position for the UK in upcoming summits.¹³⁷ Therefore, such co-operation between the UK and France strengthened the British negotiating position and its ability to enforce formulated preferences within the EU.

The development of ESDP was significantly affected by the War on terror that was declared by the US President after 9/11. The UK emphasised the importance of mutual relations with the US. In this respect, the interests and preferences of the UK have not changed. Hence, the UK expressed its support for US strategy, including a decision to invade in Iraq.¹³⁸ According to Howorth, the UK began reassessing its priorities in 2001, resulting in *"de-emphasizing the European context and focusing on the global picture."*¹³⁹ The UK's position

¹³⁵ GRANT, C. *Can Britain lead in Europe*. London: Centre for European Reform, 1998, p. 45.

¹³⁶ Joint Declaration on European Defence, Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998).

¹³⁷ DOVER, R. *Europeanization of British Defence Policy*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007, p. 54.

¹³⁸ KRAMER, S. P. Blair's Britain after Iraq. *Foreign Affairs*, 2003, 82 (4), p. 97.

¹³⁹ HOWORTH, J. Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment of ESDP. *Groupement D'Études Et De Recherches*, Policy papers 2003, 7, p. 11.

caused turbulence in further negotiations on the ESDP structure. This situation culminated in a crisis between the member states, especially between the UK, France, and Germany. For the UK, it has always been important not to undermine NATO. The division between the two states that initiated the establishment of ESDP was evident.

France's stance on US strategy was sceptical, and its representatives promoted a multipolar world order. However, the UK did not share this idea. Tony Blair was in favour of unipolarity.¹⁴⁰ In 2003, a summit of four EU countries, Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, took place to discuss the further development of ESDP. As one of the strongest security actors in the EU, the UK did not attend the summit. These countries proposed to set up an operational planning centre for the EU outside NATO. However, NATO's role was emphasised in the final report. The UK could not allow the proposal to be adopted, as there were fears that such a decision would adversely affect NATO's future.¹⁴¹ On the contrary, the British government proposed that an operational planning centre should be established within SHAPE. The outcome of further negotiations, in which the UK actively participated, continued to respect the commitments made within NATO. On the other hand, the UK had to back down and agree that the EU would build its planning centre independently. However it would not undermine NATO.¹⁴² At the same time, the UK lost an important ally, France. Therefore, the UK's negotiating position at the European level has been weakened.

Tensions were evident during the European Convention on the Future of the EU in 2003. The UK refused to support the proposal to include a mutual defence clause in the Constitutional Treaty. At the same time, UK's position towards the proposal on structured cooperation was sceptical, as it would lead to a removal of NATO from the EU's defence plans. Jolyon Howorth adds that "... *London remained concerned about were the implications in structured co-operation that a small number of self-selected states could short-circuit decision-making.*"¹⁴³ The amendments of the Constitutional Treaty do not refer to mutual defence. Instead, the notion of an obligation to provide aid and assistance if necessary was included. EU member states finally managed to agree on the final version of the constitution. The failure of the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty led to another IGC in 2007.

¹⁴⁰ MENON, A. From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq. *International Affairs*, 2004, 80 (4), p. 638.

¹⁴¹ HOWORTH, J. Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment of ESDP. *Groupement D'Études Et De Recherches*, Policy papers 2003, 7, pp. 12-13.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁴³ HOWORTH, J. The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2004, 9, p. 6.

In 2007, Tony Blair resigned as leader of the Labour Party and PM of the UK. Gordon Brown, a long-time member of the government, was appointed to be the new PM. However, this change did not affect Britain's foreign and security policy priorities. The British government's conviction that transatlantic relations were essential remained.¹⁴⁴ Like Tony Blair, Gordon Brown also emphasised the role of NATO. It was Brown's government that negotiated at an intergovernmental conference in 2007. During the 2007 IGC, the British government sought to ensure that the new treaty would not have a constitutional character. It, therefore, set out several conditions, including an independent foreign and defence policy. The UK emphasised that it was essential to maintain an intergovernmental approach within the CSDP. Hence the UK made it clear that national security must be a responsibility of the member states. Representatives strictly rejected any steps that would strengthen the supranational character of security policy. According to the British approach, the UK would support the proposal for Permanent Structured Co-operation as well as enhanced co-operation between the member states. However, the UK called for unanimity in the Council to approve such enhanced co-operation. This would ensure that the interests of the UK continue to be protected.¹⁴⁵ Although the UK agreed to adopt the Lisbon Treaty that aims to enhance security and defence co-operation, the British representatives were disappointed as other member states were not fulfilling their CSDP commitments.¹⁴⁶

To conclude, the UK's preferences regarding European security issues had changed during the 1990's. With the Labour government, some of the UK's stances and preferences towards EU politics were modified. Tony Blair was one of the most pro-European British PM. Therefore, the idea of the UK as a strong EU leader was pursued by Tony Blair himself. Compared to Major's government, the New Labour was more willing to co-operate on the EU level. However, the UK's preferences regarding the EMU were reserved even after the Labour Party came to power. At first glance, the UK's decision to support and strengthen the European defence co-operation was quite a radical change of the preferences. Such dynamics were partly driven by the EMU project. The UK put itself in opposition to EMU. In Maastricht, Major's government negotiated an opt-out from entering the last stage of EMU. In this respect, the UK

¹⁴⁴ WEI-FANG, CH. *National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany*. Durham University, 2012, p. 135.

¹⁴⁵ FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LONDON. *The Reform Treaty: The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference, 2007*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁶ O'DONNELL, C. M. Britain's coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests. *International Affairs*, 2011, 87 (2), p. 423.

is not obliged to adopt a single currency. Therefore, Tony Blair needed to redefine the priorities and accede another area of co-operation that the UK would lead.

The external factors that triggered the change of the UK's direction towards closer security co-operation prevailed. The Labour government's position was evidently more pro-European as it desired to be a centre of the decision-making process in the EU. Tony Blair proposed that the EU should be a stronger actor in international relations. Moreover, he shares an opinion that the UK could strengthen its international position within a stronger EU. The situation in Balkans was evidence of the EU's inability to act. Such a development was an impetus for discussions on strengthening European defence. In this respect, the British government decided to take the lead in European security issues. Therefore, together with France, the UK initiated a close security and defence co-operation among EU member states. Moreover, the decision for greater engagement in European politics and leadership in security and defence outlined the UK as a credible partner for the rest of the EU.

Secondly, the UK preferences have been influenced by the US-UK special relationship based on close co-operation in many areas. The transatlantic partnership is, therefore, a very important determinative factor for the formulation of the UK's preferences in security matters. For this reason, any idea of EU security and defence co-operation that would undermine NATO is inconceivable. UK has always emphasised the crucial role of NATO as an international organisation that is a guarantor of security in Europe. In this manner, Tony Blair drew a red line. British negotiators emphasised the importance of this approach and were not willing to make concessions that would harm the transatlantic partnership. Both, Saint-Malo Declaration, and the Treaty of Nice provided a framework for the functioning of ESDP. Furthermore, the relations between the EU and NATO were modified. In this respect, the EU must conduct its ESDP with respect to obligations in NATO. The successor of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, conducted the British foreign and defence policy in this manner. During negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, the position of the British government was unchanged. The UK still emphasised the crucial role of NATO within European defence. Moreover, the intergovernmental approach must be maintained. From the long-term perspective, the UK's preferences regarding security and defence did not change radically. In the end, British negotiators successfully achieved to maintain the UK's interests and preferences at the EU level.

3.2. The Conservative Party in power: European security in the shadows of British Euroscepticism

After the failure of Gordon Brown, the Conservative Party led by David Cameron won the General election in 2010. However, the party did not gain a majority of the seat. Therefore, Cameron managed to establish a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, who have strongly supported a co-operation within the EU. The next chapter will focus on David Cameron's position towards further development of the CSDP. *What were the Conservative government's preferences in the field of European security and defence? What was Cabinet's position on the institutional structure of the CSDP? To what extent did Euroscepticism, leading to the referendum on Britain's withdrawal from the EU, impact the development of security cooperation in Europe?*

In contrast to New Labour, the rhetoric of the Conservative Party towards the EU was more critical. Cameron himself was a Eurosceptic politician. However, he did not oppose UK's membership in the European Union. There was a strong Eurosceptic wing in the Conservative Party that was formed during the 1990s. This factor had a significant impact on the formulation of the attitudes and preferences of the UK towards CSDP. The strengthening of Euroscepticism in British politics was the most important factor influencing Conservative party's policy towards the EU.¹⁴⁷ The Conservative Party has consistently rejected any steps that would lead to the federalization of the European Union. From a conservative point of view, the EU is based on the co-operation of European nations. The deepening of the European integration towards a political community is therefore unacceptable. In 2010, the coalition government promised in its program that the powers of the EU supranational institutions would not be strengthened. *"We will ensure that there is no further transfer of sovereignty or powers over the course of the next Parliament."*¹⁴⁸ At the same time, the coalition government ensured that the UK should be a proactive player at the European level.

After taking office, the Cameron government had to deal with a robust defence budget deficit. In its program, the government promised to reduce defence spending radically. Therefore, this decision had an eminent impact on the UK's position on further developments of the European defence. In the case of foreign and security policy, the coalition government emphasised developing a special relationship with the United States. At the same time,

¹⁴⁷ DOREY, P. Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party's Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s. *Politics and Governance*, 2017, 5 (2), p. 27.

¹⁴⁸ The Coalition: our programme for government, 2010, p. 19.

Cameron assured that the UK's involvement in NATO is very important.¹⁴⁹ The British government adopted a *Strategic Defence and Security Review* in 2010, in which it also commented on the issues of security co-operation within the EU. "*UK membership of the European Union is a key part of our international engagement and means of promoting security and prosperity in the European neighbourhood... The EU's ability to integrate civilian and military responses coherently will become increasingly important.*"¹⁵⁰ Therefore, the government stated that it would support those EU missions in which NATO would not take any action. The Review also called for a reduction of the defence budget.

Consequently, according to O'Donnell, the UK "*would need to enhance significantly its joint efforts in defence, including with its European partners.*"¹⁵¹ In this respect, Cameron's government shifted its focus on building up bilateral co-operation. Giovanni Faleg comments on this situation followingly: "*The realisation that Britain's defence budget was insufficient to support the UK's global ambition created a momentum for members of the new government to advocate for the pursuit of selected and targeted bilateral co-operation and drop what was seen as ineffective and wasteful multilateral ventures.*"¹⁵² Hence, the Treaty for Defence and Security Co-operation between UK and France was signed in November 2010, also known as the Lancaster House Treaty. Both parties declared a belief that this Treaty would strengthen NATO. The UK and France shared support for CSDP development.¹⁵³ The British government's efforts to establish bilateral relations with other European countries were evident. Moreover, British representatives have been very critical that other EU member states have not achieved the goals set out in the framework of security co-operation. The UK feared that some countries were not taking their commitments seriously. Therefore, it decided to strengthen its bilateral relations.

Conservatives rejected and criticised the proposal to federalize the EU. They strongly opposed the draft of the European Constitutional Treaty. Moreover, they refused to launch Permanent Structured Co-operation, and criticised UK's membership in the EDA. The Conservatives perceive the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty that strengthened CSDP as a threat

¹⁴⁹ The Coalition: our programme for government, 2010, p. 20.

¹⁵⁰ Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010, p. 62.

¹⁵¹ O'DONNELL, C. M. Britain's coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests. *Internationa Affairs*, 2011, 87 (2), p. 425.

¹⁵² FALEG, G. United Kingdom: The Elephant in the Room. In SANTOPINTO, F. and M. PRICE (eds.). *National Visions of EU Defence Policy: Common Denominators and Misunderstandings*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013, p. 144.

¹⁵³ Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation, London, 2 November 2010.

to NATO.¹⁵⁴ David Cameron insisted that the Lisbon Treaty must be approved in a referendum. However, the Treaty was ratified before Cameron came to power. Followingly, Cameron declared that any further proposals that would lead to a transfer of powers to the EU must be decided by the British people in a referendum.¹⁵⁵ The Conservative Party consistently criticised the provisions of the TEU regarding the introduction of PESCO. After becoming Prime Minister, Cameron continued his efforts to thwart attempts of other EU members to activate PESCO.

The United Kingdom, led by David Cameron, actively stepped out against proposals that would jeopardize the country's sovereignty in the field of security. The Lisbon Treaty established the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. HR's main task is to coordinate CFSP. Lady Catherine Ashton from the United Kingdom was appointed as the first High Representative in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty also created the European External Action Service to help HR reach the CFSP's objectives.¹⁵⁶ Lady Ashton introduced a proposal to establish a permanent Operations Headquarters. She was convinced that the functioning of the HQ would help to implement the goals set by the Lisbon Treaty.¹⁵⁷ The proposal was supported by France and Germany. However, the United Kingdom strongly opposed it. Representatives of the UK made it clear that they would use a veto on such a proposal. According to the British government, the creation of the HQ would undermine NATO's role. The decision was also influenced by developments after the global financial crisis. Therefore countries, including the UK, were less willing to spend more money on security and defence.¹⁵⁸ Conservatives were concerned that the establishment of the HQ would strengthen the supranational character of the CSDP. Such a proposal was unacceptable for Conservatives, as they refused to transfer more powers to the EU institutions. NATO's role is crucial for the Conservative Party, as it promotes security co-operation in NATO to ensure collective security. In this respect, the preferences and interests of the coalition government do not differ from the previous New Labour government.

In the meantime, the Conservative Eurosceptic wing became stronger. It started to put pressure on the party's leadership to rethink its policy towards the EU. Discussions on

¹⁵⁴ O'DONNELL, C. M. Britain's coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests. *International Affairs*, 2011, 87 (2), p. 426.

¹⁵⁵ DOREY, P. Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party's Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s. *Politics and Governance*, 2017, 5 (2), p. 32.

¹⁵⁶ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007, Article 9 E.

¹⁵⁷ TSERTSVADZE, I. Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. *Connections*, 2017, 16 (3), p. 80.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

renegotiating the conditions for UK membership in the EU were held among politicians. The issue of a possible withdrawal from the EU has been discussed once again. David Cameron was aware of the increasing Euroscepticism not just among Conservatives but also in British society. He made a promise in 2013 that if he won the next election, he would hold a referendum on whenever the UK should stay in the Union or leave it. In the famous Bloomberg speech, he pledged to do so. *“It is time for the British people to have their say. It is time to settle this European question in British politics. I say to the British people: this will be your decision.”*¹⁵⁹ In the 2015 General elections, the Conservative Party won a majority in the House of Commons. David Cameron was forced to carry out his pre-election promise. Hence, the referendum on UK’s withdrawal from the EU was announced. However, the PM himself encouraged the British citizens to vote for staying in the EU. Peter Dorey even claims that David Cameron praised the Union.¹⁶⁰ Eurosceptical political parties that challenged the UK’s membership managed to convince the British people in the pre-referendum campaign. This was for the first time that one of the member states had spoken out to leave the European Union. The referendum raised many questions about the process of withdrawal. Negotiations on the form of post-Brexit co-operation between the EU and the UK are very important. The result of the referendum meant a loss for David Cameron. Although his stance on the EU was reserved, he did not want Britain to leave EU structures. Disappointed by the referendum result, he decided to resign as Prime Minister. The new Conservative leader, Theresa May, was appointed as a new PM. A challenging task was ahead as May had to lead the negotiations on the withdrawal conditions for the UK. At the same time, her government must attend rounds of tough negotiations on the future relations between the UK and the EU.

Even though David Cameron was more willing to conduct pro-European policies than other Conservative leaders, it was during his governing term when the UK decided to leave the EU. Regarding the matters of security and defence, the coalition government that came to power in 2010 preserved the main preferences. The UK has still considered NATO as a key security organisation, and the CSDP must be conducted in such a way that it would not harm the position of NATO. The transatlantic approach of the UK’s defence policy remains unchanged. Furthermore, the Conservatives have strongly opposed the idea of federalization that would lead to the creation of the European superstate. In this respect, Cameron criticised the adoption

¹⁵⁹ CAMERON, D. *EU speech at Bloomberg* [online]. 2013 [viewed 20 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>.

¹⁶⁰ DOREY, P. Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party’s Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s. *Politics and Governance*, 2017, 5 (2), p. 32.

of the Lisbon Treaty that empowers CSDP. During his leadership, the UK turned down any proposal that would strengthen the position of supranational bodies within the EU in the security and defence area. The case of vetoing Catherine Ashton's design of permanent HQ for the EU showed that the UK is not willing to make any concession. The domestic political situation in Britain negatively affected Cameron's opinion on European defence. Instead of focusing on building a partnership within the EU, Prime Minister decided to strengthen bilateral relations with countries such as France. Even though it was the British initiative at the beginning of the establishment of ESDP at the end of the 1990s, the gradual increase of Euroscepticism in British politics has negatively impacted the development of CSDP.

4. The United Kingdom in the ESDP/CSDP process: testing of the LI assumptions

Above-mentioned, the theory of LI refers to three main stages: National preference formation, Interstate bargaining and Institutional choice. This chapter will focus on each stage of the LI model considering the UK's position on ESDP. At this point, the main LI assumptions are tested.

Firstly, LI assumes that the state governments are the most important actors.¹⁶¹ So far, the development of ESDP/CSDP has shown that this LI hypothesis is correct. During the last decades, the national governments were key actors in the security and defence area. The UK's decision to support the idea of security co-operation in the EU was a milestone in the ESDP process. Even though the UK and France initiated the enhanced European defence, representatives made a clear statement that such co-operation will be based on an intergovernmentalist approach. Therefore, the supranational EU institutions did not have strong competence in this area. Security and defence are matters of national sovereignty. As mentioned above, LI emphasises that the states governments would support the process of integration only if it would be in their national interests. In the case of the UK, the motivations for pursuing enhanced security co-operation were apparent. Tony Blair put the UK into a leading role in this field because it was in the government's interest to strengthen UK's position at the international level.

Furthermore, Moravcsik suggests that formulated preferences are a result of bargaining at the domestic level. Moreover, such a preference reflects the objectives that are set out by other interest groups. He emphasises the role of society in the preference formation process. In this sense, the state governments are aggregators of the preferences of interest groups.¹⁶² In terms of the UK's preferences in ESDP/CSDP, the reality did not meet Moravcsik's assumption that the interest groups formulate these preferences. The preference formulation in Britain was conducted by a small number of political representatives led by Prime Minister Tony Blair. It was mainly Blair's desire to initiate closer defence co-operation. The role of the interest groups in the process of national preference formation in the UK was rather limited. It was primarily the government itself that formulated the preferences regarding the European defence co-operation. However, the government had to reflect on the importance of the special relationship

¹⁶¹ MORAVCSIK, A. and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A. and T. DIEZ (eds.), *European Integration Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 68.

¹⁶² MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, 31 (4), p. 483.

with the US and the key role of NATO. Moreover, Moravcsik claims that economic interests are the primary drivers of integration. However, he does not exclude the geopolitical interests of states.¹⁶³ Such a claim does not perfectly correspond to the case of ESDP/CSDP because the economic gains were not key drivers of the UK's initiative to enhance security co-operation in the EU.

Moravcsik admits that the formulation of preferences can be driven by issue-specific interdependence.¹⁶⁴ In the previous chapter, the thesis states that the shift of the UK's position was caused by both internal and, to a larger extent, by external factors. In the 1990s, the importance of security co-operation in Europe arose. The unstable situation in Balkans was an impetus for the New Labour to reconsider the UK's position. The external security factors influenced the British government. Hence, Tony Blair decided to pursue a closer defence co-operation. In conclusion, the integration in the security sector was caused rather by the external security situation than by motivations of economic gains.

Consequently, LI assumes that the second stage of interstate bargaining is dependent on the state's bargaining power. Moravcsik presumes that the preferences of member states will not perfectly overlap.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, to reach an agreement, negotiation at the EU level is crucial. Although the UK is one of the key security actors, it needed to gain support from other member states to pursue its national preferences. At this point, the Saint-Malo talks between the UK and France were crucial. Both represent countries with the strongest military capacity in the EU. The joint efforts to enhance the security co-operation were announced in Saint-Malo Declaration. Supported by France, the UK's negotiation position was strengthened. Since the interstate bargaining process was intergovernmental, each state could reject the idea of ESDP. Eventually, the UK was successful and effective in persuading member states to support ESDP. The British government protected its interests and managed to push ahead with its formulated preferences. It is worth mentioning that the UK emphasised its special relationship with the US, which determined the government's transatlantic approach. In this respect, Britain's preference refers to the importance of security co-operation that would not oppose the role of NATO. Moreover, according to the UK, the character of ESDP/CSDP must be built on intergovernmentalism. This approach was accepted by the EU states. The Conservative Party

¹⁶³ MORAVCSIK, A. *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1999, p. 7.

¹⁶⁴ MORAVCSIK, A and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A., T. A. BÖRZEL and T. RISSE (eds.). *European Integration Theory. Third edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 66.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

that came to power in 2010 continued to promote the preferences regarding NATO's role, transatlantic approach and enforcing intergovernmentalism. Pal Jonson notes that "*there can be no doubt about the fact the UK and France have had the most influence and leverage within the process... there existed an assumption during the negotiation process that, where the United Kingdom and France could agree, most others would follow.*"¹⁶⁶ The UK and France dominated during negotiations on ESDP.

The outcome of previous negotiations was to establish ESDP and its framework for close co-operate on security and defence matters. This was a huge success for UK and France. LI assumes that in the last stage, the governments would make an institutional choice to secure the reached agreement.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, states may decide about pooling and delegation of their sovereignty to the supranational body. In the case of ESDP/CSDP, this assumption was not fulfilled. Since the announcement of the Franco-British initiative in Saint-Malo, both states declared that security and defence issues would remain a competence of member states. Intergovernmentalism is a key aspect of ESDP. Representatives of the EU countries have never pledged to establish supranational institutions to which they would delegate security competencies. The UK has refused all proposals that would undermine the nation's sovereignty in the security and defence area. Examples of such refusal might be the cases of creating HQ for the EU outside NATO structures. Even though the New Labour government's pro-European position led to a significant change in European defence development, and Tony Blair rejected a proposal of other member states to create Union's planning centre. On the contrary, he suggested that such a centre should be established within SHAPE. Moreover, the Conservative government led by David Cameron also strongly opposed the proposal of High Representative Lady Ashton to establish a permanent operational HQ for the EU. Cameron's cabinet perceived that this step would strengthen the supranational character of CSDP. Thus, in matters of ESDP/CSDP, the institutional choice suggested by LI has not met with reality yet. The UK's withdrawal from the EU might encourage other EU states to discuss the CSDP future.

In conclusion, this chapter tested the main assumptions of LI that were assigned in the theoretical part. Regarding the establishment and further development of ESDP/CSDP, the LI hypothesis that the state governments are the key actors is valid. The UK and France demonstrated their willingness to proceed to close co-operation in the security and defence area.

¹⁶⁶ JONSON, P. *The Development of the European Security and Defence Policy – An Assessment of Preferences, Bargains and Outcomes*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2006, p. 225.

¹⁶⁷ MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st-century Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2018, 56 (7), p. 1564.

Moreover, they have been taken the lead in this field. The LI assumption regarding the preference formation can be evaluated as invalid. At this point, the thesis argues that the British government is not an aggregator of the preferences of interest groups. The role of such groups is limited in the security and defence area. Moreover, the thesis disagrees with the assumption that integration is driven mostly by economic interests. In the case of ESDP, the UK's preferences were influenced by the external security situation to a larger extent. In this respect, Moravcsik contemplates that the issue-specific interdependence, in this case, the external factors, may have an impact on preference formulation. The thesis accedes with the author. Regarding the interstate bargaining process, it is correct to presume that it depends on the bargaining power of governments. The UK called for enhanced security and defence cooperation, and it even aspired to take the lead at the EU level. Thus, the British government strengthened its negotiation position by gaining the support of the other key security actor, France. The UK was able to pursue its national preferences during intergovernmental negotiations. Lastly, LI claims that states would choose to establish institutions to ensure that agreed commitments would be fulfilled. In the case of ESDP/CSDP, this assumption is incorrect. Although member states decided to establish, for example, EDA or PSC, there has not been a formal transition of power to a supranational institution in the security and defence area. The UK strongly opposed any proposal that would undermine the intergovernmental character of ESDP/CSDP.

5. Impact of Brexit on CSDP: the future of the security co-operation between the United Kingdom and the European Union

Following the pre-election promise, British PM David Cameron announced that the referendum on UK's membership in the EU would take place on 23 June 2016. British people made a choice, with nearly 52 % in favour of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Although the referendum result was not binding, British political representatives decided to comply with the people's will. David Cameron resigned from the position of the Conservative Party's leader. Theresa May was nominated as a candidate for PM. Even before taking her office in Downing Street 10, she was aware that this term would be very difficult for the British government as it would face negotiations on conditions of leaving the EU. On 29 March 2017, the UK government officially notified the President of the European Council of its intention to leave the EU.¹⁶⁸ Article 50 of TEU was therefore triggered, and the withdrawal process was planned to be completed in 2019. This chapter will analyse the CSDP in the context of Brexit. *What are the impacts of the UK's decision to leave the EU on CSDP?* Moreover, this part will focus on the potential framework of co-operation in the security between the UK and the EU in the future.

UK's withdrawal from the EU structures will indeed have an impact on CSDP in general. Brexit has brought uncertainty into the further development of the European integration project. Moreover, there have been concerns that Brexit would negatively influence this process. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling comment that Brexit will have a significant impact on further co-operation within the EU. Moreover, it might raise questions regarding the EU' role among the member states.¹⁶⁹ However, they claim that the security and defence area *“are not likely to suffer much... security and defence have never been one of the core competencies of the EU, it will be easier to disentangle the UK from the EU in this very area.”*¹⁷⁰ After the UK referendum, there was a fear that such a tendency would continue, and some other member states would also start to question its membership. The notions of possible fragmentation within the EU were expressed. Such a fear was fuelled by the fact that

¹⁶⁸ CASTLE, S. U.K. to Start Brexit on March 29 by Invoking Article 50. *The New York Times* [online]. 20 March 2017 [viewed 24 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/world/europe/brexit-article-50.html>.

¹⁶⁹ MAJOR, C. and CH. MÖLLING. Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one. *Uibrief*, 2017, 7, p. 3.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Eurosceptic parties across the EU states have strengthened their position. On the other hand, Martill and Sus argue the opposite. According to them, Brexit represents an opportunity for the EU member states. “...Brexit appears to have had opposite effect, reinforcing a sense of ‘existential crisis’ that has contributed towards greater solidarity among the member states.”¹⁷¹ Moreover, they claim that Brexit is an important momentum for the development of CSDP. In the last decades, the UK strongly opposed any proposal that would undermine the intergovernmental character of CSDP. Authors view Brexit as an opportunity for the EU to launch some projects vetoed by the UK in the past and point out the dynamics within CSDP in recent years after Brexit. They refer to the EU’s security and defence initiatives that include the establishment of the EU military HQ or the launch of PESCO.¹⁷² However, it is important to note that these projects were proposed even before the UK decided to leave the EU. Therefore, the Brexit itself did not directly cause these improvements of CSDP. The external factors should not be forgotten.¹⁷³ The concerns that Brexit would trigger a wave of disintegration tendencies among EU member states have not become a reality.

Regarding the UK’s military power, there have been discussions that Brexit may affect the EU’s credibility in terms of security and defence. The UK is a crucial security actor at the international level. Without UK’s military capabilities, the EU would lose a considerable share of total EU capabilities (20 %). Under such circumstances, the EU would not be able to achieve the military ambitions that were set out in the EU Global Strategy in 2016.¹⁷⁴ It is worth noting that the UK has shown its willingness to provide assistance to its partners when they ask for it. Round, Giegerich and Mölling conclude that the EU will lose an experienced leader in military issues.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, “the EU loses a player with a strong global mind-set, diplomatic and strategic skills and the willingness to shape international order.”¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, although the UK is a strong military power, its contribution in terms of providing personnel, equipment, and also finance to CSDP operations and missions was disproportionally small.¹⁷⁷ Therefore,

¹⁷¹ MARTILL, B. and M. SUS. Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or French connection? *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2018, 20 (4), p. 851.

¹⁷² MAJOR, C. and CH. MÖLLING. Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one. *UIbrief*, 2017, 7, p. 7.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁷⁵ ROUND, P., B. GIEGERICH and CH. MÖLLING. *European Strategic autonomy and Brexit*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018, p. 3.

¹⁷⁶ MAJOR, C. and CH. MÖLLING. Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one. *UIbrief*, 2017, 7, p. 2.

¹⁷⁷ XAVIER, A. I. The Impact of Brexit on Security and Defence Multilateralism: More Cooperation or Overlapping Interests? *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 2018, 26 (1), p. 105.

in terms of conducting operations and missions within CSDP, the EU predicts that Brexit will not have a major impact on these matters.

The balance of power in CSDP will also be affected by Brexit. The UK had been a very active actor in terms of ESDP. The momentum for creating a framework for European defence co-operation was a Saint-Malo Declaration initiated by PM Tony Blair and his French counterpart. Even though the UK's position towards ESDP/CSDP was over time more reserved, its role was very important. Therefore, it will be very important for further CSDP development that member states need to realise some countries have to take the lead. On the other hand, Xavier shares an opinion that the *“absence of a strong opponent voice to the development of a military structure within the EU could in fact enhance the militarization of the CSDP.”*¹⁷⁸ The possibility of Franco-German leadership has been discussed. Both Paris and Berlin support the security and defence co-operation within PESCO. Furthermore, they called for the deepening of the integration process in the field of defence. In Faleg's words, *“only close cooperation between France and Germany would provide sufficient political weight to lead integrative steps.”*¹⁷⁹ However, France has been promoting the intergovernmental character of CSDP. At the very beginning of the ESDP, France and the UK insisted that security and defence matters remain a privilege of nation states. On the other hand, Germany would rather prefer a supranational approach. *“France sees it (CSDP) as a way to provide a viable tool for civilian and military crisis management through the EU, while Germany considers EU defence primarily as a tool for further political integration.”*¹⁸⁰ Some disputes in the Franco-Germany tandem might arise from the different visions of the CSDP character.

In summary, Brexit will, with no doubt, have an impact on CSDP. Some scholars assume that the UK's withdrawal is an impetus for the EU to enhance defence co-operation. Such a prediction is based on the fact that without the UK's blockade of the proposals, it will be easier to pursue plans and projects to improve CSDP. With Brexit, the EU will lose a significant military capability since the UK is a strong military power. To what extent the UK will be able to influence further development of CSDP depends on the outcome of negotiations between the EU and UK on the form of relationship in the future.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ FALEG, G. *The Implication of Brexit for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy*. [online]. CEPS, 2016 [viewed 23 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/implications-brexit-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy/>.

¹⁸⁰ JACOBS, A. and S. VANHOONACKER. *EU-UK Cooperation in CSDP After Brexit. Living apart together?* [online]. Dahrendorf Forum: Policy Brief, 2018, p. 3. [viewed 23 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/EU-UK-Cooperation-in-CSDP-After-Brexit.pdf>

5.1. Co-operation between the European Union and the United Kingdom after Brexit

The UK's decision to leave the EU triggered a difficult negotiation process on the conditions for withdrawal. The agreement was reached on 17 October 2019 when The Withdrawal Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom was signed. The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. However, negotiations continue as the future EU-UK relationship need to be shaped in detail. By the end of 2020, both parties agreed on the Trade and Cooperation Agreement that specifies conditions of co-operation in areas such as trade, transport, energy, or fisheries. Moreover, this agreement “*goes beyond traditional free trade agreements and provides a solid basis for preserving our longstanding friendship and cooperation.*”¹⁸¹ Although some agreements between the EU and UK were concluded, there is no deal on future security and defence co-operation. Theresa May expressed in her speeches a desire for a special partnership between the EU and the UK. In Florence speech, May stated that the UK might offer co-operation in diplomacy, defence and security.¹⁸² Therefore, discussion on this topic is raising questions on the form of EU-UK relations. *What models of the future relations between the EU and the UK have been suggested so far?* This sub-charter will pay attention to proposals of some scholars on the future scheme of EU-UK security and defence co-operation.

Some scholars agree that the UK's involvement within CSDP should continue even after Brexit. Jacobs and Vanhooacker argue that the UK's position is special as it is a key international actor with military resources. Therefore, they suggest that the EU should go beyond the existing treaties modifying relations with third states. According to them, the UK's position would justify such a special agreement on the engagement in CSDP of a non-member state. Moreover, they note that NATO has also established such a model of co-operation with third states called Enhanced Opportunity Partners for Dialogue and Cooperation that allows non-members to get involved in debates with no voting right. In this case, the UK should participate in FAC meetings to discuss the topic of CSDP. They call this the EU27+1 arrangement.¹⁸³ This model may, however, provoke other non-member states such as Turkey.

¹⁸¹ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, 2020.

¹⁸² MAY, T. *PM's Florence speech: a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU* [online.] 2017 [viewed 25 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu>.

¹⁸³ JACOBS, A. and S. VANHOONACKER. *EU-UK Cooperation in CSDP After Brexit. Living apart together?* [online]. Dahrendorf Forum: Policy Brief, 2018, p. 3. [viewed 23 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/EU-UK-Cooperation-in-CSDP-After-Brexit.pdf>

Another suggested model of co-operation that would encompass the UK in CSDP in future is the so-called reserve Denmark. Richard Whitman suggests that even though the UK would not be a member of the EU, it would continue to be involved in CSDP. In practice, the UK would have a special status that would allow its participation at meetings of FAC or PSC.¹⁸⁴ This model is also called a CSDP opt-in. According to Bakker, Drent and Zandee, the non-member states may opt-in and participate in some areas. However, such kind of participation does not allow third countries to have full access to influence as EU member state does. They conclude that the reserve Denmark model is unlikely to be adopted.¹⁸⁵ Even the EU representative, Michel Barnier, affirmed that the UK would not have any representatives in FAC or PSC. Moreover, there will be no option for the UK to take command in case of EU missions.¹⁸⁶

The other model of EU-UK co-operation may be based on a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA). Such a framework has already existed. FPA represents a legal basis of the co-operation between EU and third countries on CSDP. Such an agreement would allow non-member states to be involved in the CSDP mission. FPA was concluded, for example, between the EU and Georgia, Ukraine, Turkey, Norway, or Canada. These countries provided civilian personnel to EU CSDP missions.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, by signing FPA, the UK could stay involved in CSDP. However, in such a co-operation scheme, the UK's influence would be limited. "... *this would leave the UK with little early-on influence on the design of operations and without any formal influence the EU decision-making process.*"¹⁸⁸ Faleg concludes that Brexit is a chance for the EU to improve this framework of co-operation with a non-member. Therefore, it would strengthen the EU's position as an international security actor.¹⁸⁹

Alternatively, some scholars suggest co-operation through NATO. This is reasonable since NATO's role is very important in the matters of European security and defence.

¹⁸⁴ WHITHAM, R. The EU and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached? *National Institute Economic Review*, 2016, 238, p. 48.

¹⁸⁵ BAKKER, A., M. DRENT and D. ZANDEE. *European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit?* Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2017, p. 13.

¹⁸⁶ BARNIER, M. The Future of the EU. Speech by Michel Barnier at the Centre for European Reform [online]. 20 November 2017 [viewed 26 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.cer.eu/in-the-press/speech-michel-barnier-future-eu-conference>.

¹⁸⁷ TARDY, T. *CSDP: getting third states on board* [online]. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014, 6, p. 1 [viewed 2 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_6_CSDP_and_third_states.pdf.

¹⁸⁸ BAKKER, A., M. DRENT and D. ZANDEE. *European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit?* [online]. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2017, p. 13 [viewed 24 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/Report_European_defence_after_Brexit.pdf.

¹⁸⁹ FALEG, G. *The Implication of Brexit for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy*. [online]. CEPS, 2016 [viewed 23 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/implications-brexit-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy/>.

Moreover, the UK has always emphasised that the ESDP/CSDP should not undermine NATO, and it is necessary to respect the commitments of member states to NATO. Martill and Sus propose that NATO would “*become a platform for cooperation, since it offers an elegant solution to combine British independence from the EU with the necessity of close collaboration in the face of security challenges.*”¹⁹⁰ On the other hand, authors refer to a possibility that the UK would apply a bilateral approach and strive to enhance its bilateral relations with European partners such as France.¹⁹¹ Co-operation between UK and France has proved its worth in the past as it was an initiative of these two nations to establish ESDP. Moreover, both countries signed a bilateral agreement on security and defence co-operation in 2010. Howorth notes that this co-operation will continue. However, he argues that it will be affected by the role of Germany in CSDP as a new leader.¹⁹² The UK is a very strong military actor at international level. Therefore, it will be in UK’s as well as the EU’s interest to maintain security and defence co-operation. The form of the future partnership will have to be addressed in negotiations between the EU and the UK.

¹⁹⁰ MARTILL, B. and M. SUS. Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or French connection? *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2018, 20 (4), p. 857.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 857-8.

¹⁹² HOWORTH, J. EU Defence Cooperation after Brexit: What Role for the UK in the Future EU Arrangements? *European View*, 2017, 16 (2).

6. Micro-comparison of the position of two small states towards ESDP/CSDP with the UK's one: The cases of Austria and the Czech Republic

The last chapter of the thesis will pay attention to the positions of two small EU member states in Central Europe towards European security and defence issues. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse the strategic culture of these countries. This chapter will also focus on the preferences of these small countries regarding European defence co-operation. *Are the positions of Austria and the Czech Republic towards ESDP/CSDP similar to the UK's one?* The aspect of co-operation with the UK will also be the object of this chapter.

6.1. Austria's flexible approach towards ESDP/CSDP

To understand Austrian strategic culture and its approach to security and defence policy, it is necessary to understand its history. After WW2, Austria was occupied by France, the United Kingdom, the USA, and the USSR. Austria sought to gain sovereignty. In 1955, the so-called Moscow Protocol was adopted which stipulated a condition for Austria's independence, namely that the country must be neutral. The USSR insisted that Austria would not be a member of NATO and thus not become a part of the Western Bloc.¹⁹³ Condition of neutrality was propounded in the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. Under such a circumstance, "*Austria is prohibited from joining any military alliance or allowing the deployment of foreign troops in its territory.*"¹⁹⁴ Austrian neutrality was accepted by other powers. Despite a proclaimed neutrality status, Austria became a member of the United Nations in 1955. Moreover, the country has been actively participating in peace missions of the UN. This approach was a result of Bruno Kreisky's active neutrality policy.¹⁹⁵ At that time, Austria was an active actor within international organisations. Regarding the ECSC membership, Austria contemplated joining the Community. However, the aspiration of ECSC member states to deepen the process of European political integration was not reconcilable with the Austrian neutral status. Thus, Austria decided to become a member of the European Free Trade Area.

¹⁹³ BRETTNER-MESSLER, G. Austria's Engagement in Chad as Element of Its Neutrality Policy: Security Policy between Abstinance and Engagement. *Defence and Strategy*, 2008, 1, p. 82.

¹⁹⁴ KAMMEL, A. H. Austria. In: In BIEHL, H., B. GIEGERICH and A. JONAS (eds.). *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013, p. 19.

¹⁹⁵ BRETTNER-MESSLER, G. Austria's Engagement in Chad as Element of Its Neutrality Policy: Security Policy between Abstinance and Engagement. *Defence and Strategy*, 2008, 1, pp. 82-83.

After the end of the Cold War, Austria re-evaluated the EC membership and decided to submit the application in 1989. In the early 1990s, the security and defence matter within EC/EU was based on the intergovernmental principle. Therefore, Austria did not consider this as an obstacle to its potential membership.¹⁹⁶ Together with Finland and Sweden, Austria became a member of the EU in 1995. Regarding the status of neutrality, the Final Act of the Accession Treaty states that Austria “*would be ready and able to participate fully and actively in the Common Foreign and Security Policy.*”¹⁹⁷ In this respect, the Austrian membership evoked debates on the topic of its neutrality status. Moreover, in White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Austria declared its position toward CFSP and European defence. Regarding CFSP, it stated that “*In accordance with the dictates of the Integration process, Austria supports the principle the Union’s foreign policy should be gradually brought within the Community framework.*”¹⁹⁸ Moreover, Austria emphasised the co-operation in common defence policy and suggested that “*the priority goal of the CFSP is to prevent military conflicts. At the same time, the means and structures must be found to respond to and punish military aggression.*”¹⁹⁹ Austria proposed to enhance the EU’s capacities with regards to conflict prevention, crisis management or peacekeeping operations. After the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Austrian Constitution was modified, and it allows Austria to fully participate in the Petersberg tasks. Gustenau comments that since the Amsterdam treaty came into force, Austria cannot be considered as a neutral country with regards to CFSP. Instead, he calls it “neutrality á la carte” or “residual function” of neutrality.²⁰⁰ Poplawski notes that such a modification was “*the factual change of Austria’s international status to an alliance-free state (non-alliance/post-neutral).*”²⁰¹ The amendments of the constitution adopted in 1999 enabled Austria to participate in Petersberg tasks and in operations under NATO’s Partnership for Peace.

¹⁹⁶ GÉMES, A. and G. RAGOSSNIK. Austria’s Neutrality and European Integration: A Conflict between International and National Spheres of Law. In ANN, K., I. EWALB and L. T., HIEBL (eds.). *Perspectives on European integration and European Union history*. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2008, p. 242.

¹⁹⁷ KAMMEL, A. H. Austria. In. In BIEHL, H., B. GIEGERICH and A. JONAS (eds.). *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013, p. 20.

¹⁹⁸ White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference [online]. 1995 [viewed 30 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-at_en.htm#pos.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ GUSTENAU, G. Towards a Common European Policy on Security and Defence: An Austrian view of Challenges for the „Post-Neutrals“. *Occasional paper* [online]. 1999, 9, p. 14 [viewed 30 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/occ009%281%29.pdf>.

²⁰¹ POPLAWSKI, D. Neutrality in Austria’s Foreign and Security Policy after the Cold War [online]. *Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs*, 2020, 24 (2), p. 110 [viewed 31 October 2021]. Available from: <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-fb1d2faf-8f93-44af-88e6-9974966b1cd6/c/2-2020-Poplawski.pdf>.

In the early 2000s, the international security climate changed as new security threats arose. In particular, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had a significant impact on the foreign and security policy of nations. Tackling terrorism is a part of the EU's security strategy. After 9/11, the US president declared the War on Terror. The EU member states were divided as some of them would support the US's proposal of the Iraq invasion. The UK, together with Spain, Italy, Denmark or V4 countries, including Czech Republic supported the US's strategy. However, Austria was among member states that opposed this proposal. This group included all the EU neutral countries. Moreover, Austria adopted a new defence doctrine in 2001 in which Austria is defined as an alliance-free state.²⁰²

During the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty, Austria, together with Finland and Ireland, opposed the idea of mutual defence since it would be incompatible with the neutral status of these member states. Therefore, the Austrian MP proposed that *“instead of being obliged to aid one another in the event of attack, each member state would commit to provide such help as their respective Constitutions and resources allowed.”*²⁰³ Hummer argues that with the mutual defence, the EU would become a *“system of collective self-defence in the sense of Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter, commonly known as a military pact.”*²⁰⁴ In this respect, neutrality would not be compatible with the defence commitments stated by the Constitutional Treaty. Despite this fact, Austria agreed to adopt the EU constitution. However, the Treaty did not come into force due to the unsuccessful process of ratification in the Netherlands and France.

Followingly, the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty represented a challenge to the neutrality status of Austria. Regarding the common security and defence policy, it states:

*“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means on their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”*²⁰⁵

Such a characterisation may evoke a conception of defence alliance. Therefore, the last sentence of the Article 28 A.7 states: *“... This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security*

²⁰² POPLAWSKI, D. Neutrality in Austria's Foreign and Security Policy after the Cold War [online]. *Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs*, 2020, 24 (2), p. 111 [viewed 31 October 2021]. Available from: <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-fb1d2faf-8f93-44af-88e6-9974966b1cd6/c/2-2020-Poplawski.pdf>.

²⁰³ KILJUNEN, K. *The European Constitution in the Making* [online]. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004, p. 88 [viewed 30 October 2021]. Available from: http://aei.pitt.edu/32581/1/20_EU_Constitution.pdf.

²⁰⁴ HUMMER, W. The New EU – A „Military pact“? Solidarity – Neutrality – „Irish Clause“. In HAUSER, G. And K. FRANCO (eds.). *European Security in Transition*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, p. 63.

²⁰⁵ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, December 2007, article 28 A.

and defence policy of certain Member States."²⁰⁶ The so-called Irish Clause allows the neutral EU countries to opt-out from the obligation of aid and assistance in case of an attack. With the inclusion of the Irish Clause, the neutral states, including Austria, did agree with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.

The position of Austria towards the EU defence and security matters has been influenced by its neutral status declared in 1955. However, with Austrian engagement within the UN and NATO's Partnership for Peace operations, strict neutrality was an object of the debates. Moreover, after joining the EU, Austria has shown its willingness to fully participate in the security and defence area. The adoption of amendments to the Austrian Constitution in 1999 pointed out flexibility of Austria as it desired to be more engaged to ESDP and at the same time maintained its neutral status. Austria supports a closer security and defence co-operation. In the Austrian Security Strategy adopted in 2013, Austria declares with regards to CSDP that it will continue to support the common defence of the EU, including the establishment of PESCO. Moreover, the Security Strategy states that Austria will be an active member and will participate in CSDP activities.²⁰⁷ This small country has desired to strengthen its position and influence within the EU. At this point, the bargaining position of Austria is affected by its ability to co-operate with other neutral member states such as Ireland, Finland.

6.2. Position of the Czech Republic towards ESDP/CSDP

The security policy of the Czech Republic has been affected by its history. In February 1948, the Communists party came into power, and Czechoslovakia was for long decades under the regime of totality. Therefore, factual decision-making was delegated to Moscow. Czechoslovakia was a part of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. Foreign and security policy was conducted in order to fulfil the postulates of the USSR. The country was a member of the Warsaw pact that was established in reaction to NATO and was supposed to be a guarantor of security in the Eastern Bloc. The Velvet Revolution in November 1989 ended the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, and the process of non-violent transition started.

During the 1990s, the Czech governments clarified a priority to become a part of the Western World. The main object of the Czech foreign policy was the engagement in regional as well as in international organisations that would guarantee security and stability for the

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Austrian Security Strategy: Security in a new decade – Shaping security [online]. Vienna, July 2012 [viewed 31 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/sicherheitsstrategie_engl.pdf.

Czech Republic. Khol notes that the Czech Republic oriented its foreign policy towards the most important security organisation, NATO.²⁰⁸ Jireš comments that “*Czech security policy-makers believe that the country’s security cannot be separated from the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and the broader world.*”²⁰⁹ In this respect, it is important to note that the Czech Republic participated in some missions in Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, or Afghanistan.²¹⁰ The government declared that the Czech Republic shares and respects the democratic values of NATO and its aspiration to become a fully pledged member of this organisation. Even though the NATO membership was a long-term preference, the Czech Republic engaged itself in other international organisations, for example, in the United Nations, or WEU. The Czech Republic’s perception is that the role of NATO is crucial for security and stability on the European continent. The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic adopted in 1999 states that the national interest is to maintain the US presence and engagement in Europe. Moreover, the Czech government’s desire to enhance the transatlantic relationship was apparent. The Strategy states that the development of the ESDP must be in accordance with NATO commitments. Thus, it would strengthen security co-operation and the transatlantic partnership.²¹¹ In 1999, the accession process was concluded successfully, and the Czech Republic became a NATO member.

The Czech Republic’s desire to be a part of Europe again after the fall of the communist regime was apparent. There was consent of the Czech political parties that the overarching goal is to be a part of the EU. The dynamics of the ESDP process in the EU required a reaction of the Czech Republic as a candidate state. Thus, it declared to support further development of CFSP, including the security and defence dimension. The Czech Republic became a member of the EU in 2004.

Above mentioned the Czech Republic promote the significant role of NATO and the partnership with the US. Therefore, Bush’s War on Terror to combat global terrorism gained the support of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic was facing a dilemma whether it would back the US together with the UK and other states, or it would join the group of member states that opposed the US strategy led by France and Germany. Nečas concludes that the interest of

²⁰⁸ KHOL, R. Česká bezpečnostní politika 1993-2004. In PICK, O. and V. HANDL (eds.), *Zahraniční politika České republiky 1993-2004: Úspěchy, problémy a perspektivy* [online]. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2004, p. 31 [viewed 31 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.dokumenty-ir.cz/Publikace/ZP_CR_1993_2004.pdf.

²⁰⁹ JIREŠ, J. Czech Republic. In In. In BIEHL, H., B. GIEGERICH and A. JONAS (eds.), *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013, p. 73.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky [online]. 2001 [viewed 1 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/2001%20Bezpecnostni%20strategie%20CR.pdf>.

the Czech Republic is to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship that represents the foundations of the CFSP. According to him, this is the main reason for the Czech support of the Iraq invasion.²¹²

The Czech Republic repeatedly declared its commitments on active participation in the EU's CFSP, including CSDP, in the conceptions of the foreign policy adopted by the Czech government. Since the EU accession, the Czech Republic has contributed to the EU missions, or it participated in the Battlegroup. However, the perception of NATO as the most important security organisation perceived. Therefore, the CSDP should rather complement NATO not to undermine it. In addition, the Czech Republic has been supporting the intergovernmental approach in CSDP.

6.3. Austria, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom: conclusion

To conclude, above mentioned small states in Central Europe, Austria, and the Czech Republic, have different perceptions regarding the development of the CSDP. The differentiation is based on their historical experiences. In the case of Austria, its sovereignty was conditioned by the status of neutrality. Thus, the membership in security organisations such as NATO is not compatible with the Austrian Constitution declaring neutrality. However, the adoption of the amendments to the Constitution in reaction to the development of ESDP allows Austria to fully participate in the Petersberg tasks. The country also contributed to the EU missions. Moreover, its position towards further enhancements of the CSDP is positive. Together with the other neutral states, it can possibly influence the negotiation process. This was evident during the negotiations of the mutual defence clause that was not acceptable for neutral member states. Therefore, the concession was made, and the Irish Clause became an integral part of the Lisbon Treaty.

On the other hand, the Czech Republic's preferences and national interests have been influenced by the fact that the country was under the supremacy of the Communist party for a long period of time. Therefore, after gaining its independence, the Czech governments agreed that the country should be directed towards the West. The membership in both NATO and the EU was a paramount interest of the Czech Republic. During the 1990s, the country also contributed to NATO and EU missions. After the accession to the EU, the Czech government pledged to actively participate in the CSDP. However, the Czech Republic emphasises that the

²¹² NEČAS, P. Válka v Iráku a české zájmy. *Revue Politika* [online], 2003, 3 [viewed 1 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.cdk.cz/valka-v-iraku-ceske-zajmy>.

security and defence policy of the EU should not undermine NATO. Moreover, in Czech Republic's view, the US presence and engagement in Europe is very important. Thus, the EU should maintain a strong transatlantic partnership. The Czech Republic would rather implement the intergovernmental approach in CSDP.

The brief analysis of the position of these two small states showed that in the case of Austria, the preferences are different in comparison to the UK's preferences with regards to the ESDP/CSDP. This conclusion is reasonable since Austrian security interests are bounded by its neutrality status. Even though, as a neutral country, Austria has shown its willingness to strengthen the security and defence co-operation in the EU. In contrary to the UK's favouring the intergovernmental character of CSDP, Austria had declared in 1996 that it would support further development of EU foreign and security policy in terms of community approach.

On the other hand, the preferences of the Czech Republic overlapped with some of the preferences of the United Kingdom. Firstly, the Czech Republic envisions NATO as the most important security organisation that can guarantee security and stability in Europe. Therefore, the Czech Republic states in its Security Strategy documents that the CSDP should not undermine or duplicate NATO. It would rather complement and strengthen the transatlantic partnership. Secondly, the Czech Republic considers EU-US relations as vital. Therefore, the Czech governments have promoted the idea of maintaining a strong transatlantic co-operation. Finally, both the UK, and the Czech Republic have been pursuing the intergovernmental approach in CFSP and CSDP. In addition, Brusenbauch Meislová notes that "*the Czech Republic considers the UK a key like-minded partner and ally with whom it shares a typically pragmatic approach towards CFSP/CSDP.*"²¹³ With Brexit, the Czech position will be weakened.

²¹³ BRUSENBAUCH MEISLOVÁ, M. *A Breath of Fresh Air, or the Winds of Change? CFSP after Brexit and Strategic Challenges for the Czech Republic* [online]. Policy Paper. Europeum Institute for European Policy, 2017, p. 2 [viewed 5 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/pp-meislova.pdf>.

Conclusion

The establishment of the ESDP in 1999 was a milestone in the European integration process. With the changing security environment, the member states realised that they must take action and, therefore, to strengthen the EU's role at the international level. Co-operation between European countries had started even before the ESDP was established. After the end of WW2, the debates on such co-operation took place to maintain peace on the continent. Many initiatives arose. Moreover, some of them were realised. This thesis focused on the role of the UK in the ESDP/CSDP process. The main aim was to analyse the UK's position towards the security and defence co-operation in Europe. The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism was introduced, and the central hypotheses were tested on the UK's role in ESDP/CSDP. The thesis was divided into six chapters. Followingly, the thesis will summarise the results of the analysis and provide the answers to the research questions set out in the introduction.

Firstly, *What was the role of the United Kingdom within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy?* Chapter two introduced the most significant initiative and proposal to strengthen the security co-operation between European states. The role of the UK in this area was defined as momentous. Since the end of WW2, the UK political representatives proactively discussed the possibilities of intensifying security co-operation. The main driver of such a debate was the maintenance of peace. Therefore, the UK held a bilateral talk with France, resulting in concluding the Dunkirk Treaty. Notably, the UK was very active in pursuing projects in this field. Even though the UK was not an EC member until 1973, it participated, for example, in the Western Union. Moreover, the UK was a very active member, and it initiated the creation of the WEU. As an EU member, the UK was also able to influence the ESDP process. The role of the UK was fundamental in the case of the establishment of ESDP. Together with France, they proposed and called for an enhanced defence co-operation and, therefore, the Franco-British initiative has been recognised as a cornerstone of the ESDP. The UK took the lead in the security and defence area at the European level. The analysis showed that during the intergovernmental negotiations, the UK was successful in pursuing its preferences. Those preferences were formulated by the government and were influenced by both internal and external factors. However, the thesis concludes that the external security environment has impacted the UK's preferences to a larger extent.

Secondly, regarding the research question: *Has the attitude of the United Kingdom towards co-operation in the security and defence sector changed? If yes, what are the main*

drivers of the change? the thesis concludes that the UK has been willing to take part in the European security co-operation since the end of WW2. However, after the UK joined the EU in 1973, it was clear that its position towards an idea to deepen European integration meant establishing a political Union. Moreover, during the negotiations of the Maastricht treaty that created the CFSP, the UK straightforwardly stated that this policy must be based on the intergovernmental approach. The matters of high politics represent a sensitive area as they are subjected to the state's sovereignty. Since the Maastricht Treaty declares that the CFSP is a part of the second intergovernmental pillar, the UK was willing to adopt the Treaty. The UK's attitude changed radically as the New Labour government came to power in 1997. The pro-European PM, Tony Blair, desired to take the lead in the EU. Moreover, Blair wanted to strengthen the UK's position in the world via the stronger EU. This shift was significantly influenced by external factors, for example, the unstable security situation in Balkans or the relationship with the US. Even though the UK's attitude was more proactive, the national preferences remained unchanged. Most importantly, the UK emphasised the role of NATO in the sense that ESDP cannot undermine it. Moreover, the transatlantic relations were a key aspect of the UK's perception regarding defence co-operation. Of course, the enhanced security co-operation at the EU level must be intergovernmental biased. The thesis concludes that these preferences remained unchanged even during the conservative government of David Cameron. At this point, it is important to add that Cameron's cabinet was in favour of the bilateral co-operation, for example, with France.

Thirdly, the thesis tested the relevance of the LI assumptions on the case of the UK within the ESDP/CSDP process to answer this question: *Are the assumptions of Liberal Intergovernmentalism valid in the case of the ESDP/CSDP with respect to the UK?* In conclusion, the LI correctly assumes that the most significant actors of the security and defence integration are governments. The British government's role in the ESDP process was crucial, and it enabled the ESDP to proceed. However, the claims that the national preferences are a result of domestic bargaining, and the government is an aggregator of the interest group's preferences do not correspond in the case of the UK in the terms of ESDP. The preferences in the security and defence area were formulated by a small group of political representatives led by the PM. The role of interest groups was limited. Therefore, the formulated preferences did not reflect interests of those groups. In the case of the UK in the ESDP, the assumption that the economic interests are the main driver of the integration do not correspond. It is rather the issue-specific interdependence that motivated the UK to pursue enhance co-operation at the EU level. Regarding interstate bargaining, the LI correctly states that this process is dependent on the

bargaining power of governments. At this point, the thesis concludes that the UK managed to gain support among member states. Therefore, its negotiation position was strengthened. Moreover, the co-operation with the other key actor, France, ensured the UK's strong position. Those two states took the lead in the ESDP process. Lastly, the LI assumption regarding the institutional choice has not met the reality yet. The thesis revealed that there was no formal transition of power to the supranational institution in the security and defence policy so far. Even though some institutions were established, such as PSC or EDA, the CSDP is based on the intergovernmental approach. Therefore, the member states safeguard their power in this area.

Fourthly, with the UK's decision to leave the EU, it is important to analyse *How can the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union possibly impact the further development of the Common Security and Defence Policy?* At this point, the thesis concludes that Brexit will, with no doubt, impact the CSDP. The UK is a country with military capabilities. Moreover, its diplomatic relations in the world would certainly represent a loss for the EU. There are fears that Brexit will negatively affect further security co-operation among EU member states. Contrary, it may have an opposite effect, and it may lead to radical dynamics within CSDP. The other aspect of Brexit is that the balance of power in the EU will change.

Therefore, this led to the question: *What are possible perspectives for the co-operation between the United Kingdom and the European Union in the future in the field of security and defence?* In this respect, the thesis introduced models of co-operation that are being discussed. The model EU27+1 suggests that the UK would be engaged in CSDP as a non-member state. The other proposal, called reserve Denmark is based on the possibility for the UK to continue its involvement in CSDP. The co-operation would allow the UK to opt-in. That means that the UK would participate in the meetings at the EU level. However, it would not be able to make a decision. Moreover, the co-operation based on a Framework Participation Agreement has been an objective of discussions. Furthermore, the thesis concludes that there is a possibility to modify the EU-NATO relations that would ensure the UK's engagement on the European continent. It is very difficult to predict which model will be applied in future. The form of co-operation depends on the outcomes of the negotiations between the EU and the UK. Therefore, the thesis suggests that the impacts of Brexit on CSDP and the EU-UK relationship need to be addressed by scholars in future.

Lastly, the thesis briefly introduced the positions of two small states in Central Europe, Austria and the Czech Republic. In conclusion, the Austrian attitude towards security and defence co-operation has been influenced by its neutrality status. Austria is an active actor at

the EU level. Its flexible approach is apparent since Austria adopted the constitutional amendments that allow the country to be fully engaged in the sense of security and defence. The case of the Czech Republic showed that the country's long-lasting experience with the Communist regime influenced its security preferences after declaring the state's independence. The priority was to become a member of NATO and the EU. The role of NATO is critical for the Czech government. Therefore, the Czech Republic is pursuing the CSDP that would not compete with NATO. It would rather complement NATO. Czech representatives emphasise the intergovernmental character of CSDP. At this point, the thesis concludes that the Czech Republic preferences do overlap with the UK's one.

References

- Austrian Security Strategy: Security in a new decade – Shaping security [online]. Vienna, July 2012 [viewed 31 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/sicherheitsstrategie_engl.pdf.
- BAILES, A. JK. And G. MESSERVY-WHITING. *Death of an Institution. The end for Western European Union, a future for European defence?* Brussels: Academia Press for Egmont, 2011. ISBN 978 90 382 1785 7.
- BAKKER, A., M. DRENT and D. ZANDEE. *European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit?* [online]. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2017 [viewed 24 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/Report_European_defence_after_Brexit.pdf.
- BARNETT, M. High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977. *World Politics*, 1990, 24 (4), pp. 529-562. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010513>.
- BARNIER, M. The Future of the EU. Speech by Michel Barnier at the Centre for European Reform [online]. 20 November 2017 [viewed 26 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.cer.eu/in-the-press/speech-michel-barnier-future-eu-conference>.
- BAYLIS, J. Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment. *International Affairs*, 1984, 60 (4), pp. 615-629.
- BEBR, G. The European Defence Community and the Western European Union: An Agonizing Dilemma. *Stanford Law Review*, 1955, 7 (2), pp. 169-236.
- Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky [online]. 2001 [viewed 1 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/2001%20Bezpecnostni%20strategie%20R.pdf>.
- BJOLA, C. and I. MANOR. Revisiting Putnam's two-level game theory in the digital age: domestic digital diplomacy and the Iran nuclear deal. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2018, 31 (1), pp. 3-32. ISSN 0955-7571.
- BLAIR, T. In RUTTEN, M. *From St-Malo to Nice European defence: core documents*. Chaillot Papers. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2001. ISSN 1017-7666.
- BRETTNER-MESSLER, G. Austria's Engagement in Chad as Element of Its Neutrality Policy: Security Policy between Abstinance and Engagement. *Defence and Strategy*, 2008, 1, p. 82-83.

- BRITZ, M. and A. ERIKSSON. The european security and defence policy: a fourth system of european foreign policy? *Politique Européenne*, 2005, 3 (17), pp. 35-62.
- BRUSENBAUCH MEISLOVÁ, M. *A Breath of Fresh Air, or the Winds of Change? CFSP after Brexit and Strategic Challenges for the Czech Republic* [online]. Policy Paper. European Institute for European Policy, 2017 [viewed 5 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/pp-meislova.pdf>.
- BULMER, S. *New Labour and the European Union 1997-2007*. Working Paper, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008.
- CAMERON, D. *EU speech at Bloomberg* [online]. 2013 [viewed 20 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>.
- CASTLE, S. U.K. to Start Brexit on March 29 by Invoking Article 50. *The New York Times* [online]. 20 March 2017 [viewed 24 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/world/europe/brexit-article-50.html>.
- CÍSAŘ, O. Teorie mezinárodních vztahů a evropská studia. *Politologický časopis* 2002, 8 (1), pp. 50-67. ISSN 1211-3247.
- Cologne European Council Declaration on the common policy on security and defence (4 June 1999).
- Conclusions of the Presidency Santa Maria da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000.
- Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007.
- CORNISH, P. United Kingdom. In BIEHL, H., B. GIEGERICH and A. JONAS (eds.). *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013, pp. 371-385. ISBN 978-3-658-01168-0.
- Council Decision 2000/143/CFSP of 14 February 2000.
- Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001
- CHRYSSOCHOOU, D. N. *Theorizing European Integration*. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008. ISBN 9780203946107.
- DEHOUSSE, F. After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1998, 9, pp. 525-539.
- DEUTSCH, K. W. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. In: NELSEN, Brent F., STUBB, Alexander (eds). *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. Third Edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2014, 121-143 p. ISBN 1-4039-0422-7.
- DOREY, P. Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party's Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s. *Politics and Governance*, 2017, 5 (2), p. 27-40.

DOVER, R. The Prime Minister and the Core Executive: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Reading of UK Defence Policy Formulation 1997-2000. *BJPIR*, 2005, 7 (4), p. 508-525.

DOVER, R. *Europeanization of British Defence Policy*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007. ISBN 978-0-7546-4899-4.

DUQUETTE, E. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Emerging from the U.S. Shadow. *Davis Journal of International Law and Policy*, 2001, 7 (2), pp. 169-196.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, 2020.

FALEG, G. United Kingdom: The Elephant in the Room. In SANTOPINTO, F. and M. PRICE (eds.). *National Visions of EU Defence Policy: Common Denominators and Misunderstandings*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013, pp. 132-154. ISBN 978-94-6138-371-6.

FALEG, G. *The Implication of Brexit for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy*. [online]. CEPS, 2016 [viewed 23 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/implications-brexit-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy/>.

FINK-HOOIJER, F. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1994, 5, pp. 173-198.

FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LONDON. The Reform Treaty: The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference, 2007.

FRANK, L. and R. KHOL. Evropské bezpečnostní struktury. *Obran a Strategie*, 2003, 2, pp. 17-26. ISSN 1802-7199.

GÉMES, A. and G. RAGOSSNIK. Austria's Neutrality and European Integration: A Conflict between International and National Spheres of Law. In ANN, K., I. EWALB and L. T., HIEBL (eds.). *Perspectives on European integration and European Union history*. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2008, pp. 235-255.

GNESOTTO, N. ESDP: result and prospects. In GNESSOTO, N. (ed). *EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004)*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, pp. 11-32. ISBN 92-9198-057-9.

GOORMAGHTIGH, J. France and the European Community. *International Journal*, 1954, 9 (2), pp. 96-106.

GUSTENAU, G. Towards a Common European Policy on Security and Defence: An Austrian view of Challenges for the „Post-Neutrals“. *Occasional paper* [online]. 1999, 9 [viewed 30 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/occ009%281%29.pdf>.

GRANT, Ch. *Can Britain lead in Europe*. London: Centre for European Reform, 1998.

- HAAS, E. *Beyond the National-State. Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. ISBN-10 0804701873.
- HOFFMANN, S. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. *Daedalus*, 1966, 95 (3), pp. 862-915.
- HOFFMANN, S. The crisis in transatlantic relations. In LINDSTROM, G. (ed.). *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003, pp. 13-20. ISBN 92-9198-043-9.
- HOWORTH, J. National defence and European security integration: an illusion inside a chimera? In: HOWORTH, J. and A. MENON (eds.). *The European Union National Defence Policy*. London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 11-22. ISBN 0-203-98292-4.
- HOWORTH, J. Saint-Malo plus five: An Interim Assessment of ESDP. *Policy papers* N. 7, 2003.
- HOWORTH, J. The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2004, 9, pp. 1-25.
- HOWORTH, J. Catherine Ashton's five-year term: a difficult assessment. *Les Cahiers Europeens de Sciences Po.*, 2014, 3.
- HOWORTH, J. EU Defence Cooperation after Brexit: What Role for the UK in the Future EU Arrangements? *European View*, 2017, 16 (2), pp. 191-200.
- HUMMER, W. The New EU – A „Military pact“? Solidarity – Neutrality – „Irish Clause“. In HAUSER, G. And K. FRANC (eds.). *European Security in Transition*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, pp. 63-72. ISBN-10 07546 4961 X.
- H.G.L. The European Defence Community. *The World Today*, 1952, 8 (6), pp. 236-248.
- JACOBS, A. and S. VANHOONACKER. *EU-UK Cooperation in CSDP After Brexit. Living apart together?* [online]. Dahrendorf Forum: Policy Brief, 2018. [viewed 23 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/EU-UK-Cooperation-in-CSDP-After-Brexit.pdf>
- JIREŠ, J. Czech Republic. In In. In BIEHL, H., B. GIEGERICH and A. JONAS (eds.). *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013. ISBN 978-3-658-01167-3.
- Joint Declaration on European Defence, Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998).
- JONSON, P. *The Development of the European Security Defence Policy – An Assessment of Preferences, Bargains and Outcomes*. Stockholm: FOI, 2006.

JOPP, M. Introduction. In JOPP, M. (ed). *The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations*, [online]. Chaillot Paper 17, Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1994, p. 4, [viewed 5 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp017e.pdf>.

KAMMEL, A. H. Austria. In. In BIEHL, H., B. GIEGERICH and A. JONAS (eds.). *Strategic cultures in Europe: Security and defence policies across the continent*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013. ISBN 978-3-658-01167-3.

KARLAS, J. Liberalismus a velké teorie mezinárodních vztahů. *Mezinárodní vztahy*, 2014, 2, pp. 5-19. ISSN 0323-1844.

KHOL, R. Západoevropská unie – spící obr, či nedochůdče? *Czech Journal of International Relations*, 1996, 31 (2), pp. 39-37.

KHOL, R. Česká bezpečnostní politika 1993-2004. In PICK, O. and V. HANDL (eds.). *Zahraniční politika České republiky 1993-2004: Úspěchy, problémy a perspektivy* [online]. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2004, pp. 31-44 [viewed 31 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.dokumenty-iir.cz/Publikace/ZP_CR_1993_2004.pdf.

KILJUNEN, K. *The European Constitution in the Making* [online]. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004 [viewed 30 October 2021]. ISBN 92-9079-493-3. Available from: http://aei.pitt.edu/32581/1/20._EU_Constitution.pdf.

KLEINE, M. and M. POLLACK. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2018, 56 (7), pp. 1493-1509.

KLEINENDORST, S. *The Appointment of the High Representative: A Balancing Exercise at the Highest Level of the EU*. Leiden University, 2020.

KRAMER, S. P. Blair's Britain after Iraq. *Foreign Affairs*, 2003, 82 (4), pp. 90-104.

KRATOCHVÍL, P. *Teorie evropské integrace*. Praha: Portál, 2008. ISBN 978-80-7367-467-0.

Labour Party Manifesto 1997: New Labour because Britain deserves better.

LATAWSKI, P. and M. SMITH. *The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. eISBN 97815226137784.

LIJPHART, A. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *The American Political Science Review*, 1971, 65 (3), pp. 682-693.

MAJOR, C. and CH. MÖLLING. Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one. *Uibrief*, 2017, 7.

MARTILL, B. and M. SUS. Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or French connection? *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2018, 20 (4), pp. 846-863.

MAY, T. *PM's Florence speech: a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU* [online.] 2017 [viewed 25 October 2021]. Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu>.

MENON, A. From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq. *International Affairs*, 2004, 80 (4), pp. 631-648.

MILWARD, A. S., G. BRENNAN and F. ROMERO. *The European rescue of the nation-state*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1993. ISBN 9780415216296.

MILZOW, K. Europe and the European Union in the Discourse of Tony Blair. *Cahiers Charles V*, 2006, 41, pp. 121-143.

MISSIROLI, A. The EU, WEU and ESDI: Amsterdam and beyond. *Insight Turkey*, 1999, 1 (2), pp. 23-45.

MISSIROLI, A. *CFSP, Defence and Flexibility*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2000. ISSN 1017-7566.

Modified Brussels Treaty (Paris, 23 October 1954).

MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, 31 (4), pp. 473-524.

MORAVCSIK, A. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1998. ISBN 9781857281927.

MORAVCSIK, A. and K. NICAL Aidis. Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1999, 37 (1), pp. 59-85.

MORAVCSIK, A. and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A. and T. DIEZ (eds.). *European Integration Theory*. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 68-87. ISBN 978-0-19-922609-2.

MORAVCSIK, A. Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st-century Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2018, 56 (7), pp. 1648-1674.

MORAVCSIK, A. and F. SCHIMMELFENNING. Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: WIENER, A., T. A. BÖRZEL and T. RISSE (eds.). *European Integration Theory. Third edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. ISBN 978-0-19-873731-5.

MÖLDER, H. British Approach to the European Union: From Tony Blair to David Cameron. In TROITINO, D. R., T. KERIKMAE and A. CHOCHIA (eds.). *Brexit: history, reasoning and perspectives*. Cham: Springer, 2018, pp. 153-173. ISBN-13: 978-3319734132.

NEČAS, P. Válka v Iráku a české zájmy. *Revue Politika* [online], 2003, 3 [viewed 1 November 2021]. Available from: <https://www.cdk.cz/valka-v-iraku-ceske-zajmy>.

NISSEN, CH. *European Defence Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty: The road is paved for increased momentum*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. ISBN 978-87-7605-753-4.

NUTTALL, S. „Ad-hocery“ Is a Neutral Concept. In MISSIROLI, A. (ed.). *Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in European Security Matters: Assets or Liabilities?, Occasional Paper 6*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1999. ISSN 1017-7566.

NYE, J. S. and R. O. KEOHANE. *Power and Interdependence. 4th ed.* New York: Longman, 2012. ISBN-13: 978-0205082919.

OAKES, M. *European Defence: From Pörschach to Helsinki*. House of Commons Library, 2000. ISSN 1368-8456.

O'DONNELL, C. M. Britain's coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests. *International Affairs*, 2011, 87 (2), pp. 419-433.

PAGANI, F. A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union. *European Journal of International Law*, 1998, 9, pp. 737-749.

POPLAWSKI, D. Neutrality in Austria's Foreign and Security Policy after the Cold War [online]. *Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs*, 2020, 24 (2) [viewed 31 October 2021]. Available from: <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-fb1d2faf-8f93-44af-88e6-9974966b1cd6/c/2-2020-Poplawski.pdf>.

POTTON, E. and A. MELLOWS-FACER. *The euro? Background to the five economic tests* [online]. Research Paper 03/53, House of Commons Library, 2003, p. 7 [viewed 6 November 2021]. Available from: <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP03-53/RP03-53.pdf>.

PUTNAM, R. Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organisations*, 1988, 42 (3), pp. 427-460.

ROSAMOND, B. *Theories of European Integration*. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000. ISBN-13: 978-0312231200.

ROUND, P., B. GIEGERICH and CH. MÖLLING. *European Strategic autonomy and Brexit*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018.

SCHMIDT, R. J. Jr. International negotiations paralyzed by domestic politics: Two-level game theory and the problem of the Pacific salmon commission. *Environmental Law*, 1996, 26 (1), pp 95-139. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43266468>

Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010.

SIMÓN, L. *Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security: The EU-NATO Comundrum in Perspective*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. ISBN 978-1137-00500-7.

SPINELLI, Altiero. *The Ventotene Manifesto* [online]. 2 December 2013 [viewed 23 June 2021]. Available from: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/316aa96c-e7ff-4b9e-b43a-958e96afbecc/publishable_en.pdf.

TARDY, T. *CSDP: getting third states on board*. [online]. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014 [viewed 2 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_6_CSDP_and_third_states.pdf. The Brussel Treaty (17 March 1948).

The Coalition: our programme for government, 2010.

Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation, London, 2 November 2010.

Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992.

Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997.

TSERTSVADZE, I. Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. *Connections*, 2017, 16 (3), p. 73-86. e-ISSN 1812-2973.

WEI-FANG, C. *National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany*. Durham University, 2012.

WESSEL, A. R. The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 2003, 8 (2), pp. 265-288.

White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference [online]. 1995 [viewed 30 October 2021]. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-at_en.htm#pos.

WHITHAM, R. The EU and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached? *National Institute Economic Review*, 2016, 238 (1), pp. 43-50.

XAVIER, A. I. The Impact of Brexit on Security and Defence Multilateralism: More Cooperation or Overlapping Interests? *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 2018, 26 (1), pp. 101-118.