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METHOD AND PRACTICE OF ORAL
DISPUTATION
IN THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURY

THE JESUIT TRADITION

DISERTAČNÍ PRÁCE

VEDOUCÍ PRÁCE

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Prohlašuji, že jsem předloženou práci vypracoval samostatně
a že jsem uvedl veškeré použité prameny a literaturu.

V Olomouci, dne 24. 11. 2016

For my parents, family
and Eliška

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Introduction

§1. The subject of this thesis is ‘Method and Practice of Disputation in the 16th and 17th Century - The Jesuit Tradition.’ The period in question constitutes approximately a hundred years, roughly from the second half of the 16th century to the second half of the 17th century. Nevertheless, due to the incentive insights which the turn of that century and the dawn of the one following bring, I will now and then refer to two younger works, both from 1706. Let me first briefly elucidate the concept of *disputation*. In a very general way, the concept of *disputation* (Lat. *disputatio*; Ger. *Erörterung*, *Streitgespräch*; Fr. *dispute*; Ital. *disputa*) is nowadays understood as an oral or written argument. It was both widespread and institutionalized at universities and other schools mostly from the High Middle Ages to the late 18th

century. Making a complementary unity with the lectures, disputation was a method of teaching, examination and research.¹ Due to the variety of appearances, authors of dictionary entries often avoid defining a set of disputation's necessary features. Nevertheless, it is indispensable to stress the strict procedural rules of this activity which, when lacking, can not be called 'disputation' in the proper sense. A rather comprehensive survey of the main historic as well as systematic facets of this concept can be found in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, Vol. 2*, entry 'Disputation' by H. Marti.²

§2. In what follows, I am exclusively interested in the 'viva voce' or *oral* disputations. It is worth stating that a formerly unseen increase of monographs generally on the oral disputation can be observed in the last several years. Assessing Olga Weijers as the most productive author, let me mention some of her latest works: *Queritur utrum. Recherches sur la 'disputatio' dans les universités médiévales* from 2009, *In Search of the Truth. A History of Disputation Techniques from Antiquity to Early Modern Times* from 2013, and *A Scholar's Paradise. Teaching and Debating in Medieval Paris* from 2015.³ But there are other authors who have published an entire monograph to this theme in the last years, for instance Alex Novikoff (2013),⁴ Joshua Rodda (2014),⁵ and Lukáš

¹ MARTI, H. Disputation and Dissertation, p. 866.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 866–880.

³ WEIJERS, O. *A Scholar's Paradise. Teaching and Debating in Medieval Paris*. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers 2015; WEIJERS, O. *In Search of the Truth. A History of Disputation Techniques from Antiquity to Early Modern Times*. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers 2013; WEIJERS, O. *Queritur utrum. Recherches sur la 'disputatio' dans les universités médiévales*. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers 2009.

⁴ NOVIKOFF, A. J. *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2013.

Kotala (2014, in Czech)⁶. Nevertheless, as far as the ancient and medieval oral disputations are concerned, I am interested only marginally – in such a degree that can provide the most necessary context for a kind of ‘disputation phenomena ontology’ which I propose below.

§3. Being specifically interested in the disputations as practised in post-medieval period, I wish to acknowledge certain ‘classical’ or most authoritative secondary sources on the disputation method at that time. (a) On a global scale, in terms of his actual impact for future research, the first and foremost place is due to Ignazio Angelelli and his ‘The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic’ of 1970.⁷ (b) But an even earlier paper of great utility for the scholars of all advancement levels was written by Stanislav Soušedík in the Czech language. It is titled ‘Technika filosofické disputace v 17. století’ (‘The Technique of Philosophical Disputation in the 17th Century’) and appeared three years before the Angelelli’s article.⁸ Both of these texts are relatively short. In the United States, Donald Felipe deals or perhaps has mainly dealt with this theme in his dissertation (c) *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*⁹ of 1991 and (d) a later paper titled ‘Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks’ (2010).¹⁰ To the best of my knowledge, there is no

⁵ RODDA, J. *Public Religious Disputation in England, 1558–1626*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2014.

⁶ KOTALA, L. *Novověká ústní disputace. Kořeny, proces, úskalí a možnosti*. Praha: Krystal OP 2014.

⁷ ANGELELLI, I. The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1970, pp. 800–815.

⁸ SOUSEDÍK, S. Technika filosofické disputace v 17. století. *Filosofický časopis*, 1967, pp. 132–152.

⁹ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*. University of Texas 1991.

¹⁰ FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. In *Disputatio 1200–1800. Form, Funktion und Wirkung*

other work comparable to Felipe's dissertation in its extent and profundity. I wish to continue a bit upon both of his texts in *Part One* of the present thesis.

§4. Finally, the disputations I am concerned with (within the first two centuries of the post-medieval era), are those of the 'Jesuit tradition.' My dissertation, it must be emphasized, does not aim at researching all the Jesuit authors, so that it would make up a depiction of a 'continuous treatises tradition' by Jesuits on the present subject (a kind of 'lineage' of the textual or thoughts dependencies, if you like). Rather, the intention of this thesis is systematic. Also, the 'tradition' in the title signifies no more than that it pertains to the *Societas Jesu*, as far as disputing is concerned. The relevant sources used are addressed in the first chapter of each *Part*.

§5. It seems that the value of every scholarly work is conditioned by the significance of its researched subject. I suppose, it is not necessary to discuss at length the importance of the Jesuit element at the beginning of modern era. But the disputation itself matters. There are many ideas to be proposed and developed from the systematic point of view, but to highlight only one thought, let me borrow a brief argument from the great book by Joshua Rodda.¹¹ This argument comes from Daniel Featley and it is as historical as systematic, holding true until the present:

§6. "Of writing many Books, especially of Controversie, there is no end: in which, wee have an Argument without an Answer, and an Answer without a Reply. But, in a Conference orderly carried, the force of every Argument, and sufficiency of every Answer, is

eines Leitmediums universitärer Wissenskultur. Gindhart, M., Kundert, U. (ed.), Berlin: de Gruyter 2010.

¹¹ RODDA, J. *Public Religious Disputation in England, 1558–1626*, p. 185.

brought to the Test; and Truth and Error, by grappling together, try their utmost strength.”¹²

§7. First, it is a historical argument, because these are the words by Featley, a student at Corpus Christi¹³ and protestant¹⁴ chaplain,¹⁵ to Jesuit John Percy (to the ‘Romish Fisher’ as the former calls him). Featley disputed publicly with Percy in 1623.¹⁶ But more importantly, it is a systematic argument – with a double conclusion furthermore. It claims (a) that the oral disputation, when ‘orderly carried’ (i.e. formally), and because of its other advantage, which consists in the scholars ‘time-local bundleness’ (as I used to call it), will reveal the truth. (b) For this very nature as well, disputing is a more meaningful activity (from the epistemic point of view), than book writing; ‘for some cases at least,’ I wish to add. Of course, not all researchers would agree with me. Indeed, the unfavorable hints of figures such as Galileo and Leibniz are often quoted by contemporary scholars in their quick assessments of post-medieval disputations. But how do we know that we evaluate and compare the same thing, if, of its real essence and kinds, we know so little? Saying that, the main objective of present dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of that phenomenon’s very nature on various levels, but not to rate its epistemic or social value.

§8. Now, as far as the methodology is concerned, my thesis is structured in two parts, namely *Part One*. ‘Method of Jesuit Disputations’ and *Part Two*, ‘Practice of Jesuit Disputations.’ Let me define each of these terms ‘method’ and ‘practice’ to obtain a

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 41.

more precise notion on the two particular subject matters. In an effort to manage it, I proposed a sort of a ‘disputation phenomena ontology’ which helps me to orientate in all those themes and, I believe, can head off the other scholars interested in the disputations as well.

§9. First, I define two general kinds of persons, as the subjects of rights and duties as well as agents in the act of oral disputation. These are the *paradigmatic persons* and *specific persons*. I utilize both in definitions of the *method* and the *practice*. Second, the *method* of disputation is defined, which is, nevertheless, different from (and built upon) the *paradigmatic methods* definition. The term ‘paradigmatic method’ stems from the Greek word *παράδειγμα* and it signifies a main procedural pattern or trait of each of the major historical disputation methods. Third, the definitions of *disputation practice* and *practices* are built upon the previous. Finally, two indicators are proposed for a basic assessment of primary text descriptions covering disputation material.

§10. [D1] The constitutive paradigmatic persons are *opponent* and *respondent*. | [D2] The *specific persons* are either (1) derivatives of *paradigmatic persons* distinguished (i) by a sequencing, like the first opponent, the second one, the first respondent, the second one, etc. or (ii) by a subordination – the praeses is being called ‘honourable respondent’ or ‘head of respondent’ often, etc.; or, the *specific persons* are (2) additional characters, like the public or the moderator, helping the full and correct conduct of disputation. | [D3] The *method of disputation* is a sequence of *paradigmatic persons* duties. Beginning with an action of propounding by opponent and ending by the qualified decision of a *judge*, the sequence is shaped according to one or more *paradigmatic methods*. | [D4] A *paradigmatic method* is a few steps order of the *paradigmatic persons* speech activities and the latter pertain to single argumentations or illations immediately. The most known

paradigmatic methods are five in number: (a) the *Asking-answering*; (b) the *Quaestio*; (c) *Dialectical-symmetric*; (d) *Obligatio* and (e) the *Objection-solving*.|

§11. (a) The trait of *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method consists of just two simple steps. (1) The dichotomic (in most cases) interrogation on the opponent's part takes place in order to obtain material for arguing against a respondent's position. (2) A brief (in most cases as well) response on the latter's part follows. The well known disputation methods in which *Asking-answering* clearly plays the dominant role are the Socratic method as known from the Plato's dialogues, and the dialectical disputation which appears in Aristotle's *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*.

§12. (b) The *Quaestio* paradigmatic method has its 'focal point' at the respondent part. (1) The opponent propounds a particular 'question' (*quaestio*), then (2), it may be argued *pro et contra*, but it is left ambiguous for the respondent. (3) The latter provides a more ample solution. This paradigmatic method plays a key part in the Medieval Scholastic disputations or method. (c) Within the *Dialectical-symmetric* paradigmatic method, (1) the paradigmatic persons take contradictory positions in a speculative matter. (2) Each of these produces arguments for his own position. (3) Each solves arguments of the another person in order to obtain mutual assent upon which has the more solid position. Such method is found in Buridan and he calls it 'dialectic'.¹⁷

§13. (d) *Obligatio* paradigmatic method has four steps. (1) The opponent propounds a proposition (*positum*). (2) The respondent must accept it (unless it is contradictory in itself). (3) The

¹⁷ BURIDAN, J. *Summulae de Dialectica*. Translation: Klima, G. New Haven / London: Yale University Press 2001, p. 499.

opponent puts forward propositions (*proposita*) one at a time, to find the respondent in contradiction. (4) The respondent, on the other hand, must either concede or deny or doubt it in order to maintain consistency.¹⁸ (e) The *Objection-solving* paradigmatic method consists of three steps. (1) The opponent formulates an objection against a respondent's position. (2) The other paradigmatic person responds typically by employing moves 'I concede,' 'I deny,' or 'I distinguish' in order to solve the opponent's argument. (3) The opponent provides either a proof of the denials or a further objection against respondent's solution.¹⁹

§14. [D5] A *practice of disputation* is an all *specific practices* system held in an institution. | [D6] The *specific practice* is a sequence of *specific persons* activities preformed according to a single *disputation method* or according to more *disputation methods* in succession, the further conditions of which are determined (a) by

¹⁸ NOVAES, C. D. Medieval *Obligationes* as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance. *Synthese*, 2005, p. 372; EKENBERG, T. Order in Obligational Disputations. In *Medieval Forms of Argument: Disputation and Debate*. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers 2002, pp. 23–39; UCKELMAN, S. Interactive Logic in the Middle Ages. Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation Universiteit van Amsterdam 2011; YRJÖNSUURI, M. Aristotle's 'Topics' and Medieval Obligational Disputations. *Synthese*, 1993, pp. 59–82; YRJÖNSUURI, M. Duties, rules and interpretations in obligational disputations. In *Medieval Formal Logic: Obligations, Insolubles and Consequences*. YRJÖNSUURI, M. (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001, pp. 3–34.

¹⁹ CLICHTOVE, J., D'ÉTAPLES, J. L. *Introductiones Artificiales in Logicam Iacobi Fabri Stapulensis, per Iudocum Clichtoueum Neoportuensem collectae, ac familiari Commentatio declaratae. Iudoci item Clichtovei in Terminorum cognitionem Introductio, cum altera de Artium diuisione*. Lugduni [Lyon], 1535, fol. 17^r; ANGELELLI, I. The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1970, pp. 800–815; ASHWORTH, E. J. Renaissance Man as Logician: Josse Clichtove (1472–1543) on Disputations. *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 1986, pp. 15–29.

the explicit rules of an institution or (b) by a custom or (c) an actual authority. |

§15. As far as the disputation method *descriptions* found in various primary texts, I propose two parameters. First, [D7] the *length* of a relevant passage is measured in a ‘dPag’ unit (a ‘disputation page’ if you like). The 1 dPag counts for 1 000 characters including spaces. | The second parameter is a bit vague for the present, but greatly important. [D8] The *style* of a relevant passage can be (a) *sequential*, (b) *nomothetic*, or (c) *taxonomic*, when pure. (a) The *sequential* style features the frequent occurrence of conjunctions like *cum*, *dum*, *donec*; of adverbs or prepositions like *tum*, *dein*, *post(ea)*, *ante*; and of the *ablative absolute*. (b) The *nomothetic* style prescribes the general laws of disputing, often in a conditional ‘*if, then*’ form, but it provides the poor notion of the correct sequence of steps. (c) The *taxonomic* style attempts at a precise classification of various paradigmatic person duties in many divisions and subordinations. | [D9] The *relevant passage* chiefly covers the *paradigmatic methods* and the *disputation method* descriptions, but also the definitions and purposes of disputing, preparatory phases descriptions and the closest logics when interlaced with methods. | The examples of the referring manner to other places in my thesis follow. First, ^(a)§1¹³ refers to the point ‘(a)’ which is to be found in the paragraph designed by the second number. The last number signifies the page where the paragraph begins. Second, [T1]§38³¹ refers to a numbered thesis (there can be ‘D’ for definition) in a proper paragraph, but the last number signifies the page the thesis (or definition) begins, not the paragraph. Each definition or thesis is closed by the ‘|’ sign.

Part One

**Method of Jesuit
Disputations**

1 State of research, Treatises on Logic by Jesuits and Other Sources

1.1 State of Research in the *Modern Method* and in the *Asking-answering* Paradigmatic Method

§16. The *Modern method* is a disputation method which appears to be almost entirely based on the *Objection-solving* paradigmatic method as far as the secondary sources reveal. Although the term ‘modern method’ was firstly mentioned by Ignazio Angelelli, it was fully developed by doctor Donald Felipe in his *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*¹ of 1991. As Felipe’s work is considered the most authoritative, I will present his own outline of this method first. It will provide the most general background for the second chapter ‘Jesuit Method in Treatises on Logic by the Members of Society’ and for the further course of my dissertation. But let me stress here, that the term ‘Jesuit method’ is not the *proper name*. It just designates the method which appears in Jesuit sources. After the *outline* introduction, I will provide a background for the second main theme, which is the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method. My original contribution is to be found in the third chapter. As a brief result, I claim that the Jesuit method is generally shaped along the line of the *Objection-solving* paradigmatic method. But its special feature consists in the imperative to postpone distinction and in the routine application of *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method.

¹ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*. University of Texas 1991.

A. OUTLINE OF THE *MODERN METHOD*

§17. (A) Being circulated by the respondent before, a subject matter called ‘thesis’ is selected by the opponent at the beginning of the disputation act. Accompanying the selection, an direct or indirect argument (or arguments) called ‘objection’ (*objectio*), the conclusion of which is the contradiction (in the most cases) of the actual thesis, is advanced by the opponent.²

§18. (B) Now, the respondent’s careful repeating of the argument and challenging his opponent over ambiguities (for the sake of clarification), which is called ‘assumptio’ (*assumptio*), is followed either by the respondent’s request for a premise proof or by a ‘response’ (*responsio, solutio*). In the first case, the opponent proves by the mostly syllogistic proofs, called prosyllogisms. In the second case, there are several response-moves, the objective of which is to show the opponent’s argument is ineffective to contradict the thesis. The well-established responses are ‘I deny’ (*nego*), ‘I concede’ (*concedo*) and ‘I distinguish’ (*distinguo*). *Distinguo* leads to the concession of the one sense of a previously ambiguous premise (not implying the contradiction of the thesis from now), and to the denial of the other.³

§19. (C) Each type of response is followed by an appropriate type of ‘exception’ (*exceptio*) on the opponent’s part. For example, whereas a simple denial is met by a proof of the denied premise, the distinction can either be shown as materially unjustified or conceded and used against the respondent’s own thesis.⁴ The account of the next steps by Felipe is not wholly clear.⁵ But

² FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*, p. 42–43.

³ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*, p. 43–44.

⁴ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*, p. 44.

⁵ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*, p. 45, “In each instance the exceptio of the Opponent results in another argument, another objection,

as his outline seems to be generally structured according to the method described in Thomasius,⁶ let me finish it by the latter's description. In fact therefore, an 'exception' follows only in the case opponent is not satisfied with the response just provided. And, after the exception, respondent acts as in point (B). On the other hand, if the opponent is satisfied, a new objection against the thesis is made by him as in point (A).⁷

B. ASKING-ANSWERING PARADIGMATIC METHOD

§20. Among contemporary scholars, it was Donald Felipe who addressed as well the important issue of a proper relation between the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method and the *modern* or syllogistic method of disputation in his 'Ways of disputing

against the Respondent's thesis. The arguments produced by the escapes can be met by the Respondent by further requests for proof, or repetitions, assumptions, and responses, which can be met once again by the Opponent with additional proofs or exceptiones, and so on. Sources rarely mention conditions determining when a disputation is won or lost."

- ⁶ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*, p. 17, "In Leipzig, however, *Erotemata logica*, a work by Leibniz' teacher, Jacobus Thomasius, is published in 1677, which contains a whole section on disputation entitled *Processus disputandi*. . . . Also Thomasius clearly influences some later 18th century tracts on disputation found in the works of Syrbius (1717), Schubertus (1742), and Wildius (1744)."
- ⁷ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*, p. 48; THOMASIUS, J. *Erotemata logica pro incipientibus: accessit pro adultis processus disputandi*. 1692, pp. 183–184, "176. Tempus est, ut ad tertium conflictum veniamus, qui quidem tum demum futurus est, si responsio nondum satisfecerit OppONENTI. Nam si satisfecerit, ad novum ille, ubi sic placuerit, argumentum, vel novam veteris probationem se confert, similemque primo vel secundo conflictum integrabit. . . . 178. *Generalia* hic praecepta duo sunt. *Primum*: uterque alterius discursum repetet. Facit enim hoc ad eum finem, ut alter alterum rectius intelligat. Potest tamen hoc etiam omitti, si brevibus agere placeat. 179. *Alterum*: Opponens ad solutionem Respondentis excipiat; Hujus exceptionem diluat Respondens."

and principia’⁸ Besides certain other topics, he treats later on in it and, while using slightly different terminology, investigates the passages on ‘question-and-answer disputation’ in the ‘Wittenberg-Altdorf’⁹ Lutheran¹⁰ handbooks as well as elsewhere. He outlines ‘various approaches to disputation by questions during the 16th and 17th centuries.’¹¹ The treatises Felipe investigates include those of Michael Piccart (1610, 1644),¹² Jacobus Martini (1631),¹³ Johann Scharf (1635),¹⁴ Johann Felwinger (1659),¹⁵ Michael Wendeler (1650)¹⁶ and Jacobus

⁸ Cf. FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. In *Disputatio 1200–1800. Form, Funktion und Wirkung eines Leitmediums universitärer Wissenskultur*. Gindhart, M., Kundert, U. (ed.), Berlin: de Gruyter 2010.

⁹ Felipe is mostly interested in handbooks published in the early to mid-17th century by scholars (with the exception of Jacobus Thomasius) affiliated with the universities at Wittenberg or Altdorf. This holds true at least for some point in their careers and, small wonder therefore that their works on disputation exhibit many similarities. Felipe names these as the ‘Wittenberg-Altdorf handbooks.’ Cf. FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, pp. 34–35.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 35, fn. 6, “The study regretably neglects . . . the role of the Lutheran, Wittenberg-Altdorf handbooks in public confessional disputes. . . .”

¹¹ FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹² PICCART, M., VITUS, L. *Disputatio de problemate et propositione dialectics in genere*. Altdorf 1610; SCHERBE, P., SONER, E., PICCART, M., FELWINGER, J. *Philosophia Altdorphina*, Nürnberg 1644. See this quotation in FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, p. 35, fn. 7.

¹³ MARTINI, J. *Paedia*. Wittenberg 1631. See this quotation in FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, p. 33, fn. 1.

¹⁴ SCHARF, J. *Processus disputandi*. Wittenberg 1635. *Ibid.*

¹⁵ FELWINGER, J. *Brevis commentatio de disputatione*. Altdorf 1659. See this quotation in FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, pp. 34–35, fn. 5; Cf. FELWINGER, J. P. *Brevis commentatio de disputatione* [first publ. as the *Brevis commentatio de disputatione complectens totam methodum disputandi*. Altdorf bei Nürnberg, 1659]. Appendix in KESLER, A. *Methodus disputandi, Andreae Kesleri, S.S.*

Thomasius (1670).¹⁷ None of them was a Catholic. Now, to briefly summarize this phenomenon with Felipe is the most appropriate point of departure for my further investigation.

§21. A ‘classical’ distinction between (1) the disputation methods practised ‘nowadays’ and (2) that used by the ‘ancients’ appears in the German scholastics handbooks. Two ‘traits,’ as Felipe calls them, are said to distinguish the (2) from the (1), namely, the applying of ‘continuous minor questions and the absence of syllogisms.’¹⁸ Whereas Piccart, J. Thomasius, and Felwinger mention both of these traits, only the use of questions is referred to by Martini and Scharf for the ancient characterisation.¹⁹

§22. Two qualifications must be emphasized here. According to Felipe, although both Fonseca and Goclenius allow the application of ‘some interrogative moves’ to contemporary opponents, it does not imply the ‘wholesale resurrection’ of the ancient method.²⁰ Two supporting claims appear to be brought by Felipe. (a) In the ancient form, the questioning is the *only* means of inquiry, according to both Fonseca and Piccart. (b) While describing some ‘interrogative strategies’ for the opponent, even J.

Theol. Doct. et Superintendentis Ducatus Coburgensis, Exemplis Colloquiorum Theologorum publicorum ab eodem assignatis, illustrata & edita. Altdorffi, Typis Johannis Henrici Schönnerstaedt 1668.

¹⁶ WENDELER, M. *Breves observationes genuini disputandi processus.* Wittenberg 1650. See this quotation in FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, p. 35, fn. 5.

¹⁷ THOMASIUS, J. *Erotemata logica.* Leipzig 1670. See this quotation in FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, p. 35, fn. 5; Cf. THOMASIUS, J. *Erotemata logica pro incipientibus: accessit pro adultis processus disputandi.* The third edition. Lipsiae, Sumptibus Georg. Heinr. Frommanni 1692.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Martini clearly sets apart the ancient disputation form in 1631.²¹ Further, a theme of the *history* of questioning form is introduced in certain German scholastics handbooks and therefore, Felipe researches the relation of those scholars (including C. Thomasius and Le Clerc) to that ‘history theme’ in some detail.²² But neither Fonseca nor Goclenius is greatly interested in it.²³

§23. For my inquiry as well, it is important only to summarize two of Felipe’s findings concerning that time attitudes toward the *actual using* of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method or the questioning form. (A) Although theirs are not ‘inherently inconsistent’ with *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method, the German second scholastics handbooks generally ‘either disregard or prohibit’ the questioning. Or they treat it, but very briefly²⁴, among many other strategies available to an opponent and without any sign of preference, which is the case of Goclenius.²⁵ Also, J. Martini allows just minor interrogative moves.²⁶ “One is left with the impression that the ancient method of disputing by questions is only known to these authors from ancient texts and that it is not practised in the schools,” Felipe writes.²⁷ (B) On the other hand, Fonseca clearly prefers the disputing with questions and his whole tract explains strate-

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 44.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39, fn. 18, “Rudolph Goclenius, De legitima disputandi ratione, in: Rudolph Snellius, Commentarius doctissimus in dialecticam Petri Rami, Herborn 1587 [VD16S6818], pp. 114–115”

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

gies for that.²⁸ “Compared to the German handbooks, Fonseca’s emphasis even appears ‘quite radical,’” Felipe says.²⁹

1.2 Survey of Jesuit Treatises on Logic

§24. This thesis is based on several key primary sources. Now, before I will proceed to the main three chapters, let me address the way the Jesuit treatises on Logic were selected. Then, the most of the sources are shortly described.

A. THE WAY JESUIT TREATISES ON LOGIC WERE SELECTED

§25. As a matter of fact, passages dealing with disputation method can be found in the following treatises: (A) *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis*³⁰ by Francisco Toledo; (B) *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*³¹ by Pedro da Fonseca; (C) *Institutionum dialecticarum libri quinque*³² by Francisco Alfonso; (D) *Organi Philosophiae rudimenta, seu compendium logicae Aristotelicae*³³ by Jean Garnier; (E) *Ars disputandi ex optimis Academicarum Legibus concinnata*³⁴ by Henri Marcellius; (F) *Ars disserendi seu Logica in to-*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³⁰ TOLETUS, F. *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis*. Coloniae Agripinae, Apud Haeredes Arnoldi Bickmanni 1575.

³¹ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*. In *Instituições dialécticas / Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*. Latin-Portugal edition. Introduction, text, translation and notes by GOMES, J. F., Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra 1964.

³² ALPHONSUS, F. *Institutionum dialecticarum libri quinque Authore R. P. Francisco Alfonso Malpartidensi e Societate Iesu*. Compluti, Apud Antonium Vazquez 1642.

³³ GARNIER, J. *Organi Philosophiae rudimenta, seu compendium logicae Aristotelicae*. Lutetiae Parisiorum, Typis Edmundi Martini 1677.

³⁴ MARCELLIUS, H. *Ars disputandi ex optimis Academicarum Legibus concinnata*. Tremoniae, Apud Jodocum Kalcovium 1664.

mos duos divisa, Tomus II,³⁵ by Jacques Chanevelle; (G) *Dialectica nova sive introductio in philosophiam*³⁶ by Francisco Freytag and (H) *Dialectica Aristotelico-Rationalis sive manuductio ad Logicam*³⁷ by Mathias Heimbach.

§26. Since an objection may be raised, the abovementioned selection is not justified. Let me introduce the way these works were chosen or found. Negatively speaking, I could take neither a secondary source list of Jesuit disputation treatises, nor the primary one, surveying it to choose the most substantial-looking treatises for the present research programme. As far as the primary sources are concerned, to my best knowledge, there are no such bibliographies, except that found (1) in Kesler (1639)³⁸ and (2) in Felwinger (1659).³⁹ But these two figures are not the Jesuits, nor even Catholics and, more importantly, from the Society of Jesu, only Marcellius is mentioned in the latter.⁴⁰

³⁵ CHANEVELLE, J. *Ars disserendi seu Logica in tomos duos divisa. Tomus II.* Parisiis, Apud Edmundum Marinum 1667.

³⁶ FREYTAG, F. *Dialectica nova sive introductio in philosophiam.* Osnabrugi, Sumptibus Sebastini Strauff Bibliopolae Aulici, Typis Viduae Gerhardi Schorlemeri 1706.

³⁷ HEIMBACH, M. *Dialectica Aristotelico-Rationalis sive manuductio ad Logicam studiosae juventuti ad Philosophiam, aliasque scientias praeeparandae.* Coloniae Ubiorum, Ex Officina Henrici Rommerskirchen sub pingui Gallina 1709.

³⁸ KESLER, A. *Methodus disputandi, Andreae Kesleri, S.S. Theol. Doct. et Superintendentis Ducatus Coburgensis, Exemplis Colloquiorum Theologicorum publicorum ab eodem assignatis, illustrata & edita.* Altdorffi, Typis Johannis Henrici Schönnerstaedt 1668, [first publ. 1639], pp. 1–2.

³⁹ FELWINGER, J. P. *Brevis commentatio de disputatione* [first publ. as the *Brevis commentatio de disputatione complectens totam methodum disputandi.* Altdorf bei Nürnberg, 1659]. Appendix in KESLER, A. *Methodus disputandi, Andreae Kesleri, S.S. Theol. Doct. et Superintendentis Ducatus Coburgensis, Exemplis Colloquiorum Theologicorum publicorum ab eodem assignatis, illustrata & edita.* Altdorffi, Typis Johannis Henrici Schönnerstaedt 1668, p. 309.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

§27. Therefore, in an early research phase, a collection of Jesuit treatises was gathered (a) from the known secondary sources on modern disputation methods. The works by Marcellius and Freytag were found in the dissertation by Felipe.⁴¹ Unfortunately, no significant place is given to them in his *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*. Whereas the former is only mentioned in two footnotes and bibliography,⁴² the latter is addressed in a section called ‘Forming the status controversiae’⁴³ and, more fully, in a context of the *subdistinctions* shaping.⁴⁴ In Felipe’s later paper,⁴⁵ Fonseca is treated in terms of the ‘Question-and-answer disputation’ research.⁴⁶ Or, (b) it was gathered while following certain hints in the other primary Jesuit sources. For instance, Garnier was unearthed via Chanevelle.⁴⁷ Finally, (c) even Toledo and Chanevelle’s work itself was discovered quite accidentally, although one can come across the former in the Jesuit official documents;⁴⁸ see (a)§150¹⁰¹.

§28. Yet, an objection might remain to the effect that *all* of the sources from these points (a)–(c) are selected or found, in a sense, accidentally. To prevent this difficulty, a further research was undertaken by surveying the *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de*

⁴¹ FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*. University of Texas 1991.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 34, fn. 39; p. 202, fn. 260; p. 223.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 112–114.

⁴⁵ FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. In *Disputatio 1200–1800. Form, Funktion und Wirkung eines Leitmediums universitärer Wissenskultur*. Gindhart, M., Kundert, U. (ed.), Berlin: de Gruyter 2010.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38–40.

⁴⁷ CHANEVELLE, J. *op. cit.*, p. 528.

⁴⁸ PAVUR, C. N. *The Ratio studiorum: the official plan for Jesuit education*. Saint Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources 2005, p. 101; MP V, R99, pp. 397–398.

Jésus by de Backer-Sommervogel,⁴⁹ which is one of the famous monumental works. While the first 9 volumes are filled with a bibliography (Brussels and Paris, 1890–1900), the tenth (Paris, 1909) contains branch and subject indexes of the previous volumes.⁵⁰ Sommervogel’s *Bibliothèque* is a revised and even enlarged⁵¹ *Le bibliothèque des écrivains de la compagnie de Jésus* (1859–1876) by Father Augustin de Backer (and by his brother Aloysius).⁵² The de Backers’ colossal work alone contains the names of 11,000 Jesuit authors with a short biographical note in each instance, along with records of the editions, translations, and critiques even including other works published in refutation.⁵³

§29. There is an index called ‘Dialectique et Logique’ in the Sommervogel’s *Bibliothèque*.⁵⁴ It refers to some 186 works on logic by Jesuits, if we only take those written in the 16th and 17th century. But in most cases, these records are merely short theses (*Assertiones logicae*) for a public disputation or, on the other hand, full theoretical dissertations in the *quaestio* form. In the latter, no space is paid to the *art* of disputing. Nevertheless, it is possible to learn how the title of a promising text should read

⁴⁹ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome I–XII*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1890–1900, Paris: A. Picard 1890–1932, Leuven: Editions de la Bibliothèque S.J., Collège Philosophique et Théologique 1960.

⁵⁰ POLLEN, J. H. Distinguished Jesuits. In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 14. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912. New Advent [Website].

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² SPILLANE, E. Augustin de Backer. In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 2. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907. New Advent [Website].

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome X. Tables de la première partie. Par Pierre Bliard*. Paris: A. Picard 1909, col. 750–755.

from the works already known for their usefulness. It must include synonyms and variants of the latin terms like *summa*, *introductio*, *manuductio*, *minor*, *compendium*, *institutio* and those near to *logica*, *dialectica*, *organon*, etc. Alternatively, it should contain words (and their synonyms and variants) like *ars* or *methodus* or *modus* near to *disputandi*, *disserendi* etc.

§30. In this way, more than 30 of the most promising entries were selected in the *Bibliothèque*. But I would enjoy demonstrating how rare the tracts on disputation method are in fact. Thus, let me quote just five of the promising title items which, nevertheless, after being surveyed, turned out to be useless. (1) *Compendium Logicae Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu* (1677) by Carvalho,⁵⁵ (2) *Manuductio ad Logicam, sive Dialectica, studiosae juventuti ad Logicam praeparandae conscripta* (1614) by Du Trieu,⁵⁶ (3) *Logicae . . . pars altera, ea omnia quae ad secundam et tertiam operationem pertinent comprehendens* (1618) by Smiglecki,⁵⁷ (4) *Integer cursus philosophicus ad unum corpus redactus, in Summulas, Logicam . . . distributus* (1640) by Oviedo,⁵⁸ (5) *Commentarius . . . in compendium artis disserendi auctore Iaco Carpentario* (1597) by Tyrie.⁵⁹ A complete list of the surveyed ‘Jesuit Sources with no

⁵⁵ CARVALHO, I. *Compendium Logicae Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu*. Ex typographia Academiae Eborensis 1677.

⁵⁶ DU TRIEU, P. *Manuductio ad Logicam, sive Dialectica, studiosae juventuti ad Logicam praeparandae conscripta*. Duaci, Apud Balth. Bellerum 1614.

⁵⁷ SMIGLECKI, M. *Logicae Martini Smigleccii Societatis Jesu, pars altera, ea omnia quae ad secundam et tertiam operationem pertinent comprehendens*. Ingolstadii, Ex Typographeo Ederiano apud Elisabetham Angermariam, Viduam, 1618.

⁵⁸ OVIEDO, F. *Integer cursus philosophicus ad unum corpus redactus, in Summulas, Logicam, Physicam, de Coelo, de Generatione, de Anima et metaphysicam distributus. Tomus I. Complectens Summulas, Logicam, Physicam, Libros de Coelo et de Generatione. Auctore R. P. Francisco de Oviedo Madritano, Societatis Jesu, Theologiae Professore*. Lugduni, Sumptibus Petri Prost 1640.

⁵⁹ TYRIE, J. *Commentarius (D. Iacobi Tyrii Scoti de Societate Iesu) in compendium artis disserendi auctore Iaco Carpentario*. MS, 1597 at the latest.

Passages on Disputation Method’ can be consulted in the reference matters (page 161 and on). To sum up, besides those works already known from the early research phase, cf. (a)-(c)§27²³, I found only two additional texts that comprise passages on disputation methods. These are those of Alfonso (C)§25²¹ and of Heimbach (H)§25²¹.

B. RELEVANT JESUIT TREATISES ON LOGIC BEFORE THE RATIO STUDIORUM OF 1599

§31. (A) For disputation-research purposes, the initial significant work published prior to 1599 is the *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis*⁶⁰ by Francisco Toledo. Toledo was born on 4th October, 1532⁶¹ in Cordoba, Spain. When he entered the novitiate of the Society of Jesus on 3rd June, 1558 at Simancas (central Spain), Toledo had already been a philosophy professor and ordained priest. General of the order (cf. (A)§147⁹⁸) Lainez⁶² called him to Rome to teach philosophy and theology. Several popes entrusted him with prominent businesses. He played an important role in the reconciliation of Henry IV of France with the Catholic Church. Clement VIII elevated him to become the

⁶⁰ TOLETUS, F. *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis*. Coloniae Agripinae, Apud Haeredes Arnoldi Bickmanni 1575.

⁶¹ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome VIII*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1898, Paris: A. Picard 1898, col. 64; but according to PAVUR, C. N. *op. cit.*, p. 24 and SCHMUTZ, J. *Toledo, Francisco de*. Scholasticon [Website], 2014, Toledo was born in 1534; in 1533 according to ASHWORTH, E. J. Introduction. In *Robert Sanderson. Logicae Artis Compendium*. Bologna: Editrice CLUEB 1985, p. XXII.

⁶² SCHMUTZ, J., *op. cit.*

first⁶³ Jesuit cardinal on 17th September, 1593, but three years later, on 14th September 1596, Toledo died.⁶⁴

§32. His *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis* appeared in eighteen editions, the first published in 1561 in Rome and the last in Milan in 1621.⁶⁵ A passage dealing with the disputation method inscribed *Quis sit disputandi modus obseruandus inter scholasticos concertantes* is situated, quite unusually, in the First Book, after some introductory chapters on argumentation are presented.⁶⁶ The length of the passage is only 5.1 dPag. But it is worthy of research, at least due to the authority *Introductio* gained, after the Jesuit official ‘Plan of Study’ (*Ratio Studiorum*) of 1599 had recommended it (along with the Fonseca’s work) as an introductory tract for the beginning of the logic course; see ^(a)§150¹⁰¹.

§33. (B) The second work prior to 1599, and probably the more significant, is the *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*⁶⁷ by Pedro da Fonseca. Fonseca was born in 1528, Cortiçada (nowadays the Proença-a-Nova⁶⁸) in Portugal. He entered the novitiate of the Society on 17th March, 1548 and taught philosophy at *Colégio das Artes* in Coimbra (1555–1561). It was there he conceived the idea of the *Cursus Conimbricensis*.⁶⁹ In 1572, Fonseca

⁶³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁶⁴ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome VIII*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1898, Paris: A. Picard 1898, col. 64; SCHMUTZ, J., *op. cit.*

⁶⁵ ASHWORTH, E. J. Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. In *Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 2. Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*. GABBAY, M., WOODS, J. (ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008, p. 629.

⁶⁶ TOLETUS, F., *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁶⁷ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*. In *Instituições dialécticas / Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*. Latin-Portugal edition. Introduction, text, translation and notes by GOMES, J. F., Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra 1964.

⁶⁸ SCHMUTZ, J. *Fonseca, Pedro da*. Scholasticon [Website], 2014.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

was sent as a prosecutor in the General Congregation, became Assistant of Portugal, Visitor of his province and superior of the professed house at Lisbon, where he died on 4th November 1599.⁷⁰ Fonseca was one of the twelve fathers committee appointed by General Aquaviva to draft a formula of studies (*ad conficiendam formulam studiorum*) in 1581. It is not clear why this committee was supplanted by an entirely new one of only six members three years later, which actually drafted the 1586 ‘Plan of Studies’ (*Ratio studiorum*).⁷¹ For the *Ratio studiorum* development, see §144⁹⁶.

§34. His *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo* was published fifty three times between years 1564 (Lisbon) and 1625 (Lyon)⁷² and is still available in a modern edition.⁷³ There are two successive chapters (42, 43) of concern in Book VII, namely *De ordine disputandi primumque de officio argumentantis*⁷⁴ and *De officio respondentis*.⁷⁵ Compared with Toledo, these Fonseca passages are double in length, i.e. 10.5 dPag. As the section above already suggested, cf. §20¹⁷ and on, Fonseca takes key part in the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic research method; see from §73⁵².

⁷⁰ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome III*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1892, Paris: A. Picard 1892, col. 837; SCHMUTZ, J., *op. cit.*; MURPHY, J. F. X. Pedro Da Fonseca. In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 6. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909. New Advent [Website].

⁷¹ FARRELL, A. P. *The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education: Development and Scope of the Ratio studiorum*. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company 1938, p. 223.

⁷² ASHWORTH, E. J., *op. cit.*, p. 629.

⁷³ FONSECA, P., *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ FONSECA, P., *op. cit.*, p. 612.

⁷⁵ FONSECA, P., *op. cit.*, p. 618.

C. RELEVANT JESUIT TREATISES ON LOGIC AFTER THE RATIO STUDIORUM OF 1599

§35. (C) The *Institutionum dialecticarum libri quinque*⁷⁶ by Francisco Alfonso contains a short chapter called *Modus in disputatione obseruandus inter scholasticos concertantes*⁷⁷ (7.6 dPag) which is greatly dependent upon Toledo. But then, some subtle divergences concerning the distinction use are all the more important. Years later, (D) the *Organi Philosophiae rudimenta, seu compendium logicae Aristotelicae* (first publ. in Paris, 1651)⁷⁸ by Jean Garnier appeared. Garnier was born in Paris, in 1612. In 1628, he entered the novitiate in Rouen. He taught the humanities, philosophy and theology. When deputed to Rome in 1681, he died in Bologna.⁷⁹ The passage in concern called *Dialectica, Seu de arte disputandi*, is 26 dPag long and it shadows Chanevelle's description ^(F)§39³¹, as the former is clearly one of the sources for the latter.

§36. (E) The *Ars disputandi ex optimis Academicarum Legibus concinnata* (first publ. in Cologne, 1658)⁸⁰ by Henri Marcellius is the only known full-fledged tract on disputation method by a Jesuit. Marcellius was born in Someren (southern Netherlands) on 8th August, 1503 and entered the novitiate of Society on 11th October, 1612. He taught mathematics and philosophy in

⁷⁶ ALPHONSUS, F., *op. cit.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 72–77.

⁷⁸ GARNIER, J. *Organi Philosophiae rudimenta, seu compendium logicae Aristotelicae*. Lutetiae Parisiorum, Typis Edmundi Martini 1677, [first publ. Paris, 1651].

⁷⁹ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome III*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1892, Paris: A. Picard 1892, col. 1220.

⁸⁰ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*

Mainz, theology in Reims, Molsheim and Bamberg (1640–1664) and died there on 25th April, 1664.⁸¹

§37. But the utility of Marcellius' treatise regarded disputation method research is ambivalent to certain degree. On the one hand indeed, the title alone sounds promising. The *art of disputing* is to be elaborated according to the 'rules of the best academies' (alternatively, according to the 'best rules of academies'). Besides that, Marcellius leans on Jesuit tradition as he uses various ideas from the *Institutionum Dialecticarum* by Fonseca as well as from the trial *Ratio studiorum* of 1586. This gives Marcellius the authority of a well informed interpreter. Marcellius is quoted in the important primary source list of treatises on disputation by Felwinger, see ⁽²⁾§26²², as well as by at least one 19th century Jesuit work on logic.⁸² Finally, the length of the *Ars disputandi* is 101 dPag, which is the longest among relevant texts.

§38. But, on the other hand, there is a huge disadvantage with the Marcellius' work, caused by its general aim. In the *Prooemium*, the necessity of having various modes (*modus*) of objecting (*oppugnandi*) or defending (*defendendi*) 'ready at hand' (*in promptu*) is stressed. A good debater (*disceptator*) accommodates his modes to the subject disputed and has explored the correct method of arguing or defending to begin with, regarding the situation (*conditio*) of persons, places and time.⁸³ Immediately af-

⁸¹ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome V*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1894, Paris: A. Picard 1894, col. 517.

⁸² FELIPE, D. L. *Post Medieval Ars Disputandi*. *Op. cit.*, p. 34, fn. 39, "In Pesch, p. 224, there is even a reference to Henricus Marcellius, *Ars disputandi* (Coloniae, 1658) as a work which explains 'more fully' the rules and norms of disputation." Cf. *Ibid.* PESCH, T. *Institutiones logicales*. Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1888.

⁸³ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, p. 2, "Ita boni disceptatoris est, non tantum nosse leges argumentandi generales, sed etiam in promptu habere varios sive oppugnandi, siue defendendi thematis cuiuscunq; modos, & nihilominus pro

ter, Marcellius claims that this can not be obtained without certain precepts and rules and therefore he decided to ‘prescribe a method of disputing with ease’ (*facile disputandi methodum praescribere*). It is said this method is especially appropriate (*praecipue*) to philosophical contests (*concertationes*), but, nevertheless, it is usable elsewhere.⁸⁴ Wherefore I claim that [T1] Marcellius’ treatise *Ars disputandi* is meant for a student of philosophy as a help to obtain and to have ready at hand rather advanced *strategies* that are suited for a particular event and is not an account of basic disputing rules. | Precisely this point makes Marcellius’ work far less advantageous. The method I am searching for consists only in the sequence of basic duties, which is hard to discern in Marcellius.

§39. (F) Next, I will use Chanevelle’s *Ars disserendi seu Logica in tomos duos divisa. Tomus II* (Paris, 1667).⁸⁵ There is but little information on Jacques Chanevelle’s life as it is recorded in Sommervogel’s *Bibliothèque*.⁸⁶ Chanevelle was born in the diocese of Avranches (France) on 15th May, 1620. On 16th October, 1641, he entered the Jesuit novitiate and fifteen years later, on

varia qualitate rerum, quae in controversiam vocantur, & pro personam Locique ac temporis conditione exploratum habere, quae argumentandi via aut respondendi ineunda fit, & tenenda.”

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, “Quod quia fine certis praeceptis ac regulis obtineri non potest consilium meum fuit breui isto syntagmate, facile disputandi methodum praescribere, quae philosophicis quidem concertationibus praecipue accommodata sit: ad onmia vero quaestionum, sive oratoriarum, sive forensium genera, quae in controversiam vocantur adhiberi etiam possit.”

⁸⁵ CHANEVELLE, J. *Ars disserendi seu Logica in tomos duos divisa. Tomus II*. Parisiis, Apud Edmundum Marinum 1667.

⁸⁶ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome II*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1891, Paris: A. Picard 1891, col. 1063; SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome XII. Histoire. Par Pierre Bliard, S. J. Index alphabétique des noms propres et des revues*. Leuven: Editions de la Bibliothèque S.J., Collège Philosophique et Théologique 1960, col. 1004.

17th October 1656, he had the profession (*profès*). Chanevelle taught humanities and rhetoric for seven years, as well as philosophy for thirteen. He died in Paris on 5th September, 1699. His *Ars disserendi seu Logica in tomos duos divisa* deserves great research in the future. But it is enough to mention at the present (1) that his disputation description, as found in the *De methodo disputandi* passage (25.4 dPag), appears similar to the one in Sanderson’s *Logicae artis compendium*; see §44³⁴. But, as I said above, (2) Chanevelle’s work is even much closer to the Garnier’s ^(D)§35²⁹, not only for its nearly identical length.

1.3 Other Selected Sources of Great Authority

A. *RELATIO COMPENDIARIA* BY ADAM TANNER

§40. The most important non-textbook treatise dealing with the disputation method is the *Relatio compendiaria de initio processu, et fine colloquii ratisbonensis* (1602) by Jesuit Adam Tanner.⁸⁷ Tanner was born in 1571, Innsbruck. The Society of Jesus admitted him in 1590 and then, for 22 years, Tanner taught theology in Munich, Ingolstadt and Vienna. The Emperor Ferdinand II appointed Tanner Chancellor of the University of Prague. He died on 25th May 1632, at Unken in Tyrol.⁸⁸

§41. His ‘compendious account’ of the Regensburg colloquy (1601)⁸⁹ takes approximately 290 dPag in sum. On the other hand, the chapter *Catholicos magnopere, ac iure optimo, formam*

⁸⁷ TANNER, A. *Relatio compendiaria de initio processu, et fine colloquii ratisbonensis*. Monachii, Ex typographia Nicolai Henrici 1602.

⁸⁸ SOMMERVOGEL, C. *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus . . . Nouvelle édition . . . Tome VII*. Brussels: O. Schepens 1896, Paris: A. Picard 1896, col. 1843.

⁸⁹ SCHEIB, O. *Die innerchristlichen Religionsgespräche im Abendland. Band II*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag 2009, p. 484–487.

dialecticam in hoc colloquio ursisse,⁹⁰ which is devoted to the disputation method in a narrow sense, or to the ‘form’ (*forma*) as the Jesuits use to call it, takes only 12.5 dPag. However short that passage may be, Tanner attaches great authority to the *forma dialectica* as described by him. There are at least four places in the *Relatio* where Tanner stresses this method is used almost exclusively in ‘all the Academies’ (*omnibus Academiis*).⁹¹ For my research purposes therefore, such claims also bear not a small authority to the Tanner method description itself.

B. *LOGICAE ARTIS COMPENDIUM* BY ROBERT SANDERSON

§42. A non-Jesuit author, Robert Sanderson, was chosen because his work can serve as a kind of etalon of non-Jesuit dispu-

⁹⁰ TANNER, A. *Relatio compendiaria*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 88–93.

⁹¹ TANNER, A. *Relatio compendiaria*. *Op. cit.*, p. 36, “Quam enim quaeso te, mi Hunni, honestam excusationem praetexere tuae tergiuersationi potes? an quod hic modus disputandi nouus sit & inusitatus? sed est in omnibus Academiis tritissimus, & nec tibi qui de olim incognitus. . . . An quod mod^o prior disputandi ad veritatem patefaciendam aptior esset? Sed hic non solum semper visus est omnibus Academiis, quae in Germania, Italia, Gallia, Hispania, & toto terrarum orbe extant, sed etiam a te quoque, & tuis postea tanquam aptior & conuenientior, voluntate Principum, receptus est.”; *Ibid.*, p. 88, “Itaq; forma Dialectica, quam Hunnius, per contemptum quidem, sed honorifice vocauit, *Jesuiticam* . . . in quibuscunq; celeberrimis Academiis vsitata, qua in argumentando, & respondendo, debitus ordo seruatur.” *Ibid.*, p. 90, “Haec potissimum sunt, mi Hunni, quae ad formam Dialecticam, seu, vt tu loqueris, *Iesiticam*, pertinēt. Licet enim haec dudum scire debuisses, vtpote quae in omnibus celeberrimis totius orbis Academiis, tanquā regulas recte disputandi, & discuntur, & docemur” *Ibid.*, p. 92, “Et certe si alia disputandi forma ad veritatis inquisitionem accōmodatior esset, scirent vtiq; etiam hanc Academia, & sequerentur. Iam autem vnica illam omnibus totius orbis Academiis recte constitutis, in Germaniā, Italia, Hispania, Gallia, India, sola, inquam, & vnica docetur & discitur, sola tam in Theologicis, quam Philosophicis disputationibus exercetur, vt dubium nulli esse possit, hanc etiam solam, vel certe inter omnes maxime accommodatā esse ad veritatem peruestigandam, & propugnandam, quae vnica disputationis finis & scopus est.”

tation method. His work was published right in the centre of the period in which I am interested. The German disputation handbooks as researched by Donald Felipe are generally slightly younger. Several positive reasons for my choice are outlined below; see (a)-(d)§44³⁴.

§43. Robert Sanderson (born in 1587) grew up near Rotherham, Yorkshire. In 1608, taking his M.A. degree at Lincoln College, Oxford, he was established as a reader in logic. Because of his success at teaching, he was appointed again in 1609. And they were these lectures he gave as a reader in logic, which were printed (anonymously) in 1615 that became well known as the *Logicae artis compendium*.⁹² During the same period, he was ordained a deacon and priest and took his Bachelor of Divinity degree. Although he resigned the fellowship at Lincoln and gave himself over to his ecclesiastical duties, he had not abandoned his academic interests. Being graduated a Doctor of Divinity in 1636, he was appointed Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford several year later, though he could not perform his office until the Restoration of Monarchy in 1660. In the same time, when he was 73, he became Bishop of Lincoln, holding this position for the remaining three years of his life.⁹³

§44. Sanderson's *Logicae artis compendium* is the most convenient non-Jesuit source of information on the modern method. Reasons for this claim follow: (a) It was successful textbook on logics. Sanderson's biographer Izaak Walton confirms that 'most Tutors in both Universities teach Dr. Sanderson's Logic to their Pupils, as a foundation upon which they are to build their future

⁹² SANDERSON, R. *Logicae artis compendium*. In *The works of Robert Sanderson, D.D., sometime Bishop of Lincoln, Vol. VI*. Oxford, at the University Press 1854

⁹³ ASHWORTH, E. J. Introduction. In *Robert Sanderson. Logicae Artis Compendium*. Bologna: Editrice CLUEB 1985, pp. XI–XII.

studies in Philosophy. And . . . since his book of Logic was first printed, there has been no less than ten thousand sold⁹⁴ Further testimony can be found in study programmes, student notebooks, booklists etc. In 1704 at St. John’s College ‘Sanderson or Aristotle himself’ was recommended for scholastic logic.⁹⁵ Since the *Compendium* was first published in 1615, a sequence of further editions followed, none of them substantially different,⁹⁶ until the thirteenth edition appeared in 1854.⁹⁷ (b) This textbook was used at two of the foremost educational institutions, Oxford and Cambridge. No wonder, therefore, if Sanderson was read by such a figure as Newton in 1661 while an undergraduate at Trinity College, Cambridge.⁹⁸ (c) Sanderson’s presentation of the process of disputing is expanded in that way that ‘allows the reader to grasp exactly how a disputation might run in practice.’⁹⁹ (d) The method described is not a theoretical design but was actually applied. This can be proven by referring to claims similar to those that follow:

§45. “[B]ut when the question is proposed, he [i.e. respondent] indices in a bare and simple way only, which of both parts of contradiction he wants to defend, the Affirmative or the Negative: which is the custom in Oxford public schools in ordinary disputations of

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. XIV.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. XIV–XV.

⁹⁶ An objection stems from the Howell’s *Logic and Rhetoric in England 1500–1700* (1956). The two appendixes, the first of which contains a disputation method description, are not found in the first edition of *Logicae Artis Compendium*. But this is quite wrong. See ASHWORTH, E. J. Introduction. In *Robert Sanderson. Logicae Artis Compendium*. Bologna: Editrice CLUEB 1985, p. XIII., fn. 13.

⁹⁷ ASHWORTH, E. J. *op. cit.*, p. XIII.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, footnote 16, p. XIV.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. LII.

scholars . . . which is the custom in Oxford private schools . . . the former need no precepts, of the latter let it be observed this”¹⁰⁰

§46. Finally, (e) with its length 27 dPag, Sanderson’s account is comparable to those of Garnier (D)§35²⁹ and Chanevelle (F)§39³¹. But still, it is a bit longer and the *sequential* style components of his presentation are much dominant and clear.

¹⁰⁰ SANDERSON, *op. cit.*, p. 153, “sed proposita Quaestione, nude et simpliciter id indicat solum, utram partem Contradictionis defendere velit, Afirmativam, vel Negativam: qui mos est Oxoniae in publicis Scholis, in ordinariis Disputationibus Scholarium et Baccalaureorum. Suppositio Rationalis sive Satisfactoria est, in qua . . . rationum momentis statuminat: qui mos est Oxoniae in privatis Collegiis, et etiam publico in Scholis in Disputationibus solennioribus. Ilia praeceptis non indiget: de hac observentur ista: . . .”

2 Jesuit Method in Treatises on Logic by the Members of Society

2.1 The Main Duty on the Opponent's Part: to Hold Course of Argumentations

§47. It will be convenient to turn our attention to those Jesuit treatises which discern and describe in detail many paradigmatic persons duties, tasks, or parts. Those are mainly the works by Chanevelle and Marcellius. Based on their copious information, it will be easier to show the most important duties of either of the paradigmatic persons, and to discern the Jesuit method very beginning from some preparatory parts.

A. *ARS DISSERENDI SEU LOGICA* BY CHANEVELLE

§48. Generally, Chanevelle schedules tasks of an opponent or 'arguer' (*argumetans*) in four parts; he adds some appropriate virtues to them in each case. The latter bear witnesses to the ability of the opponent. (1) Choice (*electio*) of a right thesis shows mature of judgement; (2) discovery (*inventio*) of an medium or of an argument reveals fineness of talent (*ingenii subtilitas*); (3) propounding (*propositio*) of an medium or argument bears evidence to clarity and conciseness; finally, (4) insistence (*instantia*), i.e. a part when the opponent 'presses hard' (*urgeo*), shows promptness and sharpness of his the soul.¹

¹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 516, "I. Opponentis, seu argumentantis quatuor sunt praesertim officia, nempe electio thesis, inventio medii seu argumenti, propositio ejusdem, denique instantia. In electione thesis judicii maturitas elucet, in inventione argumenti ingenii subtilitas, in proponendo claritas, & brevitatis dictionis, in vrgendo animus praesens, & acer."

§49. But how does Chanevelle divide the very disputation event? (I) From the opponent point of view, he discerns between (a) a ‘disputation entry’ (*ingressus disputationis*) and (b) a disputation progress (*progressus*).² Alternatively, he distinguishes opponent’s act of (c) a ‘first propounding’ (*prima proponit*) and act of (d) ‘pressing hard’ (*urgeo*) by the same paradigmatic person.³ As far as the disputation entry (a) concerns, the opponent is to (i) salute respondent, (ii) he can have an opening speech; he is to (iii) designate a thesis he want to oppose, and to (iv) ‘shape a syllogism’ (*sylogismum informet*), conclusion of which is the contradiction of the thesis.⁴ Then, Chanevelle grants a large space to a description of (b) the ‘progress of argument’ (*progressum argumenti*) canons.⁵

§50. (II) A great importance bears the very disputation event too, if seen from the respondent site. First of all, Chanevelle declares at this place, he wants to instruct the specific person of the ‘lower respondent’ (*respondens inferior*) only. Then, the duties (*officia*) of the latter pertain either to the (d) ‘disputation beginning’ (*initium disputationis*) or to the (e) disputation course (*cursus*).

² CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 518, “VI. Cum ad disputandum accedit opponens, alii canones spectant ingressum disputationis, alii progressum.”

³ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 521, “XV. Inter vrgendum caveat sibi argumentans ab his vitiis . . . 5. nullibi, sive cum primum proponit, sive cum vrget, fophistae famam laudemve aucupetur.”

⁴ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 518, “VII. Circa ingressum disputationis quinque sint canones, 1. salutet respondentem opponens perhumaniter, 2. si quid in ejus honorem praefari velit, brevissime id fiat, & ad rem aptissime: 3. thesim aperte designet, quam oppugnare velit: 4. ita syllogismum informet, vt conclusio sit contradictorie opposita thesi, quam convellendam suscipit: 5. caveat sibi ab inepta argumentandi forma, qua novitii Logici solent contradictionem thesis pro antecedente ponere, cujus hoc sit consequens, ergo falsa thesis.”

⁵ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 518, “VIII. Circa progressum argumenti, plures sunt canones”

The chief respondent duties at (d) are (v) to repeat (*assumo*) and (vi) to solve (*solvo*) the argument.⁶ A somewhat later, Chanevelle claims once again that concerning the (f) ‘beginning of contest’ (*initium concertationis*) where the (vii) ‘argument is shaped’ (*argumentum . . . informatum est*) by opponent, respondent should repeat it without any abbreviating unless the (viii) syllogism (*sylogismus*) is more than just lengthy.⁷

§51. Let me summarize the most important points. In Chanevelle’s very disputation description, there is (A) a wider phase called ‘disputation entry’ (a)§49³⁸. As the last part of it, (B) the ‘disputation beginning’ is discerned (d)§50³⁸ which is titled the ‘beginning of contest’ (f)§50³⁸ alternatively. The points (A) and (B) are not identical, because a source activity of (B) is only the last one in (A). This (B)’s source activity is (C) the first ‘syllogism shaping’ to oppugn the thesis or the ‘first propounding’ on the opponent site; see (3)§48³⁷, (c)(iv)§49³⁸, (vii)(viii)§50³⁸. While belonging to the ‘disputation beginning’ (B) too, an (D), namely the first syllogism repeating (v)§50³⁸ and solving (vi)§50³⁸ on the respondent site, follows.

§52. Saying that, [T2] in accordance with the *disputation method* definition, the very beginning of Jesuit method is located at the opponent’s first syllogism propounding in Chanevelle; | cf. [D3]§10¹⁰ and (C) above. Consequently, [T3] the opponent’s activities of choice of thesis and discovery of an argument are not

⁶ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis respondentis, p. 521, “I. Respondens duplex, alter superior & honorarius, alter inferior . . . II. Inferioris officia vel spectant ad initium disputationis, vel ad cursum; duo sunt potissima illius officia, 1. argumentum assumere, deinde assumptum solvere”

⁷ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis respondentis, p. 522, “IV. Circa initium concertationis duo sunt canones, 1. vbi argumentum ab opponente informatum est, fideliter repetat, etiam eadem verba; & si fieri potest, nihil detrahat, addat, aut immutet nisi justo proluxior sit sylogismus”

included in the very disputation event, but they should be done as a preparation in advance; | cf. (1)(2)(3)§48³⁷.

§53. Finally, if we compare Chanevelle’s all the basic disputation event divisions, cf. (3)vs.(4)§48³⁷, (a)vs.(b)§49³⁸, (c)vs.(d)§49³⁸, and (d)vs.(e)§50³⁸, a phase (E) termed ‘pressing hard,’ ‘insistence,’ ‘progress’ or ‘course’ of an argument or of a disputation proves to be completely distinct and sequent the phases (A)–(D)§51³⁹. If the phase (E) follows a respondent’s solution, then, it must correspond or include at least opponent’s effort to save his immediately shaped or propounded objection (C)§51³⁹.

B. *ARS DISPUTANDI* BY MARCELLIUS

§54. Marcellius prescribes number of recommendations for the both paradigmatic persons too. But because there is the ‘preparation of advanced user’ disadvantage with his treatise, cf. §38³⁰, it is more difficult to discern the basic disputation parts or phases in it. As far as both paradigmatic persons concerns, Marcellius admonishes (following with plenty other advices) to invoke the grace of the Holy Spirit prior the ‘contest entry’ (*ante concertationis ingressum*).⁸ Notice, that his term is almost the same as the Chanevelle’s ‘disputation entry’ (a)§49³⁸.

§55. Let me focus on the opponent site. Opponent should determine (1) the thesis (*quid sibi . . . oppositum sit*), (2) the general ‘mode of disputing’ (*disputandi modo*), i.e. either (a) the *direct* or (b) *indirect* one;⁹ (3) he should ‘discover arguments’ (*argumento-*

⁸ MARCELLIUS, *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO XIV. Praecautio in disputatione adhibenda, p. 23, “Cura sui ipsius, praeter ea, quae dicta sunt, in eo consistit, vt primum ante concertationis ingressum sancti spiritus gratiam & coelestem opem in auxilium inuocemus”

⁹ MARCELLIUS, *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO III. Via certa determinanda, p. 26, “quid sibi ab Antagonista oppositum sit, consideret, & quibus argumentis, quoue disputandi modo, euertere illud possit, directo ne an indirecto, etiam

rum inventio) (c) by the considering of mutually contrary opinions related to the issue; (d) by the mutual balancing or weighting of for-and-against arguments or principles (*fundamenta*) of this very opinions; (e) by the inspecting of places (*loci communes, loci proprii*);¹⁰ (4) the next opponent’s task is an arrangement (*dispositio*) of arguments which may be understood in two ways generally: either (f) as a logical construction (*construere*) of argumentation or (g) as a right ordering of several arguments.¹¹

§56. But [T4] the thesis determination and the determination of direct or indirect disputing mode as well as the discovery of arguments are activities belonging to a preparation phase in Marcellius too;| see points (1)(2)(3)§55⁴⁰. Indeed, this is the case since all the activities are performed by the one ‘who intends to go in the battle’ (*in pugnam iturus*).¹² The ‘arrangement of arguments’ activity (4)§55⁴⁰ is addressed in an indiscernible way by Marcellius – as far as its belonging to the preparatory phase or to the very disputation act concerns. He wanted probably to make a

atque etiam perpendat. Colliget id vel ex Thesi, quam sibi aduersarius defendendam proposuit, vel ex ipsius Antagonistae ingenio, vel ex alijs circumstantijs.”

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27, “Disputandi materia facile inuenietur, si de re illa, quae in disceptationem vocatur, contrariae inuicem opiniones considerentur. Si fundamenta eorum librentur, & in vtramque partem rationes illis innixae perpendantur. Ita namque ex mutuo quasi conflictu & comparatione, prodit se tantum id, quod ad defensionem tutissimum est; vel firmissimum ad oppugnationem. Denique si loci communes, vel etiam proprii lustretur.”

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28, “Est autem duplex generatim, quod ad hunc locum attinet, dispositio altera singulas construit argumentationes, altera verò argumenta omnia quae ad aliquid tractandum assumuntur, congruo ad persuasione ordine ac methodo disponit, illa traditur regulis dialecticis ac logicis, haec verò in eo consistit, ut firmissimum quodque argumentum primum locum occupet; . . .”

¹² MARCELLIUS, *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO III. Via certa determinanda, p. 26, “In pugnam iturus . . . quid sibi . . . oppositum sit, consideret, & quibus argumentis, quoue disputandi modo, euertere illud possit”

transition passage, because the immediately following section called ‘Response Should be Resumed’ (*Resumenda responsio*)¹³ clearly pertains to the latter already, namely to the disputation act.

§57. A proof, that the *course of argument* theme is present in Marcellius’ treatise is left. Indeed, this is not difficult to achieve, since Marcellius claims that the opponent (i) should strongly ‘stand upon’ (*insistere*) his ‘course of argumentation’ (*argumentationis cursu*);¹⁴ (ii) he ‘progresses’ (*progreditur*) in ‘proving of argument’ (*in confirmatione argumenti*);¹⁵ (iii) he can insist (*insto*) and ‘press hard’ (*urgeo*) further what he has ‘propounded before’ (*proposuerat*).¹⁶ But what the course of argument signifies in fact in Marcellius? An another Marcellius’ passage (concerning the *petitio principii* fallacy) reveals almost identity between the ‘progressing,’ the (holding of) ‘course of argumentation’ and the right demonstration of a premise which has been denied.¹⁷

¹³ MARCELLIUS, *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO VI. Resumenda responsio, p. 28.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28, “Seriò inuigilandum est disputanti, vna quidem ex parte vt argumentationis suae cursui fortiter & potenter insistat, in eoque progrediatur”

¹⁵ MARCELLIUS, *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO XIII. Constet & argumentatio, p. 49, “Nihilominus, quam, diu (sic!) in confirmatione argumenti alicuius progreditur”

¹⁶ MARCELLIUS, *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO VIII. Solutio agnoscenda, p. 29, “acquiescat argumentans Potest tamen prudenter instare & vterius vrgere id, quod proposuerat”

¹⁷ MARCELLIUS, *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO XIII. Constet & argumentatio, p. 49, “Nihilominus, quam, diu (sic!) in confirmatione argumenti alicuius progreditur, semper cogendus est vt rectum argumentationis cursum teneat, & in forma negatam propositionem inferat, propositumque eo quo par est modo demonstret.”

2.2 The Main Duty on the Respondent's Part: Distinction which should be Postponed

§58. The main objective of this passage is to show that the distinction move on the respondent part is not just an alternative to 'nego' and 'concedo' moves, as far as the *method* is concerned. I will attempt to highlight the *sequential* style passages in the final section to prove that the distinction should not be made at the beginning of disputation act. It should be postponed according to the Jesuits treatises on logic. But first, let me introduce the most elaborate descriptions of the respondent's dealing with distinction which are found in Chanevelle and Garnier.

A. HOW THE DISTINCTION IS INCORPORATED IN CHANEVELLE'S SYSTEM OF SOLUTIONS

§59. In a very general way, Chanevelle discerns (I) a *direct* solution on the one hand and (II) the *indirect* one on the other.¹⁸ However, almost at the end of the relevant section, he briefly talks about (III) an *apparent* and a 'proper to the sophists' solution, doing it as if it were an extra to his original bifurcation (I)–(II). Chanevelle might not want to call it a 'solution' at all, as it is a *solutionis species* when one is responding to an argument but 'seemingly' (*in speciem*).¹⁹

§60. (I) The direct solution deals either with (1) the form (i.e. the *figure* and *mode*) of a syllogism or (2), with the matter (i.e. *terms* or *claims*) of it. In the case (1), the solution consists in dis-

¹⁸ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 523, "X. Solutio duplex est, altera directa, altera indirecta; directa tunc fit, cum directe ad argumentum respondetur: indirecta, cum indirecte, & quasi oblique respondetur."

¹⁹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 528, "XXIII. Alia est solutionis species, quae dicitur apparens, cum in speciem ad argumentum respouderur, & sophistarum propria, . . ."

closure of a particular fault (*vitium*) in a figure or mode of the syllogism in question. The matter-directed solution (2), on the other hand, can operate either (a), in the realm of language (i.e. in its syntax and semantics pitfalls) and then it is called the ‘solution of speaking’ (*solutio dictionis*) or (b), in the realm of things, being labelled as the ‘solution of things outside the speaking’ (*solutio rei extra dictionem*). In this second case (b), division goes on to split it either into (i) the solution of a *question* (*quaestionis*) or into (ii) the solution of *proving* (*probationis*).²⁰

§61. (II) As far as the indirect solution is concerned, in fact, Chanevelle hesitates to designate it outright as a ‘solution,’ since he uses the phrase ‘indirect solution or answer’. It seems therefore that it is *solution* in a weaker sense than (I), but in a stronger one than (III). Nevertheless, this indirect solution is divided further into two kinds: (1) a ‘towards the point’ directed solution (*solutio ad rem*) and (2) one ‘towards the person’ (*solutio ad personam*).²¹ At this ramification level of (I) and (II) – although we could descend still further, it will be convenient to have a closer look at the individual types of such solutions.

²⁰ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, pp. 523–524, “XI. [Solutio] Directa vel cadit supra formam, vel supra materiam syllogismi propositi; si supra formam, vitium syllogismi detegitur modo jam explicato: si supra materiam, vel est dictionis, vel rei extra dictionem. Solutio dictionis datur, explicata vocis ambiguitate. Solutio rei est vel quaestionis, vel probationis.” *Ibid.*, p. 265, “VI. In forma duo sunt, figura, & modus . . .” *Ibid.*, p. 266, “syllogismus immediate componitur ex propositionibus, mediate ex terminis, sicut in propositiones immediate, in terminos vero mediate resolvitur: ergo materia remota syllogismi sunt termini, proxima propositiones.” *Ibid.*, p. 522, “V. Argumentum, quod proponitur, laborat vitio vel formae, vel materiae; si primum, datis majore, & minore, negatur consequentia, & detegitur vitium formae: . . .”

²¹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 526, “XV. Solutio, seu responsio indirecta sit vel ad rem, vel ad personam.”

B. SOLUTION OF INTRINSICAL PROOF BY DISTINCTION

§62. The most important type of solution of *proof* (ii) is the solution of ‘intrinsic proof’ by a distinction. However, it is convenient to first discern the term ‘distinction’ itself, since it can have at least three different meanings, all of which are in operation in this type of solution. In the first case, using the same term ‘distinction,’ authors bear in mind a process of a *proposition*, meaning distinguishing, while in the second, similarly, a *term* meaning a distinguishing process, yet in the third case, by ‘distinction,’ they think of a well established pair of (scholastic) terms (e.g. *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*) each of which can be found, along with its explanation, in a sort of dictionary.

§63. There are two main phases of solution by the distinguishing of a proposition. The first (1) is the indispensable one. It consists in (a) separating of the equivocal term or its relevant part from the other syllogism matter (as it helps to distinguish it more clearly) and (b), in ‘attaching’ (*applicanda*) of a relevant distinction’s parts to it. Within ^(b)§, the respondent should deny or accept the infected proposition term according to (i) two parts of distinction. But sometimes there are (ii) more than two distinction parts, in the case of which an attaching step ^(b)§ along with acceptance and denying of the proposition in question must be multiplied (i.e. *subdistinguere*).²² Garnier’s example follows, where an opponent attempts to prove that logic is science (*scientia*) by the syllogism.

²² CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 525, “5. cujuslibet distinctionis duae sunt saltem partes, juxta quarum vnam propositio admittitur, juxta alteram repudiatur, sed terminus, in quem cadit distinctio, ab aliis discernendus est, eique applicanda distinctionis membra. 6. Vnius partis aliquando duae sunt, aliquando plures sunt partes, quae cum afferuntur, propositio subdistingui debet.” GARNIER, *op. cit.*, p. 245, “II. Terminus qui distinguitur, discernatur ab aliis, eique applicentur distinctionis membra, ut clarior fiat distinctio.”

All cognition of truth, born through
a cause, is science.

Logic is cognition of truth through
a cause.

(S1) —————
Logic is science.

§64. Then, the respondent is making a distinction of major premise in this way: ‘All cognition of truth, if it is *speculativa*, I concede [the major premise], but if it is *operativa*, I deny [the major premise].’ Keeping the quantity with it, we can see ^(a)§ separating just a main body of the middle term ‘cognition of truth’ from the rest and ^(b)§ the attachment of parts of distinction (i.e. *speculativa* and *operativa*) while the premise is conceded or denied according to them.²³ If the very distinction is a simple (*faciles*) or common (*vulgaris*) one (but Garnier’s example is not this case), no other phase is needed.

§65. On the other hand, (2) a complementary phase called ‘explication’ (*explicatio*) is to be added to (1) if the distinction bears a difficult or more comprehensive (*subtilior*) account along.²⁴ Explication consists of four steps. (a) The term being affected by a distinction is divided into two members. But as far as possible, such a division is to be gathered from the very examination (*ex ipsa notione*) of the term and, therefore, the latter should be defined ahead. Garnier provides us with the following example of this particular step. It had been dealing with a proposition ‘every human voice signifies by convention.’ Then a distinction was

²³ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, p. 246, “VII. Si quis ita probare conetur Logicam esse scientiam, *Omnis cognitio veritatis parta per causam est scientia, Logica est cognitio veritatis per causam: ergo Logica est scientia.* distinguetur major fic, *omnis cognitio veritatis, si speculativa sit, concedo, si operativa, nego: . . .*”

²⁴ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 525, “XIII. Distinctio data habet explicatus vel faciles, vel difficiles; si primum, explicatione non indiget; si secundum, tum explicanda.” GARNIER, *op. cit.*, p. 245, “V. Si distinctio sit vulgaris, non eget explicatione; si subtilior, eget. conducit autem exercere se in ejusmodi explicationibus, alioquin vitiose fiunt.”

made: ‘of human as far as he is an animal – I deny [the proposition], of human qua rational – I concede [the proposition].’ Now, (a) the definition and division follow: ‘human being is a rational animal and therefore it can be examined in two ways - as an animal or as a partaker of reason’²⁵

§66. Then (b), definitions of either of thus divided members must be brought forward insofar as these are definitions of the things (*definitiones quae ad rem faciunt, & quatenus ad rem faciunt*). Unlike Chanevelle, Garnier complains instead that ‘nothing but examinations or expositions of words are often used’.²⁶ Next, on the contrary to the attaching step in (1), it is stressed (c) to attach the definitions, not the words (*voces*) of distinction (not ‘speculativa’ and ‘operativa’ of the example above) back to the matter in dispute (in which point the careless respondents often fail, Garnier says).²⁷ As at least one affirmative and one negative proposition is being made in (c), it is important (d) to finally prove (*probare*) this very attaching. This can be done by bringing

²⁵ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, p. 246, “VIII. Queantum fieri potest, peti debet divisio ex ipsa notione termini, quare definiri debet antequam dividatur. Ut si agatur de hac propositione, *omnis vox hominis significat ex instituto*, quae ita distinguatur, *hominis quatenus animal est*, nego. *hominis, qua rationalis est*, concedo. sic erit instituenda explicatio, *homo est animal rationale, potest igitur spectari duorum modis, ut animal, ut rationis particeps, &c.*”

²⁶ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, pp. 525, “XIV. In explicanda solutione, servandi hi canones, 1. terminus, quem distinctio afficit, in dua membra dividatur, ita ut divisio petatur ex notione termini, 2. vbi membra divisa sunt, vtriusque definitiones afferantur, quae ad rem faciunt.” GARNIER, *op. cit.*, p. 247, “IX. Definitiones eae proferri debent, quae ad rem faciunt, & quatenus ad rem faciunt; imo saepe solae notiones, aut explicationes vocum adhibentur.”

²⁷ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, p. 247, “X. Applicandae sunt definitiones, non autem voces definitae, in quo saepe peccatur ab incuriosis.” CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, pp. 525–526, “3. definitiones, non voces definitae materiae, de qua contentio est, applicentur.”

forward reasons (*rationum momentis*) as well as some famous texts upon which respondent's thesis hinges.²⁸

§67. As the distinction in the original Garnier's example, see §64⁴⁶, is not a simple or common one, this example goes further to illustrate the complementary explication phase (2). 'The truth is either *speculativa* or *operativa*,' says respondent, making the (a) division of a term but without the 'truth' having been first defined. To define (b) the two parts of term division, respondent claims further: 'The *speculativa* truth is that which can not produce its own subject; but the *operativa* is such that it is the source of this very producing.' To attach (c) the definitions back to the matter, he claims: 'Cognition of truth, which can not produce its own subject, is science, if it is held by necessary syllogism; not likewise the cognition of truth which is producing its subject.' Finally, the previous step is proved (d): 'because science should be *speculativa* in order to be distinguished from art'²⁹

§68. This distinction mostly affects just two propositions of an opponent's proof. When either the major or minor term is ambiguous, both the relevant premise and conclusion must be distinguished. Detecting an ambiguous middle on the other hand,

²⁸ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246, "VI. Explicationis praecepta continentur hoc versiculo non valde bono. *Dividito, Definito, Applicato, Probato*. id est, terminus distinguendus dividatur primum in 2. membra; tum singula divisionis membra definiantur; postea membrorum definitiones applicentur ad rem de qua agitur; denique applicatio definitionum probetur." CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 526, "4. applicatio definitionum probetur, prolatis tum rationum momentis, tum autoritatibus illustrioribus, quibus thesis nititur."

²⁹ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, p. 246, "explicabiturque distinctio hoc pacto: *Veritas alia speculativa est, alia operativa*. ecce divisionem termini. *Speculativa est, quae non potest producere suum objectum: operativa, quae ipsius producendi est principium*. ecce definitionem membrorum. *Cognitio veritatis, quae non potest producere suum objectum, est scientia, si syllogismo necessario habeatur; non item cognitio veritatis, quae productiva est sui objecti*. ecce applicationem definitionum. *Nam scientia esse speculativa debet, ut distinguatur ab arte &c.* ecce probationem."

the respondent is to distinguish both premises. In the less common case, when both of the extremes are ambiguous simultaneously, all three propositions of the proof should be distinguished.³⁰

C. DISTINCTION SHOULD BE POSTPONED

§69. At least [T5] four authors suggest or literally claim that distinction should not be used right at the beginning (*initio*) or, not under certain conditions. | These are (1) Alfonso, (2) Marcellius, (3) Chanevelle, and (4) Freytag. But before I proceed to the three main authors, let me mention an interesting observation concerning (1) Alfonso. His disputation passage is heavily depended on a hundred years older work by Toledo. But here, as far as the first move after the opponents' propounding is concerned, Alfonso clearly differs from his source. Whereas Toledo allows either denying or a *responsio* in this phase,³¹ Alfonso suppose only the 'nego' move here.³² (2) Marcellius, when

³⁰ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 525, "7. distinctio nonnunquam duas propositiones, nonnunquam tres afficit. Ratio est, quia aliquando majus, & minus extremum ambigua sunt, aliquando majus extremum tantum, aliquando minus extremum tantum, aliquando medius terminus. Cum majus, & minus extremum ambigua sunt, omnes propositiones distinguendae, sed rarius id contingit, cum majus extremum duntaxat ambiguum, major cum conclusione distinguenda; cum minus extremum, minor, & conclusio; cum medium, maior, & minor."

³¹ TOLETUS, F. *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis*. p. 25, "Argumentans maxime observet, vt suam argumentationem integram proponat aduersus id, quod proponitur a Respondente defendendum, semper praemittens, sic argumentor, sic contendo, vel simile, quam postquam semel proposuerit, sinat Respondentem suas partes agere, nec interrumpat illum, donec aliquid negetur, vel respondeatur."

³² ALPHONSUS, F., *op. cit.*, p. 74, "Denique, integro argumento proposito, sileat & attendat respondentem, donec aliquid ille negauerit, & deinde alio argumento conetur illud probare; & postea sinat respondere; & sic se geret vsque ad finem disputationis."

he finishes a passage concerning respondent's distinction making, finally adds:

§70. “Moreover, there should not always be applied a distinction right at the beginning, so as not to be the course of argument cut through except necessity, but let he [i.e. respondent] make a delay of it rightly, until its opportunity will shine forth from the course of argument, especially, if a disputation takes place with a man of worth and erudition, whom it is uncivil to intrude upon with unnecessary declarations and distinctions of terms.³³

§71. (3) Similarly, a clear and important passage is to be found in Chanevelle. He prescribes two rules for a respondent concerning the ‘beginning of contest’ (*initium concertationis*). Obviously, respondent should first repeat the opponent's argument.³⁴ But then, Chanevelle admonishes him: ‘2. let him allow the argument to hold its course, and let he not distinguish right at the beginning, but let him deny those things which should be denied, admit those which should be admitted, until he find an opportune space for his distinction.’³⁵

§72. (4) Finally, Freytag distinguishes four precepts for the respondent, the last of which concerns the ‘rite’ (*ritus*) this paradigmatic person should observe. Almost at the end of the pre-

³³ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO X. Consequens distinguendum, & distinguendi modus, p. 46, “Ceterum non semper initio statim adhibenda distinctio est, ne argumenti cursus absque necessitate intercidatur, sed recte illius fit dilatio, donec ex cursu argumenti opportunitas eius elucescat, praesertim si disputatio fit cum viro graui & erudito, cui non necessarias terminorum declarationes aut distinctiones obtrudere est inciuiile.”

³⁴ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis respondentis, p. 522, “IV. Circa initium concertationis duo sunt canones, 1. vbi argumentum ab opponente informatum est, fideliter repetat”

³⁵ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis respondentis, p. 522, “IV. Circa initium concertationis duo sunt canones 2. sinat argumentum cursum obtinere suum, nec statim ab initio distinguat, sed neget, quae neganda sunt, concedat, quae concedenda, donec opportunum distinctioni suae locum nactus sit.”

cept-part in question and at the end of the whole disputation method passage at once, Freytag says: ‘And though it would be not expedient to distinguish right after the beginning, yet let it be perhaps bewared to delay distinction overmuch, that it could not be easily given afterwards. If the arguer advances clearly and in good form, let him [i.e. respondent] not disturb the latter in no-wise’³⁶

³⁶ FREYTAG, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–191, “Quod si tamen cardo argumenti in ea minime versetur, transire permittat, dicendo: *transeat V.G. major*. Alias neget aut distinguat. Et licet non expediat sub initium statim distinguere, cavendum tamen etiam est, ne forte distinctionem nimium differat, ut postea dari commode non possit. Quod si argumentans clare progrediatur, et in bona forma, ipse eam nullatenus turbet”

3 The *Asking-answering* Paradigmatic Method in Works by Jesuits

3.1 General Themes of the *Asking-answering* Paradigmatic Method Found in Jesuits

A. THE 'CLASSICAL' DISTINCTION IS MENTIONED IN JESUIT TREATISES

§73. Of the researched Jesuit sources, four tracts clearly reflect the difference between ancient method of disputing and those practised in their days. Besides Marcellius, Garnier and Chanevelle, who are addressed immediately after, the first and most prominent place is due to Fonseca. He writes as follows:

§74. "As we have said, there are two ways or forms of contending with other person. The one, if we invade the adversary without any question, having confidence in our assumptions: this [form] is as more serious and stricter as less ensured too. The other, if we draw forth the argumentation material from the other's answer: this form is more benignant and looser as well as much more ensured. But this second one, which was the only formula of disputing used by the ancients (as is seen in Plato and Aristotle), is rarely heard today, while the first resounds incessantly in all the classrooms."¹

¹ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 616, "Duae sunt igitur, ut diximus, confligendi cum altero rationes ac formae. Altera cum nostris sumptionibus confisi adversarium sine ulla interrogatione invadimus: quae ut gravior est, et constantior, sic etiam minus tuta. Altera, cum ex responsione alterius elicimus argumentationis materiam: quae ratio et communior est, magisque vulgaris, ac multo etiam tutior. Sed haec posterior, quae apud veteres sola fere habebatur disputandi formula, ut apud Platonem, et Aristotelem cernere est, hodie raro auditur, priorem scholis omnibus assidue resonantibus."

§75. The two ‘ways’ (*ratio*) or ‘forms’ (*forma*) of conflict are quite clearly distinguished in Fonseca. But still, this quotation needs two minor notices; (1) Fonseca does not mention a ‘syllogism’ to be made from ‘assumptions’ (*sumptio*) but simply ‘argumentation’ (*argumentatio*). He does not use that word at all in the entire passage on disputation.² (2) The correct translation of either of the forms characteristics is a tricky problem. In Latin, besides the ‘higher ensuring’ (*multo tutior*) advantage, the ancient way of disputing is evaluated by Fonseca as a more *communis* and *vulgaris* one. Both of those words can mean simply ‘common’ or ‘usual.’ But how might this be the case, if that ancient form is ‘rarely’ (*raro*) heard today?³ I translate these terms as ‘benignant’ (*communis*) and ‘looser’ (*magis vulgaris*). Then, it stands in opposition to both the ‘more serious’ (*gravior*)⁴ and ‘stricter’ (*constantior*), which are the characteristics of the ‘modern’ disputing form. The point is probably that the old way *was* looser and more benignant, as it was not bound by the syllogistic rules. But in fact, the same makes those two characteristics unfavourable in the end, compared to the strictness and seriousness of the modern form; cf. (ii)§84⁶⁰ where Marcellius’ use of this attribute is shown.

§76. A hundred years after Fonseca’s work, the same distinction appears in Garnier, Marcellius and Chanevelle. Nonethe-

² Felipe does not seem to be aware of that. Cf. FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, pp. 38–39.

³ Felipe too seems to be aware of this difficulty, since he translates both of these terms with a not wholly precise ‘more basic.’ Cf. FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁴ Felipe reads it as ‘more burdensome.’ Cf. FELIPE, D. L. Ways of disputing and principia in 17th century German disputation handbooks. *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

less, those Jesuits make several important omissions, shifts and additions. Contrary to Fonseca, Garnier (a) reveals that the objecting takes place by a ‘long series of syllogisms’ (*longa syllogismorum serie*) in his days (*nunc*). (b) He omits Fonseca’s general characterisations of both forms (such as ‘serious,’ ‘strict,’ ‘ensured,’ etc.). Marcellius saves only the ‘more ensuring’ attribute for the old form.⁵ Instead, Garnier adds an interesting evaluation saying that (i) the ‘old’ (*vetus*) custom fits better for the ‘contest of doctors’ (*ad concertationem doctorum*) whereas (ii) the present one (*hodierna*) for the ‘Jesuit students exercising’ (*ad Scholasticorum exercitationem*).⁶ Let me notice that a first glimpse of the link between the ‘old’ way and the ‘Learned’ or ‘Wises’ (*Doctos*) is already seen in Tanner.⁷ On the other hand, Garnier reminds with Aristotle that (iii) the ancient form is open (*opportuna*) to the arts of sophists, unless one beware carefully.⁸

§77. Chanevelle similarly distinguishes the old method of asking and answering in comparison with the modern ‘series of syl-

⁵ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO XIV. Interrogatio a remoto, p. 35, “Haec ratio congregiendi cum altero, per . . . interrogationes ex remoto petitas, longi tutior est ac illa, qua nostris sumptionibus confisi directe inuadimus adversarium. . . . Solaque apud veteres fere in vsu erat, vt ex monumentis Platonis & Aristotelis licet colligere. Exemplum illius habes lib. I. posteriorum cap. I. Textu 3. 4. 5. & alibi passim.”

⁶ GARNIER, J. *Organi Philosophiae rudimenta, seu compendium logicae Aristotelicae*. Lutetiae Parisiorum, Typis Edmundi Martini 1677, p. 229, “VII. Forma olim alia fuit, quam nunc vigeat in Scholis, veteres interrogatiunculis magis quam longa, ut nunc fit, syllogismorum serie oppugnabant: unde apud Aristotelem, qui nunc argumentans dicitur, appellatur interrogans; vetus consuetudo aptior est ad concertationem doctorum, hodierna ad Scholasticorum exercitationem.”

⁷ TANNER, A., *op. cit.*, p. 89, “vt breuiter interrogando potius, qui modus disputandi etiam inter Doctos olim vsitatus erat”

⁸ GARNIER, J. *Organi Philosophiae rudimenta, seu compendium logicae Aristotelicae*. Lutetiae Parisiorum, Typis Edmundi Martini 1677, p. 229, “VIII. Antiqua forma, nisi caveatur diligenter, opportuna est artibus sophistarum, ut monet Aristoteles 3. lib. Top. cap. 3.”

logisms’ proposing and solving.⁹ But more importantly, he explains or justifies Garnier’s claims (i) and (ii); see §76⁵³. (i) The ancient questioning form is more suitable for the ‘contest of doctors’ since when using the ‘manifest syllogisms’ (*sylogismis apertis*), though fair (*justum*) it can be, it is not ‘good looking’ (*decorum*) – as Aristotle says in *Topics*.¹⁰ (ii) On the other hand, the present ‘syllogistic’ form is more ‘useful for the exercising of students’ (*ad exercitationem discipulum vtilior*) on account of three reasons. With that, it is better taken care of (1) respondent’s weakness (*imbecillitas*) because he can perceive objection of opponent much more easily if bound in a syllogism; (2) conciseness (*brevitas*); and (3) profit (*profectus*) and attention (*attentio*) of the less trained listeners who can follow the objective (*scopum*) of a disputation more conveniently if the subject matter is moved (*agito*) by syllogisms.¹¹

B. DID JESUITS APPLY THE *ASKING-ANSWERING* PARADIGMATIC METHOD?

§78. Of course, the main issue is not a problem of awareness of the Society as to the historical questioning method. I inquire, (a)

⁹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, *Natura disputationis explicatur*, p. 514, “Apud veteres, vna potissimum interrogatione, & responsione continebatur, nunc syllogismorum, qui ab argumentante proponuntur, & a respondente solvuntur, serie”

¹⁰ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, *Natura disputationis explicatur*, p. 514, “vetus consuetudo aptior ad doctorum concertationem, vnde Aristoteles opponentem in *Topicis* passim interrogantem nuncupat, & libro 8. ait, *sylogismis apertis vti quidem justum esse, sed non decorum*”

¹¹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, *Natura disputationis explicatur*, p. 514, “sed quae nunc viget in scholis, ad exercitationem discipulum vtilior: quia sic melius consulitur, 1. imbecillitati respondentis, qui id quod ab opponente proponitur, facilius multo percipit, cum syllogismo illigatur: 2. brevitati, 3. auditorum minus exercitatorum profectui, juxta & attentioni, qui, dum res syllogismis agitur, scopum disputationis commodius assequuntur.”

whether or not the Jesuits actually used the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method or at least, whether they address it as allowed or used in their treatises. If so, (b) on what conditions can or should it be applied? To answer briefly (a), yes, they did. [T6] Of the nine surveyed Jesuit treatises, seven texts address the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method as the allowed or used one. | Whereas Alfonso and Heimbach contain only a brief witness to an actual application of this paradigmatic method¹² and Tanner provides important yet minor notice on it,¹³ Fonseca, Garnier, Marcellius and Chanevelle grant the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method larger passages – as we will see later on.

§79. As we saw in §74⁵² above, Fonseca claims that the old way of disputing is ‘rarely heard today.’¹⁴ But in fact, to what extent was it unusual in his time according to Fonseca’s own testimony? It seems that Fonseca’s readers-respondents could indeed be attacked (*aggredio*) by questions (*interrogationibus*), in which case they should hold a convenient rite or way of answering. Fonseca states as a matter of fact that such a rite, which he describes in detail, is ‘solely applied’ (*sola usurpatur*), ‘if at any place’ (*sicubi*) the disputation is performed (*transigo*) via questioning and responding.¹⁵ A hundred years later, Chanevelle suggests it was not

¹² ALPHONSUS, F., *op. cit.*, p. 76, “Denique, si inter argumentandum, de aliquo rogatus fuerit respondens, dicat, *interrogat me ingeniosus discipulus, vel, sapientissimus Magister, seu Doctor: an, &c. & respondeo, &c.*” HEIMBACH, M., *op. cit.*, p. 282, “Cum autem extra formam argumenti interrogatur, interrogationem repetat: dicendo *Quaerit, ergo an &c. Respondeo negative vel affirmative.*”

¹³ TANNER, A., *op. cit.*, p. 89.

¹⁴ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 616, “Sed haec posterior, quae apud veteres sola fere habebatur disputandi formula . . . hodie raro auditur”

¹⁵ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 622, “Si vero ille interrogationibus te aggrediatur, et si veteres statim sine ulla

‘every time or always’ that an opponent asked questions to obtain material for argumentation.¹⁶

C. GENERAL CONDITIONS TO APPLY *ASKING-ANSWERING* PARADIGMATIC METHOD

§80. It remains to be answered ^(b)§78⁵⁵, i.e. on what conditions the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method should be applied. [T7] In general, the proper domain of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method is a *materia probabilis*, where respondent is not wholly forced to either part of an issue. | This idea is to be found in (1) Fonseca and (2) Marcellius. According to (1) Fonseca, it is not possible to use *probabilis* material in a disputation. He even suggests that ‘disputations’ in themselves are defined by a *probabilis* material as the particular (*proprius*) subject matter. Therefore, the respondent is not ‘wholly forced’ (*omnino cogit*) to a position and therefore, it is convenient to ask him an approval of those means which can finally weaken his position.¹⁷ (2) Marcellius underlines twice and close together that the *probabilis* material is the proper domain to use the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method. Similarly to Fonseca, he clarifies it with the impossibility of compelling a respondent to either part of an issue. But in addition, Marcellius uses an important term, since he calls the matter ‘commendable on both sides’ (*vtrimque prob-*

repetitione respondebant . . . tutius tamen est . . . repetere prius interrogationem hoc modo Quae respondendi ratio, sicubi hoc tempore disputatio interrogando, et respondendo transigitur, sola usurpatur.”

¹⁶ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 519, “XI. Hi praeterea canones servandi ab Opponente, 1. interdum postulet, & interroget, vt ex datis responsis, argumentari possit”

¹⁷ FONSECA, P. Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. *Op. cit.*, p. 614, “Sed quoniam propria disputationum materia probabilis est, nec adversarium omnino cogit . . . roganda sunt ea a respondente, ex quibus assertio adversarii infirmari possit.”

abili) as the *materia dubia*.¹⁸ Whereas in Latin generally, the proper meaning of the term *probabilis* is just ‘commendable’ (which may better echo the Aristotelian ἐνδοξόν as well – the commendable proposition or premise), in the mid seventeenth century, Marcellius clearly evaluates that material as ‘doubtful’ or ‘uncertain’ (*dubius*).

§81. A more determined condition can be found in Tanner. Regularly, an opponent should confine (*concludo*) his argument (*argumentum*) by ‘a dialectical mode of arguing’ (*modo aliquo argumentandi dialectico*) and certainly not to make any declamation. But if an agreement (*conuentum*) is reached between parties on this, disputation can be performed (*transigo*) by the mode of asking (*interrogando*) briefly rather than arguing (*argumentando*).¹⁹ Three notes are to be taken here: (1) One should be always mindful of Tanner’s treatise context, which is an actual public religious colloquy, not a school disputation; see §41³² and on. (2) On the other hand, he strongly insists that these ‘rules of right disputing are learned and taught’ (*regulae rectè disputandi, & discuntur, & docentur*) at all the ‘very distinguished’ (*celeberrimis*) Academies ‘of the whole world’ (*totius orbis Academiis*); see §41³³. (3) Despite of the lexical similarity with Fonseca (a disputation *transigitur*; see §79⁵⁶), Tanner suggests that the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method, if used within a disputation, expels or

¹⁸ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO XIV. Interrogatio a remoto, p. 35, “Simili cautela in probabili materia, in qua neutram in partem determinate compelli potest aduersarius, adhiberi solet interrogatio. . . . Haec ratio congregiendi cum altero, per . . . interrogationes ex remoto petitas, longi tutior est ac illa, qua nostris sumptionibus confisi directe inuadimus aduersarium; praesertim in materia dubia ac vtrimque probabili.”

¹⁹ TANNER, A., *op. cit.*, p. 89, “Secundum, vt suum argumentum modo aliquo argumentandi dialectico concludat (nisi forte inter partes conuentum sit, vt breuiter interrogando potius . . . quam argumentando, disputatio transigatur) & non vt in cathedra concionator, in foro causidicus, declamet.”

predominates the *Objection-solving* method. To sum up, [T8] Tanner allows the use of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method on the condition that the parties reach such an agreement. Then, it may even predominate the *Objection-solving* one. |

§82. The most specific condition of when the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method should be applied in a disputation is found in Marcellius. He recommends that the opponent choose either the *direct* or *indirect* way or mode of disputing in advance; cf. (a)(b)§55⁴⁰, [T4]§56⁴¹. Interestingly, the (1) direct mode wholly excludes the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method (*sine vlla interrogatione*).²⁰ On the contrary (2), as one of its particular techniques, *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method is associated with the *indirect* mode. In this mode, the respondent is always brought (*deducitur*) to something inconvenient (*inconueniens*) and therefore to recant a previous point.²¹

§83. Certainly, to understand the conditions, to which the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method should be applied from Marcellius on, requires researching the conditions either of those *modes* are to be used upon. Two things should be considered, according to Marcellius. If (a) the issue (*id, quod in quaestionem vocatur*) is of such a quality (*tale sit*) that it ‘can be easily attacked’ (*facile oppugnari possit*) and (b) the respondent is among the weak (*imbecilus*), then the opponent can apply the direct and demon-

²⁰ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO II. Duplex probationis via, p. 25, “Directe suum probabit institutum, si sine vlla interrogatione . . . adoriatur adversarium”

²¹ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO II. Duplex probationis via, pp. 25–26, “Indirecte, & ex hypothesi res aliqua probatur cum digressionem aliqua, vel interrogatione . . . deducitur aduersarios ad aliquod inconueniens, quod ille, dum admittere omnino recusat, cogitur retractate id, quod imprudenter ante dederat, vel absurde posuerit.”

strative way (*via ostensiva, syllogismo Apodictico*).²² But if that is (c) not the case (*aliter res habeat*), the opponent is allowed to use another mode of attack;²³ questioning for example, as a particular technique of the indirect mode.²⁴ Finally, in the arguments series itself, ‘why not proceed from one [mode] to the other?’ Marcellius asks.²⁵

§84. Notice (i), the direct or demonstrative way is suitable for a weak respondent. But Chanevelle also prefers the syllogistic form because of the very same respondent quality, cf. (1)§77⁵⁴, whereas the questioning form is said to be suitable for the ‘contest of doctors;’ see (i)§77⁵⁴. (ii) Marcellius identifies the (1) the direct or demonstrative mode with Fonseca’s modern disputing form itself, since he characterizes it in the very same manner as more serious (*gravior*) and stricter (*constantior*) as well as less ensured (*tuta*);²⁶ cf. from §74⁵² on. On the other hand, (2) the techniques of the *indirect* way are suggested to be – without any further at-

²² MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO III. Via certa determinanda, p. 26, “Nam si id, quod in quaestionem vocatur tale sit, vt facile oppugnari possit; vel Aduersarius sit imbecilus &c. poterit directa & ostensiu argumentandi via eum inuadere” *Ibid.* DISTINCTIO II. Duplex probationis via, p. 25, “Directe suum probabit institutum, si . . . conclusionem ipsius thesibus immediate contrariam inferat syllogismo Apodictico sive ostensiuo”

²³ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO III. Via certa determinanda, p. 26, “Sin autem aliter res habeat, licebit subinde iuxta illa, quae inferius dicenda sunt ob liquare sinus, & alium impugnationis modum, tutiorem inuestigare”

²⁴ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO II. Duplex probationis via, pp. 25–26, “Indirecte, & ex hypothesi res aliqua probatur cum digressionem aliqua, vel interrogatione . . . deducitur aduersarios ad aliquod inconueniens Hoc autem varijs fit modis, vt patebit ex sequentibus.”

²⁵ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO III. Via certa determinanda, p. 26, “licebit . . . alium . . . modum, tutiorem inuestigare, quin imo ab vno ad alterum, in ipsa argumentorum serie procedere.”

²⁶ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO III. Via certa determinanda, p. 26, “poterit directa & ostensiu argumentandi via eum inuadere, quae vti grauior & constantior est, sic etiam minus tuta”

tributes – ‘ensured more.’²⁷ This is the case too for the questioning, specifically; see (b)§76⁵³.

§85. It seems that Marcellius attempts to interpret Fonseca in this instance (ii). His endeavour can be confirmed further, since Fonseca as well distinguishes between two *modes* of a respondent’s assertion (*assertio*) refuting (*infirmo, evertio*). It is namely, between (1) the *direct* and (2) the *ex hypothesi*, by which the respondent is mostly deduced into something inconvenient (*ad incommodum*). But it is worth emphasizing that the genus of FONSECA’s ‘modes’ is just *argumentatio*,²⁸ whereas the ‘form’ or ‘way’ belong to the *disputatio* or ‘contending’ (*confligo*).²⁹ From the formal point of view, an example Fonseca gives for the (1) is a standard *categorical* syllogism, whereas for the *ex hypothesi* case (2), the same matter is shaped in the *hypothetical* one, in the *modus tolendo tolens*.³⁰ But although there are some appearances of

²⁷ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO III. Via certa determinanda, p. 26, “Sin autem aliter res habeat, licebit subinde . . . alium impugnationis modum, tutiorem inuestigare”

²⁸ FONSECA, P. Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. *Op. cit.*, p. 614, “Argumentantis officium fere in his observandis positum est. . . . Deinde vero assumet eam argumentationem, qua existimat infirmari posse propositam assertionem. Uno autem e duobus modis conabitur eam evertere: directo videlicet, aut ex hypothesi, quod potissimum fit deductione ad incommodum.”

²⁹ FONSECA, P. Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. *Op. cit.*, p. 622, “Quae respondendi ratio, sicubi hoc tempore disputatio interrogando, et respondendo transigitur” ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 616, “Duae sunt igitur, ut diximus, confligendi cum altero rationes ac formae.”

³⁰ FONSECA, P. Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. *Op. cit.*, p. 614, “Directo, ut si Epicureus aliquis asserat, omnem voluptatem esse bonam, tu autem contra sic argumenteris, Nihil quod rationi adversatur bonum est, aliqua voluptas rationi adversatur, aliqua igitur voluptas bonum non est. Deductione vero ad incommodum, ut si eandem assertionem sic refellas, Si omnis voluptas bona esset, ea sane, quae ex homicidio capitur bona esset: at haec, ut apertissimum est, non est bona, quin potius perniciosissima: non est igitur omnis voluptas bona.”

that, Fonseca does not bind the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method or the ancient disputing form specifically to either of these *modes* of argumentation.

§86. To sum up, [T9] according to Marcellius, the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method is excluded from the *direct*, i.e. the demonstrative syllogism mode, but is associated with the *indirect*, where a respondent is brought to something inconvenient;| cf. ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾§82⁵⁹. According to Marcellius [T10] therefore, the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method can be applied in case the respondent is powerful or the issue is difficult to attack;| cf. (a)–(c)§83⁵⁹.

3.2 How The *Asking-answering* Paradigmatic Method Was Incorporated in the Jesuit Disputation Method

§87. I inquire, how the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method worked together with or was incorporated in the Jesuit disputation method. And first comes the issue of the proper disputation phase in which the questioning should take place. Then, I will deal with the most inner manner of questioning itself.

A. WHAT IS THE PROPER DISPUTATION PHASE THE *ASKING-ANSWERING* PARADIGMATIC METHOD SHOULD BE USED IN?

§88. From the disputation method point of view, two approaches basically appear in my sources. First, [T11] chiefly Fonseca, but also Marcellius and, to a certain degree, Heimbach witness that the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method can be used independently on the ‘course of argumentation’ phase.| Therefore whenever it is advantageous, even before the very first argument on the opponent’s part. Second, [T12] explicitly Chanevelle, but indirectly also Garnier and Alfonso testify, that

the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method should be applied within the course of argumentations. | One more observation is going to be clear from the following lines. [T13] Jesuit authors who prescribe or allow use of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method still understand the paradigmatic method of *Objection-solving* as an essential disputation frame. | Let me begin with Heimbach, since he deserves but brief notice. Heimbach generally claims that the *Asking-answering* takes place ‘beside the argument form’ (*extra formam argumenti interrogatur*).³¹ Here, the *form* of argument signifies the same as the *progress* or *course* of argumentation or disputation;³² see §57⁴² for this term in Marcellius. One is left with the impression that questioning is something like an ‘optional parallel activity’ next to argumentation *in forma*, which an opponent can recourse to if needed.

§89. Two places count to our issue in Fonseca. The first passage follows after the distinction is made ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾§85⁶¹ between the *direct* and the *ex hypothesi* mode of argumentation. But, Fonseca continues, because of the *materia probabilis* is proper for a disputation, an opponent should ask ‘generally *always*, before the argumentation is built up’ (*fere semper antequam extruatur argumentatio*).³³ The second place is to be found in the passage concerning respondent duties.³⁴ This passage is interesting in itself, be-

³¹ HEIMBACH, M., *op. cit.*, p. 182, “Cum autem extra formam argumenti interrogatur, interrogationem repetat: dicendo *Quaerit, ergo an &c. Respondeo negative vel affirmative.*”

³² HEIMBACH, M., *op. cit.*, p. 181, “*Secunda est, ut argumentum proponat bene mediatum, & in media ordinata digestum, ut semper procedat in forma, & pro conclusione inferat propositionem negatam.*”

³³ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 614, “Sed quoniam propria disputationum materia probabilis est, nec adversarium omnino cogit, fere semper antequam extruatur argumentatio, roganda sunt ea a respondente, ex quibus assertio adversarii infirmari possit.”

³⁴ FONSECA, P., *op. cit.*, p. 618.

cause it contains two different *styles* separately. The first half is dominantly *nomothetic* and covers seven general rules. The second, which is labelled as the eighth rule, is *sequential*. ‘When therefore a respondent’s assertion or theme as well as his position is propounded,’ Fonseca says and continues that the whole argumentation repeating should be done by the respondent, if the opponent has propounded his whole argumentation ‘with no questions.’³⁵ In the same eighth rule, Fonseca admonishes that it is more ensured (*tutior*) to repeat the question as well, if, on the other hand (*si vero*), the opponent attacks by interrogation.³⁶

§90. As it follows from Marcellius’ first passage, the questioning takes place *before* the material asked is used in a ‘series of arguments’ (*argumentorum serie*).³⁷ But also *within* the series of arguments an opponent can proceed from the one mode to another, which implies the application of *Asking-answering*; cf. §83⁵⁹. The ‘series of argumentations’ or arguments appears the same as the ‘disputation course,’ i.e. a chain of arguments, where the conclusion of an actual argument is a denied premise of the previous one; cf. §57⁴². Marcellius himself suggests this.³⁸ A next

³⁵ FONSECA, P., *op. cit.*, p. 620, “Proposita igitur assertione themateve, sive positione respondentis, si is, qui contra argumentatur, nullis interrogationibus pramissis totam statim argumentationem proposuerit, tota semel mox repetenda est”

³⁶ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 622, “Si vero ille interrogationibus te aggrediatur . . . tutius tamen est, ad veritatemque eruendam accommodatius repetere prius interrogationem hoc modo”

³⁷ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO XIV. Interrogatio a remoto, p. 35, “adhiberi solet interrogatio, quae petitur a respondente: quid sentiat de enuntiatione quapiam, quam certator in argumentorum serie adhibere cogitat.”

³⁸ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO X. Digressio ad interiora & vniuersaliora, p. 31, “Dirigi quoque potest disputationis cursus ad altiora materiae subiectae principia . . . vel eo argumentationis seriem adducat quod

relevant passage can be clearly read in the effect that the opponent asks at the beginning of disputation. By whichever mode (*via*) cf. §82⁵⁹ opponent enters (*ingrediatur*), respondent should always repeat (*resumo*) even (*vel*) the question (*quaestio*) at the beginning (*initio*).³⁹ Note, nearly the same word is used (*ingredior*) that Chanevelle applies for the ‘disputation entry’ (*ingressus*) phase; see (a)§49³⁸.

§91. Three authors prescribe that the *Asking-answering* should take place only after the first opponent’s syllogism, more precisely, within the course of argumentation. (I) Chanevelle does it most clearly. But (II) there are two other authors at least who, without explicitly saying it, presuppose the same manner; these are (a) Garnier and (b) Alfonso. (I) Three witnesses can be brought from within Chanevelle’s text. (i) At the very beginning of his disputation description, he says that there are these ‘duties of dialectician’ (*partes dialectici*): the attack (*aggredio*) and interrogation (*interrogo*) and the upholding (*sustineo*) and response (*respondeo*).⁴⁰ If we read the first two duties as belonging to the opponent and as written in the *sequential* style, cf. [D8]§1¹³, the *Asking-answering* comes after a previous argument. (ii) The *Asking-answering* theme is addressed several paragraphs after the ‘pro-

non incongrue fieri potest, maxime si aduersarius aliquid eorum, quae huc faciunt negauerit.”

³⁹ MARCELLIUS, H., *op. cit.*, DISTINCTIO II. Argumentorum resumptio, pp. 37–38, “Dvplex quidem probationis via est, vt dictum est tit. 31. distinctione 2. siue autem hanc, siue illam viam disputator ingrediatur, semper respondens vel quaestionem initio resumet.”

⁴⁰ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, p. 513, “Porro partes dialectici in tractando problemate sunt 1. aggredi, & interrogare; deinde sustinere, & respondere: quare hunc articulum in quatuor paragraphos distribuo. . . . Tertius leges, & officia argumentantis prosequetur. Quartus leges, & officia respondentis.”

gress of argument,’ cf. (b)_{§49}³⁸, when description begins.⁴¹ Now, it is *likely* that the *Asking-answering* belongs to this phase of disputation which excludes, cf. (E)_{§53}⁴⁰, that it takes place before the first syllogism propounded by the opponent. But most importantly (iii), Chanevelle situates the interrogation (*interrogo*) into the ‘course of argument’ (*in cursu argumenti*) once again in another passage.⁴² For the same reason as above in (ii), cf. (E)_{§53}⁴⁰, this second passage proves yet more clearly that Chanevelle wants the interrogation was postponed until after the first propounding or after the ‘disputation beginning’ (B)(C)_{§51}³⁹.

§92. (II) Witnesses of the Garnier and Alfonso do not explicitly locate the *Asking-answering* in a certain phase of disputation. But still, some results can be inferred from their descriptions of the very first opponent’s steps in it. (a) According to Garnier, the opponent should (1) salute the respondent moderately (*humaniter*) in his preface (*praefatio*);⁴³ when finishing this, he is (2) to clearly indicate the thesis he wants to attack;⁴⁴ ‘after it’ (*postea*), he should (3) make the syllogism conclusion which is the contradictory opposite of the thesis.⁴⁵ (b) Alfonso suggests that it is ‘during the arguing’ (*inter argumentandum*) generally,

⁴¹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, pp. 518–519, “VIII. Circa progressum argumenti, plures sunt canones . . . XI. Hi praeterea canones servandi ab Opponente, 1. interdum postulet, & interroget”

⁴² CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis respondentis, p. 523, “VII. In cursu argumenti argumentans interdum interrogat, interdum ex hypothesis arguit.”

⁴³ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, De electione thesis, & propositione, p. 232, “IX. Praefatione humaniter salutandus respondens, cavendumque a stolide puerili quorumdam more, qui palmas, laureas, victorias & triumphos meminerunt in re tam levi.”

⁴⁴ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, De electione thesis, & propositione, p. 232, “X. Salutato respondente, dicatur clare & aperte, quam in thesim argumentatio fiat, imo & ostendat argumentans, se ipsius quam intelligentissimum.”

⁴⁵ GARNIER, *op. cit.*, De electione thesis, & propositione, p. 232, “XI. Postea syllogismus conficiatur ita ut conclusio sit contradictorie opposita thesi.”

the opponent could ask (*rogo*) a response (*responsio*).⁴⁶ But ‘before the argument’ (*ante argumentum*), the opponent should beg (*peto*) modestly (*modeste*) the favor (*venia*) from the ‘by-standers’ (*circumstantibus*). Then, after repeating the conclusion defended, he is to ‘briefly and clearly’ propound (*propono*) the argument in the form of syllogism or enthymema.⁴⁷ In both of these cases (a) and (b), there is no space for *Asking-answering* before the first opponent’s propounding.

B. THE *ASKING-ANSWERING* EXACT MANNER

§93. In this passage, I am going to generally show two theses that deal with the most inner manner of questioning. First, that [T14] according to a rare evidence in Chanevelle, the very interrogation by the opponent should take place in two steps. First, the opponent is to ask *dichotomic* questions. Next, if the respondent denies these, the opponent is allowed to proceed into the *non-dichotomic* questioning; | see (c)(d)§94⁶⁷ below. Second, [T15] Chanevelle, Garnier, and above all Fonseca reflect the art of ‘required propositions concealing,’ which art is nevertheless directed to the truth; | see (e)§94⁶⁷ for Chanevelle; §95⁶⁹ for Garnier; §96⁶⁹, (II)§97⁷⁰ for Fonseca.

§94. On the opponent’s part, the most detailed description of the questioning manner can be found in Chanevelle. The opponent sometimes ‘asks and interrogates’ (*postulet, & interroget*)

⁴⁶ ALPHONSUS, F., *op. cit.*, p. 76, “Denique, si inter argumentandum, de aliquo rogatus fuerit respondens”

⁴⁷ ALPHONSUS, F., *op. cit.*, p. 73, “Preter haec argumentans obseruare debet primo, quod ante argumentum veniam modeste petat a circumstantibus: deinde repetita conclusione (quam alter defendit) his verbis, *aduersus illam artem, in qua defendis, &c. sic argumentor*, argumentum breuiter, & clare proponat vel entimemate, vel syllogismo.”

with an intention to argue from the responses given.⁴⁸ The rules for that follow: (a) The opponent should not ask the conclusion (i.e. not to commit the *petitio principii* fallacy); but (b) only those propositions against which either no objection can be raised by respondent or those against which the objection is not apparent and lies hidden (*lateo*) within it.⁴⁹ Then, with a *sequential* style, Chanevelle describes two steps of the actual interrogation. First, (c) opponent should ask *dichotomic* questions like ‘whether or not it is this’ (*an sit hoc*) or ‘whether or not it is called in that number of ways’ (*an tot modis dicatur*). But if the respondent denies (*negarit*) that ‘it is this’ (*esse hoc*) or that ‘it is called in that number of ways’ (*vel tot modis dici*), then (d) the opponent will be allowed (*licebit*) to ask directly in a *non-dichotomic* manner. In the present case, he asks the essence or quantity: ‘therefore, what is it?’ (*quid igitur est*) or ‘how many ways is it called?’ (*quot modis dicitur*).⁵⁰ The last Chanevelle rule prescribes a main tenet of the questioning art: (e) Opponent is to make use of (*utor*) the non useful or ‘not required’ (*non necessariis*) propositions, so long as they serve the interest (*inservio*) of the useful or required ones (*necessariis*).⁵¹

⁴⁸ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 519, “1. interdum [opponens] postulet, & interroget, vt ex datis responsis, argumentari possit. . . .”

⁴⁹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 519, “[opponens] postulet, & interroget . . . ita tamen, vt conclusio non interrogetur, ex propositionibus inferenda, sed eae potissimum propositiones, contra quas obiectio vel nulla est, vel non apparet, sed latet. . . .”

⁵⁰ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 519, “denique interrogetur primum, an sit hoc, an tot modis dicatur, quod si respondens negarit esse hoc, vel tot modis dici, tum licebit interrogare, quid igitur est, vel quot modis dicitur?”

⁵¹ CHANEVELLE, *op. cit.*, De officiis argumentantis, p. 519, “2. propositionibus non necessariis eatenus vtatur, quatenus necessariis inserviunt.” For the ‘necessary premises’ and the questioner art see Top. VIII, 1, 155b3–28; STUMP, E. *Boethius’s De topicis differentiis*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press 2004, p. 161.

§95. This last rule or generally the ‘art of questioner’ is worthy of further explication. According to Garnier, respondent must diligently beware opponent’s questions. Seeing their direction, the former is to disclose what the opponent is able to infer from each of them. It is by a kind of ‘foresight’ (*providentia*) that respondent overtakes (*occupo*) the art (*artes*) of those who interrogate (*interrogans*). Garnier continues: ‘indeed, for a long time, let he concede the more numerous [questions] as they are asked, if he only can.’⁵² Why such a rule? The answer is to be found exactly in the main tenet of the art of the questioner. Respondent can overtake an opponent if he knows that the former asks not required propositions first; see ^(e)§93⁶⁷ above in Chanevelle.

§96. But a full explication of such an opponent-questioner strategy is provided by Fonseca. (a) Those propositions (*ea*) that are (i) very close (*proxima*) to a respondent’s assertion, which is to be made unsteady (*labefactandae*), should be not asked immediately (*statim*).⁵³ Because if the respondent will realize it, he will deny everything and obstruct (*obstruo*) the opponent’s ‘entrance to argumentation’ (*aditum argumentationi*).⁵⁴ For the same reason, an opponent should commence to ask things which (ii) seem to stand apart (*disto*). (b) More remotely (*altius*), he is to

⁵² GARNIER, J., *op. cit.*, p. 243, “IV. Caveat diligenter ab adversarii interrogationibus, videatque quo tendant, & aperiat quid ex singulis concludi possit, providentiaque occupet artes interrogantis: imo longe plura concedat, quam quaerantur, si modo liceat.”

⁵³ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 614, “Sed adhibere debes interrogando hanc cautionem, ut non statim roges ea, quae labefactandae assertioni adversarii proxima sunt. . . .”

⁵⁴ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 614, “Id enim ille si intellexerit, negabit omnia, aditumque argumentationi per proterviam obstruet, nec te sinet unquam manus conserere argumentando. . . .”

return (*repeto*) to those questions (i).⁵⁵ But even the most important question of (i), or the proposition an opponent seeks to obtain, should not be asked directly. He can hide it (*obruo, occulo*) (1) among a multitude (*multitudine*) of others ‘now and then’ (*interdum*),⁵⁶ but (2) sometimes (*nonnunquam*) too by a veiling (*pallium*), as it were (*quasi*), of its either cause (*causa*) or effect (*effectus*) or ‘something similar’ (*rei simmilis*) or ‘anything further’ (*alicuius alterius*).⁵⁷

§97. Finally, two important questions must be raised regarding Fonseca’s rules. (I) What is the most important question or proposition (b)§96⁶⁹ that opponent strives to obtain from respondent? It is such a question or proposition, in which is seated (*posita est*) the ‘entire force of refutation’ (*tota vis refutationis*).⁵⁸ This must be underlined, because the term ‘force of an argument’ or of difficulty or of objection is used in many key sources including the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599; cf. §107⁷⁶, (c)§109⁷⁷. (II) Is all this questioner’s art a kind of a ‘palm directed cheating?’ Not at all. Rather, it is a ‘truth directed concealing.’ When Fonseca finishes this passage, he explains that the more untroubled (*securior factus*) and sized (*occupatus*) in other irrelevant things (*nihil ad propositum pertinentibus*) the respondent is, the more he can

⁵⁵ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 614, “Itaque repetendae sunt altius interrogationes, et a rebus, quae a proposito longe videntur distare, exordiendum”

⁵⁶ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 614, “idque in quo tota vis refutationis posita est, interdum multitudine interrogationum obruendum”

⁵⁷ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, pp. 614, 616, “nonnunquam etiam quodam quasi pallio causa sua, aut effectus, aut rei similis, aut alicuius alterius occulendum. . . .”

⁵⁸ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 614, “idque in quo tota vis refutationis posita est, interdum multitudine interrogationum obruendum”

claim what he really thinks; and thus, the ‘voice of truth’ (*vox veritatis*) is by no means impeded because of respondent’s fear (*metus*).⁵⁹

⁵⁹ FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Op. cit.*, p. 616, “quo respondens securior factus, et quasi in aliis rebus nihil ad propositum pertinentibus occupatus, syncerius dicat quod sentit, sicque veritatis vox nequaquam metu impediatur.”

4 Testification Based on an Analysis of the *Ratio Studiorum* and *Logicae Artis Compendium*

§98. The enumeration of Jesuit treatises on logic might even be seen as not enough stuff for a thorough research. Namely, given that (1) the passages on disputation method in treatises listed are quite concise in most cases and (2) the first editions date-range is rather wide one. It takes account of nearly one hundred fifty years from 1561 to 1706.

4.1 Methods Hidden in the *Ratio Studiorum*

§99. As we shall see from §159¹¹⁰ on, the *Ratio studiorum* §144⁹⁶ is the most proper place to seek out rules for the practice of disputations. But interestingly enough, it also contains some basic precepts on the very disputation method (or on the *forma* as they call it). In the next course, I will argue independently on the external sources, so that the results of the analysis may remain firm on their own.

A. THE *OBJECTION-SOLVING* PARADIGMATIC METHOD FROM THE RESPONDENT POINT OF VIEW

§100. Being inscribed *Formae ratio in disputando*, the respondent of point view on method is to be found in the passage¹ concerning various rules for teachers of philosophy. After a requirement for keeping the disputation in *forma* is stressed, the 1599 *Ratio* prescribes what follows:

¹ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 107–108; Cf. MP V, R99, p. 400.

§101. “And so the one who is responding should first repeat the entire argumentation without making any response to the individual propositions. Then he should repeat the propositions again, adding: *nego* or *concedo maiorem, minorem, consequentiam*. Sometimes he should also make a distinction. But he should seldom intrude either clarifications or reasons, especially against one’s will.”²

§102. What we learn from this is (1) that Jesuit respondents used entirely standard procedural elements. Namely the (i) argumentation (*argumentatio*) and proposition repeating (*repetere*) before they proceed to an examination of both, while using (ii) the well-known technical phrases ‘I deny’ or ‘I admit.’ But now, (2) in a sense, the *Ratio* detaches (iii) the making of distinction (*distinguere*) as it is to be used but sometimes (*interdum*). (3) The *Ratio* almost forbids the (iv) clarifications (*declarationes*) or (v) *rationes* as well. Not to overlook a moment of the point (2) and to get better understanding of the ideas behind the (2) and (3), we must consult the 1586 trial version *Ratio*. It treats this very same issues as follows:

§103. “And so, the one who is responding should first repeat the displayed argumentation. Next, let he say to the premises or *consequentiam: nego* or *concedo* only. For he should apply the distinctions less frequently. Because when being more numerous, they disarrange the course of disputing as well as they displease those making the arguments and might be seen as a sort of remedies zealously sought for dragging out the disputation until a true solution occurs. But the clarifications or the reasons why every single thing is said or denied as well are to be used even more sparingly. For nothing is

² Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 107–108, MP V, R99, p. 400, “Itaque qui respondet, repetat primum totam argumentationem, nihil ad singulas propositiones respondendo; tum iterum propositiones, addatque: *nego* vel *concedo maiorem, minorem, consequentiam*; interdum etiam distinguat; raro autem vel declarationes vel rationes, praesertim invitis, obtrudat.”

more annoying than this thing, especially when being intruded against opponents' will."³

§104. Now, some important findings concerning point (2)§102⁷³ are these: (a) there is a big difference between those moves *nego* and *concedo* (ii) and the making of distinction (iii), because only (*dumtaxat*) the former should be applied to opponent's argumentation (as they would be the first and most prominent reactions by respondent); (b) there is a 'course of disputing' (*disputandi cursus*) which, while infuriating the opponent, can be disarranged (*interturbare*) by more numerous distinctions (iii); there is (c) a 'true solution' (*solutio vera*) being different from the distinctions (iii) – for obstructing by the (iii), the respondent can be seen as waiting for a true solution (c) to strike him. Finally, the point (3) is much clearer as well. There are (v) reasons (*rationes*) justifying the denials being made by respondent. However, the former are in disgrace with the opponent, especially if not asked by him.

§105. So far, no rules for the opponent have been mentioned. Nevertheless, the just quoted 1586 *Ratio* passage follows after a highly important introduction,⁴ where the necessity of the form 'being observed by stiffness' (*formae rigore servando*) for the fruitful conduct of disputations is stressed and where reasons to prevent various inconvenient consequences being produced by relaxing the form are listed. This introductory place will be ad-

³ MP V, R86A, De Disputationibus, § 8, p. 75, "Itaque qui respondet, repetat primum argumentationem propositam. Deinde ad praemissas vel consequentiam dicat: nego, vel concedo dumtaxat. Nam distinctionibus minus frequenter utendum est. Cum enim illae crebriores sunt, et disputandi cursum interturbant, et displicent argumentantibus, et remedia quaedam videntur studiose quaesita ad extrahendam disputationem, donec vera occurrat solutio. Multo vero parcius adhibendae sunt declarationes vel etiam rationes, cur quidque dicatur aut negetur. Nihil enim ea res molestius, praesertim si obrudantur invitis argumentantibus."

⁴ MP V, R86A, De Disputationibus, § 8, p. 75.

dressed in *Part Two*, see §208¹³⁸. But taking it into account now, the form of disputation does not appear to consist in only the common respondent's moves, see ⁽¹⁾§102⁷³. In fact, the own rules to be followed by opponent are also indicated here. As the 1586 *Ratio* says, the laws of disputing (*disputandi leges*) are in such great honour in 'distinguished academies' that nothing more shameful (*ignominiosius*) can be objected to an opponent than 'he proves what has not been denied or that he recedes from a thread of undertaken disputation.'⁵

B. THE OBJECTION-SOLVING PARADIGMATIC METHOD FROM THE TEACHER POINT OF VIEW

§106. Being inscribed *Disputationis cura* in the 1599 *Ratio*, the teacher's duties as to the disputation method are to be found in the passage⁶ concerning various rules for the all higher faculties §149¹⁰⁰ teachers. Now, the duties in question seem to be meant for the weekly disputations practice §172¹¹⁵. This is clear on the ground that whereas there is an additional specific function of arguments resuming §181¹²² in all kinds of more solemn practices, as well as the role of the moderator §176¹¹⁸ in the monthly disputations, no other acting person but the opponent, respondent and the presiding teacher is mentioned here. After the necessity of being seen as the one who contests for both partici-

⁵ MP V, R86A, De Disputationibus, § 8, p. 75, "Offenduntur etiam viri graves, quod disputandi leges negligantur, quae in illustribus academiis tanto sunt in honore, ut nihil ignominiosius obiici possit argumentanti, quam quod non probet, quod fuerat negatum, aut a filo susceptae disputationis recedat."

⁶ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 54; Cf. MP V, R99, p. 382.

pants is stressed (for the 1586 version see §214¹⁴¹), *Ratio* obliges the teacher to what follows:⁷

§107. “He should give ample praise if something valid is delivered. And he should order everyone to pay attention when a more serious difficulty has been displayed. Immediately after, he should suggest some concise point to prop up the respondent, or to direct the one making argument. . . . He should order the disputant to proceed as long as the difficulty possesses the force; in fact, he himself should proliferate the difficulty. And he should not dissemble if the one who is arguing has crept up on another argument. He should not allow the argument is insisted on any longer when almost solved nor allow a not enough consistent response is being upheld for too long. But after some contest, he should briefly define the whole matter and explain it.”⁸

⁷ The 1586 *Ratio* had developed the following introductory part more fully. Teacher should (a) help (*assistat*) disputants in such a way so as to be seen as one who battles for either contender; (b) praise whatever valid (*boni*) is said; (c) order all to pay attention if a distinguished objection is proposed; (d) immediately after, he should say something brief to support the respondent or direct the opponent; he should (e) call those wandering off back to the form; (f) reproach (*exprobrat*) if a so many times explained matter is not understood yet; (g) neither be silent for too long nor speak constantly so that the disciples could display their knowledge and finally, (h) he should correct what was displayed. See MP V, R86A, De Disputationibus, § 8, p. 76, “Collaudet, si quid boni afferatur; attendere omnes iubeat, cum insignis aliqua difficultas proposita est; suggerat subinde breve aliquid, quo vel fulciat respondentem vel argumentantem dirigat; aberrantes revocet in formam; exprobrat etiam nondum intellectam rem aliquam, quam ipse toties inculcaverit: neque diu taceat, neque semper loquatur, ut ipsi etiam discipuli promant, quod sciunt; ipse vero quod promptum fuerit, emendet aut expoliat; . . .”

⁸ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 54, MP V, R99, p. 382, “collaudet [professor], si quid afferatur boni; et attendere omnes iubeat, cum gravior aliqua proposita fuerit difficultas; suggerat subinde breve aliquid, quo vel fulciat respondentem, vel argumentantem dirigat. . . . disputantem progredi iubeat, dum difficultas vim obtinet; immo augeat ipse difficultatem; nec dissimulet, si is qui argumentatur, proreperit ad aliud argumentum; non patiatum vel argumentum pene solutum longius urgeri, vel responsionem non bene constantem diu sustineri; sed post aliquam concertationem rem totam breviter definiat et explanet; . . .”

§108. Leaving other points aside, let me notice these key ideas. (A) A speech activity is supposed at the beginning as something valid (*bonus*) that could have been said (*afferre*) by the participants. But the situation is quite changed once a more serious (*gravior*) (B) difficulty (*difficultas*) has been displayed (*proponere*). In fact, it is a serious argument or *objection* that has been displayed, see §111⁷⁸ below. (a) All should pay attention now and (b) the teacher is to prop up (*fulcire*) respondent or direct opponent. The question is, whether or not just a first single syllogism has been displayed by the opponent at this moment. In other words, whether or not we do stay on the very beginning of the disputation process, namely before the first repeating of argumentation by the respondent, ⁽ⁱ⁾§102⁷³. It might seem so on the ground that the same term *proponere* is applied to a single argument in the respondent-duties description of 1586 text, §103⁷³ above. However, this is not the case: (1) for the teacher is supposed to discern it is a more *serious* objection or argument, but this property could hardly be clear at first; (2) for we could not find any explanation of the very first speech activity (A) in this present passage; (3) for the teacher is to support respondent by a concise point in this moment – but, provided the respondent was expected to deny simply or to concede after the very first syllogism was displayed, see ^(a)§104⁷⁴, such support would be nearly meaningless.

§109. In the following, the *Ratio* determines conditions according to which a disputation should either (C) continue or be (D) terminated. The continuation condition (C) says: as long as (c) the objection (*difficultas*) possesses the force (*dum vim obtinet*), the opponent (*disputans*) should be ordered by the teacher (d) to proceed (*progredi jubeat*). What's more, the teacher himself (e) is to proliferate (*augere*) the objection and he should not dissemble when, being caused by the opponent, (f) a hidden shift to an an-

other argument (*ad aliud argumentum*) occurred. There are questions as to the points (c)–(f). (1) Why should we not read (c) ‘while difficulty is gaining force’ as Pavur does?⁹ Although these two translations are not strictly contradictory, we should not, because the objection is serious *already* – for both participants are supposed to have gotten into trouble and then are helped or directed by the teacher, see (b)§108⁷⁷ above. (2) What is the objective of this proceeding (d) by the opponent and the proliferating of objection (e) by the teacher? To understand, let us quote the first binding *Ratio* – that of 1591:

§110. “He [i.e. teacher] should not evade any difficulty; but he should order the disputant to proceed as long as one and the same argument possesses force; for if the latter has crept up on another argument, that should not be dissembled by the teacher.”¹⁰

§111. Originally, the continuation condition (C) along with the rules (d) and (e) is clearly meant to deter a teacher from evading (*subterfugere*) a particular objection as long as it still possesses a force. Besides this finding, notice that whereas it is a *difficultas* which possesses the *vis* in the 1599 *Ratio* description §107⁷⁶, an argument (*argumentum*) possesses it according to the 1591 *Ratio*. This is an important proof that the *difficultas* signifies an argument or *objection* in fact, in *Ratio* terminology, and not, for example, a confused subject matter gaining a better sense (*vis*) by disputation. (3) What is the objective of the rule that the teacher should not dissemble the opponent’s shift (f) to another argument? A variant of the 1586 *Ratio* provides us with a further ex-

⁹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 54, “He should tell the disputant to keep moving ahead while a difficulty is gaining force; . . .”

¹⁰ MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Scholasticae Theologiae*, § 61, p. 275, “Non subterfugiat difficultatem ullam; sed disputantem progredi iubeat, dum vim obtinet unum atque idem argumentum; nam si ad aliud ille tacite prorepserit, id a professore dissimulandum non est.”

planation: if the one who is arguing is seen by himself as firmly sticking (*persistere sibi videatur*) to a commenced argument (*in coepto argumento*), but has crossed to an another one (*ad aliud*) in fact, this should not be dissembled (*dissimulare*) by the teacher (*praeses*), so that all may understand ‘in what way each single *per se* argument is to be solved’ (*dissolvere*).¹¹ Consulting such an objective with the 1591 *Ratio* passage §110⁷⁸ above, we must sum up the continuation condition (C) is meant to reach an understanding of each single objection *solution* – in spite of the teacher hoping to sometimes evade it by not signaling a step to another argument.

§112. Finally, there are two simple (D) termination conditions in the 1599 *Ratio* to be kept by the teacher, see §107⁷⁶, until he (E) shall define and explain the entire matter. On the opponent’s part, (g) when the argument is almost solved, it should not be insisted on it any longer (*argumentum pene solutum longius urgeri*). But on the respondent’s part, (h) when the response (*responsio*) is inconsistent (*non bene constants*), it should not be upheld (*sustineri*) for too long (*diu*). Therefore, there are two activities preceding the termination: there is (1) an insisting on the argument by the opponent; but there must be (2) an attack on the response as well, because the latter has been *upheld*. Although a positive answer would be natural, we can leave open the question of whether or not it is this insisting (1) the opponent should proceed in, see ^(d)§109⁷⁷. On the other hand, as no one can attack the response except the opponent in this context, the insisting

¹¹ MP V, R86A, De Disputationibus, § 8, see R86B variant of reading, note *n*, p. 77, “Quamquam si argumentator in coepto argumento persistere sibi videatur, revera tamen ad aliud transgressus fuerit, id praesidem dissimulare non oportet, ut intelligi possit ab omnibus quemadmodum unumquodque per se argumentum dissolvatur.”

(1) on the argument and the attack (2) on response must be one and the same activity by the opponent. I should notice, that this interpretation holds true, if we read this *Ratio* passage as written in the *sequential* style.

4.2 Analysis of the *Logicae Artis Compendium* Method by Robert Sanderson

§113. For the same reason as was in the case of *Ratio studiorum*, in the next course, I will analyze the passage of *Logicae artis compendium* by Robert Sanderson, which pertains to the disputation method. This analyze will be independent on the external sources, so that the results may remain firm on their own. To sum up, his method is this: (a) Within the first phase, namely in the ‘building of an argumentation,’ respondent should deny the weak premises of the opponent’s argumentation. (b) This process goes on as long as nothing more is seen that might be conveniently denied. We called this the ‘First Turning-point’ because only then is it the right time for respondent to proceed to a solution. This takes place in the (c) Second Phase: Solving of an Argument. (d) When the solution was relevant, the opponent should either ‘replicate’ or leave his present argumentation. Now, we have the ‘Second Turning-point.’

A. THE FIRST PHASE: BUILDING OF AN ARGUMENTATION

§114. (A) At the beginning of very disputation, the opponent should (i) not choose simply any argument he prepared in advance, but only a stronger one (which seems to have more *difficultatum et virium*) unless (ii) he would like to try respondent’s experience (*peritiam*) by the help of a fallacy or by a weak (*tenui*) argument first. In case the opponent is just a beginner (*tyro*) unskilled in argumentation, Sanderson recommends to supervise

that he has written down the invented syllogisms altogether with the signs of corresponding figures (*Barbara, Celarent, Darii etc.*).¹² Sanderson's example of that sort of written preparation reveals, it is clearly not enough to simply develop the first syllogism (i.e. whose conclusion is or should be the contradiction of respondent's thesis): There are four affixed prosyllogisms as well and all of these trace the minor premises line of proof.¹³

§115. After the opponent has uttered the first syllogism, the activity (B) moves on to the respondent's side. Similarly, as we can see in all other relevant sources, the first duty (*officium*) of the respondent (i) is to repeat the argument his opponent advanced. Sanderson gives some reasons for that, but the second duty, i.e. (ii) denying (*negare*), bears far more importance for us at the present phase. The task of justification (iii) of given negations is so closely associated with this duty (ii) that Sanderson, as I suppose, does not recognise it as a separate *officium*. The last one, the respondent's *officium*, which will be treated below from §130⁸⁶, is (iv) to solve his opponent's argument (*rationem solvere*).

§116. Now, how is the duty of denying (ii) to be fulfilled? Respondent can (a) deny his opponent's argument conclusion if it is unrelated (*aliena*), i.e. if it does not contradict the respondent's thesis. Similarly, he can deny the inferred conclusions of prosyllogisms when they differ from by him from previously denied premises (and similarly, that conclusion is then classified as *aliena*). But this kind of denying (a) means rather a *rejection* of the conclusion as it is 'nothing to the point' (*ἀπροσδιόνυσον*),¹⁴

¹² SANDERSON, R. *Logicae artis compendium*. In *The works of Robert Sanderson, D.D., sometime Bishop of Lincoln, Vol. VI*. Oxford, at the University Press 1854, p. 156.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 156–157.

¹⁴ Aristotele does not use this word Sanderson give us in any logical work.

ad rem nihil). Respondent can therefore admit any argument by saying e.g. ‘this does not attack my thesis’ (*Hoc non impugnat Thesin meam*).¹⁵ Or, he may (b) deny the form of the argumentation, when his opponent has broken a syllogistic rule.¹⁶

§117. For our concern, the most important turn a respondent can make at this phase is the denying (c) of either (1) one or (2) both of the premises, if they are false. Sanderson says that in (1), the minor premise should be denied most frequently (because the major ‘usually hangs on an general axiom’) by a negation without any additions (*simpliciter negabit*).¹⁷ In the case (2) when both of opponent’s premises are false, he can ‘by the way’ (*obiter*) admonish an opponent for that and he should decide to be proved which of those premises is more closely linked with the given issue (which is *Quaestioni conjunctior*).¹⁸

§118. Generally, it is not demanded that the respondent (iii) add a reason for his denial, because ‘the defence is appropriate to him, not the probation and the solution of reasons of the other, is not assignation of his own.’¹⁹ But because ‘one fool is able to deny more than ten wises can prove’ and because the disputation

¹⁵ SANDERSON, *op. cit.*, pp 144, 158.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 158–159, “Respondens illam Propositionem simpliciter negabit, sive ea Major sit, sive Minor. Sed Major, quia fere nititur axiomatice aliquo generali, rarius neganda venit; Minor frequentius.”

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 159, “Quod si utraque Praemissarum sit falsa, poterit quidem Respondens obiter admonere Opponentem geminae falsitatis, et utramque negare; sed non optime fecerit, si ei det optionem probandi utram voluerit; ipse potius unam e duabus ei imponat probandam, quae scilicet est Quaestioni conjunctior; Majorem quandoque, multo saepius tamen Minorem.”

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 159, “Sed Respondenti, ubi aliquod negandum deprehenderit, satis erit simpliciter negasse. Nec enim ab eo exigenda est ordinarie ratio negationis, cujus est defendere, non probare, et rationes alterius solvere, non suas assignare.”

would have no end (*finis*) if the respondent chose to deny ad infinitum, the respondent has in fact to (*tenetur*) add a reason in the cases listed below if he is asked for that by his opponent.²⁰

§119. We may therefore infer that (C) the responsibility moves back on the opponent's side at the present moment, as he is expected to watch whether or not the respondent will justify his negations according to the subsequent conditions. But of course the activity (iii) remains on the respondent's part. Now the respondent must add a reason, if he denies either (I) evidently true premise – because otherwise even the listeners (*Auditores*) may be bewildered (*mirari solent*); or when he denies (II) the form of argumentation obstinately (*pertinaciter*): then it is necessary for him to disclose a particular fault (*vitium*); or (III) when he denies the hypothetical proposition (which is supposed to be an enthymeme as well²¹).

§120. Or finally, when he (IV) denies induction without adding any *instantia*. *Instantia* (ἔνστασις)²² is a crucial term of a long tradition since Aristotle's period, generally meaning an 'objection.' It is not a full-fledged syllogism, but just a sentence that bears a reason against another proposition. We could say there-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, "Sed quia . . . stultus quivis unus plus negare potest, quam decem sapientes probare; nec finis ullus esset Disputationis, si liceret Respondenti pro libitu suo negare sine fine, propterea Respondens in aliquibus casibus tenetur assignare rationem suae negationis, si ab Opponente requiratur."

²¹ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 66, "Propositio Conditionalis, sive Hypothetica stricte, est in qua plures Categoricalae uniuntur per conjunctionem Conditionalem: ut, 'Si homo sit rationalis, est risibilis.' Referuntur huc Causalis: ut, 'Quia homo est rationalis, est risibilis;' et Rationalis, ut 'Homo est rationalis, ergo risibilis:' nisi Rationalis Argumentationibus potius annumeranda sit, utpote apertum Enthymema, quam Propositionibus."

²² *Cf.* for example *Anal. Post.* I, 12, 77b35sq.; *Top.* II, 2, 109b29sq.; *Top.* II, 8, 114a20sq.; *Top.* II, 11, 115b15 etc.; but especially *Top.* VIII, 1, 156a37sq.; *Top.* VIII, 2, 157a35sq.; *Top.* VIII, 8, 160b1sq.; *Top.* VIII, 10, 160b39sq.; *Top.* VIII, 14, 164a19; *Soph. Elen.* 11, 172a21; *Soph. Elen.* 9, 170b5; *Rhet.* II, 25, 2–10; *Rhet.* II, 26, 3 and 4.

fore it is an articulated antecedent of an unspoken enthymeme, where the consequent would stay in contrary or in contradiction to an opponent's claim. But the particular meaning the instantia entails for Sanderson (and the unanimously accepted 'essence' for most other relevant authors as well) at this place is simply a 'counter-example' raised against the universal inductively-gained premise. Sanderson says:

§121. "But it might happen that where number of instantias could be brought in contrary, yet suddenly, none of them would occur to respondent. In this case, he is held to an account for the denied induction, so that not be seen evading by not objecting; of that [account] may be given an acceptable one that all particulars are not of the same sense as those which are brought by opponent explicitly in that induction."²³

§122. In brief, according to Sanderson, a respondent can deny opponent's induction either by a counter-example, or a generally acceptable reason or opinion against inductive reasoning as such.

B. FIRST TURNING-POINT: PASSING TO THE SOLUTION

§123. This part is not 'a phase.' Rather, it is a set of recommendations Sanderson gives participants for when they should leave the argument-building and when the respondent is to bring a solution. In this part we will therefore address two main questions: (i) What are the conditions to be met so that the iterative process of an argument building can be terminated on the one

²³ SANDERSON, *op. cit.*, p. 160, "Sed potest fieri, ut ubi multae instantiae adduci possent in contrarium, nulla tamen subito occurrat Respondenti. In eo casu, ne videatur tergiversari non instando, debet rationem aliquam reddere negatae Inductionis; ex qua probabile reddatur, non omnia particularia esse ejusdem rationis cum illis, quae aperte afferuntur ab Opponente in illa Inductione."

hand and the solution can begin on the other? And (ii) who is expected to decide that these conditions were met?

§124. Sanderson deals with that sort of topic in two short passages.²⁴ They are, however, of great importance for our understanding the whole of disputation process. One of these places is to be found at the beginning of the actual account of the respondent's duty to solve an objection, see ^(iv)§115⁸¹. Sanderson deals with the conditions for passing to the solution here by saying:

§125. "Let the respondent not think about a solution until the opponent induces the force of his objection among the public. Premature solutions, apart from the fact that they may charge the respondent with fear, are always unpleasant for listeners: hence, the respondent will deny as long as he sees something that could be conveniently denied; where, indeed, nothing more can be denied, only then let him apply a solution the objection itself will require."²⁵

§126. If we take a quite practical look at the issue (i), i.e. of the first turning-point conditions, we can see just one respondent-self-assessment practical condition: If it is too difficult to deny for him in an easy way any further (i.e. an additional denying would require a justification he is not ready to provide, see §118⁸²), then it is the correct time for an appropriate solution. This is also the answer to the question (ii) of who is expected to decide that the passing-to-the-solution conditions were met.

§127. The next important passage is situated even before the part (B)§115⁸¹ on respondent duties, as a second main *officium* of the opponent.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 157, 160.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 160, "De Solutione non ante cogitabit Respondens quam Opponens vim Objectionis suae in medium adduxerit. Praematurae Solutiones, praeterquam quod Respondentem arguant formidinis, ingratae sunt semper auditoribus: proinde Respondens negabit quamdiu viderit aliquid quod negari commode possit; ubi vero nihil amplius negari potest, tum demum Solutionem adhibeat, qualem ipsa Objectio requiret."

§128. “After the business is brought to that point where nothing more is seen that might be denied, the next duty of an opponent is to press his adversary for a response. If he [i.e. respondent] runs away, [his opponent’s duty would be to press him] so that the argument could be repeated; if he got stuck, [his opponent’s duty would be to press him] so that something could either be denied or responded; . . .”²⁶

§129. In fact, this passage concerns various rules for the situations where a respondent does not perform his tasks appropriately and where the opponent should press him to the solution. Therefore, except this as another confirmation of the existence of a special turning-point in Sanderson’s text, moreover, we can infer such a turning-point is expected to be accompanied by a troubles-rising on the respondent’s part. This turning point clearly proves, that the distinction should be not made at the beginning of a disputation but it should be postponed, as we saw it in the Jesuits logical works and in the *Ratio Studiorum*.

C. THE SECOND PHASE: SOLVING OF AN ARGUMENT

§130. (A) If an opponent argues from a topical *place* (*ex Loco Topico*), respondent is to limit (*limitare*) the maxim (*Maxima*) of this *place*. That is, he should limit the maxim opponent’s argument seems to hinge upon.²⁷ (B) If a term (*Terminus*) in an opponent’s argument is ambiguous, as used to be the case, the respondent should distinguish it in this manner: After the respondent discerns the equivocal term which is (i) an *extreme*, he must

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157, “Postquam eo perducta res est argumentando, ut nihil ultra negari posse videatur, Opponentis proximum officium est urgere adversarium ad Responsionem. Si fugiat, ut repetatur argumentum; si haereat, ut vel negetur aliquid, vel respondeatur; . . .”

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160, “Si ex Loco Topico disputetur, limitanda est Maxima illius Loci, qua niti videtur Objectio.”

show it is accepted in either premise in one way but in conclusion in another. On the other hand, if the term is (ii) the *middle*, the respondent, following a distinction, should show that the term is not understood in both premises in the same way. Then, one of the meanings make the major premise true and the minor false, but the another one works, of course, in just the reverse.²⁸

§131. (C) If an opponent fights by the help of an *authority* (*Auctoritate pugnetur*), this *place* of the given author should be (i) inspected, (ii) the aim of it is to be weighted in terms of previous and following passages where (iii) the genuine sense of words should be inferred from and (iv) conciliated with respondent's defence. Sanderson says that respondent can sometimes reject an authority. Particularly, if he is able to show a cause that might drive the author to that mistake. For the rest of cases, it shouldn't be made blindly, but moderately, either by a serious reason to the contrary or by the testimony of another considerably eminent author.²⁹

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 145, "Expendendi autem primum Extremi: in quorum altero si lateat ambiguitas, ut plerumque fit, distinguendus est Terminus sic ambiguus, et respondendum ad Praemissam in qua ille Terminus reperitur, ostendendo Terminus illum aliter accipi in dicta Praemissa, aliter in Conclusionem. Si non sit ambiguitas in Extremis, tunc Medius Terminus est expendendus, et secundum se, et ratione habita ad Locum ex quo ducitur. Secundum se consideratum Medium si sit ambiguum, respondendum est, ut prius, per distinctionem, ostendendo Medium non eodem modo sumi in Majore et Minore; et in uno sensu veram esse Majorem, Minorem falsam; in altero Majorem falsam, Minorem veram."

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 160, "Si Auctoritate pugnetur, locus Auctoris inspiciendus, scopus expendendus ex praecedentibus et sequentibus, genuinus verborum sensus inde afferendus, et cum nostra defensione conciliandus. Potest autem rejici Auctoritas nonnunquam, praesertim si ostendi possit, quid Auctorem in id erroris impulerit; caeterum non est hoc temere faciendum, sed parcus, et modeste, et opposita vel gravi aliqua ratione in contrarium, vel testimonio alterius cujusquam non contemnendi Auctoris."

§132. (D) As has been mentioned ⁽ⁱⁱ⁾§114⁸⁰, an opponent can test the respondent by means of a fallacy at the beginning of their exchanges. For that reason, as we suppose, a fallacy-appropriate response (*Responsio*) is reflected as well, though not in the same place where Sanderson discusses the main body of solutions. If, then, the respondent shouts out a fallacy, he is to show what a fallacy is occurring and where exactly it lies hidden. It is an opponent's responsibility to press his respondent to comply with this rule.³⁰ (E) Respondent can add to the direct (*directa*) solution as well as the indirect one. He will manage that by an inversion (*retorquendo*) of the opponent's argument against his adversary's own position. But, as Sanderson notices, the indirect solution itself will not be sufficient, because it is a response *ad hominem* not *ad rem*.³¹

D. THE SECOND TURNING-POINT: REPLICATION OR PASSING TO THE NEW ARGUMENT

§133. The last distinct phase Sanderson addresses should be applied by an opponent when his respondent has met (*occurrere*) the objection of the former with a 'not entirely unrelated' (*non prorsus aliena*) response (*responsio*). Similar to the first respondent's reaction ⁽ⁱ⁾§115⁸¹ on a syllogism, here the first obligatory task on opponents part is (A) to repeat the brought response so that he adjudicates (*dijudicare*) it by small allotments (*pensiculatorius*). (B) Next, the opponent should (i) try to compel his re-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 157, "Postquam eo perducta res est argumentando, ut nihil ultra negari posse videatur, Opponentis proximum officium est urgere adversarium ad Responsionem. . . . si Fallaciam clamet, ut ostendatur quae sit Fallacia, et ubi lateat; . . ."

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 160, "Directae Solutioni potest ex abundantia addi et Indirecta, retorquendo scilicet Objectionem in ipsum adversarium; sed indirecta sine directa non sufficiet, ut quae sit responsio ad hominem, non ad rem."

spondent to something absurd or inconsistent (*inconueniens*) with the earlier positions or negations. And this is the most appropriate reaction by opponent on response. Nevertheless, if the opponent is not able to achieve that, at least (ii), he is to oppose (*contravenire*) the most relevant part of distinction by a replication, see ^(b)§134⁸⁹ below, if he has any. For smatterers (*scioli*) and sophists sometimes replicate whichever part of distinction they please so that they lead the respondent farther away from the state of the question.³²

§134. (C) Finally, conditions are determined which, being met, the opponent should resign to respond openly and apply a new argument. This situation is considered as a defeat of the opponent, for Sanderson indicates ‘so as not to be seen defeated,’ opponent might contest (*contendere*) continually or insist (*instare*) obstinately (*pertinaciter*) as though everything respondent has said equals nothing. Now the conditions to be met are these: either (a) the opponent has nothing for direct (*directe*) reply see ⁽ⁱ⁾§133⁸⁸, or (b) he is not able to affix (*attexere*) arguments to arguments in such a technical way (*artificiose*) so that the replications could be seen more as directed towards the response than as new objections against the original (*principalis*) thesis. But on this account, we can understand the very nature of these replica-

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 157–158, “Si Respondens occurrat argumento responsione non prorsus aliena, Opponens alio se vertat oportet. Repetat primo Responsionem, ut eam pensiculatius dijudicet; tum vero id agat maxime, ut ex ea, si fieri possit, Respondens cogatur in aliquod absurdum, aut inconueniens; id negando scilicet quod prius posuerat, vel concedendo id quod prius negauerat. Si id nequeat efficere, saltem si quid habeat quod replicare possit, replicet; sed non sufficet utrivis parti distinctionis contravenire replicando, quod scioli faciunt nonnunquam et Sophistae, ut Respondentem longius a Quaestione abducant; sed adversus illam tantum distinctionis partem replicandum est, quae magis conjuncta est cum statu Quaestionis, propriusque ad rem pertinet.”

tions as well. Replication is a direct argument against a claim contained in response. And (c), the objection is already abundantly solved (*abunde satisfactum est*).³³

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 158, “Quod si nec habeat quod directe replicet, nec sciat argumentis argumenta sic artificiose attexere, ut replicationes videri possint magis ad responsionem, quam novae Objectiones adversus principalem Thesin, Opponenti consultius multo fuerit datae responsioni palam acquiescere, et novo argumento uti, quam ubi abunde satisfactum est, usque contendere, et ne victus videatur pertinaciter instare, quasi instar nihili essent quae Respondens dixisset omnia.”

Part Two

Practice of Jesuit
Disputations

1 State of Research, Sources on Disputations Practice and Background of Jesuit University

§135. In *Part Two*, I will mostly analyze the variants of the Jesuit ‘Plan of Study’ – *Ratio atque institutio studiorum Societatis Jesu*, the *Ratio* for short. Therefore, an opening passage on the state of research follows a few words on those. Also, I will often use terms signifying various university administrators, namely the Rector, Prefect of Studies and Beadle. It will be continued then, on how the Jesuit University was governed. Finally, the Higher Faculties curriculum is addressed more fully as it constitutes the most proper background for Jesuit disputation practice.

1.1 State of Research and Sources on Jesuit Disputations Practice

A. THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN PRACTICE OF JESUIT DISPUTATION

§136. As George Ganss, S.J. rightly pointed out in his *Saint Ignatius’ Idea of a Jesuit University* (1956), authors of main English works on Jesuit pedagogy and schools had limited their treatises to the Jesuit secondary education (namely to the humane letters).¹ The cause of which seems to lie in a tradition having been originated in an even older, yet excellent at that time and still widely quoted, *The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education* (1938) by Allan Farrell, S.J. In this work, the declared purpose is a histori-

¹ GANSS, G. *Ignatius’ Idea of a Jesuit University*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

cal reconstruction of the gradual forming of *Ratio studiorum*, making clear its original scope and present possibilities. But immediately, in his preface, Farrell significantly qualifies this aim: ‘Of the threefold curriculum outlined in the Ratio, namely, the theological, philosophical, and humanistic, only the latter will here be studied exhaustively.’²

§137. Another still widely quoted work is the above mentioned *Saint Ignatius’ Idea of a Jesuit University* by George E. Ganss. Despite the promising title, Ganss’ main passion, which has been noted by the author’s expertise,³ is Latin in all imaginable contexts. As far as a depiction of various kinds of disputations is concerned, Ganss uses some older and well known sources⁴ which, nevertheless, are relevant rather to the medieval disputation practice in general than especially to the Jesuit one. In the remaining cases, disputations are either mentioned or treated without sufficient discussion and references by him. A passage labelled *The Utility of Disputations in Latin* is good example of the latter as well as of the author’s enthusiasm for Latin.⁵

§138. As I will argue immediately, [T16] within the English speaking scholarly tradition until 2005 that it is appropriate to assess the state of research in Jesuit disputation practice as strikingly unsatisfactory| and, for my present subject matter, nearly useless. There are two reasons for that thesis. (1) The most classical twentieth century English works on the topic are either too

² FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

³ GANSS, G., *Ignatius’ Idea of a Jesuit University*, *op. cit.*, p. x, “If Latin does have disproportionate space in this book, the reason is not that I underestimate the value of theology and philosophy, but simply and solely that Latin is the area with which my daily work has made me most familiar.”

⁴ Rashdall’s *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (1936) is often referred to.

⁵ GANSS, G., *Ignatius’ Idea of a Jesuit University*, *op. cit.*, pp. 268–270.

general §137⁹³ or §136⁹² they override ‘scholastic theology’ as the highest and all-organizing branch of Jesuit late sixteenth century university learning. And thereby, they overlook the most proper pedagogical tools of such a branch. It has been engraved clearly in the *Constitutions*:

§139. “Since the end of the Society and of its studies is to aid our fellowmen to the knowledge and love of God and to the salvation of their souls; and since the branch of theology is the means most suitable to this end, in the universities of the Society the principal emphasis ought to be put upon it.”⁶

§140. “Because of the utility there is in the practice of disputation, especially for those who are studying arts and scholastic theology, the scholastics should participate in the disputations . . . of the schools. . . . Within the college too . . . on Sunday or some other day . . . it is good to have someone from each class . . . of arts and theology . . . [to] defend some theses. . . . In addition . . . an hour ought also to be designated each day for holding disputation within the college”⁷

§141. (2) My second argument arises from the misunderstandings as seen in the 2005 English translation of 1599 *Ratio stu-*

⁶ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 12, § 1, p. 213.

⁷ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 6, § 10–11, pp. 194–195; MP I, ConstL, pp. 241, 243, 245, “10. Cum perutilis sit (praesertim artium ac theologiae scholasticae studiosis) disputandi usus, intersint scholastici ordinariis scholarum ad quas accedunt . . . disputationibus. . . . Convenit etiam singulis dominicis, vel aliquo alio die hebdomadae, in collegio nostro aliquem ex quavis classe artium et theologiae studiosorum . . . positiones tuendas suscipere. . . . 11. Praeter haec duo disputationum praedictarum genera, cotidie aliquod tempus designandum, quo in collegiis . . . disputetur. . . .” MP I, ConstH94, pp. 240, 242, 244, “10. Por la utilidad que ay en ei exercicio de disputar, specialmente para los que estudian artes y theologia scholástica, hállense los estudiantes en las disputaciones . . . de las schuelas que freqüentan Y es bien aya en ei collegio cada domingo o algún otro día de la semana . . . alguno de cada classe de los artistas y theologos . . . para que vengan a disputar o a oír los que quisieren. . . . 11. Sin estas dos maneras de disputaciones dichas aun cada dia deve alguna hora señalarse para que se dispute en los collegios”

diorum.⁸ If such a modern translation by Jesuits discloses misunderstandings in front of the English speaking scholarly world as to the key pedagogical practice of Jesuits themselves, then the state of research in it must be assessed as ‘strikingly unsatisfactory.’ From among 14 passages I had come across, which are questionable at best, I chose just two examples (a) and (b).

§142. (a) In the context of theologians specific disputation practice called ‘particular act’ (e)§193¹²⁸, Claude Pavur S.J. reads the Latin phrase *argumententur fere non pauciores quam tres* as ‘no fewer than three should *debate*.’⁹ But in such a vague translation, key information is missing that these three specific persons played roles of opponents. As their proper activity, solely opponents make arguments (*argumentor*) against a respondent’s thesis. Beside things that have been said in *Part One*, a quick justification of the last claim can be seen in Pavur’s own translation. At a place, where the ‘repetitions at home’ (c)§170¹¹⁴ are addressed, Pavur reads the Latin *Postea argumentetur unus item aut alter, totidem respondentibus*; as ‘Later, one or two should likewise engage in argument with the same number of respondents.’¹⁰ If the latter played the role of respondents the former must play the role of opponents (*argumentetur*).

§143. (b) In a context of the philosophical curriculum, there is a misunderstanding of Pavur as to his explaining Fonseca’s or Toledo’s works at the beginning of the Aristotelian logic course, cf. (1)§150¹⁰¹. This is an important issue, e.g. for authority evaluation of the disputation method passages in Fonseca and Toledo, see [T20]§152¹⁰³. Whereas Latin says *Explicit primo anno*

⁸ PAVUR, C. N. *The Ratio studiorum: the official plan for Jesuit education*. Saint Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources 2005.

⁹ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41.

¹⁰ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 52.

Logicam, eius summa primo circiter bimestri tradita, non tam dictando, quam ex Toletio seu Fonseca, quae magis necessaria videbuntur, explicando, Pavur reads it as ‘In the first year, *after* presenting its overall plan in about the first two months, he should teach logic, not so much dictating as explaining what seems to be more necessary from Toledo or Fonseca.’¹¹ While leaving translation of the term *summa* as the ‘overall plan’ for a later discussion (a)§150¹⁰¹, let us be reminded that Toledo and Fonseca are authors of the introductory works on logic, cf. §32²⁷ and §34²⁸. Therefore, these are the authors who should certainly be read in the first two months rather than ‘after.’ This is clearly testified (in the case of the latter at least) in some previous *Ratio* versions¹² and elsewhere; see (iii)§151¹⁰².

B. THE *RATIO STUDIORUM* OF 1599, ITS TRIAL VERSIONS AND RELATION TO THE PRESENT DISSERTATION

§144. In a simple view, Jesuits produced four *Ratio* between 1565 and 1599. (1) James Ledesma, S.J. (1519–75) outlined a plan of study for the Roman College *De ratione et ordine studiorum Collegii Romani* (so-called *Ratio Borgiana*), which was probably, as Farrell says,¹³ the most important contribution to the development of the future *Ratio*.¹⁴ But for the Society as a whole, it had an unofficial character. Next (2), the official *Ratio* appeared in 1586, nonetheless, this draft was never tried in prac-

¹¹ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹² MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Philosophiae*, § 3, p. 279, “Explicit anno primo Logicam; sed primo bimestri Summulam P. Fonsecae”; MP V, R86A, *De Studio Philosophiae*, § 6, p. 100, “6. Logicae *Summula* praemittatur; et *Summula* quidem P. Fonsecae”

¹³ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

¹⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 219.

tice.¹⁵ In 1591, (3) a completely reorganised and revised version of the 1586 was published and tested subsequently in Jesuit schools. Finally (4), the definitive *Ratio* was promulgated on January 8, 1599.¹⁶ Yet, in 1616 (i) a minor revision of the 1599 text was made by the 7th General Congregation as to the examination of the scholastics¹⁷ and an authoritative approval was again given to it. For 175 years, until the suppression of the Order in 1773, this version remained unchanged.¹⁸ After the restoration of the Society, *Ratio* was again modified and published in 1832, but without its previously binding status.¹⁹

§145. The declared aim of the 1586 *Ratio* (2) authors was to gather under the three separate (a) branches of Theology, Philosophy, and Humanities, cf. from §149¹⁰⁰, a series of observations and discussions, but not to shape sets of exact teaching rules.²⁰ On the other hand, the new 1591 edition (3) consisted of rules for the single university administration (b) roles or offices (for Provincial, Rector, Prefects of Studies and teachers of various subjects); cf. from §147⁹⁸ below. Therefore, although very close in content (at least for topics I researched), the arrangement of the 1591 *Ratio* is entirely different from the 1586 proposal.²¹ Finally, the 1599 *Ratio* (4) is much more compact. The total number of rules is reduced from 837 to 467. Instead of many repetitions, a new category of rules was introduced common to all the teachers of a branch.²²

¹⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 219.

¹⁶ PADBERG, J. W., *op. cit.*, p. 81; PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 219.

¹⁷ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 30; MP V, R99, pp. 360–361, see variant of reading.

¹⁸ PADBERG, J. W., *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. vii.

²⁰ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

²¹ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

²² FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, pp. 317–318.

§146. As Farrell values the 1599 *Ratio*, the abbreviated form was in a sense a mistake. The earlier clear explanations of the aims of many rules were either omitted in the final edition or ‘scattered and unduly compressed.’²³ It lost sufficient fullness of expression, so it is not only useful but necessary to consult the older version for a proper understanding.²⁴ For my dissertation therefore, [T17] the main contribution as to the specific disputation practices research does not consist in an interpretation of relevant 1599 *Ratio* rules. More precisely, it consists in the finding of intersections between those ideas easily understandable in the 1586 proposal and their binding relicts in the 1599 *Ratio studiorum* as well as in the finding of a system as presupposed by Jesuits in the latter. |

1.2 Background of Jesuit University

A. UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS

§147. Because the Jesuit University governing was incorporated in the very hierarchy of the Society, let me open with it. Now, at the top of the Jesuit Order hierarchy is (A) the General (*Generalis*, *R. P. N. Generalis*, i.e. ‘Our Reverend Father General’²⁵). When elected by the General Congregation,²⁶ he holds this office for life. Below in a line of governing, being limited in their offices

²³ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 3 and *ibid.* fn. 1.

²⁶ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 5, fn. 5, “General congregations are meetings of representatives from the leadership of the Society and from all its provinces. Their principal responsibility is to elect any new Father General. They also compose and issue major documents for the Society and make important decisions affecting the Society’s life and mission.”

to usually six years, (B) Provincials (*provincialis, praepositi provincialis, superiores*) control Jesuits (a) institutions and (b) members of a given territory. Finally, belonging under the jurisdiction of Provincials, (C) Rectors (*rectores*) govern single institutions.²⁷ Although the Rector is (i) responsible to the Provincial during the period of his office, he is not (ii) appointed and removed by the latter, but by the General of the Order.²⁸

§148. Considering the Jesuit educational system and the level of university administration alone, a Rector-complementary office (D) is the Prefect of Studies (*praefectus studiorum*),²⁹ whose primary supervising duties concern the higher faculties, i.e. the faculties of philosophy and theology. He should ensure the *Ratio studiorum* is followed by students and teachers, moderates the monthly disputations of philosophers and theologians §176¹¹⁸, visits the lectures to inspect methods used by the teachers and so on.³⁰ In the case of large schools, (E) the Prefect of Lower Studies (*praefectus studiorum inferiorum*), subaltern to the (D), may be established for the humanities.³¹ Though these Prefects are subordinated to the Rector in what pertains to their offices, they are nevertheless appointed by the Provincial (B).³² (F) The Beadle (*bidellus*) is an assistant³³ of the teacher, but not a member of the Society. As *Constitutions* and *Declarations* say, there will be ‘two

²⁷ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Ratio studiorum of 1599*, p. 113.

²⁸ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, p. 340.

²⁹ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

³⁰ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, p. 341.

³¹ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, p. 340; PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³² FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, pp. 340–341.

³³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 196–198; *Ibid.*, p. 55, fn. 61, “Beadle: *bidellus* is a very old academic term used for a kind of assistant who helps to take care of some of the business aspects of a university. Individual teachers sometimes had their own beadles, who might even help maintain the neatness of the classroom.”

or three beadles, one in the faculty of languages, another in that of arts, and another in that of theology.’³⁴ Because of the number and variety of tasks, he was to receive a good salary. One among those beadles could execute punishments (serving as a *corrector*).³⁵

B. JESUIT UNIVERSITY STRUCTURE, COURSES AND TEACHERS WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON *SUMMA* OF LOGIC

§149. As we saw above, the *Constitutions* prescribe the office of beadles (A) for the faculty of languages, (B) for the arts and (C) for theology while going on to say that the ‘university will be divided into these three faculties.’³⁶ (A) Faculty of languages (*facultad de las lenguas, facultas linguarum*) or faculty of humane letters (*litterae humaniores*)³⁷ embodies (a) Latin and Greek grammar (Lower, Middle and Upper classes), (b) Humanities and (d) Rhetoric (but as needed, also the Hebrew, Arabic, Chaldaic and Indic).³⁸ Only when being sufficiently prepared, the Prefect of Studies decides a student can be promoted to a higher of the five abovementioned classes. Although no exact length for the language faculty studies could be set, talented pupils might complete it in four years.³⁹ In the *Ratio studiorum* of 1599, mainly

³⁴ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 17, § 4, p. 227.

³⁵ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 17, § 4, p. 227.

³⁶ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 17, § 4, p. 227.

³⁷ GANSS, G., *Ignatius’ Idea of a Jesuit University, op. cit.*, p. 58, “[Ignatius] placed the Latin, Greek, Hebrew and other languages under the faculty of languages and named them *litterae humaniores*; later on, by means of an insertion, Clarification A, he put rhetoric, poetry, and history under this same heading.”

³⁸ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, p. 146; For detailed discussion of humane letters curriculum see *ibid.* pp. 344–353.

³⁹ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, p. 147.

with respect to their Prefects or teachers, the (A) language or humane letters faculty is referred to as the ‘Lower Studies’ (*studia inferiora*),⁴⁰ whereas both the faculty of Arts or philosophy (B) and (C) the faculty of theology are occasionally called the higher faculties (*superiores facultates*).⁴¹

§150. (B) Within the philosophical curriculum, students must master (1) Aristotelian Logic in the first year, (2) Physics in the second and (3) Metaphysics in the third year. (1) Let us mention the main points of the Logic course as it particularly pertains to our subject matter. (a) According to the 1599 *Ratio*, in the first two months, a teacher explained what seemed to him to be more necessary from a *summa* of logic either by Toledo or by Fonseca.⁴² It is stressed that the *loci* and *fallacies* from the Aristotle’s *Topics* and *Refutations* should be arranged more conveniently and taught now.⁴³ But in those places, Pavur’s translations of the Latin *Logicam, eius summa* as an ‘overall plan’ of logic⁴⁴ and *initio Logicae in summa* as ‘in a comprehensive overview at

⁴⁰ Cf. e.g. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁴¹ Cf. e.g. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴² PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 101; MP V, R99, pp. 397–398, “§ 1. Explicet primo anno Logicam, eius summa primo circiter bimestri tradita, non tam dictando, quam ex Toletio seu Fonseca, quae magis necessaria videbuntur, explicando.” TOLETUS, F. *Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis*. Coloniae Agripinae, Apud Haeredes Arnoldi Bickmanni 1575, [first publ. Rome, 1561]; FONSECA, P. *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*, [first publ. Lisbon, 1564]. In *Instituições dialécticas / Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*. Latin-Portugal edition. Introduction, text, translation and notes by GOMES, J. F., Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra 1964.

⁴³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 103; MP V, R99, p. 398, “§ 6. Ex Topicis vero et Elenchis loci et fallaciae, commodiorem in ordinem redactae, melius explicantur initio Logicae in summa.”

⁴⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 101, “In the first year, after presenting its overall plan in about the first two months, he should teach logic, not so much dictating as explaining what seems to be more necessary from Toledo or Fonseca.”

the beginning of logic⁴⁵ turn out too vague. By it, the relationship is erased between the *Summa* or a *Summula*, signifying particular works by Fonseca and Toledo and the important time of a *summa* of logic exposition when students have first been trained in disputation as well; see [T19]§152¹⁰³.

§151. Let me prove therefore, that [T18] in the first two months of a Logic course, when a *summa* of logic was to be exposed according to 1599 *Ratio studiorum*, the *Summa* or *Summula*, signifying a particular work by Fonseca or Toledo, was to be explained as an Introduction to logic. | Three arguments at least can be brought for that claim. (i) It is witnessed in the 1591 *Ratio*.⁴⁶ (ii) It is witnessed in the 1586 as well, where certain reasons to prefer Fonseca are also rendered. Probably not being compared as much with the *Introductio* by Toledo as with the *Summula* by Soto,⁴⁷ Fonseca's work is considered broader here, clearer, more conforming (*accomodatior*) to Aristotle and without

⁴⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 103, “6. The *loci* and fallacies from the *Topics* and *Refutations*, summarized in a more convenient arrangement, are better taught in a comprehensive overview at the beginning of logic.”

⁴⁶ MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Philosophiae*, § 3, p. 279, “Explicit anno primo Logicam; sed primo bimestri Summulam P. Fonsecae”

⁴⁷ MP I, NADAL, H. *De studii generalis dispositione et ordine* [1552], (mon. 11), p. 144, “[16] Primo igitur anno professor logices dabit tres vel quattuor menses introductionibus dialecticis, quae ex aliquo auctore eorum, qui circumferuntur, deligentur, vel certe compendium conficiatur ex aliquo eorum, qui sophistae habentur, ut ex Dominico Soto, eiusque *Summulae* (ut aiunt) ad methodum aliquam concinnentur.” MP VI, IUDICIA CONGREGATIONUM DE TRACTATU «DE THEOLOGIA SCHOLASTICA», (mon. 12), the judgment by Bartholomaeus Perez, S.J. on the recommendation of Fonseca's *Institutionum* by the 1586 *Ratio*, pp. 278–279, “Certe hispanis accommodatior est patris Toleti; exercentur enim cum utilitate ingenia hispanorum illis tricis. . . . Quare fructuose laboratur in illis, quando sine excessu fit, cumque assueti sint hispani Summulis Soti et aliorum, a quibus eae patris Toleti multa researunt, satis accommodatae manserunt pro illis, nec deterrebunt tyrones, imo recreantur illis acutis cavillationibus.”

sophistry (*sine tricis*).⁴⁸ But finally (iii), it is proven by the notice of Jesuit father Ludovico Masselli. Having been sent as a visitor to the *Roman College* in 1602, he records concerning the 1599 *Ratio* observance at the College: ‘*As to the rule 9 § 1 and next.* – It was strongly recommended, so that, for the introduction to logic at the beginning of the first year, the *Summa* by Toledo or Fonseca was explained; and the full disputation on universals was postponed for metaphysic’⁴⁹

§152. (b) Most importantly for the present disputation practice research, [T19] for the first time the higher faculties students were gradually instructed on how to dispute during the opening two months of the Logic course. | It is evident on the account that [T20] the 1599 *Ratio* constitutes a kind of schedule for disputing training in the time of a *summa* exposition. The same brings an authority to those passages in Toledo and Fonseca, which deal with disputation method. | At that time, neither the teacher nor his students were to involve themselves in the monthly disputations §174¹¹⁷. Moreover, for approximately one or two weeks at the beginning, the logicians were not to dispute at all. According to the 1586 *Ratio* proposal, in the very first week, while explaining and solving (*solutio*) the difficult points (*dubia*), see ^(d)§170¹¹⁴, the daily repetition at home as well as in the classroom §168¹¹³

⁴⁸ MP V, R86A, De Studio Philosophiae, § 6, p. 100, “6. Logicae *Summula* praemittatur; et *Summula* quidem P. Fonsecae esset forte magis ad rem, quia latior, clarior, accommodatior Aristoteli, et sine tricis, quae et inutiles sunt et deterrent tirones.”

⁴⁹ P. LUDOVICUS MASELLI S.I. VIS. STUD. COLLEGII ROMANI. ANNO 1602, (mon. 54 II 1). In *Monumenta paedagogica Societatis Iesu. Nova editio penitus retractata. VII.*, In regulas professoris philosophiae, p. 488, “*In reg. 9 § 1 et sequ.* – Valde commendatum fuit, ut initio primi anni ad introductionem logicae explicetur Toleti *Summa* vel Fonsecae; et plena de universalibus disputatio differatur in metaphysicam; et ut de Praedicamentis prima faciliora quaedam proponantur, caetera vero in finem anni reiiciantur, postquam actum fuerit de scientia.”

should be entirely without arguments. In the further repetitions, a place could be reserved for minor argumentations (*argumentatiunculis*). Based on the 1599 *Ratio* as well as that of 1586, only after this two week period, students were said to be able to (*posse*) defend some theses in their own classes on Saturday, §172¹¹⁵. But even then, teachers suggested certain arguments until, little by little, the logicians were fully trained for the fight (*ad pugnam*).⁵⁰

§153. (c) In the following period, teachers should address the easier issues of *Categories* (*Praedicamentis*), leaving the remainder for the end of the year. But *analogy* and *relation* were to be treated adequately, as they often came up in disputations.⁵¹ The second book of *On Interpretation* and both books of the *Prior Analytics* followed. During the end of the first year, attaching the *Physics* prolegomena to it, a teacher should more fully dispute the question *de scientia*. Namely, he is to treat the divisions of the sciences their distinctions according to the abstraction from matter (*abstractiones*), distinction ‘the speculative – the practical’

⁵⁰ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 107; MP V, R99, p. 381, “18. Quo tempore summam Logicae praeceptor tradit, nec ipse, nec eius auditores ad has disputationes convenient. Immo prima aut altera circiter hebdomada logici nihil disputent, una fere rerum explanatione contenti; ex quo tempore poterunt in sua classe defendere theses aliquas die sabbati.” MP V, R86A, De Studio Philosophiae, § 6, p. 100, “Dum autem *Summula* exponitur, . . . Prima vero hebdomada (sic!), quotidiana quae domi et in scholis fieri solet repetitio, nihil habeat argumentorum, sed nudam fere explanationem et dubiorum solutionem. Postea vero argumentatiunculis aliquot locus praeberi posset. Toto vero tempore *Summulae* nec professor, nec auditores in menstruas disputationes cum aliis convenient. Tametsi post unam aut alteram hebdomadam in sua classe possent defendere theses aliquas in sabbato, suggerente, si oporteret, argumenta praeceptore, donec paulatim exercentur ad pugnam.”

⁵¹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 102; MP V, R99, p. 398, “§ 3. De Praedicamentis etiam faciliora quaedam proponat, quae fere attinguntur ab Aristotele; cetera in postremum reiiciat annum; de analogia tamen et relatione, quoniam frequentissime in disputationes cadunt, quantum satis est, agat in Logica.”

(*speculativum, practicum*) and subordination (*subalternatio*) of sciences. Finally, the various manners of proceeding are to be discussed in physics and mathematics (*Physics*, book 2) and what is said on definition in *On the Soul*, book 2.⁵²

§154. (2) In the second year, the eight books of the *Physics*,⁵³ were to be covered, as well as the books *On the Heavens*⁵⁴ and the first book from *On Generation and Meteorologica*⁵⁵. Moreover, all students attended a short daily mathematics class, whereas those inclined towards these studies and being suitable for them studied in private classes after the course.⁵⁶ (3) In the third year, the

⁵² PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 102; MP V, R99, p. 398, “§ 4. Librum secundum Perihermenias et ambos Priorum libros, . . . § 5. Atque, ut secundus annus integer rebus physicis tribuatur, in fine primi anni plenior instituatür disputatio de scientia; in eamque coniiciantur prolegomena Physicae maxima ex parte, ut scientiarum divisiones, abstractiones, speculativum, practicum, subalternata, diversus quoque procedendi modus in physicis et mathematicis, de quo Aristoteles lib. 2 Physicorum; demum quicquid de definitione dicitur lib. 2 de Anima.”

⁵³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 103; MP V, R99, p. 398, “In octo libris Physicorum compendio tradatur textus libri sexti et septimi; etiam primi ex ea parte, quae est de antiquorum opinionibus. In octavo libro nihil disseratur de numero intelligentiarum, nec de libertate, nec de infinitate primi motoris; sed haec in Metaphysicis disputentur; et quidem solum ex sententia Aristotelis.”

⁵⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 103; MP V, R99, p. 398, “Textus secundi, tertii, quarti de Coelo breviter perstringantur, magna etiam ex parte praetereant. In his libris non tractentur, nisi paucae de Elementis quaestiones; de Coelo autem dumtaxat de eius substantia, et de influentiis; ceterae mathematicae professori relinquuntur, vel conferantur in compendium.”

⁵⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 103–104; MP V, R99, p. 398, “Meteorologica vero percurrantur aestivis mensibus ultima pomeridiana scholae hora; idque sive ab ordinario, si possit, philosophiae professore, sive ab extraordinario, nisi aliter fieri commodius videretur.”

⁵⁶ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20; MP V, R99, p. 362, “Audiant et secundo philosophiae anno philosophi omnes in schola tribus circiter horae quadrantibus mathematicam praelectionem. Si qui praeterea sint idonei et propensi ad haec studia, privatis post cursum lectionibus exercentur.” PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 109–110; MP V, R99, p. 402, “Pysicae auditoribus explicet in schola tribus circiter horae quadrantibus Euclidis elementa; in quibus, postquam per duos menses aliquantisper versati fuerint, aliquid

second book of *On Generation*, the books of *On the Soul* and the *Metaphysics* are explained. In the latest, the questions that depend in greater part on divine faith should be skipped.⁵⁷ Similarly, as was the case of mathematics in the second year, a minor amount of time – thirty or forty-five minutes daily – was dedicated to the *Ethics* of Aristotle.⁵⁸ As in the case of *Metaphysics*, digressions to theological questions were strictly forbidden in this course.⁵⁹

§155. (C) Within the standard four year theological curriculum, students must master the minor courses of (1) Sacred Scripture and (2) Hebrew. Nevertheless, the heart of the curriculum was framed by so called (3) Scholastic Theology. (4) The Cases of Conscience was a ‘parallel-to-theology-like’ special course aimed at training skilled ministers of the sacraments (parish priests).⁶⁰ Ever since the first year of arts studies (B), all auditors were examined for several times to discern who were prom-

Geographiae vel Sphaerae, vel eorum, quae libenter audiri solent, adiungat; idque cum Euclide vel eodem die, vel alternis diebus.”

⁵⁷ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 104; MP V, R99, pp. 398–399, “In primo libro de Anima veterum placita philosophorum summam percurrat. In secundo, expositis sensoriis, non digrediat in anatomiam, et cetera, quae mediocrum sunt. § 2. In Metaphysica quaestiones de Deo et intelligentiis, quae omnino aut magnopere pendent ex veritatibus divina fide traditae praetereant. Prooemium ac septimi et duodecimi libri textus magna ex parte diligenter explicetur. In ceteris libris seligantur ex unoquoque quidam praecipui textus, tanquam fundamenta quaestionum, quae ad metaphysicum pertinent.”

⁵⁸ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, p. 343; PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 108–109; MP V, R99, p. 401, “Ubi ab ipsomet philosophici cursus professore ethica praelegi non solent, exponat, qui ethica tradit, metaphysicis graviores huius scientiae quaestiones; idque per tres quadrantes quotidie, aut semihoram.”

⁵⁹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 108; MP V, R99, p. 401, “Intelligat, sui instituti nequaquam esse ad theologicas quaestiones digredi, sed progrediendo in textu breviter, docte et graviter praecipua capita scientiae moralis, quae in decem libris Ethicorum Aristotelis habentur, explicare.”

⁶⁰ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code, op. cit.*, p. 343; PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 95.

ising to continue in philosophy and the future studies of theology (C). Destined for the (4) Cases of Conscience, the rest was removed.⁶¹ On the other hand, at the beginning of the fourth year of standard theological curriculum, certain students were designated for two year private theology review (to obtain doctorate degree), the disputation practices of which I shall return to later on; see from §191¹²⁶.

§156. (1) Taking one hour daily, the Sacred Scripture was taught for a period of two years. The Old and New Testament alternated each year. (2) For a one year period, Hebrew was usually taught by the Sacred Scripture teacher, taking two hours per week.⁶² (3) Scholastic Theology was lectured by two teachers for four hours weekly over a four year period.⁶³ (a) In the first year, the first teacher taught questions about Sacred Doctrine, One God and Trinity from Part I of the Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, the second about justice and right from its *Secunda Secundae* and important points about religion. (b) In the second year,

⁶¹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16; “If any have been found unsuited for philosophy in the earlier examination, they should be sent to case studies or, at the judgment of the provincial, to teaching (for this is how we understand the assignment to case studies). About the rest, nothing certain should be set for the time being. In the later examination, three grades are possible for the examinees: either they surpass the average, and they ought to continue on with the remaining studies; or they are below the average, and all of these ought to be as signed to case studies; . . . ” MP V, R99, p. 401, “Ergo in priori examine si qui inepti ad philosophiam deprehensi fuerint, destinentur ad casus, vel ad docendum provincialis arbitrio (sic enim hanc destinationem ad casus intelligimus); de reliquis nihil certi pro tempore statuatur. In posteriori vero examine triplex omnino gradus in iis, qui examinantur, animadverti potest; aut enim mediocritatem excedunt, et hi reliqua studia persequi debent; aut infra illam sunt, et hi omnino casibus applicandi erunt; . . . ” Cf. LUKÁCS, L. De graduum diversitate inter sacerdotes in Societate Iesu. In *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu*, 37 (1968), pp. 266–273

⁶² FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, p. 343; PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 55–61; MP V, R99, pp. 383–385.

⁶³ FARRELL, *The Jesuit Code*, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

the first lectured on the angels, and, from the *Prima Secundae*, on the final end and on human acts. The second teacher addressed questions concerning the Incarnation from Part III and certain more important issues about the sacraments in general. (c) In the third year, the first lectured on habits and virtues from the *Prima Secundae*, the second on baptism and the Eucharist (plus on the ordination, confirmation and extreme unction, if possible). (d) In the fourth year, whereas the first taught matters concerning faith, hope and charity from the *Secunda Secundae*, the second teacher discussed the ‘penance and matrimony.’⁶⁴

⁶⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 64; MP V, R99, p. 387, “§ 1. Primus 43 quaestiones ex prima parte explicet primo anno; secundo anno materiam de angelis, atque unam et viginti quaestiones ex prima secundae; tertio anno a quaestione 55 vel 71 ad finem primae secundae; quarto anno ex secunda secundae materiam de fide, spe et caritate. § 2. Alter professor primo anno explanet ex secunda secundae quaestiones de iustitia et iure, et praecipua quaedam de religione; secundo ex tertia parte quaestiones de Incarnatione, et, si potest, graviora saltem quaedam explicet de sacramentis in genere; tertio de baptismo et Eucharistia, et, si quid potest, de ordine, confirmatione, ex tertia unctione; quarto de poenitentia et matrimonio.”

2 Practice of the Higher Faculties Disputations

§157. As defined in the Introduction, the *practice of disputation* is an all *specific practices* system held in an institution; see [D5]§14¹². Further, the *specific practice* is a sequence of *specific persons* activities preformed according to a single *disputation method* or according to more *disputation methods* in succession, the further conditions of which are determined (a) by the explicit rules of an institution or (b) by a custom or (c) an actual authority; see [D6]§14¹². Let me finally remind that the *specific persons* are either (1) derivatives of *paradigmatic persons* distinguished (i) by a sequencing, like the first opponent, the second one, the first respondent, the second one, etc. or (ii) by a subordination – the praeses is being called ‘honourable respondent’ or ‘head of respondent’ often, etc.; or, the *specific persons* are (2) additional characters, like the public or the moderator, helping the full and correct conduct of disputation, see [D2]§10¹⁰.

§158. In accordance with those definitions, the present chapter reveals the substance of *disputation practice* within the Jesuit University higher faculties, cf. (B)(C)§149¹⁰⁰ and on. Divided according to their frequency or a proper occasion generally, the *specific practices* are listed in what follows. On an everyday basis, the ‘repetitions in the classroom’ or ‘repetitions at home’ took place, where a simple disputation was the constituent part in the latter; see from §159¹¹⁰ on. So called ‘weekly disputations’ were generally held on Saturday in the classroom of each teacher; see from §172¹¹⁵ on. Finally, all teachers of every philosophy year-class gathered for monthly ‘common disputations’ and the theologians operated similarly; see from §174¹¹⁷ on. Philosophy acts are pub-

lic disputations on the entire philosophy course matter; see from §181¹²² on. The ‘particular acts’ and the ‘general acts’ are public disputations on a portion of or the entire matter of the theology course; see from §191¹²⁶ on.

2.1 Daily Disputations and Repetitions

§159. Information regarding daily disputations and repetitions (latin *repetitio* is sometimes translated as ‘review’ in secondary sources) can be found both in the Jesuit *Constitutions* (while accompanied with their *Declarations*) and, of course, in the *Ratio studiorum* of 1599. However, since these exercises had been set down in the former, some thirty years before the final *Ratio studiorum* of 1599 was promulgated, understandably there appears tension between these documents. First of all, whereas the *Ratio* primarily distinguishes between two kinds of repetitions, i.e. the repetitions held (A) in the classroom and those (B) held in the college, see §168¹¹³, then the daily disputations are understood much like parts of (B), in the *Constitution* and in *Declaration* the principal distinction seems to lay between the (1) daily repetition on one hand and the (2) daily disputation on the other. The latter is evident both from the difference of places either of these practices are embedded in *Constitutions*, as well as from the various concerns of the rules in question.

A. DAILY DISPUTATIONS AND DAILY REPETITIONS ACCORDING TO THE JESUIT CONSTITUTIONS

§160. The daily repetitions (1) are first addressed in *Constitutions* (P. IV, Ch. 6, § 8). The main objectives of these exercises are both (I) to refresh and memorize matters of a recent lecture by students and (II) to get to know the most difficult points stu-

dents cannot settle among themselves. *Constitutions* and *Declarations* state it as follows:

§161. “8. The scholastics should be regular in going to the lectures, diligent in preparing for them beforehand, in repeating them afterwards [H], in asking about points they do not understand, and in noting down what may be useful to assist the memory later on [I].”¹

§162. “H. The rector should take care that these repetitions take place at a fixed time in the schools or in the house. One student should repeat the matter and the others should listen. They should propose to one another the difficulties which occur and have recourse to the professor in matters which they cannot solve satisfactorily among themselves.”²

§163. As *Declarations* unfolds it in H, repetitions are based on three procedural elements: (i) repeating the matter of the lecture by one student in front of others, (ii) proposing the difficult points (*difficultades, difficilia*) from one another and finally, (iii) in case they are not able to settle it (*resolver, constituere*) among themselves. Students should then visit a teacher to ask him for advice.

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- ¹ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 6, § 8, in GANSS, G. E. *The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus*. St. Louis, Institute of Jesuit Sources 1970, p. 193; MP I, ConstL, p. 239, “8. Scholastici in audiendis lectionibus sint assidui, et in eis praevidendis diligentes, et, [H] postquam eas audierint, repetendis; iis quae non intellexerint interrogandis, [I] aliis vero quae oportuerit annotandis; quo in posterum memoriae defectui consulatur.” MP I, ConstH94, p. 238, “8. Los estudiantes sean continuos en yr a las lecciones y diligentes en el proveerlas, [H] y después de oídas en el repetir las, y demandar lo que no entienden y [I] anotar lo que conviene para suplir la memoria para adelante.”
- ² ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 6, § 8, H, p. 194; MP I, ConstL, pp. 239, 241, “H. *Quod ad repetitiones attinet, curet Rector ut certis quibusdam horis in scholis vel domi fiant, uno quidem repetente et aliis audientibus, et, quae difficilia occurrerint, mutuo proponentibus; et si quid erit de quo constituere inter se non possint, magistrum adeant.*” MP I, ConstH94, pp. 238, 240, “H. *Acerca del repetir, tenga el Rector cuidado que se haga en alguna hora cierta en las escuelas o en casa, repitiendo uno y oyendo los otros, y proponiéndose las difficultades que ocurren, y recurriendo al maestro en lo que bien no saben resolver entre sí.*”

§164. I inquire what the difficult points of (ii) are in fact. Namely, whether this document addresses (d1) a general kind of textual or expository difficulty students could not ‘understand’ (*entienden, intellexerint*) properly – even they discuss them among themselves – and therefore, they should ask a teacher. *Constitutions* seems to suggest this case. On the contrary, if the *resolver* or *constituere* is rightly understood as ‘to solve,’ then the *Declarations* may presuppose (d2) a more precise grasp of difficulties here, namely those hard-to-answer objections of a kind. Such an issue is directly connected with the search for the nature of a proper subject of the (2) daily disputations and even with the nature of daily disputation itself.

§165. The daily disputations (2) are prescribed by *Constitutions* later on (P. IV, Ch. 6, § 11) as the last part of rules concerning various kinds of disputations Jesuit academics should hold or take part in. Standard English translation reads as follows:

§166. “11. In addition to the two kinds of disputations mentioned, an hour ought also to be designated each day for holding disputation within the college, with someone presiding in the manner already stated. The purpose is that the intellectual powers may be exercised more and that difficult matters occurring in these branches may be clarified, for the glory of God our Lord.”³

³ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 6, § 11, p. 195; MP I, ConstL, p. 245, “11. Praeter haec duo disputationum praedictarum genera, cotidie aliquod tempus designandum, quo in collegiis, praesidente aliquo, ut diximus, disputetur; ut, ea ratione et ingenia magis exercentur, et difficilia quae in his facultatibus occurrent, magis ad Dei gloriam elucidentur.” MP I, ConstH94, p. 244, “11. Sin estas dos maneras de disputaciones dichas aun cada dia deve alguna hora señalarse para que se dispute en los collegios, presidiendo alguno, como es dicho, para que más se exerciten los ingenios, y se aclaren las cosas difficiles destas facultades a gloria de Dios nuestro Señor.” MP I, ConstH48, p. 244, 246, “Sin estas disputas, por la grande utilidad que ay del tal exercitio, specialmente en las artes y teología scholástica, aya cada día una hora para disputar de las lecciones que se leyn, en algún lugar apto para ello, asistiendo alguno que ordene la disputa y acuerde los disputantes, y les señale hasta

§167. Notice the very goals of such disputation exercises. These are both (I) to exercise intellectual powers (*ratione et ingenia*) and (II) to clarify difficult matters (*cosas difficiles, difficilia*). Therefore, provided that (d1) is the case, [T21] it looks like students had selected the most difficult matter by discussion within the daily repetition first and then this was a subject of the daily disputation. |

B. DAILY DISPUTATIONS AS A CONSTITUENT OF AT HOME REPETITIONS ACCORDING TO THE RATIO STUDIORUM OF 1599

§168. The normative *Ratio studiorum* of 1599 prescribes a practice of daily exercise for students of the higher faculties. As it was stated, there are basically two kinds of such an exercise being understood either as (A) ‘repetitions in the classroom’ (*repetitiones in schola*) or (B) ‘repetitions at home’ (*repetitiones domi*) – as it is supposed to be practiced in the student’s own college. But for completeness sake, I should mention that this *Ratio* discerns also a third kind of repetitions which 1599 *Ratio* calls (C) ‘general repetitions’ (*repetitiones generales*).⁴

§169. (A) In the case of repetitions in the classroom, *Ratio* of 1599 does not give but a short precept for the teacher. He should remain in or near the classroom for at least 15 minutes after a lecture so that: (a) students might approach him to question (*ad eum interrogandum*); (b) he might demand of them to

dónde han de proceder en los argumentos y les ayude a resolver algunas dificultades.”

⁴ MP V, R99, p. 381; PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

present him the gist of the lectures occasionally; and (c) the lectures might be repeated.⁵

§170. (B) *Ratio* schedules the repetitions at home as follows: (a) In advance, one or two (*unus aut alter*) students should be reminded to hold this exercise. Then, at a fixed hour (b) they should repeat the main points of a lecture from memory for not more than a quarter of an hour. Next, (c) another one or two are to dispute with the same number of students acting as respondents for a quarter of an hour each. Finally, (d) if any time is left, difficult points (*dubia*) ought to be displayed. For the reason of time-saving, the teacher has to hold the form of argumentation strictly and when nothing new is being said, he is to cut the argument off. All that college daily training shall last one hour and take place daily except for Saturdays, vacations, and holidays.⁶

§171. Contrary to the *Constitutions*, the above mentioned disputations (c) are understood as a constituent of the daily repetitions at home (B) in the *Ratio* of 1599. This claim is supported by the evidence of the same twofold aims *Ratio* sets for (B) as it has been done in *Constitutions* for the daily disputations (2): ‘The purposes of this procedure are both to better exercise their [i.e. student’s] intellectual abilities, and to better clarify the difficult

⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 51; MP V, R99, p. 381, “11. Post lectionem in schola, vel prope scholam maneat saltem per quadrantem, ut possint ad eum interrogandum auditores accedere, ut lectionum rationem interdum exigit, utque eae repetantur.”

⁶ MP V, R99, p. 381, “12. Domi quoque quotidie, praeter sabbatha, vacationes et dies festos, hora una designanda, qua repetatur a nostris et disputetur; . . . Praemoneatur itaque unus aut alter ad repetendum memoriter non plus quam per quadrantem; postea argumentetur unus item aut alter, totidem respondentibus; si quid vero temporis supersit, dubia proponantur; ut autem supersit, magister argumentandi formam severe tueatur; et cum novi nihil affertur, praecidat argumentum.”

points that come up.⁷ To sum up the 1599 *Ratio* idea, [T22] besides the ‘repetitions in the classroom,’ also the ‘repetitions at home’ take place in the student’s own college on an every day basis. A simple disputation became a constituent part of the latter in substitution for the anterior practice of ‘daily disputations’ as originally prescribed by *Constitutions*. |

2.2 Weekly and Monthly Disputations

A. WEEKLY DISPUTATION ACCORDING TO RATIO STUDIORUM OF 1599

§172. Each teacher of a higher faculty had to hold so called ‘weekly disputations’ (*disputationes hebdomadariae*). The general context of these was as follows: It took place (a) in teacher’s own classroom (b) on Saturday, or on some day according to the school custom (there are further specifications⁸) (c) for two hours (or longer, where there were large gatherings of non-Jesuits).⁹ (d) Not more than eight or nine conclusions taken from the week lectures matter were defended by a student on Satur-

⁷ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 52, MP V, R99, p. 381, “qua repetatur a nostris et disputetur; ut ea ratione et ingenia magis exercentur, et difficilia, quae occurrent, magis elucidentur.”

⁸ A lecture took place instead of disputation on Saturday, if two feast days had occurred in that week (or if the weekly break day occurred at once with a feast day). On the other hand, if this went on for three weeks, one disputation was inserted. *See* the very next fn.

⁹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 53; MP V, R99, pp. 381–382, “14. In sabbatho, aliove, quem academiae consuetudo exigit, die habeant in scholis disputationes per duas horas; longiores etiam, ubi sint magni externorum concursus. Quod si quam in hebdomadam duo festi dies, vel cum festo uno hebdomadaria vacatio incidat, non disputetur, sed legatur sabbatho; id vero si tribus continuaretur hebdomadis, una interponatur disputatio.”

day, as far as scholastic theology is concerned.¹⁰ Wherefore the 1599 *Ratio* based thesis, that [T23] with the weekly frequency, so called ‘weekly disputations’ were held in the classroom of each teacher on Saturday generally. | But because the 1599 *Ratio* comments rather succinctly on the specific practice of weekly disputations, to depict it in more detail means to consult the older versions of that document. Both the 1591 *Ratio* and the proposal of 1586 specify that the said practice should take place (e) in the afternoon or within the time of the last two lessons, half an hour after the common beginning of classes.¹¹ The 1591 *Ratio* speaks on the weekly disputations of both philosophers and theologians identically. (f) Four opponents should engage, each of which (g) was allowed to use two arguments and (h) to oppose for 30 minutes.¹²

§173. For particular students of logics, physics, metaphysics and theology, who were set to defend, their duty should have been reminded by the beadles §148⁹⁹ about seven days in advance. Beadles were to ensure that the conclusions for the weekly disputation had been written out on time. Next, they took them to corresponding teachers for correction and finally to the prefect

¹⁰ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 42; MP V, R99, *Regulae Praefecti Studiorum*, § 14, p. 375.

¹¹ MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Scholasticae Theologiae*, § 40, p. 273, “In sabbato aliove, quem vetus academiae consuetudo exigit, die professores vicissim proprias habeant in scholis disputationes per duas (plus etiam, ubi multiplex externorum concursus) horas ultimas”; MP V, R86A, *De Disputationibus*, § 1, pp. 71–72, “In sabbato vel (si id vetus academiae consuetudo exigat) dominico die a prandio professores vicissim habeant proprias in scholis disputationes; et quidem perduas horas, nempe dimidia hora post commune principium scholarum, nisi ubi multiplex externorum concursus longius eas protrahi suaderet.”

¹² MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Scholasticae Theologiae*, § 40, p. 273, “In sabbato aliove . . . quatuor, si non obstet paucitas auditorum, argumentetur, et quidem duobus quilibet argumentis per semihoram.”; *Ibid.*, *Regulae Professoris Philosophiae*, § 38–39, p. 282.

of studies §148⁹⁹ to be surveyed (*recognoscendas*). When anything came up on which the prefect and the teacher did not agree, the former was not to eliminate or change any conclusion without the teacher's knowledge. Finally, the rector could discreetly terminate that issue.¹³ Now, once those came to an agreement, beadles again reminded the students in question to bring as many copies of conclusions as needed. The day before the disputation, in the morning, each beadle openly posted the nicely written out copy and distributed the rest to the opponents.¹⁴ Finally, on Saturday the disputation took place according to the method analysed in *Part One*, see from §106⁷⁵ on.

B. COMMON MONTHLY DISPUTATION ACCORDING TO RATIO STUDIORUM OF 1599

§174. Beside other features, [T24] the common disputations (*disputationes communes*) differed most greatly from those held weekly in the respect that all teachers of the three philosophical subjects met and disputed together in a classroom, rather than each in his own. Also, all teachers of scholastic theology (usually two or three) met in a similar manner in another room. | Specific

¹³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 43; MP V, R99, p. 376, “[Prefectus] praeceptorem perquam benigne et comiter admoneat; remque totam ad rectorem, si necesse sit, deferat. 18. Idem servandum, cum in recognoscendis conclusionibus aliquid incideret, quod inter praefectum et praeceptorem non conveniret; neque enim eo insciente conclusionem ullam aut delere aut immutare debet; ipsa vero immutatio fiet ceteris omnibus insciis, praeter rectorem.”

¹⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 197; MP V, R99, p. 445, “4. Praemoneat septem fere ante diebus eos, qui hebdomadarias theses sunt defensuri. Curabit autem, ut eae propositiones in tempore conscriptae sint; eas vero primum ad magistrum perferet corrigendas, tum ad praefectum recognoscendas; quibus denique correctis atque recognitis, eum, qui defensurus est, admonebit, ut quot erunt opus exempla, descripta afferat; eorum autem unum bene descriptum pridie, quam sit disputandum mane publice affiget, reliqua disceptantibus deinde distribuet.”

details for common disputations of philosophers are treated from (A)§177¹¹⁹ below and for those of theologians in (B)§180¹²¹ below.

§175. Further, both these gatherings had to take place (a) every month (or every other month if there was small number of students) during the school year, (b) on some fixed day (generally on Saturday) and (c) both in the morning (for 2.5 hours) and in the afternoon (for 2.5 hours as well). But even before the points (a)–(c), *Ratio* adds the frequent clause ‘if the tradition (*mos receptus*) of the academy does not prevent it.’¹⁵ (d) It might happen there was only one teacher of philosophy in a Jesuit academy. In this case, he had to organize a more solemn disputation only three or four times a year. This was to be done with such brilliance (*splendore*) and preparation (*apparatus*) that some productive fervour would arise from it for the Jesuit studies. For the very same reason, some extern doctors (*doctores*) might be invited to argue.¹⁶

§176. [T25] The specific person of moderator was applied in monthly disputations, which was, however, distinct from the specific person of the respondent’s guardian or praeses. | It is the prefect of studies who should chair (*praesum*) all disputations to which the teachers of theology or philosophy gather. He is (a) to give a signal to stop while allotting time in such a way that each person has its proper period for disputing. The moderator should (b) not allow any objection (*difficultas*) that remains even

¹⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 53; MP V, R99, p. 382, “15. Ubi receptus academiae mos nihil obstat, singulis, praeter tres menses aestivos ultimos, aut (si pauci sint auditores) alternis mensibus communes certo aliquo die disputationes, tum ante tum post meridiem habeantur”

¹⁶ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 107; MP V, R99, p. 400, “19. Ubi non est, nisi unus philosophiae magister ter aut quater in anno instituat sollemniores aliquas disputationes festo aliove feriato die; idque eo splendore atque apparatu, invitatis etiam religiosis aliisque doctoribus ad argumentandum, ut ex ea re studiis nostris non infructuosus aliquis fervor accedat.”

less understood at the conclusion than at the beginning. After some contest therefore, (c) he should ensure the objection is carefully explicated §65⁴⁶ by the respondent's guardian (*praesideo, qui praeest*), i.e. his teacher.¹⁷ The moderator (c) does not solve the arguments but simply guides (*moderor*) the opponent and respondent, which proceeds with greater dignity if he achieves the explanation of objection (*difficultas*) not by arguing but rather by asking (*interrogando*).¹⁸

§177. (A) In the common monthly disputation of philosophers, as many students must respond as there were teachers present at the event – each respondent defended the proper themes (*quaestiones*) of a particular teacher.¹⁹ On the other hand, at least three opponents were to argue in the morning and the same number in the afternoon. But it made a difference upon which position each of those opponents disputed. Very likely, [T26] the position of an opponent arguing first was in a sense the most privileged or important. | It seems so on the ground that whereas the rest had got about three quarters of an hour

¹⁷ Cf. MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Scholasticae Theologiae*, § 44, p. 273, “Quot fuerint professores, totidem auditores et quidem ex eodem scamno, defendant, unius quilibet professori quaestiones; praesideant e scamnis professores, unusquisque suo, moderante universam disputationem praefecto studiorum.”

¹⁸ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 40; MP V, R99, pp. 374–375, “Omnibus disputationibus, ad quas professores sive theologi sive philosophi conveniunt, praefectus praesit oportet; signumque det finiendi iis, qui disputant; ac tempus sic distribuat, ut omnibus suus sit disputandi locus. Non patietur, difficultatem ullam, quae in disputationem veniat, ultro citroque sic agitari, ut non minus, quam antea incomprehensa permaneat; sed postea quam de re quapiam fuerit concertatum, eam ab eo, qui praeest, diligenter explicandam curet. Neque enim argumenta solvet ipse, sed argumentantibus et respondentibus potius moderabitur; idque maiore cum dignitate praestabit, si non argumentando (quamvis id aliquando deceat), sed interrogando faciet, ut difficultas magis explanetur.”

¹⁹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 53; MP V, R99, p. 382, “totidem auditores defendant, singuli singulorum magistrorum quaestiones.”

each, he argued a whole hour. Beside that, as a most important type of student – in terms of the Jesuit academic system, some theologian had to dispute in the first place in the morning even though this was a philosophical disputation.

§178. With regard to the advancement of students, [T27] the morning session was intentionally ‘asymmetric’. The opponent was always a more advanced student here than the respondent | as *Constitutions* require²⁰ it. The meeting proceeded as follows. First, (i) a metaphysician briefly proved (*confirmo*) one or two theses and in a philosophical manner (*philosophice*) and then a theologian argued against him; next, (ii) another metaphysician argued against a natural philosopher (without proving of theses by the latter) and finally, (iii) another physicist against a logician.

§179. On the contrary, [T28] the afternoon session was ‘symmetric’ in this sense. | (iv) A metaphysician disputed with a metaphysician, then (v) a natural philosopher with a natural philosopher and in finally (vi) a logician with a logician. Contrary to the morning session, acting as a respondent in (v), it was the natural philosopher who had to prove his theses in a similar way as the metaphysician did in (i).²¹

²⁰ ConstE, P. IV, Ch. 13, § 3, p. 216, “[Masters] should make them, and much more those studying the higher branches, engage in disputations often. . . . and in these disputations the students should debate not only with the members of their own class, but those who are somewhat lower down should dispute about matters they understand with students who are more advanced, and conversely those who are more advanced should debate with those lower down by coming down to subjects which these latter are studying.” MP I, ConstL, p. 287, “[Magistri] et his, ac multo magis facultatum superiorum studiosis, crebras disputationes imponant. . . . ubi non solum cum condiscipulis, verum paulo inferiores cum aliquanto provectoribus disputent in iis quae ipsi capiunt; quod etiam, vice versa, provectores cum minus provectoris, ad ea quae illi tractant descendendo”

²¹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 106; MP V, R99, p. 399, “17. Disputationes menstruae fiant, in quibus argumententur non pauciores, quam tres mane, totidem a prandio; primus quidem per horam, ceteri vero per ternos circiter

§180. (B) In the monthly theological disputations, (1) three opponents would normally argue in the morning and (2) another three in the afternoon. As to the number of respondents, the same is true as in the case of philosophical disputations (A): as many students had to respond as there were teachers.²² But contrary to (A), each opponent had to dispute against *all* respondents of which the one responding in the first morning position was to respond as the second in afternoon.²³ No information is left for us in the *Ratio* of 1599 concerning the distribution of time either for opponents or respondents. We do not even know exactly how their mutual interactions were ordered from this *Ratio*. Be that as it may, no more than twelve or fifteen conclusions were to be defended within the entire monthly theological disputation.²⁴

quadrantes. Et mane quidem primo loco disputet theologus aliquis (si theologorum competit copia) contra metaphysicum, contra physicum metaphysicus, physicus contra logicum; sed a prandio metaphysicus cum metaphysico, physicus cum physico, logicus cum logico.” PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 106–107; MP V, R99, pp. 399–400, “Mane item metaphysicus, a prandio physicus unam aut alteram conclusionem confirmabit breviter et philosophice.”

²² PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 53; MP V, R99, p. 382, “totidem auditores defendant, singuli singulorum magistrorum quaestiones.”

²³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 68–69; MP V, R99, p. 388, “14. In disputationibus mensuris, quibus totidem defendent, quot fuerint praeceptores, terni fere ante meridiem argumententur, totidem post meridiem; quilibet adversus omnes defendentes; et quidem, si nihil impediatur, qui mane respondent primo loco, a prandio secundo respondeat.”

²⁴ MP V, R99, p. 375, “14. . . . conclusiones nec nimis longae sint, nec plures fere . . . quam duodecim vel quindecim in mensuris disputationibus; . . .”

2.3 Public Acts

A. PHILOSOPHICAL ACTS AND THEIR MAIN PURPOSE

§181. According to the 1599 *Ratio*, [T29] before the end of the three-year philosophical training, disputations on entire philosophic matter (*acts*) must be held.²⁵ | Probably to make the end of the school year and the beginning of the new one more solemn, one of the intended respondents was to be kept for the last week of the term and the other for the first week in the new school year, if possible.²⁶ These philosophical acts were to take up the entire time of the class, at least either in the morning or the afternoon.²⁷ Based on the *Ratio* of 1599, the theology students and teachers also had to attend these philosophy acts and the latter ones were to make the disputation more nimble (*alacriorem*) and solemn by arguing (*argumentando*) and replicating (*urgendo*).²⁸ At the Roman College before 1590, these acts might be held instead of monthly disputations on Saturdays. During each act, no classes of higher faculties were taking place, so that all students of philosophy, theology and casuistry were able to attend.²⁹

²⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 43; MP V, R99, p. 376, “19. Sub finem triennii cursusque philosophici disputationes habeantur de universa philosophia; . . .”

²⁶ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “11. Eorum, qui sunt hos actus habituri, unus in ultimam, si commode potest, reservetur hebdomadam, qua studia finienda sunt; alter in eam, qua scholae rursus aperiendae.”

²⁷ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 45; MP V, R99, p. 377, “24. Porro philosophici actus totum scholarum tempus occupent minimum vel mane vel a prandio.”

²⁸ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 46; MP V, R99, p. 377, “25. Theologi non modo auditores, sed etiam professores curet praefectus, ut intersint actibus theologicis, atque adeo philosophicis; et his philosophi; et professores quidem argumentando, urgendo alacriorem ac sollemniorum reddant disputationem.”

²⁹ MP VII, PraxCollR, p. 73, “Li giorni, ne quali s’hanno a fare queste dispute, sono o gl’sabbati in luoco delle dispute del mese; massime per quelle di theologia; o qualche giorno di lettione doppo l’intermissione de studii. . . . Et accioché tanto a quelle di filosofia, quanto di theologia possino trovarsi

§182. Now, I inquire (a) who defended, (b) how many conclusions there were in these disputations, (c) who was in the position of opponent(s) and finally (d), what was the purpose of this practice. As to (a) however, the *Ratio* of 1599 fails to provide us with anything but a terse notice: ‘A few excellently trained students should be selected for them, the ones who can uphold the dignity of this place, that is, whose achievements far surpass the average.’³⁰

§183. (b) According to the *Ratio* of 1599, the number and manner (*ratio*) of conclusions ought not vary from those of so called ‘general acts’ in theology;³¹ see §194¹²⁹. We may infer that (i) it was not more than fifty theses,³² (ii) the set of conclusions could be, if convenient, identical to all Jesuit philosophy students who were going to defend in the same year, and (iii) that conclusions could be printed and published according to the local custom.³³ As to point (c) – the issue of opponents – three should usually argue in these these acts. Of these, as was true in the most cases, one had to be (i) someone from their own Jesuit teachers of theology or philosophy – or eventually, (ii) a teacher of a faculty su-

presenti tutti gli scolari di queste classi superiori, ogni volta che si fa alcuna di queste dispute, vacano tutte le scuole di filosofia e theologia e casi.”

³⁰ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 43; MP V, R99, p. 376, “ad quas deligantur pauci et egregie instructi, qui eius loci dignitatem sustinere valeant, hoc est, qui multo plus quam mediocriter profecerint.”

³¹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46; MP V, R99, p. 377, “Conclusionum autem numerus ac ratio non discrepent ab eo, quod de theologicis generalibus statutum est regula nona.”

³² PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 42; MP V, R99, p. 375, “14. In generalibus actibus conclusiones nec nimis longae sint, nec plures fere quam quinquaginta; pauciores, si publicus academiae mos aliter habeat.”

³³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “10. Generalium horum actuum conclusiones possunt, si videatur, esse communes nostris omnibus eodem anno defensuris; et publicis typis (si loci consuetudo ferat) excudi.”

perior to philosophy (*doctor*), either from a religious order or generally an extern teacher of such kind of faculty (*doctor*).³⁴

§184. Concerning (d), I claim first that [T30] the philosophical acts must have had some other aims than to serve as a final public, though still ceremonious, examination. | It seems so on the grounds that the 1599 *Ratio* does not admit a student could in fact fail during this event, because none but a few excellently trained students, ‘far surpassing the average,’ were selected before by a serious examination (*examen*).³⁵ And through that method, we lead to the two earlier *Ratios* (of 1591 and 1586) to find the true objectives of philosophical acts. First, let me quote what more the *Ratio* of 1591 adds to the 1599 version:

§185. “To exhibit an exemplar of their studies, those who have attended it should uphold a more solemn act of entire philosophy before the end of the philosophical triennial and philosophical course.”³⁶

§186. The remark that no one but those whose achievements far surpass the average should defend in this act follows next.³⁷

³⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 45; MP V, R99, p. 377, “Tres fere argumentetur; quorum unus sit, ut plurimum, aliquis ex nostris magistris sive theologiae sive philosophiae; vel doctor aliquis religiosus aut externus.”

³⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 44; MP V, R99, p. 376, “Hi seligendi sunt per examinatores tres aut etiam plures. Examinabunt autem semper praefectus et praeceptor proprius; quibus a rectore addetur tertius ex reliquis magistris vel alius, qui recte id facere posse iudicetur. Cum his tribus aderunt praeterea saltem duo alii professores a rectore item eligendi, qui vicissim etiam mutari poterunt; vel si id non possit, alii valde idonei, qui cum tribus examinadoribus suffragium scripto ferant; ita ut sint minime quinque secreta suffragia; et ab omnibus rem omnino secretam servari oportet.”

³⁶ MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Philosophiae*, § 48, p. 282, “sub finem triennii cursusque philosophici ad exhibendum specimen aliquod suorum studiorum, actum aliquem paulo celebriorem de universa philosophia, qui eam audierunt, tueantur.”

³⁷ MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Philosophiae*, § 49, p. 282, “Ad huius actus locique dignitatem sustinendam non nisi qui multo plus quam mediocriter

We can see a rather new aim of that kind of disputation here – to make great display of philosophical learning by an excellently trained student. Second, all this also holds true for the trial *Ratio* of 1586, but similarly, there is something in addition:

§187. “Because this [i.e. a more solemn act of entire philosophy] inflames young men for studying more vigorously and it makes ashamed the indolent and the cowardly ones. It brings no little authority for our schools as well. Indeed, no one should be admitted to such a kind of act unless those whose achievements far surpass the average. Otherwise, it will make cold the disputation as well as the authority of schools will collapse and too high a number of respondents will give birth to satiety.”³⁸

§188. Notice how carefully the Jesuits cared so that philosophical acts had the right character: neither to lack vigour nor to produce satiety among the public. To sum up, [T31] according to the *Ratio* of 1586 and of 1591, the nature of philosophical acts had been designed for three main objectives: (1) to make a great display of philosophical learning of a few excellently trained students; (2) to encourage much zeal for study on one hand and to make ashamed indolent students on the other; and finally, (3) to gain authority for the Jesuit schools. |

§189. As we will see later §218¹⁴³, points (2) and (3) are very likely not simply included in point (1). The display of abilities of at least some philosophy students (1) served, at once, as a goal and a mean on its own: students attempted to gain the confi-

profecerint, seligendi sunt per examinatores tres, quorum unus sit proprius professor.”

³⁸ MP V, R86A, De Studio Philosophiae, § 17, p. 104, “Id enim vehementius ad studendum inflammat adolescentes, et pudefacit desides ac ignavos. Affert et gymnasiis nostris auctoritatem non parvam. Verum ad huiusmodi actum admittendi non sunt, nisi qui multo plus quam mediocriter profecerint. Alioquin et frigebit disputatio, et scholarum collabetur auctoritas, et nimia defendentium multitudo pariet satietatem.”

dence of those distinguished members of the audience who might help them in forming their careers.

§190. As far as stateliness concerns, the philosophical acts seem to be twofold in fact, depending on the status of particular students. When an excellent non-Jesuit finished the philosophical curriculum in a Jesuit school, he was invited to perform in an even more solemn act than those of Jesuits, celebrating it by as large as possible an assembly of Jesuits, non-Jesuit doctors and leading men.³⁹ In the *Ratio* of 1599 however, this setting is designated primarily for the general acts in theology. That it was the case for philosophy as well is based on a small addition made in the *Ratio* of 1616.⁴⁰

B. PARTICULAR AND GENERAL ACTS IN THEOLOGY

§191. In the *Ratio* of 1599, [T32] either a standard or a *biennium* scenario is presupposed for students finishing the four-year theology course. In both of them, ‘particular’ and ‘general’ acts were performed. | By the ‘standard’ scenario (A), I mean that in which theologians complete their studies and mainly defend in public acts during the fourth year of their theology course; see from §192¹²⁷ below. In the *biennium* scenario (B), two more years (*biennium*) after the standard four-year period are granted to stu-

³⁹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 42; MP V, R99, p. 375, “12. Ad actus generales habendos aliqui quotannis invitentur externi, qui theologiae curriculum in nostro gymnasio non exigua cum laude confecerint. Huiusmodi autem actus oportet esse ceteris sollemniores, et quanto maximo nostrorum, externorum doctorum, ac principum etiam virorum conventu celebrari.”

⁴⁰ Cf. MP V, R99, p. 377, “Conclusionum autem numerus ac ratio non discrepent ab eo, quod de theologicis generalibus statutum est regula nona^{Ax17}.” This statement concerns the philosophical acts. Below, on the same page we read in the note A: “^A p nona t1616 add. decima, undecima et duodecima.” But ‘regula duodecima’ is exactly that one of the previous note: “12. Ad actus generales. . .”

dents for private review (*ad repetendam*) of theology and for participating in public acts; from §195¹³¹ on. With respect to the (A)–(B) decision, the most important person is the provincial (*praepositus provincialis, superior*) (B)§147⁹⁸. In the early fourth year of theology, consulting the entirety with teachers, rector, prefect of studies and his own advisers, the provincial should designate certain students ‘who are both outstanding in the tested virtue and notably talented’ for the (B) scenario, i.e. for two more years of theology review.⁴¹ Let me closely examine either of these possibilities (A) and (B) as far as the disputations or acts are concerned.

§192. (A) Within the standard scenario, the *Ratio* of 1599 prescribes two kinds of public acts. There are (I) the so called ‘particular acts’ (*actus peculiaries, actus particulares*, translated sometimes as the ‘Special Acts’) and (II) the ‘general acts’ (*actus generales*). Before we focus on each of these types in detail, let us mention two features common to both. (1) Prior to the very disputation, one or two (*unam aut alteram*) conclusions should be proved (*confirmet*) by the respondent in a more ornate but still theological manner.⁴² (2) Either in alternation or two at a time, both theology teachers should take part in these acts as specific persons of guardian or praeses, cf. (c)§176¹¹⁸, so each might deal

⁴¹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 11; MP V, R99, p. 358, “Initio quarti anni cum rectore, praefecto, magistris, suisque consultoribus designet aliquos, qui et probatae virtutis in primis sint, et ingenio polleant, ut ad theologiam privatim repetendam, et habendos actus superioris arbitrio biennio, ut Constitutiones iubent, privatum et quietum studium habeant; . . .”

⁴² PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 42; MP V, R99, p. 375, “15. Responsurus conclusionem unam aut alteram breviter (antequam ad disputationem veniatur) paulo quidem ornatius, sed theologico tamen more confirmet.”

with (*respondeat*) his proper questions. Other Jesuit doctors may play this role as well.⁴³

§193. (I) In the particular act, (a) not more than twenty conclusions taken from one of the four parts of theology are defended. As the *Ratio* of 1591 says for the *biennium* scenario (B), the first act treats the first part of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, the second the *Prima Secundae*, the third the *Secunda Secundae* and in the fourth act, conclusions of third part of the *Summa* are defended.⁴⁴ (b) But it seems this was not the case in (A) that each student defended conclusions of each part of theology. On the contrary, it is very likely that [T33] a selected student held but one of the four particular acts in the standard scenario.⁴⁵ | (c) Material relevant to a single act and student should be distributed by the prefect of studies along with the teachers, but in such a way that both (i) these particular acts do not occur too closely together without an interval and (ii) each of them takes at least

⁴³ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 42; MP V, R99, p. 375, “13. Praesideant omnibus actibus professores, vel alternis vel simul ambo; ita ut de suis uterque quaestionibus respondeat; praesidere etiam possunt alii doctores nostri.”

⁴⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 42; MP V, R99, p. 375, “14. . . . conclusiones nec nimis longae sint. . . . In peculiaribus vero actibus non plures quam viginti; . . .” MP V, R91, *Regulae Praefecti Superiorum Facultatum*, § 48, p. 253, “Actus publicos quinque theologus persolvat; quorum priores quattuor sint particulares; hoc est, ex una S. Thomae parte, nempe primus ex prima parte, alter ex prima secundae, tertius ex secunda secundae, quartus ex tertia parte, . . .”

⁴⁵ MP V, R86A, *De Disputationibus*, § 5, p. 73, “Ad hos utrosque actus seligantur auditores magis ingeniosi iudicio praefecti et consilio professorum; quorum auditorum quilibet suum particularem habebit; suum etim generalem, nisi aliud obstat; . . .” MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Scholasticae Theologiae*, § 49, p. 273, “Particularis actus unam ex quatuor theologiae partibus complectatur, neque tamen quatuor ab uno quolibet auditore habendi sunt, sed unus; . . .” PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “8. Ad peculiare autem actus, quos singuli singulos habebunt, . . .” Version of this very same point eight reads as follows: “8. Ad . . . doctor] Particulares actus non 4 ab uno, sed singuli a singulis habendi unam ex 4 theologiae partibus, amplectentur.” see *ibid.*, p. 387

2.5 hours either in the morning or the afternoon.⁴⁶ (d) As only the earlier *Rationes* mention, these acts were to take place from the beginning of the school year (*instauratione studiorum*) to Easter (*paschales ferias*), either on Saturdays (omitting the other disputations) or in the less celebre feast days or otherwise on a weekday.⁴⁷ (e) Generally, no fewer than three opponents should argue in a particular act and one of these, as was true in most cases, should be a teacher of a faculty superior to philosophy (*doctor*).⁴⁸

§194. (II) The general act (a) dealt with almost all theology subject matter which has been covered by (i) at the most fifty not too long conclusions (or fewer, according to tradition of a school). (ii) If convenient, the conclusions should be identical to all Jesuit theology students who are going to defend in the same year and (iii) should be printed and published according to the local custom.⁴⁹ (b) But not every respondent who has partici-

⁴⁶ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “8. Ad peculiare autem actus, quos singuli singulos habebunt, materias ex quatuor theologiae partibus praefectus cum magistris distribuet; sed ita, ut non nimis frequenter, sed per intervalla quaedam habeantur, ac duabus horis et dimidiata minimum circumscribantur; nec nisi mane vel a prandio tantum; . . .”

⁴⁷ RSI II, R86P, De Disputationibus, § 4, p. 101, “Praeter hebdomadarias et menstruas disputationes fiant et ab anni quarti auditoribus actus publici: quorum aliqui sint particulares, hoc est, vnius partis Theologiae, et durent usque ad Pascha. Idque vel in sabbato, quo omittantur aliae disputationes, vel in festo minus celebri, vel aliter feriato die: . . .” MP V, R91, Regulae Professoris Scholasticae Theologiae, § 49, p. 273, “fiant autem hi particulares actus ab instauratione studiorum ad paschales ferias vel in sabbato, vel in festo minus celebri, vel aliter feriato die.”

⁴⁸ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “8. Ad peculiare autem actus, . . . et argumententur fere non pauciores quam tres, quorum unus sit, ut pluri mum, doctor.”

⁴⁹ Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “9. Generales universam fere theologiam comprehendant, . . . 10. Generalium horum actuum conclusiones possunt, si videatur, esse communes nostris omnibus eodem anno defensuris; et publicis typis (si loci consuetudo ferat) excudi. . . .”

pated in the particular act ^(I)§193¹²⁸ was admitted to this general definition. Just those ‘outstanding in talent and ability’ were eligible by the provincial at the beginning of the school year; see §191¹²⁶. As was true for the philosophical acts §190¹²⁶, when an excellent non-Jesuit finished the theological curriculum (in the Jesuit school), he was to be invited to perform in an even more solemn general act, celebrating it by as large as possible an assembly of Jesuits, non-Jesuit *doctorum* and leading men.⁵⁰ (c) Contrary to the ^(I)§193¹²⁸, the general act should take (i) both the morning and the afternoon lecture time. Or (ii), where the custom dictated to dispute either in the morning or in the afternoon only, it should last at least four or five hours.⁵¹ (iii) One of these theology general acts was to be kept for the last week of the term and another for the first week in the new school year as also holds true for the philosophical acts,⁵² see §181¹²². (d) We did not yet mention the issue of opponents. The *Ratio* of 1599 does not clearly state who or how many should object, but that of

14. In generalibus actibus conclusiones nec nimis longae sint, nec plures fere quam quinquaginta; pauciores, si publicus academiae mos aliter habeat.”

⁵⁰ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 40–42; MP V, R99, p. 375, “7. Suo tempore [praefectus] in memoriam redigat superiori ut, auditis praeceptoribus, statuatur, quibusnam sive totius theologiae sive partis alicuius theses defendendae sint; . . . Ad generales vero non necesse est, ut omnes admittantur, qui peculiare habuerunt; sed ii, qui ingenio et facultate praestent, eligi poterunt; . . . 12. Ad actus generales habendos aliqui quotannis invitentur externi, qui theologiae curriculum in nostro gymnasio non exigua cum laude confecerint. Huiusmodi autem actus oportet esse ceteris sollemniores, et quanto maximo nostrorum, externorum doctorum, ac principum etiam virorum conventu celebrari.”

⁵¹ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “9. Generales . . . et antemeridianum videlicet ac pomeridianum tempus occupent, vel certe ad quaternas seu quinas horas producantur, ubi non nisi mane vel a prandio disputari moris est.”

⁵² PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 41; MP V, R99, p. 375, “11. Eorum, qui sunt hos actus habituri, unus in ultimam, si commode potest, reservetur hebdomadam, qua studia finienda sunt; alter in eam, qua scholae rursus aperiendae.”

1591 does. At least three opponents must argue, the first of which needed to be a *doctor*.⁵³

§195. (B) Within the *biennium* scenario, namely when two more years were granted to a better student for theology private review, among other academic duties, his participation in public acts played key part. Contrary to the formulation as to the number of particular acts needed within the (A), see (b)§193¹²⁸, *Ratio* of 1599 is very clear of it here. (a) The time was to be allocated such that [T34] students held four particular and one general public act within the *biennium*. | (b) Theologians celebrated the first event at the beginning of the first semester, the second at the end, the next during the second semester and the fourth within the third. Finally, the general act was to close the last semester.⁵⁴

§196. (c) With respect to the matter defended, we saw in (a)§193¹²⁸, that the trial *Ratio* of 1591 assigns particular acts to each of these (B) scenario one of the four parts of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*. But the 1599 *Ratio* says only that (i) while not being bound to defend his theology teacher's opinions (*sententiis*), a respondent can hold his own in the acts, provided these are (ii) in no way inconsistent with or alien to (*alienae*) Aquinas' doctrine. Nevertheless, this is not the only restriction. Timely (iii), with the prefect of studies and the one who is going to take part as praeses, respondent should come to an agreement not only as to these very opinions but also about their 'foundations

⁵³ MP V, R91, *Regulae Professoris Scholasticae Theologiae*, § 52, p. 274, "Generales utrumque tempus occupent; vel ad quatuor aut quinque horas protrahantur, ubi non nisi mane, vel a prandio disputare moris est. Argumentetur non minus, quam tres, quorum primus sit doctor."

⁵⁴ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 195; MP V, R99, p. 444, "9. Distribuatur illis tempus ad quatuor actus particulares et unum generalem habendum; et primus quidem particularis sub initium fere primi semestris, alter in fine; et sic deinceps singulis semestribus reliqui celebrentur, ita ut generalis ultimi semestre claudat."

and principles' (*fundamentis ac principiis*) by which he intended to defend. On the other hand (d), in the act itself, the praeses should allow the respondent to answer freely, not interrupting him as far as possible, so that he might better show his own intellectual powers (*ingeniis*).⁵⁵

⁵⁵ PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, p. 195; MP V, R99, p. 444, “10. Liberum eis sit in actibus a magistrorum suorum sententiis discedere, suasque, si libeat, tueri, dummodo nulla ratione alienae sint a S. Thomae doctrina ex quintae congregationis decreto; ita tamen, ut non solum de sententiis ipsis, sed etiam de fundamentis ac principiis, quibus eas tueri volunt, tempestive cum praefecto, eoque, qui praesidere debet, consentiant. Immo, quo melius sui ingenii specimen dent, sinet praeses eos libere respondere, nec, nisi cum maxime necesse sit, interpellabit.”

3 A More Intimate Insight into the Practice of Jesuit Disputations

§197. Whereas the preceding chapter is a rather technical description that offers a notion on a basic construction of the Jesuit specific disputation practices, the last chapter seeks to ‘get further below the surface’. It strives to provide the reader with a more portrayed picture, to pull him closely to the venue as it was. It draws a kind of struggled journey, see from §198¹³³ below, which nevertheless ends in its solemnity as well as in solid practice; see from §217¹⁴³ on.

3.1 Difficulties with Disputation Practice as Seen by the 1586 *Ratio Studiorum* Authors

§198. We can see by various hints that [T35] the old prestige of disputations declined in the late 16th century Jesuit schools. | As a historical testimony, let me quote what Johannes Busaeus, S.J., a chair of theology at the University of Mainz, writes to Father General in 1584:

§199. “But as far as this college of Mainz is concerned, first, I decided to make Your Paternity more certain as to the course of studies, which, educating approximately 20 students of theology of our, we keep here. It does not even follow such a benefit from the everyday’s professors’ lectures as in Rome does, because it seems to us [the teachers] shirk the works. The repetition of lections according to Rome manner is established four times per week only: on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday. On Saturday morning and the day before more celebrated feasts, no lecture or repetition is held. No repetition or disputation on feasts and Sundays. Weekly disputations take place one hour only, the monthly ones two. Certainly, I desired sometimes to establish more frequent disputations and repetitions, solely by which theologians seem to grow, but the col-

leagues shirk the work. Yet perhaps, it is bringing a remedy to that thing also through the new rules of studies.”¹

§200. But more serious difficulties are revealed in the 1586 *Ratio*. As we read, the prefect of studies §148⁹⁹ should make an effort to renew ‘former authority of all disputations’ of which ‘dignity and ardour seems already to be slain’ (*concidisse videtur*).² Authors of 1586 *Ratio* continue complaining that whereas all are present in the practice of lecturing, writing and joining of written texts, they very often avoid, do not pay attention to and assess as inutile the disputation. But in the end, all these do not have theology as much in memory or in understanding (*intelligentia*) as concealed in books.³ A little bit later, *Ratio* disclosures similarly show that there are many remedies for uplift of form and sheen (*splendor*) of disputations which ‘appear to lie in ruins.’⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73, “Quod autem ad hoc collegium moguntinum attinet, primum iudicavi T. Paternitatem certiore reddendam esse de ratione studiorum, quam hic in instituendis theologiae studiosis, quorum de nostris fere sunt 20, tenemus. Nec enim hic ex quotidianis professorum praelectionibus is sequitur profectus, qui Romae; quia labores refugere videmur. Repetitio lectionum more romano instituitur quaque hebdomade tantum quater: Lunae, Martis, Iovis et Veneris diebus. Sabbato a prandio et pridie celebriorum festorum nulla est lectio nec repetitio. Diebus festis et dominicis nulla repetitio aut disputatio. Hebdomadariae disputationes durant unam tantum horam, menstruae duas. Optavi quidem aliquando crebriores inducere disputationes et repetitiones, quibus solis theologi fieri videntur, sed laborem socii refugiunt. Quamquam per novas regulas studiorum fortasse huic quoque rei remedium aliquod affertur.”

² MP V, R86A, De Disputationibus, § 8, p. 73, “8. Porro conandum est, uti disputationes omnes, quarum fervor ac dignitas iam concidisse videtur, pristinae restituantur auctoritati, cum hoc exercitationis genere nihil sit utilius ad capessendas superiores facultates.”

³ *Ibid.*, “Videas non paucos in legendo, in scribendo, in compaginandis quae scripserunt, totos esse, disputationem vero fugere, negligere, otiosam existimare, habere tandem theologiam non tam in memoria atque intelligentia, quam in libris papyraceis reconditam.”

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74, “Ut autem disputationes, quae iacere videntur, in meliorem formam ac splendorem excitentur, multa praesto sunt remedia.”

§201. In what follows, I am going to render an account of ideas by which such an unfavourable development was to be reversed. I have grouped the eight original proposals into four headings intended to indicate four types of difficulties the authors of 1586 *Ratio* seem to face.

A. RECTOR'S AND STUDENTS' ABSENCE FROM DISPUTATION CAUSED BY AN ANOTHER OCCUPATION

§202. As a necessary condition [T36] to uplift the form and sheen of disputations, the 1586 *Ratio* authors appealed to both the superiors' high thinking of and outward exemplar dealing with disputation practices. | Then, not only the assiduity (*sedulitas*) and Rectors' (*superiores*) own conviction that all fruits and the Jesuit schools (*schola*) reputation (*existimatio*) depending on that are necessary. Everybody should *understand* as well that Rectors care for it in the first place.⁵ Therefore, the latter were to be (a) often present at both private and public disputations, (b) to observe and correct causes of unproductiveness of this exercise and (c) praise a vigorous (*strenuus*) work and refute sluggishness (*socordia*).⁶

§203. If Rectors could not be present at a disputation due to another occupation they were to entrust their parts to the Prefect of Studies (D)§148⁹⁹. But in this case, the Prefect must be learned

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 74, “multa praesto sunt remedia. Sed quae omnia posita sint in superiorum sedulitate; qui, nisi in hanc rem serio incumbant, sibi que per suadeant hinc omnes fructum et existimationem scholarum nostrarum pendere, efficietur plane nihil, etiamsi ea de re bene constituet multae leges aut praecepta scribantur. . . . Perficiant denique, ut intelligant omnes, cum primis eam rem sibi curae esse.”

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74, “Itaque proderit primo, si superiores frequenter intersint disputationibus privatis et publicis. Observent, quibus causis fructus huius exercitationis impediatur. Corrigan quae corrigenda sunt. Collaudent strenuam ea in re operam quorundam: aliorum redarguant socordiam.”

(*doctus*), sharp (*acer*), zealous (*industrius*) enough and above all, had much authority with the administration of studies. Otherwise he might be seen as just an empty name (*nomen inane*) to dare reproach or admonish someone. Of course, the authority of moderator (exceptionally called *praeses* in the 1586 *Ratio*) is at stake here. It has to dwell such a power (*potestas*) in it, by means of which he could ‘both honourably escort and restrain the disputants if necessary.’ Moreover, all should realize that it makes a great difference to them if he approves their work (*operam*).⁷

§204. Further, the *Ratio* of 1586 uncloaks a trick of those students who schedule whatsoever they can right on the day and time of disputation even though it is entirely superfluous and a day-off (*supervacua et otiosa*) business. To face that, Rectors have to establish for themselves very firmly to prove by those who do not let anybody be absent from the disputation. [T37] They could permit exceptional absence from the lectures more easily than from a disputation. | The reason is this: as the usefulness of a disputation may be less well understood by a younger student, when someone will start to disappear the others will easily as well. Interestingly, the 1586 *Ratio* justifies this rule, claiming the

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74, “Quod si aliis negotiis impediti haec per se praestare non possunt, committant suas partes praefecto, quem non modo doctum, acrem et industrium virum oportet esse, sed et quod caput est, magnae etiam auctoritatis in omni studiorum administratione. . . . Alioquin intelligent alii praefectum nihil aliud esse quam nomen inane, ut propterea neminem reprehendere audeat vel monere. Certe necessarium est in praeside disputationum eam esse potestatem, qua disputantes possit et honorifice prosequi et coercere, si oporteat; omnesque intelligant, multum sua interesse ab illo suam operam probari. Eiusmodi vero potestatem, si non putant superiores esse praefecto demandandam, vel ipsi per se eam exercent, vel disputationibus arbitrentur nondum satis esse consultum.”

contests (*concertationes*) lack vigour (*frigere*) without large attendance of auditors (*frequentia*).⁸

B. LACK OF DISCIPLINE AND SATIETY OF AUDIENCE

§205. It is interesting that [T38] the 1586 *Ratio* proposal considers not only the listeners' vices to be intervened against during disputations, but also their actual psychological possibilities. | Now, the third point reveals a vivid picture of students' rather fallen discipline during a disputation. I state it fully:

§206. "While disputing, let a teacher or whoever is in charge of a disputation not brook any conversations in the classroom: let him order attention to all, to refrain from fables, not to sleep, not to march out arbitrarily: let him encourage, prove fully, make ashamed as he will judge it is expedient."⁹

§207. In the next rule we see two main ideas: (a) The weekly disputations can not exceed two hours otherwise they 'choke and kill' (*angit et conficit*) the audience (*sedentes*). And then, it makes so rife disputations odious and encumbering unless the more frequent event it is, the shorter. For a tired listener, whatever

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75, "Secundo, iubeantur interesse universi disputationibus, et diligentius quam lectionibus. Porro sunt qui quicquid occupationis extraordinem nanciscuntur aut nancisci possunt, id omne conferunt in diem et horas disputationum, non secus ac si supervacua et otiosa quaedam res esset. Sane spes nulla futura est, rem istam bene componendi, nisi firmissime statuatur superiores eos se praebere, per quos nulli liceat abesse a disputationibus; eaque omnis spes praecidatur, non secus ac si dies esset lectionis, et multo etiam severius, ut sit facilior in lectionibus dispensatio. Frigent enim sine frequentia concertationes; et cum earum fructus minus perspici atque intelligi possit a iunioribus, si quis unus abesse coepit, caeteri facile dilabuntur. Quare tanto impensius curandum est, ut ea in re nihil impune peccetur."

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 75, "Tertio, dum disputatur, non ferat praeceptor aliusve qui disputationi praeest, ullas colloctiones in schola; attendere omnes iubeat, parcere fabulis; non dormire, non egredi pro arbitratu; hortetur, coarguat, pudefaciat, prout expedire iudicaverit."

well said ‘sails away more than pours in.’ (b) Now as a remedy, while the variety and change being more grateful reducing the satiety (*satietas*) of audience, four opponents are to dispute whoever of which brings two arguments for examination within half an hour.¹⁰

C. POOR RESULTS OF ARGUMENTATION CAUSED BY RELAXING THE FORM

§208. The most interesting points on disputation by the 1586 *Ratio* authors, see (A)–(E) below, concern the *form* of it (the fifth and sixth rule). Evidently, [T39] the *form* was a troublesome part of Jesuit disputation practice. | First of all, (A) the teachers themselves were to hold that the great [T40] weight of fruitful disputations consists in the form being observed by stiffness. Authors of the *Ratio* add eight interesting reasons for the thesis.¹¹

§209. When the form is neglected it can not appear neither (a) the force of arguments (*vis argumentorum*) nor (b) sharpness (*acumen*) and cleverness (*solertia*) of the respondent. When the disputants divert each other from the proposed subject matter (c) it can not be insisted on (*urgetur*) a main point of the objection (*articulus difficultatis*). Next, (d) the auditory is not able to understand what is really established after so great a wrestling (*contentionem*). (e) The same auditory is offended when adversar-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, “Quarto, hebdomadariae disputationes duas horas ne excedant. Quicquid superadditur, angit et conficit sedentes. Hinc odiosae fiunt et onerosae disputationes; praesertim tam crebrae, nisi quo crebriores, eo sint et breviores. Nam defessis, quicquid boni dicatur, nihil potest esse in precio. Effluit potius quicquid infunditur. Et quoniam varietas ac vicissitudo gratior est, levatque audientium satietatem, argumentetur quatuor, quorum quilibet argumenta duo intra semihoram examinanda proferat.”

¹¹ *Ibid.*, “Quinto, magnum fructuosae disputationis momentum positum esse putent praeceptores in formae rigore servando”

ies insult each other. But this is possible only in the case when the disputants are allowed to relax the form.¹²

§210. Similarly, (f) all men of worth (*virī graves*) feel offended when the laws of disputing are neglected. These laws, the *Ratio* says, are in such a great honour in ‘distinguished academies’ (*illustribus academiis*) that it just can not be objected anything more shameful (*ignominiosius*) to an opponent than he proves what has not been denied or that he recedes from a thread (*a filo*) of undertaken disputation. Here, our authors of *Ratio* confess bitterly ‘In this thing, we are sometimes rated badly’ (*male audimus*).¹³

§211. Further (g), so much time is just wasted at disputations, because there is no definite outcome (*exitus*) of arguments. But the intact order of form would have unloosed it in a short time. Too (h), the good estimation is being damaged, because wandering off (*aberrare*) the arguing form is peculiar to those who prefer to flee, not to fight. And whenever they can not stay firm on their own position they ‘entangle various of all tergiversations.’¹⁴

¹² *Ibid.*, “Nam ea [the form] neglecta, nec argumentorum vis apparet, nec respondentis acumen ac solertia agnoscitur; nec urgetur articulus difficultatis iis, qui disputant, sese mutuo a re proposita avocantibus; nec auditores intelligere possunt, quid tandem post tantam contentionem constitutum sit; nec disputatio trasigitur (sic!) sine audientium offendicolo, cum nonnulla interponantur interdum carpendi adversarii gratia, quorum occasionem praebet licentia deserendi formam. Quae si severe servaretur, ipsa per se contineret in officio loquentes. . . .”

¹³ *Ibid.*, “Offenduntur etiam viri graves, quod disputandi leges negligantur, quae in illustribus academiis tanto sunt in honore, ut nihil ignominiosius obiici possit argumentanti, quam quod non probet, quod fuerat negatum, aut a filo susceptae disputationis recedat. Qua in re nos aliquando male audimus. . . .”

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, “nec sine magna iactura tum temporis, quod argumentorum nullus cernatur exitus, quae formae ratio atque ordo integer brevi dissolveret; tum existimationis, quod aberrare ab argumentandi forma eorum sit, qui fugere malunt, quam pugnare; cumque ex adverso stare non possint, variis omnia tergiversationibus implicant.”

§212. (B) The short but highly important description of the very process of disputation, which I treat (mainly according to the 1599 *Ratio*) in §103⁷³, follows. (C) From the babyhood of logics, the teacher should instruct the youths in such a way that he makes them more ashamed in no other case than when fleeing from the form. (D) Now, the teacher should not require sharper approaches (*acrior ratio*) in anything else, than not to err in the form in his presence (*coram se*) and he should correct any mistake immediately.¹⁵

§213. In the sixth rule, the *Ratio* develops a further means against the unconvincing results of argumentation, as we saw in (d)§209¹³⁸. Therefore, it seems to be not sufficient just to observe the form by stiffness to get a useful outcome of a disputation. *Ratio* refers to *Constitutions* (P. IV, Ch. 6, § 10) here, claiming that for the benefit of the auditory, (E) he who presides should elicit as well as clarify the doctrine to be held from the present contest. The *Ratio* continues describing that, while the thing is often ‘convulsing to and fro’ (*ultro citroque agitari*), the attention of the auditory is dull and confused and they just leave without profit. Whereupon [T41] students ‘use to hate’ (*odisse solent*) the disputation as an idle business and nothing more than a confused shouting. | To destroy this opinion, the authors of the *Ratio* order the teacher to try to bring something of a valid (*bonae*) and valuable (*digna*) doctrine each time. They suggest to cut it

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76, “Tandem ab ipsis logicae incunabulis sic instituantur iuvenes, ut nihil eos magis pudeat, quam a forma deficecisse; et nullius rei acriorem exigat rationem praeceptor, quam ut coram se nihil in forma peccetur. Retractetur vero statim quicquid peccatum fuerit.” Cf. PAVUR, C. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 107, MP V, R99, p. 400, “20. Sic ab ipso Logicae initio iuvenes instituantur, nihil ut eos magis pudeat in disputando, quam a formae ratione deflexisse; nihil ab illis severius exigat praeceptor, quam disputandi leges ac statas vices.”

away from the long lectures somehow and to save it for the day of disputation.¹⁶

D. CLASS' SLUGGISHNESS AND DISGUST CAUSED BY TEACHER'S OWN LANGUOR

§214. As the seventh point prescribes, [T42] a proactive attitude of the teacher-praeses and gathering of visitors should avoid apathy and inflame students in the weekly theology disputations. | The exercise of weekly (*private*) disputation §172¹¹⁵, which 'use to be more numb' (*frigere solent*) than the monthly ones (*communes*) §180¹²¹ concerns mostly here.¹⁷ Teachers, the *Ratio* admonishes, should consider it is far more difficult to master (*tenere*) auditors for two hours during disputation instead of one while lecturing. It is all the more challenging, as students are writing nothing and even do not think it is an important matter for them.¹⁸

¹⁶ MP V, R86A, De Disputationibus, § 8, p. 76, "Sexto, diligenter etiam observetur quod Constitutiones in 4 P. c. 6 § 10: «Qui praeest, inquit, disputationi, ex ea concertatione eliciat declaretque ad audientium utilitatem, doctrinam, quae tenenda sit». Accidit enim non raro ultro citroque ita rem agitari, ut auditorum praestringatur et confundatur attentio, ideoque sine fructu recedant. Quocirca odisse solent disputationem, ut inutilem et non nisi confusis clamoribus perstreptem. Ad quam opinionem abolendam studeat praeceptor aliquid bonae doctrinae semper afferre; quin et aliqua ex prolixis lectionibus reseca, ut ea in diem disputationis reservet, digna etiam quae sedulus auditor observet inter disputandum, et deinde breviter referat in libellum, si velit."

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, "Deinde in privatis praesertim disputationibus, quae frigere plus solent quam communes, sic disputantibus assistat . . ."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, "Septimo, illud praeceptor cogitet disputationis diem non minus, quam lectionis laboriosum sibi futurum esse. Quare ad otium et quietem non se comparet, sed ad laborem; eoque maiorem, quo difficilius est duas horas, quam unam tenere auditorem, et quidem nihil scribentem, nec putantem id sua multum interesse."

§215. The day of disputation, therefore, will not be less laborious for a teacher than a lecture. Now, he should ‘get ready for labour, not for leisure and rest.’ Otherwise, if the teacher himself is languorous (*languere*) and allows things proceed in their own way (*res progredi sinat ut possunt*), the whole class is numb (*obtorpere*) with a kind of ‘sluggishness and disgust’ (*segnitia ac taedio*) too.¹⁹ The description of all teacher’s duties in the very process of weekly disputation follows, as we treat it from §106⁷⁵ on. Teacher is to be ‘seen’ as the one who contests (*concertare*) for both participants to obtain the disputation’s desired fervour.²⁰

§216. The 1586 *Ratio* directs the last eight rules toward the fervour too. Although of different faculties, teachers are to invite each other to attend even the weekly (*private*) theology disputations so that the contesting may grow more hot (*fervescere*) by such a gathering. By the same reason, those are also invited who try to obtain their doctorate at Jesuit academies, cf. (B)§195¹³¹, and some others. Authors of the 1586 *Ratio* finally admonish that whatever else is in use anywhere, to make the disputations more solemn they should be retained carefully.²¹

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, “Quod si langueat praeceptor et res progredi sinat ut possunt, quid mirum, si segnitia quadam ac taedio tota classis obtorpeat?”

²⁰ *Ibid.*, “Deinde in privatis praesertim disputationibus . . . sic disputantibus assistat, ut ipse videatur esse, qui in utroque concertatore concertet.”

²¹ *Ibid.*, “Octavo, invitent se invicem professores, diversarum licet facultatum, ad privatas etiam disputationes; saltem per horam aliquam, quo magis concertatio ferveat congressu praeceptorum. Eandem ob causam invitentur ad easdem nonnulli etiam, qui in nostris academiis doctoratum consecuti sunt, vel suorum studiorum curriculum confecerunt. Si quid denique aliud uspiam est in usu, quo disputationes reddi solent celebriores, id sedulo retineatur.”

3.2 The Glitter and Solidity of Disputation Practice as Seen from Without

§217. So far, the decline of former disputation prestige and particular difficulties seen by the 1586 *Ratio* authors were rendered. They proposed a series of ideas by which such an unfavourable development was to be reversed. In what follows, I will show that [T43] the endeavor of the authors probably succeeded. It seems so in terms of pageantry, as public acts shone at Collegio Romano at least in the 17th century, | from §218¹⁴³ below. But [T44] there is a testimony from without as well that Jesuits were entirely strict in keeping their students to the ‘old forms of disputation’ and that the number of disputation specific practices Jesuits fostered was probably well known in the middle of the seventeenth century, | from §223¹⁴⁶ below.

A. PUBLIC ACTS ARE SPECTACULAR FESTIVITIES AT COLLEGIO ROMANO

§218. At Collegio Romano, the public act in philosophy as well as in theology, see from §181¹²² on, played an important part in the life of every student. In the case of philosophy, it was a first opportunity to demonstrate the skills and learning of young philosophers and to gain the confidence of those who would help them in forming their career. Students strove to lure a large and aristocratic audience and, for this reason, the defence evolved into ‘a lavish spectacle, theatrical in every sense,’ Rice says.²² To imagine what a pageantry these events were, first let me glance at three activities to be managed before, namely to prepare (A) the-

²² RICE, L. Jesuit Thesis Prints and the Festive Academic Defence at the Collegio Romano. In *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773*. O’Malley, J. et al. (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1999, p. 158.

sis prints, (B) music and (C) decoration of the room. In the last part (D), several steps are listed surrounding the very act.

§219. (A) Ahead of time, after a student had completed a course of studies, had been examined and found worthy of publicly defence, the conclusions were selected and printed in the form of broadsheets. Whereas this genre consisted of plain text originally (in the first half of the 16th century), later on, such broadsheets were decorated with the heraldry of the nobleman or prelate to whom a student dedicated his conclusions.²³ Because one or two copies of broadsheets may have been posted in advance and usually all prints indicated the time and place of the event at the bottom, it might be natural to see it as an advertisement inviting attendance. More precisely, being distributed during the act, it served as a kind of program, so that the audience might follow the disputation and then take it home as a souvenir.²⁴ But it happened that the student's care for its preparation began to exceed by about 1603. Therefore we can read the laments of a professor:

§220. "You cannot imagine how much time these students waste [in the preparation of their thesis sheets], and how many opportunities they seize to run hither and thither, checking up on the drawing, the plate, and the engraver, urging speed, making changes, making corrections, checking the proofs, and so on. There's no end to it! And while they are attending to these things, they think about nothing else but how to improve the outward show of their defence, and thus two or three months pass during which they completely neglect their studies."²⁵

²³ RICE, L. Jesuit Thesis Prints, p. 149.

²⁴ RICE, L. Jesuit Thesis Prints, pp. 148–149.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 155–156; and *ibid.*, note 5, p. 166, "Ragioni perche non si ha da permettere alii alunni del Collegio Germanico et Ungarico il difendere conclusioni con fare armi a modo loro anzi con una comune a tutti: ... Non è possibile di credere quanto tempo perdono, e quante occasioni cercano di

§221. (B) Over and above, it was usual to compose music for that act and to perform it under the direction of the composer, commonly the singing-master (*maestro di cappella*) of the college. Several separate choirs might sing madrigals and motets. For example, during the philosophy defence of Giuseppe Paolucci at the Collegio Romano in 1654, ‘there was music performed by eight choirs made up of the best voices in Rome, and two orchestras, including four trumpets which accompanied the organ, a thing rarely heard before. Two of the trumpets sounded from one of the upper windows into the room.’²⁶ As Rice suggests, the music must be probably ‘jubilant and triumphal’ making use of martial themes as underlying the idea of academic battle between the defendant and ‘his adversaries, that is to say, his examiners.’ In 1626, on the occasion of a defence at Collegio Romano, a choir opened with singing: ‘To arms, soldiers, while the trumpet incites furious strikes with its menacing song! ... To arms!’²⁷

§222. Finally, (C) when ‘the great hall of the college was decorated with garlands and flowers; sweet-smelling petals were strewn over the floor; and the walls were hung from top to bottom with tapestries and damasks, often loaned for the occasion

andare qua e là per il disegno, per la piastra, per l’intagliatore, per sollecitare, per mutare, per emendare, per veder la prava etc., e mai si finisce ... Mentre stanno in questa aspettativa, non pensano ad altro se non a far comparire bene l’esteriore della disputa, e così passano due o tre mesi senza studiare’ (ARSI Rom. 157 II fol. 284).”

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 158–159; and *ibid.*, p. 166, note 8, “‘Vi fu una musica ad 8 chori dove cantarono le voci più scelte di Roma, ed oltre questi due chori d’istromenti distinti tra quali vi furono 4 trombe che suonavano d’accordo con l’organo, cosa rare volte udita. Due di queste trombe suonavano da quella fenestra che dall’habitazione dei Padri corrisponde in sala’ (ARSI Rom. 242 fol. 91).”

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 159; and *ibid.*, pp. 166–167, note 9, “*Heroicae juventutis pinacotheca ... modulis musicis celebrata dum Josephus Rubeus ... philosophicas theses defenderet in Colleg. Roman. Soc. Jesu.* (Rome, 1626), p. 3: ‘Ad arma, miles; dum tuba bellicos / Cantu minaci provocat impetus; /... Ad arma.’”

by the cardinal or prince who sponsored the student,²⁸ the act could unfold. (D) Based on Rice’s description, we can divide the rite of a public act into five steps: (1) a student’s entry into the room which was accompanied by a fanfare; (2) flowery praise of his sponsor; (3) performing a motet, the broadsheet is distributed among the public; (4) the very disputation follows, but changes between arguments and responses are punctuated by music; (5) the student again thanks his sponsor for attendance; (6) all leave the room, accompanied by music.²⁹

B. THOMAS BARLOW: A NON-JESUIT’S TESTIMONY OF JESUIT DISPUTATION PRACTICE SOLIDITY

§223. Thomas Barlow was a Keeper of the Bodleian Library in 1653 and Provost of Queen’s College, Oxford in 1657.³⁰ The general context of Barlow’s testimony is shaped by a not wholly unknown hypothesis that the new experimental physics the Jesuits promoted was a plot in fact directed against the ability of Protestants to practice theological disputations:³¹

§224. “When I was (though unworthy) Library-Keeper, and seeing the Jesuits and Popish Party cry up their New-Philosophy; I did (by friends) send to Paris, Venice, Florence, Rome, Alcala de Henares (Academia Complutensis in Spain &c.) to inquire, whether the

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ WALTON, I. The Life of Dr. Robert Sanderson [London, 1678]. In *The works of Robert Sanderson, D.D., sometime Bishop of Lincoln. Vol. VI.*, footnote, p. 331.

³¹ GORMAN, M. J., From ‘The Eyes of All’ to ‘Usefull Quarries in philosophy and good literature’: Consuming Jesuit Science, 1600–1665. In *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773*. p. 174; *Ibid*, note 17, p. 186, “Barlow to Sir J.B. (1674), in Michael R.G. Spiller, ‘Concerning Natural Experimental Philosophie’: Meric Causaubon and the Royal Society (The Hague, Boston, London, 1980), pp. 30–1.”

Jesuites, in their Colleges, train'd up their young men in the New-Philosophy; or whether (in all their Disputations) they kept them to strict form, and Aristotle's way of ratiocination? and the return I had from all places was; That none were more strict than they, in keeping all their young men, to the old principles and forms of Disputation. For they well know, that all their Schoolmen, Casuists and Controversy-Writers have so mix'd Aristotle's Philosophy, with their Divinity; that he who has not a comprehension of Aristotle's Principles, and the use of them, in all Scholastick Disputes, and Controversies of Religion, will never be able rationally to defend or confute any controverted position, in the Roman or Reformed Religion. Now, while they keep close to the old way of disputing, on the old received principles; if they can persuade us to spend our time about novel Whimsies and not well understood Experiments, and neglect the severer Studies of the old Philosophy and Scholastick Divinity; they will (in all Divinity Disputations) be every way too hard for us."³²

§225. The results of Barlow's extensive research (Paris, Venice, Florence, Rome and Alcalá) were clear. (a) In the middle of the seventeenth century, Jesuits were entirely strict in keeping their students to the 'old forms of disputation' as Barlow stresses it twice. (b) In these, none could take part successfully unless he had comprehended and was skilled in using of Aristotle's principles. (c) Theological disputations between Barlow's side and Jesuits are taken into account at least for the future. Moreover, according to the way of this description (see the remark 'in all their Disputations' in parenthesis above), (d) the number of disputation specific practices the Jesuits fostered was probably well known.

§226. Thomas Barlow himself may be of particular interest too, because he was closely linked to Robert Sanderson §43³⁴, whose great descriptions of disputation methods we have unfolded in

³² *Ibid.*

the first part of our thesis §114⁸⁰. Barlow took an office at Oxford, as Sanderson did and he became Bishop of Lincoln (from 1675 to 1691) as Sanderson did a few years ago and he was buried on the north side of the chancel of the Church at Buckden, near the grave of Sanderson.³³ They were friends as witnesses a Sanderson letter to him.³⁴ If Thomas Barlow, the Oxford officer, Bishop and friend of Robert Sanderson, has had such exceptional concern with Jesuit disputation practice, a future research in this direction might throw more light upon the relations between the Jesuit and the Oxford method of disputing.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.* APPENDIX, LETTERS, No. XIII., p. 389, “Your loving friend and Servant, Ro. SANDERSON. Botheby Paynell. 17. September 1657. *To his worthy friend Mr. Thomas Barlow, at Queenes College in Oxon.*”

Conclusion

§227. In the present dissertation ‘Method and Practice of Disputation in the 16th and 17th Century - The Jesuit Tradition,’ I exclusively dealt with the ‘viva voce’ or the *oral* disputations. While not aiming at the epistemic or social value of the Jesuit academic disputations, main objective of the thesis was to contribute to a more inner understanding of this phenomenon. Two levels generally constitute its nature and the structure of my dissertation corresponds to them. Whereas *Part One* dealt with the ‘Method of Jesuit Disputations,’ *Part Two* treats the ‘Practice of Jesuit Disputations.’ I proposed a sort of ‘disputation phenomena ontology’ in the *Introduction* as well, where each of these levels of ‘method’ and ‘practice’ obtains a precise notion by their definitions. At the first level, the *method* of disputation definition

is built upon the definition of the *paradigmatic method*. The latter signifies a primary procedural pattern or trait of each of the major historical methods of disputation. At the second level, the *disputation practice* and *practices* definitions are built upon the first level. The *paradigmatic* and *specific persons* definitions are proposed as well. In what follows, let me summarize the most important findings of both *Parts*.

§228. In *Part one*, which concerns the Jesuit disputation method, after an outline of the *Modern method* and the state of research in *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method were presented, the key primary sources were surveyed first. These were those by Francisco Toledo, Pedro da Fonseca, Francisco Alfonso, Jean Garnier, Henri Marcellius, Jacques Chanevelle, Francisco Freytag, and Mathias Heimbach. Although the last two are outside the researched period if taken in the narrower sense (both works appeared in 1706), due to the incentive insights, I still referred to them now and then. I found that the longer a work is, does not necessarily mean the more useful it is. It is because its very aim. For example, the longest Marcellius' treatise *Ars disputandi* is meant for a student of philosophy as a help to obtain and to have ready at hand rather advanced *strategies* that are suited for a particular event and is not an account of basic disputing rules; cf. [T1]§38³¹.

§229. As far as the Jesuit method itself in the logical treatises is concerned, in accordance with the *disputation method* definition, the very beginning of Jesuit method is located at the opponent's first syllogism propounding in Chanevelle; [T2]§52³⁹. Further, the opponent's activities of choice of thesis and discovery of an argument are not included in the very disputation event, but they should be done as a preparation in advance; [T3]§52³⁹. In the Marcellius' treatise, the thesis determination and the determination of direct or indirect disputing mode as well as the discovery

of arguments are activities belonging to a preparation phase; [T4]§56⁴¹. As the main result of the second chapter, I show that four authors suggest or literally claim that distinction should not be used right at the beginning (*initio*) or, not under certain conditions; [T5]§69⁴⁹.

§230. In the third chapter, which concerned several themes of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method, it was first shown that of the nine surveyed Jesuit treatises, seven texts address the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method as the allowed or used one; [T6]§78⁵⁶. Concerning the general conditions this method should be applied upon two authors claims that In general, the proper domain of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method is a *materia probabilis*, where respondent is not wholly forced to either part of an issue; [T7]§80⁵⁷. Further, Tanner allows the use of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method on the condition that the parties reach such an agreement. Then, it may even predominate the *Objection-solving* one; [T8]§81⁵⁹. Interestingly, in Marcellius, the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method is excluded from the *direct*, i.e. the demonstrative syllogism mode, but is associated with the *indirect*, where a respondent is brought to something inconvenient; [T9]§86⁶². For this reason, the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method can be applied in case the respondent is powerful or the issue is difficult to attack; [T10]§86⁶².

§231. Then I ask, what is the proper disputation phase in which the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method should be used? To sum up, chiefly Fonseca, but also Marcellius and, to a certain degree, Heimbach witness that the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method can be used independently on the ‘course of argumentation’ phase; [T11]§88⁶². On the other hand, explicitly Chanevelle, but indirectly also Garnier and Alfonso testify, that the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method should be applied within the course of argumentations; [T12]§88⁶². But it ap-

appears clear from that sort of research that Jesuit authors who prescribe or allow use of the *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method still understand the paradigmatic method of *Objection-solving* as an essential disputation frame; [T13]§88⁶³.

§232. Finally, I dealt with the most inner manner of questioning, where two important theses appeared. First, according to a rare evidence in Chanevelle, the very interrogation by the opponent should take place in two steps. First, the opponent is to ask *dichotomic* questions. Next, if the respondent denies these, the opponent is allowed to proceed into the *non-dichotomic* questioning; [T14]§93⁶⁷. Second, Chanevelle, Garnier, and above all Fonseca reflect the art of ‘required propositions concealing,’ which art is nevertheless directed to the truth; [T15]§93⁶⁷.

§233. In *Part Two*, inscribed ‘Practice of Jesuit Disputations,’ I divided the entire subject matter into three chapters. In the opening chapter, I claim that within the English speaking scholarly tradition until 2005 that it is appropriate to assess the state of research in Jesuit disputation practice as strikingly unsatisfactory; [T16]§138⁹³. Then it is stressed that as far as this present dissertation is concerned, the main contribution as to the specific disputation practices research does not consist in an interpretation of relevant 1599 *Ratio* rules. More precisely, it consists in the finding of intersections between those ideas easily understandable in the 1586 proposal and their binding relicts in the 1599 *Ratio studiorum* as well as in the finding of a system as presupposed by Jesuits in the latter; [T17]§146⁹⁸.

§234. It is further argued that in the first two months of a Logic course, when a *summa* of logic was to be exposed according to 1599 *Ratio studiorum*, the *Summa* or *Summula*, signifying a particular work by Fonseca or Toledo, was to be explained as an Introduction to logic; [T18]§151¹⁰². And, most importantly, it was for the first time the higher faculties students were gradually in-

structed on how to dispute during the opening two months of the Logic course; [T19]§152¹⁰³. Moreover, the 1599 *Ratio* constitutes a kind of schedule for disputing training in the time of a *summa* exposition. The same brings an authority to those passages in Toledo and Fonseca, which deal with disputation method; [T20]§152¹⁰³.

§235. The main, second chapter ‘Practice of the Higher Faculties Disputations’ revealed the substance of *disputation practice* within the Jesuit University higher faculties. Within a certain degree of discrepancy with the *Ratio Studiorum*, the Jesuit *Constitutions* prescribes a practice of ‘daily repetitions’ and ‘daily disputations.’ As to the relation between the latter, it looks like students had selected the most difficult matter by discussion within the daily repetition first and then this was a subject of the daily disputation; [T21]§167¹¹³. According to the *Ratio* of 1599, besides the ‘repetitions in the classroom,’ also the ‘repetitions at home’ take place in the student’s own college on an every day basis. A simple disputation became a constituent part of the latter in substitution for the anterior practice of ‘daily disputations’ as originally prescribed by *Constitutions*; [T22]§171¹¹⁵.

§236. As the *Ratio* prescribes further, with the weekly frequency, so called ‘weekly disputations’ were held in the classroom of each teacher on Saturday generally; [T23]§172¹¹⁶. But the common monthly disputations also took place. Along with other features, the common disputations (*disputationes communes*) differed most greatly from those held weekly in the respect that all teachers of the three philosophical subjects met and disputed together in a classroom, rather than each in his own. Also, all teachers of scholastic theology (usually two or three) met in a similar manner in another room; [T24]§174¹¹⁷.

§237. In the description of common monthly disputations, the utility of the *specific persons* notion was apparent. The specific

person of moderator was applied in monthly disputations, which was, however, distinct from the specific person of the respondent's guardian or praeses; [T25]§176¹¹⁸. I could further stress that the position of an opponent arguing first was in a sense the most privileged or important; [T26]§177¹¹⁹. With regard to the advancement of students, the morning session was intentionally 'asymmetric'. The opponent was always a more advanced student here than the respondent; [T27]§178¹²⁰. But the afternoon session was 'symmetric' in this sense; [T28]§179¹²⁰.

§238. Yet there are another practices beyond that. According to *Ratio* of 1599, before the end of the three-year philosophical training, disputations on entire philosophic matter (*acts*) must be held; [T29]§181¹²². I claim that the philosophical acts must have had some other aims than to serve as a final public, though still ceremonious, examination; [T30]§184¹²⁴. As the 1586 and 1591 *Ratios* witness, the nature of philosophical acts had been designed for three main objectives: (1) to make a great display of philosophical learning of a few excellently trained students; (2) to encourage much zeal for study on one hand and to make ashamed indolent students on the other; and finally, (3) to gain authority for the Jesuit schools; [T31]§188¹²⁵.

§239. In theology as well, the disputation practices of *acts* were held. It must be added as background that either a standard or a *biennium* scenario is presupposed for students finishing the four-year theology course. In both of them, 'particular' and 'general' acts were performed; [T32]§191¹²⁶. Whereas a selected student held but one of the four particular acts in the standard scenario, [T33]§193¹²⁸, all students held four particular and one general public act within the *biennium*; [T34]§195¹³¹.

§240. Although all the aforementioned seem to constitute the essence of Jesuit University practice of disputation, nevertheless, this list is not complete. I did not at all address (a) the practice of

so called ‘academies’. This may turn out to be of great significance for an understanding of the fact that the *Ratio studiorum* of 1599 entirely omits a practice of so called ‘Sunday’s disputation’ which, nevertheless, the *Constitutions* prescribe. A future examination of the so called (b) ‘general repetitions,’ of the (c) relation between public act and some other disputation practices on one hand, and graduation or final examination on the other is needed as well. (d) There are rich sources as to the rite of doctoral and others degrees conferring, which deserve further research.

§241. The third chapter, ‘A More Intimate Insight into the Practice of Jesuit Disputations,’ strove to provide the reader with a more nuanced picture. It portrayed a kind of struggled journey stemming from the 1586 *Ratio* authors’ proposals. As the old prestige of disputations declined in the late 16th century Jesuit schools, [T35]§198¹³³, to uplift the form and sheen of disputations, the 1586 *Ratio* authors appealed to both the superiors’ high thinking of and outward exemplar dealing with disputation practices; [T36]§202¹³⁵. In this line, the superiors could permit exceptional absence from the lectures more easily than from a disputation; [T37]§204¹³⁶.

§242. The most important finding illustrates that the *form* was a troublesome part of Jesuit disputation practice; [T39]§208¹³⁸. To face this problem, teachers themselves should hold that the weight of fruitful disputations consists in the form being observed by stiffness, [T40]§208¹³⁸, otherwise even the students ‘use to hate’ (*odisse solent*) the disputation as an idle business and nothing more than a confused shouting; [T41]§213¹⁴⁰. Furthermore, a proactive attitude of the teacher-praeses and gathering of visitors should avoid apathy and inflame students in the weekly theology disputations, [T42]§214¹⁴¹. But interestingly, the 1586 *Ratio* considers not only the listeners’ vices to be intervened

against during disputations, but also their actual psychological possibilities; [T38]§205¹³⁷.

§243. I finally attempt to show that the endeavor of the authors probably succeeded. It seems so in terms of pageantry, as public acts shone at Collegio Romano at least in the 17th century; [T43]§217¹⁴³. And there is a testimony from without as well that Jesuits were entirely strict in keeping their students to the ‘old forms of disputation’ and that the number of disputation specific practices Jesuits fostered was probably well known in the middle of the seventeenth century; [T44]§217¹⁴³.

Abbreviations

ARSI	Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu
ConstE	<i>The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus</i> , GANSS' translation into English
ConstL	<i>Capita selecta de studiis in Constitutionibus S. I.</i> , Textus latinus (1583), LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
ConstH94	<i>Capita selecta de studiis in Constitutionibus S. I.</i> , Textus hispanicus (1594), LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
ConstH48	<i>Capita selecta de studiis in Constitutionibus S. I.</i> , Textus hispanicus (1548-50), LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
dPag	Disputation page, i.e. a page containing matter as to the disputation in the length of 1000 characters, including spaces.
MP I-VII	<i>Monumenta paedagogica Societatis Iesu I-VII</i> , LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
PraxCollR	<i>Ordo et praxis studiorum superiorum in Collegio Romano</i> (1590), LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
R86A	<i>Ratio studiorum</i> of 1586 A, LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
R86B	<i>Ratio studiorum</i> of 1586 B, LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
R86P	<i>Ratio studiorum</i> of 1586, PACHTLER, G. M. (ed.)
RSI I-IV	<i>Ratio Studiorum et Institutiones Scholasticae Societatis Jesu I-IV</i> , PACHTLER, G. M. (ed.)
R91	<i>Ratio studiorum</i> of 1591, LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)
R99	<i>Ratio studiorum</i> of 1599, LUKÁCS, L. (ed.)

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Summary

§244. The dissertation ‘Method and Practice of Disputation in the 16th and 17th Century - The Jesuit Tradition’ deals with the ‘viva voce’ or the *oral* disputations. The main objective is to contribute to a more inner understanding of this phenomenon. Two levels generally constitute its nature and the structure of the thesis corresponds to them. The *Part One* deals with the ‘Method of Jesuit Disputations.’ Its sources are Jesuits Toledo, Fonseca, Alfonso, Garnier, Marcellius, Chanevelle, Freytag, and Heimbach, *Ratio Studiorum* and the non-Jesuit Sanderson. The Jesuit method is generally shaped along the line of the *Objection-solving* paradigmatic method. But its special feature consists in the imperative to postpone distinction and in the routine application of *Asking-answering* paradigmatic method. The *Part Two* treats the ‘Practice of Jesuit Disputations.’ It proposes a sort of ‘disputation phenomena ontology’ in the *Introduction*, where each of these levels of ‘method’ and ‘practice’ obtains a precise notion by their definitions.