Towards a Hayekian Theory of Integration: The Role of Referendums in the Evolution of the EuropeanEconomic Constitution

Jernej Kosec

Master's thesis

Anotácia:

Scholars in the spontaneous-order tradition of F.A. Hayek frequently ignore the implications of his ideas for the evolutionary analysis of international institutions. Worse yet, the apparatus imported from classically liberal political philosophy is, at times, used to make the case for legal positivism and unhampered political sovereignty when debating international governance such as the European Union. But reaffirming that regional integration is both a matter of international governmental organization and ordered social process on a sub-continental scale opens the possibility for a Hayekian study of Europe as a transnational legal, political, and economic order that has both evolved spontaneously and was created through repeatedly frustrated attempts at institutional design. The profitable question to ask is how the latter has also been subject to the discovery process of political competition, involving opinion-formation and consistently undergoing trial and error. As a case study, I focus on integration referendums – referendums with international-constitutional implications – and identify them as policy tools to alleviate the Hayekian knowledge problem of political centralization by revealing the preferences of local (national) electorates for the scope and geopolitical direction of European integration, and in turn, contributing decisively to the present configuration of transnational economic regimes in Europe. Thus, one of the main contributions this thesis aims to make is to formulate an epistemological answer to the challenge posed by flexible integration and differentiation.

Abstract:

Scholars in the spontaneous-order tradition of F.A. Hayek frequently ignore the implications of his ideas for the evolutionary analysis of international institutions. Worse yet, the apparatus imported from classically liberal political philosophy is, at times, used to make the case for legal positivism and unhampered political sovereignty when debating international governance such as the European Union. But reaffirming that regional integration is both a matter of international governmental organization and ordered social process on a sub-continental scale opens the possibility for a Hayekian study of Europe as a transnational legal, political, and economic order that has both evolved spontaneously and was created through repeatedly frustrated attempts at institutional design. The profitable question to ask is how the latter has also been subject to the discovery process of political competition, involving opinion-formation and consistently undergoing trial and error. As a case study, I focus on integration referendums – referendums with international-constitutional implications – and identify them as policy tools to alleviate the Hayekian knowledge problem of political centralization by revealing the preferences of local (national) electorates for the scope and geopolitical direction of European integration, and in turn, contributing decisively to the present configuration of transnational economic regimes in Europe. Thus, one of the main contributions this thesis aims to make is to formulate an epistemological answer to the challenge posed by flexible integration and differentiation.

Keywords

The, Role, of, Referendums, in, Evolution, European Economic, Constitution

Jazyk práce: English

Datum vytvoření / odevzdání či podání práce: 10. 9. 2021

Obhajoba závěrečné práce

• Obhajoba proběhla 23. 9. 2021
• Vedúci: Prof. Dr. Michael Wohlgemuth
• Oponent: Prof. Dr. rer. pol. Stefan Kolev

CEVRO Institute

Master programme / odbor:
Philosophy, Politics, Economics / PPE lifelong learning program