Soudní aplikace soutěžní doktríny stlačování marží

Mgr. Jan Šamánek

Advanced ('rigorózní') thesis

Margin Squeeze:Judicial Applications of a Competition Doctrine

Anotácia:

Rigorózní práce "Soudní aplikace soutěžní doktríny stlačování marží" nejprve obecně popisuje doktrínu stlačování marží a podmínky jejího použití (kapitola 1). Dále se věnuje soudní aplikaci této doktríny v případu Deutsche Telekom, a to ve všech fázích řízení (kapitola 2). Poté se zaměřuje na problematické aspekty případu Deutsche Telekom, zvláště na zvolený test stlačování marží (kapitola 3). Evropský přístup v otázce stlačování marží se výrazně liší od přístupu ve Spojených státech, kde Nejvyšší soud v roce 2009 v případu linkLine stlačení marží odmítl uznat jako samostatnou skutkovou podstatu (kapitola 4). Konečně, Soudním dvorem EU je nyní projednáván další případ stlačování marží, C 52/09 TeliaSonera, který představuje příležitost upřesnit novou soutěžní doktrínu a objasnit, zda se evropský a americký přístup skutečně liší tak dramaticky (kapitola 5).

Abstract:

The thesis "Margin Squeeze: Judicial Applications of a Competition Doctrine" analyses the judicial application of the margin squeeze doctrine, in particular by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Margin squeeze is a competition doctrine which concerns a form of abuse of the dominant position, prohibited by Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). According to that doctrine, a margin squeeze arises if a vertically integrated dominant undertaking active on both an upstream market and a downstream market charges such prices that the difference between the retail prices it charges customers and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors is negative or insufficient to cover the product-specific costs to the dominant undertaking. The doctrine most typically applies in a situation of liberalized services, for example in telecommunications. In October 2010, the very first margin squeeze case was decided by the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. It was the case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom. Essentially, the Court of Justice endorsed the doctrine and confirmed the methodology applied by the European Commission in establishing that form of abuse. This thesis starts by outlining in general terms the conditions of a margin squeese abuse (chapter 1), both in economic and legal terms. Then, the decision Deutsche Telekom is described in detail (chapter 2). There were in fact three proceedings, the administrative one before the European Commission, then the appeal proceedings at the General Court of the EU (formerly the Court of First Instance), and finally, the appeal in front of the Court of Justice. The main arguments of the parties and the responses by the General Court and Court of Justice respectively are outlined. This descriptive chapter is followed by an analytical chapter (chapter 3). The test used by the Commission and confirmed by the Court is critically examined. In particular, two problematic aspects are exposed. First, we consider the choice of the As-Efficient-Competitor Test, as opposed to the Equally-Efficient-Competitor Test. In essence, the choice of test determines what costs should be taken into account when calculating a margin squeeze, i.e. whether the costs of the dominant undertaking or of its competitors. Second, the choice of the level of aggregation of costs is discussed. That choice determines what costs (or costs for what services) should be taken into account when calculating a margin squeeze, in fact, whether certain products can be excluded from the calculation. Underlying policy considerations and implications are described. The next chapter is comparative (chapter 4). It examines the application of the margin squeeze doctrine in the United States, particularly in the Supreme Court case linkLine. The linkLine case of 2009 is of particular interest, when juxtaposed with the Deutsche Telekom decision. linkLine was the very first case regarding margin squeeze ever decided by the US Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, unlike the European Court of Justice, emphatically rejected margin squeeze as a competition doctrine. Again, the underlying policy is exposed and the US approach is compared to the European approach. Finally, a new case currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union is considered, namely C-52/09 TeliaSonera (chapter 5). TeliaSonera is extremely relevant because unlike Deutsche Telekom, which was an appeal against Commission decision, TeliaSonera regards a preliminary reference according to Article 267 TFEU. That gives the Court a bigger scope to outline the contours and the limits of the yet unsettled doctrine. In fact, what may seem as a contradiction between the european and american approach, given the opposing outcomes of Deutsche Telekom and linkLine, may become much less of a contradiction in the light of TeliaSonera. However, the case has not been decided by the Court of Justice yet, hence the only indications so far are t

Abstract:

hose provided by the Opinion of the Advocate General Ján Mazák. These are described and commented on. Conclusions follow (Chapter 6).

Kľúčové slová

stlačování marží, margin squeeze, soutěžní právo, zneužití dominantního postavení

Jazyk práce: Czech

Datum vytvoření / odevzdání či podání práce: 20. 9. 2011

Obhajoba závěrečné práce

• Obhajoba proběhla 20. 9. 2011
• Oponent: JUDr. David Raus, Ph.D., doc. JUDr. Ing. Josef Šilhán, Ph.D.

Masaryk University

Faculty of Law

Advanced ('rigorózní řízení') programme / odbor:
Law and Legal Science / Law