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The Americans and the Nanking Massacre

Bachelor Work

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Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto bakalářskou práci vypracovala samostatně a uvedla úplný seznam citované a použité literatury.

V Olomouci dne 12.5.2010

I hereby certify that I wrote this bachelor work myself using only the referenced sources.

In Olomouc 12.5.2010

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## 1. Introduction

The aim of this work is to depict the influence of American policy and American individuals on the incidents happening in Nanking<sup>1</sup> in the winter of 1937/1938, as well as to describe the consequences of this influence.

Nanking incidents, later known as the Nanking massacre, have played an important role both in terms of Chinese and the United States history. Due to the fact that Nanking was that time capital of China, the fall of the city into Japanese hands was regarded as a milestone in the Japanese efforts to conquer whole China. During the Tokyo Trial, held in 1946, Japanese society for the first time heard witnesses from other people than Japanese soldiers and the massacre was used as a main example of the Japanese atrocities committed in Asia.<sup>2</sup> The shock, which arose in Japan after hearing the truth about what happened in Nanking however quickly changed into the denial of the massacre, which resulted in the fact that Japanese government has never apologized and in the fact that even sixty years after, films denying the Massacre are produced (The Truth of Nanking), books published (*A Big Doubt about the Rape of Nanking*) or history textbooks altered.

The policy of the United States in 1937 and the following years can be briefly characterized as a policy of non-intervention, which was in contrast with agreements signed in the previous years such as the agreement signed at Washington Naval Conference, in which signatories (including the USA and Japan) among others promised to respect the territorial integrity of China. It is a well-known fact, that the end of this policy was marked by the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

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<sup>1</sup> While the official modern transcription is "Nanjing" the majority of historical documents in English use "Nanking"

<sup>2</sup> "The Nanking massacre", *Basic Facts on the Nanking Massacre and the Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, 1993, April 2010 < <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15000/15000-h/vol1.html>>.



After the war the USA active role in Asia can be proved on their full engagement in the Tokyo Trial in 1946, where among others Japanese atrocities in Nanking were discussed.

Speaking of the individual Americans, due to lack of written materials it was impossible for me to describe lives and contributions of all Americans who were in Nanking in any time from December 13, 1937 when the Japanese army for the first time entered the city to January 1938. Although as I will prove later in my work, the atrocities were not limited only to the six weeks after December 13, this period is beyond question regarded as the time were most of the atrocities happened and most people died. For this reason I have chosen fifteen people of American nationality, who were during the period mentioned above in Nanking and whose contributions are mentioned in written materials.

Nowadays, it is beyond question that without foreigners' presence in Nanking, numbers of dead and rapes would be much higher, and there would be much less written or visual sources (if any). However, due to further development of Chinese and American policies, their contributions were often underestimated, missed out and during the Korean War the foreigners were believed to be allies of Japanese, working against the Chinese citizens in Nanking. "Before the United States normalized its relations with China in 1979, the Nanking massacre received only scant attention in the media or from other sources."<sup>3</sup> The interest in the subject of the Nanking massacre was in the United States fully awakened by the Iris Chang's book *Rape of Nanking* published in 1997, which however also initiated new waves of publishing denying literature and films.

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<sup>3</sup> Takashi Yoshida, *The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 114.

Furthermore, I have attempted to contrast consequences of actions of individuals in Nanking with the results of that time policy of the United States in order to prove that the former and latter were in the majority of cases in opposition. My thesis also focuses on depicting how the stay of Americans in Nanking during the winter of 1937 and their participation in winter incidents later influenced their lives.

For the reasons mentioned above, I have divided my work into three parts. The first briefly describes the political situation preceding the incident, focusing on the incident itself and stating three major sorts of atrocities and also outlining ways and methods how Americans helped to reduce them. The second part focuses on the description of the Safety Zone<sup>4</sup>, the area established by foreigners in Nanking primary in order to help civilians and refugees. This part also deals with the description of life and the contribution of individual American as well as depicting the consequences of their stay in Nanking. Since I had the opportunity to read the diaries of several individuals, in their cases I have also tried to find reasons for their motivation and actions. The third part concentrates on the motivations and actions of American representatives and American policy not only toward China, but also towards Japan.

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<sup>4</sup> Hereafter I will refer to this as "SZ"

## 2.1 The Situation Preceding the Nanking Massacre

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."<sup>5</sup>

Japan, a country separated from China only by a strip of water, has much in common with China. However, speaking of the differences, their importance as regards the Nanking massacre was crucial. In the view of Japanese society, the most valuable member was a soldier, whereas from the point of view of the Chinese the highest post in the social structure was occupied by scholars.<sup>6</sup> As a result of this, very strict military-style education which included corporal punishment was introduced to Japanese schools in the thirties.<sup>7</sup> Also, the army had a constitutional right to appoint a Minister of War and in case that they decided to vote him off, it meant the fall of the whole government.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, the political situation significantly differed. The main goal of Japanese policy at that time was to acquire a world hegemony, and therefore first conquer Asia. The Chinese policy from January 1936 when the Chinese Communist Party publicly offered the "hand of friendship" to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek providing the condition that he would take up arms against Japan, was also officially unified. Yet, in the following years relations between the Communist Party and Kuomintang represented by Chiang Kai-shek became very strained, and in some cases even the common policy of resistance against Japan was neglected.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense*, 1980, *Project Gutenberg*, Feb. 2005, Project Gutenberg & PROMO.NET, April 2010 < <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15000/15000-h/vol1.html> >.

<sup>6</sup> See Edwin P. Hoyt, *Japonsko ve válce: Velký pacifický konflikt*, trans. Jan Hrdina, original title: *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict* (Praha: OLDAG, 2000) 14.

<sup>7</sup> See Iris Chang, *Nankingský masakr*, trans. Jiří Gojda, original title: *The Rape of Nanking* (Praha: Ivo Železný, 1998) 31.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Victor Aloysius Röling, *Tokijský proces*, trans. Pavel Vereš, original title: *The Tokyo Trial* (Praha: Mladá Fronta, 1995) 47.

<sup>9</sup> *United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 1949) 46-53.

There are many proves that the Japanese also planned the war with the USA. As Okawa Sumei, a member of Japanese generality stated, Japan represents the most powerful Asian country and the USA represents the most powerful country of the West, therefore the clash between them is inevitable.<sup>10</sup> One of the possible reasons for their desire for the clash could be the strong connection between the Japanese and the American market that the clash could have break or change for the advantage of Japan. To give an example of the connection, after the Wall Street Crash in 1929, American demand for luxurious goods including Japanese silk has fallen dramatically. Also, the Chinese disappointed with the result of Versailles agreement, decided to boycott Japanese goods. As a consequence, Japan was struggling with the problem how to feed its 60 million inhabitants using only 142,270 square miles of in majority infertile soil. And, some members of Japanese military, such as Sadao Araki started to point out the injustice of land and territory division in the world and also at the fact that, the United States itself apart from its own territory also posses over 700,000 square miles in its colonies.<sup>11</sup>

All in all, there were many steps taken by the Japanese government that could draw the attention of either the Chinese or the American government to the necessity of quick action. Only to name the most striking ones - the battle of Shanghai in 1932, followed by the declaration of former Chinese Manchuria to be an independent state (under the control of Japan) in the same year, Japan's departure from the League of Nation in 1933, their attempt to convert five northern Chinese provinces into an autonomous areas and many other Japanese actions in the following years left no place for any politician or diplomat to say that the Japanese invasion in Nanking in

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<sup>10</sup> Chang 26-27.

<sup>11</sup> Chang 25-26.

1937 was surprising or impossible to prevent. In a statement to the press on December 5, 1935, Cordell Hull defined the position of the United States toward the Japanese army penetrating into China:

Unusual developments in any part of China are rightfully and necessarily of concern not alone to the Government and people of China but to all of the many powers which have interest in China. For, in relations with China and in China, the treaty rights and the treaty obligations of the 'treaty powers' are in general identical. The United States is one of those powers.<sup>12</sup>

However, if these words and promises were realized, the Nanking massacre would have been prevented. Instead, the United States decided to close its eyes on China for more than five years.

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<sup>12</sup> *United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, 17.

## 2.2. The Incident Itself

And maps can really point to places  
Where life is evil now:  
Nanking. Dachau.  
W.H. Auden<sup>13</sup>

From November 8, 1937, after conquering Shanghai, the Japanese troops marched toward Nanking, at that-time the capital of China, from two routes: one tailed behind the left wing of the Japanese troops, the other concentrated their forces on the route to Suzhou with the aim of blocking the route of retreat of the Chinese troops.<sup>14</sup> On November 27 General Tang Shengzhi, who was in charge of defending the city of Nanking, called a press conference for foreign reporters where he announced that the city would not surrender, and would fight to the death. In addition he stated that he himself is prepared to either live or die with the city.<sup>15</sup>

However, now we know that the Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek, apart from the plan of defending the city, had another plan in reserve, which he started to realize in the second part of November. At that time he ordered the majority of government officers to relocate to three other cities west from Nanking.<sup>16</sup> By December 1, the national government of China had moved to Wuhan.<sup>17</sup> Whole museum collections were being moved outside the city and on December 8 Chiang Kai-shek with his wife and advisors left the city.<sup>18</sup>

The city was in chaos. It is obvious that by that time every citizen of Nanking was aware of the fact that the government was not sure if they have enough power to

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<sup>13</sup> W.H.Auden, *W.H.Auden: the critical heritage*, ed. John Haffenden (New York: Routledge, 1983) 295.

<sup>14</sup> See Kaiyuan Zhang, *Eyewitness to massacre: American missionaries bear witness to Japanese atrocities in Nanjing* (New York: East Gate Book, 2001) xix.

<sup>15</sup> Chang 61.

<sup>16</sup> Chang 61

<sup>17</sup> Zhang xix.

<sup>18</sup> Chang 63.

defend the city. Still, not everybody was able or willing to leave the city. Some probably feared to leave their businesses or homes without supervision, some did not have enough money even to buy some food for the journey, had such big families that they were afraid that leaving the city could separate them forever, and some were not fit enough to travel or as it happened in many cases, walk for hours. In my opinion a lot of people stayed in the city simply because of the fact that they did not suppose themselves to be in danger of being killed for sport, for gain, or for no reason at all.

As a part of the defense about one hundred thousand Chinese soldiers arrived to Nanking, a great part of which was untrained or wounded from the battle of Shanghai. Soldiers, whom as Iris Chang, author of the famous book *Rape of Nanking*, presumes, were often recruited against their will or even kidnapped.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, not largely motivated to defend the city, they had no relation, side by side to those, who kidnapped them. And, presumably even if they were willing to cooperate, due to the big dialect diversity in China, they were experiencing problems in communication with one another.

After having fighting severely for several days, Tang decided to support the start of truce negotiations with the Japanese troops.<sup>20</sup> However, on December 11 he received an order to retreat from Chiang Kai-shek. He himself was by Chiang Kai-shek directed to leave his troops and flee to safety.<sup>21</sup> From today's point of view, it is hard to speculate whether Tang himself would have preferred to stay in Nanking and so keep his promise to live or die with the city or given the opportunity and not an order, leave the city and flee to safety.

Chang presumes the execution of this order was the main reason why Nanking

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<sup>19</sup> Chang 64.

<sup>20</sup> Chang 65.

<sup>21</sup> Chang 66.

fell into the Japanese hands so quickly. She also states that some senior officers, after being informed, for various reasons did not spread the message about quick retreating among their subordinates. Consequently, some soldiers seeing their informed brothers-in-arms running away from battle, started shooting.

In addition, by the time they started retreating, there was only one relatively safe way to escape from Nanking – to cross the river. Nearby the city gate leading towards the river, crowds of people were waiting for any vessel to get them over the river. No wonder Nanking civilians seeing soldiers, who as they presumed, were far more informed than them, to tread down their brothers-in-arms in order to get into a vessel, started to panic.



### 2.2.1. No Prisoners of War

As the Chinese soldiers were trapped in Nanking, they started to get rid of their garments and mingle into the ordinary crowd in the SZ, begging them for ordinary clothes. The situation of the Chinese soldiers was really pitiful. They thought their only chance was to disguise themselves to look undistinguishable from civilians. However, they did not know that not only would their disguise not help them, but it would often be also a pretence to capture or kill any man or boy strong enough to carry a gun.

I feel obliged to state that for example in the book *Nankingský maskar* I have found references that in some cases Japanese soldiers tried to find out whether a man has a military past usually by looking at their hands (looking for either marks from using a gun or manual work that would exempt them from the possibility of being a soldier), shoulders (looking for marks of rucksack straps), forehead and hair (looking for the marks of wearing a cap) and feet (looking for blisters from long marches) or releasing them if somebody as their relative came to claim them (almost all soldiers, in order to prevent them from desertion, were from parts of China far from Nanking; therefore if somebody was claimed, there was a high probability that he was not a soldier). In the film *Nanking*, directed by Bill Guttentag and Dan Sturman<sup>22</sup> it is stated that it was Vautrin, one of the foreigners in Nanking in charge of the SZ who thought the system of claiming relatives out. However, there is no mention about her connection with this system in any written material I came across.

On the December 13, Vautrin, wrote in her diary that she knew that they were many disarmed soldiers hiding in the SZ. Some sources even claim that she herself

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<sup>22</sup> *Nanking*, Dir. Bill Guttentag and Dan Sturman, 2007, Fotissimo Films, 2010, DVD.

was hiding tens of soldiers in the loft of Ginling College. However, there is no mention of this in her diary or diaries of other foreigners. In my opinion the possibility that she herself would initiate hiding in the SZ is not probable mainly because of the fact that by hiding in the SZ, Chinese soldiers put all civilians there in danger.

It is evident in what way they posed a danger to male civilians. But, how could they endanger female civilians? As searching for soldiers became a frequent excuse to get to the SZ to kidnap women, foreigners that were in charge of individual parts of SZ could not prevent them from entering. Also, the Japanese side later on used hiding as an explanation for their entries to SZs (even if several diary records prove that by far not every entry could be justified by searching for Chinese soldiers). In the book *The Nanking Massacre: Fact versus Fiction*, it is claimed that the rounding up of the Chinese soldiers was made to protect the lives of the civilians of the city. “Had the remaining Chinese soldiers who discarded their uniforms attacked from the SZ, which existed only for civilians, the lives of those civilians would have been in danger”.<sup>23</sup>

From the point of view of Chinese soldiers, the SZ was probably the only way to survive. Soon after the fall of Nanking, it became obvious that not only were Chinese soldiers killed for sport, for no reason at all, as a part of a killing competition, but also systematically slaughtered. As early as December 13 there was an order delivered to the 66<sup>th</sup> Battalion that all war prisoners must be executed. This order in detail explained the method of execution, its start and end.<sup>24</sup> From that time on, according to many testimonials, groups of prisoners bound together were escorted to the outskirts of the city by the Japanese, not to return again.

Some Japanese nationalists explain many cases of killing and maltreatment of

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<sup>23</sup> Shudo Higashinakano, *The Nanking Massacre: Fact versus Fiction* (Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, Inc., 2005) 66.  
<sup>24</sup> Chang 38.

Chinese soldiers by pointing at obscurities in the documents instructing dealing with war prisoners and also at the fact that Japan in fact had not issued a declaration of war to Chiang Kai-shek's government and for that reason they felt it inappropriate to act in accordance with specific items in the Convention, in their entirety.<sup>25</sup>

[T]he Army refused to accord to captives taken in the fighting the status and the rights of Prisoners of War. Muto says that it was officially decided in 1938 to continue to call the war in China and "Incident" and to continue for that reason to refuse to apply the rules of war to the conflict.<sup>26</sup>

As a matter of fact, even if all foreigners in charge of SZs decided not to allow one single soldier in, the execution of this order would be impossible as the soldiers had nothing to lose and would try anything to get in there.

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<sup>25</sup> Higashinakano 61.

<sup>26</sup> See *Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The experience of International and National Courts*, ed. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman (Hague: Graham & Trotman Ltd., 2000) 774. Muto was a general in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II.

### 2.2.2. The Killing of Civilians

Due to the fact that mass killing of soldiers happened outside the city, there are only very few testimonials (including the soldiers who by chance survived), post-war testimonials of some Japanese soldiers or photos of bodies in mass graves. On the other hand due to the fact that killing of civilians happened in the city, there are much evidence from both eye witnesses and diaries and letters of foreigners.

However, some Japanese nationalists explain that these diary records are either false or misunderstood. Using the example of a diary record of John Rabe (German), where he describe bodies of civilians with bullets in their backs lying every 100 or 200 yards, the Japanese oppose that Rabe was wrong in saying these people were civilians simply due to the fact that there were no civilians outside the SZ at that time, so probably they were Chinese soldiers posed as civilians.<sup>27</sup> They use similar explanations while explaining other diary records written by Rabe or the Americans Fitch and Smith. In some cases the Japanese side even stated that victims were shot by the Chinese Supervisory Unit, refusing that even one civilian was killed.

Hence the exact figure of death is not known and the goal of my work is not to speculate the number of deaths, I will state only the figure estimated by the Chinese government and used by scientists working in the Museum of Nanking Massacre, which is 300, 000 deaths (including soldiers) and the fact that burial societies and other organizations counted more than 150,000 bodies which they buried. These figures do not take into account those persons whose bodies were destroyed by burning, or by throwing them into the Yangtze River, or otherwise disposed of by Japanese.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Higashinakano 61.

<sup>28</sup> See Chang, 89.

### 2.2.3. Rapes and Comfort Houses

Related to the number of deaths mentioned in the previous chapter is the number of people, especially women who did not die by the hand of Japanese soldiers, but as a consequence of rape either committed suicide or killed babies who were conceived as the result of being raped by a Japanese soldier. The situation of girls and women was with no doubt horrible. In fact, there was no place in the city at any time of the day that would guarantee them safety. For many of them, Ginling College, which became a part of the SZ dedicated solely for women and children, became an unattainable destination. Many women in order not to be raped on the way to the Ginling College disguised themselves as very old women or even men by shaving their hair and covering their faces in dirt.<sup>29</sup> Some of them, especially those having small children that could reveal their identity, stayed at home.

My goal is not to focus on the horrors that happened to the raped women but to focus on the influence of decision or action of foreigners which in some cases precluded rapes, but in some unfortunately had the opposite consequence.

For example Vautrin after hearing that many young women were taken from their homes to be raped or to become prostitutes, allowed from December 15 young women and children to enter the SZ freely. However, older women, who had been mistakenly supposed not to be in danger of being raped, were asked to stay at home.<sup>30</sup> Later on, it became clear that raping cases included the age group from twelve years old to over eighty, pregnant women not excluded.

Some people may ask why did she not allow women and girls to enter freely from

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<sup>29</sup> Chang 85.

<sup>30</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project*, Apr. 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

the beginning? In my opinion if she did so, food supplies that were so low that were often not provided to all women, would definitely be not sufficient. Also, I think she was fully aware of the danger of concentrating so many people in one place. In many diary records of various foreigners, I found a notice that women were afraid to leave the SZ to get some water to drink. I suppose the situation regarding water for hygiene was much worse.

The Nanking massacre, due to the high number of raped women is sometimes referred to as the Rape of Nanking, achieved its ill-fame as being the first place where Japanese military comfort stations were systematically established.<sup>31</sup>

Responding to Western powers' criticism at the massive rapes in Nanjing, the Japanese high command made plans around that time to create a vast network of brothels where thousands of "comfort women" would sexually service soldiers. Japanese historians say the plan was launched in the hope that the existence of official brothels would reduce the incidence of random rape among local women and diminish the opportunities for international condemnation.<sup>32</sup>

Consequently, comfort station, sometimes also referred as comfort houses, served for Japanese soldiers either in occupied areas or on the frontlines to comfort themselves by having sex with local women. As Chang depicts, sometimes these girls or women were bound to a bed or armchair as objects.<sup>33</sup> Speaking of the connection of comfort houses and the United States, from August 1945 to spring 1946, comfort stations were with the approval of American occupation authorities used and visited by American GIs in Japan.<sup>34</sup> Although the connection did not last a long time, I think it could contribute to later negligence of these cases after the Second World War and

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<sup>31</sup> See *Washington Coalition For Comfort Women Issue, Apr. 2010* <<http://www.comfort-women.org/history.html>>.

<sup>32</sup> Antoaneta Bezlova, "Nanking: Inflaming China's 70-year wound," *Washington Post*, 11 Jul 2007, Apr. 2010 <<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IG11Ad01.html>>.

<sup>33</sup> Chang 82.

<sup>34</sup> Eric Talmadge, "GIs Frequent Japan's 'Comfort Women'," *Washington Post* 25 April 2007, April 2010 <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/25/AR2007042501801.html>>.

the fact that the US Congress passed a resolution as late as in 2007 demanding an unambiguous apology from Japan for coercing Asian women to work in the military brothel.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> See Antoaneta Bezlova, "Nanking: Inflaming China's 70-year wound," *Washington Post* 11 Jul 2007, April 2010 < <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IG11Ad01.html>>.

### 3. Safety Zone

In November 1937 as the Japanese troops were approaching Nanking, a group of foreigners established the Nanking Safety Zone Committee, Nanking Safety Zone and the Refugee Zone. The idea was inspired by the establishment of a similar zone in Shanghai in November 1937, initiated by W. Plumer Mills. The SZ included Nanking University, Ginling College for Women, the American Embassy and several buildings owned by the Chinese government.

It was [also] composed of a score of refugee camps that occupied an area of about 3.4 square miles (8.6 square kilometers). On December 1, 1937, Mayor Ma Chaochun of Nanking met the International Committee and authorized them to take over the city's administration once he and his staff were evacuated.<sup>36</sup>

However, after the establishment of SZ, members of the SZ Committee were facing a problem – how to explain to the Japanese troops, who were quickly approaching Nanking, where the SZ is and more importantly, why should it prevent them from entering a part of the city they will have completely captured. In fact, none of the foreigners staying in Nanking after December 9, 1937 was diplomat or could expect to be treated in a better way than ordinary Chinese civilians. They were missionaries, teachers, businessmen, journalists, doctors and nurses. They tried to renew electricity and water supplies; provide refugees with food, water, blankets; establish spots for selling and buying cereals; provide impoverished people with porridge and in addition to women who gave birth to a boy they gave 10 dollars and in the case of a birth of a girl fifty cents less.<sup>37</sup>

The determination of foreigners to help the Chinese is even more admirable when

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<sup>36</sup> See *Rape of Nanking*, ed. Timothy Brook (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2003) 3.

<sup>37</sup> See 国际学术研讨会论文集 [Guoji xueshu yan hui lunwenji ] ed. 陈安吉 [Chen Anji ] (安徽大学出版社 [Anwei daxue chubanshe] 1998) 265.



taken in the historical context. Precisely ten years before the massacre, in 1927, many foreigners in Nanking suffered attacks by Chinese nationalists.

They went on a rampage of burning and looting the foreign residences and schools, smashing windows and furniture, stripping foreigner's clothes and even threatening to rape women. Vice president John E. Williams of the University of Nanking and five other foreigners were killed; eleven British, Americans and Japanese were wounded.<sup>38</sup>

Many other foreigners including the American consul and his family were trapped in their houses besieged by Chinese and almost all the foreigners' homes were looted.

Consequently, all male foreigners from the United States who decided to stay in Nanking asked their wives or families to leave Nanking. At that time they probably were not only afraid of the Japanese, but also of the Chinese. Notwithstanding they opened the SZ and so put at risk not only their possessions, but also their lives. Also, it is a well-known fact that foreigners even after the city was occupied by the Japanese could safely leave the city; however, with high probability they would not be allowed to return. One of the possible reasons why they decided to stay was stated by John Rabe in his diary – it was to "so that one fine day the truth will out."<sup>39</sup>

Members of the SZ were not only from different states, but also had very different world views. As an example of probably the most striking difference of opinion was the gap between John Rabe, a German Nazi and the American members, especially Robert Wilson. However, despite their differences they not only cooperated in order to help the Chinese, but as I can prove using the example of one of Wilson's letter to his family, they also found respect for each other.

He is well up in Nazi circles and after coming into such close contact as we have for the past few weeks and discover(ing)

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<sup>38</sup> Hua-ling Hu, *American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking* (Southern Illinois University Press, 2000) 34.

<sup>39</sup> Victor Fic, "The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe," *Idea* 29 Nov 2009, April 2010 < <http://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=22> >.

what a splendid man he is and what a tremendous heart he has, it is hard to reconcile his personality with his adulation of 'Der Fuhrer.'<sup>40</sup>

Even if they were not able to overcome differences of opinion among them, I think it would be life-threatening for them to show it in front of the Japanese. No wonder they all had similar feelings while dealing with the Japanese. As they were not in a position to threaten them with anything, in many cases they could only use their diplomacy and convincingness. For example after attending a dinner party in the Japanese embassy, Vautrin said: "we had a pleasant evening and our lips uttered with jokes, though often our hearts were heavy."<sup>41</sup>

In my opinion it is also important to mention that with high probability there was a big difference in the Japanese perception of the Americans and Germans. The Germans were at that time allies of Japan. The Americans, however, although not officially an enemy of the Japanese, were probably due to the fact that their policy of isolationism and never-ending acceptance of Japanese excuses, considered not to be such a threat. Chang describes many cases when German nationality was an advantage ranging from the case when it was either Rabe's letter to Hitler or Kriebel that caused the change in the Japanese method of bombing of Nanking (after Rabe's intervention they focused on bombing military objectives) to many cases when displaying swastika or even shouting "Germans! Germans!" stopped Japanese raping or looting.<sup>42</sup>

Vautrin, American and the only female staying in Nanking, noted they saw Japanese who were polite and also Japanese who were rude, but all shared one thing –

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<sup>40</sup> David W. Chen, "At the Rape of Nanking: A Nazi Who Saved Lives," *The New York Times* 12 Dec 1996, April 2010

< <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/12/world/at-the-rape-of-nanking-a-nazi-who-saved-lives.html?pagewanted=1>>.

<sup>41</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin, 1937-1940*. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>42</sup> Chang 98-106.

they had no mercy for Chinese soldiers and did not care much for Americans.<sup>43</sup> Her statement can be proved by the fact that on the same day she wrote that diary record presumably Japanese soldiers stole another foreigner's (Mr. Sole) car which was clearly marked by an American flag or by repeating tearing of American flags that were marking SZs or foreign properties, often followed by entries of Japanese soldiers there, justified by the fact that they did not see any mark or symbol saying that the area is a SZ or American property.<sup>44</sup> Consequently, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of December, Wilson Plumer Mills, an American missionary, after his observation found out that practically all foreign property of all nationalities in Nanjing was looted.<sup>45</sup>

Vautrin described another problem that foreigners had to solve in her diary record from the 11<sup>th</sup> of December 1937, "[r]efugees have a naive conception of the SZ – seem to think it all right to stand out in the middle of the road when an air raid is on." By the 12<sup>th</sup> she stated that three buildings in the SZ were already filled with refugees and yet for a long time there was no way to provide them with food.

It would not be the truth to say that the Zone was a completely safe place. But, compared with the area outside the Zone, there were notably less cases of both rapes and maltreatment done by the Japanese. As it was by many civilians perceived to be the only safe place in Nanking, they did not care about other things, including how to cover their basic needs. It seems to me that many of them simply believed that foreigners will find a way to solve their situations. Although later on a Red Cross kitchen was successfully opened to provide refugees with rice; as the number of refugees was rising, it became unmanageable to feed them all.

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<sup>43</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>44</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>45</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

#### **4.1. Ordinary People Saving Ordinary People**

Having read diary records written by the two most publicly known Americans staying in Nanking during the massacre, I was surprised how often they mentioned the names and contributions of other Americans there. Therefore, I decided not to focus solely on the two most known Americans – Minnie Vautrin and Robert O. Wilson. Although due to the absence of written materials it is impossible to describe the lives of every person of American nationality that contributed to improve the lives of citizens in Nanking, after mentioning Vautrin and Wilson, I would like to briefly outline the lives of thirteen other “ordinary” American nationals who stayed in Nanking within the period of December 13, 1937 to January 1938.

### 4.1.1. Minnie Vautrin

“Every night soldiers would try to get into the SZ and rape girls  
And every night Mrs Vautrin would try to prevent them from doing it.”<sup>46</sup>

Minnie Vautrin was an American missionary and teacher at Ginling College for Women in Nanking. She lived in the time when higher education for women was not common even in the United States, but maybe due to the fact that she, after being orphaned and maltreated by her foster parents, had to steel herself, she found the courage to champion women's education in China, where girls' school education was traditionally regarded as a waste of time.

While her college superiors were running away from Nanking, she was working hard to transform Ginling College into a SZ. The staff of the American Embassy provided her and other members of the International Committee with an American flag and ropes, that could in case of emergency be used to create a rope ladder needed to climb walls of Nanking, which would be the only way to escape from the city after it was captured by the Japanese. Sadly it seems that the most powerful country in the world could provide its citizen who were about to be surrounded by enemies only with a flag and ropes.

After their escape, she de facto became the head of the College.<sup>47</sup> Originally she only wanted to shelter young and unwed women but after she heard about the cases of rape of very young or very old females, she changed her mind. As she wrote in her diary many women were after the nights of horror kneeling in front of Ginling College

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<sup>46</sup> *City of Life and Death*, dir. Lu Chuan, perf. Liu Ye and Gao Yuanyuan, 2009. China Film Group, 2010, DVD.

<sup>47</sup> See Hua-ling Hu "An American Hero in Nanking," *Asia Times* 24 Aug 2002, April 2010 < <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DH24Ad01.html> >.

and imploring for them or their daughters to be taken in. The Ginling Zone itself was originally designed to shelter in maximum 2,050 women, girls and children. But in reality, in the most severe days of the Nanking massacre it became a shelter for as many as twelve thousand refugees.

In my opinion, her position as a woman was even harder than the position of the others. Almost every document picturing her also contains a scene or an example of her humiliation by the Japanese soldiers. According to her diary the first case happened as early as on the 16<sup>th</sup> of December when the Japanese after tearing down the American flag entered the SZ, searching for hidden Chinese soldiers. As she depicts she was slapped on the face by a Japanese soldier.<sup>48</sup> On the same day when Japanese soldiers came again to search for soldiers she, Lewis Smythe and W. Plumer Mills, who were by chance passing by, had to undergo an inspection carried out by Japanese soldiers. While they were waiting for the inspection, they heard screams from the Zone, and according to Vautrin at that time they first realized that the searching for the soldiers act was only done to conceal another goal of the Japanese soldiers – to select women for sex.<sup>49</sup> Many times Japanese soldiers came to the Ginling Campus to look for soldiers, often grabbing servants and it was only thanks to her presence and ability to identify a person that they were saved from the fate of being stabbed or shot.<sup>50</sup> However, it was impossible to be in every case in time to prevent Japanese soldiers from taking people away from the SZ. Sometimes, even her presence could not help the Chinese. On December 16 she describes a case when she saw a truck passing in which 8 or 10 girls were crying "Save our lives! Save our

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<sup>48</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>49</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>50</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

lives!", but there was no way she could help them. Her diary record from December 16 says "There was no crime that has not been committed today."<sup>51</sup>

Reading her diary gave me more than a linear line of events and incidents which happened during the massacre, but also provided me with a picture of her complex personality. Sometimes, I felt that the linearity that she kept in almost every record was startling and shocking. She hardly ever specially emphasized or changed the order of events when something unusual happened. Description of her daily activities and news at school alters with stories of human suffering that she either witnesses or heard and feelings of helplessness in her diary almost until 1940.

I assume that day by day hearing the names of people who were taken by the Japanese and never found, stories of women who were being repeatedly raped all night and the next night again, careful lying to women imploring her to help them find their husbands or sons taken in the first days of fall of Nanking, knowing that they are probably dead, had to exhaust her. As a result, she started to blame herself for being too slow to prevent many horrors including the looting of their residence.<sup>52</sup> Each day in her diary seems to pass similarly. In contrast to diary records written by Doctor Wilson, she dedicated significantly more space to describing her afterthoughts, while Wilson focused rather on describing actions and contributions done by others.

But, the day before Christmas 1937 marked a start of a new series of catastrophe. The Japanese asked to be allowed to pick out one hundred women to be their prostitute out of the refugees. The officer said they would pick only former prostitutes so to prevent soldiers from raping honest girls. Having read the record of her diary, where she described this event, it seems to me she did not believe their words. Also,

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<sup>51</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>52</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

as a matter of fact it is hard to think of a method they could use to distinguish former prostitutes from ‘normal’ girls. Yet, in fact what else she could do apart from giving them her approval? Is she had disapproved, they would have probably deliberately taken the girls. Having in fact no choice, after their promised they would not take any of the latter, Vautrin allowed them to begin their search.<sup>53</sup> In any case she wrote, as late as in March Japanese soldiers were still deliberately kidnapping and raping.<sup>54</sup> Very soon after the ‘prostitute selection’ Japanese came with a new plan – obligatory registration for men and women, whereas the latter was also used for the selection of beautiful girls. In this case as the records say, all girls were fortunately saved by their relatives.

However, there was one decision she made that influenced lives of many Nanking citizens in a bad manner. It was her decision to support the Japanese order to urge the women from the SZ to go home or to the remains of their homes. Because it became impossible to feed them and she felt that it was safe now to return home, she strongly persuaded refugees to leave the Zone. To her horror, in the following days she met with girls and women who had been repeatedly raped after they returned home, begging for her permission to return to SZ This made her not only to open the gates of Ginling College once again, but also left her sad, depressed and constantly blaming herself for her decision.<sup>55</sup>

Still, during my research I did not find a single mention that any Nanking citizens or her colleagues reproached or questioned her decision. Later on, when they started asking for ‘washing women’, even though I presume she was fully conscious of the

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<sup>53</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>54</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>55</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.



real content of these words, there was no way she could refuse. And still, the only one blaming her was she herself.

In 1939 she was rewarded for her heroism by the Order of Jade by the Chinese government. By that time, records in her diary contain more and more description of feelings of helplessness and tiredness. On May 13 1938 after listening to another two stories of human suffering from the winter of 1937, she wrote: One cannot wonder why these people ask you most pitifully, "How long will this terrible situation last? How can we bear it?"<sup>56</sup> This last sentence completely disapproves the presumption that the Nanking massacre lasted only for six weeks. Reading further records full of phrases as "Much depression and feeling of helplessness," from October 21, 1938<sup>57</sup>, "Am dead tired tonight and just now do not see how I can get through week...", from December 11, 1939<sup>58</sup> or "Almost three weeks have passed since I have written one line in diary...The reasons have been not just by many. Physical exhaustion is the main one," from March 22, 1940.<sup>59</sup>

I have deliberately chosen these three records that dated from different years in order to show that her feeling and mood was during these years more or less the same. She frequently thought about the massacre, blaming herself for not being able to find the solution to help everybody.

Vautrin went back to the United States to get medical treatment for an illness on May 14, 1940. Exactly one year later she committed suicide. Wilhelmina "Minnie" Vautrin due to saving a lot of lives during the Nanking massacre became known as

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<sup>56</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>57</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>58</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

<sup>59</sup> Minnie Vautrin, *Diary of Wilhemina Vautrin*, 1937-1940. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <<http://www.library.yale.edu/div/spc/Vautrin.pdf>>.

American goddess.<sup>60</sup> Thus, although she saw her stay in Nanking as her failure; in the eyes of others she was a goddess.

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<sup>60</sup> Hua-Ling Hu, *American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin* (Illinois: Southern Illinois University, 2000) 146.

### 4.1.2. Robert O. Wilson

"Murder by the wholesale and rape by thousands of cases. There seem to be no stop to the ferocity, lust and atavism of the brutes."<sup>61</sup>

Wilson, one of three American doctors in the city and the only surgeon, was in a very hard position during the massacre. He was working day and night and apart from his work, he had to carefully guard the hospital itself. From the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Nanking he devoted a lot of time to chasing Japanese trying to loot or rape in the area of the hospital. And in some cases he hurried even outside the SZ to try to stop or prevent crimes.

Wilson's life was deeply connected with Chinese culture. In the USA, one of his teachers was Pearl Buck, Nobel prize American writer, who spent majority of life in China. In China Wilson with the help of Chinese teachers started studying ancient Chinese.<sup>62</sup>

Before the occupation of Nanking, apart from curing patients and writing down detailed reports about their injuries, that time mainly from the Japanese crump, he was doing his best to hide the hospital from sight of Japanese pilots. Also, rumors said that there were many spies in Nanking working for Japan, trying to get information from wounded pilots or to incite Japanese pilots to important goals.<sup>63</sup> After the battle of Shanghai, the situation got even worse. Wagons of wounded soldiers arrived in Nanking, some of them dying right at the platform, some of them managed to get to the hospital. Yet, if they managed their way to hospital and were cured, they were

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<sup>61</sup> Robert Wilson, "Dearest Family," 1937. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010  
< [http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0016.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0016.pdf)>.

<sup>62</sup> Chang 108.

<sup>63</sup> Chang 109.

immediately sent back to fight, and if their wounds were too serious, they were given a small sum of money in order to return home. As their injuries were too severe or they were crippled, they stayed in Nanking and earned their living as beggars.<sup>64</sup>

Although, he many times witnesses both the Japanese aggression and its consequences on the bodies of his patients, he felt that his position as an American national did not protect him enough to take action every time he saw an injustice. Chang describes that Japanese soldiers in many cases started either playing with the gun or reloading it whenever they saw a foreigner.<sup>65</sup> To give an example of his active role in protecting lives of civilians, on December 21 he and George Fitch were asked by Chinese merchants to help to secure two young women. They agreed, but by the time they arrived at the place, they found three fully armed but only partially clothed Japanese soldiers. Despite the soldiers' anger Wilson and Fitch were allowed to take the intact girls to the Zone.<sup>66</sup>

In his diary, he however also described cases of Japanese soldiers who did not participate in killing and raping and tried to help civilians. For example in his letter from January 3 1938, he described a case when a Japanese soldier helped a girl which was in a horrible state after other Japanese soldiers tried to cut her head off and bayoneted her several times.<sup>67</sup>

By reading his diary description I could see a striking difference between his and Vautrin's personality. In Wilson's diary, there are relatively a lot of changes done, especially regarding phrases or sentences that can be considered as inappropriate. Using an example from his diary record dated December 21, when he was depicting

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<sup>64</sup> Chang 109-110.

<sup>65</sup> Chang, 112.

<sup>66</sup> See Robert Wilson, "Dearest Family," 1937. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 < [http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0016.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0016.pdf)>.

<sup>67</sup> See Robert Wilson, "Dearest Family," 1937. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 < [http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0016.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0016.pdf)>.

the scene when he and Fitch surprised Japanese soldiers during their rape attempt, he originally wrote that he can hardly blame the Japanese soldier for being angry as a result of being prevented from intercourse. This note was however later crossed out. In my opinion, he used this note (as well as other notes) in order to ease the horror of that moment. Later he probably thought that the note was more offensive than witty, thus he crossed it out. Also, in comparison to Vautrin he includes a lot of thoughts about his family and his baby daughter.

In early June, 1938 he left Nanking for Shanghai. His doctor career was interrupted by his participation as an eyewitness at the Tokyo Trial. He died eleven years later of a coronary attack.

### 4.1.3. Iva Hynds

She was a sixty-seven year-old nurse working in the University Hospital in Nanking together with Doctors Robert Wilson and C. S. Trimmer, another American nurse Grace Bauer and only a few Chinese helpers to care for the nearly 200 patients in their charge.<sup>68</sup> Her main duty during and after the fall of the city was taking care of newborn babies.<sup>69</sup>

### 4.1.4. Grace Bauer

Before the fall of the city, she was teaching bacteriology and chemistry to nurses and training technicians for the pathology laboratory in the University Hospital. After Nanjing was captured, her duties changed. She was helping with the management of the hospital, helping refugees as well as driving an ambulance to transport vegetables for hospital and refugees camps.<sup>70</sup>

During my research, I came across a message written by Bauer's great-cousin, which said how surprised she was when was contacted by Chinese researchers asking her to provide documents relating to the massacre. Her great-aunt Bauer after coming back to the States in 1941 did not tell her family members about her stay in Nanking and her contributions at all.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> See Antoaneta Bezlova, "The Fall of Nanking: (Reference) The New York Times Article," *The Nanking Atrocities* 2000, April 2010 < [http://www.nankingatrocities.net/Fall/fall\\_02.htm](http://www.nankingatrocities.net/Fall/fall_02.htm)>.

<sup>69</sup> See Suping Lu, *They were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by American and British Nationals*, (Hong Kong : Hong Kong University Press, 2004) 375.

<sup>70</sup> Lu 376.

<sup>71</sup> Only reply "Nanking – A Film Review," *On Frozen Blog* June 2007, April 2010 < <http://www.onfrozenblog.com/2007/06/18/nanking-a-film-review.html>>.

#### 4.1.5 Wilson Plumer Mills

After finishing his university education, he worked for YMCA in Shanghai. Thereafter he began to work under the Presbyterian Foreign mission. Before the Japanese occupation of Nanking, he played an important role in truce negotiations which would enable the Chinese army to withdraw from the city and Japanese army to enter the city without fighting.<sup>72</sup>

After negotiations failed, Mills was appointed vice-chairman of the International Committee and after the chairman John Rabe left, he was appointed chairman. In the previous chapters I have already mentioned some examples of his contributions, yet I would like to mention his letters to several people including his wife Nina, which are great source on how to get an insight into the conditions in the SZ and the International Committee. For example in his letter from January 22, 1938 he says: "[o]ne of the unexpected and delightful by-products of this otherwise tragic situation is the warm spirit of comradeship which has sprung up between the members of the German community and our missionary group during the last two and a half months."<sup>73</sup>

During the Second World War he was interned for nine months in Shanghai, yet he continued to work for missionary organizations until his death.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> See Martha Lund Smalley, "Wilson Plumer Wills," *Bibliographical Dictionary Of CHINESE Christianity* 2005, April 2010

< <http://www.bdcconline.net/en/stories/m/mills-wilson-plumer.php> >.

<sup>73</sup> See Wilson Plumer Mills, "Dearest Nina," January 22, 1938. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010

< [http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0295.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0295.pdf) >.

<sup>74</sup> See Martha Lund Smalley, "Wilson Plumer Wills," *Bibliographical Dictionary Of CHINESE Christianity* 2005, April 2010 < <http://www.bdcconline.net/en/stories/m/mills-wilson-plumer.php> >.

#### 4.1.6. John Moore Allison

As a representative of the US government he served in many states, ranging from Japan to Czechoslovakia. Soon after returning to Nanking in order to reopen the US Embassy, in January 1938, he started on a regular basis to lodge protests with the Japanese authorities and therefore became the most unpopular figure with the Japanese authorities and military personnel in Nanking.<sup>75</sup>

Kioshi Fukui, Acting Japanese Consul General, openly accused Allison of "placing too much confidence in the statements of American missionaries". As a result of this accusation, Allison decided to "investigate personally the next case which came to light."<sup>76</sup> The next case was a woman who was gang-raped by Japanese soldiers. Because she believed that she could identify them, he and Mrs. Riggs decided to accompany her to the Japanese representatives for questioning. They were told to wait for her outside the building. However, when they saw how the soldiers pushed her roughly inside, they impulsively moved to follow her. Both Allison and Riggs<sup>77</sup> were immediately slapped by a Japanese sentry and Allison described that the sentry "livid with rage... [he] shouted at us at the most offensive manner."<sup>78</sup>

This incident became known as the Allison incident, but resulted only in another Japanese excuse.

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<sup>75</sup> Lu 209.

<sup>76</sup> Lu 209.

<sup>77</sup> Charles Henry Riggs will be introduced in the following chapter

<sup>78</sup> "War in China: Face" *Time* 07 Feb 1938, April 2010  
< <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,789413,00.html> >.



#### 4.1.7. Charles Henry Riggs

Riggs went to Nanking to teach agricultural engineering at the University of Nanking. Later he became a member of the International Committee for Nanking SZ and took care of refugees.

Because of the fact that he was very active in his help, he often got into problems. Records say he was slapped by Japanese soldiers on several occasions.<sup>79</sup> (viz. the Allison incident) As other foreigners, also he was often called out to go either to a residence or a University to rescue a truck, a group of men or some women and he spent many days doing these tasks.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, he spent a lot of time on doing not so heroic, but as important tasks such as buying coal, goats, rice and other kinds of needed food and often also delivering these articles to the Chinese.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Terror in Minnie Vautrin's Nanjing: Diaries and Correspondence 1937-1938*, ed. Suping Lu (Illinois: the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2008) 34.

<sup>80</sup> Lu 94.

<sup>81</sup> Lu 116-124.

#### **4.1.8 James Espy**

Espy was U.S Vice-Consul, whose reports of conditions in Nanking before the fall of Nanking (especially his two sentences: "During the last few days some violations of people and property were undoubtedly committed by them [Chinese soldiers]. Chinese soldiers in their mad rush to discard their military uniforms and put on civilian clothes, in a number of incidents, killed civilians to obtain their clothing."<sup>82</sup>) are often used as an argument by people (mainly Japanese nationalists) denying the massacre. In all materials advocating denial of the massacre either in whole or conceding only a small number of deaths, there operates the presumption that killers of Chinese civilians and rape offenders were former Chinese soldiers disguised as civilians.

#### **4.1.9. Archibald Alexander McFadyen**

McFadyen was one of three diplomats (other two were Espy and Allison), who left Nanking before it was captured and who returned to Nanking in order to re-open the American Embassy.

Together with other members launched an investigation of Japanese atrocities in Nanking .<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> "Nanking Massacre controversy and denial," *sciencetsage.com* 04 Apr 2010, April 2010

< [http://www.sciencestage.com/resources/rrpedia/Nanking\\_Massacre\\_controversy\\_and\\_denial](http://www.sciencestage.com/resources/rrpedia/Nanking_Massacre_controversy_and_denial)>.

<sup>83</sup> See Minnie Vautrin, *Terror in Minnie Vautrin's Nanjing: Diaries and Correspondence 1937-1938*, ed. Suping Lu (Illinois: the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2008) 245.

#### 4.1.10. George Ashmore Fitch

Fitch, a son of Presbyterian missionaries, was born in China. Soon after he went to the United States to acquire an education and he returned to China to work as a Protestant missionary and work for YMCA.

In Nanking, Fitch became the head of YMCA and actively worked for the SZ. As other members, he was both helping and writing records of the atrocities. His diaries were carried to Shanghai by the first person who was allowed to leave for Shanghai after the Japanese occupation of Nanking.<sup>84</sup> There, he described not only Japanese crimes, but most importantly he states that in fact Japanese employees of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking were as helpless as them to stop outgoing atrocities. He wrote:

Every day we call at the Japanese embassy and present our protests, our appeals, , our list of authentic reports of violence and crime. We are met with suave Japanese courtesy, but actually the officials there are powerless. The victorious army must have its rewards – and those rewards are to plunder, murder, rape at will, to commit acts of unbelievable brutality and savagery on the very people whom they have come to protect and befriend, as they have so loudly proclaimed to the world. In all modern history surely there is no page that will stand so black as that of the rape of Nanking.<sup>85</sup>

He himself succeeded in smuggling the films shot by Magee<sup>86</sup> out of China when he temporarily left China in January 1938. That year he traveled throughout the United States, giving speeches about what he had witnessed in Nanking along with the films that showed haunting images of Chinese victims.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Zhang 82.

<sup>85</sup> Zhang 84.

<sup>86</sup> For information about John Magee see the next chapter

<sup>87</sup> *American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre 1937-1938*, ed. Martha L. Smalley (Connecticut: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997) 4.

#### 4.1.11. John Magee

The story of John Magee is special mainly due to the fact that he experienced the suffering of foreigners in Nanking in 1927. Although according to *American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking* his house was the only one that was not looted by the Chinese and he was not wounded, he could leave Nanking to Japan without any prick of consciousness.

He played a significant role in saving thousands of Chinese from being murdered by the Japanese, setting up a refugee hospital to take care of wounded soldiers and refugees and meanwhile served as chairman of the Nanking Branch of the International Committee for Nanking SZ. Films taken by Magee in Nanking and sent to the West were among the first visual documentations of the Nanking Massacre.<sup>88</sup>

After the war, he attended the trial of the Japanese war criminals as a witness in the Tokyo War Crime Tribunal.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Zhang 166.

<sup>89</sup> See "Brief Introductions to Members of the International Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone," *John Rabe and International Safety Zone Memorial Hall* 2006, April 2010  
< <http://rabe.nju.edu.cn/sec/5international/aqq/07.htm>>.

#### 4.1.12. Miner Searle Bates

After his studies at the University of Oxford and Yale, he started his teaching career in Nanking as a history and politics professor at Nanking University. Before the start of the occupation, he was staying with his family in Japan and decided to return to Nanking alone. One of his diary records implies that due to lack of information that was caused by the initiatory chaos and later Japanese orders, he was not sure whether his wife thought that he was killed or wounded by the Japanese bombing of the ship Panay, as this was the ship on which he should have originally left Nanking.<sup>90</sup>

Wilson described a case when Bates together with Riggs went with a woman that was raped to announce the case to the police. After she was taken to the Japanese Embassy, they accompanied her.<sup>91</sup> When she was brought back to their house, the Japanese listed five points of error in her story. These pertained to the color of the walls, the number of steps she went up, the position of lamp in the room and the time of her abduction.<sup>92</sup>

Similar to Wilson, he described his relationship to Committee Members of German nationality as very positive: "Three Germans have done splendidly, and I'd almost wear a Nazi badge to keep fellowship with them."<sup>93</sup>

After the war, Bates was summoned as a witness in many trials trying to prove the existence of the Nanking massacre and Japanese atrocities.

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<sup>90</sup> See Miner Searle Bates, "Nanking Outrages," Jan 1938. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <[http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0113.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0113.pdf)>.

<sup>91</sup> See Robert Wilson, "Dearest Family," 1938. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <[http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0017.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0017.pdf)>.

<sup>92</sup> See Robert Wilson, "Dearest Family," 1938. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <[http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0017.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0017.pdf)>.

<sup>93</sup> Miner Searle Bates, "Nanking Outrages," Jan 1938. The Nanking Massacre Project. April 2010 <[http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl\\_china\\_webapp\\_images/NMP0113.pdf](http://divdl.library.yale.edu/dl/ydl_china_webapp_images/NMP0113.pdf)>.

#### **4.1.13 Lewis S.C. Smythe**

The secretary of the International Committee and lead author of memoranda, which were reviews of the work of the International Safety Committee, as well as plans for its next move, written at critical points in the operation of the SZ.<sup>94</sup> It is obvious that without his diligent work, there would be much less evidence about the Japanese occupation of Nanking.

His other contribution were his briefs. To make sure that Japanese Embassy was aware of the actions of the Japanese military, he noted every case of Japanese misconduct, regardless if small or large, in chronological order. These briefs were on almost daily basis submitted to the Japanese Embassy.<sup>95</sup>

#### **4.1.14. Ernest H. Forster**

He was transferred to Nanking with his wife from Yangchow in order to serve at St. Paul Episcopal Church. In late November his wife was evacuated from Nanking, but she returned as early as in middle January.

He however decided to stay in Nanking and quickly transformed their house into a shelter for over one hundred people including Buddhist nuns who were hiding from the Japanese. He dedicated his time both to helping others and writing down records of incidents he heard of.

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<sup>94</sup> See *Documents on the Rape of Nanking*, ed. Timothy Brook (Michigan: the University of Michigan Press, 2003) 6.

<sup>95</sup> Brook, 6.

#### 4.1.15. Frank Tillman Durdin

He was a long time correspondent for the *New York Times* and the first American journalist allowed into China by Communists.<sup>96</sup> After several days of watching Japanese atrocities, he together with other correspondents decided to travel to Shanghai in order to send dispatches to their newspapers without hindrance from the Japanese.

As he boarded a ship bound for Shanghai, he saw groups of Chinese men being executed by the Japanese Army. After he arrived in Shanghai in a dispatch to *The New York Times* he wrote:

Just before boarding the ship for Shanghai, the writer watched the execution of 200 men. The killings took 10 minutes. The men were lined against the wall and shot. Then a number of Japanese, armed with pistols, trod nonchalantly around the crumpled bodies, pumping bullets into any that were still kicking.<sup>97</sup>

However, there was nothing he or anybody else could do. After he left Nanking, he was not allowed to return. Still, his further career was connected to China, he almost repeated his experience from Nanking when he was one of the few Western reporters to write about the February 28th Massacre in Taiwan 1947.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> See Eric Pace, "Tillman Durdin , 91, Reporter in China During World War II," *The New York Times* 9 July 1998, April 2010

<<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/09/world/tillman-durdin-91-reporter-in-china-during-world-war-ii.html?pagewanted=1>>.

<sup>97</sup> Eric Pace, "Tillman Durdin , 91, Reporter in China During World War II," *The New York Times* 9 July 1998, April 2010

<<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/09/world/tillman-durdin-91-reporter-in-china-during-world-war-ii.html?pagewanted=1>>.

<sup>98</sup> See "In Memoriam Tillman Durdin," *New Taiwan :Ilha Formosa* 7 July 1998, April 2010  
< <http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9832.htm>>.

## 5. The USA is to blame

*Every closed eye is not sleeping; and every open eye is not seeing.*

The question why superpowers did not interfere or even stop the Japanese is even more striking when we concern the history of the American and Japanese relations preceding the incident. By 1920, the relations have reached the state that Japanese regarded Americans as their main enemies blaming them for the fail to approve the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference, which lead to the creation of so-called Orange Plan, which was a series of plans dealing with a possible war with Japan.<sup>99</sup>

Another reason is in my opinion the fact that the United States were supporting China not only during the Paris Peace Conference, but also in the years following. Two years after the United States became the head of the syndicate aiming to finance China. Also, the Five-Power Treaty signed at the Washington Naval Conference was planned to lead not only to the partial naval disarmament of Japan, but more importantly although recognized Japanese dominance in Manchuria, stated that all of its signatories (hence including Japan) respect the territorial integrity of China.<sup>100</sup> In conclusion, if all promises made and documents signed were fulfilled, the massacre would be prevented.

The turning point in the American support to China is marked by the start of American policy of non-intervention resulting in the refusal made by the Secretary of State responsible for foreign relations Cordell Hull to the proposal of French and British diplomats to interfere into the Sino-Japanesene conflict using diplomatic

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<sup>99</sup> Hoyt 52.

<sup>100</sup> See "Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900-1922," *U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian*, April 2010  
< <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/88313.htm>>.



ways.<sup>101</sup> Consequently this foreign policy led the United States to the state that it was unable to do much more than watch a series of dangers emerged that brought the world closer to war.<sup>102</sup> However, it was a speech made by that time American president Franklin Roosevelt, which encouraged the British to call a conference in Brussels to discuss this Asia crisis. The conference itself also due to the fact that the United States which was also participating refused to make any commitments to collective action produced no agreement.<sup>103</sup>

On January 19 1946, General McArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers established the Tribunal for "the trial of those persons charged individually or as members of organizations or in both capacities with offences which include crimes against peace."<sup>104</sup> "It was at this moment that the majority of Japanese populace first heard about the inconceivable scale and dimension of the Rape of Nanking."<sup>105</sup> Although the Tokyo Trials were supposed to be equal in its importance to the Nuremberg Trials, it was accompanied by many problems. First, there was only one chief counsel - Joseph B. Keenan, in contrast to four chief counsels, who were present at the Nuremberg Trial. During the process itself, English language and the Anglo-Saxon right was used, both which Japanese solicitors did not understand. Later on every accused person was offered an American barrister. This however caused further problems to the accused. They all deeply believed that interests of an individual are not important in comparison with interests of Japan. So, all their testimonies were done in order not to put any blame on the emperor or their country. This approach was

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<sup>101</sup> Hoyt 154.

<sup>102</sup> See Alan Brinkley, *American History: A Survey* (McGraw-Hill Humanities, 2002) 788.

<sup>103</sup> Brinkley 788.

<sup>104</sup> "Part A –Chapter I: Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal," *ibiblio: the public's library and digital archive* Nov. 1948, April 2010

< <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-1.html>>.

<sup>105</sup> "War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo," *Nanking Atrocities* 2000, April 2010

< [http://www.nankingatrocities.net/Tribunals/imtfe\\_01.htm](http://www.nankingatrocities.net/Tribunals/imtfe_01.htm)>.

on the other hand in contrast with the American approach, which was to use any means in order to protect their client.<sup>106</sup>

Also the fact that during the process one of the American judges during the process resigned, two judges were named after the process had been started<sup>107</sup> and the judge representing British India, Radhabinod Pal, raised many objections including the one, that the whole prosecution case is very weak and conclude that "each and every one of the accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the charges."<sup>108</sup> All in all, speculations arose that the main reason for the Trial was not the justice for the Chinese, but revenge for Pearl Harbor and justifying American attacks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which according to some sources as the book *Tokijský proces*, took place after the Japanese emperor and therefore Japan, announced their decision about capitulation on the radio.<sup>109</sup> Probably as a consequence of the discrepancies mentioned above, the United States did not desire for the Tokyo Trials to achieve the publicity of the Nuremberg Trials.

Also, a big difference in the situation of post-Germany and post-war Japan was the fact, that Japan has never formally apologized for any of its crimes in China during World War II (Nanking massacre included) and it has never paid any reparation to China. One of the probable reasons why the United States did not employ any sort of enforcement action on Japan, was probably the fact that after the establishment of People's Republic of China, the USA needed Japan as its ally against communist China. And, another reason could be the economic connection between the USA and Japan which existed even during the Nanking massacre. It is a well-known fact that thanks to the open door policy, which started in China as early as in 1899 in order to

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<sup>106</sup> Tokijský proces 52.

<sup>107</sup> Tokijský proces 106.

<sup>108</sup> <http://www.answers.com/topic/international-military-tribunal-for-the-far-east>

<sup>109</sup> Tokijský proces 14.

establish equal trading rights to all nations in all parts of China, as a part of John Milton Hay's proposal and (also including recognition of Chinese territorial integrity),<sup>110</sup> there was also a good trading connection between China and the USA. "The Manchurian crisis of 1931 and the war between China and Japan that broke out in 1937 led the United States to adopt a rigid stand in favor of the Open Door policy, including the cutting off of supplies to Japan."<sup>111</sup> Yet, it must be stated that whereas American politicians were giving speeches in favor of the oppressed Chinese, meanwhile the United States continued its trade with Japan, in some fields such as scrap iron even more successfully than before.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> "The Open Door Policy," *United States History*, 2010, April 2010 <<http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h908.html>>.

<sup>111</sup> "Open Door Policy," *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, 2010, April 2010 <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/429642/Open-Door-policy>>.

<sup>112</sup> Hoyt 164.

## 6. Japanese – United States Relations

There is evidence that from December 1937 there could be no doubt that the Japanese were not likely to be stopped or threatened by the presence of the Americans. To give some examples, on December 12, 1937, in broad daylight and with clear visibility, Japanese aviators bombed and sank the U.S. gunboat Panay with a large American flag being at that time conspicuously planted on the Panay's deck.<sup>113</sup> Panay was the last ship which at the time foreigners evacuated from Nanking could use. So a significant part of its passengers was of American nationals.

Although the attack resulted in two deaths and forty-eight casualties,<sup>114</sup> "[m]any Americans felt that the incident was justified because American ships were interfering in Asian affairs,"<sup>115</sup> and thus not acting in accordance with the policy of non-intervention. Although this incident was quickly followed by an apology made by Japanese politicians, it is believed that the whole incident was calculated in order to prevent the USA from further interfering into Japanese interests in China.

On the same day, another three Standard Oil steam ships were "by mistake" attacked when meanwhile Japanese soldiers successfully climbed the ramparts of Nanjing. While the mention of the attack is hard to find in contemporary newspapers, the photograph of Japanese soldiers on the ramparts inspired spontaneous celebration parades in Japan.<sup>116</sup>

From 1938 America started participating in the World War by giving aid to European democracies,<sup>117</sup> and it took about three years and many lost lives for

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<sup>113</sup> Hoyt 788.

<sup>114</sup> See "The Panay Incident," *Wars of the War* 16 Dec 2000, April 2010 <<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IG11Ad01.html> >.

<sup>115</sup> "American Response," *The Panay Incident: An Overlooked Bombing of a US Gunboat* 2008, April 2010 <[http://www.panayincident.com/american\\_res.html](http://www.panayincident.com/american_res.html) >.

<sup>116</sup> Hoyt 173.

<sup>117</sup> "Japanese Response," *The Panay Incident: An Overlooked Bombing of a US Gunboat* 2008, April 2010 <[http://www.panayincident.com/american\\_res.html](http://www.panayincident.com/american_res.html) >.

America to stop turning a blind eye to overt acts of Japanese aggression. Finally on December 7, 1941, after Pearl Harbor, an incident in a large extent very similar to the Panay one, the USA decided to take action. However, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter, after 1949 the policy towards Japan changed again for the sake of fighting against the danger of communism.

## 7. The Japanese Seek Only Peace

The Japanese pre-invasion approach was well-thought out. Although they miscounted the length of the time needed to conquer China, their strategy of immediate “sincere” apologies following every offense, every aggression and above all brilliant timing was very effective. For example, Great Britain expected more danger from Germany or the war in Spain than from Japan, which was relatively far away. The Soviet Union, which at that time had a pact with China, found its industry in such a bad state that it was unable to let the situation get even worse by helping China.

Another decision which was made by Japanese representatives was to formulate their “goals” in China in accord with the anti-communist mood in the USA and justify their presence in China by the attempt to persuade Chinese people to stop cooperating with communism.<sup>118</sup>

I have already explained probable reasons why the USA did not take any action in order to force an apology or reparations for China. Yet, the question is, why did the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, not insist on reparation from Japan? Chang presumes that it was due to the fact, that at that time both countries (PRC and ROC) competed for political acknowledgement and for the economic advantage of having trade with Japan.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Hoyt, 169.  
<sup>119</sup> Chang, 14.

## **8. Conclusion**

The small group of American nationals staying in Nanking within the period of December 1937 and 1938 has with no doubt contributed to the lives of Nanking citizen more than the acts of United States government at that time. Their contributions were different, ranging from the financial and material aid, providing shelters for refugees, negotiating with the Japanese in the name of the Chinese, help in concrete cases and many others. Also, the influence on their decisions to stay in Nanking was not the same. For Vautrin, it meant the start of her mental illness, which resulted into suicide; for Durdin it in fact helped to launched his journalist career, whereas in the case of Wilson and Mills it marked the start of friendship with people they always hated – German Nazis.

The “ordinary“ Americans I wrote about in my thesis made some bad decisions, often watched crimes and did not interfere, or even went to the Japanese for a dinner while the Chinese were dying. However, they were not diplomats or trained specialists, thus in many situations had to rely on their own judgment; in comparison with the Chinese, their position on the view of the Japanese soldiers was only slightly better and I hope I have proved that interfering could have resulted into their deaths and consequently into deaths of many Chinese, as they would lose the foreigners' or even the SZ protection. Furthermore, their refusal to make courtesy calls to the Japanese Embassy could only lead to aggravation of the situation. In my opinion, these “ordinary” people did not only their best, but also the best anybody could do in their situation.

Yet, their participation in the Nanking massacre was in contrast with the United States policy, which was non-intervention. First, they disobeyed the embassy

evacuation call; second their frequent interventions threatened American-Japanese relations especially regarding trade. Then, falsified reports about their participation were used by the Chinese as a powerful weapon against the United States during the Korean War.

Although the Nanking Massacre, speaking in terms of deaths or its length, is much smaller than the Holocaust committed by German Nazis, in my opinion the term “forgotten holocaust” describes it very truthfully. Not only it is even in the twenty-first century in many states including the Czech Republic omitted from the history textbooks, but it was forgotten even in its time as it was first hard to believe that one nation would be capable of committing such atrocities and then inconvenient for the sake of diplomatic relations and trade.



## 9. Summary

Ve své bakalářské práci jsem se zaměřila na patnáct občanů Spojených Států, kteří pobývali v rozmezí od třináctého prosince 1937 do ledna 1938 v bývalém hlavním městě Číny Nankingu; a to především na to, jak ovlivnili událost dnes známou jako Nankingský masakr. Současně jsem se pokusila dát činy výše zmíněných Američanů do kontrastu s tehdejší politikou Spojených států a objasnit, jak se důsledky jejich pobytu v Nankingu promítly na pozdější zahraniční politice Spojených států a Číny.

Jako Nankingský masakr se nejčastěji označují události během šesti týdnů v rozmezí druhé poloviny prosince 1937 a ledna 1938, kdy započala japonská okupace Nankingu. Japonsko, soused Číny, již několik let před okupací podnikalo kroky, které ukazovaly na to, že se chystá k vojenské akci. Z událostí z pěti let předcházejících masakru bych zdůraznila bitvu o Šanghaj z roku 1932, vyhlášení samostatného státu Mandžuska na území severovýchodní Číny, vystoupení Japonska z OSN v roce 1933 a následnou snahu o prohlášení severních čínských provincií za autonomní území. Z doby krátce předcházející masakru je dle mého názoru zásadní útok na americkou loď Panay z dvanáctého prosince 1937 následovaný útoky na jiné tři americké lodě vedené během tohož dne. Panay, loď jasně označená americkou vlajkou, v den útoku převážela především občany cizích národností, kteří se krátce před okupací rozhodli opustit Nanking. Útok, který měl za následek dva mrtvé a čtyřicet osm zraněných a je dnes často přirovnával k útoku na Pearl Harbor, vyústil pouze v omluvu Japonska.

Tato omluva byla pouze jednou z dlouhé série omluv, která trvala až do útoku na Pearl Harbor. Příkladem toho, jak daleko zašla japonská agresivita, je i tzv. Allisonův incident, kdy byl americký konzul John Moore Allison společně s dalším americkým občanem Charlesem Henry Riggsem, když se pokusili doprovodit čínskou ženu

k japonskému výslechu, několikrát udeřen japonskými vojáky. Z výše uvedených příkladů chování Japonska jsem ve své práci vyvodila dva závěry. Prvním je, že účelem japonských útoků předcházejících masakru bylo odradit příslušníky cizích národností od pobytu v Nankingu a tím se zbavit jak očitých svědků, tak i možných autorů dokumentů obsahujících svědectví čínských obyvatel Nankingu. Druhým závěrem je, že japonští vojáci, vědomi si americké politiky nezasahování, se během masakru příliš neobávali Američanů. Postavení amerických občanů bylo jen málo odlišné od postavení Číňanů; to ilustruje i rozdílný přístup japonských vojáků k Američanům a k Němcům, kteří byli v té době spojenci Japonska. Není nijak těžké si představit, jak se japonští vojáci chovali k Číňanům, pokud neměli obavu udeřit amerického velvyslance.

Ve své práci jsem se zaměřila na tři hlavní rysy japonského chování vůči čínskému obyvatelstvu, kvůli kterým je dnes Nankingský masakr označován za holocaust. Jednalo se o znásilňování, vraždění civilistů a neexistenci válečných zajatců. Znásilňování probíhalo během masakru v tak nebyvalé míře, že je masakr někdy označován jako „Znásilnění Nankingu“. Znásilňování bylo zaznamenáno u dívek a žen v rozmezí od dvanácti až po více než osmdesát let. Docházelo k několikanásobným znásilněním, znásilňování těhotných žen, přičemž po znásilnění byla žena v mnoha případech zabita. Zvláštností Nankingu je existence specifické formy japonských nevěstinců, ve kterých byly ženy znehybněné a pevně přivázané k nějakému objektu (např. židle nebo sloupek od postele), kde byly volně k dispozici. Tyto nevěstince byly sice použity již předtím, ale až v Nankingu došlo poprvé k jejich masovému užívání.

Zabíjení civilistů je spojené s dalším rysem masakru – neexistencí válečných zajatců. Japonští nacionalisté dodnes tvrdí, že nedošlo k žádnému úmrtí civilistů,

nýbrž k úmrtí čínských vojáků přestrojených za civilisty. Skutečnost, že před okupací se mnoho čínských vojáků snažilo zakrýt jejich vojenskou minulost, byla dokonce zdokumentována americkým občanem Jamesem Espyem, který před okupací působil v Nankingu jako vicekonzul, a jehož popis incidentů, kdy čínští vojáci používali k získání oblečení násilí, je i dnes zneužíván jako stěžejní argument teorie, že nedošlo k žádným civilním obětem.

Ačkoliv to nijak neospravedlňuje chování čínských vojáků, je třeba si uvědomit, jaká byla jejich situace krátce před pádem Nankingu. Velká část z nich byli vojáci přesunuti z prohrané bitvy o Šanghaj; nákladní vlaky je přivážely do Nankingu již v tak zuboženém stavu, že umírali často přímo na nádraží. Vojáci, kteří přesun přežili, byli buď posláni znovu bojovat, nebo v případě, že jejich stav byl příliš zubožený, byli propuštěni a s velmi malou finanční odměnou posláni domů. Je ovšem důležité si uvědomit, že v čínské armádě již po staletí existoval systém, kdy byli vojáci verbováni případně násilně unášeni tak, aby bojovali na územích co nejvzdálenějších jejich domovině, a tím byli odrazeni od dezerce. Takto propuštění vojáci tudíž neměli možnost se při svém zdravotním a finančním stavu a k přihlédnutím k vzdálenosti, dostat domů.

Původní plán obrany Nankingu počítal s bojem do posledního muže, avšak podle rozkazu tehdejšího prezidenta Číny, Čankajška, byl po několika bitvách v okolí Nankingu jedenáctého prosince nařízen ústup. Z Nankingu, který byl v tu dobu v japonském obležení, existovala jen jediná bezpečná cesta – přes řeku. U brány vedoucí k řece se tlačily stovky obyvatel snažících se na poslední chvíli uniknout z města. Možná i z důvodu, že se obávali zhoršení situace, několik vysokých důstojníků neinformovali své podřízené o ústupu. Ti tak začali na své ustupující spolubojovníky střílet, protože je považovali za zrádce a dezertéry. Po pádu Nankingu

do Japonských rukou se tedy ve městě nacházeli buď vojáci, kterým se nepodařilo uprchnout nebo ti, kteří se o to vzhledem k svému zdravotnímu stavu ani nepokusili.

Přesný počet obětí masakru, který vypukl po vstupu japonského vojska do Nankingu, není znám. Čínská strana odhaduje 300 000 obětí. Pohřební společnosti zdokumentovaly 150 000 nalezených těl, přičemž mnoho těl nebylo pravděpodobně nalezeno kvůli tomu, že podle dobové dokumentace byli mužští civilisté často stříleni blízko řeky, kde byla poté naházena jejich těla.

V této době se v Nankingu nacházelo přibližně třicet cizinců, z nichž většina byla Americké národnosti. Tito cizinci vytvořili tzv. Bezpečnostní zónu, což byla zóna primárně určena pro čínské uprchlíky a Mezinárodní výbor pro bezpečnostní zónu, který spravoval Bezpečnostní zónu a zajišťoval komunikaci mezi Japonci a Číňany v Nankingu. Ačkoliv byli tito cizinci různých národností a tudíž i různých politických přesvědčení a náboženských vyznání, všichni bez rozdílu během masakru spolupracovali. Vztah mezi převážně silně antinacistickými Američany a německými nacisty nastínil americký lékař Robert O. Wilson v jednom ze svých dopisů domů, kdy popsal, jak velmi si váží pomoci a práce Johna Rabeho, jednoho z německých nacistů a předsedy Mezinárodního výboru pro bezpečnostní zónu a vyjádřil svůj údiv nad tím, jak někdo s tak dobrým charakterem může být obdivovatelem Adolfa Hitlera.

Celkově jsem se ve své práci zaměřila na patnáct Američanů. Jedenáct z nich se nacházelo v Nankingu po celou dobu masakru<sup>120</sup>. Tři z Američanů byli diplomaté: James Espy, Archibald Alexandr McFadyen a John More Allison. V souvislosti s americkou politikou nezasahování všichni opustili Nanking před příchodem japonských vojsk a bylo jim dovoleno vrátit se za účelem obnovení amerického

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<sup>120</sup> Pojmeme dobu masakru odkazují na výše zmíněnou definici masakru jakožto událostí během šesti týdnů od druhé poloviny prosince 1937 až konce ledna 1938; v hlavní části práce ale uvádím důvody, které vyvracují tvrzení, že se masakr omezil pouze na tuto dobu

velvyslanectví až ke konci ledna 1938. Poté iniciovali rozsáhlé vyšetřování případů japonských násilností, které vyústilo v mimo jiné ve výše zmíněný Allisonův incident.

Frank Tillman Durdin byl jedním ze skupiny novinářů, která krátce po vstupu japonské armády do Nankingu odjela do Šanghaje za účelem poslání zprávy o vývoji situace svým domovským redakcím. Přesto, že Durdinovi ani nikomu jinému z této skupiny nebylo poté umožněno se do Nankingu vrátit, jsou jeho záznamy z prvních dnů okupace, a především jeho záznam o japonském masovém vraždění u řeky, kterého byl svědkem při odjezdu, cennými zdroji informací a v minulosti i důkazem o běsnění japonských vojáků.

Co se týče skupiny Američanů, která zůstala v Nankingu během celé zimy, za nejvýraznější osobnost je považována Minnie Vautrinová, která zřídila v budově vysoké školy Ginling, kterou začlenila do Bezpečnostní zóny, útočiště pro ženy a dívky. Ačkoliv byla její práce pro obyvatele Nankingu tak ceněna, že začala být Číňany samotnými přezdívána „americká bohyně“, ona sama trpěla výčitkami a pocitem, že během masakru zklamala a v roce 1940 spáchala sebevraždu. V mé práci jsem se zaměřila na tři její rozhodnutí, která mohla být zdrojem jejích depresí. První bylo rozhodnutí zpočátku nepřijímat velmi mladé dívky a starší ženy, protože neočekávala, že i ony budou v nebezpečí znásilnění. S přihlédnutím k nedostatečným kapacitám a špatného stavu zásob je však její rozhodnutí upřednostnit nejohroženější skupiny zcela logické. Druhým milníkem bylo její rozhodnutí věřit japonské straně, když přislíbila zaručit bezpečný návrat obyvatelkám zóny do jejich domovů. Touto dobou byla situace ve škole Ginling katastrofální – ženy vyděšené z neustálého znásilňování se dokonce bály chodit ke studnám pro vodu. Důsledkem byla nouze o pitnou vodu, nemluvě o vodě nutné pro hygienu. V této situaci, kdy hrozilo nebezpečí vzniku nákazy, se Vautrinová rozhodla podpořit japonský příkaz a sama urgovala ženy

k návratu do jejich domovů. Žádná ze skupin žen, které se v následujících dnech vracely často po několikanásobných znásilněních do Ginlingu, ji nijak nevinila. Přesto je podle jejich deníkových záznamů patrné, že situace zhoršila její psychický stav. Další kritickou situací bylo, když byla Japonci požádána, aby je nechala vybrat si v areálu Ginlingu sto dívek pro jejich nevěstinec. Vzhledem k tomu, že japonští vojáci o své vůli unášeli a znásilňovali i dívky z areálu Ginlingu, lze usuzovat, že její souhlas byl ve skutečnosti jen formalitou. Docílila jím však to, že se mnoho dívek, zvláště těch, které už byly znásilněny, přihlásilo dobrovolně, aby tak ušetřily ty, kterým se doposud podařilo znásilnění uniknout. Vautrinové jsem ve své práci věnovala nejvíce prostoru, a to především z toho důvodu, že její pečlivě vedené deníkové záznamy popisují nejen činy japonských vojáků a každodenní život obyvatel Bezpečnostní zóny, ale ve velké míře i její názory a pocity.

Rober O. Wilson, Iva Hynds a Grace Bauer pracovali v nankingské nemocnici, kde nejen zachraňovali lidské životy, ale také pořizovali dokumentaci jednotlivých případů. Wilson, který byl od poloviny prosince jediným chirurgem v Nankingu, také osobně zasahoval na místech, kde bylo hlášeno znásilňování a snažil se svou přítomností odradit vojáky od pokračování v jejich násilnostech.

Wilson Plumer Mills, George Ashmore Fitch a Ernet H. Forster byli američtí misionáři, kteří pomáhali vylepšit situaci uprchlíků, zasahovali v konkrétních případech. Dnes jsou také velmi oceňovány jejich přesné záznamy jednotlivých případů a činů japonské armády.

Charles Henry Riggs a Miner Searle Bates původně přijeli do Nankingu vyučovat na Nankingské univerzitě. Stejně jako mnozí jiní cizinci i oni během okupace trávili většinu svého času pomocí v konkrétních případech, kdy byli Číňany voláni na místa, kde docházelo k znásilňování, kde japonští vojáci začali

shromažďovat mužské obyvatel, či k pomoci se zásobováním uprchlíků mimo i uvnitř Bezpečnostní zóny.

Pečlivá hlášení Lewis S.C. Smytheho, která téměř denně předával japonskému velvyslanectví, jsou dnes považována za stěžejní důkaz pro teorii, že japonská vyšší místa byla informována o běsnění svých vojáků. Přítomnost John Mageeho v Nankingu během masakru je o to více obdivuhodná, že byl přítomný běsnění obyvatel Nankingu v roce 1927, které bylo zaměřeno vůči cizincům žijících ve městě, a které mělo za následek smrt šesti cizinců a vypálení téměř všech budov v cizím vlastnictví. Jeho tajně pořízené filmy se staly prvním vizuálním svědectví o hrůzách nankingského masakru, které se podařilo propašovat z Nankingu do Spojených států.

Svědectví, písemné i vizuální záznamy byly po válce použity při projednávání japonských válečných zločinců během Tokijského procesu. Ale již o několik let později, během Korejské války, byli Američané přítomni během masakru nařčení čínskou vládou z tajné spolupráce s japonskými vojáky za účelem ochrany amerického majetku a z účasti na vraždění Číňanů v Nankingu. Dnes jsou jejich svědectví naopak zpochybňována japonskými nacionalisty a skupinami popíračů masakru.

Japonská vláda se nikdy formálně za masakr neomluvila ani neodškodnila obyvatel Nankingu. Na konci dvacátého prvního století naopak iniciovala přepsání učebnic dějepisu, aby tak ušetřila japonského studenty „nankingského trauma“.

## **10. Annotation**

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The work focuses on the influence of Americans presented within the period of December 13, 1937 to January 1938 in the Chinese former capital Nanking and contrasts consequences of these actions with that time policy of the United States. Moreover, it depicts the influence of the massacre on live of Americans staying in Nanking during the massacre and the influence on the policy of the United States, especially towards Japan.

### **Key words:**

Nanking, Nanking massacre, 1937, China, USA, US foreign policy, Japan



## **Anotace**

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Práce se zabývá vlivem Američanů přítomných v rozmezí od třináctého prosince 1937 do ledna 1938 v bývalém čínském hlavním městě, Nankingu, na nankingský masakr ve srovnání s vlivem tehdejší politiky Spojených států na tuto událost. Dále jsem se zaměřila na to, jaký vliv měl masakr na životy Američanů, kteří mu byli přítomni a jeho dopadem na zahraniční politiku Spojených Států, speciálně na vztahy mezi Spojenými státy a Japonskem.

### **Klíčová slova**

Nanking, nankingský masakr, 1937, Čína, USA, zahraniční politika Spojených Států, Japonsko

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